Sorryfor the conditionof this document. I almost didn't put in on thesystem, but it is an importantwork; and if .l didn'tdo it I wouldbe doingsomething less important at the moment. SteveBayne . www.hist-analytic.org META.MEDITATIOT{S: Studiesin Descartes

edircdb1 Alexander Sesonsfr'eand Noel Flerrting SANTA BARBARA UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA' WADSWORTH STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM Alexander Sesonshe and, Noel Flemi.ng, Edi,tors

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING: Studies philosophy in the of DavidHume

J META.MEDITATIONS: Studiesin Descartes

PLATO'S MENO: Texr and Criticism fnc' Wadsuorth. Publish'ing Cornparyt' BELMONT' CALIFORNIA Cogito, Ergo Sum 5l Augustine'santicipation. [t cannot be denied,of course,that the simi- COGITO, ERGO SUM: larities are striking. One may wonder, howevcr, whether they are all there is to the matter. Perhapsthere are also dissimilaritiesbetween INFERBNCB Descartesand Augustine important enough to justify or at least to ex- plain the one's reluctance to acknowledge tlrc cxtent of the other's OR PERFORMANCE?* anticipation. But we cannot tell whether thcrc is more ro Descartes's cogito, ergo sum than there is to St. Augustinc'ssirrilar f Hinti,kha argumentbe- aaho fore we cantell exactlywhat thereis to the cogittt:lrgrrmcnt. rv If there are important differences betwccn l)cscartes and his 2n predecessors,the questionwill also arisewhcthcr sonlc of thc anticipa- tions are closerthan others.For instance,Descartcs corrkl havefound l. Cogito, crgo sum as a problem. The fame (some would say the no- the principlein St. ThomasAquinas as well asin St. Augustine.Which toriety) of thc ntltgc cogito, ergo fl,rm makes one expect that scholarly of the two saintscomes closer to the cogito, ergo sum? industry hns lmind-and not the principlc ro$ittt, crl4o sum,by ( point olrt thrrt Descartes'sprinciple had been strikingly anticipated by meansof which this existenceis apparentlydcdrrce rl.b )nt.chc formulates the cogito principle Ls ego cogitansexisto rrsirrg St. Arrgrrstinc. Although later studies have unearthed other anticipa- withorrt rhe word.ergo at all.6 tions,r notrrbly in Campanellaand in the Schoolmen, scholars still seem But if it is true that the Cartesiandictum does not cxprcssnn to lrc cspccially impressed by Descartes's affinity with St. Augustine, in inference, equally perplexing questionsare bound to arisc. Nor orrly is slritc of his unmistakable attempts to minimize the significance of SCEuttres published (1,!tris, r lirrrnrThe PhilosopbicalRevieza,LXXI (1962), 3-32. Reprinted by permis- de Descartes, by C, Adam and P. Tannery lttr)7- siorrof tfrcauthor and Tbe PhilosophicalReuiew, 1913),VII, 140; The Philosofhical Worhs of Descartes,trans.'by ii. S. llulrlnnc and (London, t I lcinrich Scholz, das Cogito, ergo sum," Kcnt-Studien,X)fXVI G. R. T. Ross 1931), II, 38. In the sequel,tlrcse'crlitionr rvill lrc "Uber referred to as AT and HR, u93t).t2(>147. respectively,with Roman-numeralsrcferrirrg to vol- :: Scc c.g. L. BlancheqLes ant4cddentsdu pense,donc suis" (Paris, umes.Normally I shall not follow Haldine and Ross'stranslation, howcvci'; I slrtll "Je ie make use of the existingtranslations (notably of those by N, I(ernp Srrritlrlrrrl by 1r)20);(iricrrnc Gilson, Etudes sur Ie r6le de la pensiemidi6,uale ddns la formation =rather du sysrlmacarttsien (6,tudes de philosophiemddi6vale, XII) (Paris,1930), 2d pt., Anscombe and Geach) eclectically. 4 AT X, 368; HR I, 7. clr. ii, nnd the first appendix;Heinrich Scholz,"Augustinus und Descartes,"Bliit- 6 ,A4i t cr dcutsc he Philosopbie, V (1932),40923. AT IV, AT VII, 12; HR I, 140. l'iir oAT VII,481; HR II, 282. 50 52 Meta.Meditations: Studies in Descartes Cogito, Ergo Sum 53 the particle ergo then misplaced;the word cogito is likewise out of How can one representsuch a sentenceformally? If Quine is right in place in a sentencewhich only servesto call attention to the self-evi- claimingthat "to be is to be a valueof a bound variable,"the formula denceof sum. " (Ex) (x = 4)" servesthe purpose.And evcnif hc is not right in general, But is the word cogito perhapscalculated to expressthe fact that in this particular casehis claim is obviously itrstified: "4 exists"and thought is neededfor grasping tha;tsum is intuitively evident? Was it "there existsat leastone individual identical wirh a" are clearly synon- perhapsan indication of the fact that intuition was not for Descartesan ymous. Descartes'sdictum therefore seemsto bc concernedwith an irrational event but an act of the thinking mind, an "intellectual intui- implication of the form tion," asit hasbeen aptly expressed??Even if this is part of the mean- (1) ing of the word, the question will remain why Descarteswanted to B(a) = (Ex) (r= a). stressthe fact in connection rryith this particular insight. The same Descartesperceives that he thinks; hencehe obtninsrhc prcrniseB(a). point would equally well apply to most of the other propositions of If (l) is true, he can vse modus ponensto corrclrrtlcrh;rt he exists. the Cartesiansystem; and yet Descartesdoes not say, for example, Those who want to interpret the Cogito as a logicnl irrfcrcncemay cogito, ergo Deusert in the way he sayscogito, ergo sum. now claim that (1) is in fact true, and evenlogicnlly provnblc;for is Clearly the word cogito must havesome further function in Des- not cartes'ssentence. Even if the sentencedid not expressa syllogistic in- ference, it expressedsomething sufficiently like an inference to make B(a)> (Ex)(x=a&B(x)) Descartescall his sentencea reasoning(ratiocinium),8 refer to exPress- a provableformula of our lower functional calculi?Arrrl docsnor this ing it as inferring (inferre),s and call sum a conchtsion(conclusio).1o formula entail (l) in virtue of completelyunproblcrrrnric plirrciplcs? It As Martial Gueroult has trenchantly summedup the problem: "lo may seemthat an affirmativeanswer must be givcn tnotion 'pour penser il faut 6tre,"' Traaaux du lXo Congris internatioidl de philosopbie iCongrCs Descmtes) (Paris, 12In his objecdons to the Second Meditation (AT VII, 258-259;lllt ll, 1937; reprinted as the first appendix to Gueroult's Descmtes selon I'ordre des rr7). raisons,Paris, 1953,ll,t07-312) ' Seep. 308. 18AT VII, 352;HR II, 207. 54 Meta.Meditations: Studies in Descartes Cogito, Ergo Sum 55 But even if we make this allowance,there remain plenty of difi- highly relevant to the question whether thinking implies existence in culties.As we saw, Descartessometimes denies that in ti" cogito Descartes'ssense. But this we cannot do. The truth of a sentenceof the ment sum is deducedf.rom cogito. But on the view we are criticizing^rgr- form (1) turns entirely on existentialpresuppositions. If they are given the argumentis a deduction.The view is therefore unsatisfacrory. up, the provability of (1) goesby the board. It is alsounsatisfactory because it doesnot help us to unierstand My point may perhaps be illustrated by meansof an example the role of the cogito argument in the cartesiansystem. In so far as I consrructed for us by Shakespeare.Hamlet did think a great many can see, it docs not, for example,help us to appreciate the conse- things; doesit follow that he existed? quencesDescartcs wantcd to draw from his first and foremost insight. The gravcstobjcction, however, still remainsto be made.It may 5, Descartes'stemptation In spite of all this, tl'rcrcare passagesin be_shownthat thc provabiliryof (l) in the usualsystems of functional Descarteswhich seemto suppoft the interpretation undcr criticism. I calculus (quantificrtion theory) has nothing to do with the question do not want to deny that it expressesone of. thc thirrgs l)escarteshad whether thinking crrtailscxisrence. An attempt to interpret Deicartes's more or lessconfusedly in mind when he fbrmuhtcd lris famous dic- argument in tcrrns of the provabfity of (l) is thereforl bound ro re- tum. But it is important to realizethat this interprctntion is dcfcctive in main fruitlcss. important respects.It does not help to elucidatc in nrry way somc of By this I mcnn the following: if we have a closer look at the Descartes'smost explicit and most careful formulations. It is at best a qFstemsof logic irr which (l) can be proved, we soon discover that partial interpretation. they arc basedon imporrant existentialpresappositions, as I have else- One can seewhy someinterpretation like thc onc wc ltnvc bcen where called them.tn fh.y make more or les tacit use of the assump- criticizing attracted fi"r""tt"r. It gave him what must hnvc scctncda tion that all thc singular terms with which we have to deal really refir very usefulway of defendinghis own doctrinesand of silcncingcriti- to (designatc)s.nrc actually existing individual.l' In our examplethis cism. He could always ask: How can it possibly be tmc of sornconc amountsro nssurilingthat the term which replacesa in (1) muslnot be that he thinks unlesshe exists?And if you challengethc prcrrriscthat €mpty. But sincc the term in questionis "I," this is just another way of he is thinking (why cannot the all-powerful malin gtnic nttlintention of convdyin! bona fide information' 58 Meta-Meditations: Studies in Descartes Cogito, Ergo Sutn 59 reasons"') a singular term rather than a property of sentences.The notion of Iomrtically" meanshere somethinglike "{91 melely logical ,l'his the existentialinconsistency, however, can"often be applied to statements destirctive effect is of couise conditional on the fact that he identi- in a.fairly narural sense.In order to specify ,tii"rn"rrt we have to Ircarerknows who the maker of the statementis, that is, that " specify (inter alia) the sentenceuttered (t y, q) and its utterer. If the licsthe speakeras the sameman the uttered sentenceis about' can be latter refers to himself by meansof the singni"r term & when he makes In'a specialcase a self-defeatingattemPt.of this.kind his to,TpT- statemenr'we may say that the notiori appriesto the statementif rnadewithoirt saying or writing anything or. doing anything do and only if it appliesto 4 in relation to &. ,,f,i.. f" iryittg ,6 tri"t others-beliivesomething I must normally " to- make A simple examplewill make the situation crear. The sentences something'wliich can be heard or seenor felt' But in trying or to "De Gaulle doesnot exist" and "Descartesdoes not exist" a.renot in- myself bJlieve somethingthere is no need to say anything.aloud consistentor otherwise objectionableany more than the moot senrence write'anything on p"p"i. The performancethiough w6ich existential "Homer think- does not exist." None of them is farse for logicar r€asons inconrirtlt"y"r.ir., can in this casebe merely.nl.lttcmlt to alone. does whar would be (existentiaily) inconsisrenrwould be the at- nlor" an attemPt to make oneself bclicvc-that one "".oritely, tempt of a certain man (De Gaulle, Descartes,or Homer, respectively) not exist.22 to use one of these sentencesto make a $atement. uttered'by some- This transition from "public" speech-actsto "privfttc" thought- body The else,the sentencesin questionneed not have anything #o'g o, acts,however, doesnot afiect the essentialfeatures of d-rcirlogic. evenstrange about them. reasonwhy Descartes'sattempt to tbink that he docs nuld wide currency. The the hearerrealized who thc spcakcr "ligygd inconsistency (absurdity) of an existen- havebeen bound to fail as tially inconsistentstatiment ",,oo., can in a sensebe said ao'b" of [r4or*n- was. tory (pefiormative) character.It dependson an act or "performance,,, It can be sccn thrlt wc arc nlmely on a certain person'sact of-uttering a sentence'(or of other- 7. Exi.stentiallyinconsistent seatences. order to reach it we ltlvc to wise making a statement);it doesnot depen"clsolery on the meansused aonroachingDescartes's famous dictum. In the notion of cxistcntitl in- for the purpose,that is, on the ..rrt"rr"" which is"being uttered. The iir{" o"" ,r.p. We have found that sentenceis perfectly -?r" applicable (e'g', dcclrtrntivcut- correct asa sentence,but the ,tt"tript of a certain consistencyis primarily -to'statements a sense,il of coursc llc tlc- man to utter it assertivelyis curiorr-slypointless. If one of these days I terances)|rtn"'t than tt r"ttt"tt""r. In T"y it relative to e tcrm (trirttrc' should readin the morning paper, "T/hele is no De Gaulle any more,,, I fined for sentences,too, namely by making therein.This is in fnct whnt could understandwhat is belng said.But no one who knows charles de Dronoun.or definitedescription) occurring we said inter alia tlrrt thc be-ingpuzzled by these words if they were uttered i,'" aia when we first inuoduced the notion; 9"*":""11 *tp for I)e by De Gaulle himself; the only way of making sentence"De Gaulle doesnot exist" is existentiallyinconsistcnt - senseof ihem would be to give them a nonliteral meaning. Gaulle (i.e. for the personreferred to by "De Gaulle") to uttcr. sottlc- "fllr . . . to we can here seehow the existentialinconsistency of De Gaulre,s times it may even'be possibleto omit the specification front tltc fictional utterance (as well as the inconsistencyof oiher existentially utter," ,r"-.ly when the intended speakercan be gathercd inconsistentstatements) mani.fests itself. Normally a speakerwants his context. hearer to believe what he says.The whore "l"ngo"g6-game', of fact- stating discourseis basedon the assumptionthai ttrls ii normally the 22Thismeans,inefiect,thatDescartesarrivesathisfirstsndfrrrcttxlit as his ownn-tltlicrlcc' lt nobody can make his hearer believethat he doesnor insisht bv playing fot tno-"tlt a double role: he aPPears ""::.By: Uy " *t'o for his bi,'o porpos.sreprcsctrtr l)*- telling him so; such an anempr is rikely to havethe ""lrt i"ift;*+,fi;'J;;ifi;;;;.t'"ib"rr, itsclf r'd oppositeresult. The ;#"]t"ii::, H ;;;-";"c;esius, who odi"e3R"ason ," poindessnessof existentially inconsistint statementsis therefore ;n"ni-Olr"rrr"i tft""-"d;;r'd; O"3ff*,;; n"at ittr. they in due to loth.."conspire "tr."!ill!llll lllctllllll8 :,l.li: th:. the'cogito ergo sum, wheiefore "in some sense' f."o. that they automatically desuoy one of the major t""t*""J-"""tance," l)ur- purposes io'c"n.ri"; f.."e Descartes."See Albert G. A. Bolz, which the act of uttering a declarative ;;i;bdi;o* ""a serrt"rrc" normaily ttri. lieo- ;o;;;; *d1i, Moilern Mind (New flaven, 1952)'pp' 89-90' 60 Meta-Meditations: Studies in Descartes Cogito,Ilrg,o Sun 61 In a frequently occurring special case such an omission is not 8. Descartes'sinsight. Now rvc ltrtvc rt'rtr'ltt'.1rr point where we only natural but almost inevitable. It is the casein which the speaker cnn expressprecisely the import of l)csc:tt'tt's'sirrsiglrr (or nt least one refers to himself by meansof the first-person singular ,,I." tlr;tt tlrc rllost interesting prorroo'n-be

is,very misleading, however, to appeal to introspection in ex- on knowing De Gaulle.Expressed in lcssltrrrntkrxical terms, appreciat- plaining. the meaning.of the Cogito, although there is likely to be a ing the to{ito argumenrpi"rnppor"r arr_:rlrility fo llpprcciatethe logic connection between the notion of introspection and the pecuiiarities of of"the fitri-p.rro-n proroln "L" And :rltlrorrglrnr:rstcring the latter is the cartesian argumenr. we have seen rhat an existentialiy inconsistent not the samething asthe capacityfor irrtrospct'tiort,thc two are likely sentence also (Lrgit'nlly).The cogi'to _may defeat itself through an "external" speech-act.The ro be connectedwith eachother conccptrrrtlly reason why Descartescould not doubt his own existenceis in principle insight is essentiallyconnected with onc's (,wtl ('ilscin thc sameway exactly the same as the reason why he could not hope to misliad anv- introspectionis, we might saY. body by saying-"I don't exist." The one does not pr.rrrppor. introspe'c- lcrrliz.cdthat his tion any more than the other. what the philosopherswho have tpok"n 10. Tbe singularity of the cogito. l)cscultcs rrirrrtclywith his own. of introspection here are likely to have had in mind is often performa- cogito argument dealswith a particular c:nsc, toriness rather than introspectiveness. This is in'f"ct typical of his whole procctlurc; il is ty'ic'rrl of a man "wltitt ('illl lllcll lplato's famous definiti,on of is uselessfor the purpose Descarteshad in min

Collected Papers (Cambridge, Mass., 1931-l9ig), VI, sec 338; V, sec. 421. goSee AT IX, 205-206;HR II, 127;cf. AT VII l4O-141;I{lt ll' ltl' 66 Meta-Meditations: Studies in Descartes Cogito, Ergo Sutn 67 late "for himself" a sentence in the first person singular that is true and have seenthat Descartes'sinsight is not cotttprrrnlrlcwith one's becom- indubitable, namely the Cartesian sentence ego surut, ego existo. But ing aware of the sound of music lly prrrrsitrgto listcn to it but rather since its indubitabiliry is due to a thought-act which each man has to with making sure that music is to llc ltcrtrrl lrv plrryirrg it oneself. Ceas- perform himself, there cannot be any general sentence which would be ing to play would not only stop onc's lrcrrrirrgtltc: tttttsic, in the way indubitable in the same way without being trivial. The cogito insight ceasingto listen could; it would Pttt illl t:tttl lo lltt: tttttsic itself. In the of each of us is tied to his own case even more closely than Descartes sameway, it must have seemedto l)csc::trtci,lris t'crrsirtgto think would realized.3l not onlf mean ceasingto be aware of llis llwrt cxistcttcc;it would put an end to the particular way in which ltis t:xislcttt't:rt,rts fortntl to mani- 11, The role of the Cogito i.n Descartes's system. Our interpreta- fest itself. To change the metaphor, ccnsirrgt o t lrirrli rvortld not be like tion is supported by the fact that it enables us to appreciate the role of closing one'seyes but like putting out fllc lrttttlt.l"ot' tltis rcrtsotr,think- Descartes's first and foremost insight in his system, that is, to under- ing was for Descartessomething that cotrkl ttot lrt' rliscrttrrrtglcdfrom stand the conclusions he thought he could draw from the Cogito. For his existence;it was the very essenceof ltis rtrrtrtt'c.\'Vc ltlrly tlltls sur- one thing, we can now see the reason why Descartes's insight emerges mise that the original reasonwhy Descrrrtcsrttrtrlt' tlrc ( illicit lltttrnatu- from his own descriptions as a curiously momentdry affair. It is a con- ral) transition from cogito, ergo sum to su.rt,r'r's t'tt11it'trts\v;tr; o\xctly sequence of the performatoriness of his insight. Since the certainty of the sameas the reason for the curious rnorttctttrtt'ittcssol'tltc lirrrttcr my existence results from my thinking of it in a sense not unlike that which we noted above,namely the perforrttitlivctt('risol tltc rrt,riilrtirt- in which light results from the presence of a source of light, it is natu- sight' In any case'the two ideaswere intrnature consistsentirely in thirrkirrg." lrt tlrc Altiita- becomes a property which belongs to it only as long as it is thought of. tionesDescaftesis more reserved.He has alrcttl.y ltct'rrtttcrttt'itrc ol iltc In any case, this is what Descartes says of the certainty of his own dfficulty of converting his intuitive idea of thc rlcpcttrk'ltcr ol lris cx- existence. I can be sure of my existence, he says, "while" or "at the istence on his thinking into a genuine proof.'l'ltc rvrrv itt tr'ltit'lt tlrc same time as" I think of it or "whenever" or "as often as" I do so.32 idea of the dependenceis introduced is, nevertlrclc$s.rxrr('llY lltt' srttttt:: "Whereas I had only to ceaseto think for an instant," he says, "and I "Ego sum, ego existo. This is certain. How longP Ar hrrtg rrr I tlrittlt' should tlpn (even although all the other things I had imagined still For it might indeed be that if I entirely ceasedto tlrittk, I rltotrlrl tlrcrc- remained true) have no grounds for believing that I can have existed in upon altogethercease to exist.I am not at prcscnt nrlrrrittirrgrl'r1'lltin$ that instant" (Discours,-Part IV; AT VI, lf-ll; HR I, 101). which is not necessarilytrue; and, accurately spcrrlobject tine, there are alsoclear-cut differences.In so far asI know, there is no other than the intellect itsclf, wlrcrors l)rsr'rrt'tcs rlcrrics"fhat a thinking indication that Augustine was ever alive to the possibility of interpret- being needsany object otlrcr tlrrrrritsrll irr orrlcl to c:xcrciscits activ- ing his version of the Cogito as a pcrformancerather than as an infer- ity" (AT LX, 206;HR II, l 2li). 'l'lris rlissittrilrtt'ityis srrrrrllcr than it first ence or as a factual observation.saAs far as Augustine is concerned,it appearsto be. Dercartesdid rtot lrokl tlrrrt llrc tlrinlsoul is terminology. That is to say, there arc scvcrrrlrllflrlerrt rllHurr('nni('onr- tripartitc, consistirrgof being, knowing, and willing. We have already pressedinto the apparently simple fornrrrlatiott t'ttglltt,r'lgrr r/lrr rvlticlt seenthxt l)cscnrtcs'sinsight was for him intimately connectedwith the he doesnot clearly distinguish from each otlrcr, notion of thinking (rather than, say, of willing or feeling): the per- (i) Sometimes Descartes dealt with tlrc (lagita rrr ll lt \l'crr lul formance through which an existentially inconsistentsentence defeats expressionof the logical truth of sentenccsof llrc folrrr ( l) ur rrt k.rrsr itself cnn bc nn act of thinking of it, but it cannot possiblybe an act of of the indubitabletruth of a particular scntcn(.eof tlrlr turrrr, ()rr rlris willing or of feeling. Hence Descaftescould use the performatorily interpretation the argument cogito, ergo stttrtir ort llrr,'rrultr, lrxlrint{ interprctctl cogito insight to argue that the humansoul is a res cogi- with such arguments as aolo, ergo sum. Argrrrrrcrrtrllht'r'l'ltrt, rrgo tans,llr not-doargue that it is essentiallya willing or feelingbeing. In sam or ambulo, ergo sum can bp said to bc lcsr t,ottvlrtr'lrrgtlrrrrr tlrc vicw of such differences,is it at all surprising that Descartesshould Cogito merely becausetheir premisesare not rrsirrrlrrlrltrrlrlo rrr tlrrrt of hnvccrnphasized his independence of Augustinel Descartes'sargument. The word cogito may tllul lrc t'nplrrlcrllr1, rrrry If there is a predecessorwho comesclose to Descartes,he is like- other word which refers to one of my acts of cessence,for "nothing without which a thing can still exist is comprised to Descartcs's nature was in its essence."43Hence nothing could belons to his essenceor nature In short, the reason why sensation belonged that for him exactly the same as the reason why he could argtrc scrutio)ergo he could not be sure of aireacly at the iresenr srage of his argu- wcrc trroclcsrtf his basic ment, that is, nothing that he could not ascertain in the same way and sam. For him, doubting, willing, and seeing which drc nrgttments at the same time as he ascertained his own existence. For this reason, nature of thinking exactly in the same sensein ergo stttn wcrc v:tt'irtntsor nothing that belonged to his nature could be "less true than his exist- dubito ergo sum, aolo ergo sum, and aideo ence.-' "modes" of the argument cogito ergo surn. oncl lf l)cs- What this requirement amounts to is that everything that Des- Why, then, is one of these arguments a privilcgctl and sentio, cr,go srurt :rs wcll as cartes was willing to acccpt as a part of his nature (even in the senseof caftes could argue eolo, ergo sum to infer that his lliltttrc t'ottsistsPRINCIPLES lated notionri t.!-"y are literalry impossibieto berieveor ro think in a sensein which OF PHILOSOPHY* "I do not exist"-is not. I havestudied th" p"colirri.i", or somesuch senrenceselsewhere (in Knoutedge and Belief, An Introduc- tr:" the Logic Rend Descartes ? of the Tan Notionr. Ithaca, N.y.: Cornell Univer_ sity Press,1962). In n-rlnyJespects, Yf, their properties are analogous"----D- ro ,v\ thoseofexistentiallyse[-defeatingsentencs!.r+'

ra I am indebted to.professors Norman Marcorm and G. FI. von wright for Part I. Sec. 10. several useful suggestions in connection *irtih; p;;r"nr essay. That there are notions so clear in themselaes that tbcy are rendered obscure ,uhen defined after tbe manner of the schools, and that tbey dre not acquired by stady, but are born tpith us. I shall not explain here several other terms which I hrvc :rlrcrdy used and which I intend to use again below; for I do not lrclicvc that, among those who will read my writings, there can llc nny so tlrrll

r Translatedby JackMurray. Originally publishedin 1647.