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And If .L Didn't Do Sorryfor the conditionof this document. I almost didn't put in on thesystem, but it is an importantwork; and if .l didn'tdo it I wouldbe doingsomething less important at the moment. SteveBayne . www.hist-analytic.org META.MEDITATIOT{S: Studiesin Descartes edircdb1 Alexander Sesonsfr'eand Noel Flerrting SANTA BARBARA UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA' WADSWORTH STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM Alexander Sesonshe and, Noel Flemi.ng, Edi,tors HUMAN UNDERSTANDING: Studies philosophy in the of DavidHume J META.MEDITATIONS: Studiesin Descartes PLATO'S MENO: Texr and Criticism fnc' Wadsuorth. Publish'ing Cornparyt' BELMONT' CALIFORNIA Cogito, Ergo Sum 5l Augustine'santicipation. [t cannot be denied,of course,that the simi- COGITO, ERGO SUM: larities are striking. One may wonder, howevcr, whether they are all there is to the matter. Perhapsthere are also dissimilaritiesbetween INFERBNCB Descartesand Augustine important enough to justify or at least to ex- plain the one's reluctance to acknowledge tlrc cxtent of the other's OR PERFORMANCE?* anticipation. But we cannot tell whether thcrc is more ro Descartes's cogito, ergo sum than there is to St. Augustinc'ssirrilar f Hinti,kha argumentbe- aaho fore we cantell exactlywhat thereis to the cogittt:lrgrrmcnt. rv If there are important differences betwccn l)cscartes and his 2n predecessors,the questionwill also arisewhcthcr sonlc of thc anticipa- tions are closerthan others.For instance,Descartcs corrkl havefound l. Cogito, crgo sum as a problem. The fame (some would say the no- the principlein St. ThomasAquinas as well asin St. Augustine.Which toriety) of thc ntltgc cogito, ergo fl,rm makes one expect that scholarly of the two saintscomes closer to the cogito, ergo sum? industry hns l<lng sincc exhaustedwhatever interest it may have histor- 3. What is the relation of cogito ta sum? Whnt kind of topical ically or t<lpic::rlly.A perusal of the relevant literature, however, fails questionsdoes cogito, ergo sum give rise to? Onc of rlrc rnost im- to satisfy tllir- cxpcctfltion. After hundreds of discussionsof Descartes's portant questionsis undoubtedlythat of the logical forrrr of l)cscrrrtcs's famccf principlc wo still do not seemto have any way of expressinghis inference.Is it a formally valid inference?If not, wh:rc is krgically allegcd insight in tcrms rvhich would be general and precise enough to wrong about itl enablc us to its validity or its relevance to the consequenceshe iu(lgc But thereis an evenmore fundamentalquestion tlrlul tltcsc.l)ocs clainrcd to <lrrrr.r,from it. Thirty years ago Heinrich Scholz wrote that Descartes'sdictum really expressan inference?Thrrt it tkrcs is sug- thcrc lror orrly lcrrrrin many important questions concerning the Car- gestedby the particle ergo. According to Descartes,howcvcr, lry sry- tesian dicttrnr unarlswered but that there also remain important ques- ing cogito, ergo sa.mhe doesnot logically (syllogisticrlly) tlctluccszra tions trnnskc<l.rScveral illuminating papers later, the situation still from cogito but rather perceivesintuitively ("by sirnplcrlcf of nrcn- secmscsscrlrinlly the sametoday. tal vision") the self-evidenceof sum3 Similarly,Dcscartcs ^ or.crrsionrrlly 2. Srrurc"historical aspectsof the problem. This uncertainty of the saysthat one'sown existenceis intuitively obviouswithorrr Irringingin topicnl sigrrilic:rnceof Descartes'sdictum cannot but reflect on the dis- cogito asa premise.aSometimes'he intimates that his "first llrirrciplc" is cussiorrsof its historical status. The contemporaries were not slow to really the existenceof his mind-and not the principlc ro$ittt, crl4o sum,by ( point olrt thrrt Descartes'sprinciple had been strikingly anticipated by meansof which this existenceis apparentlydcdrrce rl.b )nt.chc formulates the cogito principle Ls ego cogitansexisto rrsirrg St. Arrgrrstinc. Although later studies have unearthed other anticipa- withorrt rhe word.ergo at all.6 tions,r notrrbly in Campanellaand in the Schoolmen, scholars still seem But if it is true that the Cartesiandictum does not cxprcssnn to lrc cspccially impressed by Descartes's affinity with St. Augustine, in inference, equally perplexing questionsare bound to arisc. Nor orrly is slritc of his unmistakable attempts to minimize the significance of SCEuttres published (1,!tris, r lirrrnrThe PhilosopbicalRevieza,LXXI (1962), 3-32. Reprinted by permis- de Descartes, by C, Adam and P. Tannery lttr)7- siorrof tfrcauthor and Tbe PhilosophicalReuiew, 1913),VII, 140; The Philosofhical Worhs of Descartes,trans.'by ii. S. llulrlnnc and (London, t I lcinrich Scholz, das Cogito, ergo sum," Kcnt-Studien,X)fXVI G. R. T. Ross 1931), II, 38. In the sequel,tlrcse'crlitionr rvill lrc "Uber referred to as AT and HR, u93t).t2(>147. respectively,with Roman-numeralsrcferrirrg to vol- :: Scc c.g. L. BlancheqLes ant4cddentsdu pense,donc suis" (Paris, umes.Normally I shall not follow Haldine and Ross'stranslation, howcvci'; I slrtll "Je ie make use of the existingtranslations (notably of those by N, I(ernp Srrritlrlrrrl by 1r)20);(iricrrnc Gilson, Etudes sur Ie r6le de la pensiemidi6,uale ddns la formation =rather du sysrlmacarttsien (6,tudes de philosophiemddi6vale, XII) (Paris,1930), 2d pt., Anscombe and Geach) eclectically. 4 AT X, 368; HR I, 7. clr. ii, nnd the first appendix;Heinrich Scholz,"Augustinus und Descartes,"Bliit- 6 ,A4i t cr dcutsc he Philosopbie, V (1932),40923. AT IV, AT VII, 12; HR I, 140. l'iir oAT VII,481; HR II, 282. 50 52 Meta.Meditations: Studies in Descartes Cogito, Ergo Sum 53 the particle ergo then misplaced;the word cogito is likewise out of How can one representsuch a sentenceformally? If Quine is right in place in a sentencewhich only servesto call attention to the self-evi- claimingthat "to be is to be a valueof a bound variable,"the formula denceof sum. " (Ex) (x = 4)" servesthe purpose.And evcnif hc is not right in general, But is the word cogito perhapscalculated to expressthe fact that in this particular casehis claim is obviously itrstified: "4 exists"and thought is neededfor grasping tha;tsum is intuitively evident? Was it "there existsat leastone individual identical wirh a" are clearly synon- perhapsan indication of the fact that intuition was not for Descartesan ymous. Descartes'sdictum therefore seemsto bc concernedwith an irrational event but an act of the thinking mind, an "intellectual intui- implication of the form tion," asit hasbeen aptly expressed??Even if this is part of the mean- (1) ing of the word, the question will remain why Descarteswanted to B(a) = (Ex) (r= a). stressthe fact in connection rryith this particular insight. The same Descartesperceives that he thinks; hencehe obtninsrhc prcrniseB(a). point would equally well apply to most of the other propositions of If (l) is true, he can vse modus ponensto corrclrrtlcrh;rt he exists. the Cartesiansystem; and yet Descartesdoes not say, for example, Those who want to interpret the Cogito as a logicnl irrfcrcncemay cogito, ergo Deusert in the way he sayscogito, ergo sum. now claim that (1) is in fact true, and evenlogicnlly provnblc;for is Clearly the word cogito must havesome further function in Des- not cartes'ssentence. Even if the sentencedid not expressa syllogistic in- ference, it expressedsomething sufficiently like an inference to make B(a)> (Ex)(x=a&B(x)) Descartescall his sentencea reasoning(ratiocinium),8 refer to exPress- a provableformula of our lower functional calculi?Arrrl docsnor this ing it as inferring (inferre),s and call sum a conchtsion(conclusio).1o formula entail (l) in virtue of completelyunproblcrrrnric plirrciplcs? It As Martial Gueroult has trenchantly summedup the problem: "lo may seemthat an affirmativeanswer must be givcn t<l tltcscrlrrc:stions, Descartesse refuse ) consid6rer le Cogito comme un raisonnement. and that Descartes'sargument is thus easilyconstructl us u v:rlitl krgicrl . 2" Pourquoi s'obstine-t-ilalors au moins i trois reprises(Inquisitio inference. aeritatis,Discours, Principes) i pr6senterle Cogito sousla forme qu'il Views of this generaltype havea long ancestry.G:rssr:rrtli rrlrcldy lui d6nie?"11 claimed that ambulo, ergo sr.tmr"I walk, thereforc I ill.n," is ls gootl :tn Sincethe word cogi.tois not dispensableand sinceit is not iust a inferenceas cogito, ergo sum.r2It is obviousthat on thc irrtct'prtrtrrrion premisefrom which the conclusionsum is deduced,the relation of the just suggested,Gassendi will be right. The allegcdprovulriliry of (l) two becomeea problem. One of the main objectivesof this essayis to doesnot dependon the attribute "B" at all. Thc gisr ol' l)r:scrrrtcs's clear up their relation. argumentis on the presentview expressibleby sayingtlrirf orrt:(':ulnot think without existing;and if (l) is an of 4. Cogito, ergo sum asa logical inf erence,But can we be surethat adequatercprcscrrtrrtiorr thc logicalform this Descartes'sdictum does not expressa logical inference? In many re- of principle,one can indeedequally wcll srrytlr:rt onc cannot walk without existing. spectsit seemsplausible to think that it does. Its logical form seems This alreadymakes the interpretation(1) lrr this rcply quite easyto define.In the sentence"I think" an individual receivesan suspcc. to Gassendi,Descartes denies that ambulo, ergo attribute;for a modernlogician it is thereforeof the form "B(a)." In sum is t'orrrprrr:rlrlc with cogito, ergo su.m.rsThe reasonshe the sentence"I am," or "I exist," this sameindividual is said to exist. gavear€ not vcry r'lc:rr,lrorv- ever.A part of the burdenof his remarksis perhapsthar nlrlrorrghrlrc inferencesambulo, ergo sum and cogito, ergo sum arc pnrrrllcl us lrc- ? L. J. Beck, The Method of Descartes (Oxfoid, 1952), ch. iv. 8 AT X, 523;HR I, 324. ing both of the form (1)-their premisesare essentiallydillcrcrrr. zlzr- e AT VII, 352;HR 11,207;cf ' AT III, 248. bulo is not an indubitablepremise in the way cogito may lrc r.l;rirrrctl ToPrincipidphilosophiae I,9; AT VIII' 7; HF.1,222; cf. AT II, 37, and AT v,147, to be. 11Martial Gueroult, "Le Cogito et la notion 'pour penser il faut 6tre,"' Traaaux du lXo Congris internatioidl de philosopbie iCongrCs Descmtes) (Paris, 12In his objecdons to the Second Meditation (AT VII, 258-259;lllt ll, 1937; reprinted as the first appendix to Gueroult's Descmtes selon I'ordre des rr7).
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