Barrage Map at Precisely 5:30 A.M

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BARRAGE MAP 19920085-915 At precisely 5:30 a.m. on Monday M April 9, 1917, 850 Canadian guns and 280 from the British 1st Army, began firing, signalling the start of the Battle rchival Collection CW rchival Collection of Vimy Ridge. A etcalf M eorge The artillery fired on the first German G trenches. And then every three minutes moved the barrage 90 metres further 19930013-468 | into German held land. This tactic is M called the creeping barrage and allowed Canadian troops to advance behind the protective curtain of the big guns. rchival Collection CW rchival Collection A etcalf At the beginning of First World War M eorge the basic tactic of trench warfare G was to fire lots of artillery at enemy trenches for a continuous period Many coordinated artillery pieces of time and to stop firing just were required to create the creep- before the infantry attacked. This ing barrage. Critically, the curtain method proved largely unsuccessful of artillery fire had to be lifted and because the Germans had built moved forward every few min- strong, deep bunkers and were utes in order to stay ahead of the able to reach their defenses in the advancing troops. Soldiers’ lives time between the bombardment depending on the accuracy of the ending and the infantry reaching maps and the coordination of the the frontlines. guns, so this tactic required the As the war progressed, the creeping ultimate in coordination and it was The creeping barrage method barrage became more effective. It was only made possible through de- became a solution to this problem. used successfully by the Canadians at tailed barrage maps. Instead of just aiming at the same Vimy Ridge, where the men had been target, the creeping barrage moved extensively trained to move forward forward at a prearranged pace. This 90 metres every three minutes, keep- meant that a bombardment could ing the infantry behind the advancing start in No Man’s Land as infantry artillery barrage. This technique was left the trenches and moved forward, made possible by detailed maps just in front of attacking troops. called barrage maps. A barrage. At first guns were trained on enemy front lines. The gun barrels were gradually lifted higher and higher so the shells would land on support and then on reserve trenches. Later a ‘creeping’ barrage was invented. This moved forward on a timed basis ahead of the soldiers. Barrage 1st lift 2nd lift 3rd lift 4th lift 5th lift eographic G Gun Infantry soldier 1st enemy Support Reserve lissa Dicaire/Canadian lissa Dicaire/Canadian trench trench trench A Front line hoto: P WAR AND MAPS IN THE CLASSROOM FIRST WORLD WAR During the war, mapping the battle- Ask students to work in small groups VOCABULARY fields and strategic positions became or pairs to answer the following Artillery: Large-caliber guns used in an integral part of planning for any questions about the barrage map: warfare on land, also called ordnance successful offensive. Maps helped or heavy guns. soldiers familiarize themselves with What symbols are used on the enemy-held terrain, weapon positions map? What do these symbols Bombardment: A continuous attack represent? and other obstacles. Maps also be- with bombs, shells, or types of artillery. came essential for planning maneu- Identify the direction “North” on vers such as creeping barrages. the map. How do you know? Bunker: A fortified shelter, often buried partly or fully underground, Many different types of maps were Which colours are used on the map. How are they used? Why? designed to protect troops from created during the war: falling bombs or other attacks. How are numbers used on the 1. Situation maps showed front map? Why? Creeping barrage: A bombardment line trenches, shell holes Do any words stand out? What that slowly creeps toward the enemy and craters, networks of do these words tell you? lines to create cover for the soldiers ammunition dumps advancing behind. It became a key Why was this map created? and railway lines. strategy in the First World War. How do you know? Who was it created for? 2. Positions maps showed all Field Artillery: Light, moveable guns enemy battery positions What do you know about the map (cannons, howitzers), as opposed to located by aerial photography. maker from clues on the map? the immoveable fixed or heavy guns, What do you know about this used by armies in the field especially 3. Barrage maps (1:10,000) were time in history by looking at for direct support of front-line troops. developed after the Battle of the the map? Somme, covering 10 to 15 miles Infantry: Soldiers on foot. of the Western Front and were What does the map tell used at Vimy Ridge. Barrage about places? No Man’s Land: The unoccupied maps were used to choreograph What does the map tell area between the trenches of the moving curtain of artillery fire about people? opposing armies. behind troops as they advanced. Compare this map to the Vimy From his aircraft high above Trench: Long, narrow ditch dug by No Man’s Land, Canadian Air Ridge floor map. In what ways are they the same? In what ways troops during wartime to hide from Ace Billy Bishop described it as enemies. ‘clockwork warfare’. are they different?.
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