ROOTS OF TRADITION AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC by GARY J. OHLS Bachelor of Arts, 1972 Friends University, Wichita, Kansas Master of Business Administration, 1977 California State University, Long Beach, California Master of Arts, 1994 Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island Master of Arts, 2004 Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, Texas Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of AddRan College of Humanities and Social Sciences Texas Christian University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2008 Copyright by GARY J. OHLS 2008 PREFACE Roots of Tradition: Amphibious Warfare in Early America will fill a gap in the historiography of naval and military warfare. As the title implies, this dissertation describes and analyses the early (from the Revolution through the Civil War) landing operations of American history and how they contributed to building a rich tradition in this form of warfare. No such study currently exists. The basic definition of an amphibious operation is “a military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force, embarked in ships or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish an assigned mission.” This is the current definition within the U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. A timeless definition, it applies to actions of the past as well as in the present. This dissertation will not attempt to provide a description of every amphibious operation in early America. Roots of Tradition will focus on seven major battles or campaigns that loom important in American amphibious history. It will address other amphibious operations and land or naval battles to the extent necessary to comprehend historical context. For example, to understand the New York campaign of 1776, one must also appreciate the earlier battles at Bunker Hill and Boston. Therefore, they are included in abbreviated form in the chapter addressing New York. In the interest of time and space, this study will not depict all amphibious actions. But those which are included will provide the reader with a strong appreciation of the roots of America’s amphibious traditions. ii Research for this work includes material from national and military archives, published primary sources material, published secondary sources, and military publications and directives. Many current concepts and terms used in this study have applicability over the long stretch of history even though they may not have existed during the period under examination. For example, the term joint refers to an operation involving more than one service of a single nation. Amphibious operations are usually joint unless the landing party comes exclusively from the navy. The term combined describes an operation involving services from more than one nation. Yorktown is an example of a campaign that was both joint and combined— joint because in included army and navy units, and combined because it involved American and French forces. The distinction between strategic and tactical levels of warfare existed in well- defined terms during the period of early America. In the last decade of the twentieth century, defense thinkers added a new level to the lexicon that fits in between the tactical and strategic. This is the operational level of war and addresses actions oriented on a regional or theater level. Although the classification did not previously exist, the concept did. Military commanders fully realized that an intermediate level of war existed although they had not yet codified it in terminology. By using the term, operational level of war, we in no way unfairly evaluate past historical events by current standards. The concept of operational level of war existed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries even if a formal categorization did not. Appendix A provides a complete description of the three levels of war for review prior to reading this document. A set of principles entitled Characteristics of Amphibious Warfare exists in current Defense Department doctrine. The basic concepts they address apply to iii amphibious warfare throughout history. These four basic characteristics—Integration between the Navy and landing force, Rapid Buildup of Combat Power from the Sea to Shore, Task-Organized Forces, and Unity of Effort and Operational Coherence—are available to help evaluate the effectiveness of amphibious operations and to explain success or failure. These characteristics provide one of several tools for use in assessing each of the major amphibious battles studied. Appendix B provides a more complete description of the Characteristics of Amphibious Warfare. The Principles of War came into the doctrine of most established military services during the first part of the twentieth century. They resulted from an effort to distill the teachings of military thinkers such as Jomini and Clausewitz—along with the hard lessons of war—into a relatively simple tool for students and practitioners of the art. Despite their checklist appearance, the Principles of War serve only as a flexible basis for learning and analyses. Yet they can be helpful in conducting historical analysis of military and naval actions. The naval version (which does not differ greatly from other versions) of the Principles of War is included as Appendix C of this dissertation. The concept of military planning predominates much of the discussion of operations in this study. Planning is a component of the larger field of command and control involving the process of identifying goals and ensuring that appropriate actions are undertaken. Planning may be formal or informal, but will always include such considerations as the mission, enemy capabilities, the quality and quantity of troops available to the commander, terrain and weather conditions, and time available for both planning and operations. To be of value, plans must be communicated in a manner that is understandable yet sufficiently detailed to ensure efficiency in execution. We will see in iv the case of Bladensburg where the American commander developed a sound plan, but failed to communicate it well enough to ensure success on the battlefield. At Veracruz, planning often occurred on very short timelines, yet professional quality and effective distribution ensured an efficient and successful landing operation. The final arbiter of good planning usually results on the battlefield although there are many exceptions. George Washington, for example, consistently developed and communicated good plans, but his inexperienced and unstable army simply could not carry them out during the early phases of the Revolutionary War. Later at Yorktown, his more capable army coupled with professional officers and units of the French army and navy could effectively execute his plans bringing victory in the final major action of the war. The chapter on Derna, Tripoli introduces the concept of expeditionary warfare, which has become very prominent among U.S. defense leaders of the twenty-first century. Yet expeditionary warfare—like amphibious warfare—has deep roots in the history of early America. Amphibious warfare is inherently expeditionary in nature, and Derna demonstrates important aspects of both of these subjects. Such considerations as forward deployed forces, temporary advanced bases, sea basing, and forced entry into the objective area are expeditionary principles best achieved through amphibious actions. Since both expeditionary missions and amphibious operations are typically temporary measures, they meld well into a common undertaking. Should a foreign mission require a long-term commitment ashore—such as the entry onto the European continent during World War II—it usually ceases to be expeditionary in nature. The undertaking then requires introduction of more permanent elements, such as large army units under diplomatic or political oversight, which replace the amphibious forces. The Derna v campaign provides rich examples of expeditionary and amphibious warfare. A thorough explanation of expeditionary warfare and its missions is included in Appendix D. Occasionally this study will introduce other concepts such as The Interrelationship of Policy, Strategy, and Operations or Interactions, Adaptations, and Reassessment to help analyze the outcome of an amphibious event. For the most part, these concepts are self-explanatory. In cases where they are not, an explanation will accompany the discussion. vi CONTENTS PREFACE………………………………………………………………………… iii CHAPTERS INTRODUCTION..………………………………………………………….. 1 I. NOTES ON SOURCES AND CONCEPTS…...…………….……………. 20 II. THE NEW YORK CAMPAIGN…………………...…………...………… 45 III. THE YORKTOWN CAMPAIGN.…….………………...………………. 91 IV. THE ACTION AT DERNA, TRIPOLI …...……………..……………… 137 V. THE DEFENSE OF BALITMORE……………………..………………... 181 VI. THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA..……………...……….…………. 233 VII. THE LANDING AT VERACRUZ ……………………..……………… 269 VIII. THE FORT FISHER CAMPAIGN.………………………………….. 300 IX. EPILOG PAST AND FUTURE….…………………………………….. 328 vii REFERENCE APPENDICES……………………………………………………………… 333 BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………... 342 VITA………………………………………………………………………... 360 ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………… 361 viii INTRODUCTION Although raised to an especially high level of proficiency by the United States during the twentieth century, the art of amphibious warfare has deep roots in early American military and naval tradition. The seven major battles studied in this dissertation will illustrate how this amphibious tradition