Report Hazaras and Afghan Insurgent Groups

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Report Hazaras and Afghan Insurgent Groups Report Hazaras and Afghan insurgent groups Report Afghanistan: Hazaras and Afghan insurgent groups LANDINFO – 3 OCTOBER 2016 1 About Landinfo’s reports The Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre, Landinfo, is an independent body within the Norwegian Immigration Authorities. Landinfo provides country of origin information to the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (Utlendingsdirektoratet – UDI), the Immigration Appeals Board (Utlendingsnemnda – UNE) and the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security. Reports produced by Landinfo are based on information from carefully selected sources. The information is researched and evaluated in accordance with common methodology for processing COI and Landinfo’s internal guidelines on source and information analysis. To ensure balanced reports, efforts are made to obtain information from a wide range of sources. Many of our reports draw on findings and interviews conducted on fact-finding missions. All sources used are referenced. Sources hesitant to provide information to be cited in a public report have retained anonymity. The reports do not provide exhaustive overviews of topics or themes, but cover aspects relevant for the processing of asylum and residency cases. Country of origin information presented in Landinfo’s reports does not contain policy recommendations nor does it reflect official Norwegian views. © Landinfo 2017 The material in this report is covered by copyright law. Any reproduction or publication of this report or any extract thereof other than as permitted by current Norwegian copyright law requires the explicit written consent of Landinfo. For information on all of the reports published by Landinfo, please contact: Landinfo Country of Origin Information Centre Storgata 33A P.O. Box 8108 Dep NO-0032 Oslo Norway Tel: +47 23 30 94 70 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.landinfo.no Report Afghanistan: Hazaras and Afghan insurgent groups LANDINFO – 3 OCTOBER 2016 2 SUMMARY Hazaras have traditionally been a politically and economically marginalized group, at the bottom of the social hierarchy in Afghanistan. Migration, both internally and out of the country, has been an important strategy for Hazaras. Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the political influence and socio-economic position of the Hazaras has significantly improved. The main insurgent group in Afghanistan, Taliban, does not have a sectarian agenda, and there is no evidence to suggest that Hazaras are targeted based on religion or ethnicity by insurgent groups like Taliban. IS-loyal groups, however, have gained foothold in the country during the two last years, and are allegedly responsible for the targeted attack on the Shia Muslim Hazaras in July 2016, in which almost a hundred civilians were killed. Report Afghanistan: Hazaras and Afghan insurgent groups LANDINFO – 3 OCTOBER 2016 3 CONTENTS 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 5 2. The Hazara people ............................................................................................. 6 2.1 The Hazaras’ history in brief .................................................................................. 6 2.2 Social structure and the position of women ............................................................ 7 2.3 Migration ................................................................................................................ 9 2.4 The establishment of Hezb-e Wahdat ..................................................................... 9 2.5 Ethnic antagonisms and conflicts ......................................................................... 10 3. The Hazaras’ position after 2001 .................................................................... 12 3.1 Improved socio-economic position ...................................................................... 12 3.1.1 Emigration and smuggling networks ............................................................................ 14 3.1.2 Attacks on Hazaras in Pakistan .................................................................................... 14 3.2 The significance of ethnicity after 2001 ............................................................... 15 4. Recent security incidents ................................................................................. 16 4.1 Explanation of security incidents ......................................................................... 18 5. Vulnerability caused by sectarianism in the insurgent movement .............. 19 5.1 Taliban .................................................................................................................. 20 5.2 High Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan ........................................... 21 5.3 Daesh .................................................................................................................... 22 5.3.1 Area of operation for Daesh ......................................................................................... 23 5.3.2 Does Daesh in Afghanistan have a sectarian agenda? ................................................ 25 5.3.3 Daesh and the Hazaras ................................................................................................ 25 5.4 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ......................................................................... 26 5.5 The international dimension ................................................................................. 26 6. References ......................................................................................................... 28 Report Afghanistan: Hazaras and Afghan insurgent groups LANDINFO – 3 OCTOBER 2016 4 1. INTRODUCTION This report concerns the situation of the Shia Muslim Hazara people in Afghanistan. By way of introduction, a historical review of the position of the Hazaras in Afghan society will be presented as a backdrop to understanding the current situation. We will go on to focus in particular on possible security challenges that this population group is currently facing. Because sectarianism among insurgent groups in Afghanistan can affect the Hazaras’ security situation negatively, descriptions of the various groups and their agendas are included in the report. The topics addressed are comprehensive, and the report does not intend to provide an exhaustive account of them. The focus is on issues that are considered to be of particular relevance to the immigration authorities. The report is partly based on written sources and partly on information obtained during Landinfo’s annual fact finding missions to Kabul during the period 2010– 2016. Other oral sources have also been used, such as diplomatic sources, researchers and other experts. The oral sources in Afghanistan have been anonymised out of regard for their security and work situation. Obtaining source material and gaining an overview of the conditions in Afghanistan are demanding tasks, and it can be difficult to obtain reliable information about different issues. The source situation is complicated by the difficult security situation in parts of the country, and poor road security is among the factors that create obstacles to the mobility of both local and international sources. Access to primary sources can therefore be limited. Information from secondary sources is not necessarily based on facts and can also be difficult to verify. The present conflict between various insurgent groups and the Afghan authorities, which are supported by the international community, has been ongoing since 2002. It can be difficult to obtain objective and verifiable information about both conflict- related matters and other topics. A critical review of sources is therefore important – both of the sources themselves and of the credibility of the information they provide. Available sources may have their own agenda because of their primary loyalty to one of the parties in the conflict, or to their extended family, tribe or clan. This report seeks to shed light on the situation for one ethnic group in the country, and is possibly influenced by the subjective observations and experience of various sources. The security situation in Afghanistan is volatile, unclear and subject to rapid change. It is difficult to gain an overview of the different groups and alliances, and of who is behind reported security incidents. It is not uncommon for groups to take responsibility for acts they have not committed. The relatively recent presence of IS- loyal groups in the country complicates the situation further. The information presented here about the pattern of conflict can therefore quickly become outdated. Report Afghanistan: Hazaras and Afghan insurgent groups LANDINFO – 3 OCTOBER 2016 5 2. THE HAZARA PEOPLE Because of the topography of the country, ethnic groups in Afghanistan have traditionally lived isolated from each other, except in the biggest cities. This has led to the development of different ethnic groups with their own stories, language and culture. What characterises an ethnic group is that its members share fundamental values, cultural background, social organisation and often ancestral relations. These are markers that distinguish them from other groups. Common to all the ethnic groups in Afghanistan is that they are Muslims, with a Sunni majority and a Shia minority.1 Hazaras have Mongolian features that distinguish them from the rest of the Afghan population. Mongolian tribe leader Genghis Khan and his men are said to be
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