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Republic of Guinea 2009-17 United Nations University Centre for Policy Research What Works in UN Resident Coordinator-led Conflict Prevention: Lessons from the Field June 2018 Republic of Guinea 2009-17 Josie Lianna Kaye* This case study is part of a broader research project, carried out by the UNU Centre for Policy Research (UNU- CPR) with the support of the UK Mission to the United Nations, on the role of UN Resident Coordinators in Conflict Prevention. The project aimed to extract lessons from case studies of Resident Coordinator-supported preventive action in nine countries (Bolivia 2000-09; Colombia 2012-16; Guinea 2009-15; Guyana 2003- 15; Kenya 2008-17; Kyrgyzstan 2010-17; Malawi, 2011-17; Nepal 2007-15; and Tunisia 2011-17). All case studies, and the resulting policy paper synthesizing lessons and findings can be accessed at cpr.unu.edu. © 2018 United Nations University. All Rights Reserved. ISBN: 978-92-808-9086-0 2 Guinea Introduction National Transitional Council – a cornerstone of the entire process; political discussions on state media were banned; When President Lansana Conté died on 24 December 2008 the leaders of political parties and civil society representatives after decades of authoritarian rule, political repression and became targets of military intimidation and harassment; under-development, it took only a few hours before a group and the formation of CNDD-related ethnic militias across of young military officers – acting in the name of the Conseil the country had a de-stabilising effect at the local level and National pour la Démocratie et le Développement (CNDD) and created mistrust between junta leaders and other sections led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara – enacted a bloodless, of the military.9 It was within this tense context that Guinea military ‘coup.’1 The constitution, all state institutions and the witnessed one of its most violent episodes to date: On 28th activities of trade unions and civil society organizations were September 2009, under the banner of the FVN, political suspended with immediate effect. The ‘junta’, as it became parties, trade unions and members of civil society assembled known, made bold promises concerning anti-corruption, in Conakry Stadium in a show of unity, support and discontent economic transparency and ‘free and fair’ elections, leading with the CNDD broadly speaking and in opposition to many Guineans to flock to the streets in celebration, Camara’s bid to run for president specifically. Security anticipation and hope for change.2 While the specific group forces were charged to disperse the gathering, killing over of individuals that took power was relatively unknown to the 150 people, and injuring more than 1500.10 Security forces public, Conté’s health had been in decline for over a decade were also accused of perpetrating the mass rape of women and there was a widely held expectation that the military would protestors11 and, in the days that followed, soldiers “attacked eventually step in to fill the void. and looted neighbourhoods throughout the capital that were known as opposition strongholds.”12 The joy with which the move was received by the Guinean public and political parties was matched in equal measure The spectre of civil war loomed large, not least since, in by the dismay with which it was received by the international addition to these local dynamics, the spill-over effects community, where the ‘junta’ was unanimously condemned: from sub-regional conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia had the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC) destabilised Guinea throughout the 2000s. And yet, not only suspended Guinea’s membership, calling for a return to has Guinea avoided succumbing to large-scale violence, it constitutional order; the Economic Community of West African has embarked on a largely successful – albeit incomplete States (ECOWAS) held an extraordinary summit in Abuja, also – political transition, marked by the holding of Presidential suspending Guinea and outlining five conditions3 for a return elections in 2010, legislative elections in September 2013, to constitutional order; echoing the sentiments of their regional the formation of the National Assembly in January 2014, and, counterparts, both the European Union (EU) and the United the holding of Presidential elections in October 2015 when States (US) went onto suspend all development assistance, the sitting president, Mr. Alpha Condé was re-elected.13 bar humanitarian aid;4 and the Paris-based Organisation Furthermore, the first local elections since the era of military Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) suspended Guinea’s dictatorship were finally held in February 2018 after a thirteen participation in all francophone multilateral co-operation year delay. How did Guinea step back from the ‘brink’, and initiatives, except for programmes directly of benefit to civilians what role did the United Nations (UN) broadly speaking, or to the consolidation of democracy.5 and the UN Resident Coordinator (RC) along with the UN Country Team (UNCT) specifically play in preventing violence Even before international pressure could really take effect, from spiralling into civil war? What steps did the RC and the the situation on the ground began to unravel, and over the UNCT take to foster the required dialogue and necessary course of 2009 it went from bad to worse. Just days after the compromises in the context of Guinea’s political transition? military coup the new leader appeared “increasingly erratic and messianic.”6 Concerns about levels of commitment to This case study will argue that the RC and UNCT made an the transitional roadmap and elections in particular became important contribution to conflict prevention, crisis response progressively prominent among political parties and civil and peacebuilding in Guinea as a result of the crucial ability society alike. A loose umbrella movement comprised of both of UN actors specifically and the international community as trade unions and political parties, called the Forces Vives de a whole to act in concert, towards shared goals, in a (largely) la Nation (FVN) emerged as counter-weight to CNDD and, coordinated, efficient manner. The RC acted in predominantly increasingly, the “euphoria of the 2008 Christmas season was politically ‘savvy’ ways and, at no point in the 2009-14 replaced by talk of war, confrontational politics, and increasing timeframe – which will be the main focus of this paper – did mistrust.”7 Tensions continued to rise during the course of s/he do so alone. Far from it, s/he leveraged and/or worked 2009 as a result of Camara’s expression of intent to seek the in concert with the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA)14 with presidency in elections that were scheduled for 31 January support from the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), 2010,8 despite prior promises that no members of the junta UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and Peacebuilding Support would seek personal power. Office (PBSO), and a critical role was also played by the former United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Dialogue over the democratic transition process fell into entity known as the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery complete disarray: the junta blocked the creation of a (BCPR). Outside of the UN system, the RC depended upon 3 Guinea the International Contact Group (ICG), the so-called ‘Troika’ just a few weeks later, following Guinea’s first bloodless (made up of the AU, UN and ECOWAS), the EU, the US, and military coup. He installed a ruling elite, dominated by the France, amongst others. Putting aside some of the favourable military, which – over time – “came to resemble a primitive elements of the context, any successes the RC enjoyed can corporatist regime”24 based on rent-seeking – dynamics and should be attributed to his/her ability to see him/herself that have remained at the forefront of Guinean politics for as a part of a greater whole, rather than a ‘lone ranger’ taking decades.25 Conté loosened the state’s grip on the economy on the task of supporting the political transition in isolation. and encouraged private investments, especially in the mining This required: an intricate understanding of the context, a sector. The regime also made commitments to implement deep appreciation of each actor’s comparative advantage the structural adjustment programmes imposed by the IMF within that context; and, the ability to communicate, mobilise and World Bank, which involved a drastic reduction of the and synergise with multiple actors at any given moment. public sector – a move which, the regime believed, also increased the risk of civil conflict as the result of a public 1. Country Context sector backlash.26 The regime, therefore, continued to make promises to international counterparts to implement the Underlying conflict risk factors programme on the one hand, while deliberately stalling on any real action on the other. The liberalisation of the Guinea borders Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Mali in the economy was accompanied by centralised ‘rent-seeking’, north, Côte d’Ivoire in the east and Liberia and Sierra Leone thereby channelling profits to an extremely small elite group, in the south, and has a 320km coastline along the Atlantic targeting mainly “mid- and high-ranking military officers, the Ocean.15 Despite its rich mineral wealth, Guinea sits among presidential entourage, mid-level state administrators and the world’s least developed countries: with over 9 million some privileged sections of the population.”27 people, in 2015 it ranked 178th out of 187 countries in UNDP’s Human Development Index,16 and has a long history of “poor Conté’s twenty-four-year reign was defined by “widespread macroeconomic performance, weak governance structures, corruption, repression, weak state structures, a fragmented political instability, and insecurity.”17 Progress that was made civil society, political opposition, a burgeoning drug trade, following the beginning of Guinea’s political transition in 2010 and plummeting living standards”28 and, perhaps most was quickly unraveled by the crisis associated with the Ebola notably, the manipulation of ethnic divisions29 for political Virus Disease in 2014, which was a tragic and momentous set- purposes.
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