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Signs of Domestic Radicalization Post-Revolution Radicalization Post-Revolution by Anne Wolf by Anne Wolf

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Signs of Domestic Radicalization Post-Revolution Radicalization Post-Revolution by Anne Wolf by Anne Wolf JANUARY 2013 . VOL 6 . ISSUE 1 Contents Tunisia: Signs of Domestic FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Tunisia: Signs of Domestic Radicalization Post-Revolution Radicalization Post-Revolution By Anne Wolf By Anne Wolf REPORTS 5 Jordan in the Balance: Evaluating Regime Stability By Sean L. Yom 7 Boko Haram’s International Connections By Jacob Zenn 13 Countering Islamist Radicalization in Germany By Dorle Hellmuth 17 Algerian Foreign Policy in the Context of the Arab Spring By Anouar Boukhars 22 A Profile of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi Leader Malik Ishaq By Daud Khattak 24 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Tunisian Salafists demanding the release of suspects arrested in connection with the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis. - AFP/Getty n a december 2012 interview, it is evident that Tunisia has a domestic Tunisian President Moncef radicalization problem. Tunisian Marzouki publicly admitted nationals were recently involved in a that his government has number of violent incidents in Tunisia Iunderestimated the danger posed by and other countries in the region, with Tunisia’s Salafi-jihadis.1 Since the some having received training abroad, ousting of former President Zine al- such as in the Libyan civil war.2 In late Abidine Ben Ali in 2011, Tunisia has December 2012, Tunisian authorities About the CTC Sentinel witnessed a resurgence of Salafism, even dismantled a terrorist cell linked to The Combating Terrorism Center is an including a violent Salafi-jihadi stream. al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) independent educational and research Although Tunisian authorities blame that was plotting acts of sabotage.3 institution based in the Department of Social the increase in the number of jihadists Sciences at the United States Military Academy, primarily on regional dynamics toward This article details recent violent West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses religious conservatism as well as the incidents in Tunisia and also examines the Center’s global network of scholars and former regime’s suppression of Islamists, the factors behind the radicalization of practitioners to understand and confront some Muslims in the country. contemporary threats posed by terrorism and other forms of political violence. 1 In an interview with The World Today, President Mar- zouki said in reference to the recent Salafist attack on the 2 “Tunisian Islamists Receiving Weapons from Libya,” al- U.S. Embassy in Tunis: “We [the government] didn’t rea- Monitor, February 15, 2012. The views expressed in this report are those of lise how dangerous and violent these Salafists could be.” 3 Thomas Joscelyn, “Tunisian Government Arrests al the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, For details, see Alan Philps, “Moncef Marzouki on Tuni- Qaeda Cell Tied to Ansar al Sharia,” The Long War Journal, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. sia and the Struggles of Drafting a New Constitution,” The December 22, 2012; Monia Ghanmi, “Tunisia Foils al-Qae- World Today 68:11 (2012). da Expansion Plan,” Magharebia, December 24, 2012. 1 JANUARY 2013 . VOL 6. ISSUE 1 History of Religiously-Motivated Violence in movement to bring down the Ben Ali of its ambassador. One of the suspects, Tunisia regime by force. Trained by the Salafist Ali Harzi, was released due to lack of Throughout its more recent history, Group for Preaching and Combat evidence in January 2013, although Tunisia has witnessed sporadic (which became AQIM in 2007), the authorities “strongly suspected” his religiously-motivated attacks. On group quickly recruited more members, involvement. He is, however, still facing August 2, 1987, four bombs exploded numbering 40 at its height.11 Yet the charges for membership in a terrorist in four hotels in Sousse and Monastir, government subsequently crushed organization.15 injuring 13 people.4 An extremist the group in the town of Suleiman. cell called Islamic Jihad, which was Religiously-motivated attacks seemed Most recently, on December 21, Tunisian subsequently dissolved, claimed under control from that point forward. authorities uncovered a terrorist cell responsibility.5 On February 17, 1991, affiliated with AQIM, leading to the three Islamists attacked the office of the This changed with Tunisia’s revolution arrests of 16 people, including three government Constitutional Democratic in 2011, which saw a resurgence of Libyans, while an additional 18 other Rally (RCD) party in Bab Souika, religious ultraconservatism, including cell members are still being pursued. leaving one security guard dead.6 Salafi-jihadism. Since the revolution, The members of the group, known as The most prominent attack, however, ultraconservative Muslims have obtained the Militia of Uqba Ibn Nafaa in Tunisia, was on April 11, 2002, when a young arms and clashed with security forces reportedly received training and Tunisian linked to al-Qa`ida bombed throughout the country. In May 2012, weapons in Algeria and Libya.16 They the synagogue in Djerba in Tunisia’s sought to establish a Tunisian branch of south. The attack resulted in the deaths AQIM to overthrow the government by of 21 people, including 14 German “Since the revolution in force.17 tourists, five Tunisians, and two French 2011, ultraconservative citizens.7 Radicalization in Tunisia Muslims have obtained Certain territories in Tunisia have In 2003, as an immediate response to arms and clashed with traditionally been more rebellious the Djerba attack, Ben Ali implemented and religiously conservative than a comprehensive set of anti-terrorism security forces throughout others. Tunisia’s south and interior, laws.8 Religiously-motivated incidents the country.” in particular, have found it difficult to decreased in the subsequent years. Yet deal with the modernization policies in 2006, a small group of five Tunisians launched by the colonial and post- and one Mauritanian, known as the independence governments, whose Soldiers of Asad Bin al-Furhat9 (or the Salafi-jihadis and regular criminals leaders came from more privileged Suleiman Group), entered Tunisia from attacked a police station as well as areas.18 The secular nature of the Habib Algeria with six Kalashnikov rifles and bars selling alcohol in the governorate Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes were several grenades.10 The Suleiman Group of El Kef.12 In June, they firebombed particularly alienating for Tunisia’s aimed to establish a nationwide jihadist several offices of Tunisia’s biggest trade conservative Muslims. Both Bourguiba union, the Union Générale Tunisienne and Ben Ali originated from Tunisia’s du Travail (UGTT). That same month, coastal region, which enjoyed much 4 “7 Italians, 4 Britons Hurt in Tunisian Hotel Blasts,” an attack on an arts exhibition in La higher government spending for Associated Press, August 3, 1987. Marsa killed one, injured 65 policemen development than Tunisia’s interior 5 The members of Islamic Jihad were arrested and faced and led to the arrests of more than 160 and south, resulting in a wide regional the death penalty. See Alison Pargeter, “Radicalisation in people.13 In September, violent Salafist gap in prosperity and modernization.19 Tunisia,” in George Joffe ed., Islamist Radicalisation in mobs took to the streets to protest North Africa: Politics and Process (New York: Routledge, against an American film ridiculing the Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s policies to 2011), p. 79. Prophet Muhammad and stormed the limit the power of traditional religious 6 Michael Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Al- U.S. Embassy in Tunis and an American establishments also alienated many geria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab school—leaving three dead and causing conservative Muslims. For example, Spring (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2012), p. 168. the U.S. Embassy to recall its unessential shortly after his ascent to power, 7 “Al-Qaeda Claims Tunisia Attack,” BBC, June 23, staff from Tunis.14 2002; “Tunisian President in Djerba to Mark Decade Since Bloody Synagogue Attack,” al-Arabiya, January Moreover, two Tunisian Salafi-jihadis 15 Scott Shane and Tim Arango, “Turkey Detains 2 in 6, 2013. were arrested in October 2012 for their Connection With Killings in Libya,” New York Times, 8 While called “Anti-Terrorism Law on Support of In- alleged involvement in the attack on the October 5, 2012; “Tunisian Suspect in Attack on U.S. ternational Efforts against Terrorism and Money Laun- U.S. Embassy in Libya that led to the death Consulate in Libya Freed,” Associated Press, January 8, dering,” certain aspects of the legislation were violating 2013. Tunisia’s international obligations as they enabled arbi- 16 Joscelyn. trary arrests and the prosecutions of political prisoners. 11 Ibid. 17 Ibid. For details, see “Universal Periodic Review of Tunisia: 12 “Tunisia Salafis Riot to Protest an Arrest,” Associated 18 Alison Pargeter, “Localism and Radicalization in Human Rights Watch’s Submission to the Human Rights Press, May 26, 2012. North Africa: Local Factors and the Development of Council,” Human Rights Watch, April 7, 2008. 13 “Tunisian Salafis Riot over ‘Insulting’ Art,” Reuters, Political Islam in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya,” Interna- 9 Asad Bin al-Furhat was a Tunisian scholar and fighter June 13, 2012. tional Affairs 85:5 (2009): p. 1,039. who led a Muslim army against Sicily in 827. 14 “Tunisia Death Toll Rises to Four in U.S. Embassy At- 19 Alexis Arieff, “Political Transition in Tunisia,” Con- 10 Pargeter, “Radicalisation in Tunisia.” tack,” Reuters, September 15, 2012. gressional Research Service,
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