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SIERRA LEONE human rights violations and exten- sive use of child soldiers. The country has remained relatively stable since OVERVIEW President Kabbah was re-elected in a landslide victory in May 2002. This The civil war in Sierra Leone began is partly because the UN Security in March 1991 when a small number Council has successively extended of fighters called the Revolutionary the drawdown of the UN Mission in United Front (RUF) attacked Sierra Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). In April Leone from Liberia. An Armed 2005, several thousand UN peace- Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), keepers continued to serve in the comprising mutinous members of mission there. the Sierra Leone Army (referred to as ‘ex-SLA’), overthrew the government in May 1997. The RUF accepted the ARMED GROUPS AFRC’s invitation to join the new junta, but the international commu- Revolutionary United Front nity overwhelmingly supported the (RUF) government of , exiled in Conakry. In March 1998, Origins/composition: Nigerian troops participating in the At its height, the RUF may have Economic Community of West African numbered around 20,000. Although States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group more than 24,000 RUF combatants (ECOMOG) reinstalled Kabbah, but participated in the various phases of the civil war raged on until January the government’s disarmament, 2002. demobilization, and reintegration Low points in the conflict included (DDR) programme,1 this is an inaccu- the AFRC–RUF siege of in rate indicator of the group’s actual January 1999 that resulted in more strength. Many RUF members report than 5,000 deaths, and an RUF that they were recruited by force and hostage-taking incident involving promised material rewards (sex slaves, the capture of some 500 UN peace- drugs, money) in exchange for their keepers in May 2000. The civil war participation.2 was noteworthy for the sheer scale of

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Leadership: cohesive fighting force. While many led the RUF until his RUF members disarmed and demo- capture in May 1999. Issa Sesay bilized, others left Sierra Leone to emerged as interim leader in fight in neighbouring wars. Internal November 2000. Sankoh died in cus- divisions, the indictment of four of its tody in July 2003. Sesay, who was leaders, and waning support all point indicted by the Special Court for to the eventual demise of the RUF.5 Sierra Leone (SCSL), is currently awaiting trial. Civil Defence Force (CDF) Areas of control/activity: Widespread and long-standing dis- Origins/composition: content with the country’s govern- The CDF constituted a loose-knit ment and political elites in Freetown collection of tribally based hunting initially provided the RUF with a base societies that defended their commu- of popular support that ran across nities, initially against the SLA and ethnic and district lines throughout later the RUF. Its members included parts of the hinterland. As the RUF the (Kailahun area), relied increasingly on terror and Tamaboros (Koinadugu district), the forced conscription, its control of Donsos (), the Kapras several districts within the northern (), and the Gbethis and eastern provinces increased, but (Port Loko and Tonkolili districts). at the expense of its popular support. More than 37,000 CDF members Sources of financing/support: participated in the DDR pro- The RUF received considerable fund- gramme,6 but the number of CDF ing from the illegal sale of alluvial fighters was considerably larger. diamonds.3 Burkina Faso, Côte According to a survey of ex-combat- d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Libya are widely ants, CDF members largely joined reported to have provided the RUF the militia in order to defend their with weapons.4 communities, and recruitment Status: occurred on the basis of family or The peace accords called for the community networks. Consequently, RUF to be transformed into a politi- CDF discipline appears to have been cal party. This effectively occurred relatively stronger than that of other under Sesay. The RUF is no longer a groups.7

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Leadership: Leadership: Sam Hinga Norman, who served as was chairman Kabbah’s deputy minister of defence of the AFRC and ruled the junta from for a time, was the CDF’s National May 1997 to February 1998. He Coordinator. The degree to which he remained influential with ‘ex-AFRC’ exerted control over militias other and members of the former Sierra than his Kamajor kinsmen is believed Leone armed forces through the May to have varied among other CDF 2002 elections. groups, but is reported to have been Areas of control/activity: not particularly strong. The AFRC was forced to flee Areas of control/activity: Freetown in February 1998, but some (See ‘Origins/composition’ above.) elements continued to operate in Sources of financing/support: small groups. Koroma continued to The Kamajors received some training enjoy the allegiance of some ex-SLA from Sandline International, a British and gained additional supporters private security company.8 among the general Freetown popula- Status: tion for his defence of the capital in Hinga Norman, indicted by the SCSL May 2000. in March 2003, currently awaits trial. Sources of financing/support: The Kamajors still have a well-organ- The AFRC was politically isolated, ized command structure and claim to although it might have received sup- be ready to mobilize at any time,9 but port from Liberia and perhaps some the status of many other CDF militias of Liberia’s supporters.11 Financially is unclear.10 and militarily, the AFRC benefited from exercising effective control of Armed Forces Revolutionary the country and its assets during its Council (AFRC) eight-month rule. Status: Origins/composition: Koroma has not been seen in public Disgruntled members of the armed since his reported ‘death’ in June forces established the group at the 2003. Some believe his disappearance time of the coup d’état. is simply a ploy to avoid arrest by the SCSL, which had handed down its indictment three months earlier.

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Indeed, according to the SCSL SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT Koroma’s ‘fate and whereabouts WEAPONS remain unknown’.12 The AFRC, how- ever, is no longer believed to be a Stockpiles cohesive force. Small arms: (WSB) The RUF possessed a wide array of weapons including rifles such as AK- Origins/composition: 47 assault rifles of Chinese, Soviet, The nucleus of the WSB included for- and eastern European origin, Belgian mer SLA members. Its strength was FN-FALs, German G3s, and British believed to number in the hundreds. Lee-Enfield no. 4s, and sub-machine Leadership: guns such as the German Sten and Foday Kallay headed the WSB. Israeli Uzi.13 The CDF possessed large Areas of control/activity: numbers of hunting rifles, but also Largely limited to the Rokel Creek a few assault rifles. For example, area near Occra Hills in Port Loko Gbethis who disarmed in . district turned in AK-47s, self-load- Sources of financing/support: ing rifles (SLRs), and G3s.14 The WSB attacked and robbed peo- Light weapons: ple travelling along the roads in their The RUF possessed Chinese 12.7 mm area of control. machine guns, various 60 mm, 82 mm, Status: and 120 mm mortars, and small Defunct. The WSB was neutralized numbers of anti-tank and surface-to- in September 2000 after ‘Operation air missiles.15 Barass’, a mission the British under- took to rescue their soldiers taken Sources hostage by the WSB in August. Those not killed in the raid surrendered Domestic: and later enlisted in the DDR pro- Sierra Leonean armed groups seized gramme. weapons from the Sierra Leone armed forces as well as from UN and ECOWAS troops. For example, the RUF took hundreds of

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weapons from Guinean, Kenyan, and from DDR such as pistols and hunt- Zambian troops during the May 2000 ing rifles, retrieved some 9,660 UNAMSIL hostage crisis. The AFRC weapons and 17,000 rounds of took weapons from the Malians in ammunition between December 2001 ECOMOG.16 Many of the CDF’s and March 2002.22 The success of this hunting rifles were craft-manufac- initiative led to a second undertak- tured. The Kamajors received some ing, known as CACD II, which began weapons from Nigerian ECOMOG in February 2003 and was subse- troops and from the SLA.17 quently renamed the Arms for Foreign: Development (AfD) project. The At least eight countries—Burkina project aims to completely clear 67 Faso, Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, , chiefdoms—approximately half the Liberia, Libya, the Slovak Republic, country—of arms by the end of 2005. and Ukraine—reportedly provided As of 31 December 2004, arms col- materiel to the RUF.18 The RUF also lection had either been completed seized arms from the ECOMOG, the or was ongoing in 17 chiefdoms, and SLA, and UNAMSIL.19 a total of 1,892 weapons had been collected.23 So far, mostly hunting Recovered rifles and unexploded ordnance (UXO) have been recovered. Of the DDR: relatively few assault rifles collected— Between September 1998 and January perhaps 40 or so in all—most are G3s 2002, some 25,000 small arms, 1,000 and AK-47s.24 light weapons, and almost one mil- lion rounds of ammunition were col- lected during the DDR process.20 HUMAN SECURITY ISSUES However, the programme aimed pri- marily at collecting assault weapons, CAFF and failed to recover many of the CDF’s craft hunting rifles.21 Extent of recruitment: Other: The government and UNAMSIL A Community Arms Collection and demobilized approximately 6,850 Destruction Programme (CACD), children during and after the civil which focused on weapons exempted war, but this figure does not repre-

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sent the full scale of the numbers of Functions: children recruited. For example, some CAFF’s most common functions commanders did not register chil- within the RUF included (in order of dren associated with fighting forces importance) spying, looting, camp (CAFF) in the DDR programme, pre- maintenance, manning checkpoints, ferring instead to enter into kick- and looking for food.28 Sierra Leonean back schemes with non-combatants CAFF were also directly involved whereby the commanders would in the hostilities,29 particularly in receive some of the recipients’ bene- ambushes against vehicles, killings fits. Some children, especially those of civilians, looting, as well as rapes associated with the RUF, were afraid and kidnapping. Children associated of being stigmatized and elected with the RUF often had access to instead to remain anonymous. firearms—even though these were Some 3,000 CAFF are in school. usually owned by adult members of According to UN officials, the ‘Sierra the group—and were given drugs Leone model for the demobilization before being sent to the front line.30 and reintegration of child combat- Human Rights Watch has docu- ants is widely considered a success mented how adult rebels of the RUF that could be applied to other peace- and the AFRC used girls and in some keeping operations’.25 However, a cases boys as sex slaves.31 range of organizations, such as the Women’s Commission on Refugee Displacement Women and Children, criticized the structure of the programmes because IDPs: it largely neglected the needs of girls Completion of the Sierra Leone DDR and former RUF child soldiers, leav- programme in early 2002 facilitated ing large numbers of the target pop- large-scale repatriation of refugees ulation ignored and underserved.26 and resettlement of internally dis- The overwhelming majority of chil- placed persons (IDPs). At least dren associated with the RUF were 600,000 Sierra Leoneans were dis- forcefully recruited, as a result of placed within their own country at which many ended up belonging the end of 2001.32 More than 65,000 to several—sometimes opposing— IDPs and returnees were resettled groups throughout their youth.27 between May 2001 and February

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2002.33 The final ‘official’ group of OUTLOOK 12,800 IDPs were resettled in November 2002.34 Although the DDR was imperfect, it Refugees abroad: appears that small arms and light By July 2004, 280,000 refugees had weapons are no longer easily avail- returned to Sierra Leone, and 15,000 able in the capital and throughout remained in asylum countries in the the country. Unemployment remains subregion.35 high, yet armed robberies and Refugees hosted: assaults are rare. Johnny Paul By late 2004, Sierra Leone also hosted Koroma’s supporters tried (unsuc- 50,000 refugees,36 mostly Liberians.37 cessfully) to steal weapons from the army engineer unit’s depot in Other violations or Wellington in January 2003. This abuses attempt suggests weapons are not circulating freely. Reasons for con- Killings, rape, and torture: cern remain, however. All parties to the conflict engaged in Popular support for the SCSL may human rights violations during the dissipate depending on how the civil war. The RUF and the AFRC three group trials of nine indictees, committed systematic and wide- which began in mid-2004, evolve. spread violations of human rights Youth groups have appeared in the including amputations, rape, torture, eastern diamond-mining districts, mutilations, and summary execu- and the government continues to tions. The CDF and the SLA report- struggle to assert control over illegal edly committed serious human mining in this area. The Security rights violations as well.38 Council’s decisions to continue to Other: extend the mandate for UNAMSIL In March 2003, the SCSL indicted for- have provided essential support to mer RUF leader Sesay. His trial the post-conflict peace-building began in July 2004. He faces charges process. The Sierra Leone armed of crimes against humanity, serious forces and police are still far from violations of international humani- being able to provide for the coun- tarian law, and war crimes.39 try’s defence or to uphold law and order on their own.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ENDNOTES

AfD Arms for Development 1 Thokozani and Meek (2003, p. 33). AFRC Armed Forces 2 Humphreys and Weinstein (2004, pp. 28–29). Revolutionary Council 3 Smillie, Gberie, and Hazleton (2000, CACD Community Arms pp. 52–54). Collection and 4 Obasi (2002, pp.58–59); Global Witness Destruction Programme (2001; 2003). CAFF Children associated 5 ICG (2003, p. 15). with fighting forces 6 Thokozani and Meek (2003, p. 33). CDF Civil Defence Force 7 Humphreys and Weinstein (2004, DDR Disarmament, pp. 28–29). demobilization, and 8 Berman (2000, p. 12). reintegration 9 ICG (2003, p. 13). ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring 10 Confidential written correspondence with a Group knowledgeable source, 5 May 2004. ECOWAS Economic Community 11 Liberia, as a member of ECOWAS, offi- of West African States cially condemned the coup d’état and IDP Internally displaced continued to recognize the Kabbah govern- person ment. However, given then Liberian RUF Revolutionary United President Charles Taylor’s long-standing Front support for the RUF, which entered into an SCSL Special Court for Sierra alliance with the AFRC, it would seem that Leone Taylor’s support for the sanctions that SLA Sierra Leone Army ECOWAS and the UN imposed were in SLR Self-loading rifle word rather than deed. UNAMSIL Mission 12 Special Court for Sierra Leone (2003). in Sierra Leone 13 Berman (2000, p. 15). UXO Unexploded ordnance 14 Concord Times (2001). WSB West Side Boys 15 Berman (2000, p. 15). 16 Berman (2000, pp. 7–8). 17 Berman (2000, p. 12). 18 See Berman (2000, pp. 3–10); UNSC (2000, paras. 194–95, 203–11).

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19 Berman (2000, pp. 7–8). BIBLIOGRAPHY 20 Thusi and Meek (2003, p. 29). 21 Other limitations included the inadequate Bah, Alhaji. 2004. Implementing the ECOWAS reintegration of women and children. Small Arms Moratorium in Post-War Sierra For an analysis of Sierra Leone’s DDR Leone. Working Paper. Waterloo: Project programme, see Ginifer (2004, pp. 32–34) Ploughshares. May. Accessed April 2005. 22 Thusi and Meek (2003, p. 33). programme. Berman, Eric G. 2000. Re-armament in Sierra 24 Interview with Andrew Gbanie, Assistant Leone: One Year After the Lomé Peace Superintendent, , Abuja, Agreement. Occasional Paper No. 1. 25 October 2004. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. 25 UNSC (2004, para. 21). Concord Times (Freetown). 2001. ‘300 Gbethis 26 CSC (2004a, p. 37). Disarm at Petifu Malal.’ 22 October. 27 See Chapter 6 and HRW (2003). Accessed April 2004. 28 See Chapter 6. 29 See also CSC (2004b, p. 37). CSC (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child 30 See Chapter 6. Soldiers). 2004a. Child Soldiers Use 2003: 31 HRW (2003, pp. 28, 42). A Briefing for the 4th UN Security Council, 32 USCR (2004). Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict. 33 Malan (2003, p. 15). London: CSC. January. 34 Global IDP Project (2004). Accessed December 2004. 35 UNHCR (2004). 37 UNOCHA (2004b). —. 2004b. Child Soldiers Global Report 2004. 38 Special Court for Sierra Leone (2004); London: CSC. 17 November. HRW (2003, pp. 25–48). Ginifer, Jeremy. 2005. Armed Violence and 39 Special Court for Sierra Leone (2004). Poverty in Sierra Leone. Case study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (AVPI). Bradford: Center for International Cooperation and Security. March. Global IDP Project. 2004. ‘IDPs in Sierra Leone: Population Profile and Figures.’

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Accessed April 2004. Progress and Prospects of the ECOWAS Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security. Global Witness. 2001. ‘Liberia Breaches UN Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada Sanctions – Whilst its Logging Industry Publication. January. Accessed April 2004. Funds Arms Imports and RUF Rebels.’ . Press release. 6 September. Special Court for Sierra Leone. 2003. Accessed —. 2003. The Usual Suspects: Liberia’s Weapons May 2004. Leone. London: Global Witness. March. —. 2004. ‘The RUF Accused.’ Accessed May HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2003. “We will 2004. kill you if you cry”: Sexual Violence in the Thokozani, Thusi and Sarah Meek. 2003. Sierra Leone Conflict. Vol. 15, No. 1. January ‘Disarmament and Demobilization.’ (A). New York: HRW. Accessed April 2005. In Mark Malan et al., eds. Sierra Leone: Monograph Series No. 80. Pretoria: Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy M. Institute for Security Studies. Weinstein. 2004. What the Fighters Say: UNDP (United Nations Development A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone, Programme). 2005. Arms for Development June–August 2003. Freetown: The Post- Draft Annual Report 2004. Freetown: Conflict Reintegration Initiative for Government of Sierra Leone. Development and Empowerment. July. UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Sierra for Refugees). 2004a. ‘UNHCR’s Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance. Leone Repatriation Draws to End.’ 21 July. Africa Report No. 67. Freetown and Accessed December 2004. Brussels: ICG. 2 September. Road to Recovery. ISS Monograph Series No. UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the 80. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). Obasi, Nnamdi K. 2002. Small Arms 2004a. West Africa 2005 Consolidated Appeals Proliferation & Disarmament in West Africa: Process. New York and Geneva: UNOCHA.

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—. 2004b. Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): West Africa 2004. New York and Geneva: UNOCHA. UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2000. Report of the panel of experts appointed pursuant to the UN Security Council

resolution 1306 (2000). S/2000/1195 of 20 December. —. 2004. Twenty-First Report of the Secretary- General on the United Nations Mission in

Sierra Leone. S/2004/228 of 19 March. USCR (United States Committee for Refugees). 2004. Country Profile: Sierra Leone. Accessed April 2004. .

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