The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project
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THE WEST COAST OFFSHORE VESSEL TRAFFIC RISK MANAGEMENT PROJECT Jean R. Cameron Captain William Uberti Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force Marine Safety Office San Juan PO Box 1032 San Martin Street Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/2003/1/227/2350293/2169-3358-2003-1-227.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 Neskowin, OR 97149-1032 Guaynabo, Puerto Rico 00968 Rick Holly LT Patricia Spnnger California Department of Fish and Game, Manne Region US Coast Guard Pacific Area 425 "G" Executive Court North Building 50-6, Coast Guard Island Fairfield, CA 94585 Alameda, CA 94501 ABSTRACT: The West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Pacific Area. The WCOVTRM Project Workgroup included Management Project resulted from a unique collaboration representatives the states of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and between the US Coast Guard Pacific Area, the Canadian Coast California, as well as the Province of British Columbia. Guard, and the environmental agencies representing the Membership also included representatives from key US and Province of British Columbia and the States of Alaska, Canadian federal agencies, environmental and citizen groups, oil Washington, Oregon, and California. In addition to these and shipping industry organizations, and ports. A total of 41 organizations, the Project Workgroup included federal military members and alternates worked on this project between 1999 and and environmental agencies from both the US and Canada, 2002 with the goal of producing vessel traffic management industry from all the affected regions, as well as public interest recommendations that would improve the margin of safety for our organizations. The primary focus of the project is prevention of sensitive coastal resources. drift groundings - and subsequent oil spills - by disabled vessels traveling coastwise off the West Coast of the US and Canada anywhere between Cook Inlet and San Diego. Working together Study design over a three-year period, the Project Workgroup collected information on West Coast traffic patterns, traffic volume, At their first meeting in 1999 the WCOVTRM Workgroup existing management measures, ship drift rates, historical agreed to the following project goal statement: To develop an casualty data, weather data, assist vessel availability, and offshore vessel traffic scheme for the West Coast that will prevent economic and environmental sensitivity of the coastlines. Vessel environmental damage. The Workgroup agreed that the types of concern included laden tank vessels and barges, plus geographic range of the project would be from Cook Inlet, Alaska cargo, passenger, and fishing vessels over 300 gross tons. Two in the north to San Diego, California in the south. Their area of risk assessment tools were developed that incorporated this focus was offshore only; vessel traffic management issues inside information and delineated average and higher risk areas of Puget Sound, the Columbia River, San Francisco Bay, and the operation on the West Coast. Based upon these outcomes, the Inside Passage of British Columbia and Alaska were not within Workgroup has developed findings and recommendations focused the purview of this project. on reducing risk associated with the distance offshore, collision The Workgroup agreed to address collision and grounding hazard, tug availability, and historic casualty factors. In addition risks from tank ships and tank barges, as well as passenger, to the collaborative partnerships involved in this project, the risk fishing, and dry cargo vessels 300 gross tons and larger. They assessment techniques and the regional applications are unique sought to determine the routes most frequently used by these and provide a model which could be applied to offshore regions types of vessels as they transited off the West Coast of the United worldwide. States and Canada. No one source of comprehensive data on vessel traffic patterns was available, so data were reviewed from previous West Coast vessel traffic studies, and information was Project background obtained from the United States Coast Guard. Expert opinion data was also gathered from pilots, vessel masters, and trade The Members of the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill associations, as well as from charts reviewed on vessels during Task Force signed a resolution on vessel routing in 1996, routine inspections. Based on these sources, the Workgroup expressing their concern over oil spill risks associated with accepted the following conclusions: groundings and collisions from vessel traffic off the West Coast. • In general, tank ships carrying crude oil and operated by In response to these concerns, the Task Force initiated and co- members of the Western States Petroleum Association sponsored the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk (WSPA) transit at distances of 50 nautical miles (nm) or Management (WCOVTRM) project with the US Coast Guard greater off the West Coast except when entering port or a 227 228 2003 INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL CONFERENCE traffic Separation scheme around a port. Non-WSPA crude NOAA HAZMAT also provided information on eastern and oil tankers and refined product tankers are not subject to northern Pacific circulation patterns. this agreement and can transit closer to shore. Tank ships Available casualty data indicated that more than 800 marine are generally complying with the Canadian voluntary casualties involving vessels 300 gross tons or larger had been Tanker Exclusion Zone (TEZ) off the west coast of British reported in the US and Canadian Exclusive Economic Zones Columbia. along the West Coast of North America between 1992 and 1999. • The majority of all tank barges carrying crude oil and Ninety-six of these casualties were within the scope of this report, refined petroleum products travel 25 nautical miles or i.e., "offshore" (3-200 nm) casualties that had the potential to further off the West Coast, except when entering port or result in an oil spill. These casualties ranged from mechanical the traffic separation schemes around a port, pursuant to an failures to collisions or groundings - basically, any incident that American Waterways Operators (AWO) informal may have caused an oil spill of 1000 gallons or more. It was clear agreement to do so. that incidents involving mechanical and equipment failures do Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/2003/1/227/2350293/2169-3358-2003-1-227.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 • Non-tank vessel tracks varied significantly, generally occur off the West Coast with enough regularity - an average of ranging from 3-30 nautical miles and further offshore. 12 times/year - to justify a concern that such incidents could The Workgroup collected data on vessels transiting the West result in drift groundings and the release of oil and other Coast for a one year period from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999 in hazardous materials into the environment. Noting that only US order to compile a "snapshot in time" that would give them an and Canadian flag ships are required to report casualties outside overview of the volume of coastal traffic. To avoid duplication, it of their own territorial waters, the Workgroup understood that was important to focus only on arrivals in each port and to there may have actually been more loss of power or steering determine each vessel's last port of call. The traffic volume data casualties that occurred within the US and Canadian EEZs but indicated 19,161 "arrivals" for the period of 7/1/98 to 6/30/99 for which were not reported. the vessel types covered by this study. Approximately 31% of the Recognizing that risk equations multiply probability times vessel arrivals were Trans-Pacific from Hawaii, Asia, Oceania, consequences, the Project Workgroup examined the Europe through the Suez Canal, or the Middle East. After environmental, economic, and social consequences of a major oil deducting the 5% for which the last port of call was unknown, spill on the West Coast. They reviewed findings from the approximately 64%, or 12,200 vessel arrivals in West Coast ports Evaluation of Oil Tanker Routing, a 1995 report prepared for over the one year study period studied were known to be Congress by the US Coast Guard, which indicated that the coastwise transits. Approximately 20% of all transits were tank shorelines of Washington, Oregon, and California, as well as a ships and barges. The majority of the remaining arrivals were contiguous zone that extends out to at least 25 nautical miles, are large commercial vessels such as container ships and bulk highly sensitive to oil spills. A similar study of resources off product carriers; 89% were arrivals at the major ports of Prince Alaska and British Columbia determined that a concentration of William Sound, the Juan de Fuca region, the Columbia River, San sensitive seabird, fishery, and marine mammal distributions can Francisco Bay, and Los Angeles/Long Beach (LA/LB). Although likewise be found along the entire Gulf of Alaska and British this data captured only one year's activity, the Workgroup felt Columbia coastlines. that it was a representative "snapshot in time." The Workgroup defined an "assist vessel" or "rescue" vessel as The Project Workgroup reviewed various Vessel Traffic "a tug or other vessel capable of assisting and stabilizing a Management measures already in place along the West Coast of drifting disabled vessel, in order to arrest the drift until such time North America. In general, the regulatory management measures as a suitable salvage/towing vessel can arrive on scene to provide focused on major port approach areas and areas with established necessary assistance." With this definition in mind, the protection designations such as exclusion zones or Areas to be Workgroup developed an inventory of 182 ocean-going tugs Avoided. The Workgroup noted that many of the existing vessel operating out of home-ports on the West Coast. Based upon an management measures were created individually, only taking into analysis of the bollard pull required for open ocean work under account their local regions, and that no "big picture" view had worst-case wind conditions as indicated by the NOAA data, the been taken of how the various measures worked together.