Some key ideas in the Aristotle reading from Bks. I and II of Nicomachean Ethics:

1. What is the good for human beings? It is “happiness” (Greek: eudaemonia, also translated as “flourishing”).

2. What is “happiness”? 4 views (pp. 49-50): i) the view held by the vulgar many is that it is a life of pleasure (which Aristotle dismisses as a life suitable for beasts); ii) the view of those devoted to a political life is that it is a life of honor (objection: honor depends on the giver); iii) it consists in the possession of virtue (objection: “possession of virtue seems compatible with being asleep”); iv) it is a life devoted to “contemplation” (the study of astronomy, theology, philosophy, etc.).

3. Aristotle rejects Plato’s idea that good tomatoes, good policemen, good human beings, etc., must all have something in common that makes them good. “The good is not some common element answering to one Idea.” (p. 51)

4. Happiness is something that we always choose for itself and never for the sake of something else. Pleasure, honor, and virtue are chosen sometimes for their own sakes and sometimes for the sake of something else. (p. 52)

5. A clearer account of what happiness is will emerge if we consider what is the function (or natural goal) of human beings. (bottom p. 52) If sculptors and carpenters functions, then surely human beings do too. If a human being’s parts (e.g. eye, legs, heart) have functions, then surely a human being as a whole must have one too.

6. A human being’s function has to be something unique to him. (Aristotle doesn’t explain why). Growth/reproduction is something that plants do too. A life of perception/pleasure is something other animals can have. What’s unique to human beings is reason. So our function must be to live a life guided by reason. Since the exercise of virtue requires reason, Aristotle concludes that “human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accordance with virtue” (p. 53). -- If Aristotle is right, then it follows that anyone whose capacity for rational deliberation and choice is compromised is “defective” or “bad,” in the same way that eye that is color- blind is a defective or bad eye. Thus, a severely mentally retarded person is a defective or “bad” human being. But “bad” here would not imply blame and would not be synonymous with “evil.” An evil person has reason but chooses not to be guided by it. A severely mentally retarded person, lacking reason, is incapable of either virtue or vice. -- Aristotle’s racism and sexism: In other places Aristotle says that women and some non- Greek races are incapable of the rational choice necessary for the good life. They possess the part of reason necessary to obey rules but not the part of reason necessary to figure out what the correct rules are. Some non-Greeks, Aristotle claimed, are “natural slaves.”

7. Virtue is a disposition. To identify the good life with the possession of virtue is a mistake, because the good life requires activity. The good life is not the mere possession of virtue but its active exercise. (p. 54).

8. This account of the good life also assigns pleasure a role. For in order to be virtuous, one must enjoy acting virtuously. “No one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly.” (p. 54)

9. Animals are incapable of “happiness.” For no animal is capable of a virtuous activity of the soul guided by reason. The same is true of young children.

10. The exercise of many virtues (e.g. generosity) requires “external goods.” Therefore, in order to be happy, we must be “sufficiently equipped with external goods.” (pp. 56-7)

11. Virtue is not innate but must be developed. We develop virtues through practice or “habit.” “We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.” “States of character arise out of like activities.” (p. 58)

12. The good habits of the virtuous person are destroyed by excess and defect. E.g. indulging in too much pleasure/the wrong ones or too little pleasure is incompatible with the virtue of temperance. Virtue is “preserved by the mean.” (p. 59)

13. Performing a just act doesn’t mean that one is just, any more than uttering a grammatical sentence means that one understands the rules of grammar. One can have success in a single case by accident or because one is guided by another. In order to be a just person, one must: a) choose just acts, b) from a stable, unchanging disposition, c) for their own sakes, d) knowing that the acts are just. (p. 61). [We should add to this list of conditions one that Aristotle mentioned earlier: e) finding performance of the acts pleasant]. -- Aristotle elsewhere distinguishes the following kinds of person: i) the person who has a virtue, ii) the continent person, iii) the incontinent person, iv) the person who has a vice. It’s better to be incontinent than vicious, continent than incontinent, and virtuous than continent. The continent person consistently chooses to do the right thing for its own sake, because he knows that it’s right. But he doesn’t enjoy it, because he has to fight hard to overcome his urges or temptations to do wrong. He does the right thing while “gritting his teeth.” The incontinent person loses this battle and gives in to his evil impulses/desires. (“Gives in” means that his choice is voluntary; it is not a case of psychological compulsion or having literally “irresistible” desires). The vicious person doesn’t even know what’s right. An example is the suicide bomber who targets schools with small children, believing that he is performing an act of heroic self-sacrifice for a worthy cause.

14. The virtues are states of character that involve choice. They are neither passions nor faculties. (p. 62)

15. Another definition of virtue: “it is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.” (p. 63) -- With the “determined by the man of practical wisdom” idea, Aristotle is rejecting the notion that virtue/the moral life consists in figuring out and then following a set of exception-less rules—e.g. that the just person follows the rule, “never deceive others.” There is no algorithm for leading a good life. To lead a good life one has to have “good judgment,” something that the person of “practical wisdom” possesses. Acquiring such wisdom requires a good upbringing, intelligence, and lots of experience. While it’s possible for a mere teenager to be a math prodigy, there is no way she could have the “maturity” necessary for “practical wisdom.”

16. Since virtue is a mean, for every virtue there is a corresponding vice of excess and another vice of deficiency. For example, the courageous person feels just the right amount of fear in the right situations. Cowardice is the vice of too much fear in the wrong situations, and foolhardiness is the vice of not enough fear when fear is warranted. Another example: there’s the virtue of handling money the right way (is there word in English for this?). For that virtue there are corresponding vices of excess and deficiency. The vice of excess is being wastefully extravagant (a spendthrift), while the vice of deficiency is being excessively stingy (a “tightwad”).