DOCSLIB.ORG

ANNEX 1 JOINT IMPLEMENTATION in DISCUSSION the UN

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
ANNEX 1 JOINT IMPLEMENTATION in DISCUSSION the UN ANNEX 1 JOINT IMPLEMENTATION IN DISCUSSION The UN Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro last year, saw the signing of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). The FCCC entered into force on March 21, 1994, with the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) in early 1995. The CoP will examine the performance of the obliga­ tions of the Parties, and will elaborate and specify the articles of the Convention. The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) is engaged with the preparation of the first CoP meeting. During the regular INC meetings the interpretation of the language of the FCCC is a central issue. Many of the deliberately rather fuzzily formulated articles of the Convention have led to intense discussions. One of the contentious issues is joint implementation. This concept is built into the FCCC to enable countries to undertake cost-effective measures to limit the global cost of managing the problem of global warming. The provision allows countries to invest in emission-reducing measures in other countries, where the marginal costs of abatement are lower than at home. Whether such investment should be rewarded by some form of inter­ national recognition of the effort or a 'climate credit' is a controversial question. Interna­ tional cost-effective options are supposed to exist in particular in Central and Eastern European countries and in developing countries. This annex aims to give insight in the origin of the political sensitivity of joint impl­ ementation.1 The first section gives a summary of different perceptions of joint imple­ mentation in developing countries, as expressed by several government officials and NGOs during interviews held in Kenya and during the eighth INC conference, held in Geneva in August 1993. The second section gives a summary of the key issues of the eighth INC conference, when joint implementation was on the agenda for the first time. In addition, this section outlines the statements on these key issues, as expressed by governments officials during this INC meeting. The perception of joint implementation in developing countries At present, many efforts are undertaken by industrialized countries to investigate the concept of joint implementation. However, due to limited resources, such studies are scarce in developing countries. As a result, developing may not always be fully aware of the implications of joint implementation for their economies and population, and of the merits and limitations of the joint implementation concept in general. This has raised many concerns, which were reflected during several interviews with government officials and NGOs from Kenya (held in Nairobi, May 1993), as well as in several publications of the Climate Action Network Africa (IMPACT). In addition, during the eighth meeting of This annex is based on the confidential report ''Joint Implementation in Discussion", written in the context of this research project. This report is based on information gathered in three different activities. First of all, several meetings/interviews have taken place in the United States as well as in Kenya. Second, dwing a teleconference, the members of our Advisory Board have discussed some specific issues related to joint implementation. To complete the picture of the various points of view, the eighth INC meeting (held in Geneva in august 1993) has been carefully followed. 181 the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (held in Geneva, August 1993), a number of representatives of developing countries have expressed anxieties towards joint imple­ mentation. A summary of these concerns is given below. A number of objections relate to the principle of joint implementation, sometimes based on moral concerns. These include the following arguments. Joint implementation resembles the concept of tradeable emission permits. Market structures are typically underdeveloped in Africa. In addition, international trade is often unequal. Why would 'trade' be equal in the case of joint implementation? Such policies will not work as long as there is inequality between the partners negotiating on these matters; Joint implementation will give Northern countries a right to pollute. This is morally indefensible. Developing countries equate emissions rights with the right to devel­ opment because emissions of greenhouse gases are typically considered a part of normal economic development. Hence, developing countries are not inclined to sell such rights. Moreover, marketing those rights will allow the fortunate to 'buy up the environment'; Joint implementation enables rich countries to continue their excessive, wasteful lifestyles. The burden of responsibility for global warming rests with the North. In order to restore the North/ South balance, the essential lifestyle changes must occur in the North, not in the South. During the eighth INC conference, the latter argument was also phrased as "no export of sacrifices". Developed countries have created the greenhouse gas (GHG) problem and should therefore take care of their own emissions. Some other arguments expressed dur­ ing this conference include: Developed countries (listed in Annex II) have committed themselves in the Conven­ tion to pay for necessary action by developing countries; it is not fair for them now to demand carbon credits in return for such payments; Developed countries will take advantage of developing countries in taking away from them the most cost-effective emission reduction options. Given the desperate fman­ cial situation in many developing countries, these countries may be tempted to accept joint implementation projects to gain fmancial transfers from the North, without con­ sidering the longer term obligations. When in due course developing countries also have obligations with respect to their emissions, the cheapest opportunities for emission reductions will have been used up. Joint implementation projects may tum developing countries into 'carbon repositor­ ies'. For example, covering large areas with trees infringes on the future develop­ ment opportunities of these countries. This is also denoted as 'environmental colo­ nialism'. The joint implementation mechanism may pull developing countries into the Frame­ work Convention in a way they want to avoid. Developing countries have as yet limited obligations under the Convention. A formal participation in joint implementa- 182 tion projects may involve additional reporting requirements. The transition towards actual emission reduction requirements is then narrowed; Joint implementation undercut the impact and effectiveness of the Convention by allowing countries to avoid undertaking measures at home. This is contrary to the spirit of the Convention, and will delay the transition to alternative energy economies and life styles in industrialized countries. This transition will be necessary if GHG emissions are to be stabilized at levels that do not threaten the climate and ecosys­ tems; By allowing for joint implementation, existing technology will be disseminated, while technological innovation will be delayed. Technological progress is indispens­ able to reach long-term reductions. A decade of innovation could be lost as a result of joint implementation. There is some fear that in practice the effects of joint implementation may tum out dis­ advantageous for developing countries. This concern is based on the following argum­ ents. Given the existing inequalities in bargaining positions of partners in a joint imple­ mentation project, a fair distribution of benefits is unlikely; There is no insurance that the benefits of a joint implementation project will accrue to the majority of people and satisfy their basic needs, such as food, shelter, energy, and so forth; There is a danger that joint implementation investments will not fit in with the devel­ opment priorities of developing countries; There is no guarantee that developing countries will get the best technology; Joint implementation will favour the export of technology of Northern corporations and may hinder development/dissemination of technology developed in the South; A too narrow focus on technology transfer could lead to more "white elephants" in the South; technologies that do not work because adequate infrastructure is not in place to operate the system and maintain and replace equipment; Increased production costs in the industrialized countries resulting from costs incurred with joint implementation may be transferred back to the developing coun­ tries through higher prices for manufactured goods; The system is open to manipulation and corruption. During the INC meeting there was some discussion on criteria. The criteria proposed by different countries are included in Table 1 in the next section. The discussion on criteria in Kenya was rather premature. However, some suggestions were made. Equity and social acceptability should be emphasized. The joint implementation projects should be in complete agreement with the needs of the inhabitants; There should be an equitable distribution of benefits. The benefits should be measured in broad terms. In Africa, monetary values alone are typically inadequate as criteria for decisions. In allowing for funding a joint implementation project, a cost-benefit approach which systematically sets out the good and bad consequences 183 of alternatives should be applied. The criterion of cost-effectiveness in money terms does not make sense; Criteria should take into account the specific circumstances prevailing in
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation
    Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation New Instruments for Financing Renewable Energy Technologies Thematic Background Paper January 2004 Authors: Axel Michaelowa; Matthias Krey; Sonja Butzengeiger Perspectives Climate Change and Hamburg Institute of International Economics Editing: Secretariat of the International Conference for Renewable Energies, Bonn 2004 Disclaimer This is one of 12 Thematic Background Papers (TBP) that have been prepared as thematic background for the International Conference for Renewable Energies, Bonn 2004 (renewables 2004). A list of all papers can be found at the end of this document. Internationally recognised experts have prepared all TBPs. Many people have commented on earlier versions of this document. However, the responsibility for the content remains with the authors. Each TBP focusses on a different aspect of renewable energy and presents policy implications and recommendations. The purpose of the TBP is twofold, first to provide a substantive basis for discussions on the Conference Issue Paper (CIP) and, second, to provide some empirical facts and background information for the interested public. In building on the existing wealth of political debate and academic discourse, they point to different options and open questions on how to solve the most important problems in the field of renewable energies. All TBP are published in the conference documents as inputs to the preparation process. They can also be found on the conference website at www.renewables2004.de. Executive Summary The project-based Kyoto Mechanisms CDM and JI can improve financing of renewable energy projects but will not provide a panacea for large-scale renewables promotion as long as the market price for greenhouse gas reduction credits will remain at its current level of 3 €/t CO2.
    [Show full text]
  • Has Joint Implementation Reduced GHG Emissions? Lessons Learned for the Design of Carbon Market Mechanisms
    Stockholm Environment Institute, Working Paper 2015-07 Has Joint Implementation reduced GHG emissions? Lessons learned for the design of carbon market mechanisms Anja Kollmuss, Lambert Schneider and Vladyslav Zhezherin Stockholm Environment Institute Linnégatan 87D 104 51 Stockholm Sweden Tel: +46 8 674 7070 Fax: +46 8 674 7020 Web: www.sei-international.org Author contact: Anja Kollmuss, [email protected] Director of Communications: Robert Watt Editors: Elaine Beebe and Marion Davis Cover photo: A steel plant in Ukraine with a coal waste heap in the background. Photo © Mykola Ivashchenko. This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educa- tional or non-profit purposes, without special permission from the copyright holder(s) provided acknowledgement of the source is made. No use of this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purpose, without the written permission of the copyright holder(s). About SEI Working Papers: The SEI working paper series aims to expand and accelerate the availability of our research, stimulate discussion, and elicit feedback. SEI working papers are work in progress and typically contain preliminary research, analysis, findings, and recom- mendations. Many SEI working papers are drafts that will be subsequently revised for a refereed journal or book. Other papers share timely and innovative knowledge that we consider valuable and policy-relevant, but which may not be intended for later publication. Copyright © August 2015 by Stockholm Environment Institute STOCKHOLM ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER NO. 2015-07 Has Joint Implementation reduced GHG emissions? Lessons learned for the design of carbon market mechanisms Anja Kollmuss, Lambert Schneider Stockholm Environment Institute – U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Supplementarity Challenge: CDM, JI & EU Emissions Trading
    Policy Paper Nr. 1/2004 Erstellt im März 2004 The Supplementarity Challenge: CDM, JI & EU Emissions Trading This policy paper is a contribution to the ongoing discussion on the Commission’s proposal for a directive ‘amending the Directive 2003/…/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms’ (henceforward called Proposed Directive and ET Directive respectively). It is largely based on a policy brief that has been produced within the framework of the IEEP/Ecologic contract ‘External expertise on emerging regulatory and policy issues within the responsibility of the EP Environment Committee’ (project EP/IV/A/2003/09/01). This policy brief can be downloaded from the European Parliaments website at http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/envi/externalexpertise/default_en.htm. The focus of this paper is on the question of supplementarity in the context of linking the project-based mechanisms CDM and JI to the EU Emission Allowance Trading. The EU 15 as a whole as well as many of its member states will find it very difficult to achieve compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. It might therefore become necessary to make use of the flexibility provided by the Kyoto Protocol. However, the EU’s credibility crucially depends on meeting the supplementarity requirement, i.e. achieving at least 50% of its emission reductions through domestic action. The relevant provision contained in the Proposed Directive is not comprehensive enough to guarantee this outcome, the authors therefore recommend that a more wide-ranging approach is taken. Introduction: The Situation in the EU with Respect to Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol Most of the EU 15 member states will have to make significant additional efforts to achieve compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.
    [Show full text]
  • T H E Kyoto Mechanisms & Global C L I M a T E C H a N
    T h e Kyoto Mechanisms & Global c l i m a t e c h a n g e Coordination Issues and Domestic Po l i c i e s Prepared for the Pew Center on Global Climate Change by Er ik Ha i t es M ARGAR E E C O N SU L TA N TS I N C . Mal ik Amin Asl am E NVOR K R E S E AR C H A N D D EV E L O P M E N T O RGA N I S AT I O N Sept emb er 2000 Contents Foreword ii E xecutive Summary iii I. Introduction 1 A. The Benefits of Emissions Trading 1 B. The Kyoto Mechanisms 2 C. Implementation Issues 4 D. The Kyoto Mechanisms and Domestic Policies 5 E. Equity, Environmental Integrity, and Economic Efficiency 6 II. Proposed Rules for the Kyoto Mechanisms 9 A. Participation by Legal Entities 9 B. Substitution Among Mechanisms (Fungibility) 10 C. Supplementarity 12 D. Penalties, Enforcement, and Liability 13 E. International Review of Projects 15 F. The Need To Demonstrate Additionality 17 G. Approval by Annex B Parties 19 H. Date When Projects Can Begin To Generate Allowances 20 + I. Eligibility of Sink Enhancement Projects 21 J. Levies on Transactions 21 K. Contribution to Sustainable Development 23 III. Coordination of the Kyoto Mechanisms with Domestic Policies 24 A. Potential Purchase and Use of Kyoto Mechanism Allowances by Legal Entities 25 B. Potential Sales of Kyoto Mechanism Allowances by Legal Entities 29 C. Coordination of Domestic Policies with the Rules of the Kyoto Mechanisms 31 + I V.
    [Show full text]
  • Additional Arrangements for Drought Under the UNCCD Prospective Assessment
    Additional arrangements for drought under the UNCCD Prospective assessment April 2019 This prospective assessment concerning additional arrangements for drought under the UNCCD looks at a variety of legal instruments of international cooperation, ranging from protocols to gentleman’s agreements, and assesses their suitability for addressing drought under the UNCCD. The assessment uses information of experiences in using these tools under other international processes, and takes into account the specific priorities and working modalities of the Convention in addressing drought. On this basis, the assessment presents conclusions on the likelihood of success of each legal instrument in addressing drought under the UNCCD. This assessment was authored by the UNCCD Evaluation Office with the support of Dr. Sylvestre- José-Tidiane Manga and Ms. Aurore Vernhes in June 2018 – April 2019. 2 Additional arrangements for drought under the UNCCD: a prospective assessment List of content Page 1. Introduction 5 2. Drought in the context of international cooperation 6 2.1 About drought 6 2.2 Addressing drought through international cooperation 7 2.3 Addressing drought in the context of the UNCCD 9 3. Potential legal instruments for addressing drought under the UNCCD 10 3.1 An overview of legal instruments for international environmental 10 cooperation 3.2 Legal instruments 12 a) Protocols 12 b) Annexes and amendments 19 c) Principles 22 d) Declarations 26 e) Decisions 29 f) Standards 31 g) Gentlemen’s Agreements 34 4. Conclusions 36 Annex: Potential legal
    [Show full text]
  • Joint Implementation: Current Issues and Emerging Challenges
    ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY JOINT IMPLEMENTATION: CURRENT ISSUES AND EMERGING CHALLENGES www.oecd.org/env/cc Katia Karousakis, OECD www.iea.org October 2006 Unclassified COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2006)7 Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 25-Oct-2006 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ English text only ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY Unclassified COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2006)7 JOINT IMPLEMENTATION: CURRENT ISSUES AND EMERGING CHALLENGES Katia Karousakis, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development The ideas expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent views of the OECD, the IEA, or their member countries, or the endorsement of any approach described herein. English text only JT03216583 Document complet disponible sur OLIS dans son format d'origine Complete document available on OLIS in its original format COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2006)7 Copyright OECD/IEA, 2006 Applications for permission to reproduce or translate all or part of this material should be addressed to: Head of Publications Service, OECD/IEA 2 rue André Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France or 9 rue de la Fédération, 75739 Paris Cedex 15, France. 2 COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2006)7 FOREWORD This document was prepared by the OECD and IEA Secretariats in September-October 2006 in response to the Annex I Expert Group on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Annex I Expert Group oversees development of analytical papers for the purpose of providing useful and timely input to the climate change negotiations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Paris Agreement Putting the First Universal Climate Change Treaty in Context
    The Paris Agreement Putting the first universal climate change treaty in context On December 12, 2015, 196 Parties1 agreed to the terms of a Paris Agreement, a historic document aimed at limiting global warming to "well below 2°C". The Paris Agreement was negotiated under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and is expected to come into force from 2020, replacing the existing Kyoto Protocol under which developed countries have binding emission reduction targets. The Paris Agreement is all encompassing – with legal obligations on all counties – to report and account for their mitigation actions. While implementation of the Agreement will take some time, the Paris COP showcased the range of other climate change initiatives already occurring at a sub-national government level (states, provinces and cities), and non-government action, some of which have substantial implications for companies and other organizations within those jurisdictions. A copy of the Paris Decision (containing the Paris Agreement) is available here, the terms of which we analyze in detail in this alert. Please contact a member of our Environmental Markets team for further information. Baker & McKenzie has been a part of nearly all of the prior twenty UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COPs), but even before our team arrived in Paris for COP 21, we knew this would be a different COP – and not a repeat of the Copenhagen conference, at which the Parties failed to agree to a new climate treaty. Throughout the course of 2015 the French Government worked tirelessly to prepare for COP 21. French diplomats and politicians led efforts around the world with governments, business, non-government organizations and media to prepare the groundwork for a successful outcome.
    [Show full text]
  • Linking CDM & JI with EU Emission Allowance Trading
    Policy Brief for the EP Environment Committee EP/IV/A/2003/09/01 Linking CDM & JI with EU Emission Allowance Trading Brief number 01/2004 By Thomas Langrock (Wuppertal Institute) Wolfgang Sterk (Wuppertal Institute) With contributions from Maike Bunse (Wuppertal Institute) 12 January 2004 SUMMARY Analysis 1 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) are two of the so-called flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol designed to allow its parties flexibility in achieving their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments. Under these mechanisms projects that reduce emissions or remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere generate emission certificates: Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) in the case of the CDM, Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) in the case of JI. 2 On 23 July 2003 the Commission of the European Communities put its proposal for a ‘Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending the Directive 2003/…/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms’ on the table. The proposed Directive is thus to amend Directive 2003/87/EC (ET Directive). 3 The new Article 11(bis) that is proposed for the ET Directive establishes a link between CDM & JI on the one side and EU emission allowance trading on the other. According to this proposed article, the actual flow of emission certificates from a CDM/JI project developer to one of the EU Member States will be as follows: the CDM/JI project developer receives CERs/ERUs after the project has successfully undergone the project cycle for CDM/JI projects respectively.
    [Show full text]
  • Joint Implementation and Forestry Projects: Conceptual and Operational Fallacies
    Joint implementation and forestry projects: conceptual and operational fallacies PHILIPPE CULLET AND ANNIE PATRICIA KAMERI-MBOTE Increased human activity is causing a build-up of greenhouse gases (GHGs) which are thought to contribute to global warming. Climate change is an international environmental concern because the effects of GHG emissions will be felt throughout the world irrespective of their origin. Similarly, mitiga- tion activities undertaken anywhere in the world have the same impact on the global environment. The Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature in June during the Rio conference, seeks to address the problem of global warming at the international level. It has received widespread acceptance and has been ratified by states.While the convention does not set out specific emission reduction targets, the recently adopted Kyoto Protocol sets out quan- tified emission limitation and reduction commitments for OECD countries and countries undergoing the process of economic transition to a market econ- omy (Annex B parties). Annex B parties commit themselves to reduce their overall GHG emissions by at least per cent below levels between and . Developing countries do not take on emission limitation or reduc- tion commitments. In the first part of this article, we analyse the mechanism of joint implemen- tation (JI) generally and in the Climate Change Convention specifically.The second part concentrates on JI projects in the forestry sector.We argue that the carbon sequestration potential of trees on which JI forestry projects are predi- cated has not been proven. Indeed, in the long term, these projects have a very limited effect on carbon sequestration considering that woody biomass eventually decays or burns.We also argue that JI forestry projects often conflict with local and international environmental priorities.The third part addresses concerns with JI at the international level.
    [Show full text]
  • Critical Reflections on Joint Implementation Projects in Ukraine
    NATIONAL ECOLOGICAL CENTRE OF UKRAINE CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON JOINT IMPLEMENTATION PROJECTS IN UKRAINE 0 NATIONAL ECOLOGICAL CENTRE OF UKRAINE PO Box 306, Kyiv, 01032, Ukraine tel.: +380 44 2386260, tel./fax: +380 44 2386259 [email protected], www.necu.org.ua THE INTEGRITY OF JOINT IMPLEMENTATION PROJECTS IN UKRAINE Author: Marharyta Zhenchuk Cover photo: Eugen Kompaniichenko © National Ecological Centre of Ukraine – Kyiv, November 2012 This analysis has been prepared with the financial assistance of the Air Pollution and Climate Secretariat, and European Union. Its content is the sole responsibility of author and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union. This report may be copied or reproduced in whole or partly for non‐profit use only without special permission of the NECU, provided the reference of the source is made. Table of Contents Abbreviations ....................................................................................................................................... 2 Executive Summary .............................................................................................................................. 3 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 6 Methodology ........................................................................................................................................ 6 1. Background ...........................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Annex B. Glossary of Terms
    Annex B Glossary of Terms Annex B. Glossary of Terms Adaptive capacity The ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate This Glossary is based on the glossaries published in the IPCC variability and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001a,b,c); however, additional advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences. work has been undertaken on consistency and refinement of some of the terms. The terms that are independent entries in Additionality this glossary are highlighted in italics. Reduction in emissions by sources or enhancement of removals by sinks that is additional to any that would occur in the absence Acclimatization of a Joint Implementation or a Clean Development Mechanism The physiological adaptation to climatic variations. project activity as defined in the Kyoto Protocol Articles on Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism. This Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) definition may be further broadened to include financial, The pilot phase for Joint Implementation, as defined in Article investment, and technology additionality. Under “financial 4.2(a) of the United Nations Framework Convention on additionality,” the project activity funding shall be additional Climate Change, that allows for project activity among to existing Global Environmental Facility, other financial developed countries (and their companies) and between commitments of Parties included in Annex I, Official developed and developing countries (and their companies). Development Assistance, and other systems of cooperation. AIJ is intended to allow Parties to the United Nations Under “investment additionality,” the value of the Emissions Framework Convention on Climate Change to gain experience Reduction Unit/Certified Emission Reduction Unit shall in jointly implemented project activities.
    [Show full text]
  • International Climate Negotiations Glossary
    May 2015 International Climate Negotiations Glossary Michelle Melton and Sarah Ladislaw This glossary provides an overview of terms used by negotiators and others when discussing international climate negotiations. While several excellent climate glossaries exist—including from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—that provide technical definitions of terms, this glossary also provides the political and economic context for understanding the developments leading up to the Conference of Parties 21 (COP 21) in Paris in December 2015. At COP 21, Parties to the UNFCCC will be negotiating an international agreement that provides the framework for greenhouse gas emission reduction beyond the year 2020. 2-degree target: The UNFCCC agreed to a goal to limit anthropogenic temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) relative to preindustrial levels, which corresponds roughly to carbon dioxide (or carbon dioxide equivalent, CO2e) concentrations in the atmosphere of 450 parts per million. The current scientific consensus, as expressed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and others, is that beyond that threshold, the weather and environmental impacts of climate change risk becoming irreversible, unpredictable, and dangerous. The principle of limiting warming to no more than 2 degrees was first discussed in the 1970s. The European Council formally adopted it as an aspirational target in 1996 and the UNFCCC followed suit by formally recognizing the target in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord (which was not adopted), and committing to the target in the 2010 Cancun Agreements. The 2-degree target is somewhat controversial. Several countries and many environmental organizations have called the 2-degree target inadequate.
    [Show full text]