WILLIAMS COLLEGE LIBRARIES

Your unpublished thesis, submitted for a degree at Williams College and administered by the Williams College Libraries, will be made available for research use. You may, through this form, provide instructions regarding copyright, access, dissemination and reproduction of your thesis.

_ The faculty advisor to the student writing the thesis wishes to claim joint authorship in this work.

In each section, please check the ONE statement that reflects your wishes.

1. PUBLICATION AND QUOTATION: LITERARY PROPERTY RIGHTS A student author automatically owns the copyright to his/her work, whether or not a copyright symbol and date are placed on the piece. The duration of U.S. copyright on a manuscript--and Williams theses are considered manuscripts--is the life of the author plus 70 years.

_ I/we do not choose to retain literary property rights to the thesis, and I wish to assign them immediately to Williams College. ;,de('tlni~ this wili tn the lln~ III 1,0 '.\.n \tudem lunhor from later pUf!lishirig his/her \vorl-;: the studem would, however. need to contact the Archi ves for a form. 'rhe Archi ves wOllk! be li\~e ill this lU abo grant pel'nll\S!On small sections fruln the thesis. would thcr(~ be Hny iTl.hon for tlk /\rchives to gnm1 pe!.·IHI:SS!O!l to another party IU tlh~ thesis in its if sueh a situation amse. the Archive,; would in touch \\ith the mnhor to let them know that such request had heeu madt\

L~we wish to retain literary property rights to the thesis for a period of three years, at which time the literary property rights shall be assigned to Williams College. the mlt]ior a fe'.v ye:lrs to make exclusive use of the thesis in un"CUlTIH!l:

_ I/we wish to retain literary property rights to the thesis for a period of __ years, or until my death, whichever is the later, at which time the literary property rights shall be assigned to Williams College. cdectmg chi;; uLuv~,;s the m,H:hnr great In tV thc !:i rne Some students are inten>,ted in thcir thcsis in grlH.luate ;,elmol worl" this it would niilke for then! II) :1 number such . il) in the bhmk, and line out the 'eVonls until Iny delnh. whidie'.'{.T is the later.' In event. It is for dw h.> ddruinist,;r on il if the ,;nc!s with the individual's c!Gm!J·{)ur wun't have t\) scarch fur eSl:lk ,;xeeUlOrs in this C;N'···IYi[ tbis is up to each stuc!ent-

II. ACCESS The Williams College Libraries are investigating the posting of theses online, as well as their retention in hardcopy.

·J'williams College is granted permission to maintain and provide access to my thesis in hardcopy and via the Web both on and off campus. Sdcctmg tbis (,-Ilows I\;seardk;rs amund the wOrlcilO ;Iecess !lk; vasion of your \\/ork. _ Williams College is granted permission to maintain and provide access to my thesis in hardcopy and via the Web for on-campus use only. allows the version of your work from 11k Oll·campus

_ The thesis is to be maintained and made available in hardcopy form only. ;,electmg this aEows

III. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION Because theses are listed on FRANCIS, the Libraries receive numerous requests every year for copies of works. If/when a hardcopy thesis is duplicated for a researcher, a copy of the release form always accompanies the copy. Any digital version of your thesis will include the release form.

{!,/ ~ Copies of the thesis may be provided to any researcher. Scle,:,n);: ,his ,diows Imy researcher to request u fmlll the Wiliianh e-;ecturnic \!<~r~~1{WL

_ Copying of the thesis is restricted for _ years, at which time copies may be provided to any researcher. 'rhis Ibis electronic version of Ihe thesis will be "'1'0.,,"'11"";

_ Copying of the thesis or portions thereof, except as needed to maintain an adequate number of research copies available in the Williams College Libraries, is expressly prohibited. The electronic version of the thesis will be protected against duplication. allows no 10 he mnde i\,r researdkT\. 'rhe eleelTonlc v,crsiun does not dis··aHo\') n:st:archers frmn

Signed (student author) Signat:ure RerTloved

Signed (faculty advisor) Signat:ure RerTloved

A.·\~~: ~ -~_ L"V"'~,/ I~"" ~\.~~~.. /",~) -~, 's tl'tle \J ( ,-«...."-_ :. ....' C;)tAl'l/\..{) (.4/- =-.... :,..,-,\ '" - \ "'". ." __""_.- Thesl ------'----'-----,7-)------=-"---=----1)--'--'-----'---+.,;--''''''-

Date __-+-__-;-1_/L_·.·~_/_:71,-1 _ l

Accepted for the Libraries Signat:ure RerTloved A Foreign Flower: Democracy in from 1970 to 2008

by

Katie Grace

Professor Sam Crane, Advisor

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors in Political Science

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

Williamstown, Massachusetts

2008-2009

1 A child may ask, "What is the world's story about?" And a grown man or woman may wonder, "What way will the world go? How does it end and, while we're at it, what's the story about?"

East ofEden, John Steinbeck

To Dad, for education

2 Table of Contents

Introduction 4 Chapter One: Divided Society 13 Chapter Two: Coup d'etats 28 Chapter Three: Institutional Instability 47 Chapter Four: Looking Forward 68 Addendum 85

Appendixes Appendix A: 1999 and 2006 Election Results by Seat 86 Appendix B: Constitutional Distribution of Seats by ethnicity, House of Representatives..118 Appendix C: Constitutional Distribution of Seats by appointment nomination, Senate 118 Appendix D: Percentage ofVotes Won/Percentage of Seats Won, 2006 119 Appendix E: Percentage ofVotes Won/Percentage ofSeats Won, 2001 119 Appendix F: Percentage ofVotes Won/Percentage of Seats Won, 1999 119 Appendix G: Registered Voters-Ethnic Breakdown by Constituency 2006, Open Seats 120 Appendix H: Registered Voters-Ethnic Breakdown by Constituency 1999, Open Seats 121 Appendix I: Map of Fiji with Provincial Boundaries 122 Appendix I: Annual GDP Growth Per Capita, 1968-2007 123 AppendixJ: Distribution of Households by Income per Adult Equivalent 124

Bibliography 125

3 Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, the promotion of democracy as the world's preferred mode of national governance has increased in tandem with a rise in international organizations. The promises of liberal democracy, epitomized by the successes of advanced capitalist countries like the United States, Australia, and Great Britain, have provided the foundation for an international push towards democratization in latter half of the 20th century. This effort has met with mixed results; some nations have successfully transitioned to stable democracy while others have been stymied by oppressive authoritarian regimes and instability. Fiji belongs to this latter group of nations. The troubled road that the island nation has traveled since independence provides insight into the difficulties that other nations, particularly those with divided societies, have had in adopting democracy. Aspects of Fiji's history and culture specific to that country have prevented a successful transition to democracy, suggesting that democratization must take into effect counu;-specific factors for a stable transition. Fiji's experience also provokes questions about the prudence and efficacy of overt democracy promotion as a blanket policy for the Western world and international community.

Parliamental; democracy has been Fiji's governing structure since independence from Britain in 1970. Plagued by poor governance and political instability, successful operation of democracy in Fiji has been hampered by racial division, elite manipulation, ethnically biased policies, poor civil/military relations, and economic decline. Coups have become the accepted way to deal with unpopular electoral results or government policies. It is common for Fijian nationalists like to claim that democracy is a western

4 "foreign flower" ill-suited for governing the Fijian people.1 While Fiji's overt problems are largely of poor governance-lack of regard for the rule of law, ineffective, inequitable policies and implementation-the heart of democratic failure is in the tension between

democracy's basic tenet of equality in representation and Fiji's colonial era imperative of

Fijian political paramountcy. Fiji's colonial legacy created a hierarchy of racial groups

inherently incompatible with democracy, and the incorporation of the principle of

indigenous Fijian primacy into Fiji's political institutions has produced a government

incapable of good governance. The continued failure of Fijian democracy and its attendant

democratic institutions to govern effectively in accordance with democratic principles and in

protection of all Fiji Islanders suggests that alterations must be made to the existing system.

Elite manipulation, military involvement, and economic decline have also

contributed to the failure of good governance in Fiji. In contrast to Fijian political

paramountcy, which directly undercuts Fiji's political institutions, these three issues have

their roots in poor policy development-elite manipulation in the existence of incentives to

appeal on ethnic lines, military involvement in the prestige and power accorded that

institution by constitutions and Parliaments, and economic decline in the inability of political

institutions to foster a productive policy environment. While these issues contribute to and

intensify the tendency for Fijian governments to engage in poor governance practices, the

inability ofinstitutions to rein in these issues connects directly and more broadly to the

tension between democratic institutions and Fijian political paramountcy.

The overriding doctrine of Fijian paramountcy, which has worked its way into every

Constitution and ensuing political institution since independence, dictates that the Fijian

government must privilege the rights and goals of indigenous over all other ethnic

1 Elizabeth Feizkhah, "Smash and Grab" TIME Asia. Volume 156, Nmnber 23: (2000). http://...'vn,,,vw. time.comI time lasia/magazine/2000106121fiji.html

5 groups. Insofar as policies that are beneficial to Fijians are detrimental to Indo-Fijians, Fiji's

democratic institutions do not promote good governance. When the government appears to

depart from this pro-Fijian principle either through the election of Indo-Fijian governments

or the adoption of unfavorable policies illegal disruptions have occurred, most often in the

form of coups. The acceptance of coups as a legitimate response to actions that are

perceived as attacking Fiji's overriding governing principle has undermined Fiji's democratic

system to the point that coups are almost more common than elections. Poor governance

and broken institutions have led to a lethal cocktail of coups, economic decline, and more

tenuous racial tensions.

At face value, Fiji's institutions appear to be the root of Fiji's instability and

economic decline for they are unable to accommodate transfers of power or prevent illegal

overthrows, mediate racial tensions, or promote good governance. Attempts at reforming

the system to promote good governance and economic development through renewed

institutions have focused on constitutional engineering and institutional restructuring.

However, the most notable of these attempts-the 1997 Constitution-has done little to

assuage racial tensions and has witnessed an increase in the prevalence of coups. The failure

of political scientists involved in the writing of the 1997 Constitution to design political

institutions capable of managing racial tensions and good governance stems from a

superficial focus on institutions that does not interrogate the underlying historical and

cultural foundation of those institutions. Built on assumptions that institutions which

protected ethnic interests would promote cross-cultural collaboration and mitigate racial

tension, the institutions of the 1997 Constitution were undermined by the continued

inclusion of the principle of Fijian political paramountcy. As a result, the newly designed

Constitution incorporated racial identification, ethnic cleavage, and racial hierarchy, all of

6 which had been primary causes of previous democratic and governance failure. Effectively,

after years of negotiations and institutional manipulation, Fiji's governance and democracy

post-1997 was in worse shape than before.

Blind focus on democracy and democratic institutions in Fiji has been problematic

for the country. Failure to adequately address underlying racial issues embodied in the

doctrine of Fijian paramountcy has exacerbated tensions by allowing Fijians to cloak their

divisive policies in the name of democracy while encouraging Indo-Fijians to seek the

political equality that system of government implies and requires. Successful democracy in

Fiji, in the sense of achieving equality of representation and policy, requires the interrogation

of the doctrine of Fijian paramountcy. So long as that doctrine remains in place, Indo-Fijians

will remain second-class citizens and poor governance will continue to plague the countq.

Reasons for past refusal to interrogate this principle include the perception that

ethnic/racial divisions are static and immutable. Disparities within ethnic groups primarily

along economic and class lines suggest the potential for cross-ethnic mobilization by class, a

proposition that does not seem all too far out of the realm of possibility given the results of

the 1977, 1987, and 1999 elections. Ethnic cleavages are by and large undergirded by the

state and elites with a stake in ethnic divides, and as a result do not seem to be inherently

intractable. Granted, the measures necessary to reduce the incentives for elites to appeal on

ethnic lines, remove Fijian paramountcy as an overriding principle, and promote interethnic

cooperation are certainly not simple and may present significant obstacles on their own. Fiji

may need its own Mandela and de Klerk, but continuing to adjust institutions superficially

without substantively addressing Fiji's historical and cultural background of hierarchical

racial divides will continue to prevent stable democracy from forming.

7 In short form, the particular political structure and racial hierarchy of the colonial period worked its way into early political systems, establishing indigenous Fijians as a politically paramount ethnic group. The privileging of this power structure, and in particular the role of chiefs within the Fijian community, did not promote good governance or equality in terms of the nation as a whole. Institutions were designed to be complicit with this principle and privilege one segment of society, enhancing bad governance. Efforts to correct the outcomes of poor governance-coups, economic disparity, continued ethnic division- through institutions could only go so far if the underlying historical and cultural problems were not addressed. Continued reluctance to address these problems, perhaps for good reason due to their complexity, has prevented the growth and stabilization of democracy in

Fiji.

This paper's focus on the cultural and historical factors that led to the creation of

Fiji's political institutions and the reasons for their subsequent failure lends itself to particular understandings about possible solutions for the problems. Unlike Fraenkel, who argues that Fiji's racial antagonisms are too deep seated for "quick-fix" solutions, this paper agrees more with Lawson's later arguments about tensions between ethnic nationalism and constitutionalism and the dangers of constitutional practices that explicitly recognize cultural difference.2 However, as ethnonationalism is itself an outgrowth of Fijian political paramountcy, this paper has chosen to focus on the latter phenomenon. Given the historical results of an ethnically defmed political system in Fiji, this paper argues that racialized electoral patterns and institutions will only continue to exacerbate and highlight racial tensions. As a result, one solution tllat presents itself could be to remove all references to

2 Jon Fraenkel, "The Failure ofElectoral Engineering in Fiji," Maori News Online, June 7, 2000. http://maorinews.com/karere/fiji/fiji030.htm; Stephanie Lawson, "Nationalism Versus Constitutionalism in Fiji." Nations and Nationalism, Volume 10, Number 4 (2004): 519-538.

8 race in the electoral and parliamentary systems, retaining the as an advisory body for the Cabinet and Prime Minister. The main concern with this solution is that the entrenchment of Fijians, particularly Fijian chiefs, at the top of the food chain will render it politically unviable. Other potential solutions would focus on the creation of a national identity, strengthening the rule of law, removal of incentives to appeal on ethnic lines, and subjecting the governance structure rigorously to national referendums. While a major problem with subjecting governance structures to national referendums in divided societies is a tendency for votes to splinter along ethnic lines, imposing a Constitution without adequate popular input or education reduces support for the document and its rule of law. By emphasizing a sense of "fractured unity," where Fiji Islanders see themselves as one nation with identities based on factors other than ethnicity, in tandem with a revitalized, less ethnicized Constitution, there is the potential for ethnic divisions to be toned down and progress made towards a more stable governing system. If, as is probably the case, that entrenchment and political realities prevent such measures from being enacted, smaller, more case-by-case steps may have to be pursued for progress on social, economic, and political terms. What would constitute the concrete measures this would entail is an excellent question for future research.

Fiji's experience with democracy has a number of lessons for democracy promoters and democratizing nations around the world. First, turning to constitutional engineering to manage racial tensions may not work. Fiji's failed attempts to create institutions specifically to deal with ethnic conflicts do not preclude the possibility of constitutional engineering succeeding in other nations, but its failure to work in such a small country does suggest that it may fail more often than it succeeds, particularly if existing institutions are weak.

Institutions can only be proactive if their underlying foundation is strong. Secondly,

9 adopting (or imposing) a Western-style democracy without ensuring that the necessary level of commitment to the tenets of democracy exist and can be supported in the nation's culture will pose some serious obstacles for the establishment of a stable democracy. In Fiji,

democracy and equality is supported within the Indo-Fijian community, but the chiefly

hierarchy and doctrine of political paramountcy in the Fijian community presents a major

roadblock to the adoption of equitable democracy on a national scale. In divided societies, as

in Fiji, a shared commitment must be made to upholding democratic institutions and the

rule of law if democracy is to succeed. Ethnic divisions in this sense are only important

insofar as they prevent the adoption of shared values; ethnic division in and ofitself does

not necessarily need to be an obstacle to stable democratic rule.

Democracy promoters must acknowledge the specific characteristics and histories of

each nation and adjust the practical applications of democracy accordingly if they are to

establish stable and enduring democracies. One of the benefits of democracy as a theory is

its broad range of definitions-just as democracies in the United States and Canada are

different, so too must democracies in Fiji, Samoa, and find strength in their unique

cultural and historical differences. In addition, just as democracy in the United States was

allowed to grow and develop on its own, democracy in other nations must be allowed that

same chance. The democratic institutions thrown together in the 1970 Constitution were a

mix of pro-Fijian colonial principles and pro-Indo-Fijian principles of equality, an

incompatible jumble of values that presented problems for the execution of democracy. Had

the British been in less of a rush to slough off its colonies, it is possible that Fiji would have

had more time to organize itself into a nation, rather than a collection of racially-organized

interest groups. True and stable democratization needs to come from within a nation, a

people who are committed to a common vision of what government is and should look like.

10 A sense of nationalism and commitment cannot be imposed from above or outside a nation.

While promoting democracy for its human rights values is commendable and perhaps the

morally right thing to do, as we have seen in Fiji since 1987 imposing democracy via threats

of sanctions is not amenable to successful democratization. Democracy assistance and

support is infInitely more useful and productive to the creation of stable and fruitful

democracies than hard-headed and forceful imposition from outside.

The following chapters will chart the background, progress, and destruction of Fijian

democracy and attendant governance over the period from 1970 to 2008. Chapter One will

attempt to provide a holistic ovenriew of Fiji as a country, presenting vital country statistics,

major political issues, colonial history, and a description of the Constitution and electoral

system. This chapter will introduce the genesis of ethnic division and the doctrine of Fijian

political paramounty. Chapter Two gives an in-depth discussion of Fiji's major coups,

detailing the reasons for such large-scale illegal disruptions of Fijian democracy. By far the

most overt demonstrations of the weakness of Fiji's political system, these coups will

demonstrate the incompatibility of Fijian political paramountcy or ethnonationalism and

basic institutions of democracy. Chapter Three walks through Fiji's constitutional and

electoral history, focusing on the most recent Constitution and its attendant elections. This

chapter addresses the incorporation of the doctrine of Fijian political paramountcy in Fiji's

political institutions, showing the incompatibility between privilege and equality and

demonstrating the failure of constitutional engineering and the Alternative Vote system.

Chapter Four assesses the underlying tensions of Fijian society posing problems for

democratic governance, including tensions between indigenous and universal rights, elite

manipulation, and ethnic nationalism. The chapter also presents some possible solutions for

Fiji's societal and political ills, and discusses the role ofAmerican foreign policy in hindering

11 good governance by promoting an immediate return to democratic elections and, implicitly, unstable and undemocratic institutions.

12 Chapter 1: Divided Society

Beneath a fa<;:ade of tranquility and beauty the Republic of the Fiji Islands is a nation in turmoil. Since independence in 1970, the democratically elected government has been subverted by coups three times and the country has witnessed the adoption of three radically different Constitutions. With a relatively peaceful yet ethnically divided population dealing with the aftermath of colonialism, Fiji presents an interesting case study on democratic transitions and raises important questions about the prudence ofimposing democracy on a nation missing some of the basic requirements for successful democratic governance.

Without national unity, commitment to the rule of law, or a sustained level of economic growth and facing ethnically biased institutions and rampant elite manipulation, it is no surprise that democracy has had a hard time taking root in Fiji.

This chapter provides the background necessary to understand the nation of Fiji, its institutions, and the nature ofits racial divisions. It traces the British colonial policies that instated the racial hierarchy that has been so destructive to Fiji's democratic institutions and sketches the rise of ethnically-based political identities and issues. Ultimately, this chapter shows that the colonial separation of Fijians and Indo-Fijians artificially created a hierarchical society of "homogenous" ethnic groups, which has been exacerbated by the ethnicization of policies and institutions.

Demographic and Economic Background Located roughly 2,500 miles from Australia in the middle of the South Pacific, Fiji's

837,271 inhabitants are strewn across 330 islands, a third of which are inhabited.3 The population is roughly split between ethnic Fijians at 56.8% of the population and Indo-

3 "2007 Census ofPopulation and Housing," F&i' Islands Bureau ofStatistics, October 15, 2008. ht11); //\\T\v"v.statsfiji.gov.fJ / Cellsus2007 /Release%201 %20-~;(,20Population%20Size.pdfand "Fiji Facts and Figures" F&i Islands Bureau ofStatistics, July 1, 2008. http://www.statsfiji.gov.fJ/FFFOS.pdf

13 Fijians at 37.5%.4 The rest of the population is rounded out by 10,335 , 4,704

Chinese, 2,953 Europeans, 10,771 Part-Europeans, 15,311 other Pacific Islanders, and 3,660 individuals that do not fit into any of the previous categories.s The per year population growth rate has been steadily decreasing since 1966 and currently stands at 0.7%.6 The ethnic

Fijian population grew at 1.7% per year from 1996 to 2007, while the Indo-Fijian population decreased at an average rate of -.7%. This decrease, a fall from the -.3% growth rate of 1986 to 1996, is due to continued high emigration rates as well as falling fertility rates that are well below replacement rates. It is likely that the Indo-Fijian population will continue to decrease as the Fijian population increases, widening the numerical gap between the two groups. The changing demographics of the population will also play out in geographic distribution, as seen in the transition to urban areas of 25% of the rural Indo-Fijian population in the cane belt of .7 As a result of increasing rural to urban migration 51 % of the population now lives in urban areas, and it is projected that 61 % of the population will reside in urban areas by 2030. 8 Life expectancy is roughly 71 years and 93.7% of the population over 15 is literate. 9

The UN Development Program (UNDP) classifies Fiji as a "medium development" country.lO GDP in 2007 was approximately USD$2.05 billion and 2008 estimates forecast a

4 Ethnic Fijians are the indigenous peoples of Fiji, who have a mL'C of Polynesian and Melanesian ancestry. Indo-Fijians are the descendants ofindentured laborers brought over from India by the British to serve as laborers on sugar cane plantations. 5 Rotumans are from the island ofRotuma, a dependency of Fiji that is about SOOkm away from Vanua Levu. Rotmnans are ethnically more Polynesian than Fijians. Europeans include descendants of British colonizers as well as expatriates from lmstralian, , the U.S. and other European nations. Part-Europeans, also called kai loma, are mL'Ced-race descendants of Fijians and Europeans. 6 "Census of Population 1881-2007," Fiji Islands Bureau ofStatistics, December 2008. http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/Key%20StatsIPopulation/2.1%20census%20of'%20population.pdf 7 p. 3, "2007 Census ofPopulation and Housing." 3 p. 4, Ibid. 9 "Fiji" CIA IVor/d Fat/book, March 19, 2009. https:llwww.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world­ factbook/geos/fj.html 10 "Hmnan Development Report 2007-2008" UNDP, 2007. http://l,vv-lw.undp.org.fj/ resources/mainluploads/hdr 2007en.pdf

14 contraction in the economy.l1 Fiji has an export-oriented economy, with exports ofgoods and services comprising 74% of GDP. The majority of exports were primary goods like sugar, timber, and water; only 25% of exports were secondary manufactured goods. 12 Fiji's main industries are tourism, sugar, clothing, copra, gold, silver, and lumber. 13 Foreign direct investment has fallen precipitously from 6.9% of GDP in 1990 to -0.1 % of GDP in 2005.

Fiji received USD$64 million in aid in 2005, a decline to 2.3% of GDP from 3.7% of GDP in 1990.14

35% of the Fijian population lives below the poverty line. IS There are more urban than rural poor, with 40% of the urban population living under the poverty line compared to

29% of the rural population. There is a higher percentage of Indo-Fijian than Fijian poor, with 34% of Fijians under the poverty line compared to 37% of Indo-Fijians. The disparity increases in rural areas, with 38% of rural Fijians living in poverty compared to 44% of rural

Indo-Fijians. 16 The unemployment rate increased drastically between 1996 and 2007, rising from 3.7% to 8.6%. The highest unemployment rate among ethnic, gender, and location subsectors of the population is 16.7% for urban Fijian females. Rural Indo-Fijian males have the lowest unemployment rate at 4.0%. Rural unemployment is significantly lower than urban unemployment, but rural unemployment increased more than three times between

1996 and 2007. 17

II "GDP by Activity at Current Price at Factor Cost" Fiji Islands Bureau ofStatistics, December 2008. http://,v'.vw.statsfiji.gov·fJ/Key%20Stats/National%20Income/3.2 GDP%20Current.pdf and "Fiji" CIA IVorld Factbook. 12 "Human Development Report 2007-2008" UNDP. 13 "Fiji" CIA 1170rld Fattbook. 14 Ibid. 15 The government defines poverty based on a differentiated basic needs poverty line (BNPL) for a family of four-there are four different poverty lines based on ethnicity and household location. The 2002-2003 BNPL (per week) for Rural Fijians is FJD$124.60 and FJD$138.39 for Urban Fijians, FJD$126.34 for Rural Indo­ Fijians and FJD$149.89 for Urban Indo-Fijians. "Poverty Indicators" Fiji Islands Bureau ofStatistics. http://,v"\vw.statsfiji.gov.fj/Social!povertyindicators.htm 16 Ibid. 17 "2007 Census ofPopulation and Housing."

15 There is a large imbalance in educational attainment at the college degree/postgraduate level in favor of Indo-Fijians, but there are nearly 11,000 more Fijians at the senior secondaq and certificate level, suggesting future adjustments in ethnic representation at higher levels of education.18 Due to the large numbers of rural villages and the persistence of subsistence farming, Fijians represent 73% of agriculture and fisheq workers. They also represent 47% of professionals and 55% of technicians. Indo-Fijians are

70% of plant and machine operators, 55% of craft workers, 54% of clerks, and 51 % of senior officials & managers.19 Fijians are concentrated in the agriculture, mining, and electricity and water industries, whereas Indo-Fijians comprise majorities in manufacturing, construction, and transport storage and communication. Indo-Fijians are 51 % of the [mance, real estate, and business industry compared to a 40% Fijian share, and Indo-Fijians and

Fijians are roughly equally represented in the hotel, retail, and restaurants industry. Indo-

Fijians and Fijians are both roughly equally represented in the four most poorly paid industries-agriculture, manufacturing, hotels, and construction. Dispelling claims that Indo-

Fijians are wealthier than Fijians, the 2004-2005 Employment Survey shows that 61 % of

Indo-Fijians and 68% of Fijians make under FJD$120 a week, and only 13.5% of Fijians and

18% ofIndo-Fijians make over FJD$200 a week.20 Appendix K further demonstrates the fallacy of claiming Indo-Fijians to be unfairly advantaged economically by showing a higher concentration of Indo-Fijian households in the poorest deciles of the population than Fijian households, and a higher concentration of Fijian households in the top four deciles than

18 Wadan Narsey, "Report on the 2004-2005 Employment and Unemployment Survey," Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, May 2007. http://\vww.statsfiji.gov.fjI cens&sUlveysIEUSCYo20report.pdf 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid.

16 Indo-Fijian households.21 Further, some writers have claimed that there is in fact more disparity within these ethnic groups than between them.22

History and Major Issues Prior to colonization by the British in 1874, Fiji was comprised of disparate serni- nomadic tribes. Warfare featured prominently across the country in tribal histories called tukutuku raraba, contributing to western views of Fijians as cannibalistic savages, and oral histories detailed the migration of clan-sizedyavusa from village site to village site.23 Before the arrival of Europeans in the early 19th century, Fijians as a homogeneous ethnic group sharing the same culture and history did not exist. Fijian dialects were "mutually unintelligible" to members of different tribes, and there were distinct organizational and physical differences among tribes located in various geographic regions.24 Fijianyavusa and mataqali in the west and interior of were more physically and culturally similar to

Melanesian peoples such as those in the . Theiryavusa and mataqali also tended to be smaller and less stable, with hit and run warfare as the norm.25 In the east of

Viti Levu and especially in the eastern island groups of Lau and Lomaiviti, Polynesian physical traits and culture were more prominent, with larger, more hierarchical and stable yavtlsa. Long-term, large-scale conflict was more likely in the east than in the west. 26 By the

21 See Appendi..,:: K: Distribution of Households by Income per Adult Equivalent. 22 Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, "Inequality and conflict in Fiji: From purgatory to hell?" Asia Pacific Viewpoint, December 2003, Volume 44, Issue 3: p. 305-324 and Sunil Kumar and , "Politics of Race and Poverty in Fiji: A Case of Indo-Fijian Community." InternationalJournal ofSocial Economics, 2004, Volume 31, Number 5: p. 469-486. 23 Theyavusa is the largest clan-based socio-political unit in Fiji. It can be the size of a single village or cover multiple settlements. Ayavusa is composed of several mataqali, which are collections of extended families called i tokatoka. p. 13, Peter France, The Charter ofthe Land. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1969. 24 p. 7, Ibid. 25 p. 47, Stephanie Lawson, The Faihtre ofDemotratic Politics in Fiji. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991 and p.7, Robert Norton, Race and Politics in Fiji. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. 26 Ibid.

17 mid-1850s, Fiji was still a motley collection of chiefly groups, with the most powerful tribes located in the eastern provinces of Rewa, Lau, , Cakaudrove, and Macuata.27

Western involvement in the islands began in the early 1800s with individual

European and American "beachcombers" trading in sandalwood and beche-de-mer.

Missionaries began arriving en force in the 1830s, and interest in the islands increased over the mid-1800s as Fiji became a prime location for growing copra, sugar cane, and cotton.28

As the European and American communities grew in Fiji, an increasing number of complaints were lodged with these citizens' home governments regarding the conduct of

Fijians.29 In order to press claims and situate responsibility, the Americans created the position of Ttti Viti and chose to recognize one of the more prominent chiefs-the Vttnivaltt or senior chieftain of Bau, Seru Cakobau-as the King of Fiji. Other FijianyatJttJa did not recognize his supremacy and Cakobau faced significant pressure from Ma'afu, the

Tongan chief ofLau.30 When the American consul's house burned and was looted in 1855, the Americans held Cakobau responsible and demanded that he pay USD$43,531 in restitution.31 With no way to repay the money, Cakobau was forced to strike a deal with the

British that ceded Fiji to the British Crown in exchange for the repayment ofits debts. The

Deed of Cession was signed by Cakobau, his rival Ma'afu, and 11 other high chiefs on

October 10, 1874.32 Fiji's first and most formative Governor, Sir Arthur Hamilton Gordon, assumed control in September 1875.

27 See Appendix I for a map of the provinces. p. 48, Lawson, The Faifure ofDemotratic Politiu in Fiji. 28 p.7, Norton, Race and Politit'S in Fiji. 29 p. 48, Lawson, The Failure ofDemotratic Politics in Fiji. 3D Ibid. 31 It is generally understood that the debts were grossly overstated and exaggerated. Geraldine Panapasa, "The island which played a role when Fiji was ceded to Britain," The , March 30, 2008. http://w\).Tw.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id= 85128 32 p. 7, Norton, Race and Politics in Fiji; p. 56, Lawson, The Failure ofDemotratic Politit'S in Fiji.

18 While only for five years, Gordon set in motion a political culture that has smvived largely unchanged and which shapes politics in Fiji to this day. His most important contribution was the doctrine of Fijian political paramountcy, which is claimed to stem from the Deed of Cession and proclaims that "the rights and privileges of Fijians in respect of their customs, heritage, and land are virtually inalienable and shall be paramount over any other claims."33 The Deed of Cession in fact makes no reference to such a doctrine, and it appears that the proposition assumed its legitimacy from the words and actions of

Gordon's administration and that of subsequent Governors to the point that the concept is now recognized by all groups as a foundational principle of Fijian government.34 It is extraordinary to note that the doctrine of Fijian political paramountcy essentially stems exclusively from the actions and prejudices of Sir Gordon. Gordon, who believed that he

"had a divine mission to make the islands an exception to the dismal history of colonialism," designed and promoted policies with the explicit hope of "safeguarding the rights of the

Fijian people from...the corroding effects of Western penetration.,,35 Gordon promoted a system ofindirect rule that utilized "existing" native systems of governance and created the

BOJe LIJlt Vakatttranga (BLV), the Great Council of Chiefs, to serve as a conduit between the colonial regime and native Fijians.36 Gordon also protected Fijian ownership of land by forbidding alienation of Fijian lands and forbade Fijians from working on European

33 p. 58, Lawson, The Failure ofDemocratic Politics in Fiji. 34 The 1997 Constitution recognizes this principle in section 6.j.: "the paramountcy of Fijian interests as a protective principle continues to apply, so as to ensure that the interests of the Fijian commwlity are not subordinated to the interests of other commwlities." and p. 59, Lawson, The Failure of Democratic Politics in Fiji. 35 Macnaught in p. 60, Lawson, The Failure ofDemocratic Politii'S in Fiji, and p. 2 Ahmed Ali, "Political Change, 1874--1960" in Brij V. Lal, Politics in Fiji. : University of Press, 1986. 36 The prominence of eastern chiefs led Gordon and his advisors to turn to them for help in setting up the Native i\dministration, and as a result the socio-political structure of the eastern chiefs was used as the basis for the organization. The strict hierarchy andyavusa--mataqali-i tokatoka structure of the east did not accurately reflect the organization of Fijians in interior and western Fiji, and the selection of the Bauan dialect of Fijian as the national language imposed a manufactured cultural homogeneity on Fijians and privileged the eastern chiefly elite. p. 63-68, Lawson, The Failure ofDemocratic Politics in FV/.

19 plantations.37 Essentially subverting the very Fijian interests he intended to protect by artificially creating a universal Fijian culture, Gordon's system of separate administration also served to solidify racial distinctions which became especially problematic when Indians were introduced as indentured labor in 1879.

Indians were shipped from India to Fiji to work on sugar cane plantations from 1879 until the abolition of the indenture system in 1916. Following the colonial strategy of divide and rule, the administratively and numerically small British colonial government minimized contact between Indo-Fijians and ethnic Fijians and did little to quell ethnic Fijian fears of being uprooted by a new ethnic minority.38 The colonial creation of a universal Fijian identity was further solidified by the introduction of ethnic Indians, presenting Fijians with an ethnic outgroup to define themselves against. 40,000 Indians chose to settle in Fiji after the completion of their indentured senrice, and increasing demands by Indo-Fijians for equal rights caused significant tension between the two groups.39 Fears of Indo-Fijian domination, a belief that a separate patriarchal Fijian Administration was in the best interests of all

Fijians, and Indo-Fijian agitation for equal representation via a common roll would set the stage for future political organization, debate, and disagreement.4o

Gordon's protective policies with regards to land have also had important repercussions for Fijian politics. Believing that the protection of native land was crucial to the survival of Fijian culture, Gordon moved to legally protect as much land as possible under traditional Fijian structures. Like the "traditional" Fijian socio-political structures codified under the Native Administration, the land policies that Gordon adopted had no root in a preexisting universally implemented system. As France notes, "it is clear from the

37 p. 2, Ali in Lal, Politics in Fiji. 38 p. 7-9, Ali in Lal, Politics in Fiji. 39 p. 79, Lawson, The Failure ofDemocratic Politics in Fiji. 40 p. 16,20,22 Ali in Lal, Politics in Fiji.

20 variety of subcultures in Fiji that no commonly understood and observed rules of land tenure can be confidently hypothesized as a pre-contact 'Fijian' system.,,41 The frequency of migration also precluded the creation of a constant, rigid set of rules. Gordon's interpretation ofArticle 4 of the Deed of Cession, which stated that

"the absolute proprietorship of all lands not shown to be now alienated so as to have become bona fide the property of Europeans or other foreigners or not now in the actual use or occupation of some Chief or tribe or not actually required for the probable future support and maintenance of some chief or tribe shall be and is hereby declared to be vested in Her said Majesty her heirs and successors"42 ensured that the vast majority of land in Fiji remained in native control under the ownership of mataqalis. From 1880 to 1940, mataqalis leased land directly to prospective tenants, but increasing demand for land leases by formerly indentured Indo-Fijians and administrative problems with leases prompted a revision of the land laws in 1940. The Native Land Trust

Act set aside reserve land specifically for the use and sustainment of ethnic Fijians and created a Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) with the exclusive right to manage the leasing of non-reserve natlve. 1an d "£or the benefiit 0 f F'"iJian owners.,,43

Today, 87% of Fijian land is native land, roughly 8% is freehold, and the remaining

5% is state land.44 There are concerns over the distribution of benefits from existing land policy; of rent from a parcel ofland, the NTLB claims up to 25% in administration fees,

22.5% is distributed among the three highest chiefs of the mataqali, and the remaining members split the last 52.5%.45 The economic benefits of the 1940 NLTA accrue mostly to

41 p. 14, France, The Chat1er ofthe Land. 42 Section 4, "The Deed of Cession of Fiji to Great Britain," October 10, 1874. http://'\vww.vanuatu.usp.ac.tJ llibrary/PaclawIFiji/DEED%200F%20CESSION%20°!t,20FIILhtm 43 p. 220, R. Gerard \V'ard "Land, Law and Custom: Diverging Realities in Fiji" in Land, CHStO'm and Practia in the South Paciftt, eds. R. Gerard \V'ard and Elizabeth Kingdon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 44 "Investing," Native Lands Trust Board. bttp:/ Iwww.nltb.com.fjlinvesting.html 45 p. 221, Ward.

21 high ranking chiefs, many ofwhom hold more than one position.46 In addition, market valuation ofland tends to be much higher than what the NTLB will charge for rent, and

Fijian calls for revision of the land laws frequently include demands for revaluation. 47 Most land is leased to individual Indo-Fijian cane farmers who were forced to lease land from the

NLTB after the demise of plantations in the early 20th century.48 Today, many Indo-Fijians work on leased land that they have lived on for generations. Unfortunately, ultimate ownership resides with ethnic Fijians. When land leases expire and Fijians refuse to renew them, as is increasingly the case, the economy suffers from inefficient land use and the number of transient Indo-Fijian poor sharply increases.49

Land has been the single most divisive and contentious issue in Fijian politics throughout the country's history. The indigenous Fijian spiritual connection with the na vantta conferred a sense of ownership that dovetailed with their legally recognized claim to the land.50 However, the process of living on and physically working the land endowed Indo-

Fijians with similar feelings of ownership. Fijians, secure in their doctrine of supremacy, have been loath to sell their land to perceived aliens who had dominated the Fijian economy during tl1e colonial period. The economic benefits that accrue to the Fijian chiefly elite from the continued existence of the NLTB and the chiefs' entrenched political power ensures that substantive change in land policy will not occur without a fight. However, the economic implications of a significant increase in under-utilized land and in Indo-Fijian poor are

46 Ibid. ·17 Ibid. -18 and Vijay Naidu, "Land tenure system in Fiji: the poverty implications of expiring leases," July 2001. http://devnet.anu.edu.au/online%20versions%?Opdfs/55/1OReddv55.pdf 49 Ibid. 50 VanNa is the Fijian word for land that also encompasses a feeling of ownership and connection to the land of one's birth and ancestors. It is an intensely spiritual term that describes the connection between Fiji's land and the Fijian people.

22 concerning for a country that is struggling to survive and modernize in a globalizing economy.

In the absence of a mutually agreeable solution, the ethnic nature of this division of land has meant that proposed solutions and disagreements have also mirrored this ethnic division. The debates over land use are essentially ethnic debates; they feature ethnic Fijians in control of land resources by virtue of Gordon's paternalism versus Indo-Fijians grounded in the back-breaking cane work of their indentured ancestors, still struggling to make a living. The racialization of politics and community by the colonial administration has had a tremendous effect on the form and substance of Fijian politics.

Ethnic Identity and Political Identity

The importance of ethnic identity in the formation of political identity and political parties in Fiji has its roots in the British colonial era. As discussed previously, colonial efforts to group all the indigenous peoples of Fiji together under a common political structure, language, and set of cultural practices took on a life ofits own when confronted with the massive influx of migrant Indians imported to work sugar cane. The introduction of a radically different set of peoples to Fiji caused the various groups of indigenous Fijians to focus more on the similarities among them, rather than the differences between them as they had previously done. When confronted with a new out-group, indigenous Fijians "simplified their identities" and created a new "Fijian" identity.51 In response, migrant Indians and their descendents similarly assimilated their diverse languages and cultures into an opposing

"Indo-Fijian" identity.52 As Horowitz puts it eloquently, "colonials sorted out the peoples

51 p. 68, Donald Horowitz. Ethnit' Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 52 This by and large holds true, with the exception ofIndo-Fijian Muslims. \Vhile their identity certainly fWlctions in opposition to indigenous Fijians, it stands apart somewhat from the rest of the Hindu Indo-Fijian population.

23 being ruled and centralized groups that had formerly been scattered, simultaneously clarifying and strengthening previously murky ethnic affiliations."s3

These opposing ethnic identities made their way into the political realm via power structures and the racialization of policy. Practicing their doctrine of divide and rule, the

British combined an alleged concern for the perpetuation of aboriginal culture with a division of the spoils, making indigenous Fijians sole owners of the land and endowing them with their own chiefly and provincial political structure while giving Indo-Fijians primary access to the accumulation of economic wealth. In effect, Fiji had a structure that gave

Fijians ownership of the land and acknowledged their supremacy as political actors, which derived in part from land ownership. By the time ofindependence in 1970, indigenous

Fijians had enjoyed political power disproportionate to their numbers for over 70 years and were not about to give surrender their political paramountcy to immigrants. Disenfranchised

Indo-Fijians were eager to share in the control of their country, and organized in opposition to the existing political structure.S4

As a result of the overarching separation of Indo-Fijians and Fijians, political parties in Fiji initially emerged along ethnic lines, with the supporting indigenous

Fijian concerns, and the National (NFP) standing for the interests of Indo-

Fijian cane growers.55 Political parties in Fiji today remain largely divided along ethnic lines.

53 p. 151, Horowitz. 54 Indo-Fijians received the right to vote in elections for the Legislative Council in 1929, with considerable property and income restrictions. Ethnic Fijians did not receive the right to vote until 1963. I support the view that Indo-Fijians were disenfranchised despite having the right to vote because they were consistently underrepresented and ignored in political dealings throughout the early to mid 20th century. Even though Fijians did not have the right to vote, their separate administration and benevolent colonizers gave ample room for the airing of grievances. Indo-Fijians were a serious minority and faced with the opposition of both Fijians and Europeans. 55 p. 191, Lawson, Tbe FailNre 0/Demotratit' Politics in Fiji. See Lawson for a more comprehensive discussion of the rise of political parties in Fiji until 1987.

24 The continued salience of ethnic identity in the political arena is supported heavily by the actions of political elites. Fijian political elites, particularly hereditary chiefs, are the most notorious promoters of Fijian ethnic identity in politics. The doctrine of the paramountcy of indigenous Fijian interests has been used by these elites to further both their place in the indigenous Fijian community as well as the interests of the Fijian community over those of the Indo-Fijian community.56 Fijian chiefs have played off an indigenous Fijian "fear of domination by ethnic strangers" in order to promote their own agenda in line with the concept of Fijian paramountcy.57 The casting of Indo-Fijians, who are in many cases third and fourth generation Fiji Islanders, as interlopers on indigenous soil has prevented a cross- cultural class-based political identification from arising.

Constitution and Electoral System

Fiji's government is a bicameral parliamentary democracy, a legacy ofBritish colonizers. Since independence Fiji has had three radically different constitutions, with the most current adopted in 1998. Voting schemes and the organization ofgovernment have changed with each successive constitution, but every constitution has based representation on communal constituencies delineated by race. Under this system, the Constitution allocates seats in Parliament to different racial groups. Voters choose among candidates within the seat in the House of Representatives that matches their ethnic identity and geographic location. For example, an Indo-Fijian living on the island of Kadavu would vote

56 The 1874 Deed of Cession itself makes no reference to the idea of Fijian paramountcy, but the concept allegedly arose from the interpretations of the document and verbal assurances by Sir Arthur Hamilton-Gordon and subsequent administrators. p. 56, Lawson, The Failure ofDemoiratii' Politics in Fiji. 57 p. 188, Horowitz.

25 in the Viti Levu South/Kadavu Indian Communal election while a Fijian in the same town would vote in the Kadavu Fijian Provincial election.58

Fiji's Head of State is the President. Largely based on the concept of a monarch, the majority of the President's actual power is in the appointing of the Prime Minister and

Leader of the Opposition, as well as certain reserve powers applicable during national crises.59 The president does not have veto power. Substantive executive power rests with the

Cabinet, under the authority of the Prime Minister. Of all the positions in the national government, voters are responsible only for electing the members of the House of

Representatives. The Senate, Cabinet, Prime Minister, and President are all political appointees, and the Great Council of Chiefs enjoys considerable power over the selection of various positions.

Fiji has had three major coups overthrow democratically-elected governments. Two were perpetrated by the military in 1987 and 2006, and the coup in 2001 was largely the product of civilians. The popularity of coups as a response to unfavorable electoral or policy decisions has considerably undermined the integrity of the Constitution, electoral process,

and democratic government.

Conclusion

Beginning with the colonial era, the promotion of indigenous Fijian primacy has

posed significant problems for Fijian democracy. Its emphasis on ethnic identity has

prevented the creation a national identity and turned policy disagreements into culture wars.

The principle of paramountcy has also led to destructive Fijian ethnonationalism. The

5H For a more in-depth discussion of the electoral system, see Chapter 3. 59 The extent of the President's reserve powers has been extremely contentious and particularly relevant with regards to the most recent coup-a November 2008 court ruling on the President's actions in December 2006 found in favor of a broad mandate, but a Court ofAppeals recently overturned tllis ruling in early April 2009, fmding that the President overreached.

26 salience of ethnic identity in Fijian politics and government organization is important to understanding Fiji's continuing coup culture, military involvement in politics, and economic decline. The coups of 2000 and 2006 are prima facie evidence that Fiji's existing democratic institutions are unable to handle the country's racial tensions and their manifestations in political identifications. Despite the reduced threat that Indo-Fijians pose as their share of the economy and population decreases, the role that fear mongering and elite manipulation plays in perpetuating the ethnic divide is important.

As this chapter has discussed, many crucial issues are defined along the ethnic divide, so the election of ethnically Fijian governments tends to advance policies that benefit indigenous Fijians and negatively impact the Indo-Fijian population, exacerbating already poor relations. Inter-ethnic compromise and negotiation is necessary to provide solutions to intractable policy problems in order to rehabilitate the country's economy, particularly with regards to the land issue. However, the tendency of Fijians to act in their own interests while in power tends to provoke coups by leading them to expect that Indo-Fijian governments will act in on their respective anti-Fijian interests. This tendency to propose and enact ethnically biased legislation was cited as a cause of the December 2006 COUp.6U

60 Voreqe Bainimarama. "Public Declaration of NIilitaty Takeover," December 5, 2006. Fiji Government Website. http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page 8092.shtml

27 Chapter 2: Coup d't.~tats

The three Fijian coups of 1987, 2000, and 2006 have had a profound impact on the functioning of Fijian democracy.6l At fIrst glance, the involvement of the Taukei

Movement62 and indigenous Fijian nationalists in tile coups of 1987 and 2000 suggest that racial antagonism is the root cause of the continued failure of Fijian democracy. This

explanation, however, relies on a series of misleading assumptions about the homogeneity of

ethnic groups in Fiji and discounts the importance of other contributing factors such as class

or tradition. By organizing explanations for the 1987 coup using the categories of race, class,

custom, and specific interests, Ewins' smvey of literature on the 1987 coup helps draw out a

range of issues important to assessing the origins of subsequent coups and highlighting the

differences and sin1ilarities among them.63

In examining the coups, it is important to keep in mind the specifIc conditions that

have allowed them to occm as well as the changing roles of particular individuals over time.

Due to Fiji's small size, the leadership and actions of a few individuals such as Sitiveni

Rabuka, Ratu , and Commodore Bainimarama take on monumental

signifIcance for both supporters and opponents of coups. Tinling, actors, reactions, and

61 Some argue that there were two coups in 1987, one in May and one in September. However, like \Villiam Tagupa and Sandra Tarte, I ascribe to the deflnition of a coup d'etat as an overthrow of a legal government by force or violence. (Tagupa and Tarte in p. 2, Roy Ewins. "Colour, Class, and Custom: The Literature of the 1987 Coup," 2nd ed, 1998. http://speedysnail.com/paciflc/flji coup!) Rabuka's actions in September 1987 served to reassert his power and goals over an interim government that could hardly be considered legal or legitimate. As such, I prefer to classify the September 1987 incident as a military intervention. For simplicity's sake, I have opted to omit discussions of the September intervention as it functions largely as a continuation of the May coup. 62 The Taukei Movement, driven primarily by poor male Fijian commoners, flrst appeared in 1987 as a group of indigenous Fijian nationalists agitating for Fijian supremacy in response to the election ofBavadra's Coalition government. The Movement has been the main source of civilian support for the 1987 and 2000 coups. Originally staunchly pro-chiefin 1987, perceptions that the chiefs were failing to perform their duties to protect their villagers led the Taukei Movement to take on an anti-establishment bent by the 2000 coup. (Ewins, Appendix 8 "Memorandwn submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Off1ce on the attempted coup in Fiji, 28 June 2000," Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, British House of Commons. http://w\vw.parliament.the-stationery-offlce.com/pa/cm200001/cmselect!cmfaff/7817824.htm. and Michael R. Ogden, "Republic of Fiji forthcoming in the World Encyclopedia ifPolitical Systems, 3rd Edition. New York: Facts on File," University of Hawaii, http://www2.hawaii.edu/ ~ogdell/piir/paciflc/flii.html) 63 Ewins.

28 stated motivations are all crucial to understanding the coups, and by extension, the reasons for undermining democracy.

This chapter walks through the actors, causes, and outcomes of Fiji's three major coups since independence. While the impetus for each coup is different, all of the coups share the same disregard for the law, election results, and lack of prosecution for coup- makers. Fiji's coups are the most obvious demonstration of the weakness ofits political institutions and of the tensions between democracy and the doctrine of Fijian paramountcy.

1987: Military Coup

In April 1987, a coalition of the predominately Indo-Fijian National Federation Party

(NFP) and the newly-formed Fiji Labor Party (FLP) brought about the fIrst change of government since independence by beating Ratu Mara's Alliance Party.64 The Coalition government, led by ethnic Fijian Dr. Timoci Bavadra, was in power for little more than a month before being ousted by a military coup under the direction of Lieutenant General

Sitiveni Rabuka, third in command of the Royal Fiji Military Forces. On the morning of May

14, 1987 as Rabuka looked on from the gallery, 10 masked soldiers walked into Parliament

House and forcibly took control of the government with the support of the military, the

Taukei Movement, and the chiefs. Rabuka originally claimed public safety as his motivation

for staging the coup, citing agitation and demonstrations by the Taukei Movement following

the elections. However, the claim that he only wanted to prevent further violence is hollow

given the fact that unrest had begun to fade in the week immediately preceding the 14th of

May.65 The rhetoric that emerged after the coup described the "domination" of the

64 The NFP initially won the 1977 election, but was unable to overcome internal squabbles over leadership and appoint a Prime J'vIinister. The Governor-General and Ratu Mara took advantage of the NFP's weakness and formed their own government, which was quickly defeated with a vote ofno confidence. Rescheduled elections in September 1977 returned the A.lliance to power. (p. 208-218, Lawson, The Failure ofDemocratic PoliticJ in FijI) The rise of the FLP and the electoral success ofBavadra's coalition will be discussed in the next chapter. 65 p. 257-259, Lawson, The Failure ofDemocratic Politii"J in Fiji, and p. 12, Ewins.

29 government by Indians under the Coalition government, in effect playing off racial concerns and the concept of Fijian supremacy to arouse Fijian fears. 66

There is adequate evidence to support the claim that Fijian interests, particularly with regards to land, were not likely to be assaulted by the Bavadra government.67 Regardless of the unsubstantiated nature of Fijian claims to potential persecution at the hands of an Indian government, those fears still existed and were exploited by those who stood to lose from a loss of power-namely, the chiefly establishment.68 A discussion of the 1987 coup that centers solely on race is, as Robertson and Tamarusau say, "the most comfortable explanation for the coup. It neither challenges the intellect nor poses disturbing questions."69

The challenge posed to the chiefly establishment by the election of a prominently

Indo-Fijian government was substantial because it had attracted Fijian voters by attempting to transcend racial lines. The creation of a new class-based identity in addition to existing racial identities would have splintered the chiefs' control over their Fijian constituency and undermined the force of fear-based racist rhetoric. Given the faltering economy, the arrival of class-based politics as an option made it more likely that poor and middle-class Fijians would begin to vote against their richer brethren in tandem with Indo-Fijians that shared their economic concerns. As guardians of Fijian values, the Alliance Party's failure at the

66 p. 260-261, Lawson, The Failure ojDemocratic Politics in Fiji, p. 16, EwillS, and p. 14, Robertson and Tamanisau in Ewins. 67 \\1hile numerically Bavadra's Parliament included more Indians than Fijians, his Cabinet was divided fairly between the two races, with Fijians controlling their most important IVlinistries-Fijian Affairs and I-lome Affairs. (p. 253, Lawson, The Failure ojDemotratic Politics in Fiji) Indians could not come close to the three­ quarters majority in both houses necessary under the 1970 Constitution to amend Fiji's land use policies, and any adjustment that Labour even proposed making would have affected the chiefly class more than the commoners. (p. 14,22-23, Ewins) 68 p. 260, Lawson, The Failure ojDemoimtic Politics in Fiji and p. 15, Ewins. 69 p. 13, Robertson and Tamanisau in Ewins.

30 polls resonated deeply with chiefs concerned about the loss of their own status and pnv. ilege. 70

Many prominent academics, including Lawson, Norton, Robertson and Tamanisau,

Lal, Bain, von Fossen, Ewins, and Robie, ascribe to the view that the threat by the Coalition to the chiefly establishment and its customary political and economic role in the Fijian community was a, if not the, main driving force behind the COUp.71 The chiefs had the most to lose by the election of a Coalition government and the most to gain by its demise. The

Great Council of Chiefs' endorsement of the coup on May 20th effectively guaranteed the coup's success.72 Rhetoric of race and tradition provided the chiefs with a way to energize popular support behind their self-interested aims of preserving the political status quo.

The actions of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, the head of the Alliance Party and Fiji's version of George Washington, were incredibly important to the success of the coup. Not only had Ratu Mara been a prominent political actor since 1953, but he was a paramount chief from the eastern province of Lau. This combination of chiefly entitlement and political involvement arguably made him the most influential chief and politician in all of Fiji.73 By refusing to condemn the coup and joining Rabuka's Council of Ministers the day after the coup, Mara lent the coup and its interim administration much-needed legitimacy.74 As the head of the Alliance, Mara's political reputation had taken a hit with the electoral loss and he had immense personal interest in the overthrow of the Coalition government. Mara came out from "retirement" after losing the election to serve as Prime Minister in the interim

70 p. 280, Lawson, The Failure ofDemo,ratir Politirs in Fiji. 71 Lawson, The Failure ofDemorratir Politirs in Fiji. Norton, Rare and Politirs in Fiji. Robertson, Robert T. and Akosita Tamanisau, Fiji: Shattered Coups. Lal, Brij, Power and Prec!Judire: The Making ofthe Fiji Crisis. Bain, Kenneth, Treason at Ten: Fiji' at the Crossroads. von Fossen, Anthony B., "Two Military Coups in Fiji." Robie, David, Blood on Their Banner: Nationalist Struggles in the South Pacific. 72 p. 26, Scan in Ewi1lS. 73 p. 177-178, Lawson, The Failure ofDemocrati,' Politirs in Fiji, and p. 35, Ewins. 74 p. 38, Ewins.

31 government before spending the 1990s as Vice-President and President of the Republic.75

Mara's implicit acceptance of the coup was crucial in its success; in turn, the coup was central to rehabilitating his political career.

Rabuka's specific motivations for perpetrating the coup centered on his personal prejudices against Indo-Fijians as well as his deep connection to the military.76 He believed, as detailed in the book Rabuka: No Other W cry, that the Bavadra government was a threat to the Fijian way of life as well as to the RFMF's existing structure and role.77 Rabuka's position as third-in-command in the military-which was ovelwhelmingly Fijian and pro-Alliance- and his commitment to ousting the Bavadra government for personal and customary reasons made him the perfect front-man for the coup.n While Rabuka was the catalyst, the coup's success was driven from behind the scenes by the support and patronage of Fiji's chiefs and conservative political establishment.

2000: Civilian Coup

On May 19, 2000, little more than 13 years after the 1987 coup, a group of armed

civilians and soldiers led by Fijian businessman George Speight stormed Parliament House in the name of indigenous Fijian nationalism. The Indo-Fijian-Ied People's Coalition government toppled by the coup had been elected in democratic elections under the new

1997 Constitution in May 1999. The similarities between the coups prompted descriptions of

75 p. 263, Lawson, The Failure ofDemo?ratic Politics in Fiji, and p. 24-28, Ewins. Rabuka has alleged that Mara also knew about the coup prior to May 14th, which lends credence to the view that Mara was acting with self and/or chiefly interests in mind by refusing to prevent or stop the coup. Craig DeSilva and Al Hulsen, "Fiji's Ratu Mara, ChaudlllY bodl deny coup claims", Asia Times Online, March 22, 2000. http://www.atimes.com/oceania/13C?2A.h03.html 76 p. 8, Lawson, The Failure ofDemocrati?' Politics in Fiji. n p. 7-10, Eddie Dean and Stan Ritova in Lawson, The Failure ofDemocrati?' Politics in Fiji and p. 31-33, Ewins. 78 p. 33, Ewins.

32 the 2000 coup as merely a "copy-cat" of Rabuka's in 1987.79 The timing, the storming of

Parliament, the involvement of ethnic Fijian nationalists, the use of soldiers, the racialized rhetoric employed by frontman George Speight, land reform discussions by the ousted government, and the overthrowing of an Indo-Fijian government all appear to suggest that the 1987 explanations and motivations would fit 2000. However, the number ofvery distinct differences between the two suggests the need for a different set of explanations.

Like the 1987 Coalition government, the 1999 People's Coalition was headed by a predominantly Indo-Fijian party, the FLP.80 Mahendra Chaudhry had been selected the country's fIrst Indo-Fijian Prime Minister. Unlike the 1987 Coalition however, Chaudhry's government was in offlce for nearly a year before being ousted. In the beginning, he enjoyed a relatively high level of confidence in his government, pulling in a 62% approval rating at the end of 1999.81 As time went on, however, continuous mishaps with the press, political inexperience, and questionable staff appointments combined with overly ambitious reformist policy decisions to wear down the goodwill of the heretofore quiet Fijian nationalists.82 What fInally did Chaudhry's government in, however, was land. With one-third of tenant leases expiring before 2005 and Fijian landowners agitating to either to repossess or revalue their

79 p. 3, Robbie Robertson and William Sutherland. Government By the Gun. Annandale: Pluto Press Australia, 2001. "Attempted Coup in Fiji," BBC News, May 19, 2000. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia­ pacificl754653.stm 80 A pre-election agreement with the western Party ofNational Unity (rANU) dnt attracted some indigenous Fijian votes propelled the FLP to victory over the indigenous Fijian Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), the 2000 version of dle Alliance Party. The NFP's pre-election alliance with the SVT caused Indo-Fijians to desert the party for the FLP, leaving the NFP with no seats in Parliament. The rise of the Christian (Methodist) Veitokani ni Leweni Vanua Vakaristo Party (VLV) splintered dle Fijian vote even further. (p. 5-6, Robertson and Sutherland) A more in depdl analysis of the 2000 election and the 1997 Constitution's alternative vote (A"V) system can be found in dle next chapter. 81 Sandra Tarte. "Fiji: Political Review," TlJe Contemporary Pacifii; Vol. 12.2,2000. Pages 507-515. http:! bnuse.jhu.edu/journals!contemporarv pacificI v012/12.2tarte.html 82 p. 7-9, Robertson and Sutherland. Some of these politically controversial decisions included eliminating the Intelligence Selv1ce, refusing to renew the Police Commissioner's contract, neglecting to consult the appropriate chiefs on preferred processing companies for dle ripe mahogany plantations wordl hundreds of millions of dollars, and "allegations about the misuse of ministerial entitlements and the treatment of some Fijians in the public selv1ce." (p. 8-9, Robertson and Sudlerland)

33 land in advance of the next round ofleases, the Chaudhry government was forced to come up with a solution to a politically untouchable issue. Chaudhry's solution, to extend the expiring leases and create a Land Use Commission to "broadly address" land issues, met with considerable backlash from the Native Land Trust Board and Fijian landowners.83

By April of 2000 the Coalition government's faux pas and policy stances had spurred the resurrection of the Taukei Movement under Apisai Tora and prompted rallies in protesting Coalition policies.84 On May 19 th at lOam, five thousand people gathered to deliver a petition to President Mara calling for Chaudhry's resignation. While the Nationalist

Vanua Tako Lavo Party (NVTLP) under Iliesa Duvuloco had organized the event and supported the removal of Chaudhry's government, those who stormed Parliament House were members of an elite military squadron called the Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit

(CRWU).85 The CRWU, largely composed of Fijian nationalists dissatisfied with Indo-Fijian rule and disappointed in Rabuka's withdrawal from Fijian politics, planned to use police distraction during the NVTLP march and replicate Rabuka's 1987 coup by storming

Parliament.86 The theory was that the CRWU would act as a catalyst, as in 1987, and the

83 p. 9-10, Ibid. 84 p. 10, Ibid. 85 p. 12-14, Ibid. The CRWU was fOlmed as an elite special forces unit within the RFMF by Rabuka in 1987 and trained by Major Ilisoni Ligairi, a former British SAS officer. The Unit, composed of only 60 men, was nominally focused on counter-terrorism efforts. Extremely loyal to both their founder and commander, the CRWU was somewhat of a "Praetorian Guard" and recommended for disbandment after a review in 1995 due to ofits potential to be used as a mercenary force within the country. It was disbanded by Bainimarama after the May 2000 coup. (Sanjay Ramesh, "Destruction of Democracy in Fiji", September 2002. http://w\vw.worldpress.org/images/freelancersPDF158 l.pdf, Leigh Ingram-Seal, "Fiji Army", Orders ofBattle. http:/hrww.geocities.com/pacific oob/FijiA.rmy.htm, Mark Hayes, "Whats Really Going on in Fiji", Webdiary, http://webdiarv.com.au/cms!?q=node/1150.p.11-12. Robertson and Sutherland). 86 p. 12, Robertson and Sutherland. The involvement of the NVTLP and Duvuloco is disputed. Robertson and Sutherland cite a phone call from CRWU Sergeant Vi!imoni Tikotani to a spokesman for the NVTLP on May 16th where the Sergeant allegedly offered a repeat of 1987. It is implied that the NVTLP's reaction was favorable. (p. 12, Robertson and Sutherland) However, Bainimarama and "other writers" have disputed tllls claim, stating dlat the NVTLP had no idea that a coup was imminent and that Speight and dle CRWU merely took advantage of the day's events. (p. 145, Robertson and Sutherland) Maciu Navakasuasua, a NVTLP organizer convicted of coup-related offenses, gave an interview on September 21, 2005 to tlte Fiji Sun alleging that the NVTLP had organized tlte coup on May 18th and used Speight as a frontman. A number of selllor NVTLP officials have been convicted and jailed for coup-related offenses.

34 chiefs, ethnic Fijian nationalists, and militaq would quickly rally behind their cause. 87 That assumption would later prove to be false.

The coup very nearly failed due to a lack of high-level support. Even in the absence of RFMF senior commander Commodore Bainimarama senior militaq officers refused to support the coup and ordered their soldiers not to participate.88 Rabuka himself even refused to join the conspirators saying "I sympathise with your cause but I don't agree with your methods," offering instead to be a mediator.89 As Chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs,

Rabuka's reaction also carried weight with that body, which did not come out in support of

rd the coup until May 23 . President Mara was @\:ewise unsupportive, dismayed at the rioting and mass violence provoked by the COUp.90 The coup's greatest supporters were the common Fijians who showed up by the hundreds and thousands at the parliamentary complex every day and caused millions of dollars in damages throughout the countq. Unlike the legitimacy bestowed on Rabuka's coup by the chiefly establishment, Speight's coup was lent credence by rioting, violence, and support from non-chiefly Fijians.

In contrast to the 1987 coup, Speight and the CRWU took hostages, holding members of the People's Coalition government from May 19 th to July 14th as leverage for political gains. The hostage situation, together with Speight's refusal to compromise and the establishment's inability to end the crisis led to President Mara's resignation and a serious of

87 p. 12, Robertson and Sutherland. 88 p. 15, Robertson and Sutherland. 89 p. 16, Robertson and Sutherland. j\fter the international relations disaster caused by the 1987 coup and 1990 Constitution, Rabuka appeared committed to reform, calling for what ultimately became the Constitutional Review Commission, which created the more equitable 1997 Constitution. After losing the 1999 elections, Rabuka took on the role (somewhat ironically) as the Commonwealth's special mediator to the Solomon Islands crisis. His concern with rehabilitating his image and career is often cited as the main reason for his lack of support for the 2000 coup. (p. 17, Robertson and Sutherland) 90 p. 18, Robertson and Sutherland.

35 constitutionally questionable actions by the military in order to restore order.91 Ultimately, an interim administration led by ethnic Fijian businessman and former Fiji Development Bank

CEO was appointed and the rebels left the parliamentary complex, letting the hostages go. Political uncertainty and turmoil continued as the courts and political players sorted through legal and illegal actions and administrations until democratic elections were again held in late August 2001. 92

The 2000 coup was decidedly messier than its predecessor. The political fallout from the closure ofParliament and military takeover lasted for over a year. Despite the involvement of a military squadron in perpetrating the coup, the refusal of the military to participate was a marked departure from 1987. After a decade of economic stagnation and elite Fijian rule under the 1990 Constitution, Fijian commoners were upset with the performance of their supposed protectors. Even though the CWRU provided armed force,

2000 was primarily a civilian coup. During the crisis, the chair of Ra's Provincial Council mourned that citizens "have stopped listening to their chiefs.,,93 Robertson and Sutherland mention this sentiment as well, stating "as never before, Fijian commoners now felt emboldened to take on the authority of the state and the chiefs.,,94 The People's Coalition's mishandling of the land leases as well as the resurgence of the Taukei Movement gave Fijians an outlet for their frustration.

91 For a more in-depth discussion of the legal debates over the military's actions SurroWldi:ng Mara's resignation and alleged constitutional abrogation, see Tmkling the Unconstitutional OverthrOJv ofDemotracies: Emerging Trends in the Commol1Jvealth by John Hatchard and Tunde 1. Ogowewo. 92 Qarase's administration was appointed in early July 2000, reappointed in late July 2000, and declared illegal by the High Court in November. The Court ofAppeals upheld the High Court's decision in March 2001, causing the appointment of a new interim Prime l'vIinister, Momoedonu. A day after Momoedonu's appointment, he resigned and Qarase was re-appointed caretaker Prime Minister until general elections were held in August. Qarase's SDL party won the election. 93 p. 35, Robertson and Sutherland. 94 p. 18, Robertson and Sutherland.

36 Mara and Rabuka both denounced the coup. The military, in an abrupt reversal from its 1987 role, was the force that quelled the violence and arrested the coupmakers. Instead of chiefs using the rhetoric of race and supremacy to regain their political prominence, the events of 2000 featured citizens supporting the colonial rhetoric of Fijian supremacy, spurning their chiefs, and staging a violent uprising. Fiji Times reporter Matelita Ragogo noted that "the 'Fijian people' were being used again like the fIrst coup [by] the few who needed status quo to return.,,95 Frontman Speight, a failed businessman who lost millions as a result of Chaudhry's mahogany plantation decisions, used the rhetoric of indigenous supremacy to incite Fijians to action. Unlike the 1987 coup 2000 was not a political squabble among elites-it was a full-fledged riot.

Robertson and Sutherland highlight the divisions among Fijians demonstrated by the

2000 coup, stating that the coup shattered the image of Fijians as a homogenous group.96

While the coup certainly had a more pronounced class aspect to it than the 1987 coup, the use of Fijian supremacy took on a universal tone as it became more than just a tool of the chiefly elite. The chiefly establishment's delayed endorsement and Rabuka and Mara's explicit refusal to support the coup demonstrates that their loss of privilege and power via the 1999 elections was not the primary factor in staging the coup, as in 1987. To be sure, the drive behind the 2000 coup was an outgrowth of a loss of privilege and power for a select group, but that group was not uniformly the chiefly establishment.

In Speight ojVio!em'e, Chaudhry's Deputy Prime Minister writes that "the

2000 coup has also shown that beneath the guise of pushing for Fijian interest is the real interest of those who stand to lose thousands of dollars, and in some cases millions, in

95 p. 83, Tupeni Baba, Michael Field, and Unaisi Nabobo-Baba. Speigbt ofVioleni'e. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005. 96 p. 48, Robertson and Sutherland.

37 unpaid tax and bad debts owed to the former National Bank of Fiji and the Fiji

Development Bank.,,97 In addition to those ousted by the People's Coalition government,

Baba argues that there was a significant minority ofindividuals who were interested in a coup for selfish, monetaq reasons. Journalist Robert Keith-Reid echoed that sentiment saying "it's clearer and clearer that the business at Veiuto [parliament] is being disguised by a veneer of nationalism. What it's all about is money wanted by people who had it but couldn't keep it, who have debts they don't want to repay, who have money deals they don't want found out, and, above all, who want back positions in which they can make LOTS more money laced with the thrill of power.,,98 Lieutenant Colonel Viliame Seruvakula and VLV politician likewise claim that the main plotters were failed politicians and businessmen.99 The "real plotters" of the coup, based on the conjecture that Speight could not have masterminded the whole plot, have remained unknown due to incomplete police investigations and the Qarase government's choice to begin a reconciliation campaign in

2004 before the events of 2000 had been completely illuminated. 100

Unlike 1987, the presence of an Indo-Fijian government was not immediately an issue in 2000; it took a series of policy missteps and political miscalculations over almost a year to spur a backlash. Lawson's argument about the illegitimacy of political opposition begins to fall apart in 2000, as Chaudhq was in office for nearly a year and the perpetrators were not focused on upholding the chiefly system. The Fijian populace was in large part induced to riot because of the poor job the indigenous leadership itself had been doing

1 1 throughout the 1990s. 0 This coup, while different in many important ways, is similar to the

97 p. 14, Baba, Field, and Nabobo-Baba. 98 p. 179, Ibid. 99 p. 264-266, Ibid. 100 p. 263, Baba, Field, and Nabobo-Baba and p. 44, Robertson and Sutherland. 101 p. 267, Baba, Field, and Nabobo-Baba and p. 18, Robertson and Sutherland.

38 1987 coup in that a small core of Fijian leaders actively chose to act illegally to overthrow a

democratically elected government instead of waiting for the next round of elections. The willingness of self-interested elites to manipulate the Fijian people for their own interests and

the failure of subsequent governments, individuals, and the justice system to hold those

responsible criminally accountable undermines the spirit of democracy and encourages the

creation of a "coup culture." Effectively, coups in Fiji are acceptable responses to

unfavorable election results or policy disagreements.

2006: Military Coup

In the aftermath of the 2000 coup and 2001 elections, relations between Prime

Minister Qarase and Commodore Bainimarama became increasingly acrimonious. Having

played a major part in Qarase's appointment as interim Prime Minister after the 2000 coup,

Bainimarama became increasingly concerned with the pro-ethnic Fijian bent of many of the

administration's policies as Qarase's Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) Party won

fIrst the 2001 and then the 2006 elections. Bainimarama's "deep suspicion" and distrust of

ethnic Fijian nationalists, whom Qarase appeared to be courting to win elections, arose

primarily from an incident in November 2000 when CRWU soldiers mutinied at Suva

barracks and the Commodore was almost murdered.102 Qarase's move to pardon some coup

plotters and mutineers, even going so far as to appoint two individuals convicted of coup-

related offenses Cabinet ministers, was a central factor in the deterioration of Qarase and

Ba1111tnarama.. 'I's re atlonship. 103

Qarase's administration proposed three bills in 2005 and 2006 that Bainimarama and

the military were adamantly opposed to, claiming that they were "unconstitutional,

1112 Roger Maynard. "Fiji military seizes power in bloodless coup," Tbe Guardian, December 5, 2006. http://W\vw.guardian.co.uk/world/20061decl05/fiji.travel2 !03 Nick Squires. "Personal feuds and edlnic tensions Tuesday sparked Fiji's fourth coup d'etat in two decades," Cbristian Sdem'e Monitor, December 6, 2006. http://www.csmonitor.co1l1/2006/1206/p07s02-woap.html

39 controversial, and extremist in nature.,,104 The Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill, introduced in

August 2006, was modeled after New Zealand's Waitangi Tribunal and was intended to create "a legislative framework to deal with the claims of native landowners whose land had been acquired in fee simple or as freehold by early settlers or Government through means that were 'fraudulent, dubious, or unjust."'lOS The likewise dealt with land appropriated by the state, proposing to "transfer proprietary ownership of qoliqolilO6 areas from the state to traditional owners." Bainitnarama considered both of these bills prejudicial and potentially harmful to the Indo-Fijian community.l07

The fmal piece of proposed legislation, the Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance, and Unity Bill (RTU), was the most controversial. Modeled on South Africa's Truth and

Reconciliation Commission, the RTU would have created a Reconciliation and Unity

Commission to "grant or recommend relief aimed at promoting unity and lasting peace and stability in Fiji" in the aftermath of the 2000 COUp.lOS Subject to presidential approval, the

Commission would have the power to grant amnesty to those convicted of coup-related offenses and compensate victims with government money. 109 Opponents of the bill, including the Fiji Law Society, Citizen's Constitutional Forum, U.S. Ambassador David

Lyon, the Mara family, the United People's Party, the Fiji Labor Party, and the Roman

Catholic Church among many others claimed that the RTU would not deter future coups

104 p. 9. "Qarase and Others v. Bainimarama and Others." Fiji High Cot/rt, Suva. http://fijitimes.com/extras/qarase-vs-bainimarama-coup-case-judgement.pdf 105 "Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill 2006" Parliament ofFiji Islands. http://www.parJiamcnt.gov.fj/parJiamcnt/lcgislativcIbills.aspx?billID= 31S&vicwtypc=summary&billnav-bill 106 Any area of seabed or soil under the waters, sand, reef, mangrovc swamp, river, stream, or wetland or any other area, recognized and determined within customary fishing grounds. 107 p. 9, "Qarase and Others v. Bainimarama and Others." 108 "Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance, and Unity Bill200S" Parliament ofF!ji Islands. http://\vww.beta.fiji.gov.tJ/uploads/RTU BIlL 200S.pdf 109 Ibid.

40 and would "act as a catalyst for further political instability."IIO The RFMF, the most vocal

opponents of the bill, believed that it would stymie their efforts to bring those responsible to

justice via court martials and would "create a generation of criminals with no respect for the

1aw. ,,111

Having personally experienced a threat on his life in 2000 by coup perpetrators, it is

not surprising that Bainimarama was adamantly opposed to the bill. In October 2006, the

RFMF submitted a list of demands to Qarase's administration asking, among other things, to

have the 2000 coup declared illegal and all involved removed from public office, to withdraw

the three previously mentioned bills, and to drop the Police's investigation of

Bainimarama.1l2 Qarase refused to acquiesce to Bainimarama's demands, and a series of

meetings were held between the two throughout November and early December in an

attempt to reconcile the dispute. The disagreement reached its peak with a military takeover

on December 5, 2006 when RFMF troops took over the streets of Suva and placed the

Prime Minister under house arrest, taking away his car keys.113 Assuming executive authority,

Bainimarama stated that the coup was staged to "take the country towards good governance,

rid us of corruption and bad practices and at the same time provide [for] the well being of

Fiji and its people."114

th In an address to the nation the night of December 5 , Bainimarama justified military

interference by "referring to the deteriorating state of Fiji" and the administration's inability

110 p. 254. Brij V. Lal, Islands ofTurmoil. Asia Pacific Press: 2006. "US envoy criticizes Fiji unity bill." BBC Monitoring Asia Pacifii·. London: May 30,2005. p. 124, Mosrni Bhim, "The Impact of the Reconciliation, Tolerance, and Unity Bill on the 2006 Election" in Jon Fraenkel and Stewart Firth eds. From Election to Coup in Fiji. Canberra: i\ustralia National University Press, 2007. 111 p. 127. BlUm in Fraenkel and Firth eds. 112 p. 9-10, "Qarase and Others v. Bainimarama and Others." 113 Maynard. 114 p. 11, "Qarase and Others v. Bainimarama and Others."

41 to "make decisions to (save) our people from destruction.. ,,115 B..a111llllarama expounde d upon his reasoning in another address handing back executive power to the President on January

4, 2007 claiming the coup was "undertaken with great reluctance, but it was necessary to steer our beloved nation into peace, stability, a just solution and above all to preserve our

Constitution."116 This particular address laid out twenty-five reasons and issues underlying the RFMF's disagreement with Qarase, including coup-related concerns, corruption, a lack of good governance, exclusion of the RFMF from the National Security Council and attempts to "change the command structure," failure to address the economic crisis, and

"the manner in which the 2006 elections were conducted."I17

Bainimarama's understanding of the military's mission as including a broad mandate to protect the Fijian nation stems from its actions in dispelling the 2000 coup as well as its

Constitutionally-defined role. Section 94.3 of the Constitution establishes that "it shall be the overall responsibility of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces to ensure at all times the security, defence and well being of Fiji and its peoples."lls Bainimarama saw the Qarase government as a threat to Indo-Fijians and the nation's peace and prosperity, and stated that "the military, under my stewardship, could not possibly see such an unacceptable situation unfold without seeking to address it.,,119 Armed with a loose interpretation of the RFMF's constitutional mandate and a High Court ruling in 2001 allowing for extra-constitutional actions in "some unusual or extreme situations," Bainimarama stepped into the President's shoes, dismissed Qarase, and appointed a Caretaker Prime Minister-Dr. J one

115 p. 12, Ibid. 116 p. 15. Ibid. 117 p. 16-18, ibid. 118 Section 112 of the 1997 Constihltion (replacing the 1990 Constitution) upholds the RFrvIF as established in 1990. "Constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic ofFiji." July 25, 1990. hup: //www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid /3ae6b57d8.html 119 p. 13. "Qarase and Others v. Bainimarama and Others"; Voreqe Bainimarama, "Statement by H.E. Commodore Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama, Prime IvIinister of dle Republic of Fiji Islands," 61"" Session of the UN GeneraIAJSemb(y, New York. September 28,2007. http://www.fiji.gov.t)/publish/page 10194.shtml

42 Senilagakali.120 Senilagakali dismissed Parliament in December before resigning on January 4,

2007, at which point Bainimarama gave back executive power to President Iloilo and was in turn appointed Interim Prime Minister, a position he continues to hold.

Justified by racism, corruption, and poor governance under Qarase and continuing economic decline that "threatened social catastrophe," Bainimarama classified his coup as "a coup to end all cOUpS.,,121 Fraenkel acknowledges the truth in these statements, but claims they "grossly exaggerated" existing problems.122 The bedrock ofBainimarama's plan to right decades of racialized politics and economic decline is the creation of a National Council for

Building a Better Fiji (NCBBF) which has drafted a People's Charter designed to "provide the political and governance framework, with effective supporting and functioning institutions, to make Fiji a truly democratic and progressive nation.,,123 The charter includes a

number of prescriptions for unifying the country under a national identity and moving the

120 Yabaki v. President of the Republic of the Fiji Islands was a case challenging the constitutionality of dismissing Chaudluy's administration and appointing Qarase caretaker after the Speight coup. The court found that the majority of the President's actions were justified by the doctrine of necessity. For more, see the full text of the decision at http://www.law.1Tlq.edu.au/Units/law314/Fiji Prasad/Yabaki v President.htmL Bainimarama assumed the role ofPresident in December because he claimed that "His Excellency appeared to have been blocked from exercising his constitutional powers by those surrounding him or who were putting undue pressure on him." (13, "Qarase and Others v. Bainimarama and Others") Parliament is still non­ functioning. An extremely controversial court case ("Qarase and Others v. Bainimarama and Others") decided in October 2008 found that cile President's actions in aiding the military coup by ratifying the dismissal of cile PM, appointing a Caretaker PM, and dissolving Parliament in December and January were valid and lawful, essentially ruling the interim administration legaL The impartiality of the judiciary has come into question, given the appointment to ChiefJustice of one of the three presiding judges by Bainimarama following the coup. Xavier La Canna. "Fiji High Court upholds 2006 coup." The Age, October 9, 2008. http://news.thcage.com.au/world/fiji-high court upholds-)006 coup 20081009 4wx7.html; Jon FraenkeL "Flawed Judgmcnt." Fiji DailY Post, October 23, 2008. http://tiiidailypost.com/opinion.php?date=20081023 This judgment has since been overcilrown. See Addendum. 121 "Statement by H.E. Commodore J osaia Voreqe Bainimarama, Prinle Minister of the Republic of Fiji Islands," 62"" Session ofthe UN Genera/AssemblY, New York. 28 September, 2007. 122 Fraenkel, Jon. "Fiji. (NIelanasia in Reviews: Issues and Events, 2007)." The Contemporary Pmijil~ VoL 20.2 (Fall 2008): 450 (11). 123 "Statement by H.E. Commodore Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama, Prime Minister of cile Republic of Fiji Islands," 62"" Session of the UN Genera/AssemblY, New York. 28 September, 2007. The People's Charter was released to the public on August 6, 2008 and has met with mixed reactions. BaininTarama has said the Charter must be accepted by cile people and cilat the electoral reforms in the document be put in place before elections are held again. Philippa Fogarty. "Deep Divisions in Post-Coup Fiji." BBC News, December 4, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/)/hi/asia-pacitic/7746519.stm. For the full text of the document and more on the NCBBF, go to http://www.fijipeopleschartcr.co111.fj/

43 nation toward stability.124 Bainimarama's coup and military rule in the name of national unity and multiculturalism seems to be motivated by a genuine interest in helping move Fiji toward a more stable and democratic future, but the coup and post-coup administration raise a number of concerns that could undermine this very goal.

First, if stability and democracy are the overarching goals, a coup in which a democratically elected government is overthrown does not appear to foster either stability or democracy, particularly given Fiji's coup-laden history. Even if Qarase's government was guilty of corruption125 and divisive policy stances, it is the responsibility of democratic institutions and the judicial system to fIx the problem. In the case of widespread institutional and judicial failure, as in disproportionately representing certain groups or provinces, it may be true that changes need to be made. 12G However, the deliberate abrogation of the supreme law of the land-the Constitution-does not foster the trust or faith in the system necessary for democracy and stability to flourish. Bainimarama's efforts to amend the electoral system extra-constitutionally are likely to face signifIcant legal and/or practical challenges, and his coup-even in the name of national unity-demonstrates that coups are an acceptable recourse for addressing unfavorable policies or administrations. In addition, Bainimarama and the military have come under fire for a series of human rights violations arising from the

RFMF's effort to keep the nation under control. Some opponents of the coup, from SDL members to lawyers to the press, have been arrested and taken to military barracks, where

124 Ibid. 125 Fijian politics have long been riddled with rumors of corruption. Despite widespread efforts by Bainimarama to root out suspected corruption, as of 2008, little evidence of corruption had been found. As Fraenkelnotes, charges of corruption, nepotism, and abuse ofpublic funds began to mount against the interim administration and military in 2008. Fraenkel, Jon. "Fiji. (Nlelanasia in Reviews: Issues and Events, 2007)." 12G The state of democratic institutions in Fiji will be addressed in tlle next chapter.

44 they were interrogated, bullied, and even beaten. Two were killed. 127 Freedom of speech, particularly that of the press, has also been curtailed on occasion.128 The Fiji Times has been the most vocal newspaper critical of the administration, and has been convicted for contempt of court for publishing a letter to the editor critical of the Qarase v. Bainimarama decision and had its publisher and acting CEO, an Australian national, deported in January

2009. 129

The 2006 coup arose from a personal dispute between two of Fiji's most prominent and powerful political players over Fiji's future. In a somewhat surprising development, the institution that was a bastion of ethnic Fijian nationalism in 1987 had become a proponent of multiculturalism and national unity by 2006. Fijian nationalist rhetoric was not a tool of the coup perpetrators, nor were chiefs or failed businessmen behind the plot. There were no riots, only minor violence, and Indo-Fijians overwhelmingly supported the COUp.130 The explanation put forth for linking the 1987 and 2000 coups holds true for the 2006 coup- dissatisfaction with electoral outcomes or policy decisions and a willingness to subvert the

Constitution and act extrajucially to correct what are perceived as wrongs. Bainimarama's message may be radically different from his predecessors, but his methods and their implications are equally destructive.

Conclusion: Implications for Fijian Democracy

The prevalence and increasing frequency of coups is concerning. With seventeen years between independence and the 1987 coup, thirteen years between 1987 and the 2000

127 Fraenkel, Jon. "Fiji. (J'vIelanasia in Reviews: Issues and Events, 2007)." The Contemporary Pacific 20.2 (Fall 2008): 450 (11); Narendra P. Singh. "Bainimarama leading Fiji down dangerous path," Pacific Islands Report, i\!Iarch 1, 2007, http://archives.pireporr.org/archive/2007ITvIarch/03-01-comml.htm 128 Pramil Masih. "A return to coup country." The Press, Christchurch, New Zealand: May 12,2007. pg. D4 129 "Media Freedom in Fiji \Vorsens as Another Newsman Deported," International Federation ofJournalists-Asia­ Padfi.·, Janua1Y 27, 2009. http://asiapacific.itj.org/en/articles/media-freedom-in-fiji-worsens-as another­ newsman-deported 130 Sanjay Ramesh. "Fiji, 1987-2007: The St01Y of Four Coups," lf7orldpress.ot;g, April 30, 2007. http://,,'\vw.worldpress.org!J\sia/2773.cfm

45 coup, and only six years between 2000 and the 2006 coup, there seems to be an increasing trend of turning toward coups as a political solution. The rhetoric of the coups, from anti- elitism to ethnic Fijian nationalism and multiculturalism runs the gamut of Fijian political thought. The willingness of a variety of different political and non-political actors to subvert the constitution and democratic process demonstrates a lack of respect for the law.

The law and judiciaq itself has done little to deter future coups. Rabuka not only built in an amnesty clause to the 1990 Constitution, but proceeded to enjoy a fruitful political

career throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Speight was elected to Parliament from the

Tailevu North Fijian Communal seat in the August 2001 elections despite his imprisonment

on Island. He was later dismissed for missing three consecutive sittings of

Parliament. i31 Neither the perpetrators of the 1987 nor 2000 coup were satisfactorily brought

to justice, and it is likely that Bainimarama will escape the law as well.

A piece by Lawson written after the 2000 coup discusses the interplay between

ethnic nationalism and constitutionalism in Fiji particularly surrounding the two COUpS.132

She argues tl1at nationalism in the Fijian community undermined "the most basic principles

of constitutionalism and, in turn, the quality oflife for all Fiji's citizens.,,133 The impact of the

abuse of Fijian supremacy and nationalist rhetoric during the 1987 and 2000 coups was to

seriously undermine the authority of the Constitution. Insofar as Fijian nationalism includes

the doctrine of Fijian political paramountcy and democratic constitutionalism upholds the

principles of equality, these two ideologies are at odds. When being Fijian is privileged over

being a Fiji Islander, national constitutions and political institutions fail.

i31 p. 204-212, Anare Tuitoga, "Tailevu North: Five Years Down the Line" in Fraenkel and Firth eds. 132 Stephanie Lawson. "Nationalism versus constitutionalism in Fiji." Nations and Nationalism 10 (4), 2004, 519­ 538. 133 p. 536, Lawson, "Nationalism versus constitutionalism in Fiji."

46 Chapter 3: Institutional Instability

Since independence in 1970, Fiji has had three separate Constitutions: 1970, 1990, and 1997, each with its own set of electoral rules and regulations. There have been ten general elections for the House ofRepresentatives, but not once has a stable and lasting transfer of power occurred.134 In every instance where elections returned results that ousted the current administration there has been a corresponding incident of dubious legality that has overthrown the rightfully elected government. It is no coincidence that in each of these cases the transfer of power has been made from a majority ethnic-Fijian to a majority Indo-

Fijian administration (usually a coalition)-the Alliance Party to the National Federation

Party in 1977, the Alliance Party to the Coalition (FLP and NFP) in 1987, and the SVT to the People's Coalition (FLP, FAP, and PANU) in 1999.135

The willingness of political actors to abrogate the Constitution and intentionally

undermine legally elected governments demonstrates a lack of respect across the board for what should be the supreme law of the land. The entrenchment of the supremacy of

indigenous rights in particular Constitutions and the continued demarcation of

representation by ethnicity divides the country, makes inter-ethnic tensions more prevalent,

and perpetuates a cycle of ethnically-based political parties and political platforms. In light of

Fiji's turbulent electoral history, the deliberate and careful engineering of the 1997

Constitution and the Alternative Vote system to foster multitacialism and cross-ethnic

political cooperation is particularly interesting. Given the outcomes of the 1999, 2001, and

134 There was one general election with universal suffrage that occurred prior to 1970, with voters electing the Legislative Council in 1966. As this was during the colonial era, I have not included it in my analysis. 135 The only other unlawful overthrow of a legally elected government occurred in 2006, when the military overthrew Qarase's SDL government. However, this was a situation that had been simmering for some time prior to elections and Qarase's government had just been re-elected, so a transfer of power had not taken place. The argument that Qarase's government was elected illegally under an unfair electoral system, however, is an important one and will be addressed later on in the chapter.

47 2006 elections and the 2000 and 2006 coups, the document that was internationally acclaimed for its unique power-sharing provisions and progressive human rights protections

has failed to live up to its promise.130 Despite the best efforts of academics at addressing

Fiji's underlying problems, the strength of democracy in Fiji has continued to decline since

the fIrst coup in 1987.

Constitutional History

Independence was late to come to Fiji, not because Britain was reluctant to leave but

because of serious differences between the Fijian/European Alliance Party and the Indo-

Fijian Federation Party as to the form of post-independence government.!37 The

constitutional debates that preceded independence were held in secret and the 1970

Constitution was held to neither a national referendum nor extensive public debates, with

the effect that the general population had little knowledge of and no input into the

document providing the foundation for their government.!38 The 1970 Constitution

provided for a bicameral Westminster-style parliamentary system, with the House of

Representatives popularly elected via universal suffrage and the Senate formally appointed by

the Governor-General.!39 Fiji remained a dominion of with Queen Elizabeth II as

the ceremonial head of state and the Prime Minister as the acting head of state.

The House of Representatives had 52 members, of which 22 seats were allocated to

indigenous Fijians, 22 to Indo-Fijians, and 8 to . 27 seats-12 each for

Fijians and Indo-Fijians, and 3 for General Electors-were elected via communal rolls. The

136 Kamal Iyer. "i\ decade of the Constitution," Fiji Times, August 4, 2008. http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=96937; "New Era for Human Rights with New Constitution," Amnesty International, Januaty 18, 1998. http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/libraryIIndcx/ENGASA180011998?open&of=ENG-FJI 137 p. 74. "Politics Since Independence: Continuity and change, 1970-1982," Brij V. Lal in Politi,'S In Fiji, ed. Brij V. La!. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986. 138 p. 75, Ibid. 139 p. 76, Ibid.

48 remaining 25-10 each for Fijians and Indo-Fijians, and 5 for General Electors-were elected on national rolls, where voters were allowed to vote across ethnic divisions for ethnically allocated seats. Under this system, each voter voted four times-once for their communal seat and one each for the three national seats. 140 Lal notes that in the elections held from 1970 to 1982, vote splitting among ethnic candidates did not seem to occur; instead, ethnic loyalties were paramount.141 The Senate compromised 22 members, 8 of whom were appointed by the Great Council of Chiefs, 7 by the Prime Minister, 6 by the

Leader of the Opposition, and 1 by the Council of .

The 1970 Constitution survived 17 years before being abrogated by Sitiveni Rabuka

during the 1987 COUp.142 The ethnic nationalism of Rabuka's coup made its way into the

1990 Constitution such that the electoral system that resulted was decidedly more pro-

indigenous Fijian than its predecessor. The 1990 Constitution was specifically designed

"secure the ascendency of Fijian interests.,,143 Declaring Fiji a republic and moving from

dominion to commonwealth status Rabuka drastically increased the representation of Fijians

in government as well as the power of the Great Council of Chiefs. The number of members

in the House of Representatives grew to 70, with 37 seats now allocated by law to

indigenous Fijians, 27 to Indo-Fijians, 1 to the Rotumans, and 5 to General Electors. All

seats were communal, there were no cross-voting national or open seats. The Senate

expanded to 34 members, with 24 senators now nominated by the Great Council of Chiefs,

1 by the , and 9 appointed by the President to represent non-indigenous

Fijians. Under this Constitution, the GCC appointed the President (who could only be a

140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 "Fiji Constitution (Abrogation) 1'vIilitalY Government and Finance Decree" Fiji SeJSiona/ LegiJ/ation, October 3, 1987. http:/hv\v\v.paclii.org/fj/legis/num act/fmgafdn31987633/ 143 p. 274. "Constitutional Engineering in Post-Coup Fiji" Brij V. Lal, in The ArdJitet'tttre ofDemoirary, ed. Andrew Reynolds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

49 paramount chief) and the Prime Minister had to be an indigenous Fijian. The 1990

Constitution assured that Indo-Fijians would have no chance of regaining control of the government and sparked a mass exodus of some of the most well-educated and productive members of the Fijian economy.

Intense pressure from the Indo-Fijian and international cotntnunity spurred Rabuka

to take advantage of the provisions for revision built into the 1990 Constitution, and a

Constitutional Review Cotntnission was formed in 199S. Tasked with "recotntnending

constitutional arrangements which will meet the present and the future needs of the people

of Fiji, and promote racial harmony, national unity and the economic and social

advancement of all cotntnunities," the Cotntnission submitted a report in 1996

recotntnending 697 changes to the Constitution. 144 A Joint Parliamentary and Senate Select

Committee apSC) was formed, with 24 members from both the House of Representatives

and the Senate, to review the report and draft a new Fijian Constitution. JaiJam Reddy,

leader of the NFP, and Sitiveni Rabuka, Prime Minister and leader of the SVT, were crucial

in getting the 1997 Constitution passed through Parliament.145

The 1997 Constitution remains Fiji's Constitution today. Out of a 71 member House

of Representatives, 23 seats are allocated on a communal basis to ethnic Fijians, 19 to Indo-

Fijians, 1 to Rotumans, 3 to General Electors, and the remaining 2S are classified as "open"

seats. These open seats are national and allow voters to vote for regional candidates

regardless of ethnicity. Open seats divide the country into 2S districts that are supposed to

be roughly equal in population size and ethnic distribution. Every voter in Fiji votes for two

Representatives: one from their communal district and one from their open district. The

144 p. 19, Esther Batiri Williams and Kaushik K. Saksena. Labour's Vidory: Electoral Behaviour and Opinion in l'iji, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1999. 145 p. 25, "A Time to Change" Brij V. Lal, in Fiji Before the Storm, ed. Brij V. Lal. Australia: Asia Pacific Press, 2000.

50 Senate's 32 members are appointed by the President with 14 on the advice of the GCC, 9 on the advice of the Prime Minister, 8 on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, and 1 on the advice of the Council of Rotuma.

The framers of the 1997 Constitution hoped that the provision of open seats would

force greater inter-ethnic cooperation while recognizing the reality of racial difference and

communal solidarity.146 The original version of the Constitutional Review Commission

(CRC) report proposed that the number of communal and open seats in the House of

Representatives be switched, with 45 of 70 seats coming from open constituencies in order

to further encourage multi-ethnic government, but this recommendation was rejected by the

JPSC.147 Power-sharing tools were put in place following Lijphardt's consociational theory to

facilitate inter-ethnic cooperation in government, such as the requirement that members of

opposition parties with more than 10% representation in the House be included in the

Cabinet in direct proportion to their House seats. A new Alternative Voting system was put

in place that required candidates to win a majority of votes to clinch a seat. In opposition to

the previous fIrst past the post (FPP) system voters were able to choose their preferences

among the candidates, which would be taken into account if no candidate had received a

majority of votes after the fIrst count. In the event that voters did not specify preferences,

parties had the opportunity to make pre-election alliances to exchange votes and the hope

was that such alliances would happen cross-ethnically and promote moderation and

146 Sitiveni Rabuka and Jai Ram Reddy were both ardent supporters of the 1997 Constitution, and justified continued electoral communalism by claiming that "multiracial parties... [were] a bit premature for Fiji" and Fijian citizens should remain "in our separate racial compartment[s]." Jai Ram Reddy, Hansard, Suva: Parliamentary Debates: House of Representatives, July 24,1992. As quoted in p. 7 "Changing Calculus and Shifting Visions" by Jon Fraenkel and Stewart Firth, in Fraenkel and Firth, eds. 147 p. 280,289. "Constitutional Engineering in Post-Coup Fiji" Brij V. Lal, in Reynolds, ed.

51 cooperation.148 Due to the low numbers ofvoters who specified preferences, pre-election alliances were crucial in determining election results. 149

Election History

Fiji has had 10 general elections for the House of Representatives since

independence in 1970: 1972 (Alliance Party), March 1977 (NFP), September 1977 (Alliance

Party), 1982 (Alliance Party), 1987 (NFP/FLP coalition), 1992 (Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni

Taukei-SVT), 1994 (SVT), 1999 (FLP), 2001 (SDL), and 2006 (SDL). Of these 10

elections, 7 have been won by indigenous Fijian parties. Of the three instances in which an

Indo-Fijian Party has won-March 1977,1987, and 1999-two resulted in coups and one in

the appointment of a caretaker government. In each of these cases, a splintering of the

indigenous Fijian bloc under the Alliance in 1977 and 1987 and the SVT in 1999 led to the

success of an Indo-Fijian-led coalition. It is perhaps heartening to note that the length of

time the Indo-Fijian led government has lasted has increased with each successive

administration. Regardless, the inability of ethnic Fijians-whether chiefs or ethno-

nationalists-to accept the legitimacy of an Indo-Fijian regime is troubling as it prevents the

effective operation of democratic governance and blocks a plurality of the population from

effectively advocating for their interests.

The indigenous Fijian Alliance Party,150 under the leadership of Ratu Kamisese Mara,

enjoyed an ahnost unbroken reign ofParliamentary control from elections in 1972 until

148 p. 281, Ibid. 149 In the 1999 election, only 16% ofvoters indicated their personal preferences. p. 64, Batiri \'Villiams and Saksena. 150 The Alliance Party was founded in 1966 as an way for the eastern chiefly elite to continue exerting political control over the political process, ensure the survival of the chiefly system, and protect the primacy of Fijian supremacy in constitutional/independence discussions. Their main goal was the protection of the status quo. Some small and disaffected Indo-Fijian groups joined the Alliance, but were largely ineffectual and inconsequential. A large number of General Electors also joined the Alliance in an effort to retain some sort of input and political clout in the post-colonial era given their small numbers as a percentage of the population. p. 177-179, Lawson, The Failure ofDemo.rati.· Politics in Fiji.

52 1987. 151 The one exception occurred in 1977, the fIrst time that a legally-elected administration was forced out of government. The rise of an extremist faction of ethnic

Fijian nationalists under Sakeasi Butamoka and the combined with

Indo-Fijian dissatisfaction with the administration's blatantly pro-Fijian policies to fracture the Fijian vote at the same time the Indo-Fijian vote solidifIed under the National Federation

Party,152 giving the NFP the opportunity to form a government.153 However, because of an internal leadership dispute, the NFP was unable to agree upon a Prime Minister for four days and so the Governor-General took it upon himself to appoint Ratu Mara as the leader of a caretaker government, a move of dubious constitutionality. 154 The NFP subsequently split into two factions-Dove and Flower-and was unable to repeat electoral success in the general elections held in September of 1977.

The Alliance repeated its 1977 win in 1982 to secure another fIve year term. The appearance of the Fiji Labor Party (FLP) 155 on the scene in 1985 proved to have severe

consequences for Mara's Alliance government and Fijian democracy. A coalition between

the NFP and the FLP in 1987 with indigenous Fijian Timoci Bavadra at the helm was able to

shore up enough support in the Indo-Fijian community and pull away enough Fijians from

151 See Appendi-x: A for election results. 152 The National Federation Party (NFP) grew out of the Indo-Fijian cane-growing sector in the early 1960s. Concerns about sugar prices expanded to concerns regarding land tenure, and the party eventually expanded to draw in other Indo-Fijians on issues of citizenship and access to jobs. It became a formal political party in 1964, and joined with the Fijian National Democratic Party in 1969. The NFP remained primarily an Indo­ Fijian party due to its polar opposition to the Alliance Party and criticisms of the chiefly system. p. 175-176, Lawson, The Failure ifDemocratic Politics in Fiji. 153 See Appendi-x: A for election results. p. 12, Batiri Williams and Saksena; p. 208-209, Lawson, The Failure of Democratic Politic~' in Fiji. 15·1 p. 214-216, Lawson, The Failure ifDemocratic Politic'S in Fiji; p. 12 Batiri Williams and Saksena. 155 The Fiji Labor Party (FLP) was founded in 1985 by the Fiji Trade Union Congress (FTUC), the largest organized body in Fiji at the time with 37 affiliated unions representing 40,000 workers. It was founded in response to social and economic concerns, disaffection with the Alliance, and the inability of the NFP to mount any substantive opposition to the Alliance. It was the first non-essentially-race-based party to be formed. It has always attracted more Indo-Fijians than Fijians, initially because ofits inclusion of defectors from the NFP but later because ofits opposition to the major Fijian parties-the Alliance, SVT, and SDL. p. 234-237, Lawson, The Failure ifDemocratic Politics in Fiji.

53 the Alliance to be able to take control of the House. The fIrst substantive change of government since independence occurred with the installation of a multi-racial cabinet and an Indo-Fijian majority in government. Bavadra's administration lasted just a month before it was overthrown in a military coup led by Commander Sitiveill Rabuka claiming that a

"coup was necessary to protect the interest of the indigenous Fijians.,,156 The normal course of Fijian democracy brought a legitimate government to power, but was unable to prevent the conditions that led to its overthrow. The abrogation of the Constitution in 1987 marked the last time that Indo-Fijians and Fijians would enjoy an equal distribution of communal

seats in the House.

Elections held in 1992 under the 1990 Constitution were peaceable, with Rabuka's

Soqosoqo ill Vakavulewa ill Taukei (SVT) gaining control of the House. The NFP and FLP

split the Indo-Fijian communal votes. The inability of the government to pass the budget in

November of 1993 prompted Rabuka to dismiss Parliament and hold new elections in early

1994. 157 It is important to note Rabuka's struggles and the inability of even an expressly pro-

Fijian Constitution to guarantee effective Fijian control of the government. Even with the

electoral system weighted so heavily in their favor, the SVT was unable to form a

158 government on its own. The 1994 elections saw a further splintering ofindigenous Fijian

parties, yet Rabuka and the SVT returned again to power. Governance was far from smooth,

with the administration facing "a crippling decline of confIdence in public sector institutions

facing allegations of mismanagement, corruption, and nepotism."159 A Constitution and

156 p. 260. Ibid. 157 p. 17, Batiri Williams and Saksena. 158 p. 31, Brij V. Lal. Another l.f7~: The Politics ofConstitutional Reform in Post-Coup Fiji. Australia: Asia Pacific Press, 1998. 159 p. 52, Ibid.

54 government explicitly oriented toward the welfare of ethnic Fijian citizens was failing to follow through on its mandate.

The next election was held in 1999 under the new Alternative Vote system provided for in the 1997 Constitution. In a surprising turn of events, the Fiji Labor Party gained control of the government, installing Mahendra Chaudhry as the nation's first Indo-Fijian

Prime Minister. Twenty-one political parties contested the election, but the main struggle was between a coalition of the SVT, NFP, and United Generals Party (UGP) and the

People's Coalition of the FLP, Party of National Unity (PANU), and the Fijian Association.

A third coalition between the Veitokani ni Lewenivanua Vakaristo (VLV) and Christian

Democratic Alliance (CDA) was crucial in splintering the Fijian vote and contributing to the

SVT/NFP loss.

Chaudhry's administration lasted a year until it was overthrown by ethnic Fijian

nationalists and the military's renegade Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit. The military,

under the command of Commodore Bainimarama, arrested the perpetrators and restored

democracy by supporting an early general election that resulted in the rise of the Soqosoqo

Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) 160 party under Fijian businessman and Chaudhry opponent

Laisenia Qarase. Qarase's government was reelected in May 2006, but overthrown by a

military coup, this time led by Commodore Bainimarama, in December of that year.

Democratic elections have yet to be scheduled.

Analysis of the Alternative Vote System: Does it promote moderation and

cooperation?

160 The SDL was founded in 2001 by Laisenia Qarase in a reincarnation of the SVT. It drew in its following from the Christian Democratic Alliance as well as other conservative i.ndigenous parties, and was endorsed by the GCe.

55 The governing system that arose out of the constitutional debates of the mid-1990s attempted to integrate the consociational ideas ofArend Lijphart and the integrative

approaches of Donald Horowitz to move Fiji towards a more multiethnic and moderate

government.161 Lijphart's influence is present in the provisions for a multiparty cabinet,

Horowitz's in the Alternative Vote system. In the eyes of the CRC, the AV system in

"heterogeneous, multi-member districts" was most likely to produce moderate multi-ethnic

government.162 If the system required parties to win a majority, not merely a plurality, of

votes in heterogeneous districts with preference voting would induce parties to reach out

across ethnic lines in pre-election coalitions to ideologically similar parties. Moderate

ideologies would beat out extremists, and multi-party, multi-ethnic coalitions would govern

from an "ethnic middle ground."163 However, a combination of the implementation ofAV

and manipulation of the spirit of the system has undermined its goals of producing

"moderate candidates, multi-ethnic government, and centrist multi-racial competition for

power." 164 The results of the 1999, 2000, and 2006 elections demonstrate that the AV

system is not the cure-all it was intended to be, and its ability to produce highly

disproportionate outcomes has not fostered wide-spread support.

1999 election

The fIrst election held after the 1997 Constitution was ratifIed saw a multi-ethnic

People's Coalition composed of the Fiji Labor Party, Fiji Association Party, and the Party of

National Unity beat an old guard coalition ofRabuka's SVT, Reddy's National Federation

Party, and the United General Party to win a majority in Parliament. Mahendra Chaudhry

161 Lijphart and Horowitz were among those consulted by the CRC about electoral systems in multi-ethnic and divided societies. p. 382-383, Robert F. Stockwell, "An Assessment of the Alternative Vote System in Fiji." Jot/mal ofCommonwealtlJ and Comparative Politit'S, Volume 43, Number 3, (2005): 382~393. 162 386, Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 388, Ibid.

56 became Fiji's fust Indo-Fijian Prime Minister. On the surface, AV appeared to do its job- forming multi-ethnic coalitions to govern on a moderate platform. However, the election of the People's Coalition was a hollow shell, the result of "preference engineering" that violated

the spirit of the AV system. As in 1977 and 1987, a fracturing of the Fijian vote and a

solidification of the Indo-Fijian vote propelled the People's Coalition to a win where

"political expediency and cold-blooded ruthlessness triumphed."165

The 1999 Election showcased 16 different parties with 304 candidates and 24

independents, whereas the 1994 Election had 10 different parties with 171 candidates and 6

independents.166 JaiJam Reddy, leader of the NFP, and Rabuka, head of the SVT, had both

worked together extensively on the 1997 Constitution and their coalition was committed to

multiculturalism.167 As it turned out, both Fijian and Indo-Fijian responses to party

leadership doomed the coalition. Dissatisfied with Rabuka's failed "Fijian" rule throughout

the 1990s and his subsequent sell-out of indigenous interests for amorphous talk of

multiculturalism, the rise of extremist indigenous parties like the VLV and FAP splintered

the Fijian vote.168 Parties like the VLV were so upset with Rabuka and the SVT that they

went so far as to ally with the FLP, a party about as ideologically far away from their own

position as it could be. 169 Indo-Fijians distrusted Rabuka as a result of his involvement in the

1987 coup and were wary of Reddy's involvement with him.

From the beginning, Reddy's NFP was in between a rock and hard place. If he broke

away from Rabuka and the SVT, he would be undermining the years he spent working

165 p. 35, Brij V. Lal "A Time to Change: The Fiji General Elections of 1999" in Brij V. Lal, ed. Fiji Bqore tbe Storm: elections and the politics ofdevelopment. J(,(, p. 57, Batiri Williams and Saksena. 167 p. 38 Brij V. Lal "A Time to Change: The Fiji General Elections of 1999" in Brij V. Lal, ed. Fiji Bqore tbe Storm: elettions and tbe politics ofdevelopment. 168 p. 17, Sanjay Ramesh, "Preferential voting and Indo-Fijian minority strategy." Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development, Volume 10, Nwnber 1 (2007): 1-27. 169 p. 63, Robert Norton, "Understanding the results of the 1999 Fiji elections" in Brij V. Lal, ed. Fiji Bqore tbe Stonn: elettions and tbe politics oldevelopment.

57 towards moderation and reconciliation, but Indo-Fijian hatred of Rabuka as a result of the

1987 coup and 1990 Constitution doomed the partnership from the beginning. 17o Rabuka,

"the hero of 1987," as Lal writes, "had become the villain of 1999... [everyone] wanted him defeated.,,171 Many Indo-Fijians deserted the NFP in droves as a result of its coalition with the SVT, seeing "its pre-election strategies ...as undermining Indo-Fijian interest.,,172 The

FLP's efforts to win votes blatantly undermined the spirit of the AV system by organizing preference swaps with extremist Fijian groups and listing the NFP, its closest ideological partner, last on its list of preferences.173 Their lack of agreement or consensus on important issues would later contribute to the government's downfall, as the FLP's coalition partners increasingly criticized government policy and Chaudhry's promotion of Indo-Fijian rights

fueled conflict over controversial issues like land policy.174

Despite the problems with pre-election coalitions, the actual implementation of the

AV system was rife with issues that contributed to dissonance between votes and seats won

as well as concerns over the viability of the system. For starters, the number ofinvalid

ballots-8.7%-was among the highest anywhere in the world. 175 First preference voting

remained largely along ethnic lines, and only 16% of voters exercised their right to choose

preferences. 176 36 seats were decided on preferences, giving pre-election coalitions a

tremendous amount of power. In fact, the FLP won the election by winning all 19 of the

170 p. 52, Ibid. 171 p. 34, Lal "i\ Time to Change: The Fiji General Elections of 1999." 172 p. 20, Ramesh, "Preferential voting and Indo-Fijian minority strategy." 173 p. 35, Lal, "A Time to Change: The Fiji General Elections of 1999." 174 p. 25 Dr. Sanjay Ramesh "Preferential voting and Indo-Fijian rnitlOrity strategy"; p. 387, Stockwell. 175 p. 635, Jon Fraenkel and Bernard Grofman, "Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in Ethnically Divided Societies? The Case of Fiji." Journal ofComparative Political Studies, Volume 39, Number 5, (2006): 623­ 651. 176 p. 641, Ibid.; p. 64, Batiri Williams and Saksena.

58 Indo-Fijian communal seats as well as 72% of open seats as a result of preferences from its partners.177

The discrepancy between percentage of votes won and percentage of seats won was extremely high.178 Despite only winning 34% of votes, the FLP came away with 52% of the seats in the House of Representatives, as a result of preference transfers. The SVT won 17% of votes, but only 11 % of seats while the FAP won 10% of votes but 15% of seats. Perhaps most strikingly, the NFP won 14% ofvotes, but came away with no seats. Despite winning

almost one out of every seven votes cast, the NFP was not represented in Parliament at all.

It is not surprising that numerous authors have been extremely critical of the system and

have claimed that "fair representation in Parliament cannot be expected.,,179 In addition, a

survey done during the election found that individuals were more likely to vote along ethnic

party lines than ideological ones and many voters were unclear or mistaken on candidates'

and parties' positions on issues. 18o

2001 election

The discrepancy between votes won and seats won as well as the ideological

differences within the People's Coalition's contributed to a profound sense of

disenfranchisement and voter malaise during the 2001 election. 181 Held after the 2000 coup,

the 2001 election saw the creation of a new ethnic Fijian party-the SDL--under interim

Fijian Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, and the regrouping of the Fijian vote.

Fear and anxiety in the Indo-Fijian community arising from the coup contributed to

low turnout among the Indian community-only 78.6%, which is surprising given that

177 p. 17, Ramesh, "Preferential voting and Indo-Fijian minority strategy" 178 See Appendi.., F: Percentage ofVotes \Von/Percentage of Seats Won, 1999. 179 p. 61, Batiri \Villiams and Saksena; p. 24, Ramesh, "Preferential voting and Indo-Fijian minority strategy"; Fraenkel and Grofman;Jon Frankel, "The Alternative Vote System in Fiji: Electoral Engineering or Ballot­ Rigging?" Journal ofCommomvealtb and Comparative Politics, Volume 39, Number 2, (2001): 1-31; Stockwell. 180 p. 45, 111, Batiri Williams and Saksena. 181 p. 20, Ramesh, "Preferential voting and Indo-Fijian minority strategy."

59 voting under the 1997 Constitution is mandatory. 1HZ The NFP's share of the Indo-Fijian vote fell precipitously again, and the FLP maintained their hold on all 19 of the Indo-Fijian communal seats. 183 Low Indo-Fijian turnout, a solidification of the Fijian vote behind the indigenous SDL, and SDL's own manipulation of preferences-ethnically this time- transferred the bulk of open seats into SDL hands. In the 2001 election, "the majority in both communities voted for the most strident political representatives of their perceived ethnic interests."lH4

The 2001 elections again saw a high number ofinvalid ballots-12.1%-and disproportionality in seats, with the SDL winning 27% of votes but 45% of seats. ISS The ethnic nationalism of the SDL government brought to power in this election underscores the

AV system's inability to bring to power moderate governments. The electoral results also highlight the increased polarization of Fijian politics along ethnic lines in the wake of the

2000 coup. The issues with the AV system that arose during the 1999 election remained

problematic in 2001, and the government that the AV system brought to power in 2001

arguably increased divisions between the Indo-Fijian and Fijian communities. Shunning the

power-sharing agreements in the Constitution, the government's refusal to work with the

FLP combined with the choice by moderates not to join an ethnic nationalist government to

further polarize the political scene. The aftermath of the 2001 election was exacdy what the

CRC had intended to prevent by implementing the AV system.

2006 election

The 2006 election continued much in the same vein as the previous elections. While

the disproportionality between votes and seats has diminished, the electoral system has

IH2 Ibid. 183 See Appendix E: Percentage ofVotes Won/Percentage ofSeats Won, 2001. 184 p. 643, Fraenkel and Grofman. 185 p. 636, Fraenkel and Grofman. Appendix E: Percentage ofVotes Won/Percentage of Seats \'(Ion, 2001.

60 moved even further away from multi-ethnic cooperation and moderation. The results of the election demonstrate a marked resolidification into the standard two-party show, with an ethnic Fijian party pitted against an Indo-Fijian party. Voter turnout was 8% higher than in

2001, and Indo-Fijians increased their own participation 10% from the previous election.1S6

Invalid ballots were again high, at 9%.187

Anticipating increasing solidification, moderates latched on to the larger parties early on in the pre-election process. ISS Qarase's SDL Party won all 23 Fiji Communal seats, as well as 13 Open seats. The FLP won all 19 of the Indo-Fijian communal seats as well as the remaining 12 open seats. Two of the General communal seats went to the United People's

Party (OPP), and the remaining General seat and the Rotuman seat went to independents.1s9

Unill<:e previous elections, only 12 of the 71 contests required preference voting. None of

these 12 occurred in the Indo-Fijian or Fijian Communal seats; one was a General seat, one

the Rotuman, and the remaining 10 were in Open seats. The greater proportion of Fijian

communal seats guarantee that a Fijian government will be elected if open seats split evenly.

The movement over these three elections back towards a two-party, ethnically-based

system shows that the AV experiment has failed to achieve its goals, and may have

exacerbated existing problems. Fraenkel and Grofman point out the risks of placing too

much hope in the change-inducing outcomes of electoral engineering and constitutional

mechanisms, stating that "although [AV provisions] may enable cross-ethnic voting, [they]

do not necessarily favor moderate parties simply because they employ preferential ballots." 190

The AV's tendency to produce "highly disproportional outcomes" in Fiji may have served to

186 p. 274, Jon Fraenkel, "Bipolar realignment under the alternative vote system: an analysis of 2006 electoral data," in Fraenkel and Firth, eds. IS7 p. 275, Ibid. 18S p. 272, Ibid. lS9 See Appendix A: Election Results 2006 by Seat. 190 p. 648, Fraenkel and Grofman.

61 exacerbate existing fears and tensions within Fijian society, allowing for the re-awakening of the Taukei Movement and undermining democracy even further. 191

The 1999,2001, and 2006 elections resulted in the formation of administrations by large ethnic parties, a result that the AV system had attempted to avoid. In fact, these results demonstrate that parties in Fiji that appeal to sectional ethnic interests succeed. The increased ratio of open/national seats to communal seats in the 1997 Constitution over its predecessors has not reduced the incidence of communally based parties because it has not

sufficiendy removed the incentives to appeal on ethnically based platforms.

There are also concerns regarding the distribution of open seats. The CRC

recommended the formation of 15 three-member heterogeneous districts to adequately

represent the various constituencies. 192 When the JPSC replaced this recommendation with

25 single-member open seats, creating satisfactorily ethnically heterogeneous constituencies

became much more difficult. In the 2006 election, 13 of the 25 open seats were

constituencies where Fijians comprised more than 50% of the population, compared to only

10 for the Indo-Fijians.193 In 1999, 10 of the 25 open seats were majority-Fijian, and 11 were

majority-Indo-Fijian. 194 Even if the SDL Party did not campaign outside of the 13 districts

where ethnic Fijians held a majority in 2006, even if the SDL Party lost 4 of those 13 seats,

as long as the SDL Party carried all ofits Fijian communal seats SDL would win a majority

in Parliament. It would take an Indo-Fijian coalition or party 17 open seats to achieve a

majority. While general geographic separation of Indo-Fijians and Fijians makes creating

ethnically equal open constituencies problematic, if political parties continue to be defmed

by ethnicity, communal seats remain unevenly distributed, and the boundaries of open seats

191 p. 391, Stockwell. 192 Ibid. 193 See Appendix G: Registered Voters-Percentage ofTotal by Constituency, Open Seats 2006. 194 See i\ppencli.'{ H: Registered Voters-Percentage ofTotal by Constituency, Open Seats 1999.

62 are not modified to account for changes in population, it is not likely that a multi-racial or

Indo-Fijian government is likely to be elected and unseat indigenous Fijian nationalists in the future.

Given the prevalence ofvoting on ethnic lines, Fijians are given the dominant hand having a greater portion of the distribution of communal seats, making it easier to form a majority government. However, the volume of open seats could still ideally encourage political parties to reach out to other ethnic groups and broaden their political message if distributed such that ethnic groups are evenly represented within each seat. As Seniloli,

Arms, and Fraenkel point out, however, cross-ethnic cooperation has not proven to be the case. 195 Arms believes that "any multi-ethnic government that eventuates will be due to the multiparty cabinet provisions of the constitution; it will not derive from the AV system."I96

It appears as though Horowitz's "major practical victory" has failed. 197

Constitutional Concerns

While decidedly an improvement over the 1990 Constitution, aspects of the 1997

Constitution apart from the flawed electoral system could continue to present problems for

building a prosperous, just, and stable nation. Most central to the concerns about

constitutional stability is the concept of paramountcy of Fijian interests. Experience has

shown that this concept has a remarkable amount of power, and is often used to legitimize

extralegal political maneuvering. The belief that Fijian interests should be superior to those

of Indo-Fijians to some extent has never seriously been challenged, largely due to its

sensitive nature. Apart from the explicit mention of Fijian political paramountcy in Section 6

195 p. 272-287,]on Fraenkel, "Bipolar realignment under the alternative vote system: an analysis of the 2006 electoral data." p. 288-299, Kesaia Sen.iJ.oli, "Fiji's electoral boundaries and malapportionment." p. 385-398, Rev. David G. Arms, "The case for reform of the electoral system in Fiji." All in From Election to Coup in Eili,]on Fraenkel and Stewart Firth, eds. Canberra: Australia National University, 2007. 196 p. 388, Rev. David G. Arms. "The case for reform of the electoral system in Fiji." 197 Lijphart. p. 632, Fraenkel and Grofman.

63 of the 1997 Constitution, provisions for the protection of Fijian interests include the institutionalization of the GCC and the allocation of communal seats, and the composition and appointment of the Senate privileges indigenous interests over those of national unity to the detriment of the nation. 198

In discussing the role of ethnic Fijian nationalism versus a broader civic nationalism,

Lawson writes that "ethnic nationalism has seriously undermined the most basic principles of constitutionalism and, in turn, the quality of life for all Fiji's citizens.,,199 The acknowledgment of the paramountcy of ethnic Fijian interests inherently assigns all other

Fijian citizens a lower status, violating the principle that all citizens should be considered equal in a democracy.200 The presence of racially based identification, particularly with regards to suffrage and representation, is problematic because it "enshrines constitutionally

the claim that...Fiji's people are to be separate, bounded 'races,' with different natures,

interests, and political and property rights.,,201 Fiji remains the only nation in the world that

still mandates the separation of electors on the basis of racial identity.202 A communally

based democratic system encourages the development of communally-based parties and

destabilizes attempts at national unity and cross-ethnic cooperation.

An illustration of the lack of respect for the Fijian Constitution even ry members of

Parliament can be found in the Parliament's Hansard from November 29,2006. The Hon.

198 p. 520, Lawson, "Nationalism versus constitutionalism in Fiji." 199 p. 536, Ibid. 200 p. 25, Ralph Premdas. "Seizure ofPower, Indigenous Rights and Crafting Democratic Governance in Fiji." Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Volume 8, Issue 4 (2002): 16-36. 201 p. 201, Martha Kaplan "Discourses Against Democracy in Fiji" in Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey and the United States ed. Dru C. Gladney. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1998. 202 New Zealand maintains a separate roll for Maoris but the percentage oflegislators elected from this roll is insignificant, and it is not mandatory for Maoris to be included on the Maori roll-they may choose to enroll or not. p. 95, Pinto-Duchinsky, "Power Sharing" in and , eds., Fiji and the World. Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1997

64 /03 in a discussion about the Employment Relations Bill, opposed the insertion of protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation. In response to a comment that such protection was provided for in the Constitution, Representative

Bulanauca replied "I know, it's in the Constitution, and I oppose the Constitution for that matter."Z04 The opposition of an elected official to the set oflaws that should be providing the framework for his work is troubling. For his constituents who have been inundated with talk of Fijian supremacy and ethnic Fijian nationalism, it is unlikely that his actions will help inspire confidence in the Constitution.

The 1997 Constitution simultaneously attempts to claim to be nationally multi-ethnic

as well as protective of diverse communal cultural identities, a juggling act unparalleled in

difficulty. "Acute collective ethnic consciousness" and the lack ofincentives to reach across

the aisle has prevented political leaders from understanding their compatriots and reaching

stable and workable conclusions on how to address Fiji's complex issues.zos This is likely to

continue until leadership decides to step up and take responsibility for moving the country

towards a more stable and inclusive future.

The high turnover in Constitutions and illegal overthrow of governments is also of

concern. The frequency of constitutional revision and coups demonstrate a lack of respect

for the rule of law that gets progressively more difficult to correct as more damage is done.

The protection from prosecution for treason that Rabuka built into the 1990 Constitution as

well as the lack of explicit anti-coup provisions or punishments in the 1997 Constitution has

not prevented the illegal overthrow of elected governments or the near abrogation of the

Z03 Elected from the Bua Fijian Communal Constituency for the VLV and then SDL parties. 204 Parliamentary Debates, "House of Representatives Hansard," Parliament ofPiji Islands. November 29, 2006. http://\v'Ww.parliament.gov.fj/hansard/viewhansard.aspx?hansardID=570&viewtype=full 20S p. 35 Premdas; p. 75, Stephanie Lawson. Tradition versus Democrary in the South Pacific. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

65 Constitution. Without a strong rule of law and explicit anti-coup language in the

Constitution, it is unlikely that democracy will ever gain a strong foothold in Fiji, for "the willingness of all parties to accept defeat in elections Ueading] to the alternation in government is the key to the survival and legitimacy of the Westminster model [of

,,206 government.]

The legitimacy of Fiji's democratic government and Constitution is also at stake.

Williams and Saksena note in their 1999 election survey that there is "no overwhelming acceptance of the Constitution."Z07 This is problematic, for Mozaffar states that "the legitimacy of democratic constitutions depends on the extent to which they emerge from an inclusive process of negotiation and deliberation and reflect the consensus of major segments of the society."zo8The lack of negotiation and education on the Constitution does

not promote universal acceptance of the document. Salevao echoes this sentiment in

discussing the rule of law, "for the rule of law to have any force of value at all, there must be

a Jhared commitment from both government and governed to uphold the dictates of the law.. .it

must first win the minds and hearts of the people, command their respect and satisfy their

acquiescence therein."zo9 The Fijian Constitution has not won over the hearts and minds of

the Fijian people. For the rule oflaw and democracy to take root, leadership must

demonstrate its commitment to upholding the law, individuals must understand and see the

importance of the document, and the text must be acceptable to people universally. In a

divided multi-ethnic society, this is a challenging feat, but the Constitution as it exists today

has not and cannot move Fiji towards a more just and united future.

206 p. 80, Mozaffar, "Constitutional Designs" in Brij Lal and Tomasi Vakatora eds. Fiji and the World. 207 p. 116, Batiri \Villiams and Saksena. Z08 p. 31, Mozaffar, "Constitutional Designs" in Brij Lal and Tomasi Vakatora eds. Fiji and the World. 209 p. 2, Iutisone Salevao. Rtile ofLaw, Legitimate Governance, and Development in the Pacifit·. Canberra: Australia National University Press, 2005.

66 Conclusion

The current democratic structure in Fiji has not contributed to the building of a cohesive national identity, economic development, or the strengthening the rule of law. As

Fraenkel writes, "fundamental rules and institutions in Fiji are accepted up to a point, but not if they threaten vested interest too directly or they deliver the 'wrong' outcome."ZlO The prevalence of coups as a response to unpopular electoral outcomes has had a destabilizing effect on Fiji's democratic institutions as well as the economy. The mass emigration of Indo­

Fijians as a result of the 1987 coup and ensuing pro-indigenous Fijian policies has depleted

Fiji's talent pool and deprived the country of some of the economy's most productive members. If the divide between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians cannot be bridged by an overarching commitment to the Fijian nation, the downward spiral of coups and ethnically divisive government will continue to prevent Fiji from political stability and economic growth. The unwillingness of successive reformers to challenge the concept of Fijian political paramountcy or reject communally-based voting is detrimental to democratic progress.

Z10 p. xxi, Jon Fraenkel and Stewart Firth, "Fiji's Perpetual Legitimacy Crisis," in Fraenkel and Firth, eds.

67 Chapter 4: Looking Forward

Fiji's democratic travails highlight issues facing newly formed democracies all over the world, particularly with regards to creating democratic states and nations out of heterogeneous populations. It raises questions about the state and the interplay between universal human rights and community rights, the differential treatment of aboriginal or indigenous groups and "immigrants" or descendents of colonizers, the role that identity should or does play in politics and the appropriateness of democracy as an ideal or actualized governing system in divided societies. Because of Fiji's territorial integrity, colonial history, and small size, it presents an interesting case study of a country struggling to both overcome and protect its past and move fOlward to peace, stability and prosperity. Unlike other former

British colonies, however, Fiji's main tension is between an indigenous majority and a sizable imported non-colonizer minority. Its concerns, and subsequent solutions, are different from countries like Northern Ireland or South Africa where an indigenous majority is combating a colonizer minority, or Australia and the United States, where the indigenous minority is fighting to stay alive against the threat of an assimilationist colonized majority. Fiji, excepting size and economic development, is most similar to Malaysia, which has chosen to actively pursue affirmative action in favor of the majority-ethnic Malays -and wields "democratic" power with a heavy hand.

The tension inherent in democracy's egalitarian principles and Fiji's principle of paramountcy of Fijian interests presents problems for both the protection of the Indo-Fijian minority and the effective functioning of a democratic state. This chapter traces a some of

Fiji's more intangible issues regarding nationalism, elite manipulation, and rights claims

involving aboriginality, proposing a few potentially workable solutions. These solutions-

68 and the time Fiji is allowed by the international community to implement them-is heavily impacted by U.S. foreign policy, which is discussed towards the end of the chapter.

Nationalism and Cultural Division

Democracy is premised on the concept of equality and the right of each person to participate in their government. Given the "morality, prudence, and acceptability" of the concept of intrinsic equality, it is generally accepted that democracy, in allowing for some roughly equal distribution of political power,211 is the best of all feasible alternatives.212 In theory, democracy allows for the protection of rights and self-actualization for all citizens.

However, democratic institutions necessary to protect political equality and the individual are difficult to design and implement. It is often impossible to ensure that the principle of "one person, one vote" is always upheld and that institutions do not privilege or favor one group over another.213 Tocqueville and Mill claim that a unified nationalism, based on "like feelings and similar opinions" is necessary to provide the respect for the rule oflaw and legitimacy of democracy necessary for a stable democratic future.214 The extent to which citizens of a state must share the same feelings and opinions is a crucial question particularly in divided societies, but at the very least there must be a "commitment from both government and governed to uphold the dictates of the law...based on common respect for the foundational values deemed essential to a just society.,,215

Hammering out what these "foundational values" are is challenging if the citizens of a state do not share the same culture and history. In the particular case of Fiji, not only do

211 The extent to which citizens' votes are equal depends heavily on institutions of government and participation. 212 Quote from p. 68, Robert A. Dahl. On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University, 1998. The appropriateness of democracy as the lesser of all evils is echoed in Diamond, Linz, Lipset, and Rajan among others. 213 p. 5. Tbe Logic ofDemocracy. Anthony McGann. 1\.nn Arbor: University of IvIichigan Press, 2006. 214 p.185, 189, "The Liberal Image of the Nation" William E. Connolly in Political Tbeory and tbe Rigbts of Indigenous Peoples, ed. Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton, \Vil! Sanders. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 215 p. 2, Salevao.

69 ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians share separate communal histories as a result of the British colonial regime, but inherent in the Fijian mindset and national law is the concept of Fijian paramountcy, which complicates efforts at political equality. The process of creating a national culture is rendered more complex by individual and group identities and their impact on value judgments relating to things like property rights and access to resources.

Likewise, the extent to which specific group rights should be protected by the state in a democracy is a contentious issue, particularly in the case ofindigenous peoples in post- colonial societies. On the one hand, the democratic state is based on political equality and is thus theoretically blind to divisions, but such blindness may prevent the adequate representation of minorities.

Some authors, like Kyrnlicka, claim that the retention of separate cultural group rights is crucial for the protection of authentic individual action, the type that democracy strives for, as "people's values are socially informed by their group memberships."216 Others, like Jacobsen, take a more pessimistic view of the future of divided societies, claiming that

"the dynamics of C01ll1llunity are so powerful, enduring, and penetrating that they are

undermining and will ultimately destroy the emerging nation-state.,,217 These two contentions

are dangerous in that they assume static, unchanging, monolithic cultural identities which

ignore internal divisions of cultural groups, the possibility of cross-cultural identifications,

and changes ofvalue preferences over time. What is considered "Fijian" today is largely a

construct ofBntish colonizers who chose the eastern confederacies as a model for

"Fijianness." The urbanization of Fijian populations and incorporation into the economy has

216 p. 34, Kymlicka in Frank Cunningham. Theories oJDemocrary. New York: Routledge, 2002. 217 p. 44,]acobsen in Edward Lipuma, "The FOlmation ofNation-States and National Cultures in Oceania" in ed. Robert J. Foster, Nation Making: Emergent Identities in Posti'olonial Melanesia. Ann Arbor: University of lYIichigan, 1995.

70 periodically allowed for class-based, rather than racially-based, identification. As Rajan says,

"identities are not natural or fixed, but socially constructed and variable."218

Ifwe agree that identities are mutable, then it is possible to create a national consciousness that allows both for the unity necessary for a democratic government to function and a plurality of subordinated group interests. The key to this scenario is that the groups must acknowledge "the need to live together-to share the same land and history and to construct an understanding of that land and history that does justice to the presence of each.,,219 Unlike other nations with significant ethnic divides, ethnic violence has been relatively latent, only breaking out en masse around the 1987 and 2000 coups. Ratuva attributes this peacefulness to the post-independence efforts at multiculturalism that were able to forge a sense of unity.220 However, the inability of the government to "make use of

symbolism to create overarching loyalties transcending ethnic affiliations" such as national ideologies, heroes, or organizations, helped ensure that ethnic loyalties remained supreme.221

With the exception of radical Fijians, there is a general recognition that Indo-Fijians

and Fijians must find a way to live together in a "multi-racial harmony"; disputes arise over

how to best achieve that goal. 222 Indo-Fijians want a new civil society that privileges national

sovereignty over race or religion, while Fijians are more interested in accommodation among

racially defined communities.223 It may be possible to create a national identity that respects

cultural integrity in Fiji, but there is still a problem with the ingrained doctrine of Fijian

218 p. 34, Nalini Rajan, Demotmcy and the Limits ofMinority Rights. Sage Publications: London 2002. 219 p. 101, Ross Poole "The Nation-state and Aboriginal Self-determination" in ed. "tvllchel Seymour, The Fate of the Nation State. Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004. 220 This unity was subsequently shaken by elite manipulation and etllnocentric Fijian fears of domination. p. 199, Steve Ratuva, 'The Paradox of Multiculturalism: Ethnopolitical Conflict in Fiji" in ed. M. Anne Brown, Sealrity and Development in the Pacific Islands. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2007. 221 p. 130, R.S. "tvIilne, Politics in Ethnicaljy Bipolar States. Vancouver: University ofBritish Columbia Press, 1981. 222 p. 74, HenryJ. Rutz, "Occupying the Headwaters ofTradition: Rhetorical Strategies of Nation Making in Fiji," in Foster. 223 Ibid.

71 paramountcy and the correlated view that Fijians should have preeminent control of the country by virtue of their aboriginality.

Aboriginal Rights

The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues defines indigenous peoples as "peoples [who] have retained social, cultural, economic and political characteristics that are distinct from those of the dominant societies in which they live" and require special protection of their rights.224 The use of the word "dominant" in the UNPFII's conception of indigenous peoples is crucial, because it implies that indigenous societies that are majorities "do not possess group rights, because they do not require them for freedom...the dominant societal culture is their culture and provides all the meaningful options they require."225 Demands for group rights assume that minoliry communities are essential places ofidentity and that their protection is crucial for the realization of individual rights.226 They also assume that there is an intrinsic value to indigenous cultures that needs to be protected against "economic and political decisions made by the majority" that could

threaten the survival of those cultures.227 In a democratic society with an indigenous majority, indigenous communities are able to contribute heavily to the national culture and

dictate policy by virtue of their numerical superiority, so there is no need for special

protection.

Unlike the Maori in New Zealand or the American Indians in the United States,

Fijians in Fiji constitute an indigenous majority. Concerns over the protection of Fijian

224 UNFPII, "History." Last accessed: March 27, 2009. A.vailable at: http://www.lln.org/esalsocdevIllnpflilen/history.html 225 p. 112, Dominic O'Sullivan, Beyond Biculturalism: Tbe Politics ofan Indigenous Minority. Wellington: Hua Publishers, 2007. 226 p. 105, O'Sullivan; p. 118, Rajan; p. 129, David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Etbnoc,t1tural and Multicultural Politii'S. New York: Routledge, 2000. 227 p. 203, Philip Pettit, "Minority Claims and Democracy," in eds. lvison, Patton, Sanders.

72 culture provided fodder for elite manipulation and was a powerful source of fear for the

Fijian community throughout the 20th centuq. Fijians feared being "submerged by immigrants" losing their "right to govern in their own land" and witnessing the decline of their culture.228 In the 1950-, when the Indo-Fijian population was expanding faster than the Fijian population, Indo-Fijian requests for equality, common rolls, and democracy were seen as attempts to dominate and subsume Fijian culture. Fijians felt that democracy would add political cultural control to the economic control already held by the Indo-Fijian community by virtue of unfettered participation in the economy. The doctrine of Fijian paramountcy found its outlet in political power-the "unwritten law" of Fijian politics became that substantive political power must remain with Fijians to counteract Indo-Fijian control of the economy.229 All of Fiji's Constitutions have enshrined Fijian paramountcy on the grounds that "equitable distribution of resources and opportunity was the only way to satisfy socioeconomic grievances and pacify the rising tide of ethnonationalism."230 The emphasis on Fijian rights while Fijians were in a numerical minority could be justified on the basis of necessary protection as a result of colonial policies that marginalized the Fijian community, but that is no longer viable as Fijians have constituted the majority of the population since shortly after the 1987 coup.231

Patton writes that indigenous peoples share a "common experience of colonization, dispossession, non-recognition of their systems of law and government and forced assimilation into settler societies built upon their traditionalland."232 Unlike other British

228 p. 92, Asesela Ravuvu, The Farade ofDemo.,ary. Suva: Reader Publishing House, 1991. 229 p. 99, Benjamin Reilly, Democrary in Divided Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 230 p. 217, Ratuva. 231 "2.2 Population of Fiji by Ethnicity" Fiji Islands Bureau ofStatistics, December 2008. http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/Kev·%20Sta ts IPopulation12.2%?Opop'Yo20by'Yo20ethnicity.pdf 232 p. 115, Paul Patton, "Autonomy and Indigenous Sovereignty" in ed. Ephraim Nimni, National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics. New York: Routledge, 2005.

73 colonies, Fijian culture, once defmed, was "protected" by the creation of the Great Council of Chiefs and separate Fijian Administration designed to allow Fijians some sort of ability to advocate for themselves. This highly patriarchal stance by the British preserved Fijian culture and land rights, but prevented mass Fijian incorporation in the economy. Unlike the United

States, New Zealand, or Australia, there has been no overarching post-colonial attempt at assimilation into an existing dominant, or British, national culture. On the contrary, the tension between Indo-Fijians and Fijians is over the content of such a national culture, whedler it should be unifying or compartmentalized.

Indigenous or minority communities can also claim special group rights on the basis of social justice. In some cases, affIrmative action programs may be necessary to right historical wrongs, as in targeted poverty alleviation programs or educational grants on the basis of ethnicity.233 However, it is not clear that Fijians are disadvantaged any more than their Indo-Fijian counterparts. In terms of resources, Fijians control 90% of all the land in

Fiji, so they are certainly not disadvantaged when it comes to access to land. In terms of socio-economic indicators such as poverty and education it is not clear that Fijians are any worse off than Indo-Fijians. The 50/50 by 2020 Afflrmative Action plan put in place by the

Qarase government has failed both Fiji's Human Rights Commission test as well as that of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrinlination.234 Both of these organizations, as well as the UN Development Program, acknowledge that poverty afflicts all communities regardless of ethnicity, and that Indo-Fijians comprise the poorest of the poor and have an average household income 14% lower than that of indigenous Fijians. 235 It is not

233 p. 213, Kemp, in Nimni, ed. 234 ed. , Papers on Racial Discrimination in Fiji; Vol 2: Laws, Regulations, Policies. Lautoka: Fiji Institute ofApplied Sciences, 2006. 235 p. 248, 1997 UNDP Report quoted in "Human Rights Commission Report on Affirmative Action Policies" in Chand.

74 clear that indigenous Fijians are any more disadvantaged than Indo-Fijians nor that they are entitled to any more special programs than Indo-Fijians.

Elite Manipulation

Paul R. Brass writes in his book Ethniciry and Nationalism that ethnicity is "a contingent and changeable status that, like class, mayor may not be articulated in particular contexts at particular times.,,236 He argues that it takes "conflict between indigenous and external elites and authorities or between indigenous elites" for ethnicity to take on the primal)' identification necessary for ethnic awareness and demands to arise.237 Brass,

Diamond and Plattner, Rutz, Cunningham, Reilly, and Premdas all detail the importance, and

238 destructiveness, of elite manipulation of ethnicity for political gains. Elites, as the main powerbrokers of government, play an important role in setting an example for the wider populace by demonstrating commitment to the state as well as reinforcing the rules of the game by adhering to the law.

Linz, Diamond, Lipset, and Dahl all highlight the importance of elite loyalty to the stability and legitimacy of the system.239 Without a unified commitment to the system and trust among political actors, it becomes even more likely that political actors will turn to

"ethnic or national chauvinism for unity.,,240 This in turn solidifies ethnic identification, making ethnic cleavage "appear permanent and all-encompassing" and increasing the political payout to elites who continue to appeal to ethnic groupS.241 Reilly and Premdas both

236 p. 19, Paul R. Brass, Etbni,ity and NationaliJm. London: Sage Publications, 1991. 237 p. 26, Ibid. 238 p. 15 Brass; p. xxi Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner "Introduction" in ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, Nationali.sm, Etbni( Confli(t, and Demolrary, Baltimore: J ol111s Hopkins Press, 1994; p. 78 Rutz; p. 18 Cunningham; p. 108, Reilly; p. 35, Premdas. 239 p. 15-17, Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction: Comparing Experiences with Democracy," in ed. Lany Diamond, Juan J. Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, Politi(J in Developing CountrieJ. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990. 240 p. 18, Cunningham. 241 p. xviii, Diamond and Plattner.

75 attribute the failure of Fijian democracy to a "failure of political leadership, capacity and commitment within Fiji to the idea of multi-ethnic democracy" and an "exploitation by ethnic entrepreneurs" of ethnic consciousness.242 Without the incentives or substantive opportunities to reach across ethnic lines, as Ghai points out, there has been no impetus on the part of political elites to work towards a united Fiji.

Potential Solutions

Fiji's hurdles to sturdy democracy include a populace divided along ethnic lines that have been solidified by elite manipulation, a doctrine of Fijian paramountcy by virtue of aboriginal status, and illiberal and divisive political institutions that have exacerbated ethnic tensions. The challenge for Fiji is to create a commitment to the state and rule of law that is acceptable on some level to all segments of the population, which will allow for stability and economic growth. It is not likely that a consensus will be reached without an acknowledgement of the need for unity and an effort at transcending ethnic divisions in order to create a national identity. This is not an easy task, for it requires a redistribution of power away from the chiefly elite, a restructuring of political debate away from issues defmed on ethnic lines, country-wide education on the Constitution, state institutions, and concerns of other communities, commitment by political elites to uphold the spirit and dictates of an equitable law, and the presence of enough similarities between groups to form a national culture out of a lowest common denominator.

There are a few structural and policy alternatives that can be pursued to assist with these changes. To erase the ethnic division of representation that reinforces ethnically divisive politics and remove the impetus for elites to appeal to ethnic concerns, all communal seats should be abolished. Since Fijians constitute a majority and already have

242 p. 108, Reilly; p. 35 Premdas.

76 veto power in the Senate, they should have no problem electing representatives to promote their ethnic interests if that is how they choose to identify. Having a House of

Representatives elected entirely from common rolls will encourage elites to explore other appeals besides ethnicity to get elected. Since Fijian interests are no longer in trouble of being "overrun" by the numerical or economic superiority of Indo-Fijians, the removal of communal requirements could be a feasible policy change.

On the other hand, the existing geographic dispersion of ethnic groups may end up privileging ethnic identities in elections even without explicit communal seats. If the doctrine of Fijian paramountcy and ethnic identification is intractable and any political maneuvering that attempts to remove Fijians from assured political control will end in another coup, it may be best to keep the Constitution the way it is and give the rule of law more time to become legitimate and supreme. In this case, it may be prudent to create an Indo-Fijian component of the Great Council of Chiefs or Ministry of Fijian Affairs to advocate for the

Indo-Fijian minority. Indo-Fijians hold a special and important place in Fijian history, and as citizens are entitled to protection of their rights. If it is legislatively impossible to protect

Indo-Fijians by a semblance of true and equal representation, the presence of a permanent cabinet level department may help to ensure that Indo-Fijians are heard and represented effectively.

There is also the option of abandoning reform and allowing the Constitution and political system to continue as designed. This would continue to privilege the principle of

Fijian paramountcy but would not necessitate writing new laws. The equal rights provisions in the 1997 Constitution and the existence of communal seats would guarantee Indo-Fijians some measure of protection and representation. However, this will not solve Fiji's

77 underlying inter-ethnic tensions and would continue the emigration of Fiji's professionals, amplifying the brain drain and depleting the country of its human capital.

It may not seem prudent, in light of the turnover in Constitutions and existing lack of respect for the rule of law, to throw out the 1997 Constitution and its progressive bill of rights entirely because of the electoral system and a few paragraphs ensuring the primacy of

Fijian rights. The Constitution does provide for amendments and alterations in sections 190 to 192, however the requirements for amending the Constitution are quite steep. The House must pass the amendment(s) in Bill form with a supermajority of 53 of the 71 members.

Further, 15 of the 23 Fijian communal seats, 13 of the 19 Indo-Fijian communal seats, and 2 of the 3 General seats must approve of the Bill. The Bill must then make it through the

Fijian-dominated Senate and be approved by 9 of the 14 members appointed by the Great

Council of Chiefs. Any alteration to the Constitution will be extremely hard to achieve given these constraints, particularly because what was previously proposed would rob the Fijians and Fijian chiefs of the assurance of political power.

It may make sense to take the 1997 Constitution, adjust the troublesome passages, and submit the Constitution to a national referendum. No Fijian Constitution has yet been subjected to a public vote-the closest any Constitution has come to popular support is the

1997 Constitution's Constitutional Review Commission's village and town meetings soliciting opinions on content. A popular vote on the Constitution would circumvent the problem of a conflict of interest in elites voting for or against systems that directly impact their chances of being re-elected, would increase popular support for the document that is eventually accepted, and increase education on the Constitution and its attendant laws and principles. Keeping the majority of the 1997 Constitution would decrease the discrepancies between current and future laws. The extreme changes in laws and values that came with the

78 changes from the 1970 to 1990 and 1990 to 1997 Constitutions contributed to the undermining of the law and lax support for and commitment to the state and the rule of law.

All of the propositions put forth, with the exception of leaving the system as is, require a commitment by political elites to adjust their values and make a commitment towards inter-ethnic cooperation and unity. The polarized and ethnicized political and party system has not fostered the creation of a transcendent elite willing to potentially sacrifice their political careers for the good of the country. There are those who have attempted to work towards multiculturalism that when push came to shove, like Ratu Mara, chose to pursue the route of ethnic division. There are others, like Rabuka and Reddy, who lost to ethnic outbidders in their pursuit of a multicultural agenda. History does not demonstrate sympathy for those elites who voluntarily undertake to unite the country and heal the divide.

There is only so much that policy can be expected to achieve. It can provide the framework and foundation for the type of action necessary to create cross-cultural acceptance, but it cannot compel political actors to change their values or adhere to the spirit of the law. There will always be loopholes to be found, and the best that policy and institutions can attempt to do is provide a forum for the settlement of disputes. In the case, as is likely, that there is not a critical mass of elites willing to forsake the temptation of ethnic politics for the long-term unity of the country, small piecemeal steps should be taken to ensure that progress is being made in a positive direction socially, politically, and economically. Given the economic state of the country and the universal acknowledgement that the Fijian economy must be dealt with, it may be easiest to begin with economic adjustments and branch out from there. More specific, concrete descriptions of potential policy decisions and efforts are subjects for another paper.

U.S. Foreign Policy

79 The U.S. is generally consistent with its support for democracies abroad, except when there are overriding economic or security concerns that necessitate being on good terms with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments. Throughout the post-WWII period, the United States has consistently supported regimes in countries such as Pakistan or

Saudi Arabia that expressly conflict with the rhetoric of human rights and democracy that the U.S. employs in other countries. This hypocrisy, brought to the fore in a House of

Representatives hearing on U.S. foreign policy in Thailand and Fiji, not only questions the

U.S. commitment to democracy but also leads to some misleading policies towards countries that do not factor heavily on the American agenda.243 For a small country like Fiji that relies heavily on aid and benevolence from larger countries but does not factor substantially into economic or security considerations, the pressure to democratize often leads to the implementation of shoddy and ill-formed democratic institutions that are unstable and do not live up to the tenets of liberal democracy espoused by countries like the United States.

There are three broad views on American democracy promotion. The fIrst proclaims that as democracy is the highest form of government, the U.S. is bound by morality and responsibility as the world's premier democracy to promote democracy abroad. The second views U.S. attempts at democracy promotion as more destabilizing than progressive for foreign countries and claims that an explicitly pro-democracy foreign policy prevents the

U.S. from pursuing goals more attune to national interests. The fInal view charts a middle ground between its predecessors, acknowledging the inherence of democracy promotion as a part of American identity and foreign policy but views the methods used to disperse a

243 "The Impact of Coup-Related Sanctions on Thailand and Fiji: Helpful or Harmful to U.S. Relations?" Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tendl Congress, first session, August 1, 2007. http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/37066.pdf

80 distincdy American version of democracy to the exclusion of all other alternatives as detrimental to domestic and international interests.

It must be stated that U.S. democracy promotion blurs the lines between democracy and liberal democracy. Democracy, in and of itself, is the system by which each citizen has the right to vote in free and fair elections for a share of political power, while liberalism encompasses the rule of law and the right to freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and property.244 These two concepts are roughly employed together in the American political system, but they can be separated in practice.245 Because of the conflation of the two ideas and the difficulty ofimposing liberalism on a country, U.S. democracy promotion in practice tends to focus on the existence of democratic institutions rather than the ability of those institutions to govern well or in a liberal fashion. 246

The requirements for successful democracies, let alone the ideal of successful liberal democracies, include economic stability, consent, and the rule of law. Many writers see the imposition of democracy not only as violating the laws of consent but also as subverting the ability of states to create the strong economic institutions necessary to sustain democracy.247

Rhodes, Wiarda, and Brownlee all agree that while perhaps not ideal, liberal authoritarian regimes are useful in building up the conditions necessary for democracy, and are often

244 p. 42-43, Francis Fukuyama, The End ofHistory and the Last Man. New York: The Free Press, 1992; p. 13, Tony Smith, The United States and the lf70rlduJide Struggle ftr Demolrary in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994; p. 17, Fareed Zakaria, The Future ofFreedom. New York: W.\V Norton & Company, 2003. 245 p. 43-44, Fukuyama, The End ofHistory and the Last Man. 246 Smidl; Zakaria; Fukuyama; Lloyd C. Gardner and Marilyn B. Young, eds., The New Amerimn Empire. New York: The New Press, 2005. 247 p. 181, Howard J. Wiarda, The Crisis ofAmerican Foreign Poliry. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2006; Zakaria.

81 better than the alternative of a U.S.-imposed, unstable, unsupported in-name-only democracy. 248

The problems with the current implementation of American democracy promotion abroad include the dangers of selective implementation, disconnect between democratic institutions and human rights/liberalism, and an overstatement of the actual impacts of

American influence on the democratization of other countries. Whereas Huntington and

Smith argue that democracy could not have survived in the 20th century without U.S. help,

Cox, Ikenberry, Inoguchi, Brownlee, Zakaria, Wiarda, and Koonings/Krujit contend that the actual impacts of American efforts to promote democracy in the world have been much more mixed and troublesome.

The pursuit of the proliferation of decidedly American democracy abroad has been at the center ofAmerican foreign policy for much of the 20th century. While the efficacy of such promotional efforts is questionable, this foreign policy has a profound effect with regards to nations, like Fiji, struggling to maintain democracy. The uneven and unilateral imposition of a policy of democratization abroad, a lack of appreciation for the importance ofinternal factors surrounding the creation of democracy, and a focus on institutions rather than substance of governance has led to a backlash of anti-American sentiment, increased instability, and failed democracies. While promoting democracy is a respectable foreign policy goal, the narrow and preachy way in which the United States has chosen to define and implement this goal undermines both America's reputation abroad and its goals of security, stability, and peace.

The United States has no major interests in Fiji. The American military base in

Guam covers U.S. strategic interests in the Pacific, and Fiji is too small and far away to be a

248 p. 250, Edward Rhodes in Gardner and Young; p, 205 Wiarda; p. 203 Jason Brownlee, Authoritan'anism in an Age ifDemocratization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007,

82 major economic concern. U.S. promotion of democracy in Fiji has followed the book, particularly after the instatement of Commodore Bainimarama after the 2006 coup. The U.S. has implemented targeted sanctions, including rescinding all military aid, and has come out very strongly in favor of a "move immediately to restore democracy and to hold free and fair elections."Z49 The State Department has consistently encouraged Bainimarama to reinstate democratic elections and relinquish power.

By encouraging an immediate return to elections, the United States is implicitly accepting Fijian government the way that it exists in the 1997 Constitution. As discussed previously, there are some serious concerns about the adherence of Fiji's democratic institutions with even the basic tenets of democracy. The United States is thus supporting a return to a "democracy" that is neither liberal nor democratic and which has failed to bring stability and growth to tl1e country in the past. The continued insistence on immediate returns to existing democracy excludes the possibility of reform or measured transitions in a country where internal factors present particularly challenging problems. American foreign

policy is thus actively precluding attempts at constructively addressing the underlying

tensions preventing democracy from being successful.

Fiji's problems-those of an indigenous majority that refuses to accept a concept of

the Fijian nation that includes non-ethnic Fijians, the abuse of ethnic nationalism by elites

for political gain, a Constitution and state that acquiesces to the demands of an indigenous

majority on the basis of their ethnicity regardless of need to the detriment of the nation as a

whole, and the continued privileging of communal identity over national identity-are not

intractable, but they are extremely complicated and will require effort and commitment from

249 Stephen Kaufman, "United States Supports Call for Fijian Elections by end of 2009," Department oj'State, January 27, 2009. http://w\vw.state.gov/rlpa/prs/ps/2009/01/115443.htm; Robert Wood, "Bainimarama has no plan for ," Department ofState, January 27, 2009. http://www.america.gov1stIdemocracy english12009IJanuary/200901)7172437esnamfuakO.3292353.html

83 all members of society to overcome. The mutability of identity and value judgments as well as the changing demographics of the country suggest that the adjustments in national consciousness and political structures necessary for a functional and equitable democracy in the future may be possible. It will not be a short or easy process, but to rule out the possibility ofinter-ethnic cooperation and commitment would be a mistake of the highest order.

Democracy, as it exists today in Fiji, cannot adequately represent all Fijian citizens.

Fiji will not be able to modernize and protect its citizens without support from the international community and commitment on the part of all Fijians to uphold the rule of law and democratic values, and work towards national unity. Ifthey truly believe in the tenets of democracy, Fiji's politicians and reformers need to begin pressing on the doctrine of Fijian political paramountcy. Ifnot, perhaps the democratic project is not the best system of government for Fiji. Ultimately, the Fijian people must decide on their own government. In the absence of rampant human rights violations, it is the responsibility of the international community to assist and support Fiji in its search for a system ofgovernment that allows for good governance, growth, and stability.

84 Addendum

On Friday, April 10th ,2009 President annulled the judiciary and abrogated the 1997 Constitution in response to the Court of Appeals decision of the case of

Qarase v. Bainimarama. The Court found the Constitution's Presidential reserve powers did not extend to dissolving Parliament in December of 2006 and appointing a caretaker government, led by Commodore Bainimarama, in January of 2007.250 As such the

Bainimarama administration was found to be unlawful, and the Court recommended that

President Iloilo dismiss the Commodore and appoint a new caretaker Prime Minister- neither Bainimarama nor Qarase could be considered-and to hold democratic elections as soon as possible. Iloilo, and presumably Bainimarama, found this decision to be untenable took extralegal steps to remain on the "smooth path to holding parliamentary elections based on the electoral reforms and other reforms as set out under the [people's] Charter [for

Building a Better Fij~" begun by the interim administration. Iloilo claimed that the abrogation was necessary to "facilitate the holding of true and parliamentary elections" by

September 2014.251

This announcement was accompanied by the standard outrage from the usual suspects including Amnesty International, the US, Australia, and the Commonwealth

Secretariat. The Pacific Islands Forum suspended Fiji on Friday May 1st for missing a deadline to schedule elections. Public Emergency Regulations have been implemented and the media is under intense supervision, but there was no marked increase in violence or instability within the nation during the month of April. It is too soon to tell what this means for democracy in Fiji over the next five years, but hopefully thirty years from now discussions of Fijian democracy will tell a different story.

250"Qarase v. Bainimarama appeal decision" Court ojAppeal, Suva. http://fijitimes.com/extras/Qarase vs Baillimarama-Court-of-appeal-judgemellt.pdf 251 Josefa Iloilo. "Address to the Nation," April 10, 2009. http://fijitimes.com/extras/Fiji-presiclent-speecb annulling-constitution-judiciary.pdf

8S Appendix A: 1999 and 2006 Election Results by Seaf52

Bua Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Selaima Kalouruvit Independent 684 12.77% Veisamasama Etonia Bose Independent 207 3.86% Vula Tosateki Independent 146 2.72% Mitieli Bulanauca SDL 4,321 80.65% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Tonasa Vueti NVTLP 243 4.39% Beato Ratulovo COIN 3,027 54.74% Aminiasi Turaga SVT 1,149 20.78% Mitieli Bulanauca VLV 1,111 20.09%

Kadavu Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Konisi Tabu Yabaki SDL 3,766 77.44% Semesa Matanawa FLP 45 0.89% Ruperu Drodroveivau Independent 57 1.13% Koroi Tames Michael Ah Koy Independent 1,191 23.54% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Emasi Qovu FAP 456 9.20% Alipate Vosawale VLV 339 6.84% Tames Michael Ah Koy SVT 4,159 83.95%

Lau Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Laiserua Qarase SDL 4,896 93.33% Viliame Cavubati NAPF 350 6.67% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Koila Mara Nailatikau VLV 3,012 50.82% Viliame Cavubati SVT 2,816 47.51% Isoa Tuinasaqalau NVTLP 99 1.67%

252 "2006 Election Results for each seat." Elel'tions Office, Government of Fiji. http://www.elections.gov.fj/results2006.html;Batu-iWilliams.EstherandKaushikK.Saksena.Labour·sVictory: Eledoral Bebaviour and Opinion in Fiji. Suva, Fiji: University of the South Pacific, 1999.

86 Lomaiviti Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Filise Baleinakaro NVTLP 135 2.19% Simione Kaitani SDL 5,109 82.28% Tone Kauvesi IND 920 14.82% Iliesa Tora IND 44 0.71% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage ofVotes #1 #2 #3 #4 Penitoa Baleinagusui NVTLP 367 EXCL 0% Tone Kauvesi SVT 1,363 1,365 1,375 1,401 22.01% Timoci Tuisawau FAP 707 710 EXCL 0% Etuate Basaga VLV 1,240 1,242 1,248 EXCL 0% Simione Kaitani Independent 1,895 2,253 2,259 3,475 54.60% Tomasi Tokalauvere FLP 792 794 1,482 1,488 23.38%

Macuata Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes \\1asasala Samuela NFP 215 2.64% Savenaca Lario IND 103 1.26% Damudamu Samuela Nakete FLP 459 5.63% Isireli Leweniqila SDL 7,075 86.84% Erarni Biaunisala IND 295 3.62% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage ofVotes #1 #2 #3 Josefa Nalurnialevu SVT 3,646 3,651 3,669 46.29% Dimuri Tui Vunibola NVTLP 352 EXCL 0% Iowane Rakai FLP 573 575 EXCL 0% Poseci Waqalevu Bune VLV 3,355 3,700 4,257 53.71%

87 Nadroga/Navosa Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentaj:!;e ofVotes Sakiusa Timoci NVTLP 172 1.16% Manumanunivalu Veniana Gonewai FLP 2,527 17.02% Ratu Isikeli Tasere SDL 10,624 71.56% Peniasi Kunatuba IND 1,167 7.86% Inoke Kadralevu PAND 356 2.4% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage ofVotes #1 #2 #3 Semwaia I-Iong-Tiy SVT 4,742 4,745 5,366 41.05% Inoke Kadralevu Independent 855 856 EXCL 0% Mosese Naisaroi NMDP 124 EXCL 0% Leone Tuisowaqa FAP 6,296 6,415 6,621 50.65% Atunaisa Mataitoga VLV 1,054 1,055 1,084 8.39%

Naitasiri Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentaj:!;e ofVotes Ilaitia Bulidiri Tuisese SDL 8,455 84.14% Maika Moroca FLP 424 4.22% lope Gonevulavula NVTLP 353 3.51% Kavekini N avuso NAPF 404 4.02% Manoa Luqere Naitala IND 413 4.11% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage ofVotes #1 #2 #3 Peceli Rinakama FAP 2,648 4,440 6,403 71.21% Solomoni Naivalu SVT 1,965 2,026 EXCL 0% Asesla Ravuvu VLV 1,896 EXCL 0% Kavekini N avuso NVTLP 2,483 2,526 2,589 28.79%

88 Namosi Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Ratu Suliano SDL 2,481 89.12% Matanitobua Waisea N Batilekaleka NVTLP 178 6.39% Koleta Marama FLP 125 4.49% Sivivatu (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 Votes Etuate Maria Vunitabua NVTLP 206 209 EXCL 0% Aselemo Vakadranu VLV 148 EXCL 0% Atonio Tanaburenisau FAP 970 1,106 1,309 56.57% Kiniviliame Manumanunitoga SVT 990 999 1,005 43.43% Taukeinikoro

Ra Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Mosese Ramuria NAPF 225 2.66% Tevita Tabalailai IND 734 8.67% Timoci Naco FLP 1,048 12.38% Tomasi Vuetilovoni SDL 6,456 76.29% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 Votes Peni Nasuva Independent 573 EXCL 0% Waqanicakau To Nacola Independent 952 1,062 1,458 1,493 EXCL 0% Eloni Goneyali PAND 2,474 2,655 2,696 2,726 4,138 52.98% Mecuisela Independent 653 745 EXCL 0% Naisogobuli Evuloni Bogi NVTLP 2,032 2,138 2,485 3,592 3,673 47.02% Tone Banuve SVT 1,127 1,166 1,172 EXCL 0%

89 Rewa Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Viliame Raile IND 95 1.57% Ro SDL 3,401 56.36% Tuisawau Felipe Q Tuisawau IND 2,371 39.29% Taniela Robonu FLP 167 2.77% Senikuta (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage ofVotes #1 #2 #3 Timoci Qiolevu Silatolu FAP 1,063 1,864 3,100 59.70% Epeli Mataitini SVT 1,256 1,275 EXCL 0% Tevita Bukarau VLV 845 EXCL 0% Sakeasi Butadroka NVTLP 2,029 2,054 2,093 40.30%

Serua Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Ananaiasa Qio Vucago IND 232 6.44% Pio Kameli Tabaiwalu SDL 2,792 77.51% Sakeasi Lomalagi IND 431 11.97% Levani Tonitonivanua NVTLP 147 4.08% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 Votes Semi Tabaiwalu Independent 399 399 406 EXC 0% L Misaele Driubalavu SVT 1,131 1,174 1,183 1,194 1,247 37.28% Sakeasi Lomalagi FAP 630 637 646 1,032 EXC 0% L Levani Tonitonivanua NVTLP 768 768 1,110 1,119 2,098 62.72% Josateki Nasova VLV 364 367 EXCL 0% Atunaisa Lacabuka Rasoki II NDP 13 EXC 0% L

90 Ba East Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Paulo Ralulu SDL 5,528 60.43% Apimeleki Nabaro NFP 732 8% Porupate Lesavua PAND 2,888 31.57% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Isimeli Bose SVT 2,932 34.91% Joti Naliva Naisau VLV 578 6.88% Pauliasi Matawalu NVTLP 475 5.66% Porupate Lesavua PAND 4,413 52.55%

Ba West Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Pauliasi Namua NFP 257 2.23% Ratu Meli Q Saukuru SDL 9,211 80.05% Taniela Wai FLP 1,156 10.05% Meli Bogileka PAND 883 7.67% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage ofVotes #1 #2 #3 lliesa Ratunavu NVTLP 313 EXCL 0% Vilive Ravouvou VLV 1,661 1,668 EXCL 0% Etuate Vugakoto SVT 3,136 3,433 3,465 34.47% Tavai Meli Bogileka PAND 4,942 4,951 6,587 65.53%

Tailevu North Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Laisiasa Cabenalevu FLP 312 4.02% Samisoru Tikoinasau SDL 6,281 80.90% lliesa Duvuloco NVTLP 1,171 15.08% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage ofVotes #1 #2 #3 Tosefa Serulagilagi FAP 3,398 3,424 3,454 46.37% Ifereimi Ravoka VLV 743 EXCL 0% Savenaca Tokainavo SVT 1,494 2,203 3,995 53.63% Iliesa Duvuloco NVTLP 1,814 1,822 EXCL 0%

91 Tailevu South Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Irami Ului Matairavula SDL 6,722 80.79% Akuila Wailevu Raikoti IND 59 0.71% Saukelea Erini NAPF 493 5.93% Levani V Tuinabua IND 1,046 12.57% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Esira Rabuno FAP 3,810 53.59% Ameo Liaci Ramokosoi NVTLP 429 6.03% Lagisoa Delana SVT 2,871 40.38%

Cakaudrove East Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Vilimone VosaroRo IND 287 4.17% Lutuvakula Melania NAPF 480 6.97% Ratu Naiqama SDL 6,120 88.86% LaIabaIavu (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes SVT 5,135 78.66% Inoke Tabualevu VLV 1,099 16.84% Josua Gabiriele UNLP 294 4.50%

Cakaudrove West Fijian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Vaniqi Manasa IND 607 7.13% Ramasirai SDL 7,674 90.1% Vosawale Tosua NFP 236 2.77% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Tuisuva Voreqe FAP 550 6.94% Kinijoji Maivalili SVT 5,460 68.94% Salote Raikolo QaIo VLV 1,910 24.12%

92 North East Fijian Urban Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Nanise Vurusere SDL 11,454 84.55% Kasami Nagusuca Manasa Tugia IND 353 2.59% Sairuana Rokovucago FLP 1,357 9.94% Saimoni Raikuna NAPF 338 2.47% Bogivitu Lotawa IND 61 0.45% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage ofVotes #1 #2 Isireh Leweruqila SVT 3,812 5,418 53.21% Tanie1a Tabu VLV 2,032 2,046 20.09% Lasarusa Yehuda Ben- NVTLP 1,645 EXCL 0% Zion Sovea Semi Seruvakula FAP 2,693 2,718 26.69%

North West Fijian Urban Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Lemeki V Vuetaki NAPF 283 1.93% Joji Natadra Banuve SDL 11,620 79.04% Ravuama Rairuma IND 477 3.24% Nanovu Mosese Tukikaukamea IND 31 0.21% Vuh Salusalu Mahe UPP 115 0.78% Ratu Maileki Lalabalavu NFP 158 1.07% Akanisi Koroitamana FLP 2,017 13.72% North West Fijian Urban Communal (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 #4 Votes Akarusi Koroitamana PANU 5,320 5,330 5,962 8,297 67.23% Divuki Miliakere Ah VLV 66 EXCL 0% Tong Navitalai Ratukalou NVTLP 652 658 EXCL 0% Vilisoru Cagimaivei SVT 3,869 3,884 3,901 4,045 32.77% Kitione Vuataki VLV 2,435 2,470 2,479 EXCL 0%

93 South West Fijian Urban Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Viliame Karia FLP 817 6.97% Jone Yavala Kubuabola SDL 10,123 86.41% Silikiwai Emosi NAPF 470 4.01% Seveci Naisilisili IND 305 2.6% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 ofVotes Isimeli Jale Cokanasiga FAP 2,143 2,223 2,239 3,030 5,378 56.76% Posiano Nauku FLP 817 819 822 EXCL 0% Kelemedi Rakuve Bulewa SVT 3,969 3,976 3,985 4,003 4,097 43.24% Naipote Vere VLV 1,833 1,834 2,429 2,442 EXCL 0% Manasa Dela Moce NVTLP 618 623 EXCL 0% Kevueli Bogilevu Independent 95 EXCL 0%

Suva City Fijian Urban Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Peni Vulaca Secake SDL 880 8.92% Volavola Josaia \V'aqabaca FLP 675 6.84% Apete Naitini NAPF 760 7.7% Mataiasi Ragigia SDL 7,205 73.04% Semi. Uluivuya NVTLP 46 0.47% Akuila Bale IND 142 1.44% Miriama Rayawa Cama NFP 157 1.59% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 #4 Votes SVT 3,700 3,712 3,772 3,880 42.22% Viliame Sovalatila FAP 1,408 2,146 3,222 5,311 57.78% Volavola Susana Tuisawau FLP 1,170 1,181 EXCL 0% Lili King VLV 2,131 2,152 2,197 EXCL 0% Josaia Waqabaca NVTLP 782 EXCL 0%

94 Tamavua/Laucala Fijian Urban Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Netani Sukanaivalu NAPF 788 6.15% Laisiasa Corerega NFP 128 1% Ratu Tone \Vaqairatu SDL 10,880 84.92% Tone Tubuto FLP 970 7.57% Kaumaitotoya U.K.M.S. POTT 28 0.22% Basilio D IND 18 0.14% Kalokalodromu (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage ofVotes #1 #2 Manasa Lasaro VLV 2,780 EXCL 0% Ema Tagicakabau FAP 2,871 5,489 54.81% Tonetani Kaukllnoce SVT 4,363 4,525 45.19%

Nasinu Fijian Urban Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Joji Uluinakauvadra NAPF 459 3.67% Inoke Luveni SDL 10,631 84.91% Emasi Qovu IND 630 5.03% Vilikesa Ravia FLP 800 6.39% Tiko Liesa Via IND 0 0% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 Votes Fereti Seru Dewa Independent 223 EXCL 0% Sikeli Naiova NVTLP 1,046 1,172 1,188 EXCL 0% Nirnilote Fifita porr 234 274 EXCL 0% Titoko Inoke Luveni VLV 2,210 2,219 2,236 2,392 EXCL 0% Apolosi SVT 3,027 3,045 3,246 4,259 4,509 49.57% Biuvakaloloma Toji Uluinakauvadra FAP 2,356 2,386 2,426 2,445 4,587 50.43%

95 Suva City General Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Aca Lord SDL 702 25.71% Daniel RobertJohns NFP 60 2.2% Rounds Ganilau UPP 1,458 53.41% Lavenia Bernadette IND 510 18.68% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 Votes Edward Jennings COIN 161 EXCL 0% Norman Lawrence FAP 577 707 EXCL 0% Low Robin Anthony UGP 1,360 1,379 1,432 47.48% Storck William Granger Aull Independent 918 930 1,584 52.52%

North Eastern General Communal (2006) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Votes Percentage #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 ofVotes I-larry Arthur UPP 528 545 561 941 0 0% Robinson Nawaia IND 357 366 0 0% Touakin Rebo Terubea FLP 383 391 423 0 0% David SDL 1,467 1,478 1,511 1,547 1,639 1,639 44.87% Christopher Rocky Percival NAPF 289 0 0% Billings Robin Irwin IND 629 873 1,158 1,165 2,014 2,014 55.13% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage ofVotes #1 #2 #3 #4 Vincent Walter Lobendahn UGP 1,660 1,661 1,684 1,694 47.41% Anthony Fong COIN 87 87 EXCL 0% Leo Barry Smith Independent 1,326 1,326 1,328 1,879 52.59% Edward Daniel Reece FAP 480 561 561 EXCL 0% Ian Mitchell Simpson Independent 20 EXCL 0%

96 Western/Central General Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Millis Malcolm UPP 2,234 50.47% Beddoes Noel Iupasi Tofinga NAPF 453 10.23% Anaseini Tuineau NAPF 34 0.77% Henry Vula Tawake Shaw SDL 54 1.22% Pateresio Nunu Polania SDL 1,651 37.3% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes David Pickering UGP 2,392 54.07% Kenneth Low Independent 1,123 25.38% Arthur Jennings COIN 909 20.55%

Vitilevu East/Maritime Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Sanjeet Chand Maharaj FLP 4,744 78.39% Bhima Sami NFP 946 15.63% Jayant Prasad Maharaj IND 200 3.3% Akmal Ellyas Ali SDL 162 2.68% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Krishna Chand Sharma FLP 4,011 62.69% Dhirendra Kumar NFP 2,387 37.31%

Tavua Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Anand Babla FLP 5,707 79.48% Suresh Chandra NFP 1,329 18.51% Mohammed TaniE I<:han SDL 144 2.01% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Anand Babla FLP 5,463 75.43% N arendra Reddy NFP 1,779 24.57%

97 Ba East Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes lain Kumar FLP 4,956 72.2% Praveen Bala NFP 1,874 27.3% Nirbhay Chand SDL 34 0.5% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Ahmaed Gaffar FLP 6,202 73.56% Ram Lajendra NFP 2,229 26.44%

Ba West Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Madan Sen SDL 180 2.17% FaroukJaneman NFP 870 10.51% Narendra Kumar Padarath FLP 7,229 87.32% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Ami Chand FLP 5,545 65.58% Vinod Patel NFP 2,910 34.42%

Lautoka Rural Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Mohammed Shameem SDL 252 2.85% Deo Kumar NAPF 125 1.41% Udit Narayan FLP 6,832 77.18% N aren Prasad NFP 1,643 18.56% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Azmat Khan NFP 2,803 34.08% Anand Kumar Singh FLP 5,422 65.92%

98 Lautoka City Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Tai Gawander FLP 7,629 79.89% Rosemary Satanji NAPF 172 1.8% Rakesh Kumar NFP 1,590 16.65% Azizul Dean SDL 158 1.65% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Ganeshwar Chand FLP 6,146 61.34% Tagannath Sami NFP 3,720 37.13% Mohammed Rauf PANU 153 1.53% Khan

Vuda Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Vyas Deo Sharma FLP 7,131 85.12% Rajendra Singh NFP 748 8.93% Abdul Afizu Rahiman SDL 330 3.94% Arbin Prakash Narayan IND 14 0.17% Sanel Prasad NAPF 155 1.85% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Bissun Datt Independent 201 2.12% Vinod Chandra Deo Maharaj FLP 6,936 73.10% Swam Kumar Maharaj NFP 2,352 24.79%

Nadi Urban Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Gunasagaran Gounder FLP 8,108 76.06% Sushila Rameshwar NFP 2,151 20.18% Mohammed Zarib SDL 266 2.5% Kamlesh Prasad IND 120 1.13% Sanmogam Naidu Sanu IND 15 0.14% Nadl Urban IndIan Communal (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes NFP 3,567 34.31% AmjadAli FLP 6,829 65.69%

99 N adi Rural Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Perumal Mupnar FLP 6,825 71.91% Kama Waddi Raiu NFP 2,528 26.64% Armogam Sami SDL 138 1.45% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Shiu Sharan Sharma FLP 5,395 66.09% Dewendra Pratap NFP 2,768 33.91%

Nadroga Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Lekh Ram Vayeshnoi FLP 7,219 81.04% Parma Nand NFP 1,215 13.64% Ashok Kumar SDL 474 5.32% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Lekh Ram Vayeshnoi FLP 5,647 61.06% Mohammed Azam NFP 3,601 38.94% Khalil

Viti Levu South/Kadavu Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Pravin Narayan NAPF 143 2.1% Chaitayna Lakshman FLP 5,575 81.99% Bimal Singh SDL 205 3.01% Bimal Bimlesh Prasad NFP 877 12.9% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Prince Gopal FLP 3,992 63.83% Lakshman Maan Singh NFP 2,262 36.17%

100 Suva City Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Gyam Nand FLP 7,660 77.32% Shiu Ram COIN 20 0.2% Chandra Kant Umaria NFP 1,675 16.91% Mohammed Salamat SDL 147 1.48% Ali Dildar Shah NAPF 405 4.09% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes \\1adan Lal N arsey NFP 5,111 43.83% Deo Narain FLP 6,549 56.17%

Vanua Levu West Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Suresh Chand NAPF 33 0.5% Bijay Prasad SDL 48 0.72% Suvinay Kumar NFP 708 10.69% Basawaiya Surendra Lal FLP 4,886 73.75% Charan Teath Singh NAPF 950 14.34% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Biman Chand Prasad NFP 2,912 38.61% Anup Kumar FLP 4,630 61.39%

Laucala Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Dewan Chand FLP 13,133 89.43% Praveen Chand NAPF 504 3.43% Indar Singh SDL 203 1.38% Sundresan Goundar NFP 828 5.64% Roshan Dildar Shah TFP 18 0.12% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Hikmat Singh Verma FLP 8,816 77.84% Attar Singh NFP 2,510 22.16%

101 Nasinu Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percental:!e ofVotes Hari Prasad Sharma SDL 5 0.04% Mohammed I<:halim NFP 615 5.11% I<:rishna Datt FLP 10,940 90.89% Fatima Bano Shad NAPF 28 0.23% Imraz Iqbal Ali SDL 226 1.88% Liaquat Khan NAPF 222 1.84% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percental:!e ofVotes FLP 7,725 73.61% Clement Claudius Toseph COIN 34 0.32% NFP 2,735 26.06%

Tailevu Rewa Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percental:!e ofVotes Ragho Nand FLP 8,058 86.69% Anay Sumeshwar NFP 967 10.4% Yadav Mohammed Tazim NAPF 144 1.55% Nilesh Chand Maharai SDL 126 1.36% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percental:!e ofVotes Ahmed Riaz Dean FAP 356 3.81% Aptar Singh NFP 3,605 38.59% Ragho Nand FLP 5,381 57.60%

Labasa Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percenta2:e ofVotes Jaiwant I<:ris Arulappan NFP 1,137 14.04% Subrail T Goundar SDL 147 1.82% Kamlesh Reddy FLP 6,813 84.14% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percental:!e ofVotes Keshwan Padayachi NFP 1,756 21.78% Charan Teath Singh UNLP 1,181 14.65% Vinod Prasad FAP 237 2.94% Sanju Reddy FGWC 37 0.46% Muthu Swamy FLP 4,037 50.07% Pradeep Singh Independent 814 10.10%

102 Labasa Rural Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Mohammed Tahir FLP 5,279 83.16% Satya Deo NAPF 139 2.19% Mohammed Rafiq NFP 930 14.65% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Mohammed Rafiq NFP 1,772 21.96% Niranjan Kuar UNLP 341 4.23% Umesh Chand FGWC 152 1.88% Subedhar Mohammed Lateef FLP 5,806 71.94%

Macuata East/Cakaudrove Indian Communal (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Vijay Chand FLP 5,298 83.29% Kamal Kumar Raj NFP 632 9.94% Tames Venkat Sami NAPF 350 5.5% Chitta Singh SDL 81 1.27% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Satish Chandra Gulabdas NFP 2,297 32.70% Dayal Patel UNLP 162 2.31% David Manohar Lal FAP 362 5.15% Giyannendra Prasad FLP 4,203 59.84%

Rotuma Communal (2006) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Votes Percentage #1 #2 #3 ofVotes Sosefo Kafoa SDL 526 531 0 11.97% Mua Ieli UPP 532 548 566 566 12.76% Taukave Sosefo Sikuri NAPF 245 0 5.52% Inoke Victor Fatiaki IND 1,149 1,348 1,361 1,361 30.69% Jioji Konousi IND 1,983 2,008 2,508 2,508 56.55% Konrote (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Kafoa Pene LFR 1,982 49.62% Marieta Rigamoto Independent 2,012 50.38%

103 Tailevu North/ Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Isoa Gonenicolo IND 1,585 11.05% Tamani Tomasi Tokalauvere FLP 1,769 12.33% Aisake Bukavesi NVTLP 849 5.92% Josefa Dulakiverata IND 2,800 19.52% Tosefa Vosanibola SDL 7,342 51.18% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage ofVotes #1 #2 #3 #4 Litia Cakobau SVT 3,015 3,021 3,050 EXCL 0% Josefa Vosanibola VLV 1,803 1,803 EXCL 0% Mani Lal Patel NFP 10 EXCL 0% Viliame Sausauwai NVTLP 2,368 2,368 4,107 6,411 46.59% Tu'uakitau FAP 6,563 6,567 6,602 7,348 53.41% Cokanauto

Tailevu South/Lomaiviti Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Adi Aseneca Caucau SDL 10,400 61.43% Aisea Naikawakawa FLP 5,736 33.88% Wailevu Tone Tovehi IND 793 4.98% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 ofVotes Isireli FLP 3,351 3,363 3,399 3,400 4,912 8,759 55.92% Mokunitulevu Vuibau Epenisa Seru SVT 6,161 6,166 6,168 . 6,745 6,783 6,905 44.08% Cakobau Samuela FAP 3,926 3,929 3,931 3,945 3,969 EXCL 0% Matawalu Ram Krishna NFP 22 EXCL 0% Reddy Toji Bakoso NVTLP 594 594 595 EXCL 0% Josua VLV 1,567 1,567 1,571 1,574 EXCL 0% Tubunavere Uluiviti Idris Ali Independent 43 45 EXCL 0%

104 Nausori Naitasiri Open (2006) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Votes Percentage #1 #2 #3 #4 ofVotes Asaeli Masalica SDL 7,723 7,804 7,811 8,298 8,298 52.91% Peter Arunesh NFP 485 485 0 3.29% Chand Tosaia Gucake N£\PF 584 587 1,051 0 7.12% Lavenia FLP 6,935 6,937 6,951 7,515 7,515 47.09% Wainiqolo Padarath Lasarusa Sovea IND 86 0 0.58% Ben Zion (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 #4 Votes Sitiveni Kinikini SVT 169 EXCL 0% Lepani FAP 1,630 1,671 2,454 2,612 19.37% Tagicakibau Lavinia Padrath FLP 5,106 5,125 5,135 6,747 50.04% Mridula Sainath NFP 4,044 4,098 4,100 4,123 30.58% Ledua Vereti NVTLP 804 816 EXCL 0% Vilikesa Mocelutu VLV 1,729 1,772 1,787 EXCL 0%

Nasinu/Rewa Open (2006) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Votes Percentage #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 of Votes Indar Deo NAPF 748 760 0 0% Tohn Ali SDL 5,188 5,199 5,225 6,746 8,179 8,179 46.43% Azim Hussein FLP 8,611 8,625 8,663 8,688 9,436 9,436 53.57% Priscillia Singh NPF 563 0 0% Seru Serevi IND 845 1,362 2,035 2,181 0 0% Pita SDL 1,664 1,672 1,692 0 0% Tagicakiverata (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 Votes Peniasi Silatolu VLV 1,178 1,225 1,287 8.96% Atunaisa Bani Druavesi SVT 131 EXCL 0% Liesa Via Tiko FAP 1,161 1,179 EXCL 0% I-Iarnam Sign Golian NPF 3,920 3,963 3,970 27.65% Apenai Turaganikeli NVTLP 1,785 1,800 1,825 12.71 John Ali FLP 6,185 6,192 7,277 50.68%

105 Cunningham Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Aminiasi Delana IND 536 2.79% Leoni Tuisowaqa NAPF 659 3.34% Ramesio Rogovakalali FLP 7,492 38.98% Rajesh Singh SDL 9,831 51.15% Joketani Delai SLM 49 0.25% Peni Vatubai NAPF 225 1.17% Manuel Lui Arisais NFP 428 2.23% (Snr) (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 #4 Votes Toeli Kalou FLP 4,926 4,946 4,950 6,741 50.29% Berenado SVT 4,383 4,397 4,420 4,468 33.33% Vunibobo Tosaia Gucake FAP 1,880 1,883 1,926 EXCL 0% Soani Nakuna NVTLP 614 615 EXCL 0% Saimoni Lutu VLV 1,561 1,564 2,127 2,196 16.38% Vinod Lal NFP 41 EXCL 0%

Laucala Open (2006) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Votes Percentage #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 ofVotes Vijay Krishna Nair FLP 6,985 6,985 6,986 7,015 7,845 7,845 49.96% Keshwan Nadan NFP 638 638 638 0 0% Salabula Losena SDL 7,138 7,140 7,161 7,171 7,856 7,856 50.04% Manunivavalagi NAPF 874 875 916 1,515 0 0% Dalituicama Korovulavula Nimilote Titoko Fifita POIT 23 0 0% Viliame Civoniceva IND 43 63 0 0% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage #1 #2 #3 #4 ofVotes Sumj Mati Nand FLP 5,089 5,120 5,130 6,395 50.17% Sowani Tobewaqiri NVTLP 309 311 EXCL 0% Manunivavalagi FAP 1,441 1,443 1,453 EXCL 0% Dalituicama Korovulavula Mosese Uluicicia SVT 4,125 4,157 4,163 4,266 33.47% Mariama Rayawa Cama VLV 1,714 1,715 2,000 2,085 16.36% Jag Nadan NFP 68 EXCL 0%

106 Samabula/Tamavua Open (2006) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Votes Percentage #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 ofVotes Baba Tupeni L SDL 5,939 6,000 6,011 6,021 6,118 6,118 46.07% Pramod Rae NFP 666 668 671 0 5.05% Pita Kewa Nacuva SDL 92 0 0.69% Monica Raghwan FLP 5,332 5,341 5,599 5,656 7,162 7,162 53.93% Filipe Bole NAPF 961 979 999 1,603 0 12.07% Manoa Dobui UPP 290 292 0 2.2% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 ofVotes Tubeni L. Baba FLP 5,361 5,368 5,427 6,444 7,750 58.37% Raymond Nair VLV 1,269 1,274 1,337 1,400 EXCL 0% James Raghwan Raman NFP 4,726 4,730 5,384 5,434 5,528 41.66% Sovea Nagera Tabua SVT 565 879 EXCL 0% Peceli Vuniwa NVTLP 333 EXCL 0% Tunidau Viliame FAP 1,024 1,027 1,130 EXCL 0% Saulekaleka

107 Suva City Open (2006) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Votes Percentage #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 ofVotes Ofa M.P. Swann IND 341 345 0 0% Misaele Weleilakeba SDL 5,705 5,707 5,746 5,963 6,135 6,135 50.96% Tom Ricketts FLP 3,261 3,475 3,493 3,524 5,903 5,093 49.04% Attar Singh NFP 745 746 965 0 0% Tikotikoca Inoke Sem UPP 223 0 0% Epeli Gavidi Ganilau NAPF 1,763 1,765 1,834 2,551 0 0% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 Votes Meli IND 457 517 520 619 1,064 1,079 EXC 0% Vakarewakobau L Mataiasi Vave SVT 1,040 1,040 1,074 1,076 1,091 1,112 1,617 1,791 EXC 0% Ragigia L i\senaca Bentley FAP 870 870 872 873 885 EXC 0% L Viliame VLV 1,510 1,510 1,510 1,511 1,525 1,550 1,598 EXC 0% Gonelevu L Francis \Vaqa NVTL 500 500 500 500 501 EXC 0% Sokonibogi P L Prince Vyas COIN 65 EXC 0% Muni Lakshman L Bhavik Waghela IND 110 110 118 EXC 0% L Pramod Kumar NFP 89 91 EXC 0% Rae L Ofa Duncan UGP 3,849 3,850 3,862 3,866 3,870 3,879 3,905 5,187 6,723 55.65%

Kenneth FLP 3,590 3,592 3,624 3,634 3,645 4,460 4,960 5,102 5,357 44.35% Vincent Zinck

108 Lami Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Eroni Ratuwalesi IND 36 0.26% Esaroma Ledua IND 1,474 10.74% Filimoni Lacanivalu FLP 2,260 16.46% Mere Tuisalalo Samisoni SDL 7,664 55.82% Benjamin Wainiqolo NAPF 681 4.96% Padarath Viliame Savu NVTLP 57 0.42% Jasper Singh IND 1,087 7.92% Vilikesa Rauca NAPF 168 1.22% Lionel Danford UPP 303 2.21% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 Votes Lute Taoba FAP 2,025 2,029 2,036 2,311 2,342 2,351 2,370 2,621 EXC 0% Powell L Mere Tuisalalo SVT 4,249 4,256 4,265 4,271 4,309 4,827 4,848 4,974 5,409 43.80% Samisoni

William]ames UGP 539 605 605 605 607 EXC 0% Traill L j'yIichael FLP 2,349 2,353 2,356 2,359 2,371 2,381 3,130 4,754 6,940 56.20% Columbus Emosi Sili IND 202 202 EXC 0% L Elenoa Ligairi VLV 355 355 361 362 EXC 0% Sikivou L Viliame Savu NVTL 786 786 789 791 803 872 EXC 0 P L Jagdish Pratap IND 237 237 290 EXC 0% L j'yIirza Namrudh IND 83 EXC 0% Buksh L Serupepeli Dakai 'lLV 1,524 1,526 1,647 1,650 1,917 1,918 2,001 EXC 0% L

109 Lomaivuna/Namosi/Kadavu Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Ted Young SDL 11,817 73.02% Mitieli Baleivanualala FLP 2,972 18.36% Peter Asiga Lee IND 1,395 8.62% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage #1 #2 #3 ofVotes Konisi Tabu Yabaki SVT 7,219 7,405 8,628 57.28% Isikeli Nasoga Independent 685 EXCL 0% Vuli Meli Titoko VLV 1,428 1,586 1,682 11.17% Samu Konataci NVTLP 1,260 1,425 EXCL 0% Ted Young FAP 4,472 4,648 4,754 31.56%

Ra Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Epineri Vocevuka FLP 4,870 30.42% SDL 10,172 63.54% Vurewa Aporosa NAPF 968 6.05% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 ofVotes Tevita Bolobolo SVT 3,495 3,524 3,540 3,586 EXCL 0% Veretariki NVTLP 2,382 2,395 2,417 EXCL 0% Wakanivuga Joji Natadra VLV 850 EXCL 0% Banuve Selesitino Luba FAP 1,846 1,859 EXCL 0% Sanjeet Chand FLP 3,826 3,833 5,630 5,655 5,803 39.94% Maharaj George Shiu Raj IND 2,129 2,917 2,941 5,287 8,725 60.06%

110 Tavua Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Damodar FLP 7,231 53.89% Narendra Reddy NFP 1,723 12.84% Semi Leiene SDL 4,069 30.32% Savenaca Tuwai PAND 303 2.26% Koroinasau Ratu Semi NAPF 92 0.69% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Jone Naeqe Nakautoga SVT 2,603 19.21% Williame Bouwalu VLV 230 1.70% Krishna Reddy PAND 1,289 9.52% Pravin Singh FLP 6,803 50.22% Hansy Scino Peters NVTLP 1,146 8.46% Shiu Ram NFP 1,476 10.90%

Ba Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Ram Lajendra NFP 2,981 17.61% John Nacamavuto NAPF 139 0.82% Dunn Jale 0 Baba SDL 60 0.35% Mahendra Pal FLP 10,709 63.27% Chaudhry Ralulu Rusila NAPF 16 0.09% Savenaca Nabeka PAND 283 1.67% Faiaaz Ali SDL 2,737 16.17% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Savenaca Nabeka PAND 809 4.76% Diwan Chand Shankar NFP 5,285 31.11 % Mahendra Pal FLP 10,358 60.97% Chaudhry Saimoni Baleirewa SVT 46 2.7% Daben Singh VLV 490 2.88%

111 Magodro Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Vijay Lal NAPF 731 4.71% Josese Drikalu Botitu SDL 3,761 24.24% Davendra N aidu NFP 2,023 13.04% Gyan Singh FLP 9,000 58.01% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 #4 Votes Epeli Navatoga SVT 1,169 1,182 EXCL 0% Mosese Tuki Yasa VLV 447 EXCL 0% Shiu Charan NFP 3,927 3,928 5,094 5,109 33.95% Jag Narain Sharma FLP 6,968 6,971 6,975 9,940 66.05% Steven Pradeep PANU 2,538 2,968 2,980 EXCL 0% Singh

Lautoka City Open (2006) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Votes Percentag #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 e ofVotes Isimeli Bose IND 351 351 353 0 0% Daniel Urai FLP 7,420 7,424 7,429 7,448 7,839 7,839 52.28% Josefata Niumataiwalu IND 88 89 0 0% Alexander O'Connor UPP 402 402 406 410 0 0% Jone S. Bouwalu SDL 5,222 5,278 5,356 5,380 5,390 5,390 35.95% Sailesh Naidu NFP 1,450 1,451 1,451 1,757 1,766 1,766 11.77% Bijesh Chandra IND 62 0 0% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 ofVotes Josefa Turuva SVT 192 193 EXCL 0% Savitri Chauhan NFP 5,255 5,256 5,352 5,381 5,488 35.90% Hassan Ali NLP 109 EXCL 0% Viliame Niumataiwalu PANU 2,097 2,098 2,122 3,429 EXCL 0%

Manoa Dobui VLV 1,213 1,319 1,375 EXCL 0% Haroon Ali Shah FLP 6,421 6,421 6,479 6,479 9,799 64.10%

112 Vuda Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Mohammed Yusuf SDL 4,435 28.29% Felix Anthony FLP 9,745 62.19% N arend Kumar aka NFP 1,267 8.08% Bissun Dart Viliame Rakuli PANU 177 1.13% Aca Tuigaloa Saukuru IND 54 0.34% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Tevita Momoedonu FLP 8,978 57.71% Sikeli Malo SVT 73 4.7% Reyama Natakele Loa PANU 2,410 15.49% Sayed Khaiyum NFP 4,096 26.33%

Nadi Open 2006) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Votes Percent~ #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 ofVotes Arvind Deo Singh SVT 237 237 238 238 238 0 0% AmjadAli FLP 8,630 8,631 8,691 8,691 8,694 8,695 9,060 9,069 9,688 9,688 52.13% NFP 2,645 2,645 2,645 2,645 2,652 2,653 2,664 2,669 2,676 2,676 14.40% Williams Josephine upp 389 389 390 390 393 394 0 0% Raikuna Shyam Sundaram SDL 5,432 5,486 5,487 5,575 5,584 5,818 5,829 6,215 6,222 6,222 33.47% Ratu Vera Naovuka IND 65 65 0 0% Qoro Rajendra Kmuar IND 56 0 0% Kamenieli PAN 476 476 476 476 622 622 624 633 0 0% N awaqavonovono U Joseva IND 168 169 171 178 0 0% Samudunatua Vatunitu Ratu Jeremaia IND 392 392 392 393 403 404 409 0 0% Lewaravu Pravin alUleson IND 96 96 96 0 0% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage ofVotes #1 #2 #3 #4 Manjuwati Verma NFP 5,653 5,723 5,746 5,841 33.16% Topeni Vatunitu VLV 1,185 1,213 EXCL 0% Pradhuman Raniga FLP 7,559 7,572 7,678 11,773 66.84% Makalesi Lutuciri SVT 156 EXCL 0% Avisai Vuniyayawa Tora PAN 3,061 3,106 4,190 EXCL 0% U

113 Yasawa/Nawaka Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Sivia Qoro FLP 7,858 50.3% Bal Subramani NFP 2,772 17.74% Saimoni Naivalu SDL 4,163 26.65% Mataiasi N Saukuru PANU 769 4.92% Dewa Nand IND 60 0.38% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage ofVotes #1 #2 #3 #4 Tai Ram Reddy NFP 4,651 4,657 4,662 4,681 33.12% Gunasagaran Gounder FLP 6,576 6,577 6,583 9,453 66.88% Jone Nalewatobo VLV 1,078 1,088 EXCL 0% Eroni Lewaqai PAN 1,805 1,812 2,889 EXCL 0% U Tako Sisa SVT 24 EXCL 0%

N adroga Open (2006) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Votes Percentag #1 #2 #3 #4 e ofVotes Ali Mohammed Tamal NAPF 260 369 0 0% Mesulame Rakuro FLP 6,959 6,960 6,973 7,939 7,939 53.50% Immanuel Manu NFP 770 770 1,012 0 0% Viliame Navoka SDL 6,734 6,739 6,853 6,899 6,899 46.50% Vilisite Qera NVTLP 115 0 0% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage ofVotes #1 #2 #3 AditKumar NFP 35 EXCL 0% Mosese Volavola FLP 6,239 6,255 7,907 55.22% Savenaca Takolevu FAP 1,667 1,667 EXCL 0% Sakiusa Makutu SVT 6,377 6,396 6,411 44.78%

114 Serua Navosa Open /2006) Candidate Party Prol?;ressive Vote Count Votes Percentage #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 ofVotes Atunaisa Lacabuka NDP 123 196 0 1.1% Rasoki Anisi Dau Bati IND 81 0 0.46% Tona Rokowai NVTLP 433 434 621 623 0 3.5% Pio Iowane \'V'ong IND 1,005 1,008 1,009 1,016 1,022 0 5.75% Peniasi Lavava FLP 6,318 6,319 6,319 6,356 6,360 7,311 7,638 7,638 42.96% Dakua William j\'1cGoon NFP 938 939 940 1,240 1,840 1,860 0 10.46% Jone V SDL 8,537 8,538 8,546 8,545 8,553 8,610 10,143 10,143 57.04% Navakamocea Viliame Bale NAPF 346 347 347 0 1.95% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 #4 Votes Isaia Gonewai VLV 1,010 1,088 EXCL 0% Benjamin Wise UGP 344 EXCL 0% Kuini Viukaba FAP 7,686 7,788 7,870 9,207 56.87% rona Rokowai NVTLP 1,238 1,274 2,222 2,246 13.87% Mesulame Narawa SVT 4,535 4,623 4,653 4,737 29.26% Pio Iowane Wong IND 1,377 1,417 1,445 EXCL 0%

Bua/Macuata West Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Tosefa Cavu NAPF 939 6.15% Hazrat Ali NAPF 48 0.31% Vitori Cavalevu NAPF 30 0.2% Tuvuki Isireli B IND 235 1.54% Lemeki Qalibau FLP 4,618 30.24% Tosefa Dimuri SDL 8,307 54.4% Tosefa Rusaqoli NFP 565 3.7% Suliasi Saraqia IND 528 3.46% (1999) Candidate Party Progressive Vote Count Percentage of #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 Votes Filimone Ralogaivau SVT 5,898 5,906 6,016 6,021 6,078 39.55% Rameshwar Prasad NFP 18 EXCL 0% Manoa Bale FLP 4,244 4,251 4,506 4,951 9,290 60.45% Ramesh Chand UNLP 363 365 EXCL 0% Meli Bulitiliva VLV 4,388 4,389 4,389 4,396 EXCL 0% Josefa Rusaqoli NVTL 457 457 457 EXCL 0% P

115 Labasa Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Mohammed Sharif SDL 80 0.62% Gonelevu Siteri N ai NAPF 273 2.1% Koresi Matatolu NAPF 5 0.04% Sailosi Semi Lutua SDL 265 2.04% Poseci Bune FLP 8,066 62.19% Timoci Bulitavu SDL 3,015 23.25% NFP 1,266 9.76% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Sakeo Tuiwainikai VLV 975 7.18% Nareish Kumar FLP 7,043 51.84% Chitta Singh UNLP 1,051 7.74% Bijend Prasad Ram NFP 4,516 33.24%

Macuata East Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Agni Deo Singh FLP 8,357 62.51% NFP 1,669 12.48% Iliesa Seru SDL 3,343 25.01% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Krishna Datt FLP 8,807 58.92% Parmod Chand NFP 4,038 27.01% Mehi Lal UNLP 571 3.82% Joeli Tumuri VLV 1,532 10.25%

116 Cakaudrove West Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Gilbert Vakalalabure IND 511 3.61% Aporosa Tuikoroalau IND 540 3.81% Ratu Osea SDL 8,409 59.38% Vakalalabure Peni Naulu IND 1,544 10.9% Inia Poate Tubui SDL 698 4.93% Saliceni Tulevu FLP 2,359 16.66% Gonelevu Solomone Catarogo PANU 91 0.64% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Mosese Gere NVTLP 443 3.37% Epeli Ligamamada FAP 1,574 11.98% Sitiveni Ligamamada Rabuka SVT 9,190 69.92% Aisake Kaunisela Kubuabola VLV 1,936 14.73%

Lau/Tavenui/Rotuma Open (2006) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Fani Tago NAPF 2,553 18.41% Vosaniveibuli llisoni Taoba IND 204 1.47% Savenaca Uluibau SDL 10,888 78.51% Draunidalo Pio R Naiqama IND 223 1.61% (1999) Candidate Party Votes Percentage ofVotes Senimili Rokolewasau FAP 1,099 8.05% Tuivanuavou \'\!aisea Qoronalau NVTLP 215 1.58% Epeli Gavidi Ganilau VLV 4,423 32.41% Naiqama Tawake SVT 7,911 57.96% Lalabalavu

117 Appendix B: Constitutional Distribution of Seats by ethnicity, House of Representatives253

Constitution Total # Fijian Indo-Fijian Rotuman General Open Members 1970 52 I National 10 10 5 1 Communal 12 12 3 1990 70 I Communal 37 27 1997 71 TOpen 25 I Communal 23 19 1 3

Appendix C: Constitutional Distribution of Seats by appointment nomination, Senate254

Constitutio Total # GCC Prime Leader of Council President's n Members Minister the of discretion Opposition Rotuma 1970 22 8 7 6 1 1990 34 24 1 9 1997 32 14 9 8 1

253 Communal seats can only be voted for by members of that ethnicity. National seats are open for universal suffrage, but the seats (and thus the candidates) are allocated and restricted by ethnicity. Open seats are open for universal suffrage and can be contested by any candidate, regardless of ethnicity. All information is from the 1970, 1990 and 1997 Constitutions. 254 Under the 1970 Constitution, the Senate was formally appointed by the Governor-General, who was required to accept the nominations ofvarious institutions as designated in the chart. After Rabuka declared Fiji a republic in 1987, the President took on the role of appointing Senators on the advice of various institutions as designated. The colmnn "President's discretion" refers to 9 seats appointed by the President under the 1990 Constitution that were intended to be filled by Indo-Fijians and minorities. All information is from the 1970, 1990 and 1997 Constitutions.

118 Appendix D: Percenta e ofVotes Won/Percentage of Seats Won, 2006255

SDL 44.49 50.7

FLP 39.18 43.66

IND 4.89 2.82

UPP .4 2

Appendix E: Percentage ofVotes Won/Percentage of Seats Won, 2001256

NFP 1.15 1.41

NLUP 1.34 2.82

1.42 2.82

UGP 0.34 1.41

Appendix F: Percentage ofVotes Won/Percentage of Seats Won, 1999257

FLP 33.93 52.11

13.58

FAP 9.66

NVTLP 2.57 1.4

PANU 3.26 5.63

UGP 1.55 2.81

255 "2006 Election Results for each seat." 256 "2000 Summary by Percentage of Votes Won/Percentage ofSeats Won," Elutions OjJice, Government of Fiji. http://\Jv\v\v.e1ections.gov.fj/results2001 Isummaries/04 perc vote seat.html 257 "1999 Summary by Percentage ofVotes Won/Percentage of Seats Won," Elections Office, Government of Fiji. http:lh\lww.elections.gov.fj/resultsI999/sum percent.html

119 Appendix G: Registered Voters-Ethnic Breakdown by Constituency 2006, Open Seats258

District Fijian Indian Rotuman General Tailevu North/Ovalau Open 90.62% 6.25% 0.32% 2.81% Tailevu South/Lomaiviti Open 68.85% 30.35% 0.16% 0.64% Nausori/Naitasiri Open 52.24% 44.57% 1.27% 1.93% Nasinu/Rewa Open 46.00% 51.75% 0.76% 1.49% Cunningham Open 57.22% 36.80% 1.58% 4.40% Laucala Open 48.86% 44.39% 3.18% 3.58% Samabula/Tamavua Open 49.73% 42.53% 2.24% 5.50% Suva City Open 53.91% 31.61% 4.61% 9.86% Lami Open 72.34% 16.30% 1.42% 9.94% Lomaivuna/Namosi/Kaduva 83.53% 15.43% 0.44% 0.61% Open Ra Open 68.44% 31.02% 0.08% 0.46% Tavua Open 42.51% 55.13% 1.24% 1.13% Ba Open 25.58% 73.32% 0.18% 0.92% Magodro Open 28.31% 71.28% 0.03% 0.38% Lautoka City Open 42.40% 52.23% 1.30% 4.06% Vuda Open 32.29% 65.46% 0.71% 1.55% Nadi Open 40.95% 55.29% 1.05% 2.71% Yasawa/Nawaka Open 38.35% 61.44% 0.07% 0.14% Nadroga Open 54.35% 43.92% 0.25% 1.48% Serua/Navosa Open 66.94% 30.69% 0.47% 1.90% Bua/Macuata Open 63.58% 34.04% 0.04% 2.35% Labasa Open 27.53% 70.31% 0.14% 2.02% Macuata East Open 28.31% 70.92% 0.04% 0.73% Cakaudrove West Open 72.71% 16.49% 0.20% 10.59% Lau//Rotuma Open 79.48% 9.09% 7.65% 3.78% Total Voters for 2006 Elections 53.37% 42.63% 1.12% 2.88%

258 "2006 Open Constitution Roll Breakdowns." ElectionJ Office, Government of Fiji. http://www.elections.gov.fjlintroduction/2006openConstRollBreakdowns.pdf

120 Appendix H: Registered Voters-Ethnic Breakdown by Constituency 1999, Open Seats.259

District Fijian Indian Rotuman General Tailevu North/Ovalau Open 87.7% 8.79% 0.31% 3.3% Tailevu South/Lomaiviti Open 68.27% 31.03% 0.11% 0.57% Nausori/Naitasiri Open 48.9% 47.52% 1.14% 2.15% Nasinu/Rewa Open 45.21% 52.77% 0.67% 1.33% Cunningham Open 57.44% 35.14% 1.76% 5.63% Laucala Open 47.93% 44.8% 3.35% 3.9% Samabula/Tamavua Open 46.84% 43.57% 2.83% 6.73% Suva City Open 49.43% 35.41% 4.36% 10.78% Lami Open 66.8% 20.12% 1.47% 11.59% Lomaivuna/Namosi/Kaduva 82.77% 16.09% 0.4% 0.71% Open Ra Open 64.7% 34.67% 0.13% 0.47% Tavua Open 42.6% 54.91% 1.3% 1.16% Ba Open 17.06% 81.8% 0.1% 1.03% Magodro Open 26.76% 72.64% 0.14% 0.44% Lautoka City Open 39.03% 54.2% 1.98% 4.77% Vuda Open 27.43% 70.52% 0.52% 1.52% Nadi Open 36.62% 59.07% 1.09% 3.34% Yasawa/Nawaka Open 36.63% 63.07% 0.04% 0.25% Nadroga Open 48.16% 50.56% 0.24% 1.03% Serua/Navosa Open 66.91% 30.1% 0.42% 2.56% Bua/Macuata Open 61.48% 36.24% 0.06% 2.2% Labasa Open 21.06% 75.58% 0.07% 2.01% Macuata East Open 21.47% 78% 0.04% 0.48% Cakaudrove \'\!est Open 73.49% 14.34% 0.26% 14.34% Lau/Taveuni/Rotuma Open 80.95% 7.08% 8.17% 3.77% Total Voters for 1999 Elections 51.15% 44.38% 1.21% 3.26%

259 "Ethnic Breakdown of Open Constituencies." Elections Office, Government of Fiji. Last Visited: March 14 2008. Available at: http://www.elections.gov.fj/results1999/open ethnic.html

121 Appendix I: Map of Fiji with Provincial Boundaries260

F !.Il

"\ tOMA1VlTl 'q, "" ~

lALX

, , ,~.", ~.. -( ,.., -.... ._- ...... -'~. _.,~ _-- _ _ '- - ,-, - .------,

Fig. 53. Fiji: provinces Based on G.S.G,S. Di'lap no. 4Z9.5 (Cassini1s projection).

2611 http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps lhistoricallpacific islands 1943 1945/fiji prov:1nces.jpg

122 Appendix J: Annual fijian GDP Growth % Per Capita 1968 -2007

40.00%

35.00%

30.00%

25.00%

20.00%

15.00%

10.00%

5.00%

0.00%

-5.00%

-10.00%

,,-40,," Annual Fijian GDP Growth % Per Capita

Source: "Gross Domestic Product of Fiji," Fiji Is/ands Bureau ofStatistics, March 2009. http://www.statsfiji.gov.f) [Key%20StatsINational%20Income13.1 GDpoj()20Summary.pdf

123 Appendix K: Distribution of Households by Income per Adult Equivalent 14

12

V> -0 o 10 .s:: <11 V> ;;s o :c 8 ­o Wn rtl 1: 6 <11 ~ <11 0. 4

2

2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 Fiji<1n Tot<11 9 10 9.5 9.5 10 11 10.5 11 10.5 11 10 10.5 11 10 9 9.5 9 8.5

Lowest Deciles Highest

Source: "Distribution of Households by Income per Adult Equivalent," Fyi Islands Bureau ofStatistics, March 2009. http://www.statsfiji.gov.f) [Key%20Stats !HII<~S!16.6Distrib%20of%20I-IholdcYo20by%20inc ome.pdf

124 Bibliography

"Attempted Coup in Fiji," BBC NewJ, May 19, 2000. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilasia­ pacific/754653.stm

Baba, Tupeni, Michael Field, and Unaisi Nabobo-Baba. Speight oj Violence. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005.

Bainimarama, Voreqe. "Public Declaration ofMilitary Takeover," December 5, 2006. t'iji GOlJernment WebJite. http:/hV'l.vw.fiji.gov.fJ/publish/page 8092.shtml

Bainimarama, Voreqe. "Statement by H.E. CommodoreJosaia Voreqe Bainimarama, Prime Minister of the Republic of Fiji Islands." 621/d Smion ojthe UN GemralAJJemb/y, New York, September 28, 2007. http://www.fiji.gov.fJ/publish/page 10194.shtml

Batiri Williams, Esther and Kaushik K. Saksena. Labour'J Victory: Electoral Behaviour and Opinion int'zji. Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1999.

Brass, Paul R. Ethnidty and NationaliJm. London: Sage Publications, 1991.

Brown, David. Contemporary NationaliJm: Civi(~ Et/JIlocultural and Multicultural PoliticJ. New York: Routledge, 2000.

Brown, M. Anne, ed. Security and DelJeiopment in the Pmific fJlandJ. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2007.

Brownlee, Jason. Authoritariani.rm in an Age ojDemocratization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

"Census of Population 1881-2007,"F!;i fJlandJ Bureau ojStatiJticJ, December 2008. http: / hv",v\v.statsfiji.gov.fJ /Key%20Stats /Population/2.1 %20census%20of%20population.p df

Chand, Ganesh, ed. PaperJ on Rmial DiJcrimination in Fl;t~ Vol. 2: LaWJ~ Regulation, PolideJ. Lautoka: Fiji Institute of Applied Studies, 2006.

'Constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji." July 25, 1990. http://W\vw.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b57d8.html

Cox, Michael, G. John Ikenberry, Takashi Inoguchi, eds. American Democracy Promotion: ImpttiJeJ, StrategieJ, and ImpactJ. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Cunningham, Frank. Theo17'eJ ofDemocracy. New York: Routledge, 2002.

Dahl, RobertA. On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

125 DeSilva, Craig and Al Hulsen, "Fiji's Ratu Mara, Chaudhry both deny coup claims", AJia TimeJ Online, March 22, 2000. http://www.atin.1es.com/oceania/BC22Ah03.html

Diamond, Larry. Del;eloping Democrary: Toward ConJolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.

Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner, eds. Civil-Military ReiationJ and Democrary. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Diamond, Larry and Marc F. Plattner, eds. NationaliJm, Ethnic Conflict, and Democrary~ Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. PoliticJ in Developing CountrieJ. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990.

"Distribution of Households by Income per Adult Equivalent," Fiji IJlandJ Bureau ojStatiJticJ, March 2009. http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/Key%20StatsII-lIES116.6Distrib%20ofD/o20Hhold%20by%20inc ome.pdf

Dolman, Everett Carl. The Warrior State: How Military Organization StructureJ PoliticJ. New Yark: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Dorrance, John C. The United StateJ and the Pacific IJlandJ. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1992.

Ewins, Roy. "Colour, Class, and Custom: The Literature of the 1987 Coup," 2nd ed, 1998. http://speedysnail.com/pacific/fiji coupl

Feizkhah, Elizabeth. "Smash and Grab" TIME AJia. Volume 156, Number 23: (2000). http://w\V\.v.time.com/time/asia/magazine/200010612/fiji.html

Field, Michael, Tupeni Baba, and Unaisi Nabobo-Baba. Speight ojViolence. Auckland: Reed Books, 2005.

"Fiji" CL4 World Factbook, March 19, 2009. https: IIwww.cia.govllibraryIpublicationsI the-world­ factbook Igeos!fj.html

"Fiji Constitution (Abrogation) Military Government and Finance Decree" Fiji SeJJional LegiJlation, October 3, 1987. http://www.paclii.arg/fj/legis/num act/fmgafdn319876331

"Fiji Facts and Figures" Fiji IJlandJ Bureau ofStatiJticJ, July 1,2008. http:/hvww.statsfiji.gov.fj/FFF08.pdf

Fogarty, Philippa. "Deep Divisions in Post-Coup Fiji." BBC Newj~ December 4, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/?Ihi/asia-pacific/7746519.stm

Foster, RobertJ., cd. Nation Making: Emergent IdentitieJ in POJtcolonial MelaneJia. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1995.

126 France, Peter. The Charter ofthe Land. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Ftaenkel, Jon. "Fiji. (Melanasia in Reviews: Issues and Events, 2007)." The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 20.2 (Fall 2008): 450 (11).

Fraenkel, Jon. "FlawedJudgment."f'Zji DailY Post, October 23, 2008. http://fijidailypost.comI opinion.php?date=20081023

Fraenkel, Jon. "The Alternative Vote System in Fiji: Electoral Engineering or Ballot-Rigging?" Journal ofCommonwealth and Comparative Politics, Volume 39, Number 2 (2001): 1-31.

Fraenkel, Jon, "The Failure of Electoral Engineering in Fiji," Maori News Online, June 7, 2000. http://rl1.aorine"\vs.com/karereIfiji/fiji030.htm

Fraenkel, Jon and Stewart Firth eds. From Election to Coup in l'i;i. Canberra: Australia National University Press, 2007.

Fraenkel, Jon and Bernard Grofman. "Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in Ethnically Divided Societies? The Case of Fiji." Journal ofComparative Political Studies, Volume 39, Number 5, (2006): 623-651.

Fukuyama, Francis. America at the CroJSroads: Democrary, Power, and the Neoconser!JatilJe Legary. New Haven: Yale University, 2006.

Fukuyama, Francis. The End ofHistory and the LastMan. New York: The Free Press, 1992.

Gardner, Lloyd C. and Marilyn B. Young, eds. The New AmeriC(11Z Empire. New York: The New Press, 2005.

"GDP by Activity at Current Price at Factor Cost" Fyi Islands Bureau ofStatistics, December 2008. http://ww\v.statsfiji.gov.fJ/Key%20Stats/Nationalo/o20Income/3.2 GDP%20Current.pdf

Gladney, Dru c., ed. Making Majorities: Comtituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malq)lJ"ia,F'ijl~ Turkry, and the United States. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1998.

"Gross Domestic Product of Fiji," Fyi lJlands Bureau C!/StatistieJ, March 2009. http://\v\''ilw.statsfiji.gov.fJ IKey%20Stats INational%20Income/3.1 GDP%20Sun1.mary.pdf

Hayes, Mark. "Whats Really Going on in Fiji", Webdiary, http://webdiary.com.au/cms /?q=node/1150

Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkley: University of California Press, 1985.

"Human Development Report 2007-2008" UNDP, 2007. http://w\V\.v.undp.org.fJ/resources/main/uploads/hdr 2007en.pdf

127 Iloilo, Josefa. "Address to the Nation," April 10, 2009. http://fijitimes.com/extras IFiji-president­ speech-annulling-constitution-judiciary.pdf

"The Impact of Coup-Related Sanctions on Thailand and Fiji: Helpful or Harmful to U.S. Relations?" Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, August 1, 2007. http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov1110/37066.pdf

"Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill 2006" Parliament ofFiji Islands. http://www.parliamcnt.gov.fj/parliament/lcgislativc/bills.aspx?billID=315&vicwtypc=sum mary&bil1nav=bill

Ingram-Seal, Leigh. "Fiji Army", Oceania Orden' ofBattle. http://www.geocities.com/pacificoob/Fiji.A..rn1.y.htm

"Investing," Native Lands Trtlst Board. http://www.nltb.com.fj/investing.html

Ivison, Duncan, Paul Patton, Will Sanders, eds. Political Theory and the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Iyer, Kamal. "A decade of the Constitution," Fiji Times, August 4,2008. http://\v\vw.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=96937

Kaufman, Stephen, "United States Supports Call for Fijian Elections by end of 2009," Department of State, January 27, 2009. http://www.state.govlr/pa/prs/ps/2009/01/115443.htm

Koonings, Kees and Dirk Krujit, eds. Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democrary. London: Zed Books, 2002.

Kumar, Sunil and Biman C. Prasad. "Preferential Voting and Political Engineering: The Case of Fiji's 1999 and 2001 General Elections." Journal ofCommonwealth and Comparative Politics, Volume 42, (2004): 312-332.

La Canna, Xavier. "Fiji High Court upholds 2006 coup." The Age, October 9, 2008. http://news.theage.com.au/world/fiji-high-court-upholds-2006-coup-20081009-4wx7.html

Lal, Brij V. Another Wcry: The Politics ofComtitutionaI Reform in Post-Coup Fiji. Australia: Asia Pacific Press, 1998.

Lal, Brij v., ed.f't;i Before the Storm: Elertiom and the Politics ofDevelopment. Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2000.

Lal, Brij V. and Tomasi Vakatora, eds.Fiji and the World. Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1997.

Lal, Brij V. and Tomasi Vakatora, eds. Fiji in Tramition. Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1997.

Lal, Brij V. IJlands ofTurmoil. Asia Pacific Press: 2006.

128 Lal, Brij V., ed. Politics in Fiji. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986.

Lawson, Stephanie. "Nationalism Versus Constitutionalism in Fiji." Nations and Nationalism, Volume 10, Number 4 (2004): 519-538.

Lawson, Stephanie. Thef'ail14re ofDemocratic Politics in Fiji. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Lawson, Stephanie. Tradition Verstts Democrary in the S014th Pacific. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Masih, Pramil. "A return to coup countq." The PresJ, Christchurch, New Zealand: May 12, 2007. pg. D4

Maynard, Roger. "Fiji militaq seizes power in bloodless coup," The G14ardian, December 5, 2006. http://www.guardian.co.uk/wotld/2006/decl05/fiji.travel2

McGann, Anthony. The Logic ofDemocrary: Re{'omiling Eq14ality, Deliberation and Minority Protection. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006.

"Media Freedom in Fiji Worsens as Another Newsman Deported," International Federation of ]o14rnalists-Asia-Pacific, Januaq 27, 2009. http://asiapacific.ifj.org/en/articlesImedia­ freedom-in-fiji-worsens-as-another-newsman-deported

"Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on the attempted coup in Fiji, 28 June 2000," Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, British HONse ofCommons. http://www.parliament.the-stationery­ office.com/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmfaff/78/7824.htm

Milne, R. S. Politics in EthnicallY Bipolar States: Gz!yana, Malqysia,f'yi. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1981.

Narsey, Wadan. "Report on the 2004-2005 Employment and Unemployment Survey,"f'yi Islands B14rea14 ofStatistics, May 2007. http:/hl\vw.statsfiji.gov.fJ/cens&surveys IEUS%20report.pdf

"New Era for Human Rights with New Constitution," Amnesty International, January 18, 1998. http://asiapacific.amnesty.orgllibraryIIndex/ENGASA 180011998?open&of=ENG-I~]I

Nimni, Ephraim, ed. National C14lt14ral A14tonomy and its Contemporary Cn'tics. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Norton, Robert. Race and Politics in Fiji. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, eds. Transitionsfrom A14thoritarian R14le: ProJpeds for Democrary. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

O'Sullivan, Dominic. Bryond Bic14lt14raliJlJ?: The Politics ofan Indigeno14s Minority. Wellington: Huia Publishers, 2007.

129 Ogden, Michael R., "Republic of Fiji forthcoming in the World Enrydopedia ifPolitital Systems, 3rd Edition. New York: Facts on File," University of Hawaii, http://www2.hawaii.edu/~ogdenIpiirIpacificlfiji.html

Openshaw, Roger and Elizabeth Rata, eds. Pub/it Poliry and Etbnir:iry: Tbe Politits ifEtbnit Boundary Making. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Panapasa, Geraldine, "The island which played a role when Fiji was ceded to Britain," Tbeflji Times, March 30, 2008. http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=85128

ParliamentalJ Debates, House of Representatives Hansard, Parliament ifFt;i' Islands. November 29, 2006. http://W\\.\.v.parliament.gov.fj/hansard/viewhansard.aspx?hansardID=57O&..rviewtype= full

"Poverty Indicators" Fiji' Islands Bureau ifStatistits. http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/Social/povertyindicators.htm

Premdas, Ralph R. "Seizure of Power, Indigenous Rights and Crafting Democratic Governance in Fiji." Nationalism and Etbnit Politin, Volume 8, Issue 4 (2002): 16-36.

"Promotion of Reconciliation, Tolerance, and Unity Bill 2005" Parliament ifFiji IJ-lands. http://\\'\,vw.beta.fiji.gov.fj/uploads/RTU BILL 2005.pdf

'Qarase and Others v. Bainimarama and Others." Fiji Higb Court, Suva. http://fijitimes.comlextras Igarase-vs-bainimaranu-coup-case-judgement.pdf

"Qarase v. Bainimarama appeal decision" Court ifAppeal, Suva. http://fijitimes.com/extras/Qarase­ vs-Bainimarama-Court-0f-appeal-judgement.pdf

Rajan, N alini. Demotrary and tbe Limits ifMinoriry Rigbts. London: Sage Publications, 2002.

Ramesh, Sanjay. "Destruction of Democracy in Fiji", September 2002. http://www.worldpress.org/images/freelancersPDF/58 i.pdf

Ramesh, Sanjay. "Preferential Voting and Indo-Fijian Minority Strategy." Journal ifPeate, Conflid & Development, Volume 10, Number 1 (2007): 1-27.

Ramesh, Sanjay. "Fiji, 1987-2007: The StolJ of Four Coups," WorldpreJJ.org, April 30, 2007. http://w\\\v.worldpress.org/Asia/2773.cfm

Ravuvu, Asesela. TbeFafade ifDemotrary. Suva: Reader Publishing House, 1991.

Reddy, Mahendra and Vijay Naidu, "Land tenure system in Fiji: the poverty implications of expiring leases," July 2001. http://devnet.anu.edu.au/online%20versions%20pdfs155/1OReddy55.pdf

Reilly, Benjamin. Demotrary in DilJided Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

130 Reynolds, Andrew, ed. The Architecture of Democrary. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Robertson, Robbie and William Sutherland. Government By the Gun. Annandale: Pluto Press Australia, 2001.

Salevao, Iutisone. Rule oJLaw, Legitimate Governante, and Del)elopment in the Pacific. Canberra: Australian National University, 2005.

Seymour, Michel, ed. Thef'ate ofthe Nation State. Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004.

Singh, Narendra P. "Bainimarama leading Fiji down dangerous path," PacificIslands Report, March 1, 2007, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2007/March/03-01-comm1.htm

Tony Smith, The United States and the Worldwide Stmggle for Democrary in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Squires, Nick. "Personal feuds and ethnic tensions Tuesday sparked Fiji's fourth coup d'etat in two decades," Christian Sdence Monitor, December 6, 2006. http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1206/p07s02-woap.html

Sriskandarajah, Dhananjayan "Inequality and conflict in Fiji: From purgatory to hell?" Asia Pacific Viewpoint, December 2003, Volume 44, Issue 3: p. 305-324.

Stockwell, Robert F. "An Assessment of the Alternative Vote System in Fiji." Journal ofCommonwealth and Comparative Politics, Volume 43, Number 3, (2005): 382-393.

Tanner, Adrian. "On Understanding Too Quickly: Colonial and Postcolonial Misrepresentation of Indigenous Fijian Land Tenure." Human Organization Publications, Volume 66, Number 1 (2007): 69-77.

Tarte, Sandra. "Fiji: Political Review," The Contemporary Padfic, Vol. 12.2, 2000. Pages 507-515. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/contemporary pacific/v012/12.2tarte.html

"The Deed of Cession of Fiji to Great Britain," October 10, 1874. http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/library/Paclaw/Fiji/DEED%200F%20CESSION%20%20F 1.1 1. htn1

UNFPII, "History." Last accessed: March 27, 2009. Available at: http://''V\'i.lw. un.org/esa/socdev/unpfti/en/history.html

Ward, R. Gerard and Elizabeth Kingdon, eds. Land, Glstom and Practice in the South Pacific. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Wiarda, Howard J. The Crisis ofAmerican Foreign Poliry. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006.

131 Wood, Robert. "Bainimarama has no plan for elections in Fiji," Department ofState, Januaq 27, 2009. http://www.america.gov/st/democracy- english12009 /January120090127172437esnamfuakO.32923S3.html

Zakaria, Fareed. The Future ofFreedom. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003.

"Ethnic Breakdown of Open Constituencies." ElectionJ Office, Government of Fiji. Last Visited: March 14 2008. Available at: http://w\vw.elections.gov.fj/results1999 / open ethnic.html

"1999 Summaq by Percentage of Votes Won/Percentage of Seats Won," ElectionJ Office, Government of Fiji. http://ww\v.elections.gov.fj/results1999/sum percent.html

"2.2 Population of Fiji by Ethnicity" Fyi hlandJ Bureau ofStatiJticJ, December 2008. http://W\Vvv.statsfiji.gov.fj/Key%20StatsIPopulation12.2%20pop%20by%20ethnicity.pdf

"2000 Summaq by Percentage of Votes Won/Percentage of Seats Won," ElectionJ Office, Government of Fiji. http:/ hVvvw.elections.gov.fj /results2001/summaries/04 perc vote seat.html

"2006 Election Results for each seat." ElectionJ Office, Government of Fiji. http://www.elections.gov.fj/results2006.html

"2006 Open Constitution Roll Breakdowns." ElectionJ Office, Government of Fiji. http://\VVV\v.elections.gov. fj lintroduction/20060penConstRollBreakdowns.pdf

"2007 Census of Population and Housing,"f'!Ji hlandJ Bureau ofStatiJlicJ, October 15, 2008. http://www.statsfiji.gov.fj/Census2007/Release%201 %20-%20Population%20Size.pdf

132