Conduct of the Second Day; Water/Climate Security Tabletop Exercise

I. Exercise introduction

There are four parts to the exercise, the first an hour and a half, the second an hour and a quarter, the third and fourth (after lunch) both one hour in length. The overall subject is national environmental risk management using water security planning as an example through a facilitated roundtable discussion among assembled experts and agency representatives. The emphasis is on decreasing vulnerability through better adaptation to the realities of the threat. The ultimate objective is to help local and national agencies take more effective actions, improve their distribution of labor, eliminate duplication, and cooperate more fully, both in preparing for national disaster and in responding once a crisis occurs.

In this exercise we are focused on the front end of the process, that is preparation, early warning, and first response to (in this case) widespread and serious flooding. The CMDR Center of Excellence is concerned with exploring/understanding the chain of command, who exactly is in charge among the various agencies with roles and responsibilities in CM/DR, to include issues of cross-border and international cooperation. Our purpose in this exercise is not to teach disaster response per se, but to help critical agencies improve their communications, C2, interoperability, cooperation, and coordination for disaster preparedness and relief.

At some point during the introduction if it has not already been done we want to review the players and understand just who is in attendance. This will likely be done on the first day during introductions and in the presentations. We can talk about seating and if we want to make name/agency place cards so everyone around the table knows who represents which agency. This should include both Bulgarian national agencies and representatives from the UN and NATO and if present the EU/EC. Attendees from other countries can be observers except that if there are representatives from the government of or we might want to have them at the table since the scenario depicts cross-border flooding from into these countries.

We begin the introduction with a discussion of ‘first principles’ just so we all understand what our objectives are and where we are operating in the disaster response spectrum. We need to understand the threat; just what it is we are dealing with, in this case severe and destructive flooding resulting from overflowing rivers.

Next, we need to understand the system in place to deal with the threat. This includes the agencies with roles in preparation for and response to disasters, including agencies at the national and international level, and at regional, and local levels. This includes understanding how the various agencies are related, the difference between C2 and coordination, who is supported and who is supporting. It also includes the assets, knowing what everyone brings to the table in terms of both preparation and response. It is important that cooperation extend to all governmental levels including agriculture, transportation, and urban development. We want to look at Bulgaria from a standpoint of its national crisis management system, meaning how consolidated and

1 coordinated is it? Are existing subsystems simply allocated to different ministries giving them an ad hoc approach by definition; and most important, how harmonized is the engagement of civil- military capabilities?

We need to understand where we are at any given time on the continuum. Government agencies have very different tasks, responsibilities, roles and missions to “the left or right of the boom” to take a phrase from JIEDDO. Each agency needs to understand just what it is responsible for at a given point on the continuum, where it fits in the scheme, who the agency responds to, what it owes and what it can count on being provided.

Well to the left in this case is recognizing the extent of the threat, where are flood plains historically located, which rivers are most likely to overflow, when in the year does this normally happen. Then move to what can be done to lessen the severity of the threat, including measures that can be taken ahead of time, now. We need to understand that disaster risk for any particular community or population is the nexus of the hazard itself, cyclones, storms, excessive rainfall, etc., and the particular vulnerability of a community. Vulnerability can change because of changes in the hazard – climate change, rising sea levels, precipitation pattern changes – and changes in the community such as urbanization altering drainage patterns, poverty, population growth, deforestation and so forth. Logic tells you many things could be done well in advance of an occurrence. Building reinforced houses or houses on stilts in flood plains, planting trees with good root structure in landslide areas, building water catchment and detention systems, protecting wetlands, strengthening and raising retaining walls and dikes, designing excess capacity into reservoirs, and so forth.

It is important for agencies to understand that measures such as these, and others, should cover an entire river basin, which of course requires coordination among levels of government, sometimes at a multinational level, and some form of central management. Defense measures must be comprehensive to an entire catchment area, regardless of borders. When we think of cross-border threats we should think of strategies in three stages – first retain excess water locally where possible, then make provisions to store it, and only lastly discharge excess into the watercourse. Clearly this is not always the norm. It is important to understand that flood events are part of nature and in some form will always exist. Our objective should be minimizing the risk, managing the consequences, and ameliorating the severity. We need to keep in mind that structural measures (walls, barricades) are never absolute and when breached can intensify the consequences.

In terms of how the day might go, if the introduction and the description of the scenario take the first period, we would see the second hour covering preparation measures and warning, the third covering Bulgarian national responses, and the fourth bringing in international cooperation and supranational organizations such as the UN, the EU/EC, and NATO. This will include cross- border issues and measures to be taken when a disaster spreads from one country into another.

2 Next we move to a description of the scenario that we will use to guide the inter-agency discussion. This can be done as part of the first part, or at the outset of the second segment.

For our scenario we will use primarily the Marista and the river basins, as well as the to a lesser extent. The is the longest river basin in Bulgaria at 480 Km and with a flood plain of more than 34,000 square km. Together with the Tundezha river to the north and east these two rivers flow through Bulgaria’s East Aegean River Basin District. There are actually four distinct river basin districts in Bulgaria. To the west of the East Aegean is the West Aegean Region Basin District comprising the flood plains of the Sturm and Mesta rivers primarily, both of which flow south into Greece. The Danube River Basin District comprises most of the northern half of Bulgaria which drains into the long Danube running west to east along the border with Romania. On the coast on the east side of the country is the Basin. There are climatic and geographical characteristics of the two river basins in the East Aegean district, the Maritsa and the Tundzha, which can lead to excessive runoff conditions leading to flood conditions downstream. These characteristics include frequent flash floods, significant variability of precipitation year-to-year, and heavy soil erosion which reduces the reservoirs' capacities through sedimentation. In the spring melting snow and torrential rainfall cause these rivers to rise beyond the protective barriers designed to contain the overflow. Floods in all of these three river sub-basins inside Bulgaria can cause severe flooding in neighboring Turkey, and Greece. Among the most disastrous were the cyclone-fed floods in 2005 which were severe enough to be characterized hundred year floods if not worse. Flooding in these basins was also severe in 2006, and November 2007.

The destructive forces of rainstorms, severe thunderstorms, intensive snowmelt, floods and droughts, appear to have increased in this region of central Europe during recent years. Another important factor is that in the final decades of the last century the region saw only minor flood activity which led to less investment for barriers, dikes, and other flood mitigation measures, increasing the threats today as the climate pattern changes.

There is no question but that the severity and frequency of natural disasters globally has risen steadily over the past decades. This is partly due to climate change, but also to demographic changes, and the harmful effects on the environment of increasing populations. An analysis of national risk assessment studies showed floods to be the most common risk addressed by member countries. Floods in Europe occur as a result of a wide range of meteorological conditions such as storms with heavy and prolonged precipitation, as well as rapid and widespread melting of snow. In the run-up to a flood disaster situation there is generally some form of severe weather, including heavy rainfall, winds and hail in the water shed regions of affected rivers. A first order result of these storms is often localized flash flooding and smaller stream overflows. Measures of rainfall in the 70 mm and over of rainfall in a 24 hour period are sufficient to raise water levels to the danger point in most streams and

3 rivers. In 2013 in central Europe there were what was once classified as hundred-year floods for the second time in only 13 years.

There are other underlying factors which have increased the potential for catastrophic floods in Europe generally, such as river and stream levels which remain high following previous wet seasons, absence of sufficient river bank fortification, excessive deforestation, and over-full reservoirs. As suggested, climate change projections in central Europe, including Bulgaria, suggest heavier precipitation than normal with resulting extreme stream flows in coming years. This is, in fact, a mixed phenomenon with some regions reporting a decrease in precipitation. The general effect of climate change, however, on flood frequency judging from global and regional climate modelling indicates that some parts of central Europe in particular will experience more frequent and more severe floods in the future. These risks are made worse by human-imposed alterations in the hydrological regime, including land use changes, urbanization, and wetland draining.

The Maritsa river rises out of the mountains south of Sophia and flows generally east across much of Bulgaria. Along the course of the Maritsa river are approximately 700 reservoirs and 15 high dams. Most of the hydroelectric power production is located in the upper part of the Maritsa basin and many of the dams farther downstream are small and used for irrigation and fish breeding. As the river runs east through central Bulgaria for a short way it forms the boundary between and Pazardzik provinces. As such it flows directly between the towns of Hadzhievo in Pazardzik and Trivoditsi in Plovdiv. East of that point the river flows across a wide, flat plain and thence through the center of the city of Plovdiv. There are dikes on the plain, but they tend not to be well maintained and most of the infrastructure is antiquated. During the catastrophic 2005 floods failure of these dikes allowed wide flood plain dispersion which may have saved the major city of Plovdiv from destructive flooding had the city dikes been broached.

In the Maritsa flows largely thorough provice, turning south at and flowing by the towns of and Lyubimets, and then through the center of the larger city of . In both Plovdiv and Svilengrad thousands of people live in flood prone areas behind dikes. After it leaves Svilengrad the Maritsa forms the boundary between Bulgaria and Greece for almost 90 km before leaving Bulgaria altogether and flowing south between Turkey and Greece. The river flows south and east through rich flat farmland and merges with the Tundzha at (Odrin). South of that confluence the river again forms the boundary between Turkey and Greece as it flows south to the . In Greece the Maritsa is the and as the frontier between Greece and Turkey it has long been a disputed border between Asia and Europe, fortified in some places and almost a no-man’s land. This obviously interferes with cooperative flood warning and control.

The Tundzha is another long river, extending 350 Km within Bulgaria and eventually flowing into the Maritsa on Turkish territory. The flood plain of the Tundzha is almost 8,000 square km.

4 It rises on the southern slopes of the Stara Planina in Plovdiv province and flows south, then east through the Kazanluk Basin and across the Thracian Plain. Just above the city of the Tundzha turns south and goes through the middle of Yambol. It then flows just west of the towns of Hanovo, Tenevo, and , all of which are population centers vulnerable to flooding when the Tundzha overflows. South of Elhovo the Tundzha forms the border between Jambol and Haskovo provinces. There is the smaller village of Srem between Elhovo and the border with Turkey which is also subject to flooding. In the mountains south of Srem the river forms the boundary between Bulgaria and Turkey until it leaves Bulgaria altogether and flows south toward the Turkish town of Edirne. There are several small towns and villages along the banks of the Tundzha in Turkey before the river flows into the Maritsa at Edirne.

The third river in our scenario is the Arda river farther south and west in Bulgaria. The Arda flows generally easterly and enters Greece just above Ivailovgrad, Bulgaria. The Greek town of lies along the Arda and is subject to flooding when the water level is excessively high in Bulgaria. Smaller towns east of Komara such as Elaia, , and are similarly at risk. The level of the Arda as it flows into Greece is largely controlled by the dam at the reservoir which lies just to the northwest in the mountainous terrain of southern Bulgaria. The Ivaylovgrad reservoir has a storage reservoir volume of 150 million cubic meters with only six million cubic meters of free volume. In March of 2015 over one particular three-day period the aggregate inflow to the Ivaylovgrad reservoir was close to 50 million cubic meters.

In Bulgaria water levels in reservoirs are maintained by the hydro-electric power plants which, it has been suggested, keep water levels at artificial highs for better power generation. As potential flood conditions approach the power plant authorities are requested to release additional volumes of water into the river to avoid uncontrolled overflowing of the reservoir dams. After the Arda leaves Bulgaria it flows east in Greece to join the Maritsa just west of Edirne where the Tundzha comes down from the north. There are several small towns situated along the Arda in Greece between Bulgaria and where the Arda spills into the larger Marista. These include Komara, Elaia, Keramos, and , all of which are subject to flooding.

The scenario proposes a period of intense spring storms with heavy precipitation, high cyclonic winds and hail. The storms and increased rainfall have been concentrated in the south of Bulgaria in the East Aegean Region Basin District especially in Yambol, Plovdiv, Stara Zagora, and Haskovo provinces. In these provinces code orange has been set for dangerous meteorological phenomena for strong winds and significant amounts of rain. The level of the Maritsa river at Harmanli continues to rise and has reached the yellow threshold. In the past 24 hours the Marista level has risen above the yellow threshold as well at Svilengrad. The Tundzha is also rising as shown by readings near Elhovo where the river has risen into the yellow condition.

Added to the danger is the excessive snow melt in the mountains after a particularly wet winter. The heavy rain is falling on already saturated terrain. There are already power outages in over 100 settlements due to fallen trees from the high winds and the soaked topsoil. There are also

5 reports of road closures in some mountainous areas due to landslides. There have been reports of flash flooding in some mountain areas. Rainfall has also been heavy the mountains of Kardzali province where the Arda river rises and feeds the series of major reservoirs on the way to the Greek border.

In particular the Ivaylovgrad reservoir is reporting a greatly increased inflow from the upriver Studen Kladenets reservoir as some 200 cubic meters of water per second was drained from that reservoir. Authorities at Ivaylovgrad report that if this level continues unabated the dam will be overwhelmed within one to two days. The Maritsa river is rising dangerously in the vicinity of Pazardjik, and to the northeast the reservoir at Zhrebchevo is already over its normal limit and rising. The Marista and its tributaries continue as well to increase their levels along the downstream stretches. The Kirilovo dam above the town of Elhovo is near its maximum capacity and overflow would drain directly into the Tundzha river already at its highest level in several years.

There can be more detail in this description of the growing threat, but the point is to pose a scenario where conditions are building for serious floods along the trace of these three important rivers, all of which pose coordination challenges within Bulgaria and cross-border issues with Bulgarian neighbors Turkey and Greece. As we move through the sessions we will intensify this crisis for certain areas to help with the discussion.

The second morning session will include a discussion of flood warning. If we have not introduced the scenario yet, we will do so at this time. We want to understand the mechanisms for providing warning of impending flood conditions, what agencies are responsible for warning and how they monitor rivers and reservoirs to understand the level of threat at any particular time. For Bulgaria the National Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology has a primary role in warning mechanics. This should include warnings provided by agencies outside Bulgaria such as the EU/EC and the United Nations. As an example the European Flood Awareness System (EFAS), has been up and running since 2012 and apparently provides warnings across all of Europe. It will be important to discuss how valid and accurate current day warning models are, how warnings are transmitted to the people who need to hear them, and just what various agencies do with the information. As an example, is there some point in the warning sequence when evacuation is ordered for certain populations, and who makes that decision, and how is it carried out? During this session if people want to say anything about preparation in terms of taking measures on the ground to ameliorate the effects of severe flooding this is a time to have such a discussion.

The third session following lunch will continue the scenario to presume that flood crises exist in certain regions and municipalities in the three selected river basins.

It is here that we hope to have a general discussion by all parties in attendance as to how the Integrated Rescue System actually works for disaster response in Bulgaria. We would look

6 forward to an explanation from the Ministry of the Interior as to the roles and missions of the Civil Protection Directorate, what is the role of the Council of Ministers, the Consultative Council, and so forth. We would need to hear from the representative from the Ministry of the Environment and Waters and understand how that ministry works with the MOI in disaster response. Hopefully there will be someone there who can discuss the role of the military in providing medical support through the Military Medical Academy. We also want to hear from the private sector, such as the Bulgarian Red Cross, and understand where they fit into the response and relief picture and also how they fit into the C2 structure. If there are people from the EU/EC we can hear how the Emergency Response Coordination Center (ERCC) operates within the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO). If there is a knowledgeable person in attendance it would be useful to hear about recent changes and improvements in the field of the law and regulations including the importance of the National Law for Disaster Response, the Law on Disaster Protection, and the updated Water Law. Lastly, in this session we will want to discuss civil-military cooperation and how the military enters the picture and what kinds of disaster relief operations they are prepared to carry out.

The final session we will turn to cross-border issues and how response to flood disasters is coordinated between neighboring countries that share a common river basin.

In this section we will continue the scenario to describe severe flooding of the three rivers as they flow into Turkey and Greece in the vicinity of Edrine. We will be careful to generalize the discussion so people present from other countries such as possibly Serbia can enter the discussion and make a useful contribution. This is possibly an area of some contentions since there is currently a feeling among some people in Turkey (such as the Turkish Minister of Forestry and Water Affairs) who have suggested river flooding in Turkey to be more a function of Bulgarian reservoir regulation policies than overflowing rivers. We will look for input in this discussion from outside agencies such as the European Union and the United Nations who have roles in promoting agreements and cooperation among neighboring countries. In this section if there are other points of discussion that members of the seminar wish to bring up we can accommodate those inputs as well.

Big picture questions we hope to shed some light on through the day’s discussions:

 What should a holistic crisis management concept consist of? What institutions, structures and processes are needed to ensure effective coordination and cooperation in the case of crisis at national level?  Has there been established a single management process at a national level, of uniform methods of risk assessment in all directions based on future scenarios?  Are there any new and useful approaches to crisis preparation and crisis responses regarding inter-agency crisis management concepts?  Is there an effective early warning system, which should be compatible and functionally related to the warning systems mainly of the neighboring countries, EU and NATO?

7  Is there any need to establish international principles for country crisis management?  Are the sensors for collecting current meteorological information from different sources (automatic stations of the Air Force, NIMH, BAS, Chief Directorate for Fire Safety and Civil Protection, Aerospace Monitoring Centre and others) integrate into a common system?  Has a legal and regulatory basis been established for the organization and use of the capabilities of different volunteer units in support of the response and recovery of the consequences of disasters?  Do all of the members of the national system for crisis management act jointly in the entire management process of decision making? This is especially true in the area of interagency communication and exchange of critical information in the part relating to the participation of other ministries and agencies in this process.  Have uniform standard procedures, unified communications and information environment and uniform criteria for assessing the readiness of the authorities and the forces involved in the crisis management measures been adopted?  Does the national legal framework for disaster management outline a clear division of roles and responsibilities at the various levels of government?  Are there mechanisms in place to ensure intra-governmental co-operation during disasters and crises? Is there a clear governmental focal point for preparing and managing disasters and crises?  Are criteria and mechanisms in place for issuing early warnings of imminent disaster to the affected population?  Is there (or are there) functioning regional emergency operations center(s) to co-ordinate emergency relief with neighboring states?  Do these operations centers disseminate indications and warnings, do they communicate operational decisions, and do they contribute to maintaining a common operating picture?

Dr. Thomas Bowditch Strategic Studies CNA (703) 980-3327 (cell) (4340 978-1213 (home) [email protected]

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