and Lincoln’s Rise to the Presidency REINHARDH. LUTHIN It is a familiar fact that spent part of his early life-from 1816 to 1830-in Spencer County, Indiana. This period, formative years as they were, par- tially moulded his viewpoint.’ In still another way Indiana exerted influence on the Emancipator’s career. This occurred in 1860, when he was elevated to the Presidency of the . In ascending to this exalted office Lincoln was to have the indispensable help of the state in which he had spent part of his youth. For in this critical year the Hoosier State was to be a vital factor in national affairs. Indiana had never been rabidly opposed to slavery. The lower counties, settled originally by people from below the Mason and Dixon line, were so strongly filled with south- ern sympathies that antislavery work there was discouraging. Free Soil meetings were frequently broken up, and the gen- uine opponents of slavery had almost come to accept the .‘ The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, viewed by other northern states as a measure to open up the Northwest to slavery, caused relatiyely little excitement in Indiana. In the election of 1854 the forces opposed to the dominant proslavery Democratic party were able to unite only on a three-cornered platform taking in antislavery men, prohibitionists, and Know Nothings : “Free- dom, Temperance, and our Native Land” were the issues;’: and the Democrats dismissed their opponents as “The Aboli- tion Free-Soil Maine-Law Native-American Anti-Catholic Anti-Nebraska Party of Indiana.”4 The state grew no more

1 For Lincoln’s early years in Indiana, see Albert J. Beveridge, Abraham Lincoln, 1809-1858 (2 vols., , 1928), I, 38-99; Bess V. Ehrmann, The Missing Chapter in the Life of Abraham Lincoln (Chicago, 1938) ; R. Gerald McMurtry, “The Lincoln Migration from to Indiana,” in Indiana Magazine of History, XXXIII (1937), 386-421. ‘Theodore C. Smith, The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Northwest (, 1897), 303; John D. Rarnhart, “The Southern Influence in the Formation of Indiana,” in Indiana Magazine of History, XXXIII (1937), 261-76; Dale Beeler, “The Election of 1852 in Indiana,” ibid., XI (1915), 314-15, and XI1 (1916), 39. 3 Godlove S. Orth to , September 25, 1854, Colfax- Orth Papers (Indiana State Library, ). 4 Ovando J. Hollister, Life of Schuyler Colfaz (New York, 1887), 74. 386 Indiana Magazine of History radical in its antislavery beliefs during the ensuing years,5 and the Democrats continued to hold sway.0 Nevertheless, Indiana was a political prize for which the anti-Democratic forces were willing to expend much en- ergy. It ranked second among the northwestern states, with a national convention vote of twenty-six and an electoral vote of thirteen, and held fifth place in the Union. Like and , it was considered essential to the success of either party in 1860.’ When the Presidential year 1860 opened, the opposition (as those combating the Democrats were called) was still divided into three main groups-the Republicans, the “Ameri- cans” (Know Nothings), and the remnants of the old Whig party who still declined to believe that ’s party was all but dead. Cooperation between them was especially difficult because the large German element in the Republican party disliked the “Americans,” and the Old Line Whigs feared the radicalism of the Republicans. But one factor was in their favor-the growing schism in the Democratic ranks. The Indiana Democrats, surfeited with success, had begun to quarrel among themselves. Some were disappointed over meager spoils; some were angry at the party autocrat, United States Senator Jesse D. Bright; and others were grieved because their party neglected internal improvements and homestead legislation.8 On February 22, 1860, the opposition forces met in mass state convention at Indianapolis ; the radical name “Republican” was studiously av0ided.O The supporters of Judge , of Missouri, were on hand, urging him on the Hoosiers as the best possible presidential timber. But their plans for a solid pro-Bates delegation to the Republican

5 to Schuyler Colfax, May 4, 1857, Greeley-Colfax Papers (New York Public Library, ). 6. Charles Kettleborough, “Indiana. on the Eve of the Civil War,” in Puhlwatzons, Indiana Historical Society (Indianapolis, 1895- ) , VI (1919), 137-38. Charles Roll, “Indiana’s Part in the Nomination of Abraham Lincoln for President in 1860,” in Indiana Magazke of History, XXV (1929), 1-2. 8Mildred C. Stoler, Influence of the Democratic Element in the Republican Party of Illinois and Indiana, 1854-1860 (Ph. D. thesis, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 1938), 26-31 ; William W. Wick to William H. English, June 5, 1854, William H. English Papers (William Henry Smith Memorial Library, Indianapolis). 9Carl F. Brand, “The History of the Know Nothing Party in Indiana, in Indiana Magazine of History, XVIII (1922), 301-02. Indiana and Lincoln’s Rise to the Presidency 387

National Convention at Chicago were doomed to failure, since the radical Gennan-American element would have no part of the Missouri jurist, who was too conservative, and moreover, had supported the “American” presidential ticket in 1856 and had consorted with Know Nothings in St. Louis.’” Still, the Bates men were confident that majority sentiment in Indiana was for their favorite.” The Indianapolis conclave, besides nominating Henry S. Lane for governor, selected a slate of delegates to represent the state at the Chicago convention, including four delegates-at-large. The latter were Caleb B. Smith, William T. Otto, Pleasant A. Hackleman, and Daniel D. Pratt.’* Meanwhile, in Springfield, Illinois, the popular lawyer, citizen, and Republican leader, Abraham Lincoln, was being groomed for the presidential nomination by personal friends and political associates. By April, 1860, plans were afoot by Lincoln’s managers to have him selected as Illinois’ “fav- orite son” at the Republican National Convention, to meet in Chicago on May 16. The strategy of Lincoln’s sponsors, led by Republican State Chairman Norman B. Judd, of Illinois, was to gain support also in the three other doubtful states- Indiana, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.I3 Lincoln quietly and tactfully cooperated with Judd and others in the task of attracting support outside Illinois. He was particularly con- cerned with Indiana. Among his “confidential friends” in Indiana with whom he told a Connecticut leader to correspond, Lincoln on April 14, 1860, named “J. W. Gordon,” of Indianapolis, and “W. T.

1” Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 23, 1860 ; Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel, February 23, 24, 1860. For the Germans’ hostility to Bates, see Frank I. Herriott, “The Conference in the Deutsches Haus, Chicago, May 14-15, 1860,” in Transactions of th,e Illinois State Historical Society, 1928, in Puhlications of the Illinois State Historical Librarg (Springfield, Illinois, 1899- ) , No. 35 (1928), 101-91; St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican, March 11, 1860; Edgar R. Harlan to Missouri Historical Society, February 7, 1908, Edward Bates Papers (Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis). “Howard K. Beale led.). The Diaw of Edward Bates. 1859-1866. in American Historical Assoiiation Annudl Report for 1930 (Wash: ington, 1933), IV, 102. 12 Indianapolis Daily Journal, February 23, 1860. 19 William ‘Baringer, Lincoln’s Rise to Power (Boston, 1937), 5-188; Norman B. Judd to Lyman Trumbull, April 2, 1860, Lyman Trumbull Papers (Library of Congress). 388 Indiana Magazine of History

Page,” of Evansville.” On May 1, Lincoln sent a note to Cyrus M. Allen, of Vincennes: Our friend Dubois, and Judge David Davis, of Bloomington [Illinois], or both, will meet you at Clinton on the 12th. If you let Usher and Griswold of Terre-Haute know, I think they will cooperate with you. 15 Cyrus M. Allen had much in common with Lincoln: both had been born in Kentucky, migrated to Indiana in their youth, and served as Whigs in their respective state legislatures.’” Allen, wrote Lincoln later, “particularly has been my friend.”’? The “Usher” mentioned by Lincoln was John P. Usher, with whom he had ridden the circuit as a lawyer.1s On May 2, the day following his letter to Allen, Lincoln dispatched a message to an delegate to the Chicago convention-Richard M. Corwine, lawyer and one- time partner of Rutherford B. Hayes: Yours of the 30th ult. is just received. After what you have said, it is perhaps proper I should post you, so far as I am able, as to the “lay of the land”. Fi,rst, I think the Illinois delegation will be unanimous for me at the start; and no other delegation will. A few individuals in the other delegations would like to go for me at the start, but may be restrained by their colleagues. It is represented to me by men who ought to know, that the whole of Indiana might not be difficult to get. You know how it is in Ohio. I am certainly not the first choice there; and yet I have not heard that anyone makes any positive objection to me. It is just so everywhere as far as I can perceive. Everywhere, except here in Illinois and possibly in Indiana, one or ano.ther is preferred to me, but there is no positive objection. This is the ground as it now appears. 1,believe you personally know C. M. Allen of Vincennes, Indiana. He is a delegate and has notified me that the entire Indiana delegation will be in Chicago the same day you name, Saturday, the 12th. My friends, Jesse K. Dubois, our auditor, and Judge David Davis, will probably be there ready to

14 Emanuel Hertz, Abraham Lincoln: A New Portrait (2 vols., New York, 1931), 11, 772. 15 Ibid. 16 James Sutherland, Biographical Sketches of the Members of the Forty-First General Assembly of the State of Indiana (Indianapolis, 1861), 78-79. 17 Ida M. Tarbell, The Life of Abraham Lincoln (2 vols., New York, 1900), 11, 347. 18 Thomas Le Grand Harris, “,” in Dictionary of American Biography (20 vols., New York, 1928-1936), XIX (1936), 134-35. Indiana and Lincoln’s Rise to the Presidency 389 confer with friends from other States. Let me hear from you again when anything occurs.~Q Lincoln had some justification for believing that “the whole of Indiana might not be difficult to get.” Besides hav- ing lived part of his early life in Indiana and having his debates with Stephen A. Douglas in 1858 well received there, he had been cordially welcomed when he spoke at Indianapolis in September, 1859. More significant, he had much in com- mon with the conservative Indiana “opposition” leaders ; like many of them, he had been a Henry Clay Whig. Iris anti- slavery views were not so strong as to antagonize the aboli- tion-hating elements in the southern counties, who were for Bates. In short, Indiana Republicans could logically support Illinois’ favorite son-and former Hoosier-if the majority of party leaders considered him “available.”2n It was not surprising, therefore, that on April 19, 1860, the state’s fore- most Republican organ, the Indianapolis Joumal, gave to Lincoln’s supporters words of encouragement, in an editorial favoring Supreme Court Justice John McLean for President : It may be that we had better suffer defeat with him [Senator William H. Seward of New York] or Chase [Governor of Ohio] than achieve victory with McLean or Lincoln, but we can’t so see it. . . . We say Judge McLean-and Mr. Lincoln of Illinois stands in very much the same relation-presents a strong claim on the attention of the Republican Convention. . . . Next to Judge McLean, we believe Abram [sic] Lincoln of Illinois presents the best combination of qualities as a candidate and officer.21 Lincoln was second choice of Indiana’s most widely cir- culated Republican newspaper ! And the Lincoln people in Illinois put the above editorial to effective use. On May 11 -the day following the adjournment of the Illinois Republican Convention at Decatur, at which Lincoln’s home state dele- gation was instructed for him”-there appeared in the In- dianapolis Journal an anonymous letter to the editor, dated

19 Daniel J. Ryan, “Lincoln and Ohio,” in Publications, Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society (Columbus, Ohio, 1887- ) , XXXII (1923), 117-18. For material on Corwine, see Charles R. Wil- liams (ed.), Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes (5 vols., Columbus, Ohio, 1922-1926), I (1922), 458, 480, 481, 489, and 540. 20 Roll, “Indiana’s Part in Nomination of Lincoln,” in Indiana Magazine of History, XXV, 4-5. 21 Indianapolis Daily Journal, April 19, 1860. “2 Isaac N. Arnold, The Life of A braham Lincoln (Chicago, 1885), 161-62. 390 Indiana Magazine of History

“Springfield, Ill., May 8, 1860.” This well-timed letter as- sured the Joumal that its mention of McLean and Lincoln for the Republican presidential nomination had been warmly received in Illinois. The letter, adroitly worded, disposed of Bates as unsatisfactory to the large German element in the party and was careful not to offend the McLean supporters: Of course, Lincoln is decidedly the first choice of Illinois . . . Should Judge McLean, however, be thought more available, Illinois will show her confidence in the veteran and well tried statesman, by a generous and enthusiastic support.23 On May 16 the Republicans assembled in national con- vention at Chicago. The Hoosier delegation was early on the scene. In the selection of a standard-bearer, the more practical party leaders emphasized the necessity of satisfy- ing Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.24 And herein lay Lincoln’s strength. . Lincoln’s managers at Chicago had as their prime ob- jective the support of the four “doubtful” states. They al- ready had Illinois, naturally. Indiana was the first of the other three “doubtfuls” the Illinois men approached. Although there was considerable sentiment for Edward Bates-Congressman Schuyler Colfax, of South Bend, and John D. Defrees, Indianapolis editor-politician, were work- ing valiantly for the Missourian25-others among the Hoo- siers had open minds.*“ One delegate-at-large, Pleasant A. Hackleman, held this viewpoint : If we can ascertain who are the favorites with our people, and who would be most likely to carry the four doubtful States of N. J., Penn., Ind., and Ill. we ought to act as a unit at Chicago. . . . Seward, Lincoln and Bates all have their friends.27 But it soon developed that Seward, although having more strength in the national convention than any other contender, had few friends in Indiana; he symbolized antislavery radi- calism.28 Henry S. Lane, who had been nominated by the

“3 Indianapolis Daily Joumml, May 11, 1860. 24 Boston Daily Advertiser, May 15, 1860. 28 Hollister, Life of Colfax, 147-48; Dr. John S. Bobbs to , May 19, 1860, Simon Cameron Papers (Library of Congress). Zti Alexander H. Conner to Daniel D. Pratt, April 23, 1860, Daniel D. Pratt Papers (Indiana State Library, Indianapolis). “Pleasant A. Hackelman to Daniel D. Pratt, March 23, 1860, Pratt Papers. 28 Dawson’s Fort Wayne, Indiana, Daily Times, .April 12, 18, and May 2, 1860. Indiana and Lincoln’s Rise to the Presidency 391

Republicans for governor of Indiana, was determined that his campaign for election must not be jeopardized by having an extreme antislavery man head the national ticket. Lane went among the delegates from other states, insisting that Seward could not carry Indiana in November.”’ Mrs. Lane reminisced later : I was with my husband in Chicago, and may tell you now . . . that Thurlow Weed, in his anxiety for the success of Seward, took Mr. Lane out one evening and pleaded with him to lead the Indiana dele- gation over to Seward, saying they would send enough money from New York to ensure his election for Governor, and carry the State later for the New York candidate. His proposal was indignantly rejected.”o Indiana’s choice narrowed down to Bates or Lincoln. And the determination of the way thestate would vote rested primarily with Caleb B. Smith and his friends. Smith had served in Congress with Lincoln during the session of 1847-1849. Like Lincoln, he had been a Whig who had finally entered the Republican ranks. Having suc- ceeded in being appointed one of Indiana’s four delegates- at-large and chairman of the delegation, Smith decided to throw his influence behind the Illinois contender ; he effect- ively stifled the pro-Bates element at the Hoosier caucus held in Chicago on May 15, despite the efforts of Colfax and others to swing the delegation to the Missouri One Lincoln worker, Joseph Medill, editor of the Chicago Press & Tribune, reported to his associates that half of the Indiana delegation had been won over even before the national con- vention convened.R2 Medill might have added that the entire delegation was already in the Lincoln column. In attracting the Indiana delegation to Lincoln, strong evidence appears that Judge David Davis and other Lincoln managers promised Smith a cabinet position in the event of Lincoln’s nomination and election to the Presidency. Lin- coln’s Bloomington friend and Davis’ fellow-townsman, Jesse W. Fell (then secretary of the Illinois State Central Commit- tee), in recommending that cabinet positions be given to

?“bid., May 16, 1860; Alexander K. McClure, Abraham. Lincoln and Men of War-Times (Philadelphia, 1892), 24-35. 30 McClure, Abraham Lincoln and Men of War-Times, 30-31n. 31 Louis J. Bailey, “,” in Indiana Magazine of History, XXIX (1933), 220-27;. Indianapolis .Daily Journal, May 16 and 17, 1860; St. Louis Dazly Mzssouri Republzcan, May 16, 1860. 32 Tarbell, Life of Abraham Lincoln, I, 34711. 392 Indiana Magazine of History

Indiana and Pennsylvania, wrote Lincoln, following the lat- ter’s election : Such a disposition of favors was a good deal spoken of at Chicago, in a quiet way, though of course no improper pledges-so far as I know or believe-were asked-as I am very sure they were not, and could not be given.33 Lincoln’s law partner, William H. Herndon, maintained, how- ever, that at Chicago, Judge Davis promised Smith a cabinet position in return for Indiana’s support of Lincoln for the Charles Gibson, a Bates manager at the Chi- cago convention, made the same assertion regarding Davis’ promise to Smith.35 Moreover, Davis’ biographer has located among the Judge’s private papers two letters written by Smith which indicate that a “bargain” was made.3G In ad- dition, Williah T. Otto, one of Indiana’s four delegates-at- large at Chicago, confided to a friend, Mrs. Gresham, that Smith was offered a cabinet post while the Chicago conclave was in session: I have . . . frequently heard Judge Otto tell how Cileb B. Smith imposed on Judge David Davis and Joseph Medill when the latter dur- ing the convention was pledging everything in sight to insure Mr. Lincoln’s nomination. “Mr. Smith,” Judge Otto said, “made Judge Davis believe that the Indiana delegation would go to Seward unless Smith was promised a place in the cabinet; when the truth was that none of us cared for Smith, and after we got to Chicago and looked over the ground all were for Lincoln.”37 And William P. Fishback, friend and law partner of Repub- lican State Chairman Alexander H. Conner of Indiana, later wrote his brother confidentially : “There was a determination and promise on the part of Mr. Lincoln to give Mr. C. B. Smith a place in his Cabinet.”3* Following Lincoln’s election ...___

93 Jesse W. Fell to Abraham Lincoln, January 2, 1861, Jesse W. Fell Papers. Copy in possession of Dr. Harry E. Pratt of Spring- field, Illinois. 34 Paul M. Angle (ed.), Herndon’s Life of Lincoln (New York, 1930), 381. 85 Charles Gibson, “Edward Bates,” in Missouri Historical Society Collections (St. Louis, Missouri, 1880- ) , I1 (1900), 55. Caleb B. Smith to David Davis, January 31, February 5, 1861, in David Davis, 1815-1886, by Harry E. Pratt (Ph. D. thesis, Univer- sity of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, 1930)’ 77. :(i Matilda Gresham, Life of Walter Quintin Gresham (2 vols., Chicago, 1919), I, 110-11. 38 William P. Fishback to his brother “Tip,” January 19, 1861, photostat, miscellaneous papers (Indiana State Library, Indianapolis). ‘rne original is believed to be in the possession of Mrs. Charles D. Herron, of Washington, D. C. Indiana and Lincoln’s Rise to the Presidency 393

to the Presidency, Smith himself wrote a “confidential” letter to a friend: I should not decline a seat in Mr. Lincoln’s Cabinet, and although I have no promises from any one authorized to speak for Mr. Lincoln I have reason to believe that a place will be offered me. I am wely confident that if a place is offered any person from Indiana it will be offered to me. I do not wish to be Postmaster-General but if I go into the Cabinet, would much prefer the Interior Department.39 On May 15-the day before the national convention as- sembled at Chicago-it was recognized by those on the scene that the Lincolnites had added practically the entire Hoosier delegation to the lllinois group as a strong nucleus for the Lincoln cause. Under that date an Indianapolis correspond- ent sent word from Chicago: “Illinois is for Lincoln always, and all the time. Indiana leans in the same direction. At a caucus of the delegates held this morning, the expression was in the main for Lincoln.”‘n Another reported: “Illinois and Indiana are for Abe Lin~oln.”~’ With Lincoln reasonably assured of Indiana and certain of his own Illinois, he was in a more formidable position than any other candidate save Seward. The support of these two pivotal states now impressed the New England states with Lincoln’s strength.“’ The chairman of the pro-Seward Massachusetts delegation, John A. Andrew, began to fear Republican defeat in November if Seward were nominated. Accordingly, on Tuesday evening, May 15, a committee from Massachusetts visited the delegates from the four “doubtful” states. Andrew as spokesman pointed out that all desired victory in the general election and that he and other New Englanders were for Seward, but that they “preferred the success of the party rather than the election of any par- ticular individual.”’j Andrew, conceding that Seward could not carry Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, suggested that delegates from those states concentrate their

39 Caleb B. Smith to William Schouler, “confidential,” December 1, 1860, William Schouler Papers (Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Massachusetts). 40 Indianapolis Daily Journul, May 16, 1860. 41 St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican, May 16, 1860. 42 William Jayne to Lyman Trumbull, May 20, 1860, Trumbull Papers. 43 Thomas H. Dudley, “The Inside Facts of Lincoln’s Nomination,” in The Centuw Magazine (New York, 1881-1930), XL (1890), 477-79, see 478. 394 Indiana Magazine of History strength upon a single candidate for President.44 Andrew’s advice impressed the delegates from the four states. Bay State men accordingly communicated with those states, re- questing them to designate three men who, in their opinion, could carry their respective Indiana delegates were of distinct service to Lincoln in attracting the huge Pennsylvania delegation, with its bloc of fifty-four convention votes-second only to New York. The Keystone State had a “favorite son” candidate in United States Senator Simon Cameron, but Cameron could not com- mand united support even in his home state delegation. Henry S. Lane, still determined that the radical Seward should not be nominated lest he be handicapped in his coming gubernatorial campaign in conservative Indiana, cooperated with Andrew G. Curtin, Republican candidate for governor of Pennsylvania, who was as fearful of his own chances in Pennsylvania as was Lane in Indiana. At Chicago, Lane and Curtin were in constant consultation and mapped anti- Seward strategy. Largely through their efforts, the pro- Lincoln Indiana and the anti-Seward Pennsylvania delega- tions met on Thursday evening, May 17-the day before balloting for President began.“, The Pennsylvania delega- tion caucused until the morning hours. “There were hun- dreds of Pennsylvanians, Indianians and Illinoisans, who never closed their eyes that night,” wrote one observer. “I saw Henry S. Lane at one o’clock, pale and haggard, with cane under his arm, walking as if for a wager, from one caucus- room to another, at the Tremont Curtin was on the same mission. After prolonged wrangling as to whom to support, the Pennsylvanians decided to go for Lincoln over Bates.*R At this same midnight caucus the Lincolnites were aided by Caleb B. Smith, Henry S. Lane, and other

44 Ibid. 45Herman Kreismann to Elihu B. Washburne, May 16, 1860, Elihu B. Washburne Papers (Library of Congress) ; Boston Dailg Advertiser, May 17, 1860; Springfield, Massachusetts, Republican, May 17, 1860. 41; McClure, Abraham Lincoln and Men of War-Times, 30-37. 47Murat Halstead, Caucws of 1860: A Histoq of the National Political Conventions of the Current Presidential Campaign (Columbus, Ohio, 1860), 142. 48 Stanton L. Davis, Pennsylvania Politics, 180’0-1863 (Cleveland, Ohio, 1935), 105. Indiana and Lincoln’s Rise to the Presidency 395

Hoosiers in attracting most of the delegates from the fourth “doubtful” state, New Jersey.49 With Indiana and Illinois lined up for Lincoln, and with Pennsylvania and New Jersey agreeing to go for him after casting complimentary first ballots for their respective favor- ite sons, Cameron and William L. Dayton, the Lincoln man- agers were in a position strong enough to combat Seward’s support in the New York, Minnesota, Michigan, and Wiscon- sin delegations and scattered support in Massachusetts and Maine. The encouraged Lincolnites now worked among the smaller state delegations on this day, the 18th, when ballot- ing for President started. Wrote one delegate at this junc- ture: “Ind. Illinois & Pa. have been here in force determined to accomplish the defeat of Seward.’’50 He might have added that there was now the positive object of nominating Lin- coln. Murat Halstead, observing events carefully, declared that even while the midnight caucuses were in progress, Henry S. Lane . . . in connection with others . . . had been operat- ing to bring the Vermonters and Virginians to the point of deserting Seward. Vermont would certainly cast her electoral vote for any candidate who could be nominated, and Virginia as certainly against any [such] candidate. The object was to bring the delegates of those States to consider success rather than Seward, and join with the battle-ground States-as Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana and Illi- nois insisted upon calling themselves. This was finally done, the fatal break in Seward’s strength having been made in Vermont and Virginia, destroying at once, when it appeared, his power in the New England and the slave State delegations. . . . The cry of a want of availability which was from the start raised against Seward, now took a more definite form than heretofore . . . . Henry S. Lane, cmdidate in Indiana . . . asserted hundreds of times that the nomination of Seward would be death to him, and that he might in that case just as well give up the canvass. He did not feel like expending his time and money in carrying on a hopeless cam- paign, and would be disposed to abandon the contest.51 As the convention assembled on the morning of May 18, an enthusiastic Lincoln supporter exulted : “Lincoln will be nominated. I think he is the second choice of everybody.’’52

49 Reminiscences of Charles Perrin. Smith, MS., 174-75. This manuscript is in the New Jersey State Library, Trenton, New Jersey. “Robert Hosea to Salmon P. Chase, May 18, 1860, Salmon P. Chase Papers (Library of Congress). 51 Halstead, Caucuses of 1860, pp. 142, 143. 52J. F. Farnsworth to Elihu B. Washburne, telegram, May 18, 1860, Washburne Papers. 396 Indiana Magazine of History

The convention was called to order. Breathless atten- tion was focused on the dais. The roll of states began. Seward was nominated for consideration, and the applause was “enthusiastic.” Judd, of Illinois, presented Lincoln’s name, and the “response was prodigious, rising and raging far beyond the Seward shriek.” Then, “Caleb B. Smith seconding the nomination of Lincoln, the response was ab- solutely terrific.”;’ After Bates and the lesser candidates were put in nomination, the convention proceeded to ballot. When called, Indiana cast her twenty-six votes for Illinois’ favorite. “This solid vote,” it was related, “was a startler, and the keen little eyes of Henry S. Lane glittered as it was given. He was responsible for it.”;‘ That is, he was largely responsible for it-along with Caleb B. Smith. A week later Lincoln himself was to thank Smith: “I am indeed, much indebted to, Indiana; and, as my home friends tell me, much to you personally.”‘i Lincoln was named as Republican can- didate for President on the third ballot. Considerations of political expediency and desire for victory in November, grouped together under the popular term “availability”- aided by the skillful strategy of Lincoln’s supporters in 11- linois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and the lesser states-turned the tide in his favor. Of Indiana’s r61e at Chicago a dele- gate from Indianapolis related : Mr. Lincoln owes his nomination to a prevailing opposition to Mr. Seward among the delegations from the Free States bordering on the slave states, on the grounds of expediency. The delegates from Indiana were divided in their preferences. . . , An opinion gathered strength that Mr. Seward would be nominated on the first or second ballot, and our delegation, while they were divided into those who preferred Mr. Bates, Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Cameron, Mr. Seward and Mr. McLean, were, with two exceptions, unanimously opposed to him, on the grounds of his being the subject of too great prejudice with our people. It was then moved that our delegation vote as a unit for Mr. Lincoln in order to defeat Mr. Seward. . . . Indiana having no candidate of her own was in a position to make her vote decisive.56 Jndiana and Pennsylvania were particularly courted by all parties in the campaign. Each was an “October” state,

53 Halstead, Cuucuses of 1860, p. 144. 51 Zbid., 146. j’John G. Nicolay and John Hay (eds.), Complete Works of Abmhuni Lincoln (12 vols., New York, 1894), VI, 21. 2”Dr. John S. Bobbs to Simon Cameron, May 19, 1860, Cameron Papers. Izdinna and Lincoln’s Rise to the Presidency 397 holding its gubernatorial contest one month before the presi- dential election. Each had been carried by Buchanan in 1856 and thus decided the Presidency against the Republican standard-bearer, Frkmont. “Should Indiana and Pennsyl- vania go right in October.,” wrote John D. Defrees, of Indi- anapolis, “the Presidential election in November will go by default.”s7 Thus all groups exerted titanic efforts in the Hoosier and Keystone states.” Indiana remained conserva- tive in its antislavery views, and the ardent Republican Horace Greeley declared : “Indiana, after California, is our most doubtful Free State.”5” The Indiana Republicans contended that they were fight- ing for free homes for the homeless, for the laborer against the aristocrat, for a Pacific railroad, for the extension of freedom, for the preservation of the Union, to rescue the government from the “corrupt” Democrats, to put “Old Abe” in the chair, against a slave code, against Douglas’ squatter sovereignty, and against polygamy (a thrust at the Mormons in Utah). Lincoln was presented as a moderate, whereupon the Democrats stigmatized all Republicans as abolitionists. The Democratic central organ, the Indianapolis State Sen- tind, set the pace in the onslaught on Lincoln.6o Lincoln, watching developments from his home in Springfield, Illinois, became concerned. To Caleb €3. Smith he wrote : From present appearance we might succeed in the general result, without Indiana; but with it, failure is scarcely possible. Therefore put in your best efforts. I see by the despatches that Mr. Clay had a rousing meeting at Vincennes.61 To the said Clay-Cassius M. Clay, of Kentucky, who was stumping Indiana-Lincoln sent word ’in July : I see by the papers, and also hear from Mr. Nicolay, who saw you at Terre-Haute, that you are filling a list of speaking appointments in Indiana. I sincerely thank you for this; and I shall be still further

57 John D. Defrees to Thurlow Weed, August 25, 1860, Thurlow Weed Papers ( Library, Rochester, New York). 58 David Davis to Thurlow Weed, September 11, 1860, ihid. 39 Horace Greeley to Logan U. Reavis, August 21, 1860, Logan U. Reavis Papers (Chicago Historical Society). 60 Charles Zimmerman, “The Origin and Rise of the Republican Party in Indiana from 1854 to 1869,” in Indiana Magazine of History, XI11 (1917), 405-08; Indianapolis Dailg State Sentinel, May 26, 1860. 61Nicolay and Hay, Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln, VI, 47. 398 Indiana Magazine of History obliged if you will at the close of the tour, drop me a line, giving your impression of our prospects in that state.62 The Republicans decided on August 29 for the grand rally for Lincoln at Indianapolis. Fifty thousand crowded into the city. Huge processions of campaign clubs-“Wide- Awakes” and “Rail-Mau1ers”-led crowds to hear Caleb B. Smith, Henry S. Lane, and conservatives from other states speak on the necessity for electing Lincoln. In the evening a large torchlight procession was staged.G3 Lincoln’s friend and manager, Judge David Davis, was sent into Indiana by an alarmed Republican National Com- mittee. Returning home in late August, he wrote Lincoln: “I got home yesterday having gone through Indiana at the request of the National Committee. Will be down Monday and report. I should like two or three hours conver~ation.”~~ No record is extant of Davis’ conference with Lincoln about the critical Indiana situation, but a few weeks later we find the Judge writing the New York leader, Thurlow Weed:

Am in receipt of a letter from Caleb B. Smith of Indiana. He says “that the greatest fears I have in reference to our state election arise from the efforts now making to induce the Bell men to vote the Dem. State ticket. The Louisville Journal is appealing to the Bell men in this state [Indiana] to defeat the Republican State ticket, as the prestige of the success will give the state to Lincoln in November. This paper circulates extensively in Southern Indiana, where the Bell men mostly live, & I fear that many of them will follow its advice. I have very strong faith that we shall carry the State in Oct. I do not think it possible to give half the Bell men to the Democratic ticket, & I think we can stand this.” Still, Indiana is in great danger. I hope the National Committee will do all they can for the State. The whole money they asked (& more if it can be raised) should be sent at once. Men work better with money in hand. The first order of German speakers are needed in Indiana. . . . I believe in God’s Providence in this Election, but at the same time we should keep our powder dry.65 The veteran leader of Indianapolis, Defrees, had previ- ously appealed to Weed: “To injure our prospects in No-

62Ehrmann, The Missing Chapter in the Life of Lincoln, 3-4. 63 Zimmerman, “Origin and Rise of the Republican Party in In- diana,” in Indiana Magazine of History, XIII, 394. “David Davis to Abraham Lincoln, August 24, 1860. Copy in possession of Dr. Harry E. Pratt, of Springfield, Illinois. The original is supposed to be in possession of the Lincoln Tomb, Springfield. “David Davis to Thurlow Weed, September 11, 1860, Weed Papers. Indiana and Lincoln’s Rise to the Presidency 399

vember, I am afraid a majority of Bell men will vote against us in our State in October. . . . We need money very much.””‘; Certainly the fear was genuine that the conservative sup- porters of John Bell, the Constitutional Union nominee for President, would vote for the Democratic gubernatorial can- didate, Thomas A. Hendricks, and thus defeat Lane for gov- ernor in October. If such a thing occurred, the Republicans were apprehensive of its psychological effect on Lincoln’s chances in Indiana in November. Judge Davis, in emphasizing the necessity for compe- tent German orators, was cognizant of a delicate situation in Indiana-the Know Nothing tradition. Even as late as 1860, Indiana still contained nativistic influences. The In- diana Republican party had recruited much of its member- ship from former “Americans” and antiforeign conservative Whigs, and was at this time appealing to others of these groups to come into the Lincoln camp.G7 The Democrats saw in all this a fertile issue. To alienate the Teutonic ele- ment from the Republican standard, the Democrats resur- rected the Massachusetts “Two Year” Amendment of 1859, so obnoxious to all naturalized groups. Fort Wayne’s Dem- ocratic mouthpiece declared : Who passed the law in Massachusetts preventing foreign-born citizens from voting, when duly naturalized according to the Constitu- tion of the United States? The Know Nothings and the Republicans.63 In their quest for the German vote the Democrats had still another issue-prohibition. Most of the “Maine Law” ad- vocates had finally found their way into the Republican party. Moreover, they charged Lane-and justly so-with having supported the antiliquor law passed by the Indiana Legisla- ture of 1855 and later declared unconstitutional.@‘ The Republicans, to hold the Indiana Germans, pointed to President Buchanan’s veto of a homestead bill as proof

66 John D. Defrees to Thurlow Weed, August 25, 1860, ibid. ti7 William K. Edwards to Richard W. Thompson, June 4, 1860; R. N. Lamb and Frederick J. Waldo to Richard W. Thompson, August 11, 1860, Richard W. Thompson Papers (Lincoln National Life Founda- tion, Fort Wayne, Indiana); Harry J. Carman and Reinhard H. Luthin, “Some Aspects of the Know Nothing Movement Reconsidered,” in The South Atlantic Quarterly (Durham, North Carolina, 1902- ), XXXIX (1940), 213-34, see 229-30. fig Fort Wayne, Indiana, Sentinel, June 30, 1860. 69 Zbid., September 8, 15, and 22, 1860. Indiana Magazine of History that the Democrats were hostile to free land.7o Finally, Re- publican State Chairman Alexander H. Conner, in despera- tion, called upon to stump Indiana.?’ The Wis- consin German leader, who made an extensive tour, extolling the virtues of Lincoln and Lane, was enthusiastically re- ceived by the Teutonic element in the Hoosier State.72 In late August, Defrees wrote Thurlow Weed : The amount sent by the National Committee ($2,000) has been exhausted in the payment of Carl Schurz and other speakers and on a few German Republican papers. Could you not influence the Com- mittee to send a few thousand more? It ought to be sent immediately to A. H. Conner, the Chairman of our Committee, who will use it faithfully and efficiently.73 Later Schurz asserted that for his services he had received “$500. from I~idiana.”?~ With the German element fairly certain to go for Lane in the October election, another worry loomed for the Re- publicans-the abolitionist tinge that the Democrats had placed on them. ’Throughout September the Indianapolis State Sentinel continued its assault on Lin~oln,?~and other Democratic organs persistently appealed to “conservative, Union-loving citizens of Indiana” to defeat Lane and elect Hendricks But suddenly a ray of hope appeared -the split in the Democratic party, more particularly, the feud between Lincoln’s “northern” Democratic opponent for the Presidency, Stephen A. Douglas, and Indiana’s senior United States Senator, Jesse D. Bright. The personal and political enmity between Douglas and Bright had started several years before, when the Little Giant became infuriated at President Buchanan’s action in making the Indiana Senator the chief patronage-dispenser for the Northwest-an enmity made more bitter in 1857- 1858 when Douglas broke with Buchanan over the Presi- dent’s insistence on having Congress adopt the proslavery

70 Dawson’s Fort Wayne, Indiana, Daily Times, June 28, 1860. “Alexander H. Conner to Daniel D. Pratt, July 26, 1860, Pratt Papers. 72Dawson’s Fort Wayne, Indiana, Daily Times, June 29, 1860. 73 John D. Defrees to Thurlow Weed, August 25, 1860, Weed Papers. 74Carl Schurz to John P. Sanderson, December 22, 1860, Carl Schurz Papers (Library of Congress). iJIndianapolis Daily State Sentinel, September 10, 1860. i(i Fort Wayne, Indiana, Sentinel, September 15, 1860. Indiana and Lincoln’s Risc, to the Presidency 401

Lecompton Constitution for Kansas. Bright remained dog- gedly loyal to the President and denounced Douglas at every turn. More bad blood was brewed between the two when Douglas voted against the seating in the Senate of Bright and Graham N. Fitch, whose election was being contested by the Republicans. The wounds had not healed by 1860. The pro-Douglas, or “anti-Lecompton” forces captured con- trol of the state Democratic convention at Indianapolis in January. Then Bright fought tenaciously to block Douglas’ nomination for President at Charleston. When Douglas was named for President by the later convention, un- restricted warfare was on between the two Democratic fac- tions.?? The Republicans were in high glee, one leader re- porting :

Senator Bright said last week that if Douglas was nominated he would take the stump against him in Indiana . . . [and] that if the contest was to be between Douglas and Lincoln he would vote for the latter.78 Bright, long the generalissimo of the Hoosier Democracy and Buchanan’s northwestern swordsman, made good his threat. Ke placed his organization behind the candidacies of John C. Breckinridge, the “southern” Democratic nominee for Presi- dent, and his running mate, Senator Joseph Lane, of . Bright’s biographer concludes : “Bright was too shrewd a politician to believe that Breckinridge would carry the state ; his paramount object was to impair Douglas’ chance to the full extent of his ability.”79 -4 Breckinridge-Lane convention met on July 31. Bright sounded the keynote :

I go into this fight now under the banner of those heroes and statesmen-Breckinridge and Lane. . . . The names of Douglas and Johnson were forced upon the party by a fragment of a packed National

77 Stephen A. Douglas to Samuel Treat, February 5, 1857, Febru- ary 28, 1858, Samuel Treat Papers (Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis); Jesse D. Bright to Allen Hamilton, December (no day listed), 1858, Allen Hamilton Papers (Indiana State Library, Indianapolis) ; George F. Milton, The Eve of Conflict: Stephen A. Dou.gkcs and the Nesdless War (Boston, 1934), 259, 275, 278, 406, 420, 430, 469, and 478; Charles B. Murphy, “The Political Career of Jesse D. Bright,” in Publications, Indiana Historical Society, X (1931), 128-34. 78 John Woodruff to Arthur B. Calif, Private, June 18, 1860, Arthur B. Calif Papers (John Hay Library, Brown University, Provi- dence, Rhode Island). 79 Murphy, “Jesse D. Bright,” in Publications, Indiana Historical Society, X, 134. 402 Indiana Magazine of History

Convention. . . . Douglas! The President knows him too well to re- ward his treason by giving him aid and comfort.80 The Bright forces started a tri-weekly campaign paper, the Old Line Guard, whose editorial policy was more strongly anti-Douglas than anti-Lincoln. The “Joe Lane Rangers” were organized to combat the Lincoln “Wide-Awakes” and especially the Douglas “Little Giants.”” The Old Line Guard’s arguments against Lincoln were mild, compared to its scorch- ing editorials against Douglas. It portrayed the Republican standard-bearer not as a mauler of rails but as a grog-shop keeper who “sold red-eye at a picayune a nip”82-a refer- ence to Lincoln’s youthful years in New Salem, Illinois, when he retailed liquor with other merchandise. In early September, Bright, with his colleague Senator Fitch, Congressman William H. English, and others took the stump for Breckinridge and Joe Lane.83 It was soon recog- nized that Indiana would be carried by Lincoln or Douglas; neither Breckinridge nor Bell cut a large figure. To vote the Breckinridge ticket was soon viewed as strengthening Lincoln’s chances.*4 The embittered Bright told one audience : If I were to tell you that I believe that we are going to carry the State, I should tell you that which I don’t believe. . . . Let the breach be as wide as possible between us; and let the sound and rotten men of the Democratic party be separated.85 To make matters gloomier for the Democrats supporting Douglas, the Breckinridge State Central Committee decided that it would be inexpedient to place a state ticket in the field. This left the Breckinridge men free to support whom- ever they pleased at the Henry S. Lane-Thomas A. Hendricks gubernatorial contest in October.SG With Indiana conceded for either Lincoln or Douglas in November, and with Bright’s pro-Buchanan “Lecompton” Democrats knifing the Little Giant, the Douglasites became __ 8” Indianapolis Old Line Guard, August 9, 1860. Herschel V. John- son was the vice-presidential candidate on the ticket with Douglas. 81 Ihid., September 4, 1860. Jose h Lane, Breckinddge’s candidate for vice-president, had spent much ofhis early life in Indiana. 82 Ihid., July 24, 1860. 83 Ihid., September 15, 1860. 84 Zimmerman, “Origin and Rise of Republican Party in Indiana,” in Indiana Magazine of History, XIII, 402. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid., 401. Indiana md Lincoln’s Rise to the Presidency 403

alarmed. They appealed to Douglas himself : “Important that you visit Indianapolis about the middle of Septembe~.”~~ Other such urgent requests came to the Illinois Senator.8s On September 28, Douglas and his running mate, Herschel V. Johnson, were welcomed to a great rally at the state’s metropolis. Tens of thousands heard Douglas in an open- air demonstration. He blasted the Buchanan administration for deserting the Democratic National Platform of 1856, and pleaded with his audience to resist both the northern sectionalism as represented by Lincoln and the southern sectionalism as symbolized by Breckinridge.89 Then Doug- las proceeded to other parts of Indiana.!’O But it was plain that he was being blocked by Bright’s organization, which would prefer the election of Lincoln to that of Douglas. Destiny was smiling on the Republicans in another way. This was due to the hatred of the Whig-minded Constitu- tional Union men for anything smacking of the Democratic party. It was an era of ardent past party loyalties. The Constitutional Union State Convention was held in Indianapolis on August 15 and endorsed Bell for President. The attendance was disappointingly small and it was evident that Bell could not carry Indiana. Governor Morehead of Kentucky was present, full of the Kentucky feeling that the Bell men and Douglasites should unite on one state ticket to defeat the “sectional” Republicans. But Richard W. Thomp- son, most influential of all Indiana Constitutional Unionists and never reconciled to any Democrat, had other ideas. At Terre Haute, Thompson denounced all Democrats as the authors of all the mischief that had been done, and inter- preted the rupture in the Democracy as a just reward for their tampering with the nation’s peace and welfare. He stated that none could be elected by popular vote except Lincoln. He feared that if none of the four White House contenders-Lincoln, Douglas, Breckinridge, or Bell-should receive a majority of the electoral college and the election should be decided by Congress, the House of Representatives

87Ashbel P. Willard to Stephen A. Douglas, August 9, 1860, Stephen A. Douglas Papers (University of Chicago Library). 88 W. S. Pierce to Stephen A. Douglas, August 10, 1860; Joseph J. Bingham to Stephen A. Douglas, August 12, 1860; Charles E. Sturgis to Stephen A. Douglas, September 1, 1860, Douglas Papers. 89 Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel, September 29, 1860. ”OFort Wayne, Indiana, Sentind, October 6 and 13, 1860. 404 Indiana Magazine of History would be unable to elect a President of the United States. 3n such an eventuality the presidential office would fall to Breckinridge’s running mate, Senator Joseph Lane of Oregon, in his capacity as president pro tempore of the Senate. To the Union-minded Old Line Whig Thompson, the “disunion- ist” Democratic Joe Lane was to be avoided at all costs- even if Lincoln should be the next President.g1 Rather than run the risk of the Oregon Senator’s selection as chief ex- ecutive, Thompson declared, “I tell you frankly, I would prefer the election of Lincoln.”9z Thompson added : I would greatly prefer seeing Mr. Bell elected, but he shall never be elected, with my consent, nor shall any man, by a bargain with Mr. Douglas or his friends, or Mr. Breckinridge or his friends.93 Thereupon Thompson issued a circular addressed to the “Con- servative Men of Indiana,” contending that too much atten- tion was paid to national politics and not enough to state affairs. The prospect of Joe Lane as President would be a triumph for disunion, Thompson argued. He could not see how Whigs, who constituted the bulk of the Constitutional Union party, could be asked to vote for Hendricks, the Dem- ocratic gubernatorial candidate, who had supported Douglas’ hated Kansas-Nebraska Act and thus helped to bring the Republican party into being. Thompson was for the Repub- lican Henry S. Lane for governor, since his election would revive the spirit of Whiggery, for which Thompson had long been laboring. Between Lane and the Bell men there was but one difference-slavery-and upon that question Lane as governor would have no opportunity to do anything, since he would have no power outside Indiana. William K. Edwards, next to Thompson the most power- ful Bell leader in the state, shared Thompson’s views. Other Constitutional Unionists became impressed with such rea- soning, for they began to drift toward the Republican state ticket, “not because they believe in its principles but because of the desire to defeat the Democrats.” By early October it was obvious that most Bell men would vote for Henry S. Lane for governor.94 Too, Lincoln’s freedom from antislav-

w Zimmerman, “Origin and Rise of Republican Party in Indiana,” in Znduina Magazine of History, XIII, 396-97. 92 Ibid., 397. 93 Ihid. 94Zbid., 397-98; R. N. Lamb and Frederick J. Waldo to Richard W. Thompson, August 11, 1860, Thompson Papers. Indiana and Lincoln’s Rise to the Presidency 405 ery radicalism and the comparative conservatism of the Re- publican national platform were inducing hosts of Bell men to go over to Lincoln. Surveying the scene in Terre Haute, Edwards informed Thompson : The result of the Chicago Convention on their candidate and platform was more moderate than was apprehended or anticipated. It is quite a come-down from 1856. . . . Many of our men here have given in. . . . Lincoln however to my mind is so much better than Seward and Co., that I have no opposition to him.‘’j The state election was held October 9. With the Bell men supporting Lane, and with the Bright Democrats doing likewise rather than go for the pro-Douglas Hendricks, there could be only one result: the election of Henry S. Lane as governor. It was a close race. Of over 260,000 votes cast, Lane received a majority of less than 10,000 over Hendricks. The Douglasites blamed Bright‘s organization for their de- feat-and they were partly correct.9G Lincoln received word of the favorable results in Indi- ana and in Pennsylvania almost simultaneously. He sent the glad tidings to his friend and law partner, William H. Hern- don: “I cannot give you details, but it is entirely certain that Pennsylvania and Indiana have gone Republican very largely. Pennsylvania 2.5,000, and Indiana 5,000 to 10,000.”‘i7 Douglas was crestfallen on hearing the news from the Hoosier and Keystone states. “Mr. Lincoln is the next President,”qq he remarked dejectedly. The Little Giant was right. The results in Indiana and Pennsylvania were harbingers of a Lincoln victory in Kovember. Republican orators and editors could now emphasize to wavering conservatives that their triumphs in the two “October” states had resulted in no moves toward secession below the Mason and Dixon line.””

9; William K. Edwards to Richard W. Thompson, June 4, 1860, Thompson Papers. 96Milton, Eve of Conflict, 497 and n. 54; Murphy, “Jesse D. Bright, in Publzcations, Indiana Historical Society, X, 134 ; Zimmer- man, “Origin and Rise of Republican Party in Indiana,” in Indiana Magazine of History, XIII, 408-10; Indianapolis Daily Journal, Decem- ber 4, 1860; Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel, October 11, 1860. $17 Nicolay and Hay, Conzplete Works of Abraham Lincoln, VI, 62. 99 Milton, Eve of Conflict, 496. 99 Indianapolis Daily Journal, October 12, 1860; Springfield, Massachusetts, Reprubliean, October 10, 1860.