DOCSLIB.ORG

Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2000

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2000 Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2000 Reviews of Papua New Guinea and tion of May 1999, became more overt West Papua are not included in this in the early months of 2000. Fijian issue. political parties, led by the former governing party, Soqosoqo ni Vakavu- Fi j i lewa ni Taukei (sv t), held meetings For the people of Fiji, the year 2000 around the country to discuss ways to was the most turbulent and traumatic oppose if not depose the government in recent memory. The country and thereby return to power. These endured an armed takeover of parlia- meetings helped fuel indigenous Fijian ment and a hostage crisis lasting fifty- unease and animosity toward Chaud- six days, the declaration of martial hry’s leadership. Signaling its move law and abrogation of the 1997 con- toward a more nationalist stance, the stitution, and a bloody mutiny in the sv t terminated its coalition with the armed forces. These events raised the Indo-Fijian–based National Federa- specter of civil war and economic col- tion Party in February, describing the lapse, international ostracism, and a coalition as “self-defeating.” future plagued with uncertainty and In March, the Taukei Movement ha r dship. Comparisons with the coups was revived with the aim, according of 1987 were inevitable, but most to spokesman Apisai Tora, of “rem o v - observers would conclude that the ing the government through various crisis of 2000 left Fiji more adrift legal means as soon as possible” (Sun, and divided than ever before. 3 May 2000, 1). In 1987 the Taukei The month of May has become Movement had spearheaded national- synonymous with coups in Fiji. It ist opposition to, and destabilization was on 14 May 1987 the country wit- of, the then Labor Coalition govern- nessed its first military coup d’état, le d ment. In 2000, the movement’s battle by then Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni cry was familiar: the People’s Coali- Rabuka. On 19 May 20 0 0 a group of tion government was not working in nine gunmen attempted to repeat his- the interests of the indigenous people. to r y, by taking hostage Prime Minister Tora’s role in the Taukei Move- Mahendra Chaudhry and his People’s ment was a dramatic turnabout from Coalition government. While the pre- his 1999 position, when he led one of cise details of who was involved and the Labor Party’s coalition partners, how the takeover was to be executed the Party of National Unity (pa n u). ar e still to be revealed, the gunmen Tora lost his bid for a seat in parlia- who stormed parliament were no ment, and subsequently blamed his doubt banking on the support of defeat on Chaudhry’s decision to field various antigovernment forces to a Labor candidate against him. In en s u r e they carried the day. January he announced his resignation The campaign to oust Mahendra as pa n u secretary. This followed an Chaudhry from office, which began unsuccessful attempt in September covertly soon after the historic elec- 1999 to pull the party out of the 529 530 the contemporary pacific • fall 2001 coalition, a move that was rebuffed previously limited to indigenous by pa n u’s four parliamentarians. Fijians and Rotumans (such as Fijian Splits deepened within all the Development Bank loans) be opened Fijian-based parties in the People’s up to other races. Despite advice even Coalition, and between those parlia- from some allies, the government per- mentarians and cabinet ministers loyal sisted with the proposed legislation. to Chaudhry and those opposed to his Leading the opposition to the bill was leadership. Labor’s relations with its Senator Laisenia Qarase, a nominee principal coalition partner, the Fijian of the Great Council of Chiefs in the Association Party (fap), became espe- Senate. His argument, which echoed cially fraught. With the deputy prime that of other critics, was that remov- minister and fa p leader, Adi Kuini ing special assistance for Fijians in Speed, away on medical leave, the commerce and industry, aimed at party leadership was taken over by closing the gaps between the races, backbencher Ratu Tu‘akitau Coka- would lead to ethnic tensions and nauto, a vocal critic of Chaudhry. In political instability. He labeled the April a special general meeting of the government’s approach “arrogant, fa p endorsed its withdrawal from belligerent and provocative” (Sun, 14 the People’s Coalition, but this was Mar 2000, 3). This led to a highly decided in the absence of the party’s public feud, conducted through news- four cabinet ministers. paper advertisements, between Qarase Anti-Labor and anti-Chaudhry sen- and the government, with the latter timent was fueled by a number of accusing Qarase of “running an contentious policy initiatives taken by orchestrated propaganda campaign to the government. These included the discredit the government based on lies Constitutional Amendment Bill, and distortion” (Review, April, 17). introduced in the House of Represen- Perhaps most sensitive of all, how- tatives in February. It proposed fifteen ever, was the government’s land pol- changes to the constitution, some of icy. The stand-off between the gov- which the sv t had put forward when ernment and the Native Land Trust it was in power. Fijian critics claimed Board (n lt b) on the future of land that the bill would dilute the power of leases continued into 2000. The the Senate and by implication that of urgency of resolving this issue was the Great Council of Chiefs, as well underscored by a report that up to 95 as weaken other Fijian institutions, percent of cane leases, due to expire particularly in respect to advising the before 2002, would not be renewed president. On the other hand, the bill (Sun, 16 Mar 2000, 1). Chaudhry’s alienated human rights and civil soci- determination to retain the Agricul- ety groups by its attempt to remove ture Landlord and Tenant Act (alta) constitutional provisions prohibiting provided potent ammunition to his discrimination on the basis of sexual critics, eager to read in his actions a orientation. bias toward the interests of Indo- Also controversial was the govern- Fijian farmers. One newly formed ment’s Social Justice and Affirmative organization, the Foundation of the Action Bill. Among other things it Indigenous Fijian People, under the proposed that assistance programs leadership of Rewa parliamentarian political reviews • m elan e s i a 531 Ratu Timoci Silatolu, warned non- liament condemned the government’s indigenous Fijian leaders to refrain choice of c d c, saying it showed that from commenting on alta. Another Fijians “have no voice in deciding Chaudhry opponent, nltb General how their resources will be used” Manager Maika Qarikau, was report- (Post, 8 Apr 2000, 2). In April the edly busy meeting provincial councils Great Council of Chiefs requested around the country, feeding antigov- that the government defer any further ernment sentiment over land issues. decisions on the mahogany question, A key platform of the government’s forming a committee to look into land policy was the proposal to set up how landowners would benefit from a Land Use Commission. According the resource. This was chaired by to Chaudhry, the proposal aimed to Senator Qarase. deal with the problem of unused land. Fijian mistrust of the government “The land can be developed and used was also stirred by the parliamentary to obtain a return for those who own majority it enjoyed. svt’s president it” (Times, 8 Mar 2000, 1). Critics, and former deputy prime minister, including Vice President Ratu Josefa Taufa Vakatale, claimed that the gov- Iloilo, described the proposal as an ernment had such an overwhelming attempt to impose state control over majority that the sv t was powerless land use, thus denying landowners in opposition. Labor held 37 seats in their rightful ownership. A govern- the 71-seat parliament, but the total ment-sponsored visit to Malaysia by number for the Coalition was 58 seats ten chiefs, to observe land use policy (including the 3 Christian Democratic there, was labeled “a ploy” to further Alliance members and 3 indepen- divide the Fijian people. dents). According to Vakatale, the Land issues gained greater political only option for the people was to salience due to the potentially huge take to the streets. returns that would be realized from In April a series of antigovernment the country’s vast mahogany planta- marches began. The first, in Lautoka, tions. In March it was announced that attracted only about five hundred the Commonwealth Development demonstrators. At the next march in Corporation (c d c) was the govern- Suva on 28 April, there were an esti- ment’s preferred strategic partner in mated four thousand, led by promi- the harvesting, processing, and mar- nent Fijian politicians and members keting of the resource. The former of parliament. They called for the chairman of Fiji Hardwoods (a com- removal of the “anti-Fijian” govern- pany formed in 1997 to manage the ment and for its replacement by an plantations), George Speight, had been indigenous-based government. The sacked from his position soon after demonstrators also called for the the 1999 election by Agriculture Min- 1997 constitution to be replaced by ister Poseci Bune. There were allega- the 1990 constitution. The govern- tions of conflict of interest due to ment’s response was to publish full- Speight’s close association with a rival page advertisements in the daily to the c dc—the US-based Anglo- papers listing all its initiatives to assist Pacific Corporation (Sun, 9 Apr 2000, indigenous Fijians. When Police Com- 15–17).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Fiji's Road to Military Coup, 20061
    2. 'Anxiety, uncertainty and fear in our land': Fiji's road to military coup, 20061 Brij V. Lal Introduction If civilization is to survive, one is driven to radical views. I do not mean driven to violence. Violence always compromises or ruins the cause it means to serve: it produces as much wrong as it tries to remedy. The State, for example, is always with us. Overthrow it and it will come back in another form, quite possibly worse. It's a necessary evilÐa monster that continually has to be tamed, so that it serves us rather than devours us. We can't do without it, neither can we ever trust it.2 Fiji experienced the whole gamut of emotions over the course of a fateful 2006. The year ended on an unsettled note, as it had begun. Fiji was yet again caught in a political quagmire of its own making, hobbled by manufactured tensions, refusing to heed the lessons of its recent tumultuous past, and reeling from the effects of the coup. Ironies abound. A Fijian army confronted a Fijian government, fuelling the indigenous community's worst fears about a Fijian army spilling Fijian blood on Fijian soil. The military overthrow took place 19 years to the day after frustrated coup-maker of 1987 Sitiveni Rabuka had handed power back to Fiji's civilian leaders, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau and Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, paving the way for the eventual return to parliamentary democracy. The 2006 coup, like the previous ones, deposed a democratically elected government. Perhaps more importantly, it peremptorily sidelined the once powerful cultural and social institutions of the indigenous community, notably the Methodist Church and the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC)3 ± severing with a startling abruptness the overarching influence they had exercised in national life.
    [Show full text]
  • The Case of Fiji
    University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Volume 25 Issues 3&4 1992 Democracy and Respect for Difference: The Case of Fiji Joseph H. Carens University of Toronto Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Cultural Heritage Law Commons, Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons Recommended Citation Joseph H. Carens, Democracy and Respect for Difference: The Case of Fiji, 25 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 547 (1992). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol25/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DEMOCRACY AND RESPECT FOR DIFFERENCE: THE CASE OF FIJI Joseph H. Carens* TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ................................. 549 I. A Short History of Fiji ................. .... 554 A. Native Fijians and the Colonial Regime .... 554 B. Fijian Indians .................. ....... 560 C. Group Relations ................ ....... 563 D. Colonial Politics ....................... 564 E. Transition to Independence ........ ....... 567 F. The 1970 Constitution ........... ....... 568 G. The 1987 Election and the Coup .... ....... 572 II. The Morality of Cultural Preservation: The Lessons of Fiji ................. ....... 574 III. Who Is Entitled to Equal Citizenship? ... ....... 577 A. The Citizenship of the Fijian Indians ....... 577 B. Moral Limits to Historical Appeals: The Deed of Cession ............. ....... 580 * Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto.
    [Show full text]
  • History of Inter-Group Conflict and Violence in Modern Fiji
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Sydney eScholarship History of Inter-Group Conflict and Violence in Modern Fiji SANJAY RAMESH MA (RESEARCH) CENTRE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY 2010 Abstract The thesis analyses inter-group conflict in Fiji within the framework of inter-group theory, popularised by Gordon Allport, who argued that inter-group conflict arises out of inter-group prejudice, which is historically constructed and sustained by dominant groups. Furthermore, Allport hypothesised that there are three attributes of violence: structural and institutional violence in the form of discrimination, organised violence and extropunitive violence in the form of in-group solidarity. Using history as a method, I analyse the history of inter-group conflict in Fiji from 1960 to 2006. I argue that inter- group conflict in Fiji led to the institutionalisation of discrimination against Indo-Fijians in 1987 and this escalated into organised violence in 2000. Inter-group tensions peaked in Fiji during the 2006 general elections as ethnic groups rallied behind their own communal constituencies as a show of in-group solidarity and produced an electoral outcome that made multiparty governance stipulated by the multiracial 1997 Constitution impossible. Using Allport’s recommendations on mitigating inter-group conflict in divided communities, the thesis proposes a three-pronged approach to inter-group conciliation in Fiji, based on implementing national identity, truth and reconciliation and legislative reforms. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This thesis is dedicated to the Indo-Fijians in rural Fiji who suffered physical violence in the aftermath of the May 2000 nationalist coup.
    [Show full text]
  • Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2002
    Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2002 Reviews of West Papua and Solomon mined, circumvented and ignored by Islands are not included in this issue. the highest in the land including those who were sworn in to uphold it” Fiji (Times, 19 May, 10). During the final The political and economic highlights months of 2002, the Fiji Labour Party in Fiji in 2002 have again brought and some quasi-political civil society into sharp focus a lesson painfully movements like the Citizens Constitu- learned after the 1987 military coups: tional Forum (ccf) questioned why it takes years to recover from the neg- some members of Parliament had been ative ramifications of any national permitted to continue serving in Prime political upheaval. The economic and Minister Qarase’s cabinet despite sociopolitical fallout of the May 2000 videotaped evidence of their close civilian coup in Fiji continued to involvement in the May 2000 civilian impact major events in both the uprising. The extensive video footage politico-legal and economic domains of siege activities at the Veiuto Parlia- of the nation during the year. The mentary Complex emerged during the path to economic recovery and socio- first treason trial of Josefa Nata and political normalcy was generally shaky Timoci Silatolu, which commenced on and fraught with difficulties. The local 26 November and featured deposed tabloids regularly featured major Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry scams within the civil service, exacer- as a key state witness (Post, 27 Nov, bated by gross fiscal mismanagement 2; Times, 29 Nov, 1). Following the by the state and a general lack of 14 November conviction of fifteen political goodwill between the major former Counter Revolutionary War- political parties—the ruling Soqosoqo fare Unit soldiers who had been found Duavata ni Lewenivanua (sdl) and guilty of the November 2000 mutiny the opposition Fiji Labour Party (flp).
    [Show full text]
  • The Complexities of Fiji's Four Coups Sanjay Ramesh
    The Complexities of Fiji’s Four Coups 125 Brij Lal (1988, 1992) saw the defeat of the Alliance Party that ruled Fiji from 1970 to 1987 as the principal cause of the coup. He argued that the Alliance Party led by indigenous chiefs did not want to relinquish 1987 to 2007: The Complexities of Fiji’s Four Coups power to an indigenous Fijian commoner or to the trade union members of the Fiji Labour Party. Victor Lal (1988) analysed the possibility of for- Sanjay Ramesh eign involvement in the Fiji coup and contextualised the events of May 1987 within the cold war political framework. Victor Lal argued that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had worked with the indigenous Fijian Introduction pro-western military and indigenous nationalists to undermine the newly elected government in 1987. Robert Robertson and Akosita Tamanisau Fiji politics is often conceptualised as two distinct ethnic groups, (1988) and William Sutherland (1992) argued that the rise of the FLP- one indigenous and the other migrant, warring within the bosom of a sin- NFP coalition was an expression of multiethnic class aspiration which al- gle state. However, the December 2006 non-racial coup raises questions legedly threatened the neo-traditional chiefly political hegemony whereas about the ‘ethnicist’ arguments of the past. It shows that previously ethnic Michael Howard (1991) and Stephanie Lawson (1991) highlighted that race analysis was used to mask indigenous power struggles. This paper the eastern chiefs – the eastern chiefly oligarchy - were not prepared to provides an account of Fiji since the first coup in Fiji on 14 May 1987 relinquish their traditional political authority to a commoner indigenous and shows how race was used by the various Fiji governments and in- Fijian.
    [Show full text]
  • Elections and Politics in Fiji
    i ii iii Co-Published by ANU E Press and Asia Pacific Press The Australian National Unversity Canberra ACT 0200 Email: [email protected] Website: http://epress.anu.edu.au National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Lal, Brij V. Islands of turmoil : elections and politics in Fiji. Bibliography. Includes index. ISBN 0 7315 3751 3 ISBN 1 920942 75 0 (Online document) 1. Fiji - Politics and government. 2. Fiji - Social conditions. 3. Fiji - Economic conditions. I. Title. 996.11 This work is copyright. Apart from those uses which may be permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 as amended, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission from the publishers. The views expressed in this book are those of the author and not necessarily of the publishers. Editor: Bridget Maidment Publisher: Asia Pacific Press and ANU E Press Design: Annie Di Nallo Design Printers: University Printing Service, The Australian National University Cover photo, Nukulau Prison, is copyright and used with permission (www.fijilive.com). Author photo by Darren Boyd, Coombs Photography. First edition © 2006 ANU E Press and Asia Pacific Press For the people of the Fiji Islands There is a dawn at the end of the darkest night v Contents Abbreviations vii Preface viii 1. The road to independence 1 2. Continuity and change 24 3. Things fall apart 49 4. Back from the abyss 77 5. Rabuka’s republic 100 6. Charting a new course 126 7. A time to change 155 8. George Speight’s coup 185 9. In George Speight’s shadow 206 10.
    [Show full text]
  • 2003 Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor February 25, 2004
    Fiji Page 1 of 9 Fiji Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2003 Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor February 25, 2004 Fiji is a constitutional republic with an elected President, Prime Minister, and Parliament. Ethnicity remained a dominant factor in the country's politics, economy, and society. Following free and fair elections in 2001, the political situation improved; however, concerns remained about the composition of the Cabinet. The 1997 Constitution requires that any party receiving more than 10 percent of the seats in Parliament be given cabinet positions. However, when Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase of the Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party formed a government in late 2001, it excluded the Fiji Labor Party (FLP) led by deposed Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry, although the FLP had won substantially more than 10 percent of the parliamentary seats in the 2001 elections. The FLP took legal action against the Government, and in July the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the FLP. Subsequent negotiations between Qarase and Chaudhry broke down over the exact numbers of FLP M.P.s to be admitted into Qarase's Cabinet. The Supreme Court is expected to hear the resulting case in early 2004. The final two co-conspirators of May 2000 coup leader George Speight, Timoci Silatolu and Josefa Nata, were convicted of treason in March and sentenced in June. The Vice President, a government minister, and the Deputy Speaker of Parliament were all awaiting trial at year's end for their participation in Speight's takeover of Parliament in May 2000.
    [Show full text]
  • Fiji Islands Political Crisis: Background, Analysis, and Chronology
    Fiji Islands Political Crisis: Background, Analysis, and Chronology December 11, 2000 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RS20690 SUMMARY RS20690 Fiji Islands Political Crisis: Background, December 11, 2000 Analysis, and Chronology Thomas Lum On May 19, 2000, Fijian businessman George Speight and his followers took Prime Specialist in Asian Affairs Minister Mehendra Chaudhry, an ethnic Indian Fijian, and 30 government and parliamentary officials hostage in an attempt to return the political system to indigenous Fijian dominance. The Fiji military appointed an interim civilian government, negotiated the release of the hostages on July 14, 2000, and then arrested Speight on July 26, 2000. Although the interim civilian government expressed disapproval of Speight’s actions, it also indicated plans to create a new Constitution that bars Indo-Fijians from the position of Prime Minister. On November 16, 2000, the Fiji High Court found the formation of the interim government and abrogation of the 1997 Constitution illegal. The United States has demanded a swift restoration of democratic government in Fiji. Congressional Research Service Fiji Islands Political Crisis: Background, Analysis, and Chronology Background Fiji’s Importance in the Region The Republic of the Fiji Islands has the second largest population (813,000 persons) among Pacific Island states, after Papua New Guinea; and second highest per capita income, after the Cook Islands. Many observers regard the Fijian economy as one of the most viable and potentially prosperous in the region.1 Prior to the 1987 coups, described below, many political analysts regarded Fiji as a model of democratic, multi-ethnic government. Even in undemocratic periods, political violence has been relatively minimal and most human rights have remained protected.2 Fiji and Papua New Guinea are the only two South Pacific nations to have significant armed forces.
    [Show full text]
  • 2004 September
    Country Report Fiji September 2004 The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent St, London SW1Y 4LR United Kingdom The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For over 50 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The Economist Intelligence Unit delivers its information in four ways: through its digital portfolio, where the latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising seminars and presentations. The firm is a member of The Economist Group. London New York Hong Kong The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent St The Economist Building 60/F, Central Plaza London 111 West 57th Street 18 Harbour Road SW1Y 4LR New York Wanchai United Kingdom NY 10019, US Hong Kong Tel: (44.20) 7830 1007 Tel: (1.212) 554 0600 Tel: (852) 2585 3888 Fax: (44.20) 7830 1023 Fax: (1.212) 586 0248 Fax: (852) 2802 7638 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.eiu.com Electronic delivery This publication can be viewed by subscribing online at www.store.eiu.com Reports are also available in various other electronic formats, such as CD-ROM, Lotus Notes, online databases and as direct feeds to corporate intranets. For further information, please contact your nearest Economist Intelligence Unit office Copyright © 2004 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited.
    [Show full text]
  • Sugar and Democracy in Fiji: the Material Foundations of Post-Colonial Authoritarianism 1970-2005
    Sugar and Democracy in Fiji: The material foundations of post-colonial authoritarianism 1970-2005 By Keiran Barbalich A Thesis submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters of Arts in Political Science School of History, Philosophy, Political Science & International Relations Victoria University of Wellington 2009 Abstract Fiji became independent in 1970, and functioned for 17 years under a constitution with democratic elements, including elections. Three times since 1987, however, armed force has overthrown constitutionally elected governments. Some observers see this as a failure of the consolidation of Fijian democracy, while others acknowledge the façade of Fijian democracy. Among those who acknowledge Fiji’s authoritarian institutions, conflict persists as to whether authoritarianism is the inevitable product of ethnic conflict in Fijian society, or a consequence of post-colonial institutional legacies. No movement toward democracy in Fiji is likely to succeed until we understand the material foundations underlying Fiji’s authoritarian politics. This thesis argues that Fiji’s authoritarian political institutions, established under colonial rule, have been sustained since independence by forces in the international economy. These forces have helped to maintain the economic, social and political dominance of a Pacific- Fijian chiefly elite over Fijian society. Specially, chiefly control of the sugar industry, Fiji’s principal export, has provided chiefs with sufficient patronage resources to retain their control over Fijian society through electoral politics or, at the event of undesirable electoral outcomes, through armed opposition. Through post-colonial structures, the chiefs control the land-tenure system, and through their setting and receipt of land rents, they have been the principal beneficiaries of Fiji’s sugar exports.
    [Show full text]
  • Elections and Politics in Contemporary Fiji
    Chiefs and Indians: Elections and Politics in Contemporary Fiji Brij V. Lal 1he Republic of Fiji went to the polls in May 1992, its first election since the military coups of 1987 and the sixth since 1970, when the islands became independent from Great Britain. For many people in Fiji and out­ side, the elections were welcome, marking as they did the republic's first tentative steps toward restoring parliamentary democracy and interna­ tional respectability, and replacing rule by decree with rule by constitu­ tionallaw. The elections were a significant event. Yet, hope mingles eerily with apprehension; the journey back to genuine representative democracy is fraught with difficulties that everyone acknowledges but few know how to resolve. The elections were held under a constitution rejected by half of the pop­ ulation and severely criticized by the international community for its racially discriminatory, antidemocratic provisions. Indigenous Fijian po­ litical solidarity, assiduously promoted since the coups, disintegrated in the face of the election-related tensions within Fijian society. A chief-spon­ sored political party won 30 of the 37 seats in the 7o-seat House of Repre­ sentatives, and was able to form a government only in coalition with other parties. Sitiveni Rabuka, the reluctant politician, became prime minister after gaining the support of the Fiji Labour Party, which he had over­ thrown in 1987, and despite the opposition of his predecessor and para­ mount chief of Lau, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. In a further irony, a consti­ tutional system designed to entrench the interests of Fijian chiefs placed a commoner at the national helm.
    [Show full text]
  • Fiji New Caledonia Samoa Solomon Islands Tonga Vanuatu
    COUNTRY REPORT Pacific Islands: Fiji New Caledonia Samoa Solomon Islands Tonga Vanuatu September 2000 The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent St, London SW1Y 4LR United Kingdom The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For over 50 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The EIU delivers its information in four ways: through our digital portfolio, where our latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising conferences and roundtables. The firm is a member of The Economist Group. London New York Hong Kong The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent St The Economist Building 25/F, Dah Sing Financial Centre London 111 West 57th Street 108 Gloucester Road SW1Y 4LR New York Wanchai United Kingdom NY 10019, US Hong Kong Tel: (44.20) 7830 1000 Tel: (1.212) 554 0600 Tel: (852) 2802 7288 Fax: (44.20) 7499 9767 Fax: (1.212) 586 1181/2 Fax: (852) 2802 7638 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.eiu.com Electronic delivery This publication can be viewed by subscribing online at http://store.eiu.com/brdes.html Reports are also available in various other electronic formats, such as CD-ROM, Lotus Notes, online databases and as direct feeds to corporate intranets. For further information, please contact your nearest Economist Intelligence Unit office London: Jan Frost Tel: (44.20) 7830 1183 Fax: (44.20) 7830 1023 New York: Alexander Bateman Tel: (1.212) 554 0643 Fax: (1.212) 586 1181 Hong Kong: Amy Ha Tel: (852) 2802 7288/2585 3888 Fax: (852) 2802 7720/7638 Copyright © 2000 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited.
    [Show full text]