Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2000

Reviews of Papua New Guinea and tion of May 1999, became more overt West Papua are not included in this in the early months of 2000. Fijian issue. political parties, led by the former governing party, Soqosoqo ni Vakavu- Fi j i lewa ni Taukei (sv t), held meetings For the people of , the year 2000 around the country to discuss ways to was the most turbulent and traumatic oppose if not depose the government in recent memory. The country and thereby return to power. These endured an armed takeover of parlia- meetings helped fuel indigenous Fijian ment and a hostage crisis lasting fifty- unease and animosity toward Chaud- six days, the declaration of martial hry’s leadership. Signaling its move law and abrogation of the 1997 con- toward a more nationalist stance, the stitution, and a bloody mutiny in the sv t terminated its coalition with the armed forces. These events raised the Indo-Fijian–based National Federa- specter of civil war and economic col- tion Party in February, describing the lapse, international ostracism, and a coalition as “self-defeating.” future plagued with uncertainty and In March, the Taukei Movement ha r dship. Comparisons with the coups was revived with the aim, according of 1987 were inevitable, but most to spokesman Apisai Tora, of “rem o v - observers would conclude that the ing the government through various crisis of 2000 left Fiji more adrift legal means as soon as possible” (Sun, and divided than ever before. 3 May 2000, 1). In 1987 the Taukei The month of May has become Movement had spearheaded national- synonymous with coups in Fiji. It ist opposition to, and destabilization was on 14 May 1987 the country wit- of, the then Labor Coalition govern- nessed its first military coup d’état, le d ment. In 2000, the movement’s battle by then Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni cry was familiar: the People’s Coali- Rabuka. On 19 May 20 0 0 a group of tion government was not working in nine gunmen attempted to repeat his- the interests of the indigenous people. to r y, by taking hostage Prime Minister Tora’s role in the Taukei Move- Mahendra Chaudhry and his People’s ment was a dramatic turnabout from Coalition government. While the pre- his 1999 position, when he led one of cise details of who was involved and the Labor Party’s coalition partners, how the takeover was to be executed the Party of National Unity (pa n u). ar e still to be revealed, the gunmen Tora lost his bid for a seat in parlia- who stormed parliament were no ment, and subsequently blamed his doubt banking on the support of defeat on Chaudhry’s decision to field various antigovernment forces to a Labor candidate against him. In en s u r e they carried the day. January he announced his resignation The campaign to oust Mahendra as pa n u secretary. This followed an Chaudhry from office, which began unsuccessful attempt in September covertly soon after the historic elec- 1999 to pull the party out of the

529 530 the contemporary pacific • fall 2001 coalition, a move that was rebuffed previously limited to indigenous by pa n u’s four parliamentarians. and (such as Fijian Splits deepened within all the Development Bank loans) be opened Fijian-based parties in the People’s up to other races. Despite advice even Coalition, and between those parlia- from some allies, the government per- mentarians and cabinet ministers loyal sisted with the proposed legislation. to Chaudhry and those opposed to his Leading the opposition to the bill was leadership. Labor’s relations with its Senator , a nominee principal coalition partner, the Fijian of the in the Association Party (fap), became espe- Senate. His argument, which echoed cially fraught. With the deputy prime that of other critics, was that remov- minister and fa p leader, Kuini ing special assistance for Fijians in Speed, away on medical leave, the commerce and industry, aimed at party leadership was taken over by closing the gaps between the races, backbencher Tu‘akitau Coka- would lead to ethnic tensions and nauto, a vocal critic of Chaudhry. In political instability. He labeled the April a special general meeting of the government’s approach “arrogant, fa p endorsed its withdrawal from belligerent and provocative” (Sun, 14 the People’s Coalition, but this was Mar 2000, 3). This led to a highly decided in the absence of the party’s public feud, conducted through news- four cabinet ministers. paper advertisements, between Qarase Anti-Labor and anti-Chaudhry sen- and the government, with the latter timent was fueled by a number of accusing Qarase of “running an contentious policy initiatives taken by orchestrated propaganda campaign to the government. These included the discredit the government based on lies Constitutional Amendment Bill, and distortion” (Review, April, 17). introduced in the House of Represen- Perhaps most sensitive of all, how- tatives in February. It proposed fifteen ever, was the government’s land pol- changes to the constitution, some of icy. The stand-off between the gov- which the sv t had put forward when ernment and the Native Land Trust it was in power. Fijian critics claimed Board (n lt b) on the future of land that the bill would dilute the power of leases continued into 2000. The the Senate and by implication that of urgency of resolving this issue was the Great Council of Chiefs, as well underscored by a report that up to 95 as weaken other Fijian institutions, percent of cane leases, due to expire particularly in respect to advising the before 2002, would not be renewed president. On the other hand, the bill (Sun, 16 Mar 2000, 1). Chaudhry’s alienated human rights and civil soci- determination to retain the Agricul- ety groups by its attempt to remove ture Landlord and Tenant Act (alta) constitutional provisions prohibiting provided potent ammunition to his discrimination on the basis of sexual critics, eager to read in his actions a orientation. bias toward the interests of Indo- Also controversial was the govern- Fijian farmers. One newly formed ment’s Social Justice and Affirmative organization, the Foundation of the Action Bill. Among other things it Indigenous Fijian People, under the proposed that assistance programs leadership of Rewa parliamentarian political reviews • m elan e s i a 531

Ratu Timoci Silatolu, warned non- liament condemned the government’s indigenous Fijian leaders to refrain choice of c d c, saying it showed that from commenting on alta. Another Fijians “have no voice in deciding Chaudhry opponent, nltb General how their resources will be used” Manager Maika Qarikau, was report- (Post, 8 Apr 2000, 2). In April the edly busy meeting provincial councils Great Council of Chiefs requested around the country, feeding antigov- that the government defer any further ernment sentiment over land issues. decisions on the mahogany question, A key platform of the government’s forming a committee to look into land policy was the proposal to set up how landowners would benefit from a Land Use Commission. According the resource. This was chaired by to Chaudhry, the proposal aimed to Senator Qarase. deal with the problem of unused land. Fijian mistrust of the government “The land can be developed and used was also stirred by the parliamentary to obtain a return for those who own majority it enjoyed. svt’s president it” (Times, 8 Mar 2000, 1). Critics, and former deputy prime minister, including Vice President Ratu Josefa Taufa Vakatale, claimed that the gov- Iloilo, described the proposal as an ernment had such an overwhelming attempt to impose state control over majority that the sv t was powerless land use, thus denying landowners in opposition. Labor held 37 seats in their rightful ownership. A govern- the 71-seat parliament, but the total ment-sponsored visit to Malaysia by number for the Coalition was 58 seats ten chiefs, to observe land use policy (including the 3 Christian Democratic there, was labeled “a ploy” to further Alliance members and 3 indepen- divide the Fijian people. dents). According to Vakatale, the Land issues gained greater political only option for the people was to salience due to the potentially huge take to the streets. returns that would be realized from In April a series of antigovernment the country’s vast mahogany planta- marches began. The first, in Lautoka, tions. In March it was announced that attracted only about five hundred the Commonwealth Development demonstrators. At the next march in Corporation (c d c) was the govern- on 28 April, there were an esti- ment’s preferred strategic partner in mated four thousand, led by promi- the harvesting, processing, and mar- nent Fijian politicians and members keting of the resource. The former of parliament. They called for the chairman of Fiji Hardwoods (a com- removal of the “anti-Fijian” govern- pany formed in 1997 to manage the ment and for its replacement by an plantations), George Speight, had been indigenous-based government. The sacked from his position soon after demonstrators also called for the the 1999 election by Agriculture Min- 1997 constitution to be replaced by ister Poseci Bune. There were allega- the 1990 constitution. The govern- tions of conflict of interest due to ment’s response was to publish full- Speight’s close association with a rival page advertisements in the daily to the c dc—the US-based Anglo- papers listing all its initiatives to assist Pacific Corporation (Sun, 9 Apr 2000, indigenous Fijians. When Police Com- 15–17). Opposition members of par- missioner Isikia Savua warned that the 532 the contemporary pacific • fall 2001 police would not be able to control democratically elected government future protests, the home affairs min- or to appoint an interim government ister ordered police not to issue any (Post, 6 May 2000, 1). The first new permits. This move was over- anniversary of the People’s Coalition turned by the prime minister, but not Government occurred on Friday 19 be f o r e Fijian politicians threa t e n e d “t o May. The government celebrated with take the law into their own hands” a special morning tea in their parlia- (Times, 6 May 2000, 1). Another mentary offices. As parliament march was planned for 19 May. resumed its sitting that morning, By May there was growing specu- about two thousand protesters gath- lation of another coup, with commen- ered in downtown Suva to demon- tators likening the political situation strate once again their opposition to to the lead-up to the coup of May the Chaudhry government. Mean- 1987. Army Commander Frank Baini- while a small group of armed men, marama “categorically” denounced wearing civilian clothes, made their such speculation, stating that “the way to parliament in two vehicles. At military will not be used in any way about 10:30 a m they burst into the to promote the downfall of any legiti- parliamentary chamber, handcuffing mate government” (Post, 9 Apr 2000, government members and taking 1). However, media speculation them prisoner. On hearing of the pointed to the more likely possibility armed hold-up, the antigovernment of an elite “civilian” coup rather than demonstrators marched to the gates a 19 8 7 -style coup (Re v i e w , Ma y 20 0 0 ; of parliament, where they formed a Post, 15 May 2000, 4). While the human shield. Later that morning government could not ignore such rioting broke out in Suva. Looting speculation, it did not appear too dis- and arson continued unchecked for turbed. In a mild rebuke to his oppo- the remainder of the day. sition, Chaudhry remarked, “I hope The spokesman for the armed the people engaged in such disruptive gr oup soon revealed himself as George activities will realize that they are Speight, the former head of Fiji Hard- doing greater harm to Fiji” (Post, woods. He announced that a “civilian 18 May 2000, 1). coup” had taken place, carried out by Taukei Movement anger was also “soldiers of the vanua” on behalf of directed at President Ratu Sir Kami- the indigenous people, and that as a sese Mara. The movement’s leader, result the constitution was suspended Apisai Tora, castigated the president as were the powers of the president. for not responding directly to a peti- Appearing at his side (and named as tion calling on him to dismiss the the interim prime minister) was fa p Chaudhry government, appoint an parliamentarian, Timoci Silatolu. Also interim government, amend the 1997 prominent in early negotiations with constitution, and call new elections. Speight’s group were sv t leader Ratu The president’s response had been Inoke Kubuabola, acting fa p leader channeled through the media, where Ratu Tu‘akitau, and former prime his officials had pointed out that he minister and current chairman of the did not have the power to dismiss a Great Council of Chiefs Sitiveni political reviews • m ela n e s i a 533

Rabuka. When asked by the media reports described Speight as an whether he supported the takeover, “undischarged bankrupt and failed Kubuabola declined to comment and businessman,” who had appeared instead called for calm. The situation before the High Court four days ear- was confused further when neither the lier on charges of extortion. Mean- army nor the police appeared willing while, Rabuka was reported to be to stop the looting on the streets of attempting to broker a settlement, Suva. While an announcement from meeting with Speight, Ratu Mara, the military headquarters indicated and the captive government. Speight that the army did not accept the described Rabuka as acting in his per- takeover and continued to recognize sonal capacity and not as the chair- Chaudhry as prime minister, the army man of the Great Council of Chiefs also claimed to be awaiting instruc- (g c c), which he claimed no longer tions from the Ministry of Home existed. At the same time, Speight Affairs. But Home Affairs in turn reiterated that he was acting on a claimed to be awaiting word from the mandate from the indigenous people new “interim Home Affairs minister,” that “went beyond legal technicali- named as Raquita Valalalabure. ties.” He challenged overseas govern- A semblance of authority was ments to recognize his legitimacy and finally imposed when President Ratu he confidently predicted that his Mara spoke to the nation later that “interim government” would be up day and announced a state of emer- and running by Monday. gency. He described the takeover bid So ended one of the most bizarre as unlawful and pledged to do his and shocking days in Fiji’s modern utmost to resolve the situation. This history. It was also the beginning of a included addressing the issues that had ten-day stand-off between the hostage- caused the unrest (namely indigenous takers in parliament (soon to be Fijian concerns). He called for the labeled the George Speight Group) release of all captives and for the per- and the president. While the more petrators to “disband.” In response to militant nationalist leaders as well as the declaration of the state of emer- some prominent chiefs aligned them- gency, the army deployed two battal- selves with the Speight group, other ions to assist police in restoring law Fijian politicians appeared to waver and order, but not within the parlia- and wait on the sidelines. With Ratu ment building, where the hostage- Mara standing firm against the group, takers remained. a propaganda campaign was launched Shortly after that address, Speight by Speight supporters aimed at dis- also gave a press conference where he crediting the president. Meanwhile declared himself head of state and out in the farmlands of Naitasiri and announced that decrees would be Tailevu, another campaign was con- drafted to establish the “legal frame- ducted, aimed at terrorizing Indo- work” for his government. He Fijian residents and driving them from claimed to have the support of all their homes. In the western provinces Fijian political parties as well as the of Vitilevu, Fijian opposition to the police and army. However media takeover led to threats of economic 534 the contemporary pacific • fall 2001 sabotage but also to calls for a sepa- military was to issue a decree that rate western government. A meeting abrogated the 1997 constitution. It of the Great Council of Chiefs was also planned a decree granting convened to discuss the crisis and amnesty to the Speight group once mobilize support for the pres i d e n t . Bu t the hostages were released. An interim its deliberations were marred by deep- military government was set up, with ening rivalries and divisions within Bainimarama as head of an executive the chiefly establishment. The resolu- council, initially planning to rule for tion adopted at the end of three days six months then hand over to a civil- was a vain attempt to give the Speight ian government. An impasse soon group most of what it wanted (par- developed, however, over the Speight don, interim government, review of group’s demand that their Taukei the 1997 constitution) while retaining Civilian Government be set up imme- Ratu Mara as head of state. Not sur- diately with High Chief Ratu prisingly the resolution was rejected as president. The army by the Speight group, and Ratu Mara commander’s view was that none of instead prorogued parliament and the group had the credibility or the moved to set up an interim council of competence to be included in the advisers with full executive powers. civilian government. He also rejected With tensions deepening and ugly their demand that the Great Council scenes of violence erupting around of Chiefs be reconvened to appoint a parliament and in downtown Suva, new president. “The military main- the army leadership made its move. tains its stance that we must secure A group led by Commander Frank the release of all hostages and return Bainimarama met the president on the of all arms and other military stores afternoon of 29 May and presented before anything else is done. The g c c him with a traditional isevusevu, fol- will be convened when we are assured lowed by a request that Ratu Mara of the peace and stability of the “stand aside” and allow the military nation” (government press release, to assume control. This was report- 4 June 2000). edly in the interests of “national secu- Negotiations toward a “peaceful” rity” as well as to ensure the presi- end to the crisis dragged on through dent’s safety. Later that night, Ratu most of June and into July. During Mara and some members of his fam- this time the government of Mahen- ily were spirited aboard a naval vessel dra Chaudhry continued to be held that took them to Mara’s chiefly hostage, while around them the island of Lakeba. The army comman- grounds of parliament became the der then declared martial law, a devel- campsite (and at times fairground) for opment broadly welcomed by the Fiji hundreds of Speight supporters. Many public as a last resort against anarchy were from the villages of Tailevu and civil war. (Speight’s province) and Naitasiri. Thus the first episode in Fiji’s polit- The armed men who had originally ical crisis ended, and another began. stormed parliament were identified In what appeared to be an attempt as soldiers from a special elite force to “neutralize” the demands of the known as the First Meridian Squad- Speight group, the first action of the ron and previously called the Counter political reviews • m ela n e s i a 535

Revolutionary Warfare (c rw) Unit, ment and release the hostages, the set up by Rabuka after the coups of army commander on 4 July swore in 1987 to deal with “terrorist” activi- an Interim Civilian Government, ties. They passed the time in parlia- headed by former banker and Senator ment training “militia units” made up Laisenia Qarase. Comprising promi- of young men and boys. While mostly nent Fijian technocrats and profes- confined to the grounds of parlia- sionals, its task was to halt the slide ment, the more unruly elements also in the economy as well as to address engaged in criminal acts of arson, indigenous interests and concerns. theft, and assault in the surrounding The announcement of the interim neighborhood, causing many residents government was described by Speight to flee their homes. The army main- as “an affront to the objective of the tained a watchful, though mainly pas- coup and to the aspirations of the sive, role on the streets, except when vanua,” and he dismissed the line-up provoked into occasional skirmishes as mainly “Mara’s men” (Times, 4 with the “rebels.” July 2000, 3). In the following days The stance adopted by the interna- the crisis escalated. A gr oup of Speight tional community was one of cautious supporters seized control of the coun- support for the efforts of the military try’s main power station in central to end the crisis, but at the same time Vitilevu, shutting down power sup- unequivocal condemnation of the plies to most of the island. In the Speight group. Calls were made for a northern town of Labasa, mutineers speedy return to democratic govern- took control of the army barracks, ment, but trade and aid sanctions backed by chiefs supporting Speight. were not imposed as long as the The unrest spread to other parts of hostage drama continued. At the end the country, with roadblocks erected, of June an agreement was reached police stations occupied, and resorts between trade unions, employers, the and factories seized and shut down. military, and civil society groups to At one major prison, inmates took end union bans on Fiji. The crux of wardens hostage, and a number also the agreement was that a constitu- escaped. tional resolution to the crisis should To stem the rapidly deteriorating be pursued. Meanwhile an economic situation the military and the Speight crisis was developing, with mounting group reached an agreement on the job losses (many in the tourism sec- terms by which the hostages would tor), falling government revenue, and be released and civilian government massive pay cuts. The Finance Min- restored. Signed on the night of 9 July istry predicted that Fiji would experi- and known as the Muanikau Accord ence negative 15 percent growth for (after the neighborhood where most the year, with a government deficit of of the negotiations were held), it con- 9 percent gross domestic product. (A tained a number of concessions by the 20 percent pay cut for civil servants army. The most significant was an was announced and later lowered to undertaking to hand over power by 12.5 percent). 13 July to a president and vice presi- In an effort to pressure the Speight dent to be appointed by the Great group to end the occupation of parlia- Council of Chiefs. This would pave 536 the contemporary pacific • fall 2001 the way for the appointment of a new the cabinet line-up, with Ratu Iloilo interim civilian government and the abdicating any responsibility for the setting up of a constitution review selection, leaving it to the military and process. While the Speight group the Speight group to finalize. The mil- undertook to release all hostages at itary’s preferred candidate for prime the time of the gcc meeting, as well minister was Qarase, while that of the as to return all weapons to the army, Speight group was Bau chief and Fiji’s the military promised to promulgate High Commissioner to Malaysia Adi a decree granting immunity for all Samanunu Cakobau. (During this “political offences” committed period Qarase and his team continued between 19 May and 13 July. The to govern in a caretaker capacity.) two names that appeared to have the The standoff ended dramatically on endorsement of both sides were Vice the night of 27 Ju l y , when Speight and President Ratu for presi- some of his advisers were arrested at dent, and Ratu Jope Seniloli for vice an army checkpoint, allegedly for president. George Speight was violating the curfew and for illegally reported to be “ecstatic” over the carrying arms. Early the next morn- outcome, describing it as a “great ing, the army stormed the school at day for Fiji” (Post, 10 July 2000, 1). Kalabu village, on the outskirts of On the evening of 13 July (and Suva, where hundreds of Speight sup- after the Great Council of Chiefs porters had relocated after vacating elected Ratu Josefa and Ratu Jope as the parliamentary compound. About president and vice president respec- three hundred people were arrested, tively), the hostages were finally including a number of the elite c rw released, ending fifty-six days in cap- soldiers who had taken part in the tivity. The editorialized, coup attempt. On 28 July, several “The former People’s Coalition Gov- other Speight supporters were ernment has returned to a country arrested, including Timoci Silatolu, shaken and torn apart by events of and on 29 July the core members of recent months” (14 July 2000, 6). the group were transported to the The international response was a mix- nearby island of Nukulau, declared a ture of relief that the hostages were prison zone by the military. It was free, and apprehension that Fiji was reported that treason charges against heading down an unconstitutional the detainees would be investigated, path. The end of the hostage drama with the military claiming that Ratu did not bring any immediate relief to Iloilo’s life had been threatened (Post, the country’s law-and-order problems, 28 July 2000, 1). The army also which seemed only to be worsening. claimed that since the terms of the With the swearing in of Ratu Josefa Muanikau Accord had not been ful- as president on 18 July, a tense stand- filled (namely return of all weapons off developed between the military by the Speight group), immunity did and the Speight group over the posi- not apply. tion of prime minister and the compo- With the arrest of the group, a new sition of the interim government. This episode in the crisis began. On 28 Ju l y led to a delay in the announcement of the second interim administration was political reviews • m ela n e s i a 537 sw o r n in, made up of 20 ministers and reinstatement of the 1997 constitution 8 assistant ministers. Laisenia Qarase was “not realistic.” In order to have retained his position as prime minis- “enduring peace and stability” in Fiji, ter, and 13 members of his original it was necessary to “look deeper into cabinet were also returned. Among the root causes of widespread Fijian the new faces were sv t leader Kubua- disaffection.” This required the bola, Taukei Movement leader Tora, preparation of a new constitution to and fa p faction leader Tu‘akitau, address issues of importance to Fijians politicians who had publicly sup- and Rotumans, including their “col- ported the “indigenous cause” of the lective desire” that the positions of Speight group, if not its “method.” head of state and head of government The “vigorous pursuit of indigenous always be held by them (Review, Aug Fijian concerns” was made the central 2000, 26–29). objective of the Qarase administra- The administration’s “road map” tion, with policies to meet that goal for the return to constitutional gov- outlined in a Blueprint for the Protec- ernment was to promulgate a new tion of Fijian and Rotuman Rights, constitution by August 2001 and to initially unveiled on 13 Ju l y . It covered hold elections a year later (by Sep- the drafting of a new constitution, tember 2002). However, Qarase was land and resource issues (including unsuccessful in selling this plan to for- abolishing a lta), measures to eign governments. A meeting of the st r engthen Fijian participation in com- Commonwealth Ministerial Action me r ce, review of the Fijian Adminis- Group, which closely monitored tration and the Great Council of developments in Fiji, described the Chiefs, and affirmative action for timetable as “inadequate in terms of Fijians and Rotumans. The blueprint’s the need to promote reconciliation adoption led many observers to con- and unity in Fiji” and reaffirmed its clude that the objectives of the Speight support for the 1997 constitution group had been realized. (Times, 19 Sept 2000, 5). The Euro- In responding to the appointment pean Union also declared its dissatis- of the new administration, Labor faction with the situation and stated Party spokesman and deposed foreign that it retained the right “to use any minister , said it was action or measure in response to vio- unfortunate the president’s advisers lations of democracy” (P N B, Nov had not considered a government of 2000, 13). The appointment of a con- national unity. “The composition of stitution review committee in October the (interim) government is discrimi- did little to reassure or allay concerns. natory and an open invitation for fur- Its chairman, Professor Asesela ther sanctions . . . .The government of Ravuvu, made clear his position that national unity as provided for in the “western concepts of democracy and 1997 constitution offers Fiji a legiti- human rights” were a threat to indig- mate solution to the crisis” (Times, 29 enous values and institutions and July 2000, 2). Qarase, however, had should be rejected. Not surprisingly firmly turned his back on any “consti- the committee’s public hearings, which tutional” approach, asserting that the began in November, were largely boy- 538 the contemporary pacific • fall 2001 cotted by Indo-Fijians, as well as by quently overturned by the High most mainstream political groups and Court, after it ruled that the decree leaders. was invalid. By year’s end the issue While the Qarase administration remained unresolved, with a final drew its legitimacy from the upsurge decision pending in the Court of of indigenous Fijian nationalism gen- Appeal. Aside from the issue of erated by the events of 19 May, it also immunity, prosecution efforts were sought to silence the most public pro- also hampered by the inability of the tagonists of that uprising—the Speight office of the director of public prose- group. Part of its strategy for national cution to gather sufficient evidence reconciliation and international reha- against some of the accused to bring bilitation depended on a full investi- them to trial. On 11 October, nine gation into, and the prosecution of, c rw soldiers were discharged by the those responsible for the coup Magistrate’s Court, after charges of attempt. But this required a delicate treason against them were dropped. balancing act between bringing the This was followed by the dismissal on guilty to justice and not alienating too 6 December of treason charges against many of the administration’s support- four key members of the Speight ers. A number of prominent people group held on Nukulau. clearly owed their positions of power The failure to prosecute certain to the events of 19 May, and some individuals, despite what appeared to were also under a cloud of suspicion be very clear and public acts of intent for their alleged involvement. They to depose the People’s Coalition Gov- included the vice president, several er nment, drew wide criticism and con- ministers in the Interim Government, ce r n. Questions were raised about the some members of the constitution integrity and competence of the prose- review team and the police commis- cutor’s office, about apparent incon- sioner. Investigating, let alone charg- sistencies in the application of the law, ing such individuals, would prove a but most of all about the likely conse- highly sensitive, if not impossible, quences for the country if the remain- undertaking. ing members of the Speight group On 16 August, Speight and sixteen were to be released, including Speight others were charged in the Magis- himself. The court proceedings proved trate’s Court with treason and various to be a double-edged sword for the related offenses. Over the next few interim administration, exposing its weeks more “rebels” were charged highly tenuous legal and political with treason. Complicating the prose- position, while seeking to contain cution case, however, was the status the dangerous instability that still of the immunity decree promulgated remained. soon after the release of the hostages. Just how dangerous this situation The Magistrate’s Court had earlier was became tragically apparent soon acquitted a Speight supporter for after the release of the nine soldiers in attempted murder on the grounds mid-October. In what was described that he was covered by the immunity as an act of compassion and mercy, decree. This acquittal was subse- the nine were accepted back by the political reviews • m ela n e s i a 539 military and allowed to resume duties village, to be bussed into the barra c k s , under close supervision. It was not where they would provide a human long before some of these same sol- shield in a re-run of the parliamentary diers allegedly joined forces with other takeover. However, the army sealed members of the First Meridian Squad- off access to the barracks, preventing ron (more often referred to as the the villagers from carrying out this c rw unit) in an attempt to overthrow plan. As evening fell, the largest unit the military commander. The plot, in the army (the Third Battalion Fiji which reportedly involved a number Infantry Regiment), which had been of prominent chiefs, ultimately aimed away on a training exercise at the to replace the Qarase administration time of the mutiny, together with the with one more sympathetic to, if not navy and other military contingents, including, the Speight group. A variety mounted an assault on the barracks. of motives for the mutiny were later They succeeded in taking back control reported: to thwart investigations into of all installations and capturing a the events of 19 May, to avenge the number of the mutineers. About perceived mistreatment of c rw sol- twenty escaped, later to be captured diers and civilians by the army after or to surrender. The death toll was the storming of the Kalabu village eight soldiers (three “loyalists” and school, and to stop the rumored dis- five “rebels”). Over thirty people, banding of the c rw unit. including some civilians caught in The mutiny began at lunchtime on crossfire, were injured. 2 November at the main barracks of The brutal killing of the three the Fiji army outside Suva. A group of “loyal” soldiers (one shot dead while about forty soldiers (led by some offi- he slept, another while he worked at cers) opened fire on the commander’s his desk), and the ferocious retaliation office, taking control of the armory, of the army against the mutineers, left the national command center, and the the people of Fiji shocked and shaken. officers’ mess, and holding a number The mutiny showed how far the coun- of hostages. Public reaction was at t ry ’s “civility” had been eroded and first muted, as many assumed a minor how close to the point of disintegra- internal fracas. But as casualties tion it had come. Apart from the mounted, with Suva’s main hospital obvious issues it raised—How could having to cope with an unprecedented this have been prevented? What was number of emergencies, the serious- Rabuka doing in the barracks at the ness of the situation became apparent. height of the fighting? Who, apart The mutiny was probably doomed from the rebel soldiers, was involved? early on, when the commander —the mutiny confronted the country managed to escape the barracks with some bigger questions. What was and assume control from the relative the answer to Fiji’s steadily worsening safety of a suburban army base. But economic and political problems? the rebel soldiers continued to hold How could meaningful reconciliation out well into the evening. It was later and recovery be achieved? And did reported that a mass of civilian sup- the interim government have a future? porters were waiting at nearly Kalabu On the last question, many observers 540 the contemporary pacific • fall 2001 had begun to doubt that it did, given ity vested in it by the 1874 Deed of its perceived failure to provide effec- Cession. tive leadership and a clear sense of Meetings of Fijian leaders, held to direction. discuss the Gates ruling, created a new The Fiji High Court provided the wave of instability and uncertainty. As interim government with perhaps its the year ended, there were warnings greatest challenge. In what would of renewed violence should the Gates pr ove a defining moment for the coun- ruling be enforced, with many sug- tr y, High Court Justice Anthony Gates gesting that political solutions come handed down a ruling on 15 Novem- before legal solutions. Said one chief, ber that declared the 1997 constitu- “Do the judges want turmoil to con- tion extant, the parliament elected in tinue in the country? The law is one 1999 intact, and Qarase’s interim gov- thing but reality is another” (Times, er nment without any “constitutional 2 Dec 2000, 3). These meetings foundation of legality.” He called for prompted the army to warn, in turn, Ratu Mara (whom he declared still against agitation and rumor monger- the president since there was “no evi- ing. The army’s position, in the wake dence” that he had resigned) to recon- of the mutiny, was clearly to prevent vene parliament and appoint a prime any upsurge in civil unrest and threats minister who could command the to national security. But it faced a confidence of the House, and sug- growing dilemma. While pledging gested that a constitutionally based loyalty to the president it had government of national unity be set installed, Ratu Iloilo, and support up (Times, 16 Nov 2000, 7). for the interim government, the army The reaction to this ruling was per- also recognized the likely national and haps predictable. While it was warmly international repercussions of ignor- welcomed by members of the deposed ing the court’s ruling. Foreign gov- government, their supporters, civil ernments, the union movement, and society groups, the legal fraterni t y , an d human rights organizations vowed foreign governments, it was received swift retaliation should Fiji not return with hostility and skepticism by many to a legal and democratic system of others. The interim administration government. rejected the ruling entirely and vowed The dawn of the new millennium to take the case to the Court of saw the country poised precariously Appeal (claiming that proper proce- between disaster and salvation. The dures were not followed and it had events of 2000 could not be undone, been prevented from putting its evi- nor could the enormous price paid by dence before the court). But the the people and the economy be com- administration also appeared to pensated. Yet it remained to be seen dismiss the relevance of the court’s whether Fiji’s leaders, particularly the ruling, with Qarase claiming that his interim government, the Great Coun- government drew its authority from cil of Chiefs, and the army, had the its appointment by the president, who vision and courage to put Fiji on the in turn was mandated by the Great path to long-term recovery. A lasting Council of Chiefs, which in turn was solution would only be realized when acting in accordance with the author- all political leaders, and all the differ- political reviews • m ela n e s i a 541 ent communities, were involved in a tion of the Société le Nickel (s l n), pr ocess of dialogue and rec o n c i l i a t i o n . and arguments over the role of indig- This should include a full and honest enous Kanak custom in forming a debate about the reasons behind the common nationhood among diverse, coup attempt. But too many Fijian often polarized, ethnic groups. It was leaders had yet to embrace this notion, a year filled with discord, but in Octo- committed instead to racist prescrip- ber the country tried to put on a hope- tions and policies that denied any ful face by hosting the eighth Festival voice to the country’s other communi- of Pacific Arts, a regional honor that ties and ethnic groups. As it greeted its political strife had canceled fifteen the new year, what Fiji desperately years earlier. needed was a chance to redeem its Having experienced tragic inter- future, a future that continued to be communal bloodshed in the 1980s, held hostage—like the People’s Coali- New Caledonian leaders voiced no tion Government had been—by the support for the actions of extremists greed and folly of an influential few. in neighboring Fiji in May 20 0 0 . c k sandra ta rt e Wamytan, president of the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Social- iste (flnks) condemned the Fijian Re f e re n c e s coup attempt by George Speight: “T h e nationalist claims of Melanesians must PNB,Pacific News Bulletin. Monthly. Suva. be taken into account, but in a demo- Post, The Daily Post. Daily. Suva. cratic framework.” Wamytan blamed The Review. Monthly. Suva. Britain for the ethnic crisis in Fiji, but he also recommended that Indo-Fi j i a n s Sun, The Fiji Sun. Daily. Suva. take steps to share economic power Times, The Fiji Times. Daily. Suva. with native Fijians (NC, 25 May 2000). Likewise, Leopold Jorédié, Kanak vice-president of the New Caledonian executive council, said his New Ca l e d o n i a government “will not support a coup. Year two of the Noumea Accord To us, it is obvious that any govern- (Chappell 1999) saw continuing ment must come out of the will of the movement toward self-government but people” (pir 25 May 2000). Aloisio also ongoing tensions in the fragile Sako, president of the Wallisian consensus that produced the fifteen- Rassemblement Démocratique to-twenty-year agreement in 1998. In Océanien (rd o ), called the Fijian coup a May issue of l’Express a scathing a dangerous case of misdirected ethnic article entitled, “The Discords of antagonism that trampled on funda- Noumea” (Conan 2000), highlighted mental human rights (Sako 2000). contradictory interpretations by the The issue of “collegiality” in the signatories of what the accord meant, congress had come up soon after the a lack of collegiality in the territorial 1999 elections, when millionaire congress, growing disunity among Jacques Lafleur’s loyalist Rassemble- Kanak politicians, disputes over the ment pour la Calédonie dans la provincial shares of a partial localiza- République (rpcr) gained a narrow