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Progress and Missed Opportunities: Morocco Enters Its Third Decade

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Progress and Missed Opportunities: Morocco Enters Its Third Decade POLICY BRIEFING / JULY 2020 Progress and Missed Opportunities: Morocco Enters Its Third Decade Under King Mohammed VI Yasmina Abouzzohour1 n the midst of the coronavirus pan- demic, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI will celebrate 21 years on the Ithrone in July 2020. Over the last two decades, the king has spearheaded posi- tive civil and political reforms, as well as formidable foreign policy and infrastruc- tural changes. Most recently, the regime took swift and effective measures to con- trol the initial spread of the COVID-19 outbreak. Yet, deeply rooted socioeco- nomic and political challenges have fu- eled growing popular disillusionment with the regime and triggered numerous On July 30,1999, one week after succeeding strikes and protests in recent years. Two decades on, regret and missed opportunities his father, Morocco’s are multiplying, as Moroccans look back on the reign of a monarch many had hoped King Mohammed VI sits in a horse-drawn would bring about deep political reform and eradicate social inequality. carriage, on his way to preside for the first time over Muslim prayers at the Ahl Fes Mosque This policy briefing closely evaluates the major achievements and challenges that came in Rabat. Source: Reuters out of Morocco’s first two decades under King Mohammed VI. First, it overviews the noteworthy foreign policy achievements, large-scale infrastructural developments, im- portant civil reforms, and limited political transformation undertaken by the monarch. Second, it examines the lack of deep political reform and socioeconomic growth that continues to plague the kingdom. Finally, it contends that the regime should preemp- tively introduce genuine and targeted reforms in order to improve political and socio- economic conditions and prevent popular discontent from boiling over into violence. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS • Promote genuine political change: The • Reduce social inequality for vulnerable Moroccan regime should bring about groups: The regime should raise funds concrete political opening by minimizing (by reforming the taxation system) to interference in government affairs and improve the living conditions of rural by effectively dividing tasks between the populations and to enhance education monarchy and the government. and welfare for vulnerable groups. Copyright © 2019 Brookings Institution The Brookings Institution is a private nonprofit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommenda- tions of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institution, its man- agement, or its other scholars. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are not determined by any donation. INTRODUCTION In 2019, the Arab Barometer found that 70 per- ering public debt. Furthermore, the economy relies cent of Moroccans between the ages of 18 and 29 on oil imports and unstable agricultural and tour- had thought about emigrating,2 while 49 percent ism sectors. In the last decade, protests triggered by supported rapid political change on the domestic economic hardship have faced increased repression front—the latter percentage being the highest of all from the regime, which fears rising instability. In Arab countries polled.3 Such figures—along with fact, since the 2011 uprisings, the regime has faced chronic protests, a countrywide boycott, critical great security concerns due to the emergence of the chants and rap songs, and expressions of discontent Islamic State group (IS) in neighboring countries on social media—point to an increasing sense of and the Hirak movement in the historically rebel- popular disillusionment with the regime. The grow- lious Rif region. Two decades on, the reform process ing frustration of a wide group of Moroccans comes seems to have collapsed altogether. at an interesting time in the country’s political his- tory. King Mohammed VI will celebrate 21 years Overall, continuous economic hardship and politi- on the throne on July 30, 2020—in the midst of a cal restrictions will increase popular frustration and pandemic that has pushed the country into manda- fuel further protests. Yet, the king—who remains the tory lockdown, left many without wages, and led to most powerful political actor in the country—can a reported rise in police violence.4 still deescalate this volatile situation, as the regime has not yet resorted to brutal violence. To avoid cha- Under Mohammed VI, Morocco has undergone im- os, the regime should focus on: (1) bringing about portant political and economic reforms while facing concrete political opening by limiting interference considerable challenges. During the first five years of in government affairs and by effectively dividing the king’s reign, the regime allowed fairer elections, tasks between the monarchy and the government; decreased media censure, acknowledged the human and (2) reducing social inequality by reforming the rights violations committed during the reign of the taxation system, thereby raising funds to improve late King Hassan II (1961–1999), and pursued eco- the living conditions of rural populations and to en- nomic development programs. Other achievements hance education and welfare. include strengthening the country’s foreign policy by diversifying its alliance base and upgrading its infra- ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES structure through large-scale projects. In response to the 2011 uprisings, the regime introduced reforms Since Mohammed VI succeeded to the throne that marginally limited its powers (i.e., requiring in 1999, Morocco has undergone noteworthy that the prime minister come from the party with changes in terms of foreign policy, infrastruc- the largest share of votes, and reducing the number tural development, and civil reform. However, of diplomatic and high administrative posts that concrete political reform continues to lag behind could be nominated directly by the monarch).5 Fur- past promises, and socioeconomic challenges per- thermore, an Islamist party—the Justice and Devel- sist despite minor advances. opment Party (PJD)—entered the government for the first time in the country’s history. FOREIGN POLICY RE-DIRECTION However, despite these achievements, Morocco re- Morocco has taken significant strides in foreign mains plagued by socioeconomic challenges. The policy by diversifying its alliance base to pursue country suffers from high unemployment rates, economic and diplomatic interests.6 Under the poverty, social inequality, mediocre healthcare and current king, the country has rejoined the Af- education, a persistent urban-rural divide, and tow- rican Union (AU), developed stronger ties with 1 Policy Brief • July 2020 the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), improved positions the kingdom as the West’s gateway to Af- relations with Europe, and strengthened its posi- rica, thereby allowing it to enhance its international tion as an international ally in fighting terrorism standing, shore up regional support, and improve its and irregular migration.7 economy. Morocco rejoined the AU in 2017, more than three decades after leaving it.11 Since then, the To maintain trade relations and continue to receive regime has demonstrated its interest in joining the bilateral aid from Europe—Morocco’s largest trad- Economic Community of West African States,12 ing partner and donor—the regime has often had to which invited Morocco to a recent summit.13 The accept trade restrictions and human rights criticism king has personally worked to build ties with sub- from the European Union (EU). Indeed, the EU Saharan countries; he has made numerous visits to accounted for 59.4 percent of Morocco’s trade in various states and signed nearly 1,000 agreements 2017 (i.e., 64.6 percent of its exports and 56.5 per- for economic, political, and security deals.14 cent of its imports).8 At least 73 percent of Moroc- co’s inward foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks Through the king’s efforts, Moroccan companies in 2019 came from European countries.9 have increased cooperation with sub-Saharan Af- rica in banking, telecommunications, insurance, Under Mohammed VI, there has been a con- and manufacturing. In fact, according to the Af- scious effort to reduce this influence, and Moroc- rican Development Bank, 85 percent of the king- can decision-makers have striven to diversify the dom’s FDI went to sub-Saharan states in 2018.15 country’s support base by strengthening ties with Moroccan-African trade is also growing—it GCC countries and developing new relationships increased by 68 percent between 2008 and 2018 with non-traditional partners, such as China and (see Figure 1),16 while Moroccan exports to western Russia.10 Most striking has been the kingdom’s Africa tripled during the same period.17 Beyond re-direction toward sub-Saharan Africa. boosting the kingdom’s economy and diversify- ing its alliance base, Morocco’s ties to sub-Saharan Indeed, Mohammed VI has championed greater countries will further benefit its relationship with presence within the African continent, a move that the EU by promoting Morocco-EU-African trade. Figure 1: Annual Change in Total Trade Volume with Morocco (%), 2008–18 World Europe & Central Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 50 40 30 20 10 Percentage 0
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