ANNEX 1 JOINT IMPLEMENTATION IN DISCUSSION

The UN Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro last year, saw the signing of the UN Framework Convention on (FCCC). The FCCC entered into force on March 21, 1994, with the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) in early 1995. The CoP will examine the performance of the obliga• tions of the Parties, and will elaborate and specify the articles of the Convention. The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) is engaged with the preparation of the first CoP meeting. During the regular INC meetings the interpretation of the language of the FCCC is a central issue. Many of the deliberately rather fuzzily formulated articles of the Convention have led to intense discussions. One of the contentious issues is joint implementation. This concept is built into the FCCC to enable countries to undertake cost-effective measures to limit the global cost of managing the problem of global warming. The provision allows countries to invest in emission-reducing measures in other countries, where the marginal costs of abatement are lower than at home. Whether such investment should be rewarded by some form of inter• national recognition of the effort or a 'climate credit' is a controversial question. Interna• tional cost-effective options are supposed to exist in particular in Central and Eastern European countries and in developing countries. This annex aims to give insight in the origin of the political sensitivity of joint impl• ementation.1 The first section gives a summary of different perceptions of joint imple• mentation in developing countries, as expressed by several government officials and NGOs during interviews held in Kenya and during the eighth INC conference, held in Geneva in August 1993. The second section gives a summary of the key issues of the eighth INC conference, when joint implementation was on the agenda for the first time. In addition, this section outlines the statements on these key issues, as expressed by governments officials during this INC meeting.

The perception of joint implementation in developing countries At present, many efforts are undertaken by industrialized countries to investigate the concept of joint implementation. However, due to limited resources, such studies are scarce in developing countries. As a result, developing may not always be fully aware of the implications of joint implementation for their economies and population, and of the merits and limitations of the joint implementation concept in general. This has raised many concerns, which were reflected during several interviews with government officials and NGOs from Kenya (held in Nairobi, May 1993), as well as in several publications of the Climate Action Network Africa (IMPACT). In addition, during the eighth meeting of

This annex is based on the confidential report ''Joint Implementation in Discussion", written in the context of this research project. This report is based on information gathered in three different activities. First of all, several meetings/interviews have taken place in the United States as well as in Kenya. Second, dwing a teleconference, the members of our Advisory Board have discussed some specific issues related to joint implementation. To complete the picture of the various points of view, the eighth INC meeting (held in Geneva in august 1993) has been carefully followed.

181 the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (held in Geneva, August 1993), a number of representatives of developing countries have expressed anxieties towards joint imple• mentation. A summary of these concerns is given below. A number of objections relate to the principle of joint implementation, sometimes based on moral concerns. These include the following arguments. Joint implementation resembles the concept of tradeable emission permits. Market structures are typically underdeveloped in Africa. In addition, international trade is often unequal. Why would 'trade' be equal in the case of joint implementation? Such policies will not work as long as there is inequality between the partners negotiating on these matters; Joint implementation will give Northern countries a right to pollute. This is morally indefensible. Developing countries equate emissions rights with the right to devel• opment because emissions of greenhouse gases are typically considered a part of normal economic development. Hence, developing countries are not inclined to sell such rights. Moreover, marketing those rights will allow the fortunate to 'buy up the environment'; Joint implementation enables rich countries to continue their excessive, wasteful lifestyles. The burden of responsibility for global warming rests with the North. In order to restore the North/ South balance, the essential lifestyle changes must occur in the North, not in the South.

During the eighth INC conference, the latter argument was also phrased as "no export of sacrifices". Developed countries have created the (GHG) problem and should therefore take care of their own emissions. Some other arguments expressed dur• ing this conference include: Developed countries (listed in Annex II) have committed themselves in the Conven• tion to pay for necessary action by developing countries; it is not fair for them now to demand carbon credits in return for such payments; Developed countries will take advantage of developing countries in taking away from them the most cost-effective emission reduction options. Given the desperate fman• cial situation in many developing countries, these countries may be tempted to accept joint implementation projects to gain fmancial transfers from the North, without con• sidering the longer term obligations. When in due course developing countries also have obligations with respect to their emissions, the cheapest opportunities for emission reductions will have been used up. Joint implementation projects may tum developing countries into 'carbon repositor• ies'. For example, covering large areas with trees infringes on the future develop• ment opportunities of these countries. This is also denoted as 'environmental colo• nialism'. The joint implementation mechanism may pull developing countries into the Frame• work Convention in a way they want to avoid. Developing countries have as yet limited obligations under the Convention. A formal participation in joint implementa-

182 tion projects may involve additional reporting requirements. The transition towards actual emission reduction requirements is then narrowed; Joint implementation undercut the impact and effectiveness of the Convention by allowing countries to avoid undertaking measures at home. This is contrary to the spirit of the Convention, and will delay the transition to alternative energy economies and life styles in industrialized countries. This transition will be necessary if GHG emissions are to be stabilized at levels that do not threaten the climate and ecosys• tems; By allowing for joint implementation, existing technology will be disseminated, while technological innovation will be delayed. Technological progress is indispens• able to reach long-term reductions. A decade of innovation could be lost as a result of joint implementation.

There is some fear that in practice the effects of joint implementation may tum out dis• advantageous for developing countries. This concern is based on the following argum• ents. Given the existing inequalities in bargaining positions of partners in a joint imple• mentation project, a fair distribution of benefits is unlikely; There is no insurance that the benefits of a joint implementation project will accrue to the majority of people and satisfy their basic needs, such as food, shelter, energy, and so forth; There is a danger that joint implementation investments will not fit in with the devel• opment priorities of developing countries; There is no guarantee that developing countries will get the best technology; Joint implementation will favour the export of technology of Northern corporations and may hinder development/dissemination of technology developed in the South; A too narrow focus on technology transfer could lead to more "white elephants" in the South; technologies that do not work because adequate infrastructure is not in place to operate the system and maintain and replace equipment; Increased production costs in the industrialized countries resulting from costs incurred with joint implementation may be transferred back to the developing coun• tries through higher prices for manufactured goods; The system is open to manipulation and corruption.

During the INC meeting there was some discussion on criteria. The criteria proposed by different countries are included in Table 1 in the next section. The discussion on criteria in Kenya was rather premature. However, some suggestions were made. Equity and social acceptability should be emphasized. The joint implementation projects should be in complete agreement with the needs of the inhabitants; There should be an equitable distribution of benefits. The benefits should be measured in broad terms. In Africa, monetary values alone are typically inadequate as criteria for decisions. In allowing for funding a joint implementation project, a cost-benefit approach which systematically sets out the good and bad consequences

183 of alternatives should be applied. The criterion of cost-effectiveness in money terms does not make sense; Criteria should take into account the specific circumstances prevailing in developing countries. In Africa there is a real trade-off between protecting the environment and satisfying basic needs. The criteria should reflect this situation; Environmental effectiveness (real emission reductions) and additionality of funds are important.

Generally speaking, developing countries seem to give prtortty to energy-related joint implementation projects. There seems to be an overall negative perception of including sinks in the joint implementation system. Giving a country permission to undertake afforestation measures in Third World countries to offset their own emissions is tantamount to dumping; Linking sources in the North to sinks in the South raises the spectre of Northern countries determining forestry policies in the South. Instead, forestry policies in the South should be determined by the rights of local and indigenous peoples to control and manage their own resources, not by the needs of Northern citizens to compen• sate for their excess carbon emissions; Kenya faces a sharp increase in population, and hence a growing demand for energy. Woodfuel is the most important source of energy, accounting for over 72% of all energy use. Only a small proportion of wood products is commercially traded. In this context, it will be hard to change the behaviour of the population towards the forests; In Kenya, fertile land is scarce, and hence there is a little potential for afforestation projects. Foreigners will never be allowed to decide on the destination of scarce land, and projects will not be approved unless the project has a profound economic interest for the local community; Including sinks in the joint implementation system involves many technical diffi• culties and risks; The discussion on joint implementation projects in Kenya should focus on technol• ogy transfers. Joint implementation investments should promote environmentally development in Kenya. Hence, projects which result in a reduc• tion in (imported) energy demand should have priority; Investments should be Southern driven, i.e. made available in response to specific requests by Southerners for programmes designed to serve wider communities of people; If sinks are included in the joint implementation system, carbon credits should be linked to carbon debits. Hence, a country funding afforestation projects (claiming credits) should also count carbon emissions for which it is responsible as carbon debits (for example as a result of deforestation activities).

Although the arguments presented here suggest a rather gloomy perception in developing countries of joint implementation, a number of developing country representatives see some advantages in the concept. They see joint implementation as a mechanism to

184 increase flows of efficient technology and fmancial resources to developing countries. Additional perceived benefits of joint implementation projects include stimulation of employment opportunities, reduction of local pollutants and a reduced demand for (imported) fuels and hence an improvement of the balance of payment. The general per• ceived advantage of joint implementation over a global system of tradeable emission permits is the relative transparency and clarity of its effects: allowing for joint implemen• tation has relatively less serious implications for future emissions (and therefore develop• ment opportunities) of developing countries. There is a general perception that research into the potential effects of joint imple• mentation in developing countries is needed. Some recommendations on follow up activ• ities, and in particular on further research include: Stimulate focused research at national levels on implications of joint implementation for developing nations, and in particular to the poor; Reflection is needed on how to make these macro-level solutions responsive to the needs of the rural population, since a mechanism such as joint implementation is not defined, motivated or controlled by the local people themselves; Increase mechanisms for public discussion and negotiation. This will increase accep• tability of joint implementation, as people will then experience joint implementation less as something imposed by the North; Disseminate of information on joint implementation in general.

To summarize, there is a need to help developing countries to mobilize funds to under• take research in joint implementation, which should increase awareness of implications and opportunities of joint implementation.

Key issues at the eighth Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee The concept of joint implementation means different things to different governments and NGOs. This was certainly reflected in the 8th meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiat• ing Committee, held in August 1993 in Geneva. The INC has specific responsibilities under the Framework Convention with respect to joint implementation; it has to prepare draft criteria for implementing joint implementation, which have to be considered at the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) in 1995. In August 1993 joint imple• mentation was on the agenda of the INC for the first time. The most important statements with respect to joint implementation are summarized in the attached table. The purpose of this table is to give an overview on the general perception of joint implementation as well as of the points of views on the main items, as expressed by different government representatives. The first and second column (A and B) give views on types of joint implementation partnership. The third column (C) answers the question whether the joint implementation system should allow for sinks, and the following column (D) concerns the relationship between joint implementation and the financial mechanism of the FCCC (GEF). The summarized statements of different gov• ernments are followed by a rough indication of the general perception of the joint imple-

185 mentation concept, represented in column E. Some comments on these key issues are given below.

Partnerships (columns A and B) The FCCC imposes different commitments on the Parties to the Convention. Different circumstances and capabilities of Parties have led to "common but differentiated respon• sibilities" in tackling the global warming problem. The OECD countries, listed in Annex II, have committed themselves inter alia to funding emission reduction measures in de• veloping countries2• In addition, developed countries have a commitment to take steps to return to their 1990 levels of by the year 2000. Other Parties to the Convention have less specific obligations. An important issue during INC 8 was the question whether joint implementation projects may be carried out between Annex-1 countries only, or whether they may involve developing countries as well (columns A and B). The language of the Conven• tion suggests that joint implementation with developing country Parties is allowed. How• ever, several developing countries spoke against inclusion of developing countries in joint implementation. Although most Western countries, including the European Union (EU), saw opportunities for partnerships with developing countries, some OECD coun• tries expressed concerns as well. Concerns with a technical character refer to the fact that developing countries have not committed themselves to a quantified target, which can lead to problems in assessing the 'baseline' and hence the additionality of a project. Other concerns relate to the argument that priority should be given to emission reduc• tions in developed countries (see above).

Joint implementation and present commitments (columns A and B) The language of the Convention suggests that joint implementation can be used to fulfil the present commitments, i.e. to take measures designed to return emissions by the year 2000 to their 1990 levels. However, several countries opposed this interpretation, and argued that joint imple• mentation cannot be used as a substitute for the present commitments of developed coun• tries. Not only most developing countries, but also a number of OECD countries, stated that joint implementation should not be used to realize existing commitments. The ne• cessity of structural changes in life-styles in industrialized countries was stressed, and the essential enhancement of technological innovation in these countries (these countries answered questions A and/or B with 'not yet'). Very few countries endorsed the literal reading of the Convention, admitting joint implementation as a partial substitute for exist• ing national commitments.

Sources and sinks (column C) Some countries see joint implementation as projects limited to the energy side (COz), whereas others argued that the concept should include other sources of GHG emissions

These funds are, for the time being, to be channelled by the Global Environment Facility (GEF).

186 and sinks. Several speakers emphasized that sinks should be excluded, for the time being or forever. This probably relates to some concerns presented in section 1 ('environmental colonialism') as well as perceived technical difficulties in including sinks in the joint implementation system. Some countries even stated that the assumed cost-effectiveness of joint implementation measures is illusory, and is primarily the result of inappropriate resource accounting methods which ignore political and social costs.

Joint implementation and existing financial flows (column D) Some countries are concerned that joint implementation will lead to a decrease in exist• ing financial flows to developing countries, such as the Official Development Assistance (ODA). Some countries feared that joint implementation would become a substitute for the financial assistance by OECD countries called for by the FCCC. This money is to be channelled, for the time being, to developing countries by means of the Global Environ• ment Facility (GEF). Expectations on the amount of the funds vary. In some countries' view, the industrialized countries have already committed themselves to decreasing their own emissions and limiting the growth of developing country emissions. From this point of view, joint implementation may seem redundant. Other countries realize that there are financial constraints to undertaking substantial measures both on the national as well as on the international level. In this view, joint implementation is an opportunity to mobilize new funds (through the business community). However, the majority of the representa• tives clearly stated in the INC meeting that joint implementation should be kept separate from financial commitments under the Convention (column D).

Table Statements of representatives of governments during INC 8. A Does the provision on joint implementation in Article 4.2(a) of the FCCC apply to projects between two or more Annex-1 countries? B Does the provision on joint implementation in Article 4.2(a) of the FCCC apply to projects between an Annex-1 country and a developing country? C Should the joint implementation system include sinks? D Should joint implementation funds be separate from - and additional to - the fman• cial mechanism of the FCCC (GEF)? E What is the general perception of joint implementation? ( - =negative, + =positive) n= no y= yes ny= not yet (question A and B: this usually means that credits for joint implementation cannot (for the time being) be applied to present commitments under Article 4.2. of the FCCC)

187 Country A B c D Criteria E Algeria y n - Australia y y y y Joint implementation arrangements would meet the fol- + lowing conditions: * projects that result in net reductions of emissions * consistency with the national plans and priorities of host Parties * no negative social and environmental impacts on host Parties * voluntary arrangements based on mutual agreement between participants; and could be based on the following principles: * simplicity- to encourage early and widespread partici- pation * accountability- to engender trust amongst participants and non-participants * transparency- to determine whether emission reduc- tions take place * flexibility- to ensure that a wide variety of projects are eligible

Belgium ny ny ny y Clear and unambiguous criteria are needed to ensure + (on credibility and transparency of joint implementation. behalf Criteria for accounting and crediting should allow only of the activities with sound scientific bases for the calculation EU) of costs and reductions of emissions. Until the CoP has laid down criteria for the determination of sinks, this should not be included in the scope of joint implementa- tion. "Baseline" information needed to assess the incremental impact of a project on net GHG emissions should be defined very carefully. In designing criteria for joint implementation, INC should ensure that such pro- jects are encouraged by making it possible that they will be registered as international contributions by the span- soring Party, pending future decisions about crediting them against further commitments agreed under the Convention.

Canada y y y projects must + * contribute to real, verifiable and measurable reduc- Lions in emissions * be consistent with local economies and social develop- ment priorities of host countries and must be acceptable in terms of their impact on the local economy, public health and the quality of the environment * help strengthen endogenous capacities in host countries Colom- y +- - bia (G77 +china)

188 Denmark y y It is important that criteria for using joint implementation + are clear and transparent so that the intention of devel- oped countries cannot be misunderstood. It should be considered to include developing country Parties on the condition that should fulfil certain criteria to be laid down. No interference with present development assist- ance. One provision could be that only countries which are fulfilling the recommendation of Agenda 21 of allo- eating 0.7% of GNP as ODA should be eligible for participating in joint implementation. * credits for joint implementation projects should be limited in time and determine with a decreasing crediting over the lifetime of the project * Joint implementation concept should only include co1 emissions from fossil fuels. Sinks should not be included until the CoP has laid down criteria for determination of sinks. * reporting requirements should be strengthened for joint implementation including developing countries * socio-economic criteria for the "baseline scenario" for the period in question should be designed very carefully. Finland y ny y * joint implementation is voluntary in nature + * joint implementation is complementary part of national policies to fulfil the commitments in a cost effective way. Joint implementation should not interfere with other commitments undertaken by Annex-1 Parties * the effects of joint activities on the emissions by sources and removals by sinks should be evaluated by using the same methods as evaluating the effects of activities taken within the national territory. These re- viewing method&should have international transparency * the evaluation of the effects should cover the full life cycle of the project and joint activities * to avoid double counting joint implementation activ- ities should be reported to the Convention by participat- ing countries in a consistent way * the joint activity projects should be initiated and imple- mented after the signature of the Convention. They should not be part of earlier cooperation agreements. Joint implementation should promote mobilization of additional resources. At a later stage there is a need to create a mechanism, e.g. a clearinghouse, to deal with multilateral joint imple- mentation activities. This mechanism could be used to take care of joint activities between countries without defined commitments or targets. The mechanism would assist the financing and recipient Parties to find each other. These kind of multilateral activities need specific common criteria. The principles mentioned above could form a base for the later elaboration of these criteria. This mechanism would mainly serve the needs of the developing countries and the criteria should be worked out taking into account their specific needs. It would be appropriate that the clearinghouse would be part of the future financial mechanism.

189 France y y It is often suggested that, particularly with regard to - C02, it is very expensive to reduce emissions in devel- oped countries and very cheap to do so in developing countries and countries with unstable economies. More- over it neglects the advantages of innovation dynamics. To prevent industrialized counties to give undue prefer- ence to joint implementation a number of provisions are needed. * partial crediting, e.g. 50 per cent of emission reduction * credits should not exceed a certain percentage of do- mestic emission reductions (say, 25 per cent) * it is only permitted if donor country has already imple- mented at home all actions with unit costs per ton of emission avoided less than or equal to that of the action in the recipient country * accounting procedures have to be specified * restrict the tune-frame of joint implementation to the end of the present decade, afterwards rich countries should be obliged to give minimum assistance to devel- oping and "transition" countries Germany ny ny y * there should be common understanding among + contracting parties that the improved cost efficiency achieved by joint implementation must be used to improve climate protection. * joint implementation could be applied before 2000, but this requires clearly defined reduction commitments further-reaching than the present obligations * consideration should be given to a certain degree of "over achievement" where the emission reductions achieved are not fully offset against the reduction obligations, but can rather be discounted by a certain set percentage * participation must always be voluntary * for annex I countries, specified shares of the various reduction commitments should be agreed upon which should not be met by joint implementation projects but only by measures on the state's own territory * contracting parties should be responsible for socio- economic and environmental impact assessments * support pilot phase without crediting arrangements Japan y y + Malaysia y n * joint implementation must lead to a real reduction of - GHG emissions of Parties involved * Funds for joint implementation projects should be additional to normal commitments of fmancial resources from Annex-I Parties. * Developed country Parties must flfSt meet the obliga- tions of stabilization and reduction fully at national levels before any joint implementation with developing countries could be considered

190 Mexico y y y * Projects involving sinks or reservoirs must be reviewed + carefully (and more critical) in light of sovereign man- agement of natural resources * criteria should avoid deviations of the obligations adopted by the Parties to the Convention * Joint implementation should not exceed a small per- centage of the eventual quota assigned to each partici- pant country with responsibilities under the Convention * Donor countries cannot claim the total reduction result- ing from joint implementation projects. * It should be shown that joint implementation results in better results for global climate health * Counting emissions reductions should not go beyond time set in the project. * Resources need to be new and additional, independent of the financial mechanism or other financial and techno- logical obligations, including ODA. * Distortion of development priorities of the recipient countries should be avoided. Preference must be given to projects presented to the financial mechanism out of the developing countries will. Nauru y n y * limit joint implementation to Parties with similar com- - mitrnents (annex I) * sum of emission reductions of joint implementation projects equal to or greater than the sum of separate commitments * joint implementation projects between annex I should only be considered after those countries have reduced GHG emissions within their own territories * joint implementation could be limited to an appropriately small fraction of total commitments of developed country partners in order to avoid creating disincentives to appropriate technological innovation * prior to any arrangement, parties may wish to seek consensus on the legal, institutional and administrative framework governing joint implementation

191 Nether- ny ny y * emissions reductions should be real, including aspects + lands such as establishing clear baselines in order to avoid double counting. Other aspects include for instance verifiability, available methods to quantify emissions and sins, and clear accounting and reporting arrangements. * with respect to additionality, joint implementation arrangements should be strictly separate from and in addition to financial obligations of developed country Parties. * proper balance between actions taken within industrialized countries and elsewhere. Mechanism to obtain the balance is, flrst, that of partial crediting (mea- ning a certain percentage of actual reductions under a joint implementation project can be used for crediting against (future) commitments of Parties). Another option would be to make use of a clearinghouse concept, mean- ing that parties wanting to get credits would have to go through a central clearinghouse or "fund". Credits could be obtained against a set price (for example $10/ton). The fund then will use the money to get actual reduc- tions through a mix of cost-effective projects, and will be able to do it at lower cost. Third concept would be to keep separate account of domestic and international reductions. Annex-! countries might then assume interna- tiona! commitments in addition to domestic commitments (parallel accounting and dual commitments). The first category (including both general as well as some project related issues) should include criteria * to enable pilot projects to be taken into consideration when in the future crediting will be possible under an agreed system (so as to encourage pilot schemes to be developed, as was also stressed in the EU intervention * about methodologies to be used to quantify effects of projects * related to the balance between domestic and intema- tiona! action * regarding the "good standing" of partner countries with respect to their obligations under the Convention * regarding accounting, verification and reporting * regarding the life time of projects to be used under joint implementation arrangements * regarding the necessary "baseline" information in host countries * regarding the legal arrangements * on the "insurance" arrangements in case of failure of joint implementation projects

192 Norway y y Joint implementation should be innovative, practical and + flexible and be guided by cost-effectiveness and environ- mental effectiveness. Joint implementation should be voluntary, in accordance with the national priorities of host Parties and should be additional to the specific commitments toward the Financial Mechanism. Non- bureaucratic criteria for joint implementation should satisfy the following conditions * efficiency: lowest possible global expenditure for a given level of abatement * equity: a fair distribution of gains from joint imple- mentation * effectiveness: joint implementation should be conson- ant with FCCC goals * robust: joint implementation should be flexible to adjust to the evolution of the FCCC * practical: joint implementation should be simple and transparent to arrange, administer and monitor

Russian * take into account the optimum project implementation + Pede- period and the real economic capacities of joint imple- ration mentation partners * cost effectiveness should also take into consideration the real economic capacities of the partners Sweden y y y + Switzer- y ny y * developed countries should implement commitments to + land stabilize to 1990 levels by the year 2000 domestically * The cost-effectiveness criterion should be defined bro- adly so as to include environmental and social effective- ness * Impact assessments should be performed and reported for joint implementation projects * A mechanism or subsidiary body will have to be ere- ated for or tasked with reviewing compliance as well as assessing the effects on emissions of joint implementa- lion projects. * Standard reporting guidelines will have to be devel- oped * Parties will have to be required to show the additional nature of the programmes, i.e. that the positive impact on emissions would not have been obtained otherwise. * Agreed accounting methods in case where sinks or different GHG are included will have to be developed.

Since joint implementation represents one specific aspect of the Convention which implies a well-defined set of rules and criteria, should a specific protocol or annex not be developed on this subject?

193 United y y y * Voluntary nature. Joint implementation should consist + States of mutually voluntary projects between parties, and could be agreed to and accepted by governments of participat- ing countries. * Additionality. Joint implementation cannot be seen as system which reinforces business as usual; commitments and projects have to be above a certain baseline to ensure that real reductions are brought about. This applies to both the public sector resources and private resources. * Verifiable reductions. It is important and quite man- ageable to develop a system in which projects have base- lines and, over the lifetimes of such projects, emissions are carefully monitored and tracked. This is important to build confidence in any joint implementation system. * Diversified. Joint implementation would be a very diverse system of projects; energy, agricultural, and sinks.

194 ANNEX 2 STATUS OF RATIFICATION OF THE CONVENTION 15 February 1994

1. Mauritius 04/09/92 29. Sweden 23/06/93

2. Seychelles 22109/92 30. Norway 09/07193

3. Marshall Islands 08/10/92 31. Tunisia 15/07/93

4. United States of America 15/10/92 32. Burkina Faso 02/09/93

5. Zimbabwe 03/ll/92 33. Uganda 08/09/93

6. Maldives 09/11/92 34. New Zealand 16/09/93

7. Monaco 24/11/92 35. Mongolia 30/09/93

8. Canada 04112/92 36. 07/10193

9. Australia 30/12/92 37. Tuvalu 26/10193

10. China 05/01/93 38. India 01/ll/93

11. Saint Kills and Nevis 07101/93 39. Nauru ll/ll/93

12. Antigua and Barbuda 02102193 40. Jordan 12/ll/93

13. Ecuador 23102/93 41. Micronesia 18/ll/93

14. Fiji 25102193 42. Sudan 19/ll/93

15. Mexico 11/03/93 43. Sri Lanka 23/ll/93

16. Papua New Guinea 16/03/93 44. United Kingdom 08/12193

17. Vanuatu 25/03/93 45. Germany 09/12/93

18. Cook Islands 20102193 46. Switzerland 10/12/93

19. Guinea 07105/93 47. Republic of Korea 14112193

20. Armenia 14105!93 48. Netherlands 20/12193 21. Japan 28/05/93 49. Denmark 21/12/93

22. Zambia 28/05/93 50. Portugal 21/12/93

23. Peru 07/06193 51. Spain 21/12/93

24. Algeria 09/06/93 52. E.E.C. 21/12193

25. Saint Lucia 14/06/93 53. Cuba 05/01/94

26. Iceland 16106/93 54. Mauritania 20/01/94

27. Uzbekistan* 20/06193 55. Botswana 27/01/94

28. Dominica* 21106/93

(*)=Accession

195 ANNEX 3 TEXT OF RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION

Article 2. Objective The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.

Article 3.1 and 3.3. Principles l.The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof. 3.The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures should take into account different socio• economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaption, and comprise all economic sectors. Efforts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested Parties.

Article 4.2(a), (b) and (d). Commitments The developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I commit themselves specifically as provided for in the following: (a) Each of these Parties shall adopt national (this includes policies and measures adopted by regional economic integration organisations) policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention, recognizing that the return by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol would contribute to such modification, and taking into account the differences in these Parties' starting points and approaches, economic structure and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available technologies and other individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of the Parties to the global effort regarding that objective. These Parties may implement such policies and measures jointly

196 with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention and, in particular, that of this subparagraph. (b) In order to promote progress to this end, each of these Parties shall communicate, within six months of the entry into force of the Convention for it and periodically thereafter, and in accordance with Article 12, detailed information on its policies and measures referred to in subparagraph (a) above, as well as on its resulting projected anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol for the period referred to in subparagraph (a), with the aim of returning individual or jointly to their 1990 levels of these anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. This information will be reviewed by the Conference of Parties, at its first session and periodically thereafter, in accordance with Article 7. (d) The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, review the adequacy of subparagmphs (a) and (b) above. Such review shall be carried out in the light of the best available scientific information and assessment on climate change and its impacts, as well as relevant technical, social and economic information. Based on this review, the Conference of the Parties shall take appropriate action, which may include the adoption of amendments to the commitments in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. The Conference of the Parties, at its first session, shall also take decisions regarding criteria for joint implementation as indicated in subparagraph (a) above. A second review of subparagraph (a) and (b) shall take place not later than 31 December 1998, and thereafter at regular intervals determined by the Conference of the Parties, until the objective of the Convention is met.

Article 7.2(c). Conference of the Parties [The Conference of the Parties may] Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of measures adopted by them to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under the Convention.

Article 8.2. Secretariat 2. The functions of the secretariat shall be: (a) To make arrangements for sessions of the Conference of the Parties and its subsidiary bodies established under the Convention and to provide them with services as required; (b) To compile and transmit reports submitted to it; (c) To facilitate assistance to the Parties, particularly developing country Parties, on request, in the compilation and communication of information required in accordance with the provisions of the Convention; (d) To prepare reports on its activities and present them to the Conference of the Parties; (c) To ensure the necessary coordination with the secretariats of other relevant international bodies; (J) To enter, under the overall guidance of the Conference of the Parties, into such administrative and contractual arrangements as may be required for the effective discharge of its functions; and

197 (g) To perfonn the other secretariat functions specified in the Convention and in any of its protocols and such other functions as may be detennined by the Conference of the Parties.

Article 9. Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice I. A subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice is hereby established to provide the Conference of the Parties and, as appropriate, its other subsidiary bodies with timely infonnation and advice on scientific and technological matters relating to the Convention. This body shall be open to participation by all Parties and shall be multidisciplinary. It shall comprise government representatives competent in the relevant field of expertise. It shall report regularly to the Conference of the Parties on all aspects of its work. 2. Under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties, and drawing upon existing competent international bodies, this body shall: (a) Provide assessments of the state of scientific knowledge relating to climate change and its effects; (b) Prepare scientific assessments on the effects of measures taken in the implementation of the Convention; (c) Identify innovative, efficient and state-of-the-art technologies and know-how and advise on the ways and means of promoting development and/or transferring such technologies; (d) Provide advice on scientific programmes, international cooperation in research and development related to climate change, as well as on ways and means of supporting endogenous capacity-building in developing countries; and (c) Respond to scientific, technological and methodological questions that the Conference of the Parties and its subsidiary bodies may put to the body. 3. The functions and tcnns of reference of this body may be further elaborated by the Conference of the Parties.

Article 10. Subsidiary Body for Implementation I. A subsidiary body for implementation is hereby established to assist the Conference of the Parties in the assessment and review of the effective implementation of the Convention. This body shall be open to participation by all Parties and comprise government representatives who are experts on matters related to climate change. It shall report regularly to the Conference of the Parties on all aspects of its work. 2. Under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties, this body shall: (a) Consider the information communicated in accordance with Article 12, paragraph 1, to assess the overall aggregated effect of the steps taken by the Parties in the light of the latest scientific assessments concerning climate change; (b) Consider the infonnation communicated in accordance with Article 12, paragraph 2, in order to assist the Conference of the Parties in carrying out the reviews required by Article 4, paragraph 2(d); and (c) Assist the Conference of the Parties, as appropriate, in the preparation and implementation of its decisions.

198 Article 11.5. Financial Mechanism The developed country Parties may also provide and developing country Parties avail themselves of, financial resources related to the implementation of the Convention through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels.

Article 12.2(a) and (b) and 12.8. Communication of Information Related to Implementation 2.Each developed country Party and each other Party included in Annex-1 shall incorporate in its communication the following elements of information: (a) A detailed description of the policies and measures that it has adopted to implement its commitment under Article 4, paragraphs 2 (a) and 2 (b); and (b) A specific estimate of the effects that the policies and measures referred to in subparagraph (a) immediately above will have on anthropogenic emissions by its sources and removals by its sinks of greenhouse gases during the period referred to in Article 4, paragraph 2 (a). 8.Any group of Parties may, subject to guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and to prior notification to the Conference of the Parties, make a joint communication in fulfilment of their obligations under this Article, provided that such a communication includes information on the fulfilment by each of these Parties of its individual obligations under the Convention.

Article 14. Settlement of Disputes 1. In the event of a dispute between any two or more Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, the Parties concerned shall seek a settlement of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their own choice. 2. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention, or at any time thereafter, a Party which is not a regional economic integration organization may declare in a written instrument submitted to the Depositary that, in respect of any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, it recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any Party accepting the same obligation: (a) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice, and/or (b) Arbitration in accordance with procedures to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties as soon as practicable, in an annex on arbitration. A Party which is a regional economic integration organization may make a declaration with like effect in relation to arbitration in accordance with the procedures referred to in subparagraph (b) above. 5. Subject to the operation of paragraph 2 above, if after twelve months following the notification by one Party to another that a dispute exists between them, the Parties concerned have not been able to settle their dispute through the means mentioned in paragraph 1 above, the dispute shall be submitted, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, to conciliation. 6. A conciliation commission shall be created upon the request of one of the Parties to the dispute. The commission shall be composed of an equal number of members appointed by each Party concerned and a chairman chosen jointly by the members appointed by each Party. The commission shall render a recommendatory award, which the Parties shall consider in good faith.

199 ANNEX 4 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE POLISH ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

One of the basic principles of the new environmental policy is respect for the law: the addressees are expected to be law-abiding citizens. This means the legal system and the system of enforcement should be reconstructed in such a way that there will be no prosecution of infringement or circumvention of a regulation if it is due to circumstances outside the control of the person concerned or due to impossibility of performance or if it is done in the public interest. Excessive pollution is the main threat to the natural environment. The strategy for warding off his threat is based on the principle of control at source. This means that the choice of preventive measures and methods for dealing with damage should be made according to the following hierarchy: avoid the generation of pollution by action aimed at changing manufacturing and consumption practices so as to reduce pollutants; recycling, i.e. recirculation of materials and resources; recuperation of energy, water, and raw materials from sewage and waste; utilization of waste to reduce emissions into the environment; and neutralization of pollution; i.e. cleaning of wastewater, detoxication of combustion gases, and neutralization and dumping of solid wastes. The principle of common goods will be implemented through the adoption of institutional and legal conditions by citizens, social groups and non-governmental organizations. Action for environmental protection will be promoted through environmental education programmes designed to induce a greater ecological consciousness and a new ethic of behavior towards the environment. In connection with the transition of the Polish economy to the market system, environmental policy will be subject to economic principles. This means that the greatest possible advantage will be taken of market mechanisms, while state intervention will be maintenaned to the extent necessary. Adherence to economic principles also means strict implementation of the polluter• pays principle. Full responsibility, will be placed on the originator of the pollution i.e. the person using the environmental resource in question; his reposibility will include liability for the effects of pollution and other damage to the environment. In the reconstruction of environmental law and the system of economic instruments, the principle of decentralization (regionalization) will be observed. This means: extension or introduction of rights of territorial autonomy and regional charges, standards and other environmental requirements imposed on commercial enterprises; regionalization of national mechanisms and policies of environmental protection in respect of three categories of areas: environmentally hazardous areas (industrialized and urbanized areas); ares of major natural resources (forests and "environment-friendly" agriculture); and intermediate areas; linking regional policies to the European regional ecosystems.

200 The major role played by in the pollution of the European environment, as well as the transboundary influx of pollutants into Polish territory, highlight the need for the principle of a common solution whereby the entire international community is to address European as well as global problems of environmental devastation. A need also exists for strengthening the links between regional European policies and regional ecosystems. With a view to the vast task to be accomplished and the large investments required to reduce degradation and to resuscitate the environment, the principle of staging long-term plans should be adopted, with the selection of priorities for each stage to be implemented.

201 ANNEX 5 ADDITIONAL GHG 'COSTS' OF PROJECTS

In many cases the implementation and operation of a project involves an additional GHG 'cost'. For example, construction of a windmill requires a kg of steel, and the production of steel causes the emission of p kg C02-equivalent. Thus the 'cost' of the investment, i.e. the windmill, in terms of GHG emission will be equal to:

GHG additional emission = a * P kg C02

This additional 'cost' should be deducted from the gross GHG effects ensuing from implementation of the windmill JIP. A further deduction should be made in respect of GHG emissions involved in operating the JIP. It will be be necessary in the near future to collect adequate information on addi• tional GHG 'costs' (investment, operating), expressed in units of C02-equivalent, for the main materials and products,3 so that they can be used in assessing the additional GHG 'cost' of each JIP.

The cost of making such estimates and producing a full life-cycle analysis is high and takes a lot of time. 202 ANNEX 6 POLISH ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

An assessment of environmental impact should meet the following requirements: it should include the following elements of the environment: the surface of the land, soil, minerals, surface and underground waters, marine environment, flora and fauna in their mutual interrelationships; it should take into account the successive stages of realization of the investment, operating it and, insofar as relevant, its liquidation, together with any appurtenances attached to it or remote, taking into account also any foreseeable emergency situations; depending on needs and possibilities, it should start from data and particulars, collected during prior surveys and environmental studies, also taking into account subsequent observations and measurements relating to the state of detonation of the environment and other onerous factors; the issues should be presented as required by the nature of the phenomena in question, with a view to facilitating the analysis and interpretation thereof.

This assessment should include specifically: characteristics of technical and technological solutions; consumption of energy, materials and water, and quantification of different kinds of waste and pollutants produced, and other onerous factors; determination of methods to minimize a negative impact on the environment and of the protective facilities required to attain the objective, together with the technological and economic efficiency thereof; determination of the scope and method of developing a protective zone where, in spite of technical solutions actually applied or planned, the harmful impact on the environment cannot be eliminated or reduced to acceptable proportions; a forecast of changes in the state of the environment which will result from the planned investment, from the application of a design or from the exploitation of an existing object or complex of objects.

A complex assessment of the impact made by an investment should also include: a specification and characteristics of the area in the immediate neighbourhood of each object and the present state of the environment, with emphasis on elements on which the project will make a particular impact; specification of admissible impact on the environment and any onerous factors; estimate of significant and likely impacts made on any particular element of the environment and on human health as well as on the scenic values, with a determination of the direct, indirect and long-term impacts resulting from the use of natural resources, including minerals, emission of pollutants and other onerous factors and manufactured or stored waste materials; particulars which are useful for the determination of the admissible level of ernittion of pollutants, noise, vibration and other factors onerous for the environment; and

203 particulars useful for the determination of conditions on which licenses for intake of water and ejection of sewage may be granted; determination of the conditions on which the environment may be used.

204 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arrow, K.J., R.C. Lind, (1970), 'Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions', American Economic Review, Vol. 60, (June 1970), pp. 364-378. Asante, S.K.B., (1980), 'The Concept of Stability of Contractual Relations in the Transnational Investment Process', in K. Hossain (ed.), Legal Aspects of a New International Economic Order, Frances Pinter, London, pp. 234-262. Barrett, S., (1992), 'Acceptable Allocations of Tradeable Carbon Emission Entitlements in a Global Warming Treaty', in UNCT AD/RDP/DFP/1, Combating Global Warming: Study on a Global System of Tradeable Emission Entitlements, New York. Barrett, S., (1993), Joint Implementation for Achieving National Abatement Commitments in the Framework Convention on Climate Change, OECD, Paris. Benedick, R.E., (1991), Ozone Diplomacy, New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet. Bloed, A., van Dijk, P. (eds.), (1988), Forty Years of International Court of Justice: Jurisdiction, Equity and Equality, Europa Instituut, Utrecht. Bodansky, D., (1993), 'The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary', in 18 Yale Journal of International Law, pp. 451-588. Brower, C.N., (1990-V), 'The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal', in 224 Receuil des Cours de l'Academie de Droit International de Ia Haye, Chapter V, pp. 333-385. Burg, T. van der, (1993), Negative Cost Options for Energy-saving: An Interpretation from the Economic Perspective, Amsterdam, Institute for Environmental Studies, W93/04. Burg, T. van der, (1993), On Joint Implementation, Institute for Environmental Studies (93/190), Amsterdam. Burg T. van der, (1991), Project Appraisal and Macroeconomic Policy, State University Groningen (Ph.D. dissertation). (A revised version will be published in 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers). Charnovitz, S., (1991), 'Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX', in 25 Journal of World Trade, no. 5, pp. 37-55. Chowdhury, S.R., (1988), 'Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Substratum of the Seoul Declaration', in P. de Waart, P. Peters and E. Denters (eds.), International Law and Development, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, pp. 59-85. EBRD, (1992), Environmental Procedures, European Procedures for Reconstruction and Development, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. GATT, (1986), The Texts of the Tokyo Round Agreements, Geneva, pp. 1-25. GEF (Global Environment Facility), (1993), Mobilizing Private Capital against Global Warming: A Business Concept and Policy Issues, Discussion Draft, February 1993, Washington, The World Bank. Goldberg, D.M., (1993), 'As the World Bums: Negotiating the Framework Convention on Climate Change', in 5 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, pp. 239- 275. Grubb, M.J., (1990), Energy Policies and the , Vol. 1, Policy Appraisal, RIIA, Darthmouth, UK.

205 Grubb, M., (1992), 'Options for an International Agreement', in UNCTAD/RDP/DFP/1, Combating Global Warming: Study on a Global System of Tradeable Emission Entitlements, New York. Hanisch, T., (1991), 'Joint Implementation of Commitments to Curb Climate Change', CI• CERO Policy Note 1991:2, Oslo. IAEA, (1993), 'Electricity supply in Central and Eastern European countries: The role of nuclear energy', IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 35, No 1 (March). IUCN/UNEP/WWF, (1991), Caring for the Earth. A Strategy for Sustainable Living, The World Conservation Union, United Nations Environment Programme, World Wide Fund For Nature, Gland, Switzerland. Jackson, J.H., (1969), World Trade and the Law of GATT, Bobbs-Merrill, U.S.A. Janikowski R., Michaliszyn B., (1993), Mozliwosci wprowadzenia produkto-zorientowanej polityki ekologicznej w Polsce (Possibilities of Implementation of Product-oriented Ecological Policy in Poland), Instytut Ekologii Teren6w Uprzemysowionych, Katowice (in Polish). Janikowski R., Michaliszyn B., (1993), Ecolabelling in Poland, UN ECE Seminar on Low• waste Technology and Environmentally Sound Products, Warsaw. Janikowski R., (1993), Wielokryterialny model decyzyjny jako narzedzie oddzialywania projektowanej dzialalnosci czlowieka na srodowisko (Multi-criteria Decision Model as a Tool of Environmental Impact Assessment), Instytut Ekologii Teren6w Uprzemys• lowionych, Katowice (in Polish). Jones, T., (1992), Cost-Effectiveness and Implementing the Climate Change Convention, Paris, OECD. Kimball, L.A., (1992), Forging International Agreement: Strengthening International Institutions for Environment and Development, World Resources Institute, Washington D.C. Kucharski R., Marchwinska E., Gzyl J., (1993), Agricultural Policy in Poland in Polluted Areas, Ecological Engineering (to be published). Lillich, R.B., (1972-1975), The Valuation of Nationalized Property in International Law, 3 vols., Charlottesville. Lind, R.C., (1982), Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy, Washington, John Hopkins University Press. McKinsey and Company, (1989), Protecting the Global Environment: Funding Mechanisms, Findings and Conclusions of the Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change, Noordwijk, November 1989. MEPNRF, (1991), National Environmental Policy of Poland, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry, Warsaw. Merkus H., (1992), The Framework Convention on Climate Change: Some Thoughts on Joint Implementation, The Hague, Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment, CCD/Paper 11. Merkus, H., Heintz, R., (1993), Joint Implementation in Discussion, Institute for Environ• mental Studies, Free University, Amsterdam.

206 National Advisory Council for Development Cooperation, (1987), Recommendation on Graduation and Integration of Developing Countries and the GATT Trade Round, no. 89, The Hague, February 1987. Nordhaus, W.D., (1992), 'The "Dice" Model: Background and Structure of a Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy Model of the Economics of Global Warming', New Haven, Yale University, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper no. 1009. Nowicki M., (1993), Environment in Poland. Issues and Solutions, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London. OECD, (1991), Environmental Labelling in OECD Countries, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris. Parikh, J.K., (1993), Incremental Costs and Benefits for Donors and Receivers, Bombay, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research. Parry, C., Grant, J.P., Parry, A., Watts, A.D. (eds.), (1986), Encyclopedic Dictionary of International Law, Oceana Publications, New York. Patterson, E., (1992), 'GATT and the Environment. Rules Changes to Minimize Adverse Trade and Environmental Effects', in 26 Journal of World Trade, pp. 99-107. Pearce, D.W. and C.A. Nash, (1981), The Social Appraisal of Projects. A Text in Cost• Benefit Analysis. London, Macmillan. Peters, P., (1991), 'Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties', in 22 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law. Petersmann, E.U., (1993), 'International Trade Law and International Environmental Law' ,in 27 Journal of World Trade. Pinto, M.C.W., (1986), 'The Duty of Cooperation and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea', in A. Bos and H. Siblesz (eds.), Realism in Law-making, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 131-154. Sachariew, K., (1991), 'Promoting Compliance with International Environmental Legal Standards; Reflections on Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms', in Yearbook of International Environmental Law, Vol. 2. Samuelson, P.A., (1964), Discussion, American Economic Review Proceedings, May 1964, 59, pp. 93-96. Sanford, S., (1992), 'Secretariats and International Environmental Negotiations: Two New Models', in L.E. Susskind, E.J. Dolin and J.W. Breslin (eds.),lnternational Environmen• tal Treaty Making, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, pp. 27-60. Schrijver, N.J., (1988), 'Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources versus the Common Heritage of Mankind: Complementary or Contradictory Principles of International Economic Law?' in P. de Waart, P. Peters, E. Denters (eds.) International Law and Development, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, pp. 87-101. Sebenius, J.K., (1991), 'Designing Negotiations Towards a New Regime: The Case of Global Warming', in International Security, Spring 1991, pp. 475-476.

Seifritz, W., (1993), 'The Terrestrial Storage of C02-dry Ice', in Energy Conversion Management, Vol. 34. Sociaal Economische Raad, Environment, Trade and Sustainable Development; Some International Issues, no. 93/04 E.

207 Sugden, R. and A. Williams, (1978), The Principles of Practical Cost-Benefit Analysis, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Tietenberg, T., (1992), 'Implementation Issues: A General Survey', in UNC• TAD/RDP/DFP/1, Combating Global Warming: Study on a Global System ofTradeable Carbon Emission Entitlements, New York, pp. 137-139. UNEP Collaborating Centre on Energy and Development, (1992), UNEP Greenhouse Gas Abatement Costing Studies, Roskilde, Denmark. United Nations Centre for Human Rights and UNITAR, (1991), Manual on Human Rights Reporting: under Six Major International Human Rights Instruments, New York. Vellinga, P., T. Hanisch, R.K. Pachauri, D. Schmitt, (1992), The Climate Convention: Criteria and Guidelines for Joint Implementation, CICERO Policy Note 1992:2, Os• lo/New Delhi/Essen/Amsterdam. Vickrey, W., (1964), Discussion, American Economic Review Proceedings, May 1964, 59, pp. 88-92. Westing, A.H., (1990), 'The Atmosphere as a Common Heritage of Humankind: its Role in Environmental Security', in 34 Scientific World, no. 4, pp. 5-6. Wildhaber, L., (1984), 'Executive Agreements', in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Instalment 7, Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam. World Bank, (1992), The World Bank Atlas: 25th anniversary edition, Washington D.C. Yamin, F., (1993), 'The Climate Change Convention and Joint Implementation: Legal, Institutional and Procedural Issues', FIELD Working Paper. Zakariya, H.S., (1980), 'Changed Circumstances and the Continued Validity of Mineral Development Contracts', in K. Hossain (ed.), Legal Aspects of a New International Economic Order, Frances Pinter, London, pp. 263-278. Zurek J., (1992), Environmental Protection in Poland, A Guide-book on Legal Regulations, Administrative Procedures and Institutions, Institute for Environmental Protection, Warsaw.

208 INDEX

Actors ...... 34-40 enterprises ...... 35, 38, 162 governments ...... 34, 37, 55, 117-119, 162 intergovernmental organizations ...... 37-39, 163 non-governmental organizations ...... 39, 163 Additionality ...... 52, 75, 79-81, 86-88, 140-142, 131, 165, 168 baseline ...... 52-53, 90 countries with difficult regimes ...... 81-91 countries with easy regimes ...... 79-80 probability of a project being additional ...... 84-89, 142, 149 Agreements ...... 50, 56-58 Annex-1 countries ...... 4, 7-8, 79-80, 107-108, 168 Annex-IT countries ...... 8, 168 Assessment ...... 137-144 Commission for Environmental Impact Assessment ...... 144

Barriers (to joint implementation) ...... 117-119 Belgium ...... 28-30 Business and industry ...... 35-37

Clearinghouse ...... 55-56 Climate Fund ...... 121-126 Commitments ...... 5-8, 107-109, 130, 168-170 Committee on Joint Implementation ...... 60, 62, 63, 177 Conference of the Parties ...... 3, 25-27, 73, 172 Cost-effectiveness ...... 51, 53, 110, 114, 154, 163, 167 Countries with economies in transition ...... 7, 80-81, 129 Crediting ...... 40-45, 46, 47, 166, 172 Criteria for joint implementation ...... 46-53, 108-117, 129-132, 146, 155-157, 167-172 multi-criteria decision model ...... 148, 155, 178, 179

Developing countries ...... 8, 81, 167, 174 Differential treatment ...... 7, 32 Direct GHG effects .•...... 74-75, 77-78, 93-97, 136, 165 joint implementation project ...... 73 replaced project ...... 74-78, 97-103, 165 Dispute settlement ...... 63, 163, 176 arbitration ...... 17, 63 conciliation ...... 63 negotiation ...... 63

209 Environmental investigations ...... 146 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ...... 144 European Community/Union ...... 17-23, 29-31, 53-55, 58,144, 162, 163 competition rules ...... 22 non-discrimination ...... 19, 24 public procurement ...... 18, 22 subsidies ...... 19, 24 Equity ...... 112, 168-169

Financial Mechanism ...... 25, 26, 171-172

GATT ...... 17-19, 23-25, 58, 64-66, 162 Agreement on Public Procurement ...... 24-25 most favoured nation ...... 18 non-tariff barriers ...... 17, 19 Standards Code ...... 19, 23 Subsidies Code ...... 19, 24 GHG certificates ...... 75-80, 91-93, 95-97, 105-109 GHG Executive Body ...... 144, 157 GHG Information and Data Resources Centre ...... 144, 156 Global Environment Facility ...... 26, 31, 38-39, 163 Graduation ...... 32, 33

Human rights ...... 12

Indirect GHG effects ...... 74-76, 97-109, 122-125, 136, 165 changes in energy prices ...... 74, 97, 101-104 exhaustion of cheap opportunities in receiving countries ...... 74, 108-109 more ambitious commitments of countries ...... 74, 108-109 transfer and diffusion of technology ...... 102-104 Industrial rationalization ...... 9-11 Inspection ...... 62-63 Integration ...... 32, 33 International Body on Joint Implementation ...... 121-125 International law principles ...... 15-19 common concern ...... 16 duty to cooperate ...... 15-16 common heritage of humankind ...... 8, 16 responsibility and liability ...... 8, 17 territorial sovereignty ...... 8, 15 International river law ...... 12-13

210 Interpretation rules ...... 4-6, 11-12 narrow interpretation ...... 4-6, 11-12 wide interpretation ...... 4-6, 11-12 Investing party ...... 48-50, 73-74, 162, 164, 168 Investment ...... 29-31, 58-60, 84-87, 94-96, 110-115, 153-156 foreign investment ...... 14, 150-143, 162 bilateral investment treaties ...... 33,63, 163, 176

Joint implementation project ...... 73-75, 130-132, 144, 162-166, 168-171 profile ...... 144, 153-156, 178

Kenya ...... 28, 30, 31, 33

Law of the sea ...... 13, 15, 16, 169 Legal instruments ...... 56-58 arrangements ...... 60, 170 contract ...... 56 memorandum of understanding ...... 57, 176 treaty ...... 57

Monitoring ...... 60-62. 122-124, 129, 137, 179 Montreal Protocol ...... 9-11

Negative cost-options ...... 40, 81-83, 101-103, 152-153 Norway ...... 5, 22, 30, 42

Objective of the FCCC ...... 5-6, 65, 164 Obligations ...... 7, 9, 11-12, 134, 162 OECD ...... 7, 30, 138, 162

Permanent sovereignty over natural resources ...... 15, 43, 50, 169 Poland ...... 28-30, 178-179 Polish environmental policy ...... 132, 178, 140, 148 Precedents ...... 8-14

Receiving party ...... 21-23, 73, 169 Reporting ...... 61-62 Risk ...... 86-88, 95-97

Sanctions ...... 64-65 Secretariat ...... 25, 171 Social ...... 81-83, 110, 113-114, 132, 151-153, 171 Sponsorship ...... 40

211 Subsidiary Body for Implementation ...... 26-27, 120, 171-172 Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice ...... 25-26, 119, 171

Tradeable permits ...... 54-56, 126 Transfer of technology ...... 26, 102-104,74-76, 172 Transparency ...... 22, 53, 168, 169

Uncertainty ...... 87-89, 166

Verification ...... 51, 62-63, 122-124

Withdrawal ...... 59, 170

212 ENVIRONMENT & POLICY

1. Dutch Committee for Long-Term Environmental Policy: The Environment: Towards a Sustainable Future. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2655-5; Pb 0-7923-2656-3 2. 0. Kuik, P. Peters and N. Schrijver (eds.): Joint Implementation to Curb Climate Change. Legal and Economic Aspects. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2825-6