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Airef) © Shutterstock OECD Review of the Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF) © Shutterstock REVIEW OF THE INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY FOR FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY (AIREF) 29 NOVEMBER 2017 by: Lisa von Trapp, Scherie Nicol, Peter Fontaine, Santiago Lago-Peñas, and Wim Suyker TABLE OF CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS AND ACROMYMS ........................................................................................................................ 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................... 5 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................................... 7 INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................... 10 CHAPTER 1. CONTEXT .......................................................................................................................................... 12 1.1. AIREF’S GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND STAKEHOLDER RELATIONS .......................................................... 13 1.2. MANDATE ............................................................................................................................................................ 14 1.3. GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE IFI COMMUNITY ..................................................................................................................... 15 1.4. CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................................... 19 CHAPTER 2. INPUTS ............................................................................................................................................. 20 2.1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................... 20 2.2. FUNDING ............................................................................................................................................................. 20 2.2.1. AIReF budget approval process ................................................................................................................. 21 2.2.2. AIReF revenues and expenditure ............................................................................................................... 23 2.3. HUMAN RESOURCES ............................................................................................................................................... 25 2.3.1. Senior leadership ....................................................................................................................................... 27 2.3.2. AIReF Advisory Board ................................................................................................................................ 28 2.4. ACCESS TO INFORMATION ....................................................................................................................................... 29 2.4.1. Legislative underpinnings .......................................................................................................................... 29 2.4.2. Access to information in practice .............................................................................................................. 30 2.4.3. Changes on the horizon ............................................................................................................................. 34 2.5. INDEPENDENCE ..................................................................................................................................................... 36 2.6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................... 36 CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY AND OUTPUTS ........................................................................................................ 38 3.1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................... 38 3.2. TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF AIREF METHODOLOGIES ................................................................................................... 39 3.2.1. Results of the technical assessment .......................................................................................................... 40 3.3. KEY ISSUES FOR AIREF REPORTS ............................................................................................................................... 45 3.3.1. Near-term focus versus longer-term estimates ........................................................................................ 45 3.3.2. Treatment of uncertainty .......................................................................................................................... 47 3.3.3. Transparency ............................................................................................................................................. 49 3.3.4. Comparing AIReF against established peers ............................................................................................. 50 3.4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................... 53 CHAPTER 4. SPECIAL FOCUS: AIREF’S SUBNATIONAL ROLE .................................................................................. 54 4.1. CONTEXT ............................................................................................................................................................. 54 4.2. AIREF’S SUBNATIONAL MANDATE ............................................................................................................................. 55 4.3. INPUTS ................................................................................................................................................................ 57 4.3.1. Staffing ...................................................................................................................................................... 57 4.3.2. Access to information................................................................................................................................ 57 4.3.3. Analytical tools .......................................................................................................................................... 58 4.4. OUTPUTS ............................................................................................................................................................. 58 4.4.1. Communications of subnational outputs .................................................................................................. 59 4.5. CONTRIBUTIONS .................................................................................................................................................... 59 4.5.1. Public debate and transparency................................................................................................................ 59 4.5.2. Improved fiscal management at the subnational level ............................................................................. 61 1 4.5.3. National/subnational fiscal discussions .................................................................................................... 62 4.6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................... 63 CHAPTER 5. IMPACT............................................................................................................................................. 65 5.1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................... 65 5.2. INFLUENCE ON THE PUBLIC DEBATE ............................................................................................................................ 65 5.2.1. Traditional media ...................................................................................................................................... 66 5.2.2. Website and social media ......................................................................................................................... 66 5.2.3. Parliamentary debate ............................................................................................................................... 69 5.3. USE OF THE “COMPLY-OR-EXPLAIN” AUTHORITY ......................................................................................................... 71 5.4. IMPROVED FISCAL MANAGEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY GAINS ......................................................................................... 73 5.5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................... 75 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................................... 77 ANNEX A. REVIEW TEAM AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................ 80 ANNEX B. INTERVIEW LIST ..................................................................................................................................
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