The Causes of Fiji's 5 December 2006 Coup
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THE CAUSES OF FIJI’S 5 DECEMBER 2006 COUP A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY BY BRETT A. WOODS UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables v Acknowledgements vi Abstract vii List of Acronyms and Abbreviations viii Part I: Introduction Chapter One - Introduction 1 Literature on the Coup: Existing Explanations 4 Methodology 9 Analysis 9 Sources 12 Definitions 14 Limitations 16 Thesis Structure 17 Chapter Two - The Causes of coups: Methodology and Literature 19 Background Causes: Civilian Control 20 Triggering Causes 29 Conclusion 41 Part II: Background causes Chapter Three - Fiji’s Coup Risk 43 Historical Legacy 43 Domestic Political Economic and Social Context 55 International Context 61 Institutional Factors 63 Military Culture and Professionalism 64 Fiji’s Coup Risk 68 Part III: Triggering Causes Chapter Four - 2004 Reappointment of Bainimarama 71 Description of Events 72 Discussion 79 Conclusion 82 Chapter Five - The “Promotion of Reconciliation Tolerance and Unity Bill 2005” Dispute 84 Description of Events 85 Discussion 95 Conclusion 100 Chapter Six - January 2006 Coup Threat 102 Description of Events 102 Discussion 110 Conclusion 114 Chapter Seven - 2006 Election 115 Description of Events 116 Motivation 120 Opportunity 121 Discussion 122 Chapter Eight - December 2006 Coup 123 Description of Events 124 Discussion 142 Conclusion 150 Part IV: Conclusion Chapter Nine - Conclusion 153 Background Causes 153 Triggering Causes 154 Implications 159 Suggestions for Further Research 161 Final Comments 161 Appendices Appendix One - List of Important People 164 Appendix Two - RFMF second Ultimatum demands 21/11/2006 168 Appendix Three - Wellington meeting outcomes 169 Bibliography 172 LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Triggering Causes and Outcomes for each of the Five Disputes 11 Table 2: Motive and Opportunity for each of the Five Disputes 12 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to acknowledge the time and effort given to this research by my supervisors John Henderson, and Scott Walker. Thanks to all those who took the time to discuss this topic during my research trip to Fiji, particularly Michael Green, Asrali Lave, Steven Ratuva and Joiji Kotobalavu who agreed to be interviewed. A special thanks to Amelia Stuart for the countless hours spent helping me edit and tidy up this work. vi ABSTRACT This thesis looks at the causes behind Fiji’s 5 December 2006 coup. It takes a twofold approach, first looking at the background causes which illustrate that Fiji was vulnerable to a further coup after the 2000 coup. The study then moves on to an analysis of the triggering causes. This analyses both the motive; consisting of threats to the military’s interests and failures of the government, and the opportunity, consisting of a deflation in the government’s legitimacy and military cohesion. To test these factors a cross-time comparison of the five instances of high tension between the Fijian military and Government is presented in an effort to identify how the coup differed from those disputes that preceded it. These periods of tension are: the 2004 reappointment of Bainimarama; the Unity Bill dispute; the January 2006 coup threat; the 2006 election; and the December 2006 Coup. From this analysis it was found that threats to the military’s interests were key in generating the motive for intervention, but that governmental failures were not a significant factor; while they motivated the military to be a vocal actor, they did not garner the motive for intervention. The opportunity was only found to occur when there was both a deflation in the Government’s legitimacy and strong military cohesion. For Fiji’s 2006 coup the motivating factors were the threats to the military’s interests, from the scheduled Supreme Court ruling on the role of the military, the rivalry with the fully-armed Tactical Response Unit of the Police, and crucially the pending criminal charges against Bainimarama. This coincided with the opportunity for intervention from a drop in the Government’s legitimacy as a result of a crisis in the multi-party Cabinet and the Government’s growing ethnic bias, along with strong cohesion in the military. vii LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ANC - All Nationals Congress Party (1992-1995) CAMV - Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua (political party, dominated by supporters of 2000 coup, was in coalition with SDL from 2001 – 2006) CRW - Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit (of the RFMF) DPP - Department of Public Prosecutions EPG - Eminent Persons Group (of the Pacific Islands Forum) EU - European Union FDF - Fiji Defence Force (military during WWI) FLP - Fiji Labour Party FMF - Fiji Military Forces (WWII – Independence 1970) (& 1987 – 1990) GCC - Great Council of Chiefs GDP - Gross Domestic Profit NFP - National Federation Party PAC - Public Accounts Committee PANU - Party of National Unity (1998 – present) RFMF - Royal Fiji Military Forces (Independence 1970 – 1987 Coup) / Republic of Fiji Military Forces (1990 – Current) SDL - Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (political party headed by Qarase, in power from 2001 election up till 2006 coup) SVT - Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (political party, also known as the Fiji Political Party (FPP) in English) TRU - Tactical Response Unit (of the police) VAT - Value Added Tax UN - United Nations WTO - World Trade Organisation viii PART I INTRODUCTION The Causes of Fiji’s 5 December 2006 Coup Brett Woods Part 1: Introduction Chapter One – Introduction Chapter One INTRODUCTION On 5 December 2006 Fiji faced its fourth coup. In many ways this was an unusual coup: by nature coups are generally conceived in secret and surprise the unsuspecting Government and its citizens. This coup, however, was well forewarned, even if many observers did not believe the threats of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF). The coup was also unusual for Fiji as it was, for the first time, committed against an Indigenous Fijian-dominated Government, which the powerful chiefly hierarchy and nationalist elements strongly supported. In fact, ethnicity, previously the focus of almost all Fijian political crises, played only a background role in this coup. The RFMF, led by Commodore Vorque Bainimarama, overthrew the Government for the alleged purpose of ‘cleaning up’ the racist policies and corrupt nature of Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase and his Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party. While this appears to be an altruistic motive, historically most coups have been justified in a similar way, whereas upon closer examination other causes are revealed as more relevant. Thus, the central question of this thesis is: what were the causes of Fiji’s 2006 coup? The 2006 coup had its roots in the coup of May 2000. Commodore Bainimarama, the Commander of the RFMF, was heavily involved in resolving the 2000 coup; in particular, he removed the President Ratu Mara Kamisese and assumed this role under the Doctrine of Necessity. After several months of negotiations, he was then able to bring an end to the crisis through an agreement 1 The Causes of Fiji’s 5 December 2006 Coup Brett Woods Part 1: Introduction Chapter One – Introduction that gave many concessions to the coup perpetrators and set up Qarase as the new interim Prime Minister. Soon after, the agreement broke down and Bainimarama had many of those who were involved arrested, often in a brutal manner. This resulted in a mutiny by those within the RFMF with connections to the coup perpetrators, during which Bainimarama’s life was directly threatened. A general election was called in 2001, which was won by Qarase’s new SDL Party, largely consisting of the interim regime in coalition with the Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua (CAMV) Party, which was composed of nationalist supporters of the 2000 coup. From this time on, Bainimarama took a very central role in the political process in Fiji. Of particular concern to him was the proper prosecution of the perpetrators of the 2000 coup. The SDL/CAMV Government often did not follow through on this and at times ensured the early release of the most high profile convicts. These tensions were played out on several occasions in the years between the coups. Of particular note are four instances of high tension between the Government and the military: Bainimarama’s reappointment in 2004, the Unity Bill dispute in 2005, the January 2006 coup threat, and the 2006 election. On each of these occasions, the possibility of a coup arose, but nothing eventuated. It appeared some sort of balance had been reached where the military would publically criticise the Government but not go as far as to intervene. As noted by the ex Vice President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi: After the 2001 elections to the eve of the coup, the military played a generally useful if somewhat vocal part in general debate on issues of national interest and concern. There is little doubt this helped to moderate the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) Government’s inclination to pander to the nationalist and more extremist elements in its midst. (Madraiwiwi, 2007). However, this situation changed dramatically on 5 December when, after weeks of threats, Commodore Bainimarama announced that the military had taken control of the country. The conflict started in early October, when the RFMF issued a three-week ultimatum to the Government to dispose of the Promotion of Reconciliation Tolerance and Unity Bill, the Qoliqoli Bill, and the Indigenous Claims 2 The Causes of Fiji’s 5 December 2006 Coup Brett Woods Part 1: Introduction Chapter One – Introduction Tribunal Bill, or to resign. The military, and much of the public, viewed these Bills as ethnically biased, and felt they would take the Government’s nationalistic stance to a new and unacceptable level. Tensions soared in late October, when the police held seven tonnes of ammunition at Suva Wharf, afraid that it would be used to overthrow the Government.