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Issue 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Focus on Third Offset Strategy

ISSUE EIGHTY-TWO, 3 ’s Goldwater-Nichols? Interagency Decisionmaking During the Mayaguez Incident RD QUARTER 2016 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 http://ndupress.ndu.edu

Gen Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Publisher MajGen Frederick M. Padilla, USMC, President, NDU

Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.

Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.

Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.

Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich

Copyeditor Erin L. Sindle

Book Review Editor Dr. Frank G. Hoffman

Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Printing Office

Advisory Committee COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International Security Affairs; LTG Robert B. Brown, USA/U.S. Army Command and Staff College; Brig Gen Christopher A. Coffelt, USAF/Air College; Col Keil Gentry, USMC/Marine War College; BGen Thomas A. Gorry, USMC/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Col Steven J. Grass, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Brig Gen Darren E. Hartford, USAF/National War College; Col Brian E. Hastings, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; RADM P. Gardner Howe III/U.S. Naval War College; LTG William C. Mayville, Jr., USA/The Joint Staff; MG William E. Rapp, USA/U.S. Army War College; LtGen Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC/The Joint Staff; RDML Brad Williamson/Joint Forces Staff College

Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Stephen D. Chiabotti/ School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/ National War College; Mark J. Conversino/Air War College; Thomas P. Ehrhard/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/Joint Forces Staff College; Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.)/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Mark H. Jacobsen/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/Georgetown University; Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.)/ National War College; James A. Schear/Office of the Secretary of Defense; LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)

Printed in St. Louis, Missouri, by

Cover 2 images (top to bottom): CH-47 Chinook assigned to 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade maneuvers over M119A3 light howitzer during Division Artillery Readiness Test, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, January 20, 2016 (U.S. Army/Christopher Freeman); Chief Aviation Ordnanceman is pinned by her wife during chief petty officer pinning ceremony in the hangar of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron (VRC) 30, Naval Air Station North Island, , September 16, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Stephanie Smith); U.S. Marines with Battalion Landing Team, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, on demolitions range at Crow Valley, , during Amphibious Landing Exercise 15, October 8, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Joseph DiGirolamo) About the Cover In this Issue Technical Sergeant Dean Criswell, 22nd Special Tactics Squadron NCOIC of Dialogue operations, signals to CH-47 th 2 From the Chairman Chinook from 1-214 Aviation Regiment, May 15, 2015, on Mount Rainier, Washington. Criswell, Forum a pararescueman, was training 4 Executive Summary Tactical Air Control Party Airmen on mountain rescue operations 6 Securing the Third Offset (U.S. Air Force/Tim Chacon) Strategy: Priorities for the Next Secretary of Defense By Timothy A. Walton 16 Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and 76 What It Means to Be 118 The Tao of Doctrine: Contesting the Third Offset Strategy Expeditionary: A Look at an Art of Operations By James R. McGrath the French Army in Africa By G. Stephen Lauer By Michael Shurkin 24 Avoiding Becoming a 125 Joint Engineers Launch Paper Tiger: Presence in a 86 Sharpening Our Cultural New Knowledge-Based Warfighting Defense Strategy Tools for Improved Global Management Program By Elbridge Colby and Health Engagement By Brian E. Griffin Jonathan F. Solomon By Suzanne Leclerc-Madlala and Maysaa Alobaidi 128 JPME II Available at JPME Today Satellite Sites 91 The Primacy of COG in Planning: By Kenneth Pisel 33 Switching the Paradigm Getting Back to Basics from Reactive to Proactive: By Steven D. Kornatz 132 Joint Doctrine Update Stopping Toxic Leadership By Mike Rybacki and Chaveso Cook Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Recall . JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship 40 Measuring Strategic Deterrence: 98 Abandon Ship: Interagency joint and security studies journal designed to A Wargaming Approach inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and Decisionmaking During other partners on joint and integrated operations; By Douglas R. Ducharme the Mayaguez Incident national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat ; ; and developments in By Richard B. Hughes training and joint professional military education to transform America’s military and security apparatus Commentary to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting 47 A Way Ahead for DOD Book Reviews freedom today. All published articles have been vetted through a peer-review process and cleared by the Disaster Preparedness 106 National Insecurity and What Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. By Frank C. DiGiovanni Good Is Grand Strategy? NDU Press is the National Defense University’s Reviewed by Brian C. Collins cross-component, professional military and academic 54 The U.S. Pacific Command publishing house. Response to Super The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 108 Blood Year expressed or implied within are those of the Reviewed by Thomas C. Greenwood contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views By Thomas Parker, Sean P. of the Department of Defense or any other agency of Carroll, Gregg Sanders, Jason 110 The U.S.-China Military the Federal Government. E. King, and Imes Chiu Submissions and Communications Scorecard and China’s JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent Military Power research from members of the Armed Forces, 62 #SocialMediaMatters: Reviewed by Thomas McNaugher security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, Lessons Learned from academic specialists, and civilians from the and abroad. Submit articles for consideration Exercise Trident Juncture to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. By Gregory M. Tomlin Joint Doctrine manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress. Or write to: Editor, Joint Force Quarterly 112 The Multinational NDU Press Features Interoperability Council: 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504) Enhancing Coalition Operations Fort Lesley J. McNair 68 China’s Goldwater- Washington, DC 20319 By Michelle L. Pryor, Thomas Nichols? Assessing PLA Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 Labouche, Mario Wilke, and Email: [email protected] Organizational Reforms Charles C. Pattillo, Jr. JFQ online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm By Phillip C. Saunders 3rd Quarter, July 2016 and Joel Wuthnow ISSN 1070-0692 Soldier with Joint Forces Command–United Assistance, assigned to and Headquarters Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), holds up U.S. flag during promotion and reenlistment ceremony, January 1, 2015, at Barclay Training Center, Monrovia, Liberia (U.S. Army/Rashene Mincy)

Upholding Our Oath

s the Chairman of the Joint for a peaceful transfer of power to a new pins not only our warrior ethos but also Chiefs of Staff, I am honored administration, I write to share my views the expectations of how we conduct A to represent the extraordinary regarding our mutual obligations as mil- ourselves while in uniform. Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, Airmen, itary professionals and rights as citizens and Coastguardsmen who make up the during this election season. Our Responsibilities Joint Force. Throughout my travels and and Conduct engagements, I continue to be inspired Our Values As military professionals, our most by your professionalism, your com- Every Servicemember swears “to important asset is the trust of and mitment to defending the Nation, and support and defend the Constitution credibility with the American people. your adaptiveness in encountering the of the United States” and to “bear true While we must always safeguard our security challenges our country faces. faith and allegiance to the same.” This professional integrity, extra vigilance is Meeting the challenges of today’s oath is embedded in our professional required during any political transition. dynamic and demanding operating envi- culture and underpins the values that Our individual and collective obligation ronment while preparing the Joint Force shape and define our all-volunteer during this election season is twofold. to win future fights remain a team effort. force. Beginning with General George First, we must recognize that we have This must remain our number one pri- Washington resigning his military com- one Commander in Chief, and until ority, and I continue to devote my time, mission, our deliberate and disciplined authority is transferred on January 20, focus, and energy to this effort. At the commitment to upholding the principle 2017, the Joint Force must remain same time, as our country again prepares of civilian control of the military under- clearly focused on and responsive to the

2 Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Soldier fills out absentee ballot form during voting assistance drive at Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar (U.S. Army/Dustin Senger) existing National Command Authority. engagements with the media, the It is an honor to serve as your Second, the Joint Force must conduct public, or in open or social forums. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing itself in such a way that the new admin- from you. JFQ istration has confidence that it will be Closing served by a professional, competent, We are living in the most volatile and General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. and apolitical military. This is especially complex security environment since Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff important in the context of delivering World War II. Whether confronting the best military advice. violent extremist organizations seeking to destroy our way of life or dealing Civic Participation with state actors threatening interna- Every member of the Joint Force has tional order, threats to our national the right to exercise his or her civic security require a Joint Force that is duty, including learning and discuss- ready, capable, and trusted. To that end, ing—even debating—the policy issues I have a duty to protect the integrity driving the election cycle and voting for and political neutrality of our military his or her candidate of choice. Provided profession. But this obligation is not that we follow the guidance and reg- mine alone. It belongs to every Soldier, ulations governing individual political Marine, Sailor, Airman, and Coast- participation, we should be proud of guardsman. Thank you for joining me our civic engagement. What we must in honoring our history, our traditions, collectively guard against is allowing and the institutions of the U.S. Armed our institution to become politicized, Forces by upholding the principle of or even perceived as being politicized, political neutrality. by how we conduct ourselves during

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Dunford 3 Marines with Alpha Battery, 2nd Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion visited Onslow Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Jacksonville, North Carolina, December 18, 2014, to learn more about U.S. Marine Corps history (U.S. Marine Corps/Neysa Huertas Quinone)

Executive Summary

istory seems to have a greater reexamined and even rewritten in light does not repeat in detail, but it does attraction as we age. As the past of new information found in archives or rhyme. We welcome what you have to say H stretches out, we often look to it in the stories of those who experienced on the value of history, especially regard- in order to relate our experiences today events and are willing to tell their stories. ing joint operations, as the U.S. military to those we fondly (or not so fondly) Consider the survivors of the atomic age has a wealth of those to review. I know of remember. Recently, I was asked if from Hiroshima to the veterans of open- no better way to gauge the progress we Joint Force Quarterly could include air testing. What do their experiences are making on the future force than to more warfighting articles, particularly have to tell us about the cost of deter- look at where we have been. those that have a historical focus. I rence in the 21st century? Even our most This issue’s Forum focuses on the readily responded that we always are recent have stories yet to be told future of U.S. defense strategy with three interested in such pieces, but we receive but will be critical in evaluating what our articles that suggest how Department of few submissions for our Recall section. future force should be and do. History Defense (DOD) leadership might guide A simple enough proposition, but in is exactly where we should be drawing efforts already under way. In discussing execution one that is fully dependent our understanding of how to deal with the defense budget for fiscal year 2017, on inputs from our audience. I have fre- our increasingly complex world. Theories Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert quently remarked that such articles have are useful only if they can be tested and Work and Vice Chairman of the Joint a much higher chance of acceptance for validated. In many cases, we already Chiefs of Staff General Paul Selva, USAF, publication because we receive so few know what the outcomes are because we identified a number of security issues that warfighting articles in comparison to have examples that can be reviewed for a the United States will face going forward. what we publish. wealth of understanding, often paid for in These issues include not only a likely I am not sure why our authors do not lives lost. We owe it to our future force to return to great power competitions but write about the past as much as the pres- review the past carefully against our plans also continuing security challenges from ent and the future. History has a great for the future because not everything Russia, China, , Iran, and deal to offer, especially to those who have changes just because we think it does. As terror groups. One of the phrases that yet to experience similar events. It can be one of my mentors once told me, history these three articles focus on is the DOD

4 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 effort to “offset [its] strengths using new at home and abroad. For an increasing among Recall articles is nearly 100 per- technological, operational, and organi- number of our military, the use of social cent. I recently began a concerted effort zational constructs to achieve a lasting media has outpaced our traditional to seek out submissions that incorporated advantage and to strengthen deterrence.” communications channels in significant themes of warfighting and history, which As the Obama administration comes to ways. Gregory Tomlin provides us a has been the focus of our Recall section a close, Timothy Walton offers the next look into a recent North Atlantic Treaty in JFQ from the beginning. With your Secretary of Defense a priority list aimed Organization exercise Trident Juncture, help, I anticipate a growing number of at achieving this Third Offset Strategy. which incorporated social media into submissions that will help our readers get One of the keys to figuring out this operations with interesting and insightful a better sense of history, warfighting, joint strategy, according to the Vice Chairman, results. operations, and how these topics matter to is modeling and simulation, and James From China and Africa to continuing successful future missions. McGrath suggests a way to use these tools our discussions on global health engage- Our book review editor, Dr. Frank to enhance our information operations ment and planning, our Features section Hoffman, has once again lined up three as a part of the overall strategy. Elbridge covers it all. First, Phillip Saunders and great reviews by three longtime sup- Colby and Jonathan Solomon next Joel Wuthnow, from the Center for the porters of JFQ who will no doubt cause suggest that the mission of presence is es- Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the you to consider adding these titles to sential to achieve any warfighting defense National Defense University, an import- your reading list. As a disclaimer, Tom strategy that might emerge in the future. ant source for insightful work on China’s Greenwood and Tom McNaugher are Our JPME Today section offers two rise, present an article on China’s ongoing members of our editorial board. significant papers on different topics, efforts to reform the People’s Liberation Our Doctrine section has three which I believe should be widely read and Army. Michael Shurkin writes that recent important pieces along with the Joint used in the classroom across the JPME events in Africa that require external Doctrine update from the Joint Staff. community and beyond. Mike Rybacki security assistance have involved the de- Michelle Pryor, Thomas Labouche, Mario and Chaveso Cook offer a framework for ployment of the French army in ways that Wilke, and Charles Pattillo, Jr., suggest addressing the persistent issue of toxic might prove educational to other forces. the best means for improving coalition leadership in the military. The Naval War In a follow-up article to JFQ 80’s focus operations lies in the effective organiza- College’s Douglas Ducharme next de- on global health engagement, Suzanne tion of the Multinational Interoperability scribes how wargaming can offer a method Leclerc-Madlala and Maysaa Alobaidi Council. On doctrine itself, Stephen Lauer for measuring strategic deterrence, a con- provide us with suggestions on how to guides us into the metaphysical side of op- cept that everyone acknowledges as key to improve cultural awareness, which is cru- erational planning as it relates to doctrine’s a defense strategy, but few have been able cial to the success of these efforts. Always use. Brian Griffin gives us a brief explana- to fully analytically show its impact. a favorite topic here at JFQ in the past, tion of a key new joint logistics capability In Commentary, we have views from and among students and practitioners of that will greatly assist loggies, staffs, and around the globe and the Pentagon on the art of planning, Steven Kornatz writes commanders alike. Finally, Kenneth Pisel how to deal with disasters and integrate about refocusing on the center of gravity of the Joint Forces Staff College discusses social media into military operations. As through a back-to-basics approach. recent developments in Joint Professional we often focus on combat overseas, being In a brief but important moment in Military Education, Phase II. trained and ready for disasters at home U.S. history in the immediate aftermath We look forward to your thoughts and abroad is a primary mission for the of the final withdrawal from Vietnam in on these articles. Whether you are com- joint force. As Director of Force Training 1975, President was faced menting on the future force or retelling in the Assistant Secretary of Defense with a rapid onset crisis in that region. the story of past joint operations, Joint for Readiness office, Frank DiGiovanni Richard Hughes takes us back to those Force Quarterly is here for your use to stir provides his unique perspective on how events with a discussion on how the creative thinking and debate, to further best to achieve this requirement. A little interplay of agencies and departments solidify the bond of jointness among the over 5 years ago, was struck by in the U.S. Government dealt with the Services, and to strengthen the bonds of Super Typhoon Haiyan, which resulted seizure of in South East Asia in teamwork necessary with our friends and in a wide range of recovery requirements, the Mayaguez Incident. As an aside and allies across the globe. Let us know what many of which were more than Japan to reiterate, when I am asked about the you find in our history that engages you could deal with alone. The U.S. Pacific submission process at JFQ, I often remark so your ideas can be considered by the Command response was crucial in help- that the easiest way to get published in the more than 120,000 quarterly online JFQ ing Japan cope with this massive disaster, journal is to write a history piece because readers worldwide. JFQ as Thomas Parker, Sean Carroll, Gregg we receive so few submissions on histo- Sanders, Jason King, and Imes Chiu ry-related topics. Luckily, each of these William T. Eliason describe, with important takeaways for pieces tends to be written and re- Editor in Chief planners of future recovery operations searched, which is why the acceptance rate

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Eliason 5 U.S. Airmen with 36th Airlift Squadron during first day of Pacific Air Forces commander-directed Red Flag–Alaska 14-3 at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, providing combined offensive counterair, interdiction, close air support, and large force employment training, August 11, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Chad C. Strohmeyer)

Securing the Third Offset Strategy Priorities for the Next Secretary of Defense

By Timothy A. Walton

ollowing a process of examining planning decisions in general and the First Offset Strategy of the 1950s, in strategy, scenarios, and assessments, Third Offset Strategy in particular be which President Dwight D. Eisenhower F this article identifies for the next guided by increased selectivity, transpar- countered the ’s conven- Secretary of Defense eight capability ency, and commonality. tional numerical superiority through the statements that merit attention as the buildup of America’s nuclear deterrent, Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) top Setting the Course and on the Second Offset Strategy new investment priorities as part of the In November 2014, then–Secretary of of the 1970s, in which Secretary of Third Offset Strategy in the fiscal year Defense Chuck Hagel announced a new Defense Harold Brown shepherded 2018 budget and beyond. Additionally, Defense Innovation Initiative, which the development of precision-guided this article recommends that reforms to included the Third Offset Strategy. The munitions, stealth, and intelligence, the analytical processes informing force initiative seeks to maintain U.S. military surveillance, and (ISR) superiority over capable adversaries systems to counter the numerical superi- through the development of novel ority and improving technical capability Timothy A. Walton is a Fellow in the Center for capabilities and concepts. Secretary of forces along the Central Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Hagel modeled his approach on the Front in .

6 Forum / Securing the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter are challenging U.S. ability to ensure with weapons of mass destruction. has built on Hagel’s vision of the Third operational access. Although a future Unique capabilities to counter these Offset Strategy, and the proposed fiscal Presidential administration probably will threats may need to be developed. year 2017 budget is the first major create its own defense strategy docu- Ultimately, however, the ability of the public manifestation of the strategy: ap- ments, these enduring requirements and United States to deter and defeat PRC proximately $3.6 billion in research and challenges will likely continue. aggression serves as a bellwether for U.S. development funding dedicated to Third The People’s Republic of China capabilities worldwide. By developing Offset Strategy pursuits.1 As explained by (PRC) has developed powerful forces the ability to deter and defeat the pacing Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, capable of challenging the U.S. ability to threat of the PRC, the United States will the budget seeks to conduct numerous project power, deter and defeat aggres- ensure that it not only has the funda- small bets on advanced capability research sion, and operate effectively in different mental capabilities necessary to defend and demonstrations, and to work with domains, as called for by U.S. defense its allies and advance its interests in the Congress and the Services to craft new strategy documents. The scale and so- Asia-Pacific but that it also has many of operational concepts so that the next ad- phistication of the PRC threat, coupled the capabilities necessary to counter most ministration can determine “what are the with an overall Comprehensive National other types of aggression worldwide. key bets we’re going to make.”2 Power capable of rivaling that of the Consequently, to innovate and develop The next Secretary of Defense will United States, result in a near-peer threat new capabilities, DOD should aggres- have the opportunity to make those big that is rapidly adopting peer characteris- sively focus the majority of its attention bets. However, what should he or she tics. The ability of the United States to and resources on those capabilities on? In response, this article answers counter Chinese aggression and project necessary to excel in relevant scenarios two related questions. First, what sorts power is essential to its ability to advance involving China. of military capabilities should receive top its interests and sustain its partnerships. priority for new investments? Second, There are valid reasons for devel- Selecting Scenarios what changes should be made to the ana- oping unique capabilities necessary to While multiple planning scenarios with lytical processes supporting force planning counter grave threats not related to land, maritime, and air components decisions? In identifying capabilities that China. Multiple states, including Russia involving China merit examination and merit the greatest emphasis, this article and Iran, are fielding potent A2/AD may reveal distinct operational needs, examines relevant strategy, scenarios, and capabilities, and it is likely that many the defense of Taiwan should be the assessments to identify insights regarding A2/AD capabilities will proliferate lead planning scenario for DOD to current and future operational needs.3 globally. The threat posed by Russian identify operational needs. Strategically, While not comprehensive, this article aims aggression to North Atlantic Treaty even if conflict in Taiwan never takes to direct activity toward the highest prior- Organization (NATO) Allies—especially place, it is perceived as a potential ity areas and illuminate a way forward for in the Baltics—is particularly worrisome. major scenario involving the United the next Secretary of Defense. A recent series of RAND wargames States, and the perceived capability of unambiguously concluded that “as the United States to deter and defeat U.S. Strategy presently postured, NATO cannot suc- aggression underpins U.S. alliance The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) cessfully defend the territory of its most relationships. Overall, the United States articulated 10 missions the joint force exposed members.”6 While addressing strategically requires a demonstrated must accomplish in the future.4 These this threat will require improvements in ability to defend its allies and partners missions include the ability to: the posture and capacity of the force, it to support its security guarantees and will also require the development of new advance its interests. Additionally, in the deter and defeat aggression •• capabilities that may not overlap with the defense of Taiwan, the United States project power despite antiaccess/ •• capabilities necessary to counter Chinese has a crucial intersection of interests, area-denial (A2/AD) challenges aggression in most China-focused sce- objectives, and capabilities that result in operate effectively in cyberspace and •• narios. For example, ground maneuver a critical planning scenario. space. forces likely require new capabilities Operationally, to a greater degree The follow-on 2014 Quadrennial to engage enemy forces at range and than other possible scenarios involving Defense Review confirmed the impor- in mass with different types of fires. China, the People’s Liberation Army tance of these missions and called for Furthermore, the continued growth of (PLA) can leverage short-range and inte- the joint force to “project power and the Islamic State of and the Levant rior lines of communication to employ an win decisively” in spite of “increasingly and other terrorist groups around the enormous capacity of forces to attempt sophisticated adversaries who could world threatens to endanger not only to compel capitulation or to invade and employ advanced warfighting capabili- U.S. interests abroad but also U.S. cit- occupy Taiwan. Additionally, the United ties.”5 However, capable adversaries are izens at home. This threat is magnified States may receive little indication and adopting potent A2/AD strategies that by the potential of terrorists to be armed warning of an impending Chinese attack,

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Walton 7 Defenders from 790th Missile Security Forces Squadron Tactical Response Force take up defensive positions, April 14, 2016, as they prepare to advance toward launch facility during exercise in F.E. Air Force Base, Wyoming, Missile Complex (U.S. Air Force/Brandon Valle) further complicating its ability to support of Taiwan might seek first to deter PRC the international economy by interdicting the defense of Taiwan. aggression via deployment of forces in trade and reorganizing trading structures; In light of this challenging situation, a resilient warfighting posture and the and resupplying Taiwan as possible. prudence demands the United States communication of the general costs of At the same time, Taiwan would employ it as a planning scenario. This conflict. Specifically, disruption to peace defend itself by preventing the landing of is not to say a potential conflict with and stability in the international order enough PLA combat power to sustain an China would likely remain localized to would lead to dislocation from it. invasion and by countering those troops the Western Pacific. On the contrary, Then, if deterrence fails, U.S. forces that do arrive. To that end, Taiwan would it would likely involve overt and covert would employ geographically distrib- be well served to pursue a strategy that conflict across the globe, as well as in uted units to prevent a successful PRC increases the difficulty of conducting space and cyberspace, and DOD must invasion of Taiwan, counter compellent an invasion. One approach, described plan accordingly. However, if the United forces, support Taiwanese survival, and in a recent report from the Center for States can succeed in the defense of apply direct pressure via strikes against Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Taiwan scenario, it is likely to have many PRC power projection forces and indirect would develop resilient sea and air denial of the constituent elements and concepts pressure via an extended blockade and capabilities, layered ground defenses, necessary to win in other scenarios in- other elements of a whole-of-government and counter–command, control, com- volving China—such as conflict in the response. Specifically, operational lines of munications, computer, intelligence, South China Sea or East China Sea—or effort may include disrupting, deceiving, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) scenarios involving other countries.7 and destroying PRC over-the-horizon systems to prevent the landing of enough This analysis uses a notional (OTH) ISR capabilities; defeating a PRC PLA combat power and reduce its effec- 2020–2025 defense of Taiwan scenario, amphibious invasion; constraining and tiveness once on the ground.8 which seeks to capture, at a general level, eventually defeating a PRC naval fleet; Overall, the scenario would likely expectations regarding how forces might defending allies and partners as possible, feature a U.S. commitment to swiftly be employed. An overall concept of with a focus on protecting power pro- counter PRC aggression, backed by the operations (CONOPS) for the defense jection nodes; dislocating the PRC from commitment to conduct a prolonged,

8 Forum / Securing the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 global compellent campaign as neces- . Both traditional and alternative Top Priorities for New sary.9 It is possible that in the defense of CONOPS that could be employed are Investments Taiwan scenario, U.S. forces could rely relatively brittle and vulnerable to enemy The above process of examining strat- more heavily on indirect approaches, disruption and deception. Additionally, egy, scenarios, and assessments illus- such as an extended blockade. However, U.S. forces face at least four major opera- trates the enormous challenges facing more directly responsive operational tional problems: DOD plans for the defense of Taiwan. alternatives must be examined. Their The exercise, however, has also pro- ports and airfields are at risk of air inclusion in a suite of response options •• vided focused insights on operational and missile strikes for national leadership represents the needs in terms of military capabilities networked integrated air defense minimum acceptable level of military •• and novel concepts of operation. systems (IADS) restrict the area of planning, especially as they may be re- The following section identifies mil- operation for supporting and strike quired to counter immediate, existential itary capabilities that should receive top aircraft threats to allies or partners, such as that priority for new investment as the core carrier strike groups can be tracked posed by an invasion. •• capabilities the Third Offset Strategy. and engaged at significant ranges The section aims for a finite set of concise that limit the offensive power gener- Assessment of the Force statements of need for new capabilities to ated by the carrier air wing Assessments of the performance of accomplish operational tasks. If employed both the space and the cyber the programmed joint force against •• with new concepts of operation, they domains are contested. advanced adversaries such as China or have the potential to offset adversary Russia reveal significant challenges as a Additionally, perceived U.S. advan- advantages and increase the likelihood of confluence of three factors that would tages in military competitions, such as U.S. success in the defense of Taiwan and exacerbate existing deficiencies. First, undersea warfare, air superiority, and other possible contingencies. sophisticated A2/AD systems will secure C4ISR, are eroding due to sym- In Chinese culture, the number eight likely proliferate to a larger number of metric and asymmetric counters adopted is most auspicious. Accordingly, this countries than currently field them. by the PLA. Moreover, the geographical article has selected eight statements that Second, A2/AD battle networks and environmental conditions of the reflect the most urgent needs of future (sensors; command, control, and com- Western Pacific, and the Taiwan Strait commanders. Some of the capability munications; and weapons) will mature in particular, facilitate PLA defensive statements will subsequently present and improve in sophistication and concepts and likely complicate the ability associated inputs, that is, types of systems. regional and global coverage. Third, of the United States to employ certain The following descriptions do not pre- China will likely continue to develop assets, such as attack submarines, in par- clude a formal examination of options or capabilities, posture, and forces more ticular concepts of employment. In other analysis of alternatives for each capability suited to global power projection, areas, such as surface warfare, ground- statement, but rather reflect a preliminary moving beyond most current estimates based offensive fires, electronic warfare, assessment of promising alternatives, of regional hegemony. China’s 2015 and integrated air and , the which may be useful as the Office of the defense strategy confirmed this shift to a United States faces marked deficiencies Secretary of Defense (OSD) guides accel- force capable of enhanced power projec- vis-à-vis PRC threats.12 erated initiatives to address these urgent tion.10 This destabilizing “Anti-Access A 2015 RAND report assessed the operational needs. Enabled Power Projection Force” has Sino-American balance of power in the Strike Fixed and Mobile Targets the potential of posing major challenges context of two scenarios: a Taiwan inva- Defended by Robust IADS from Long for the United States in not only East sion and a Spratly Islands campaign. It Range. In the defense of Taiwan sce- Asia but also other regions of the world observed that “the advantages conferred nario, U.S. power projection requires the through the extended range of main- by proximity severely complicate U.S. ability to destroy key targets inside and land China–based weapons and sensors, military tasks while providing major ad- outside of China. Among others, OTH the global mobility of other antiaccess vantages to the PLA.”13 While the report ISR and space-situational awareness systems, and the development of global emphasized that there are many actions sensors enable China’s A2/AD capa- power projection and sea control that the United States could take to bilities and severely constrain U.S. joint forces, such as surface action groups, reinforce deterrence and provide stability operational access. Given the importance amphibious and carrier battlegroups, in the region, its sobering conclusion of these and other targets, they are likely nuclear-powered attack and guided-mis- stressed that “over the next five to 15 defended by advanced, robust IADS, sile submarines, and long-range aerial years, if U.S. and PLA forces remain on which challenge U.S. ability to penetrate refueling and strike aircraft.11 roughly current trajectories, Asia will defenses, launch weapons, and have The defense of Taiwan scenario is witness a progressively receding frontier weapons successfully strike their targets. highly challenging for U.S. forces and of U.S. dominance.”14 This difficulty in striking targets on land entails the assumption of high levels of increasingly applies to mobile targets at

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Walton 9 Members of 576th Flight Test Squadron monitor operational test launch of unarmed Minuteman III missile, March 27, 2015, at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California (DOD/Michael Peterson) sea, as a combination of ship-borne and is, the B-21) capable of cooperating the PLA’s attack calculus and compel land-based defenses poses the same prob- with other systems to penetrate de- a reliance on a smaller inventory of lem for naval strike missions. fenses and fire sufficient numbers of longer range standoff precision-guided In response, DOD should con- new short-range, stand-off weapons to munitions. Even more importantly, in sider developing two new unit classes. overwhelm advanced point defenses. The the Second and Third Island Chains, First, DOD should develop conven- combination of new long-range missiles the ability of defenses to counter the tionally armed intermediate nuclear and bombers (with supporting systems) more limited numbers of PRC weapons forces–compliant and noncompliant would improve U.S. ability to degrade able to reach these areas is essential to intermediate-range missiles (maneuvering enemy defenses and exploit them with preserving the ability of the joint force to re-entry vehicle ballistic missiles and volume precision fires. operate from this area. boost-glide vehicles, respectively) capable Provide Robust and Resilient While wide-area defenses against of penetrating the most advanced and Terminal Defense Against Structured cruise and ballistic missiles are beneficial robust IADS to strike their targets or the Attacks of Theater Air and Missile for the defense of military forces and IADS themselves. Missiles could be fired Threats. In this scenario, the United partner and ally populaces, preliminary from different platforms: ground-based States requires the ability to defeat assessments suggest they face significant U.S. Army units in the First and Second structured attacks of PLA air and mis- challenges, including difficulty estab- Island Chain, naval surface platforms (in- sile threats. While the capacity of the lishing complex kill chains to intercept cluding commercial-standard Handysize PLA’s structured attack threatens to missiles at long range during combat freighters), or submarines.15 If fielded in overwhelm defenses at locations near conditions, the large size of long-range sufficient numbers, these theater weapons Chinese launch points (throughout interceptors, and relatively higher costs could credibly penetrate defenses and many areas of the First Island Chain), compared to current and projected termi- provide a resilient offensive fire capability. the ability of U.S. and friendly forces nal defenses. Therefore, relative increases Second, DOD should develop to sustain a degree of protection (thus in investment should be largely devoted sufficient numbers of an all-aspect, denying enemy air superiority, even in to short-range or terminal defenses in- low-signature long-range bomber (that the First Island Chain) could complicate stead of wide-area defenses.

10 Forum / Securing the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 In response, DOD should consider developing improved defense capabilities for naval combatants and ground forces. These include more plentiful missile and gun-based defensive systems, high-pow- ered microwave weapons, lasers, jammers, and electronic decoys. Additionally, DOD should improve passive or lower probability of intercept/lower probability of detection surveillance and targeting capabilities for these weapons and im- prove joint force track integration and battle management capabilities. To be successful, these active defenses must be complemented by a dedicated commit- ment to passive defenses: dispersal and displacement of forces, hardening of key , camouflage, concealment, deception, and rapid reconstitution capabilities. Conduct Persistent ISR in A2/AD Environments. U.S. forces require the ability to credibly detect PRC power projection and strike forces and weap- ons, thus discriminating true targets from feints and decoys and cueing other forces to surveil or strike. Persistent ISR in A2/AD environments is challenging due to the range and sophistication of multidomain A2/AD threats—includ- ing China’s ability to jam or destroy and communications—and to the decreased force gradient caused by operating platforms—in particular air- craft—from a distance. In response, DOD should con- Unarmed Minuteman III ICBM accelerates toward test range near after launching from sider developing and deploying new Vandenberg Air Force Base, March 27, 2015 (DOD) capabilities leveraging multiple sensor phenomenology. Options include vulnerable to PRC disruption, deception, First Island Chain—and beyond—and ground-based high-frequency OTH and or destruction; in particular, orbital destroy them as necessary. As with other S- or L-band multistatic radars, low-sig- satellites and sea cables are vulnerable capability statements, this requirement nature high-altitude long endurance to enemy attack, with major deleterious extends to other scenarios involving (HALE) unmanned aircraft systems effects on U.S. forces. the PRC. Currently, U.S. advantages in (UAS), and fixed and distributed under- In response, DOD should consider undersea warfare are being addressed by sea sensors and unmanned underwater developing new, more survivable commu- PLAN anti-submarine warfare efforts, vehicles (UUV). nications and PNT capabilities. Promising which could potentially limit the freedom Provide Secure Long-Distance alternatives include ground-based global of action of U.S. submarines during Communications and Positioning, positioning system pseudolites, HALE hostilities. Additionally, the ability of U.S. Navigation, and Timing (PNT). Long- UAS, and improved inertial and celestial surface combatants to conduct offensive distance communications and PNT navigation capabilities. sea control has degraded relative to the capabilities are essential for commanding Contain and Destroy Naval Forces. ability of PLAN combatants, and U.S. units, integrating forces, navigating, The United States must be able to not surface-based warfare is concentrated in and executing certain kill chains during only interdict a PRC amphibious invasion high-value surface combatants that may operations in the region. The U.S. force but also restrict the movement of face difficulty operating within the A2/ defense communications architecture is PLA Navy (PLAN) forces within the AD envelope.

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Walton 11 U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor flies over Arabian Sea in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, January 27, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Corey Hook)

In response, DOD should con- missiles (both modifications of short- the carrier as a system, with calculated sider focusing on three lines of effort. range missiles such as the Army Tactical improvements to the carrier ship, the Regarding surface combatants, promising Missile System and development of new carrier air wing, and other supporting options include deploying new long- intermediate-range missiles) and anti-sub- ships. Regarding the carrier air wing—the range combination land-attack/anti-ship marine rocket torpedoes. most critical area for improvement—in- missiles to a range of surface combatants, Provide Long-Range, Long- vestments should be focused on those submarines, and aircraft (such as the B-2 Endurance Carrier-Based Naval Air capabilities that increase striking range, and B-21), adding the ability to conduct Forces. Naval air forces play a crucial role provide new sea control capabilities (for vertical launch system reload under in the defense of Taiwan scenario by pro- maritime strike and surveillance), and way or in forward anchorages (so as to viding air support to other naval forces, integrate new munitions and sensors.16 improve the overall combat potential strike against enemy surface combatants This includes a stealthy, long-range, and of the fleet and enable distributed and inside and outside the First Island Chain, unmanned surveillance-strike aircraft. forward logistics), and disaggregating broad-area surveillance of the maritime Operate Air and Naval Forces from some combat power into new classes of space, offensive counter-air escort and an Increased Number of Resilient and small surface combatants (ranging from airborne electronic attack for bomber Dispersed Air and Sea Locations in the the Navy’s proposed frigate to fast attack missions, and supplemental defensive Asia-Pacific Region. In the defense of craft). counter-air for Second Island Chain Taiwan scenario, U.S. ability to operate Regarding undersea naval forces, bases. The need for sea-based airpower from a range of locations in the First, DOD should focus on developing would especially grow if airbases on land Second, and Third Island Chains com- numerous ISR and lethal autonomous are under attack. However, limitations in plicates the PRC’s attack calculus and UUVs, advanced sensors, and mines. aircraft range and type among the current enables U.S. power projection. Currently, DOD should also increase funding for and projected carrier air wing restricts the U.S. forces are concentrated in a limited attack submarine production. utility of the carrier as a system, especially number of largely unhardened bases, Regarding land forces, DOD should in missions in which large, long-range which facilitates PLA structured attack. focus on the role Army sensors and strike sorties are required and Air Force tanking In response, DOD should develop weapons could play in targeting naval is unavailable. and exercise the ability to operate air combatants. Key forces include ground- In response, DOD should develop and naval forces from dispersed clusters launched coastal defense cruise or ballistic capabilities for maximizing the utility of of air and naval locations in the First,

12 Forum / Securing the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Second, and Third Island Chains. A more passive and active low probability of concentrate effort and investment into more distributed posture in the First intercept or detection sensors and com- the most important capabilities needed to Island Chain would complicate enemy munications.17 Additionally, DOD should deter and defeat aggression and project targeting. Also, a more distributed and develop new secure C2 systems. At the power despite A2/AD challenges, not hardened posture in the Second Island same time, DOD should systematically only vis-à-vis China but also beyond. Chain would complicate targeting and develop the capabilities to attack and de- provide credible force-generation nodes. ceive Chinese C4ISR systems. Changes to the Analytical Lastly, select operating locations in the Processes Supporting Third Island Chain (such as , the Summary of Top Priorities Force Planning Aleutians, and Central Pacific islands west Based on a process of examining envi- To support the pursuit of the objectives of ) would reduce trans-Pacific sioned strategy, scenarios, and assess- as part of the Third Offset Strategy, sustainment requirements and provide for ments, the aforementioned capability the next Secretary of Defense should rapid contingency tanking and attrition statements should receive attention reform analytical processes informing reserve reinforcements to the Second as DOD top development priorities. force planning decisions along the lines Island Chain. Informed by other, classified sources of of three guidelines: increased selectivity, These recommendations apply to information, there may be additional transparency, and commonality. both air forces and naval forces, which capability statements that merit close The force planning process should also face logistical constraints oper- examination. Concomitantly, other key carefully adhere to a strategy-based pro- ating from a distance. The proposed Third Offset Strategy efforts will likely cess that encompasses an examination distributed posture would utilize active be in classified research and develop- of strategy, scenarios, and assessments. and passive defenses and measures as ment projects that may take years to Building off of strategic guidance, force appropriate. Necessary capabilities in- bear fruit. planners should exercise selectivity in clude improvements in combat logistics By focusing on the requirements of choosing the most important scenarios force capabilities, offshore and inland specific scenarios, instead of pursuing to inform assessments. As mentioned, petroleum distribution systems, vertical assorted technologies for their seemingly the defense of Taiwan scenario should launching system reload, runway rapid “revolutionary” nature, this process receive top priority. In examining this preparation and repair, and intratheater ensures that Third Offset technological and other scenarios, realistic and prudent lift. Although this capability statement development is closely linked to opera- assumptions regarding enemy capabilities might normally be considered a posture tional challenges—much like the Second and practices should be included. Efforts statement, the numerous subordinate Offset Strategy was informed by the to shape assumptions in unrealistic or capability requirements associated with operational demands of combat with imprudent ways that favor outcomes this overall capability and the major im- the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. The for particular Services should be repu- portance of this effort elevate it to one of process will inject a sense of urgency and diated. Additionally, while eschewing these top priorities. focus into DOD efforts—and ultimately a capabilities-based approach for force Precisely Disrupt, Deceive, and the linkage will result in the development planning, planners should be mindful Destroy C4ISR Systems and Defend of truly transformative capabilities that es- of the possibility of lagging intelligence Against Similar Capabilities. The tablish areas of enduring U.S. advantage. assessments of future adversary projected ability to precisely disrupt, deceive, and There are other capabilities important or validated threats. Consequently, force destroy Chinese C4ISR systems would to the defense of Taiwan scenario (and planners should improve sensitivity have tactical, operational, and strategic other challenging scenarios involving analysis (examining a range of values for relevance. Open sources indicate that China) that require attention and addi- key variables) and prudently assume the Chinese forces are assiduously preparing tional investment, such as the ability to presence of adversary capabilities when to wield similar capabilities and fight in interdict military and commercial lines appropriate—even if the threat is not “complex electromagnetic conditions.” of communication—especially seaborne formally validated. Major U.S. secure command and control lines of communication. However, those In terms of assessments, the Secretary (C2) and sensing capabilities are vulnera- capabilities likely do not require the same of Defense should direct the Director of ble to these forms of attack and deception level of additional investment as the enu- Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation while at the same time being essential to merated top priorities to be realized. to reinstate the ability to conduct OSD the highly networked American way of Lastly, there are other important campaign-level modeling, which was war. The ability to detect, defend, and capabilities to accomplish operational eliminated in 2011. Campaign-level counter these attacks and deceptions, tasks unrelated to China scenarios. As modeling consists of the use of large-scale while conducting our attacks and decep- mentioned, this includes certain new computer simulations to examine the tions, is critical. To do so, DOD should capabilities necessary to counter Russian performance of a full fielded military in shift from today’s high-power active sens- aggression. The eight listed priorities are planning scenarios. It takes the results ing and communication capabilities to not comprehensive but rather seek to of focused DOD wargaming activities,

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Walton 13 USS John C. Stennis steams at dusk in South China Sea, supporting security and stability in Indo-Asia Pacific, April 25, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Emiline L.M. Senn) as well as inputs from more detailed in turn force-planning dynamics to senior concepts of operation may allow senior tactical modeling, to better represent decisionmakers. leaders to more effectively gauge the situ- the effects of large-scale forces on a Furthermore, the assessment process ation and respond accordingly. battlefield. Campaign-level modeling is requires improvement in its character- Finally, DOD should exercise essential in developing insights on the ization of risk. Increased commonality increased transparency in how it com- performance of the entire joint force and within and among Services in how risk municates assessments to senior leaders in revealing key dynamic relationships is measured would assist in better un- inside and outside DOD, including and interdependencies. These insights derstanding the effect of programs on senior political leadership in Congress are instrumental in properly analyzing desired outcomes.18 Moreover, changes and the . An increased level complex factors necessary to judge the are necessary in how assessments of of transparency could more effectively adequacy of the joint force to meet ca- risk are aggregated. Current practices communicate the effects of different bud- pacity requirements, such as the two-war frequently “average” levels of risk across getary decisions on scenario outcomes, construct, and to make sensible, informed a portfolio; consequently, even though a as well as arming civilian leadership with trades between solutions. Campaign-level single point of failure in an effects chain a better understanding of key defense modeling is essential to the force plan- may produce extreme levels of risk, the issues. ning process, and although the Services overall assessment may conclude that risk have their own campaign-level modeling is being mitigated due to actions in other, Overcoming Obstacles capabilities, OSD should once more be less stressing areas. Similarly, assessments Pursuit of both the top priorities for able to conduct its own analysis to pro- of risk frequently assume projected ca- new investment, as well as improving vide objective, transparent assessments to pabilities in the program of record will force planning analytical processes, will senior decisionmakers. address current capability gaps, seldom be challenging. The proposed fiscal year In addition to campaign-level mod- anticipating the future adversary capabil- 2017 DOD budget takes some positive eling, assessments should use simpler, ities that will exacerbate those same gaps steps to focus resources on the priori- more transparent analytic tools and or produce new ones. ties, but much more is necessary in the wargames with capable Red Teams to As assessments of risk are vertically subsequent budgets to set DOD on the examine discrete issues. These processes aggregated throughout Services and right path. reveal key insights and assist in evaluating combatant commands, these problems The next Secretary of Defense will new CONOPS for emerging challenges. mount enormously. Increased transpar- likely face passive and active opposition Additionally, their increased level of trans- ency regarding the effects of high levels from portions of the Services, Congress, parency assists in explaining combat and of risk on subsequent or encompassing and industry. Among the Services, there

14 Forum / Securing the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 7 will be resistance to reallocating fund- Islamic State aggression, to reforming By focusing on necessary capabilities, this article does not examine the force-sizing ing from the Army to the departments Goldwater-Nichols, military compensa- considerations involved in being able to address most relevant in a conflict with China: tion, and base structure. the threat posed by China and other actors the Navy and Air Force. Within all the Given limits of time and resources, simultaneously. It also does not address critical Services, funding must be reallocated to the next Secretary of Defense will find questions of readiness, such as the sufficiency of those capabilities that are relevant in the it challenging to reform the entire current or future munitions inventories. 8 Jim Thomas, John Stillion, and Iskander most operationally stressing scenarios. In DOD enterprise at once. He or she can, Rehman, Hard ROC 2.0: Taiwan and Deter- many cases, there will be opposition from however, initially concentrate on those rence Through Protraction (Washington, DC: Service branches that might have pro- areas in which the greatest impact can be Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess- gram budgets reduced to fund the newly achieved. The top eight investment pri- ments, December 2014). proposed capabilities. Given the limited orities and changes to the force planning 9 Compellence is “inducing [an enemy’s] withdrawal, or his acquiescence, or his collab- terms of Cabinet secretaries, some may process are prime places to start. oration by an action that threatens to hurt, attempt to stall to wait him or her out. Armed with a new mandate, the often one that could not forcibly accomplish its In Congress, the next Secretary of new Secretary of Defense will be able to aim but that, nevertheless, can hurt enough to Defense will face the dual challenge of in- collaborate with Congress to realize these induce compliance.” See Thomas C. Schelling, creasing funding for DOD amid Budget changes. However, time is short. Each Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale Univer- sity Press, 1966), 2–3. Control Act limits and collaborating with day that passes, U.S. military gaps grow, 10 China’s Military Strategy (Beijing: The the House and Senate Armed Services and adversaries (especially China) feel State Council Information Office of the Peo- Committees to ensure a unified approach increasingly emboldened to use military ple’s Republic of China, May 2015), available on these top investment priorities. In par- force to threaten U.S. and allied interests. at . 11 This phrase was developed by Jim Thom- requirements for nuclear modernization of Defense should answer a nation that as of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary investment by increasing topline funding pines for a new defense strategy, secure Assessments. in a manner that does not throttle con- a legacy as a transformative leader, and 12 James R. Holmes, “The U.S. Navy’s ventional modernization investments, successfully define and implement a suc- Cruise Missile Nightmare,” Real Clear Defense, at precisely the time the Third Offset cessful Third Offset Strategy. JFQ February 20, 2015, available at . celled programs will solicit congressional Notes 13 Eric Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China support to block necessary changes. Military Scorecard Forces, Geography, and the 1 To accomplish these goals and other Aaron Mehta, “Defense Department Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa Budget: $18B Over FYDP for Third Offset,” Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), xxx. necessary changes in DOD outside of Defense News, February 9, 2016. 14 Ibid., xxxi. the purview of force planning, creative 2 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “DepSecDef 15 The First Island Chain refers to the first methods to incentivize stakeholders will Work Details 2017 Budget,” Breaking Defense, chain of major archipelagos out from the East be necessary. These include positive and February 9, 2016, available at . principally composed of the Bonin Islands, pots of funding to address statements 3 This force planning process of strategy, Marianas Islands, and Caroline Islands. of need. Additionally, OSD will need to scenario, and assessment was developed by 16 For more information on the potential secure the political support of Congress David Ochmanek of RAND. Some of the lan- role of the in a conflict against and the President to enact some of these guage in the strategy, scenario, and assessment China and necessary carrier strike group sections of this article was first published in improvements, see Walton, Cropsey, and disruptive changes—especially if a larger Timothy A. Walton, Seth Cropsey, and Bryan McGrath. portion of the budget shifts to classified G. McGrath, Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, 17 Bryan Clark and Mark Gunzinger, investments. The process of strategy, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict (Wash- Winning the Airwaves: Regaining America’s scenario, and assessments may serve to ington, DC: Hudson Institute, October 2015). Dominance in the Electromagnetic Spectrum 4 clearly convey the grave stakes involved Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priori- (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and ties for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: Budgetary Assessments, December 2015). in these decisions to those leaders and Department of Defense, 2012). 18 Mike Leonard, James Thomason, and encourage them to positively participate 5 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Wash- James Bexfield, “QDR: The Role of Analytics in this crucial process. ington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), in Addressing the New Budget Environment,” Lastly, the next Secretary of Defense 14, 19. Phalanx: Bulletin of Military Operations Re- 6 will face numerous other, important David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, search and Related Sciences, June 2013. Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern defense challenges that will threaten to Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics engross his or her attention, ranging (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), available from leading U.S. forces in Afghanistan, at .

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Walton 15 U.S. Navy E-2C Hawkeye 2000 aircraft assigned to “Wallbangers” of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 117 approaches flight deck of USS John C. Stennis while ship is underway in Pacific Ocean, July 13, 2006 (DOD/John Hyde)

Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset Strategy

By James R. McGrath

While the United States and our closest allies fought two lengthy wars over the past 13 years—the rest of the world and our potential adversaries were seeing how we operated. They looked at our advantages. They studied them. They analyzed them. They looked for weaknesses. And then they set about devising ways to counter our technological over-match.

—Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work

16 Forum / Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 t is well established that both military in pursuit of the Nation’s capabilities. Regrettably, the appeal for state and nonstate adversaries are core and enduring national interests, the development of new operating con- I gaining parity with current U.S. most notably safeguarding national cepts and wargaming techniques seems military-technological capabilities, security, promoting democratic values, to be overlooked in the media and most and as a result adversaries are eroding maintaining long-term economic defense policy think tanks. the tremendous asymmetrical con- prosperity, and preserving the current What many analysts fail to realize is ventional warfare advantages once international order.4 The solution to that the operating environment, spe- exclusively enjoyed by U.S. forces.1 this problem—one that has yet to be cifically the information environment This leveling of the playing field has fully articulated and bounded in scope, (IE),7 has changed, and our adversaries been enabled through decreased costs much less solved—has been named the are undermining our asymmetrical of modern information technology Third Offset Strategy, meaning that advantages through innovative use of and low barriers of entry to attaining there are a series of strategic capabilities the information space, particularly by precision weapons; stealth capabilities; that must be developed to give U.S. operating in the informational and cogni- sophisticated commercial and military forces a decisive military-technological tive dimensions on a global scale.8 What command and control (C2) capabilities; offset that generates lasting asymmet- should be obvious—but unfortunately is advanced intelligence, surveillance, and rical advantages over any potential not to many military and defense plan- reconnaissance (ISR); and relatively adversary for the next 25 to 50 years. ners—is that IO is precisely the tool set cheap access to commercial and gov- The strategy is so named because there that joint force commanders already have ernment-sponsored space and cyber already were two successful offset strat- to attack our adversaries’ newly found capabilities.2 As a result, in November egies in the 20th century.5 The first was advancements in C2 warfare, ISR, and 2014, then–Secretary of Defense Chuck President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s New precision weapons. Unfortunately, for ex- Hagel announced the Defense Inno- Look Strategy during the 1950s, which ample, the Russians,9 Chinese,10 and the vation Initiative to counter adversary sought to develop advanced nuclear Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,11 to technical and tactical progress that, if weapons capabilities to offset the Soviet name a few, are now also demonstrating left unchecked, will ultimately hinder Union’s overwhelmingly superior con- advanced forms of information warfare U.S. ability to project power across ventional forces and nascent nuclear that continually undermine U.S. tactical the globe and permanently challenge capabilities. The second strategy was prowess and enable successful antiaccess/ its aims of retaining its coveted status Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s area-denial (A2/AD) strategies that are as a global hegemon.3 While there Offset Strategy during the 1970s, which the root cause of the problem.12 For are many aspects to this initiative, the was aimed at countering recent Soviet U.S. forces to achieve the Third Offset Third Offset Strategy, as outlined in advances in both numerical and techni- Strategy, the joint force must be able to policy, does not adequately address the cal parity regarding its nuclear arsenal, achieve information superiority at the need for advanced information opera- coupled with sustained numerically time and place of its choosing. To do tions (IO), particularly IO wargaming, superior conventional forces deployed in that, the joint force must develop innova- modeling and simulation (M&S), and Eastern Europe and elsewhere around tive operating concepts for IO, wargame training systems. The purpose of this the globe. Essentially, the U.S. Offset them using a variety of computer-based article is to make the case that increas- Strategy invested in stealth technolo- methods, and then train to the newly ing the investment in joint live, virtual, gies, precision weapons, sophisticated discovered tactics, techniques, and pro- and constructive (LVC) IO wargaming C2 capabilities, and advanced airborne cedures that are absolutely essential for and simulations will generate lasting and space-based ISR that were ulti- 21st-century warfare—a type of warfare asymmetrical advantages for joint force mately revealed to the world during the aimed at breaking the will of the adver- commanders and will significantly con- first . sary through control of the IE. tribute to the achievement of the Third As outlined by Secretary Hagel and Currently, IO is often treated as an Offset Strategy. currently being championed by Deputy ad hoc, additive activity during most Secretary of Defense Robert Work, the joint LVC training events; therefore, Military Problem Defense Innovation Initiative emphasizes IO is routinely ignored or underutilized The Defense Innovation Initiative three key areas for sources of innovation: despite being a major component of is aimed at solving the problem of long-range research and development, every real-world joint operation since ensuring that lasting power projection new operating concepts, and reenergiz- Operations Desert Shield and Desert capabilities are available to the U.S. ing wargaming efforts and techniques.6 Storm13 and arguably in other forms, such Currently, most of the discussion re- as psychological warfare and deception, garding this initiative is overly focused throughout all of human history.14 Much on purely technical, materiel solutions, of the reason for this routine omission Lieutenant Colonel James R. McGrath, USMC, is the Information Warfare Department Head for such as unmanned autonomous systems and lack of prominence in major joint Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic. and sources of new global strike and ISR LVC exercises is that military information

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 McGrath 17 support operations (MISO, formerly IRC is necessarily required for a particular indispensable to the process of systemati- known as psychological operations), pub- mission.17 In fact, multiple IRCs applied cally unravelling an adversary’s integrated lic affairs, electronic warfare (EW), cyber in a combined arms fashion are a prereq- air and coastal defenses; undermining his warfare, military deception (MILDEC), uisite to achieving success in any one of ballistic and cruise missile standoff weap- special technical operations, and other these critical mission areas. This idea is ons; and blinding his advanced land, sea, information-related capabilities (IRC)15 consistent with the accepted Department air, cyber, and space-based ISR platforms. are difficult to simulate over a relevant of Defense (DOD) IO definition and is Furthermore, there is a defensive aspect exercise time horizon. Even more chal- precisely why they are considered ger- of C2 warfare that requires advanced lenging is the ability to realistically but mane to any serious discussion of future electromagnetic spectrum operations, sufficiently model the physical, technical, IO.18 The following discussion briefly information assurance, and defensive and cognitive complexities of the IE as highlights the need for further develop- cyberspace operations to ensure assured a coherent whole whose sum is greater ment and implementation of these six C2 over friendly forces on a global scale. than its individual parts. If this can be mission areas, as well as their relevance to Without a modern, robust defensive C2 achieved, U.S. joint forces would be able the future joint force. warfare capability, U.S. global power pro- to train in synthetic environments that Generally speaking, psychological jection is nearly impossible. would ultimately enable them to effec- warfare is defined as actions against the Denial and deception operations are tively maneuver within the IE, counter political will of an adversary, his com- a combination of operations security recent adversary military-technological manders, and his troops, and includes and MILDEC activities, supported by a gains and newfound information warfare inform and influence operations directed wide-range of IRCs, to protect critical prowess, and provide the baseline for a at any third party capable of providing information, facilitate surprise, and delib- newly defined technical, military, and sympathy or support to both the adver- erately mislead an adversary to achieve a psychological offset. sary or friendly forces.19 This mission area tactical, operational, or strategic advan- directly targets the cognitive dimension tage. Denial and deception operations IO as the Solution of our adversaries’ operations in the IE provide force-multiplying advantages By acknowledging the fact that adver- and ultimately attacks their will to resist. by enabling operational access and joint saries are reducing our operational It should be the primary focus of the forcible entry operations under A2/AD advantages and conventional overmatch joint force in order to ensure lasting conditions and contributing to the cogni- through innovative use of the IE, it tactical, operational, and strategic success, tive demise of an adversary as part of the becomes increasingly imperative that especially while state and nonstate actors psychological warfare effort. In addition, U.S. IO training, wargaming, and are simultaneously competing for domi- counter–denial and deception opera- operating concepts be improved. It nance in this highly contested space. After tions are critical to future conflicts, as is also important to emphasize that all, by definition, war as a contest of po- demonstrated by our adversaries’ skilled this improvement should not only litical wills by other means is the primary use of deception in Syria, Iraq,22 and the mirror-image the activities of our basis of most warfighting philosophies.20 Crimean Peninsula.23 adversaries, but also provide joint force Therefore, increasing the effectiveness Cyber warfare in the IO context is commanders with a comprehensive set of joint operations in this mission area about controlling the content and flow of tools and concepts that allows them would certainly require improved MISO, of information within the information to outmaneuver adversaries within the EW, cyber, and MILDEC capabilities and dimension of the IE. It includes the cognitive, informational, and physical authorities at all levels of war. convergence of the cyber and EW IRCs, dimensions of the IE. As a starting C2 warfare is about controlling the where cyber is enabled at the tactical point, a brief analysis of modern IO physical and informational dimensions level through radio frequency spectrum reveals at least six interrelated IO lines of the IE by cutting off an enemy force operations; cyber warfare in support of of effort (LOE), which if truly inte- from its commander, key decisionmakers, the other five IO mission areas; and of- grated with each other could facilitate or automated control systems through fensive cyberspace operations in support the Third Strategic Offset. These attacking vulnerable control mechanisms of traditional kinetic operations. For primary LOEs or mission areas are psy- or by simply attacking the commander instance, a prime example of this IO mis- chological warfare, C2 warfare, denial and removing him or her from the C2 sion area in action is the Russia-Georgia and deception, cyber warfare, engage- equation, ultimately resulting in the war of 2008, during which the Russians ment, and IE situational awareness.16 collapse of his or her subordinate forces.21 executed the world’s first synchronized While on the surface some of these Applying IRCs for C2 warfare purposes cyber attack in concert with major com- IO LOEs appear well-established is one of the few ways to overcome bat operations, likely using both state IRCs, that is not the intent or the the joint operational access and A2/ cyber capabilities and nonstate hackers case. These highly complementary and AD problems. Using a combination of to attack key Georgian communications, interdependent mission areas are IRC physical destruction, EW, cyber, MISO, finance, and government nodes prior to agnostic—meaning that no one particular and MILDEC capabilities would be and during combat operations to control

18 Forum / Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Then–Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announces Defense Innovation Initiative and Third Offset Strategy during Reagan National Defense Forum at The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, November 15, 2014 (DOD/Sean Hurt)

the narrative and pace of the psycholog- context, engagement is an IO mission— in the U.S. Pacific Command area of ical war as well as demonstrate Russian not a warfighting function focused on the responsibility to ensure that Chinese resolve and future deterrence capabili- intersection between partnership activities psychological, media, and legal warfare27 ties.24 Furthermore, there is tremendous and special warfare activities.26 In this are countered with the overarching goal opportunity for future cyber warfare context, engagement is about operating of ensuring that our regional allies are operations to: 1) support C2 warfare in in the cognitive dimension of the IE able to observe our actions and interpret A2/AD conditions by creating gaps and through informing and influencing part- them as U.S. commitment to defend our seams in an adversary’s defensive system ner and adversary nations using a wide common interests. of systems from standoff ranges, espe- range of IRCs, including but not limited Lastly, IE situational awareness is cially during the early shaping phases of to media operations using public affairs defined as understanding past events an operation; 2) enable the psychological and MISO. Engagement as an IO mis- within all three dimensions of the IE, warfare effort through focused and broad sion also includes public affairs operations tracking ongoing events, and being able social media messaging; and 3) support to harden the friendly force against ad- to adequately model and reliably predict both the engagement and IE situational versary psychological warfare. Moreover, (or at the very least wargame) a wide awareness efforts as message delivery and for the foreseeable future, engagement variety of possible outcomes in support ISR platforms. will remain a combatant commander’s of the other five IO mission areas. These The U.S. Army has recently estab- primary tool for Phase 0, steady-state, activities include not only all traditional lished engagement as a concept for a and theater security cooperation (TSC) intelligence disciplines but also the use seventh warfighting function and defines operations, used to send signals to our of a broad range of IRCs operating on it as influencing people, security forces, adversaries and allies that we are com- the battlefield as sensors, processors, and governments across the range of mitted to the current international order and actors. In addition, IE situational military operations to prevent, shape, and and a stable security environment. For awareness requires advanced M&S to win in the future strategic environment.25 instance, engagement could and should aid IO planners and commanders in the While there are close similarities, in this be used to amplify our TSC actions extremely difficult task of understanding

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 McGrath 19 the dynamic, nonlinear, and ever-chang- ronments for individual and small- Ultimately, the desired endstate for de- ing IE. Furthermore, IE situational unit IRC tactical trainers through veloping an advanced IO M&S capability awareness requires a detailed understand- high-level constructive simulations is to ensure that there are highly trained ing of individuals, social groups, behavior supporting strategic- and combatant forces ready to design, plan, rehearse, dynamics, communication architectures, command–level wargaming, capable execute, and assess operations within the exploitation of narratives, and target au- of seamlessly integrating with each IE, particularly when confronted with dience vulnerabilities, as well as the newly other as well as other kinetic and a sophisticated, technologically enabled emerging techniques of real-time, live big legacy M&S systems. 21st-century adversary. This can and data analytics, social media scraping, and •• Must incorporate the full array of should be implemented via a family of memetic warfare.28 possible effects that can be generated tactical- through strategic-level M&S sys- by organic and non-organic IRCs tems that adequately model and simulate IO M&S Requirements from the strategic to the tactical level friendly, neutral, and adversary deci- As discussed, there is a known gap for of warfare. sionmaking capabilities, behaviors, and joint force commanders to exercise •• Must be interoperable with other information systems as well as the complex their IO cell within the six mission areas joint and Service-level LVC M&S feedback loops that comprise all relevant outlined above. There is also a gap for networks and systems. aspects of the physical, informational, and exercising both supporting organic and •• Must be compatible with all major cognitive dimensions of the IE. non-organic IRCs and then integrat- constructive M&S programs of ing them with traditional kinetic fires. record in order for IO M&S to be IO Considerations Closing this gap with computer-based fully integrated into a single common There are five prominent counterargu- M&S would ensure that joint forces tactical and operating picture. ments that immediately come to mind are well trained in a repeatable and •• Must be interoperable with current for not developing advanced IO M&S expandable synthetic environment prior command and control systems and capabilities. These arguments range to employment across the full range of classified intelligence systems up to from the cost of IO M&S materiel military operations. This is particularly Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented solutions, the presence of other existing important because IO mission areas Information and other high-level solutions, widespread doubts regarding and their supporting IRCs are highly operational security control measures the efficiency and efficacy of IO across sensitive in nature, and live IO training to be integrated into a single common the full range and spectrum of military events are nearly impossible to conduct. tactical and operating picture. operations, and the complex framework For instance, certain EW, cyber, and •• Must incorporate open source media of legal and policy restrictions govern- special technical operations capabilities and the replication or emulation ing most joint force IRC employment. must be well protected to achieve any of social and traditional media for The first counterargument is that form of technical surprise, and MISO, analysis, using advanced forms of developing IO M&S systems would EW, cyber, MILDEC, and special tech- data analytic techniques to simulate be expensive and that the technology nical operations also have uniquely strict actions in the IE. for simulating the IE is not mature. political and legal sensitivities. •• Must incorporate advanced decision However, this is exactly the type of Achieving repeatable, scalable, and support M&S techniques, including investment that the Defense Innovation fully integrated simulation of the IE is not but not limited to artificial intelli- Initiative is calling for: an investment that an easy task. However, if the Third Offset gence–enabled augmented reality, leverages advanced technologies such as Strategy is to be realized, the Services and chatbots, and other expert systems to artificial intelligence, machine learning, DOD must invest in materiel solutions facilitate understanding of actions in agent-based modeling, and big data ana- to enable the joint force to train its IO the IE. lytics that our adversaries would not likely forces in a synthetic environment. There •• Must leverage state-of-the-art have ready access to exploit. This invest- are several key additional requirements artificial intelligence algorithms, ment in IO M&S would also lead to new for any useful automated M&S of the machine-learning software, and operating concepts that would be tested IE and IO for advanced wargaming advanced M&S paradigms, such during high-level joint wargames using purposes: as agent-based modeling, systems the very same systems, which is precisely dynamics, and game-theoretic mod- the intent behind the second and third Must encompass a system-of-systems •• eling in a federated architecture, to key areas for innovation outlined by the approach that includes training accurately model complex, adaptive Defense Innovation Initiative. for individual IO and IRC mission systems with the goal of replicating The second counterargument is that essential tasks through the highest the behaviors and communications the Joint Staff and the Office of the levels of a joint force’s collective-level conduits of a vast array of thinking Secretary of Defense are already invest- training events. Examples include target audiences and their highly ing in IO M&S through the use of the a range of immersive virtual envi- automated information systems. Joint IO Range and other cyber and EW

20 Forum / Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Soldiers from Britain’s Royal Artillery train in virtual world during Exercise Steel Sabre 2015 (MOD/Si Longworth) initiatives. While that is a first step, the violence threshold low or controlling the held our adversaries in check for the past Joint IO Range is only a stovepipe capa- attitudes and the behavior of the local 25 years are also the root cause of our cur- bility for cyber warfare effects rather than populace is paramount. This is not the rent military problem—namely that U.S. a capability that truly exercises all relevant case, however, since IO and IRCs have joint forces routinely win tactically and IRCs in support of joint operations—that routinely been employed by U.S. forces sometimes operationally, but continuously is, something more than cyber and EW throughout all phases of operations and have their victories ultimately overturned operations are required to realize the true all types of conflict, from World War II at the operational and strategic levels, potential for full-spectrum IO, specifically through Operations Enduring Freedom such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ironically, how to assemble a relevant array of IRCs and Iraqi Freedom. Additionally, there it has been the overdependence on our aimed at placing an adversary on the is considerable evidence that increasing physical, conventional superiority that horns of a dilemma and then inducing the lethality of operations using infor- has led the U.S. military to neglect the a complete collapse of their will to resist mation warfare is central to the strategy mental and moral aspects of warfighting, our aims and objectives. Without being of our 21st-century adversaries, most a deficiency that IO, by definition and if able to model and integrate the cognitive, notably and recently demonstrated by the sufficiently raised to the appropriate level informational, and physical aspects of the Russians operating in Ukraine and Syria.29 of prominence within U.S. warfighting IE in a coherent simulation, influencing The fourth counterargument is that doctrine, can immediately address.30 In adversary decisionmakers and their sup- IO is not well suited for the strategic addition, to further discredit the notion porting systems would not be achievable shaping and deterrence missions required that IO is an ineffective strategic shaping to the level of what is required for the by the Third Offset Strategy, or at least and deterrence tool, it is a well-accepted Third Strategic Offset. not as effectively as the physical advan- fact that due to international legal, diplo- The third counterargument is that IO tages that the Second Offset capabilities matic, and political constraints, IO and a is not suited for major combat operations, have provided. However, in some sense, handful of select influence-oriented IRCs and thus many military planners perceive the luxuries that were afforded by the are our military’s only available tools to it as a tool only for counterinsurgency or unprecedented freedom of movement, successfully prevent, deter, initiate, or irregular warfare, whereby keeping the maneuver, and firepower that successfully close a conflict.

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 McGrath 21 solution that is eerily similar to nefari- ous systems of science fiction literature and movies, such as The Terminator’s self-aware “SkyNet” and “Genisys” programs.31 The flaw in this popularized global strike and ISR network solu- tion—other than the obvious science fiction connotations—is that it is short- sighted and deals only with the current problem within the physical dimension of the operating and information envi- ronments. The real solution is some- thing far more complicated and worthy of the forward thinking required by the Third Strategic Offset problem set. A better solution is an advanced, semi-autonomous hybrid kinetic and nonkinetic weapons system fully enabling Soldiers from U.S. Army’s 350th Tactical Psychological Operations, 10th Mountain Division, drop the warfighter to, at a moment’s notice, leaflets over village near Hawijah, Iraq, on March 6, 2008, promoting idea of self-government (U.S. conduct highly integrated, cognitively Air Force/Samuel Bendet) focused operations that are also simulta- neously synchronized with other ongoing The fifth and final counterargument those commanders with well-trained IO joint actions across the globe, as well as is that there are insurmountable legal and staffs. Hence, developing an IO M&S concurrently facilitating long- and short- policy restrictions for the joint force to and training capability is actually part of term influence campaigns. Continuously conduct full-spectrum IO. This is simply the solution to the military problem and and consistently striking at the will of our not the case. However, the two primary not an impediment. Lastly, as joint forces adversaries through the use of carefully supporting counterarguments either re- continue to demonstrate their increased selected physical, information, and cog- volve around U.S. Code Title 10, Armed proficiency for fighting and winning in nitive-related capabilities should be the Forces, versus Title 50, War and National the IE—and as our adversaries do the ultimate goal of this advanced weapons Defense, arguments, or claim that the same—it is inevitable that over time, system concept. This system would current review and approval processes many of the authorities for certain sensi- facilitate maneuver warfare and mission for IRCs are too complicated to achieve tive IRC activities, currently held at the command by integrating, synchroniz- timely and relevant effects in the IE. The strategic level, will naturally be delegated ing, and coordinating many different first supporting argument is false because to operational and tactical commanders. capabilities by different commanders at Title 10 and Title 50 issues have already all levels directly against an adversary’s been solved and are deconflicted on a Future Innovation physical, moral, and mental critical daily basis using a highly complex but ex- In the long run, creating the neces- capabilities. Again, this is something tremely effective ISR and strike network. sary technical innovation in the field that clearly cannot be accomplished This network is enabled by intelligence of advanced IO M&S and training without advanced IO M&S accurately professionals and operators working side would no doubt lead to the maturation and continuously modeling the complex, by side, both physically and virtually, and of capabilities and tactics needed to nonlinear, and ever-changing IE. While allows the lowest tactical formations to achieve the goals of the Third Strategic the fusing of kinetic and nonkinetic receive the benefits of strategic assets and Offset. Furthermore, the gaps that modeling into a semi-autonomous global vice versa. There is some truth to the IO M&S could immediately close are effects network might seem like material second supporting counterargument that also the first steps in the necessary for science fiction, in the current era of the review and approval processes are research, design, and development of an machine-based learning and artificial in- overly complex. Many IRCs do, in fact, integrated global effects network that telligence–enabled autonomous vehicles, require DOD- and national-level approv- could and should act as the primary these capabilities are not too far over the als. This is not true for all IRCs, however, intellectual engine for an advanced, horizon and are worthy goals for the am- and there are numerous IRC-unique semi-autonomous global strike and bitions of the Third Offset Strategy. programs already in place for military ISR network—a network that has been planners to immediately implement. In considered the “holy grail” by those The military-technological gains of our addition, all IRCs can be and already who already offer solutions to the Third adversaries over the past several decades are implemented with great effect for Strategic Offset problem and that is a are apparent and alarming. To counter this

22 Forum / Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset Strategy JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 18 threat and meet the intended objectives information, and physical. See Joint Publication Information operations are generally 3-13, Information Operations (Washington, defined as the integration, coordination, and of the Defense Innovation Initiative, a DC: The Joint Staff, November 20, 2014), x. synchronization of IRCs to deny, degrade, robust set of research and development 9 Jolanta Darczewkska, The Anatomy of disrupt, or usurp an adversary’s decisionmaking programs, concept development activities, Russian Information Warfare (Warsaw: Centre capabilities, people, and systems in support of and wargaming efforts has begun to un- for Eastern Studies, May 2014), available a commander’s objectives as defined by DOD cover a series of technologies required to at . 20 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J.J. an advanced family of IO LVC M&S 10 Larry M. Wortzel, The Chinese People’s Graham (, 1909), chapter 1, available systems is not the only capability required Liberation Army and Information Warfare at . to achieve this ambitious offset strategy, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 21 Libicki, 9–15. failing to recognize the prominence of IO 2014), available at . Its Enemies,” BBC.com, January 29, 2015, In addition, these IO M&S capabilities 11 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com- available at . future advanced, semi-autonomous global Activity, Complex Operational Environment 24 David Hollis, “Cyberwar Case Study: effects system. Therefore, advanced IO and Threat Integration Directorate, Threat Tac- Georgia 2008,” Small Wars Journal, January tics Report: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 2011, available at . bility that will fully enable the joint force 2014), 1, 13–15, available at . tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-8-5.pdf>. 12 Joint Operational Access Concept, Version 26 Ibid. adversaries. JFQ 1.0 (Washington, DC: DOD, January 17, 27 Wortzel. 2012), available at ; and Joint Concept for Entry of culture being rapidly transferred to wide Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, audiences, particularly over social media—that 1 James R. Clapper, Opening Statement to April 2014), available at . cognition and behavior. See Jeff Giesa, “It’s Senate Armed Services Committee, February 13 John Broder, “Schwarzkopf’s War Plan Time to Embrace Memetic Warfare,” Defense 9, 2016, available at

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 McGrath 23 C-130 Hercules pilot with 36th Airlift Squadron performs visual confirmation with night vision goggles during training mission over Kanto Plain, Japan, October 14, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Osakabe Yasuo)

Avoiding Becoming a Paper Tiger Presence in a Warfighting Defense Strategy

By Elbridge Colby and Jonathan F. Solomon

he American military is reentering military dominance, a dominance that modernization of its nuclear and nonnu- a period of competition. For the enabled, and in some cases even pro- clear forces, the proliferation of nuclear T 20 years following the collapse pelled, a more ambitious and assertive arms to North Korea, and the general of the Soviet Union, the U.S. military foreign policy. diffusion of advanced technologies as- reigned supreme, nearly unchallengeable Yet as the Pentagon has been mak- sociated with the Revolution in Military in any state-on-state contingency that ing increasingly clear in recent years, Affairs all mean that U.S. military primacy Washington might seriously care to take this long-accepted ascendancy is now is under increasingly severe stress. on. This meant that a whole generation in question. The conventional military The Pentagon has already begun to of U.S. policymakers and military pro- buildup of China’s People’s Liberation take steps to try to respond to these trou- fessionals became accustomed to U.S. Army (PLA), Russia’s sophisticated bling developments, including through its commendable new Third Offset Strategy and related initiatives. These Elbridge Colby is a Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Jonathan F. are designed to leverage U.S. advantages Solomon is a Senior Systems and Technology Analyst at Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. in the development and exploitation of

24 Forum / Avoiding Becoming a Paper Tiger JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 technology, in bureaucratic flexibility, of the purpose of forward presence prior budgets. Allies abroad, meanwhile, rarely and in military doctrine and training to to the collapse of the Soviet Union. objected to U.S. forces deployed nearby. extend U.S. conventional military su- During the , U.S. forces abroad As long as U.S. forces were sized above periority into the future. Hopefully this evidenced American resolve, but they certain thresholds and challenges to the endeavor will pay off. were also expected to perform important supremacy of the U.S. military remained But the reality is that even if they are specific military objectives in the event of relatively modest, Washington faced successful, these efforts will not spare war. U.S. conventional military posture, no serious tradeoffs between combat the U.S. military the need to alter the force design, and operations, especially readiness and day-to-day “showing of way it is postured, operates, and plans after the Soviet Union attained the ability the flag.” As a consequence of all these for conflict. Indeed, the Offset Strategy’s to launch nuclear strikes at the American factors, the importance of presence as very success likely depends upon such homeland, were typically determined—or a goal in and of itself was trumpeted changes. And some of these modifica- at least heavily influenced—by the partic- in documents such as Quadrennial tions are likely to be significant—not only ular military concerns of how to stave off Defense Reviews and Service strategic in strictly military terms but also in the and, ideally, defeat Soviet Bloc aggression documents.1 political and strategic consequences they or coercion and, if this failed, to make the Yet this is no longer the world the entail. threat of U.S. nuclear usage more cred- U.S. military faces. Rather, the United ible. The U.S. military of the latter part States is confronted with intensifying The Importance of “Presence” of the Cold War consequently developed challenges to its military primacy, espe- One of the most fundamental of these conventional forces, based and operated cially from China and Russia. At the same changes will be the way the U.S. them, and planned for their employment time, the United States has been chipping military postures itself and operates, primarily with these warfighting concerns away at its own military preeminence particularly in peacetime. Since the end in mind. through sequestration and a straitjacket of World War II, the United States has In the wake of the dissolution of the approach to budget efficiency that pursued a national strategy of forward Soviet threat, however, this demanding prevents the Defense Department from engagement, allying or partnering requirement evaporated. U.S. forces no downsizing in a strategic fashion. with a host of countries in Europe, the longer faced a peer or near-peer chal- In this world, presence is no longer Middle East, and Asia, and, as it viewed lenger that could seriously contest them a relatively costless good; peacetime for- necessary, fighting adversaries in these in plausible contingencies. Yet at the same ward presence in this more challenging, key regions. As a corollary of this strat- time, Washington—sensibly—elected to emerging military-technological envi- egy, U.S. military forces have been for- maintain its national strategy of forward ronment will involve tradeoffs, including ward-based in or otherwise rotationally strategic engagement and the military some drastic ones, with war-waging deployed to these areas. The presence primacy that underwrote it. Even as the ability. U.S. forces that operate forward of U.S. forces has thus been a regular United States reduced its force structure within the expanding and darkening feature of the strategic landscape of from its 1980s peak, though, it retained threat envelopes generated by the in- these regions, playing a significant role many of the forward-presence require- creasing military power of potential U.S. in shaping perceptions and calculations ments (albeit with some reductions and opponents will be placing themselves at among allies and foes of Washington. tailoring) that it had established during greater and greater risk. For instance, Indeed, this presence has become the Cold War. U.S. forces still actively pa- U.S. warships such as aircraft carriers such a regular feature of political-military trolled the waters of the Western Pacific that are lauded for showing the flag life in these areas that many consider it and the skies over the Middle East and in the Western Pacific are increasingly a significant factor in the deterrence of were stationed in , Japan, and vulnerable to potential Chinese attack adversaries and the reassurance of allies. South Korea. capabilities, such as the DF-21D anti-ship In fact, to some, the visible, tangible pres- This led to a situation in which, as ballistic missile and the PLA’s large arse- ence of U.S. forces has been as much—if the memory of the Soviet threat faded, nal of anti-ship cruise missiles.2 not more—of a factor in deterrence and the presence of U.S. forces seemed to be- At the same time, impressive new assurance as the actual warfighting ability come as much the point of their existence U.S. shorter range aircraft such as the of those forces. To this way of thinking, as their warfighting capabilities. The value F-35 need to operate from airfields, such one that has become particularly ascen- of presence independent of warfighting as on Okinawa, well within the reach of dant since the end of the Cold War, the capability had some strategic logic; visible Chinese precision-guided land-attack fact that U.S. forces were present to forces continued to demonstrate the munitions. The bases that house U.S. demonstrate American will and resolve U.S. commitment to stay engaged, both ground forces on Okinawa and elsewhere was more important than their combat to friend and foe. But they also allowed in the Western Pacific that show the U.S. capabilities. the military Services and sympathetic commitment to staying put in the region, Such a view represents a distinct defense decisionmakers and strategists meanwhile, are also increasingly vulnera- change from how U.S. strategy conceived to argue for sustained, if not larger, ble—as are the aircraft and ships designed

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Colby and Solomon 25 Chief Warrant Officer 3 signals to E/A-18G Growler on flight deck of aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 11, 2016 (U.S. Navy/J. Alexander Delgado) to supply and move these forces around. from the perceived ability to harm an however, the ability to bog down and The essential point is that the U.S. opponent or to defeat or blunt his frustrate if not prevail over an opponent’s forces that are postured and employed actions to such a degree that he will act military forces is usually central because primarily for visible frontline presence as with restraint or back down. the ability to harm is so circumscribed, an independent mission are increasingly In the realm of nuclear weapons, the especially against near-peer adversaries. sacrificing their combat survivability, ability to harm tends to predominate as a Thus what is particularly important for with corresponding degradation of their driver of decision. In calculations of con- conventional deterrence is maintaining war-waging utility. ventional conflict, however, deterrence an advantage in conventional military by denial tends to be more salient than power, particularly with respect to a Presence and deterrence by cost-imposition (though given potentially contested area.4 In Warfighting Ability the latter can play a significant role). That particular, scholarship indicates that This is a problem, in fact a very serious is, conventional deterrence relies primar- conventional deterrence has been most one, because, despite some of the rheto- ily on a potential aggressor’s judgment of effective when adversaries judged that a ric of the post–Cold War era, deterrence one’s ability to prevent him from forcibly potential defender’s conventional forces derives not from the symbolism of being attaining his political objectives, if not de- could resist their attacks, particularly in present but above all from a potential feat him outright. Thus the conventional a relatively short timeframe. To put it attacker’s perceptions of the defender’s forces that deter most effectively are another way, the combined effects of realistically employable military power those that can contribute to the frustra- the defender’s in-theater and otherwise and capability—in other words, from tion or decisive defeat of the adversary’s quickly surgeable forces’ capabilities, warfighting ability. Presence can con- pursuit of his aims.3 quantities, postures, and positioning had tribute to this calculus by reinforcing Because of the different mechanism of outsized effects upon the decisions made the perception of the defender’s will or effect, what defines effective conventional by the potential aggressor state leaders. by latently complicating an aggressor’s deterrence is different from what typifies When defenders induced those leaders to path toward conquest, but it does not its nuclear variant. In nuclear deterrence, believe that any notional conventional of- itself constitute effective deterrence. after a certain threshold, resolve tends fensive would likely be arrested and that, Rather, at its root, deterrence stems to be central. In conventional dynamics, at minimum, would result in a protracted

26 Forum / Avoiding Becoming a Paper Tiger JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 conflict fraught with high cost, risk, and While technology offers some options secure in their Japanese ports when China uncertainty, successful deterrence was for addressing these challenges, the fact could not strike accurately against these almost always the historical result.5 remains that it generally requires a mini- facilities are now imperiled there in the This not only shows the value of for- mum of 10 years under current laws and event of war. ward-deployed and decisive surge forces, Defense Department policies to develop but it also demonstrates that the former and then initially field new systems and Framework for Optimal must, at least in aggregate, be both platforms. And that assumes applied re- Deployment militarily effective and practically usable, search has already reduced a technology’s Accordingly, the United States needs a especially within a campaign context. In developmental to fairly low levels. framework for determining how to opti- an increasingly competitive military-tech- Deputy Secretary Work highlighted ex- mally deploy its conventional forces to nological environment, therefore, the actly these points in his aforementioned deter most effectively in light of more United States can no longer afford to speeches when he observed that many capable potential opponents. Such an deploy substantial forces in ways that of the Offset Strategy initiative’s tech- approach should build on the following would not contribute to—or could even nological research investments will not model informed by conventional deter- detract from—prevailing in the event of bear fruit until the 2020s or early 2030s. rence thinking. conflict. Rather, the U.S. defense posture Some especially mature technologies The first layer of forces are those that writ large, including its forward-deployed may be fielded over the next 5 years, but must be deployed in close proximity to a forces, must make clear to more capable by and large they will do so via capa- potential contested zone to allow them and ambitious potential adversaries that bility upgrades to existing systems and to immediately arrest and inflict costs U.S. forces can effectively resist and re- platforms. Solutions to the presence-ver- upon an opponent’s offensive. These spond to any aggression. sus-surge-readiness dilemma over the forces should be capable of absorbing an Yet at the same time, the United next 15 years, then, must lean heavily on aggressor’s withering conventional first States has an interest in maintaining the creative new ways for positioning, postur- strike with adequate allotments for losses, benefits afforded by presence. Figuring ing, and employing our existing forces. then rallying to arrest the aggressor’s out how to maximize forward-deployed The starting point for confronting offensive progress and contribute to forces’ warfighting capabilities and this problem, however, must begin with preventing a fait accompli U.S. defeat. survivability, while also enabling at least the recognition that warfighting consid- Submarines, tactical aircraft suited for dis- some portion of the force to perform erations must predominate, at least with persed operations from austere airbases, traditional “show the flag” missions, respect to any decision affecting substan- and dispersible ground forces that can therefore represents one of the era’s tial or material portions of the joint force. immediately arrest an aggressor’s land most significant and pressing strategic Thus any significant forward deployment offensive or threaten an aggressor’s use of planning challenges. This is beginning, or basing should be integrated into a the sea or air within the contested zone albeit haltingly and partially, to receive credible strategy for fighting and pre- exemplify the kinds of forces that should the recognition it merits at the highest vailing against a major power adversary be allocated to this layer. levels of defense policy. Deputy Secretary such as China or Russia. Building a force Many of these forces would need to be of Defense Robert Work, in unjustifi- commensurate with this logic will involve permanently stationed near frontline areas ably little-noticed speeches in 2014 and change because over the past 30 years the in peacetime so that they would not have 2015, described in clear and unmistak- U.S. military has grown accustomed to to be deployed in the midst of tensions, a able terms the increasingly high costs surging forces unopposed into a combat posture that could well undermine crisis presence demands that stress the U.S. theater, initiating conventional operations stability and unfavorably compel the military’s supply of deployable forces; at a time of its choosing, and then deci- United States to appear to be the party these costs can and will exact from com- sively defeating adversary countries over responsible for escalation. Land-based bat effectiveness—and thus deterrence.6 the span of a few weeks to months. frontline presence forces would need As Work described, the “surge forces” Yet as American military advantages large, hardened, and dispersed stockpiles of the United States (those designed narrow and potential adversaries expand of munitions as well as other stores to to decisively prevail in a conflict) are their abilities to strike at U.S. forces account for an aggressor’s likely ability to becoming decreasingly competitive in a forward while also hindering American pressure U.S. and allied supply lines early much more challenging military-tech- reinforcement surges into theaters, in a conflict. Some light “tripwire” forces nological and geopolitical environment. such an approach will no longer suffice. might also be added to this echelon’s land This, according to Work, is leading the Indeed, if the United States prematurely and sea contingents during peacetime to Defense Department to look for innova- deploys or dispatches campaign-critical promote deterrence, but they would not tive and flexible ways to conduct presence forces substantially into a theater’s con- be expected to play major combat roles if a missions while focusing on the main tested zones, it risks their destruction or war broke out. Such tripwire forces might challenge: augmenting the warfighting disablement in the event of conflict. For be particularly suitable for more symbolic capabilities of the joint force. instance, U.S. warships that were once showing the flag operations.

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Colby and Solomon 27 U.S. Air Force joint terminal attack controller uses laser rangefinder designator for close air support training mission at Grayling Air Gunnery Range, Grayling, Michigan, July 29, 2015 (U.S. Air National Guard/Scott Thompson)

Presence forces that would be critical It is of vital importance to appreciate Army and Marine units designed to to preventing an aggressor’s quick victory that the use of light forces as a tripwire marry up with equipment preposi- should be allocated to a second and much at the frontline would not be credible tioned in theater) heavier layer and would be positioned at without the second layer’s latent back- •• forces ready for deployment on short the contested zone’s periphery during a ing from “over the horizon” locations. notice but that could take a week or crisis. Nothing would prevent these forces Furthermore, the second echelon would more to arrive in the theater (surge- from conducting peacetime training or be responsible for ensuring the protection ready U.S. naval forces) engagement operations in forward areas of the sea, air, and overland transpor- •• forces that require lengthy prepara- that might be contested in a conflict. The tation routes necessary for allies’ basic tion to be ready for overseas combat key would be to base these forces outside economic sustenance, frontline forces’ (the rest of the deployable joint likely contested zones and to be able to logistical sustainment, and the flow of force). quickly sortie or disperse them in a crisis U.S. reinforcements and materiel into With the exception of the immedi- to reduce an aggressor’s opportunities for the theater during a war’s first days and ately employable long-range bombers, preemptive attacks. Ground forces sized to weeks.7 these surge forces would build up over quickly reinforce the frontlines from rear- While forward-deployed forces would days to weeks, accumulating the military ward garrisons in-theater, aircraft carriers, focus on stemming and bloodying an capability to allow the joint force to eject ships capable of supporting amphibious adversary’s advance, actual war-winning or defeat enemy forces and/or impose operations, large naval surface combatants, forces would have to be surged from the such costs on the adversary as to compel and theater-range land-based air forces ex- continental United States. These forces him to terminate the conflict on accept- emplify the kinds of forces that should be would fall into four categories: able terms. allocated to this echelon. The air and naval forces that conduct combat opera- Adapting U.S. military posture forces in this contingent would be used •• tions directly from their bases (for to this approach would require sub- to provide frontline forces with combined example, intercontinental-range stantial changes. To start with, the arms support, with the caveat that they bombers) Department of Defense should redesign would typically do so by conducting brief forces able to quickly arrive in the its contingency plans for major conflicts forays into the contested zone during the •• theater (surge-ready theater-range to conform to this logic, such that early phases of a war, as dictated by calcu- aircraft, airmobile Army units, and they focus on making use of available lated risk and operational conditions.

28 Forum / Avoiding Becoming a Paper Tiger JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 peacetime U.S. forces in theater, backed short-range strike forces. History sug- this “trust-based” approach to command by long-range weaponry as well as air- gests that munitions expenditure rates and control. craft to the maximum extent possible, to in war will be well in excess of peacetime A fifth route is through a vastly delay and bloody (if not deny) adversar- estimates, and complex long-range strike greater attention to electronic warfare. ies’ efforts to score quick and cheap gains weapons are less likely to be quickly Improved electronic warfare capabilities through aggression. In other words, producible in wartime than guidance kits are critical to protecting forward forces rather than concentrate on achieving for short-range strike weapons.8 It would from adversaries’ wide-area surveil- rapid and decisive victory, which would therefore be necessary to allocate the lance, reconnaissance, and strike assets. be exceedingly difficult against the likes scarce inventories of the former toward While it would take the better part of of Russia or China, the United States punching holes in an adversary’s defenses the next decade to broadly introduce should instead strive to ensure that any and suppressing an adversary’s opera- the next-generation electronic warfare conflict these nations would initiate tions. This would allow the two forward systems currently in the development would result in a costly, risky, and uncer- echelons to obtain greater margins of pipeline throughout the joint force, tain contest in which they would clearly temporary localized superiority for their mature advanced electronic warfare be the aggressor, and one in which operations within a contested zone early technologies that already exist could the United States would be ready and in a war. It would also pave the way for nonetheless be rapidly packaged for use capable of deploying its surge forces for the entire joint force to use comparatively by forward forces as interim solutions decisive effect. more plentiful and readily producible until that time.9 It also follows that the Fortunately, a contingency response shorter range munitions over the course Services would need to do much to along the above lines and the peacetime of a protracted conflict. condition their forward-deploying forces posture to enable it could be execut- A third avenue is via doctrine and so that they could safely and effectively able before 2020 using systems and plans that embrace dispersed operations conduct complex operations under platforms that exist today or are being to reduce forward forces’ susceptibility restrictive electromagnetic emissions con- delivered within that timeframe. Doing to attack within a contested zone. To do trol, not to mention under an adversary’s so, however, would need to proceed this, the Services as well as the combatant electromagnetic opposition. The ability from near-term efforts by the Defense commanders would need to develop via- to smartly employ electromagnetic de- Department to develop doctrine and ble approaches for logistical support and ception while countering the adversary’s operating concepts, improve training, supply line protection of dispersed forces. attempts to do the same would be partic- and field off-the-shelf technologies that New tactics and procedures would also be ularly crucial. extract greater combat readiness and ca- needed to enable on-scene coordination/ Improved tactical training regimes pacity from available forces. cooperation among the different Services’ constitute a potential sixth area of effort. combat arms. Additionally, combatant Rigorous, routine, and realistic tactical Measures to Strengthen commanders would need to work with training is essential to the combat read- Warfighting Capabilities their allied counterparts to develop suit- iness of forces preparing for peacetime One approach is to develop new able forward locations for ad hoc airbases, forward presence missions. In this era operating concepts that enable rapid logistical distribution sites, mobile sensor of constrained training budgets, tacti- reinforcement of the two peacetime and weapons launcher positions, relocat- cal-level commanders still have many forward layers. Forces and materiel able headquarters sites, and the like. training tools and opportunities at their would need to be surged forward from A fourth method is through a more disposal that do not require units to leave bases in a theater’s rear areas and from decentralized command and control doc- their garrisons, take to the air, or go to the United States itself in the face of the trine that embraces delegation of tactical sea. The Services should accordingly adversary’s probable efforts to retard or initiative to the lowest practicable level. expand use of off-the-shelf simulation block those flows. Cold War–era surge Also known as “mission command,” this technologies as much as possible to en- concepts, such as the Return of Forces is intended to account for the impossibil- able tactical training events that would to Germany (Reforger), ought to be ity of exercising tightly centralized tactical otherwise be too difficult or expensive to closely studied to harvest ideas that may control over dispersed forward forces conduct in actual environments.10 be applicable to today’s circumstances. in a supremely complex and dynamic A final set of efforts could take More attention would need to be paid battlespace. This also accounts for the into account that many of our forward to how reinforcements would be pro- certainty that adversaries would strive allies would be core contributors to tected as they enter an opposed theater to disrupt and exploit U.S. command, the frontline echelon as they would be and then proceed toward their destina- control, and communications pathways inherent parties to conflicts waged in tions by air, sea, and land. through kinetic as well as nonkinetic their defense. It stands to reason that A second method is through oper- means. Much experimentation, training, these allies’ forces could do much to ating concepts and doctrine to address and “cultural adjustment” would be nec- multiply forward-deployed U.S. forces’ the division of labor between long- and essary for forces to become proficient in combat potential. For example, many

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Colby and Solomon 29 Ships from USS George H.W. Bush Carrier Strike Group simulate strait transit during predeployment evaluation, December 10, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Justin Wolpert) have proposed that multinational Brigade Unfortunately, the same may well be bases used early in a war would need Combat Teams reporting to the Supreme true of overall fiscal pressures on defense to be located at increasing distances Allied Commander Europe could be acquisition. As a result, technology re- from the frontline. This means formed using ground unit contributions search, development, and procurement U.S. aircraft performing missions in from the United States and its North priority decisions made today will have support of the frontline or second Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) an outsized impact on forward forces’ echelon would need greater range, Allies to deter Russian aggression against warfighting capabilities in the mid-2020s on-station endurance, and payload the Baltics.11 Similarly, a standing NATO and beyond. capacity than the fighters we pres- maritime task force could be established ently have or will soon field. This for the Baltics that includes not only Five Critical Capabilities highlights key attributes for the Air warships but also land-based aircraft, air Five capability areas in particular will be Force’s planned long-range strike and missile defenses, and anti-ship missile critical to developing a joint force that platform as well as for the Navy’s batteries. Combatant commanders’ ef- can prevail in regional wars while still proposed F/A-XX fighter. The latter forts to cultivate these kinds of combined performing peacetime presence missions in particular would need to take on forces, plus U.S. armaments sales or at a reasonable level: the long-range fleet air defense role financial or technical assistance that helps last performed by the F-14. Forward forces would need afford- allies procure off-the-shelf capabilities, •• Since the strike capabilities of poten- able and wartime mass-producible •• could have disproportionately high re- tial adversaries would hold forward guided munitions that are “good turns on investment. port facilities at risk, and since every enough” for waging protracted Taken together, the aforemen- day of transit from forward areas conflicts. This means that there tioned measures offer great promise to rearward ports represents time would be tradeoffs between weapon for strengthening the warfighting ca- that warships are not fighting at the capabilities and the numbers that pabilities—and thus the conventional front, the Navy should equip its could be quickly manufactured using deterrence credibility—of U.S. forward logistics ships with the capability to available commercial electronics and forces in relatively short order. It is clear, reload surface combatants’ vertical other materials, tested, and then though, that the trends driving the U.S. launchers and submarine magazines delivered during a conflict. military’s presence-versus-readiness chal- at sea or in anchorage. Failure to do As the effective strike ranges of lenges will not be diminishing anytime •• so would present a potentially cam- potential adversaries continue to soon. Indeed, if anything, those trends paign-breaking problem for forward increase and contested zone sizes will only worsen during the 2020s. naval surface and submarine forces. expand accordingly, many U.S. air-

30 Forum / Avoiding Becoming a Paper Tiger JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 •• Unmanned systems will provide foreign military sales as well as direct deterrence is a force that can adequately future forward forces with dramat- commercial sales—could strengthen punish or defeat a prospective aggressor. ically expanded capabilities. Partic- those bulwarks. Forward and visible presence will often ularly important will be the use of be reconcilable with this need, especially such systems as communications A Present and Capable Force in peacetime; but when it is not reconcil- relays within a contested zone; the The recommendations offered here are able, the U.S. defense establishment must resultant highly directional line-of- intended to be stimulative and sugges- give due priority to the warfighting ability sight pathways will be extraordinarily tive rather than exhaustive or definitive. of the joint force. For ultimately, it is in difficult for adversaries to detect, Hopefully, they will provide defense the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to degrade, or exploit. Unmanned decisionmakers and those who influence do grave damage to or defeat opponents systems will also play central roles in them with a framework for ideas and that U.S. coercive strength lies. A military electronic warfare, whether as direc- ways of grappling with the need to strategy that neglects this simple but tion-finding sensors, decoys, or elec- augment the joint force’s warfighting unforgiving reality risks creating a hollow tronic attack platforms. Unmanned capability while enabling presence mis- force and, ultimately, a paper tiger. JFQ systems will additionally be needed sions. But perhaps the most significant as scouts to support high-confidence result would be for the defense estab- classification of targets and avoid lishment simply to recognize the exis- Notes weapons or strike platform wastage, tence and severity of the problem, the 1 to serve as “wingmen” for manned reality of the tradeoffs involved, and the See, for example, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of platforms, and to serve as strike plat- need for earnest and creative responses. Defense, 1997), 39, available at ; •• Directed energy weapons may offer be significant because the formidable Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: forward forces radically expanded military buildups of potential adversaries Department of Defense, 2001), 11, 25; and capability enhancements. Electro- and the general diffusion of advanced The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015 (Washington, DC: The magnetic railgun technologies offer military technology mean that the U.S. Joint Staff, June 2015), 9, 11. ground and surface naval forces the defense establishment needs to change. 2 The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s tantalizing promise of being able to The United States can no longer afford (PLA’s) ability to conduct long-range anti-ship strike targets with inexpensive projec- the luxury it enjoyed during the years fol- attacks, though, is highly dependent on an tiles from increased standoff ranges. lowing the collapse of the Soviet Union, integrated theater-wide ocean surveillance and reconnaissance sensor network. This “system Similarly, high energy laser systems when the United States, bestriding the of systems” contains many inherent vulnera- may be ideally suited as point defense world like a military colossus, could eas- bilities that suggest it would be most capable weapons against an adversary’s use ily—almost thoughtlessly—reconcile the at the outbreak of a war, and thereafter would of inexpensive air or surface vehicle demands of warfighting prowess with the suffer increasing degradation due to U.S. use swarms. The electro-optical/infrared advantages of forward presence. Instead, of deception, electronic and cyber attacks, and physical attacks to suppress, disrupt, confuse, sensors used to aim lasers will addi- in a world in which American forces are or destroy the PLA’s ability to maintain a tionally provide U.S. forces with an increasingly vulnerable and in which high-confidence “picture” of the battlespace. excellent situational awareness tool, the United States will have to prepare For more elaboration, see Jonathan F. Sol- most notably when radars are being to struggle for mastery of every domain omon, “Defending the Fleet from China’s jammed. against increasingly capable opponents, Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: Naval Deception’s Roles in Sea-Based Missile Defense” (Master’s the U.S. defense establishment needs to Investments in these five areas should thesis, Georgetown University, 2011); and concentrate much more on the increas- be harmonized among the Services as Jonathan F. Solomon, “Maritime Deception ingly daunting task of ensuring that the and Concealment: Concepts for Defeating well as among core allies. This would joint force can effectively fight and prevail Wide-Area Oceanic Surveillance-Reconnais- allow the creation of constructive ca- in a conflict with America’s plausible foes. sance-Strike Networks,” Naval War College pability redundancies while avoiding Review 66, no. 4 (Autumn 2013), 87–116. Effective conventional deterrence unnecessary duplications of effort. 3 See Michael S. Gerson, “Convention- derives ultimately not from the mere Cooperative research and development al Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,” sight or knowledge of the defender’s Parameters 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009), 32–48; with allies may be especially beneficial in presence, but from respect for his evident Edward Rhodes, “Conventional Deterrence,” this regard, as not all good ideas or cut- ability and resolve to defend and over- Comparative Strategy 19, no. 3 (Fall 2000), ting-edge technologies are born, or best 221–253; and Jonathan F. Solomon, “Demys- come and, usually less reliably, to punish. or most efficiently developed, in America. tifying Conventional Deterrence: Great Power A force that is present but not capable The more U.S. and allied forces coordi- Conflict and East Asian Peace,”Strategic Stud- of inflicting damage or inducing frus- ies Quarterly (Winter 2013), 117–157. nate or share responsibilities for holding tration sufficient to dissuade a potential 4 For an excellent exposition of this point, the line forward in specific theaters, the aggressor is not a force that will instill see Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested more that armaments cooperation—and Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise the fear needed to deter. Far better for

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Colby and Solomon 31 Ships from U.S. and Indian navies and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force participate in trilateral naval field training exercise Malabar 2014 to improve collective maritime relationship and increase understanding in multinational operations, July 30, 2014 (U.S. Navy/Chris Cavagnaro) and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” Their Effects on Strategy (Part 1 of 2),” Blog, September 3, 2015, available at . 5 Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence ination.net/2014/11/guided-munitions-in- 11 Terrence K. Kelly, “Stop Putin’s Next and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale ventory-management.html>; and Jonathan Invasion Before It Starts,” U.S. News and University Press, 1988). See in particular pages F. Solomon, “Guided Munitions Inventory World Report, March 20, 2015, available at 56–76. See also Solomon, “Demystifying Con- Management, Producibility, and their Effects . Work,” Council on Foreign Relations, Sep- available at . ert-work-asia-pacific-rebalance/p35728>; and 9 For example, see the discussion of interim Speech as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of off-the-shelf electronic warfare systems fielded Defense Bob Work at McAleese/Credit Suisse by the U.S. Army for operations in Afghanistan, Defense Programs Conference, Washington, as well as discussion of the Army’s timeline DC, March 17, 2015, available at . Ukraine,” Defense News, August 4, 2015, 7 For the authors’ discussion of this kind available at . Politics and Strategy 57, no. 6 (December 10 For an assessment of how this point is 2015–January 2016), 21–50. already being implemented by the U.S. Navy, 8 For elaboration on this point, see see Jonathan F. Solomon, “The Use of Simula- Jonathan F. Solomon, “Guided Munitions tors and Synthetic Environments for Advanced Inventory Management, Producibility, and Tactical Training,” Information Dissemination

32 Forum / Avoiding Becoming a Paper Tiger JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Air Force Reserve security forces members participate in 6-day combat leaders course while living in field conditions, placing practical application of combat maneuvers into complex mission environments (U.S. Air Force/Nicholas B. Ontiveros)

Switching the Paradigm from Reactive to Proactive Stopping Toxic Leadership

By Mike Rybacki and Chaveso Cook

sk any member of the U.S. Given this depth of information, we Armed Forces if they have wit- must ask, “Why is there not a proactive A nessed firsthand the effects of approach to preventing these leaders a toxic leadership environment, and from advancing in leadership roles?” they will almost certainly say “yes.” The purpose of this article is to provide Major Mike Rybacki, USA, is an Academic Instructor in the Department of Behavioral They will usually further elaborate an overview of the current thoughts on Sciences and Leadership at the United States on the damning effects of the toxic toxic leadership and provide an action- Military Academy. Major Chaveso “Chevy” Cook, environment by providing examples of able approach for countering and pre- USA, is Commander of Delta Company, 3rd Military Information Support Battalion (A), Fort Bragg, everything from combat ineffectiveness venting the development of toxic leader North Carolina. to low rates of retention and morale.1 environments.

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Rybacki and Cook 33 Figure 1. Toxic and Transformative Triangles are not sufficient, however, due to the contextual influence and role of followers Destructive in an organization.7 Leaders Followers in a toxic situation are defined as being either “conformers” or “colluders.” Conformers have unmet needs, low maturity, and/or low core self- evaluation. This explains why populations Toxic living in poverty can be susceptible to Triangle tyrannical leaders. Colluders, on the other Susceptible Conducive hand, seek to benefit from a toxic situation Followers Environment alongside the leader. This group is defined Positive as having ambition, a similar world view as Environment the leader, and “bad” values. The environ- ment must also be “conducive” for a toxic leader and susceptible followers to persist. Instability, perceived threat, cultural values, a lack of checks and balances, and ineffective institutions are the elements of Transformative an environment in which a toxic situation Triangle may arise. Values-Based Capable Leadership Followers The Transformative Triangle In an effort to simplify a complicated Toxic Leadership Defined Furthermore, these authors argue issue, we propose our triangle of ele- that definitions of toxic leadership as a ments in figures 1 and 2. Each major The definition we will use is pre- process or as an outcome exclusively are component has subcomponents, which sented by Art Padilla, Robert Hogan, incomplete. Viewing destructive leader- will be further discussed. Also shown and Robert B. Kaiser in their article ship as the result of a leader’s behavior in figure 1 is a juxtaposition of our titled “The Toxic Triangle: Destruc- within a process “assumes that a leader’s transformative triangle versus Padilla, tive Leaders, Susceptible Followers, bad intentions are an essential compo- Hogan, and Kaiser’s toxic triangle. Both and Conducive Environments.”2 nent of destructiveness” and that “certain environments are “infectious.” Both The authors evaluate conflicting and behaviors are inherently destructive.”3 seep deep into the culture and the indi- competing language in the work of Some undesirable behaviors, such as ego- vidual members of the organization. For previous authors, psychologists, and centrism, will not always lead to a toxic purposes of this discussion, we propose social scientists. They first refute the situation. Viewing toxicity as entirely an that in a toxic context, the destructive idea that leadership by definition is only outcome is limiting in that even “good” leader is the primary driver of toxicity, a “positive force,” where “positive” leaders may produce “bad” outcomes.4 while in a constructive context, the would mean using human energy and After determining what toxic positive environment is the primary resources to influence others to create a leadership is not, the central argument driver of transformative outcomes. This desired result. Subscribers to this line of presented by Padilla, Hogan, and Kaiser is visually represented at the apex of thinking would argue that toxic leaders is that previous definitions of toxic each triangle. are not leaders at all. Narrowing the leadership that focus solely on the leader definition of leaders to those individu- are too narrow and incomplete. Denise Positive Environment als who have only a positive influence Williams identified 18 different attributes A positive atmosphere is one that is becomes problematic when evaluating and “types” of leaders in her research.5 uplifting, supportive, and develop- their “influence” over time and across Prefaced by the reminder that even a mental in nature. Research has shown the many individuals/groups one leader destructive leader must be truly “lead- that when people “work with a posi- could affect. Similarly, toxicity in an ing” by influencing others to forego tive mind-set, performance on nearly organization exists regardless of the their interests and contribute to long- every level—productivity, creativity, broad ranges of leader competence and term goals, Padilla, Hogan, and Kaiser engagement—improves.”8 We also effectiveness. In broader terms, the identify the attributes of a toxic leader as know that effective leadership is context leader in question may or may not be five “elements”: charisma, personalized dependent.9 Understandably, it may be entirely successful in leading his or her power, narcissism, negative life theme, especially difficult to measure positivity. organization. and ideology of hate.6 These attributes Here we use five measures as indicators

34 JPME Today / Stopping Toxic Leadership JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 of a positive environment: empower- Figure 2. Transformative Triangle ment, transformational and transactional balance, active listening, diplomacy, and Positive Values-Based Capable a respectful and candid setting. Environment Leadership Followers Empowerment. To empower is to • Empowerment • Character • Upstanders invest, equip, enable, or supply someone • Transformational and • Reasonable and restrained • Lower level leadership with power. All of this requires a certain transactional balance standards-based approach • Penchant for proper dissent amount of giving. Leaders have to pour • Diplomacy • Super-ordinate thoughts • Unity of effort and actions themselves into others and their efforts. • Respectful and candid forum • Equal loyalty to mission, • Active listening • Selfless intent leadership, and organization A leader must create action, devote time, • Close match between make space, provide opportunity, men- espoused and enacted values tor, coach, teach, and work on behalf of others to empower them. Constructive leaders are those who understand that they are obligated to endow followers leaders and subordinates feel like they are goes on to specifically state that doing with the ability to do what is needed. less capable.14 Therefore, a balance must so allows them to be magnanimous John Steele, author of a study released be sought to get tasks accomplished and rather than shoving them in a corner.17 by the Center for Army Leadership in facilitate growth. It is giving a little to get a little, but 2011, proposes that constructive leader- Active Listening. Active listening is more often than not, it is giving a little ship is the result of a leader whose focus is a combination of synthesizing another’s to get so much more. Our decisions as pro–organizational behaviors, pro–self-in- information in conversation while not leaders greatly affect our followership’s terests, and pro–subordinate behaviors.10 simultaneously formulating our own environment. They affect our leaders, The one differentiation made between subsequent retort. It requires that we not too. Bringing them all into our deci- this and a toxic environment is the em- multitask while engaging in discussion, sionmaking process garners ownership powerment of subordinates—whether denouncing the widely held belief that of what results we may achieve together. leaders look to accomplish organization pausing for silence after one is finished Diplomacy breeds connectedness, which objectives through subordinates or in speaking is a sign of misunderstanding, in many cases takes us from sympathy to spite of subordinates. weakness, or unpreparedness in an en- empathy. Accurate empathetic under- Transformational and gagement. Leaders truly understand the standing is paramount to deciphering the Transactional Balance. Environments importance of active listening if they can human experience, which gives leaders that focus on development work toward pay attention and actively pinpoint an- a better perspective. Being empathetic is growing leaders rather than creating bet- other’s perspective. Other tenets of active not just some sort of banal platitude, as ter followers. Transformational practices listening are: the emotional quotient has become as look to restructure and renew members important to leadership and decisionmak- ask appropriate questions of the organization. Transformational •• ing as the intelligence quotient. Taking stop and pay attention leadership “fosters capacity development •• this up a level from the individual to the use physical listening (that is, body and brings higher levels of personal •• group, through research on organiza- language, eye contact) commitment among followers to orga- tions, Rensis Likert found that the ideal withhold judgment nizational objectives.”11 Steele finds that •• executive approach from the perspective pick up on emotions/feelings “units that make leader development a •• of the led clusters around participative pause to reflect higher priority also tend to report fewer •• management as opposed to autocratic synthesize the information toxic leaders, and consider toxic leader- •• management, benevolent , or restate, paraphrase, or summarize. ship less of a problem.”12 Transactional •• even consultative management.18 Yan Ye practices are not on the other end of Carl Rogers’s person-centered ap- confirms the findings of Likert, stating the spectrum, per se, as they are more proach to humanistic psychology and that “autocratic leadership is likely to pro- akin to a different practice altogether. psychotherapy suggests that “humans will duce passive followers.”19 Transactional leadership focuses more allow themselves to be influenced only Respectful and Candid Setting. on “exchanging tangible rewards for after they decide they have been heard Respect goes in all directions in an the work and loyalty of followers.”13 and understood.”15 organization that has a positive environ- Transactional processes are needed to Diplomacy. Author Paul Arden ment. It is not only afforded to those in get the job done, and a can-do attitude describes the importance of diplomacy, positions of authority. All members of facilitates results. It has been suggested telling us that we must take into account the organization owe each other respect. that subordinates, however, generally what others desire, as it will soften our True respect should extend to all ex- want more developmental experiences. approach and prepare them to look at changes, be it around the water cooler, in When this is not the case, many junior what we want to show them.16 He then a presentation, during a working group,

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Rybacki and Cook 35 or elsewhere. Followers owe leaders the determine decisions, our attitude deter- the wearers’ hands, a leader should no ground truth, and Steele’s study indi- mines the atmosphere, and our character longer require followers to wear gloves, cates that constructive leaders often take determines the trust in an organization.27 to let their gloves and hands dry out. advantage of this by encouraging “frank Leaders who display upright character Superordinate Thoughts and Actions. and free-flowing idea discussion.”20 These through both behavior and values will Many of our military standards derive leaders seek to foster an atmosphere that have a culture of trust in their organiza- from tradition. Traditions only stay is conducive to connections, especially in tions. Steele states that there is a strong alive because of leaders and followers. this era filled with hyper-connectivity. Ye relationship between constructive leader- Institutions are built upon traditions, as states that the advent of the information ship and behaving ethically, wherein there well as standards, norms, ethics, creden- age has “highlighted the need for more lie inviolable moral principles.28 Lacking tials, and even schedules. But they do flexible leader-follower relationships.”21 principles may lead to a bending of rules not honor themselves; members of the Our ability to quickly reach out to each that destroys the trust that connects a organization honor them. Institutions other has allowed us to know more than leader and followers. Steele further states need people to make them what they are. just what followers think. Likewise, Kent that there is a strong relationship between Members of the organization tell others, Bjugstad finds that effective leaders also constructive leadership and behaving by words and deeds, what institutions need to create the environment that ethically.29 Mutual trust allows working stand for. When leaders focus on uphold- garners respect for followers “who will toward goals on behalf of the whole, ing the institution, they focus less on the speak up and share their points of view where followers trust that the leader is story they become. The institution is big- rather than withhold information.”22 This taking them in the right direction and that ger. One should not read “bigger” strictly all suggests that mutual respect sets the the leader trusts that the followers will through the lens of size, though it is an foundation for quality relationships. do the right thing(s) to accomplish that important and unforgettable dimension goal. James O’Toole argues that without with respect to this definition. It should Values-Based Leadership committed understanding couched within be thought of from the broader sense of Noted leadership consultant John morals and values, trust will be broken importance. This importance is heavily Maxwell writes in The 360° Leader and the leader will not be followed.30 derivative from esteemed tradition(s) that “decisions that are not consistent Reasonable and Restrained developed over time, long before the cur- with our values are short lived.”23 Standards-Based Approach. The military rent member was part of the organization. With recent studies from the Army’s is a standards-based organization. Steele A values-based leader carries on the insti- Command and General Staff College reminds us that even micromanagement tution because it is guaranteed to outlive finding lying commonplace in the U.S. can be effective “when a subordinate is all existing members of the organization. Army’s officer corps and numerous incompetent or wants tight guidance.”31 Selfless Intent. Dysfunctional leader- stories demonstrating moral failures in Different types of followers may require ship behaviors, including self-centered everything from politics to the busi- different leadership approaches to get attitudes and motivations, adversely affect ness industry, value judgment has taken the most out of them. Path-goal theory subordinates, the organization, and mis- center stage. In a constructive environ- tells us that leader behavior is dictated by sion performance.34 In a Military Review ment, values can “influence both one’s both the composition of their follower- article, Joseph Doty and Jeff Fenlason effectiveness and the climate in which ship and the characteristics of the task find that almost all toxic leaders are nar- [he] work[s].”24 Values provide leaders, at hand, spanning from a directive style cissistic.35 If toxic leaders are “individuals and followers to a certain extent, an to an achievement-oriented style.32 As whose behavior appears driven by self- anchor in unsettling situations. In mentioned earlier, leadership approaches centered careerism at the expense of their today’s unstable security environment, can be democratic to a certain extent, subordinates and unit,” then values-based leaders are being put into danger- as the interactions between leaders and leaders should display selfless intent that ous situations more often. The three followers can and will at times determine accentuates their subordinates’ and unit’s components of psychological readiness our outcomes. Before leader-member accomplishments.36 From recognition to for leadership in difficult contexts are exchange theory, for example, most mission completion, constructive leader- caring, competence, and values.25 Teams research focused solely on the approach ship has to be about putting others first. will be more apt to have mutual trust that leadership was something leaders Close Match Between Espoused and and cohesion when the leaders derive did to followers, as opposed to with Enacted Values. What leaders say and their actions and decisions from values. followers.33 We should hold followers do matter. Leading by example requires Character. Character is paired with accountable, but not to the point of ne- both words and deeds. Organizations commitment and competence in the glecting simple courtesy. For example, if have missions that are girded by a vision profession of arms as defined in Army gloves are required for work or training, that consists of ethics, standards, and Doctrine Publication 6-22, Army then that is the standard to be adhered goals for their members. An alignment Leadership.26 Maxwell argues that our be- to. But if it is raining so badly that gloves of all these factors is needed to achieve a havior determines the culture, our values are soaked to the point of deteriorating mission’s desired endstate. If people are

36 JPME Today / Stopping Toxic Leadership JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Airman provides security during training event for U.S. Army Alaska’s Warrior Leader Course on Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, May 16, 2014 (DOD/ Justin Connaher)

our greatest resource, then leaders have about the leader.40 Margaret Rioch the problems associated with follower- to be good stewards of relationships. states that almost all relationships “can ship is its negative connotation as being a Followers and leaders work together bet- be looked at as variations on the theme weak, passive, or conforming position.43 ter when they “are comfortable with each of leadership-followership.”41 If we Upstanders change that paradigm. Quite other, and value congruence is one way believe that leadership is a process, we simply, upstanders are those who do not to achieve common ground.”37 Susan cannot extricate the fact that there is stand idly by in negative situations. In Fiske, John Cacioppo, and Reid Hastie a transaction occurring between the Padilla, Hogan, and Kaiser’s work, sus- remind us that “groups determine how leader and follower and both their ceptible followers, in the form of colluders behaviors associated with a task are to be respective perspectives and experiences. and conformers, are a part of a destructive accomplished in ways that conform to its Because of this linkage, the leader environment. Robert Kelley defines four core values.”38 A close match between is burdened with both creating and types of followers, noting that conformists what we believe in and what we do is maintaining that relationship while also are the “yes people” of organizations.44 significant, as novel situations tend to initiating and continuing communica- He also defines “exemplary followers” place us into contexts that require quick tion and direction. However, it is of as independent, innovative, and willing decisionmaking. Psychologist Gary Klein the utmost importance for a follower to to question leadership.45 Upstanders would state that quick, on-the-spot deci- be a good listener, be loyal, share the take this one step further—they not only sions come from habit, and we want our values of the leader and the group, and question leadership in their independence personal and professional habits to match give honest feedback to better the expe- but also become a check to everyone in our values and norms at both the organi- rience. All of these qualities strengthen the organization, balance the system, and zational and individual levels.39 and enhance the leader-follower rela- bring their own innovative solutions to tionship while allowing for a bidirec- the table when problems arise without Capable Followers tional checks and balances system. prompt. In their literature review of the context Upstanders. William O’Connell Lower Level Leadership. Leadership of military environments, Fiske, argues that it “takes true moral courage is not an amalgamation of characteristics Cacioppo, and Hastie posit that lead- to risk a comfortable niche in the unit by that manifest within ourselves; it has to ership is categorically not exclusively advocating an unpopular idea.”42 One of be externally confirmed by the experience

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Rybacki and Cook 37 Ranger Assessment Course instructor (right), informs class leader that he needs to improve leadership skills, Nevada Test and Training Range, October 3, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Thomas Spangler) of others. Rioch states that “the word responsibilities to be accomplished. In all on the follower. We believe that follow- leader does not have any sense without of these important followership roles, we ers owe their leaders the truth. As a unit a word like follower implied in it.”46 But should view the follower not explicitly in creates upstanders, one of their key com- followers have a direct stake in the lead- a subordinate status. The leader-follower ponents is questioning leadership. Having ing, as everyone is pushed in the direction relationship is a two-way street. a prudent and proper way of addressing of growth. Growth can be individual Penchant for Proper Dissent. At those questions is the key. betterment or for the betterment of the the very onset, it may seem as if dissent Unity of Effort. An important group in the form of attaining the end- goes against good order and discipline. objective regarding constructive leader- state. It should be understood that this However, Brian Gibson notes that there ship would be to promote small unit does not mean that without lower level is likely “no more difficult calling for a cohesion and other forms of teamwork. leadership, the leader-follower relation- military professional than to dissent.”47 In Research demonstrates that high-quality ship fails. However, we propose that for concert, O’Connell finds that junior lead- leader-member exchanges lead to less the most optimal leadership exchange, ers “can enhance mission effectiveness turnover, more positive evaluations, followers must take a more responsible when they appropriately challenge the greater organizational commitment, role in fostering a cohesive environment. status quo.”48 It should be understood greater participation, better job attitudes, Certain key roles are needed for good that superiors are in the best positions and more support given to the leader.50 followership. “Second-in-command” is a to deal with toxicity because they have Interdependence leads to the achieve- followership role that allows the leader to the positional authority to counter it or ment of a common goal. Group members be replaced if not around or when delega- deal with it in other appropriate means. who understand this interdependence tion is needed. A “sidekick” is an assistant However, George Reed argues that gain greater insight into how they can who can relieve the burden of the leader leaders “might be the last to observe the facilitate trust and cooperation. Cohesion while not filling an institutional position. behavior unless they are attuned to it.”49 cannot be discounted, as it specifically “Partners” are an accompaniment to the Though leaders should be wary, Reed’s speaks to willingness to remain a team and leader and can allow a division of the thought places some of the burden back work within the team construct. Only by

38 JPME Today / Stopping Toxic Leadership JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 23 collaborating effectively with all members John Maxwell, The 360° Leader (Nash- Notes ville: Thomas Nelson, Inc., 2006), 244. working in the same direction, if not the 24 Paul Hanges, Lynn Offerman, and David same task, can team members “truly gain 1 Joseph Doty and Jeff Fenlason, “Narcis- Day, “Leaders, Followers, and Values: Progress the benefit of task accomplishment.”51 sism and Toxic Leaders,” Military Review and Prospects for Theory and Research,” The Equal Loyalty to Mission, Leadership, (January–February 2013), 55. This article Leadership Quarterly 12 (2001), 129–131. 25 and Organization. Effective unit per- cites a study reporting that 80 percent of the Patrick Sweeney, Mike Matthews, and officers and noncommissioned officers polled Paul Lester, Leadership in Dangerous Situations: formance is a function of “the combined had observed toxic leaders in action and that 20 A Handbook for the Armed Forces, Emergency effect of the behaviors of individual unit percent had worked for a toxic leader. Services, and First Responders (Annapolis, MD: members, to include leaders and those 2 Art Padilla, Robert Hogan, and Robert Naval Institute Press, 2011), 5–6. they lead; these behaviors take place both B. Kaiser, “The Toxic Triangle: Destructive 26 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, before and during defined missions.”52 Leaders, Susceptible Followers, and Conducive Army Leadership (Washington, DC: Headquar- Environments,” The Leadership Quarterly 18 ters Department of the Army, 2014), available The most effective followers are commit- (2007), 176–194. The authors use the terms at . beyond themselves.53 Loyalty cannot just 3 Ibid. 27 Maxwell, 244–245. be to the leader, to those around us, or 4 Ibid. 28 Steele, 14. 5 29 to the task at hand. Studies show that Denise Williams, “Toxic Leadership in the Ibid. U.S. Army,” U.S. Army War College Strategy 30 O’Toole, 36. collective efficacy gained through loyalty Research Project, March 2005. 31 Steele, 25. “works harder on behalf of the group, 6 Padilla, Hogan, and Kaiser. 32 Peter Northouse, Leadership: Theory and sets more challenging goals, and persists 7 Ibid. Practice (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publica- in the face of difficulties and obstacles.”54 8 Shawn Anchor, “Positive Intelligence,” tions, 2007), 129. 33 Horizontal allegiances (to peers and Harvard Business Review, January–February Ibid., 127. 2012, available at . 35 Doty and Fenlason, 55. allegiances (to the organization or sub- 9 Susan Fiske, John Cacioppo, and Reid 36 Walter Ulmer, “Toxic Leadership: What ordinate entities), or effectiveness, trust, Hastie, The Context of Military Environments: Are We Talking About,” Army (June 2012), and even rationality are undermined.55 An Agenda for Basic Research on Social and 48. Organizational Factors Relevant to Small Units 37 Bjugstad, 307. (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 38 Fiske, Cacioppo, and Hastie, 34. In their article Padilla, Hogan, and 2014), 60. 39 G.A. Klein, Sources of Power: How People Kaiser state that “leadership can yield 10 John Steele, “Antecedents and Conse- Make Decisions (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). results ranging from constructive to quences of Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Army: 40 Fiske, Cacioppo, and Hastie, 59. destructive.”56 Here we draw the same A Two-Year Review and Recommended Solu- 41 Margaret Rioch, “All We Like Sheep,” conclusion, adding that the definition tions,” Center for Army Leadership, Technical Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Report 2011-3, 4. Processes 34, no. 3 (1971), 258–273. of constructive leadership emphasizes 11 Iain Hay, “Transformational Leader- 42 William O’Connell, “Military Dissent and positive outcomes that not only lead ship: Characteristics and Criticisms,” Flinders Junior Officers,” inConcepts for Air Force Lead- organizations and their members to University, 2006, 1. ership, ed. Richard I. Lester (Maxwell AFB, AL: success but also have the capacity to be 12 Steele, 18. Air University Press, 1988), 326. 13 transformative in nature, changing a Hay, 1. 43 Bjugstad, 304. 14 Morton Ender and Remi Hajjar, “Mc- 44 Robert Kelley, “In Praise of Followers,” negative (toxic) environment to a positive Donaldization in the U.S. Army: A Threat to Harvard Business Review, November 1988, one. Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer, the Profession,” in The Future of the Army Pro- 142–148. USA (Ret.), stated that although we have fession, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Mat- 45 Ibid. been “alerted for years to the issue [of thews (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 15. 46 Rioch, 262. 15 toxic leadership]; as an institution we have Michael Passer and Ronald Smith, Psy- 47 Brian Gibson, “The Need for Proper chology: The Science of Mind and Behavior, 5th Military Dissent,” U.S. Army War College been reluctant to confront it directly.”57 ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2013). Strategy Research Project, 2012, 7. Of note, constructive leadership is overly 16 Paul Arden, It’s Not How Good You Are, 48 O’Connell, 324. studied, but not in the context of being It’s How Good You Want to Be (New York: 49 George Reed, “Toxic Leadership,” Mili- an active deterrent to toxicity; it should Phaidon Press, 2003), 42. tary Review (July–August 2004), 71. 17 start to be studied more in terms of how Ibid. 50 Northouse, 155. 18 James O’Toole, Leading Change (San 51 Sweeney, Matthews, and Lester, 187. relations among leaders, followers, and Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995), 149. 52 Fiske, Cacioppo, and Hastie, 65. environments can combat seeds of nega- 19 Yan Ye, “Factors Relating to Teachers’ 53 Bjugstad, 308. tivity from growing. Our transformative Followership in International Universities in 54 Sweeney, Matthews, and Lester, 189. triangle specifically addresses the elements Thailand,” Assumption University of Thailand, 55 Ibid., 100. of Padilla, Hogan, and Kaiser’s “toxic 2008, 1. 56 Padilla, Hogan, and Kaiser, 190. 20 Steele, 14. 57 Ulmer, 50. triangle” and suggests how an effective 21 Ye, 2. paradigm shift could foster the appropriate 22 Kent Bjugstad, “A Fresh Look at Follower- relationships for positive outcomes. JFQ ship: A Model for Matching Followership and Leadership Styles,” Comcast Spotlight, 2006, 308.

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Rybacki and Cook 39 Two U.S. Navy Sailors and Peruvian sailor confirm position of simulated enemy destroyer in combat information center aboard guided- missile frigate USS Rentz during wargames as part of annual UNITAS multinational maritime exercise, off coast of Colombia, September 14, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Corey Barker)

Measuring Strategic Deterrence A Wargaming Approach

By Douglas R. Ducharme

uring the of sequences of a Soviet first strike much both his and Khrushchev’s perspectives 1962, President John F. Kennedy costlier. For example, U.S. extended- that allowed Kennedy to assess relative D weighed a number of factors to deterrence strategies would be at risk, resolve and select actions that would assess the potential effectiveness of which could suggest that the United control escalation. U.S. actions to deter the Soviets from States might not risk nuclear war if the No rubric currently exists, however, further deployment of medium-range Soviets subsequently assaulted Berlin. for national leaders to make these time- nuclear missiles in Cuba. Kennedy Although Kennedy’s greatest fear was constrained decisions in ambiguous realized that an existing missile gap the potential for human error and acci- strategic environments. Decisionmakers gave the United States an assured dental escalation during the standoff, may lack the time to identify and weigh second-strike capability, but Soviet he gained insight into Soviet Premier the relevant factors associated with a missiles in Cuba would make the con- Nikita Khrushchev’s risk tolerance after strategic crisis. This article describes receiving a rambling four-part cable how the U.S. Naval War College uses from the seemingly stressed Soviet wargaming to help measure factors 1 Douglas R. Ducharme, Ed.D., is an Associate leader. In the end, it was the rational associated with strategic deterrence deci- Professor at the U.S. Naval War College. consideration of these factors from sionmaking by emulating notional crises

40 JPME Today / Measuring Strategic Deterrence JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 between nuclear-capable adversaries. As conflict by convincing that enemy that Figure 1. Total Resolve as the a result, wargaming not only provides the costs of such actions will outweigh Sum of Three Components decisionmaking experience for those who the benefits that may be accrued through participate but also examines the suitabil- escalation.”7 Through analysis of escala- ity of various deterrence strategies through tion dynamics using wargaming, the U.S. Risk analysis of the decisions made and the per- Naval War College has attempted to pro- Tolerance Total Resolve ceptions that influence those decisions. vide a framework for measuring strategic Maintaining a secure and effective deterrence effectiveness. nuclear deterrent remains the high- est priority mission for U.S. military Measuring Escalation forces.2 However, assessing the effective- and Resolve Credible Capabilities ness of strategic deterrent options can At the U.S. Naval War College, the prove challenging due to the difficulty War Gaming Department has examined of measuring deterrence as a strategy. strategic deterrence through the lens Joint doctrine defines deterrence as the of escalation and resolve. Escalation prevention of adversary action by the can be viewed as “an increase in the Stakes existence of a credible threat of unac- intensity or scope of conflict that crosses ceptable counteraction that results in a threshold(s) considered significant by belief that the cost of action outweighs one or more of the participants.”8 From the perceived benefits.3 Deterrence can this perspective, escalation can be mea- also be described as the manipulation sured as an event. But defining escala- Figure 2. Relative Resolve as the of an adversary’s estimation of the costs tion as a distinct event fails to consider and benefits of taking action.4 Abstract either the intent of action or “any type Difference Between Challenger concepts such as prevention and manipu- of conflict, where adversaries typically Resolve and Defender Resolve lation inhibit an objective examination strive to gain a comparative advantage.”9 using empirical methods. In any case, escalation as a concept tends Relative Deterrence has a behavioral science to be easier to measure than deterrence, Risk Resolve dimension to it, as “deterrence, more but still proves challenging. Tolerance Challenger Risk 5 resolve Tolerance than anything else, is psychological.” Game theory can be used to exam- minus Unfortunately, there are few historical ex- ine deterrence with relative resolve as defender amples, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, a key variable for measuring escalation. resolve of how leaders think during a strategic is a contest of resolve and Credible crisis between nuclear-capable adversaries. a competition in taking risks. Resolve is Credible Capabilities Capabilities Therefore, wargaming provides a suitable defined as a state’s willingness to run the means to research deterrence. risk of disaster. But relative resolve must Gaming is a means to gain useful also consider the adversaries’ resolve as experience and information in advance of well as one’s own, where “a state’s beliefs an actual commitment; of experimenting about the resolve of its adversaries are Stakes Stakes with forces and situations that are too important, but so are its beliefs about its remote, too costly, or too complicated to adversary’s beliefs.”10 mobilize and manipulate; and of exploring To conduct this examination, resolve Challenger Defender and shaping the organizations and systems needed to be modeled and subsequently of the future. When, as in atomic warfare, measured. As depicted in figure 1, we there are no precedents, no historical assessed resolve using a simple model Understanding one’s own resolve is examples to furnish guidelines, wargaming comprised of three components: stakes, important, as is understanding that of the creates its own history of artificial wars.6 credible capabilities, and risk tolerance. adversary. However, it is the comparison While wargaming provides a labora- The stakes represent the strategic objec- of the two resolves that matters. Relative tory to experiment with deterrence tives and national interests of an actor, resolve pertains to how an actor perceives strategy, the measurement device for either challenger or defender, in a crisis. the other actor’s resolve relative to its deterrence remains elusive. Thus, instead Credible capabilities represent the rel- own, and is calculated as the difference of measuring deterrence directly, a better evant factors of time, space, and forces for between the challenger resolve and the approach may be viewing deterrence as a either actor that enhance the perception defender resolve. Because resolve is an key to managing an enemy’s intentional that escalation is possible. Risk tolerance additive function of the three compo- escalation, such that an enemy is discour- represents the inherent aggressiveness or nents, a defender may perceive itself as aged “from deliberately escalating a boldness of either actor. having greater stakes and more credible

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Ducharme 41 capabilities, but less risk tolerance, than Figure 3. Likely Defender Reactions to Challenger Actions the challenger. In this case, as depicted When Relative Resolve Equals Zero in figure 2, the challenger has a greater resolve relative to the defender. High The relative resolve is calculated as the Escalation challenger resolve minus the defender re- solve. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between relative resolve and escalation. When relative resolve is equal to zero, any escalation by the challenger could Moderate result in a reciprocal escalation by the Escalation adversary, as perceived by the challenger. Relative Resolve With perfect information, a game theory perspective would suggest that escalation

Challenger Actions would not occur because each escalation by a challenger would face a likely recip- Low (Challenger minus Defender Resolve = 0 Escalation rocal escalation by the defender.11 In a situation where the challenger Note: Perfect Information resolve is perceived as greater than the defender resolve, the relative resolve is greater than zero. As depicted in figure Status 4, the slope of the line for relative resolve Quo slides up on the graph, leaving a gap Acquiesce Low Escalation High Escalation below the slope on the vertical access as Likely Defender Reactions a prime environment for “salami tactics.” This term refers to a strategy where a challenger can escalate gradually, slicing off small parts of its objectives one at a Figure 4. Likely Defender Reactions to Challenger Actions time, with little expectation of defender retaliation. Thomas Schelling described When Relative Resolve Is Greater Than Zero salami tactics in simple terms:

High “Salami tactics,” we can be sure, were in- Escalation vented by a child. . . . Tell a child not to go in the water and he’ll sit on the bank and submerge his bare feet; he is not yet “in” the water. Acquiesce, and he’ll stand up; no more of him is in the water than before. Moderate Think it over, and he’ll start wading, Escalation Relative Resolve not going any deeper; take a moment to decide whether this is different and he’ll go

(Challenger > Defender Resolve) a little deeper, arguing that since he goes Challenger Actions back and forth it all averages out. Pretty Low soon we are calling to him not to swim out Escalation Note: Perfect Information of sight, wondering whatever happened to all our discipline.12

When a challenger escalates a small Salami Tactics amount, figure 4 suggests the defender Status will acquiesce and a new status quo Quo Acquiesce Low Escalation High Escalation emerges. However, if the defender perceived the relative resolve as equal, Likely Defender Reactions such as depicted in figure 3, then a corre- sponding escalation could be expected by the defender. Therefore, “only if both the

42 JPME Today / Measuring Strategic Deterrence JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Austrian soldier plots points on map during exercise Combined Resolve II at Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Figure 5. Likely Defender Reactions to Challenger Actions Germany, May 14, 2014 (DOD/Justin De Hoyos) with Imperfect Information challenger and defender are sufficiently confident that their adversaries are irreso- High lute will there be a crisis.”13 Escalation The previous escalation situations are based on two conditions: deliberate escalation decisions for instrumental purposes, that is, to gain some advantage; Moderate and having perfect information. There Escalation are other types of escalation and informa- tion levels that must be considered. For Relative Resolve example, the concept of autonomous risk that some other outcome will occur is a Challenger Actions result of uncertainty and unpredictability Low because actors cannot guarantee that Escalation Note: Imperfect Information Zone of Uncertainty a particular outcome will be realized.14 There is always a chance of accidental es- calation because actors make mistakes.15 In addition to autonomous risk and accidental escalation, there is the risk of Status Quo inadvertent escalation when intentional Acquiesce Low Escalation High Escalation acts are mistakenly perceived as escalatory, Likely Defender Reactions “usually because they cross a threshold of

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Ducharme 43 Sailor monitors subsurface contacts in combat information center aboard guided-missile destroyer USS Jason Dunham in Atlantic Ocean, as part of simulated wargames, May 19, 2014 (U.S. Navy/Derek Paumen) intensity or scope in the conflict or con- each game move. To measure resolve, decisions based on their assessments of frontation that matters to the adversary players are asked to assess a statement relative resolve. In assessing wargames, but appears insignificant or is invisible to concerning each actor’s willingness to measures of relative resolve can help the party taking the action.”16 Adversaries escalate. The data collected are subjec- analysts explain why players escalated often misunderstand each other’s inten- tive and attempt to measure something or acquiesced. Trends in relative resolve tions, even when accompanied by clear psychological, where “deterrence is like all across moves can indicate whether play- messaging. Often messages that are either other psychological variables: it will vary ers were successful in their deterrence sent or received are misdirected, badly by person and condition.”21 Therefore, strategies. Reasons for shifts in percep- formulated, contradictory, or absent al- the results are not examined by comparing tions of resolve usually involve one or a together.17 Sometimes an actor resorts to how one actor assesses his own resolve combination of the three components of bluffing to be perceived as more resolute with how another actor assesses his resolve: stakes, credible capabilities, and than he actually is. Likewise, an actor because each personal scale could differ. risk tolerance. While stakes and credible may demonstrate his resolve through But it is useful to measure the perceived capabilities, such as a nation’s objectives deliberate escalation for suggestive or relative resolve, that is, each actor’s resolve and forces employed, can be identified reputational purposes as a form of signal- compared to his perceived resolve for his more readily, identifying risk tolerance is ing.18 Due to imperfect information, the adversary or allies. However, a tendency particularly challenging as it is more of an escalation calculus for decisionmakers does exist to perceive an adversary as more inherent trait that characterizes individuals. includes a zone of uncertainty when resolute than oneself. This inclination is considering an escalation decision, as de- a result of the difficulties of emulation, Perceptions of Risk Tolerance picted in figure 5. Therefore, the greater incomplete information, emotion, the Risk assessment takes into account both the imperfect information and mispercep- limits of human cognition, and a variety of the probability and the consequences tion, the more crisis stability decreases:19 possible biases affecting perceptions.22 associated with a course of action. While “Ambiguity does not deter universally.”20 The use of two-sided wargames at- the consequences could be benefits or Survey questions are used in wargames tempts to replicate environments of costs, the probability concerns the likeli- to assess player perceptions at the end of strategic crisis that allow players to make hood that a course of action will result

44 JPME Today / Measuring Strategic Deterrence JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 in those consequences. Risk manage- increases capabilities, and demonstrates numerous possible reasons for per- ment involves making decisions that higher stakes in the crisis. The concept ceptions of both ally assurance and balance risk costs with mission bene- of extended deterrence has been part of demonstrations of resolve. The likely fits.23 Risk tolerance involves a predispo- U.S. strategy since 1957, when Henry cause may lie in one or a combination sition for aggressiveness and boldness. Kissinger realized the necessity of having of the three components of resolve. It usually remains constant, but risk allies surrounding an adversary and of For example, maintaining the integrity tolerance may shift due to a change in minimizing the cost of their security by of the alliance, in itself, may add to the domestic politics that pushes for riskier lessening dependence on local defenses.26 overall stakes in a conflict. Likewise, the policies. Consider, for example, U.S. Extended deterrence, however, also has combined capabilities of the alliance may strategic decisionmaking following an its disadvantages. For example, it may add not only to the quantity of credible unprovoked attack: “Domestic politics create a credibility problem, suggesting employment options available in a con- could force large changes in policy in whether a state would risk annihila- flict but to the diversity as well. Finally, a very short period of time. The White tion for the sake of allies. This dilemma risk tolerance for an alliance, standing to- House, the Congress, and the Pentagon might explain why Japan would likely gether rather than alone, would likely be may have to pivot in a hurry, and use contemplate developing its own nuclear formidable in a conflict. For this reason, much more aggressive, risky steps to capability if it believed the United States game findings have helped inform plan- manage the problem. . . . [R]estraint would not consider a nuclear option in ners on the critical role that maintaining may disappear overnight.”24 its defense.27 alliance cohesion has in contingencies While it is common to ask players In addition to risk-sharing, some allies involving strategic deterrence of nuclear- during wargames to assess risk, another have higher risk tolerance, thereby increas- capable adversaries. approach attempts to assess risk toler- ing the overall risk to all partners in the ance through understanding the players’ alliance. Overall, building and maintaining Applying Wargaming Lessons comfort with uncertainty or imperfect a coalition requires a major effort and faces The use of wargaming at the U.S. Naval information. An actor with a high risk numerous challenges. While joint doctrine War College has provided a laboratory tolerance may take more aggressive ac- describes an alliance as having broad, long- in which to examine strategic deterrence tion with a large zone of uncertainty, as term objectives and common interests,28 approaches. Because wargaming alone depicted in figure 5, despite imperfect the diversity of stakes and interests among does not provide answers, the key to information and a greater risk of inadver- allies can be extensive. The defining assessing deterrence lies with the ability tent or accidental escalation. Additionally, feature of multiplayer games is coalitions, to measure escalation and resolve as the an array of risk represents a range of in which different countries align with espoused effects and inherent drivers options between doing too little (acqui- one another. But coalitions are not static; of deterrence decisions. Breaking down escing) and doing too much.25 The larger they tend to be dynamic, changing over resolve into the components of stakes, the array of risk, the riskier it is to escalate time.29 Learning about regional allies may credible capabilities, and risk tolerance because one must take larger, more be more important for deterrence strate- helps explain the motivations behind dangerous steps toward the brink. The gies than any analysis of game theory or the escalation decisions made in a strate- smaller the array of risk, the less risky it is abstracted gaming practices.30 gic deterrence wargaming environment. to escalate because the steps toward the During a recent strategic deterrence This, in turn, allows researchers to brink are smaller. Therefore, risk toler- wargame at the U.S. Naval War College, apply lessons to better understand the ance can be measured during wargames a moderate correlation occurred between dynamics of real-world strategic chal- as a function of players’ comfort with the measures of U.S. resolve and the lenges. These lessons inform operational ambiguity and the availability of escala- U.S. demonstration of commitment to plans and potentially influence policy tion options. As players appear more its allies, as perceived by the adversary. decisions, such as those concerning comfortable with ambiguity and have When it appeared that U.S. forces were forward-deployed forces, alliance agree- more escalation options available, their successful in assuring allies, the adversary ments, and nuclear force posture. risk tolerance seems higher. perceptions of U.S. resolve increased. While wargames provide general This correlation suggests a relationship insights on strategic deterrence at the Coalition Effects on Resolve may exist between the effectiveness of conceptual level, specific insights about Building coalitions and working with coalition-building and that of demon- adversaries and notional scenarios can be allies can be difficult tasks. However, as strating resolve, potentially mitigating the derived at the empirical, albeit classified, Sir Winston Churchill famously stated, risk of escalation. This finding reinforces level. For example, in his recent article “There is at least one thing worse than the lessons of the Cold War, where the “Future Scenarios of Limited Nuclear fighting with allies, and that is to fight “politics of alliance were as important to Conflict,” Thomas Mahnken outlines without them.” Fighting with a coalition deterrence as any other element.”31 five nuclear conflict scenarios with which has numerous benefits in the context Correlation, however, does not to address an array of national security of deterrence. It allows for risk-sharing, necessarily mean causation. There are dilemmas:

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Ducharme 45 Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division exchange stories about overnight battle upon completion of training exercise at Piñon Canyon Maneuver Site, June 8, 2015 (U.S. Army/William Howard)

Cambridge University Press, 1990), 53. •• How would U.S. forces respond to leaders to decisionmaking experience, 11 Ibid., 156–157. a selective nuclear attack by North and potentially helps them develop a ru- 12 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence Korea? bric for strategic deterrence options. JFQ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), What North Atlantic Treaty Orga- 66–67. •• 13 nization force posture would deter Powell, 91. 14 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Russia from conducting (while not Notes Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision provoking it to conduct) a preemp- Making, and System Structure in International 1 tive, incapacitating nuclear attack Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Thinking in Time: The Use of History for Deci- during a crisis over the Baltics? 1977), 210; quoted in Powell, 18. sion Makers (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 15 What credible nonforce options, if Morgan et al., 26. •• 10–14. 16 Ibid., 23. 2 any, exist to retaliate against a dem- National Military Strategy 2015 (Wash- 17 Delpech, 18. onstration nuclear attack by Iran? ington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 2015), 10. 18 Morgan et al., 31–33. 3 •• What counterforce options are Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Opera- 19 Powell, 161. tions (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 20 needed to deny China the ability to Delpech, 48. 11, 2011), GL-9. 21 Bracken, 70. use nuclear force to prevent a battle- 4 Austin G. Long, Deterrence: From Cold 22 Long, 56. field defeat in the South China Sea? War to Long War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 23 JP 3-0, III-14. •• What role do military forces play in Project Air Force, 2008), 7. 24 Bracken, 223. 5 a whole-of-government approach to Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: 25 Powell, 99. Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics 26 dealing with the collapse of a nuclear Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2013), 43. Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1957), 239; state such as North Korea or ? 6 Francis J. McHugh, Fundamentals of War Delpech, 29. Gaming (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War Col- 27 While analyzing these problems may Bracken, 240. lege, 1966), 19. 28 JP 1-02, Department of Defense Diction- inform forward-based presence and 7 Forrest E. Morgan et al., Dangerous ary of Military and Associated Terms (Washing- st force posture, they likewise help evalu- Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21 ton, DC: The Joint Staff, November 8, 2010, ate the effectiveness of extended nuclear Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Project Air as amended through June 15, 2015), 11. Force, 2008), xiii. 29 Bracken, 241–242. deterrence that “may be more open to 8 Ibid., 8. 30 Delpech, 49. question in the context of today’s nuclear 9 Thérèse Delpech, Nuclear Deterrence in 31 Long, 14. powers. It is worthwhile, then, to explore st the 21 Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a 32 Thomas G. Mahnken, “Future Scenarios new approaches to enhance U.S. ex- New Era of Strategic (Santa Monica, CA: of Limited Nuclear Conflict,” inOn Limited tended nuclear deterrence guarantees to RAND, 2012), 56. Nuclear War in the 21st Century, ed. Jeffrey 10 allies.”32 Wargaming provides a method Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner (Stanford: Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge: to explore these new approaches, exposes Stanford University Press, 2014), 143.

46 JPME Today / Measuring Strategic Deterrence JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Sailors assigned to Coastal Riverine Squadron 3 train with Philippine marines aboard patrol boat during exercise Balikatan 2015, April 27, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Joshua Scott)

Pakistani friends asked me, “Is this the end of the world?” I answered, “No,” A Way Ahead but his question did give me pause. Finally, after almost 6 minutes, the noise subsided and the ground stopped for DOD Disaster moving. I did not know it at the time, but I had just experienced one of the largest ever recorded in Preparedness Pakistan. According to one source, the “shallow registered a 7.6 magnitude on the Richter scale.”1 By Frank C. DiGiovanni The earthquake “epicenter was located approximately 19 km north-northeast of the city of Muzaffarabad, the capital n October 8, 2005, I was just Freedom and to coordinate coalition, of the Pakistani-administered part of 6 weeks into my assignment Afghan, and Pakistani border opera- Kashmir,”2 and “100 km north-north- O coordinating with the Pakistani tions. It was a pretty average deploy- east of Islamabad.”3 military to the air logistics routes ment. That changed at 0850 local time. When all was said and done, in the open through Pakistan into Afghani- First, I heard a sound like a freight train 30,000-square-kilometer affected area, stan in support of Operation Enduring and then the building began to rock like over 1,000 aftershocks were recorded.4 a cork bobbing, and the ground beneath Some 87,000 people lost their lives.5 us was acting more like liquid than Approximately 56 percent of all housing solid, with visible ripples moving toward was destroyed, leaving an estimated 3.3 Frank C. DiGiovanni serves as the Director of 6 Force Training in the Office of the Assistant us. The ground continued to move for million homeless. Nearly 65 percent of Secretary of Defense for Readiness. what seemed like forever, and one of my all medical facilities were ruined, and 50

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 DiGiovanni 47 USNS Mercy in port at Naval Base Guam supporting 2015, largest annual multilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission conducted in Indo-Asia-Pacific region, September 4, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Peter Reft) percent of all schools were destroyed.7 This was not accomplished without a area?” “Where were our relief forces going Additionally, vital roads and highways herculean effort, including a personal call to bed down?” “How were they going were rendered impassable by landslides to USCENTCOM Commander General to be supported?” These are but a few of and bridge failures,8 making it nearly John Abizaid, USA. the questions that had to be answered in impossible to reach the hardest hit Although the mission was accom- a very short amount of time. Although communities. plished, even at the time I knew my these questions seem comprehensive, they After the initial shock waves settled, responses were not always the most ef- represent only about 20 percent of the de- my immediate thought was, “What fective or efficient. Snap decisions were cisions that had to be made within 2 hours can I do to help?” As the senior U.S. required to answer questions such as of the Ambassador’s order to support the Air Force officer on the ground, I was “Was pulling from wartime stocks the relief effort. To make matters worse, there ready to take immediate action, but was right thing to do?” “Why was it necessary was no continuity book or pre-deploy- told to stand down because Pakistan, to call the USCENTCOM commander ment training to assist my decisionmaking as a sovereign nation, must first request personally to energize the relief effort?” process. After all, my mission was to sup- foreign assistance. The next day, when “Were there other organizations that port Operation Enduring Freedom, not the request came, Ambassador Ryan were better suited to support this effort?” conduct disaster relief. Crocker’s orders were clear: “Get all the “What was the right sequence of aerial blankets, tarps, and water jugs you can port equipment and supplies to support Fast Forward 10 Years get here . . . now.” I sprang into action, the relief effort?” “What was the maxi- As the Director of Force Training in levering the central logistics hub for U.S. mum on ground aircraft capacity of the the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Central Command (USCENTCOM) for primary airfield?” “Who was coordinating Defense for Readiness, I am constantly supplies, getting intra-theater air autho- host-nation overflight clearances, airfield scanning the horizon to understand, rized, and within 12 hours the requested slot times, logistics inventory, storage, and assess, and ensure our military forces supplies were on the ramp in Islamabad. dispersion of relief supplies to the affected are prepared to conduct the operations

48 Commentary / A Way Ahead for DOD Disaster Preparedness JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 they may be assigned to perform. This responds in support of foreign disasters. My recommendation is to integrate includes their ability to engage in foreign Changes include updated policy, opera- and systematize disaster preparedness disaster relief missions. On this last tional guidance, and more efficient pro- activities across DOD while addressing mission in particular, I have a few battle cesses and procedures. DOD has clari- the persistent issues through training, scars. Although my training prepared fied and updated policy and operational exercises, and policy. Furthermore, me to adapt and seize the initiative in guidance on the conduct of steady-state I posit that these activities should be my efforts to support Pakistan after the humanitarian assistance programs and promulgated as an effective engagement earthquake, there were a lot of things I foreign disaster relief operations (for mechanism with other nations and their could have done better. They included example, DOD Directive 5100.46, . such things as pre-planned procedures “Foreign Disaster Relief”). DOD has Why DOD and disaster prepared- for transferring supplies and equipment also worked with other U.S. depart- ness, one might ask? The Department of to affected populations, standardized ments and agencies to enhance coopera- Defense is often called upon to respond communications regimens across the tion before and during disasters, most to large disaster relief operations in sup- wide range of relief participants and notably in partnership with the U.S. port of U.S. strategy and goals, primarily the host nation, dealing with myriad Agency for International Development’s to alleviate human suffering. These first responders who descended on Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. operations show no sign of decreasing the airfield within hours of the official Finally, there has been progress made to in number in the near term. From a request for help, the need for heavy-lift provide training opportunities for U.S. strategic perspective, the consequences of helicopters and a seaport to bring in forces on humanitarian assistance/disas- disaster or crisis, whether to economies, heavy construction equipment, building ter relief (HA/DR) topics. However, infrastructure, social order, or the envi- relationships on the ground in a hurry this training is neither institutionalized ronment, could have long-term impacts and then acknowledging they lacked the nor standardized across DOD and more on regional stability. Even a nation as trust engendered by long-term interac- needs to be done. large as the United States received aid tion, and recognizing my own absence Every new response yields multiple from other nations in our response to of knowledge and training at that time. lessons from which there have been clear Hurricane Katrina. Based on my experiences above, it successes as well as opportunities for Disaster relief efforts also have been appears that a “preparedness-focused” improvement. DOD has improved sys- shown to increase positive opinion of approach instead of “response-focused” tems for information-sharing with other the United States. During the 2005 approach may serve our men and women responders. Focusing on preparation, Pakistan relief effort, the ability of the in the Armed Forces more efficaciously planning, and the building of relation- United States to respond, with DOD when planning and training for a disaster ships with host nations has slowly begun as a key partner, proved effective in situation. Furthermore, the requirement to bear fruit as evidenced in the most improving the people of Pakistan’s per- shows no signs of letting up as there con- recent Nepal earthquake where regional ception of the United States. Prior to the tinues to be a constant demand signal for actors stepped in more readily and earthquake there was a generally poor our nation to support those in need. Since quickly than in the past.9 There is greater opinion of the United States, largely due the Pakistan earthquake, the Department understanding by DOD leadership on to ongoing military operations in Iraq of Defense (DOD) has supported over 50 the role relationships play in successful re- and Afghanistan. By November 2005, foreign disaster relief operations includ- sponses. Yet there are still issues that have Neilson Company polling demonstrated ing Operation Unified Response in Haiti consistently been identified, including: “the number of Pakistanis who had ‘a fa- in 2010, the Pakistan floods in 2010, vorable opinion of the United States’ had more in-depth DOD planning and Operation Tomodachi in Japan in 2011, •• grown from 23 percent to 46 percent. communications with host nations Operation Damayan in response to Super By the spring, a Department of State improving U.S. forces’ knowledge of Typhoon Haiyan (Typhoon Yolanda) •• poll conducted from late January to early the operating space, particularly just- in the Republic of the Philippines in February showed that number rising to in-time knowledge 2013, and more recently Operation 55 percent.”11 Strong response capability integrating DOD into a U.S. whole- United Assistance in support of the Ebola •• supported by enhanced disaster prepared- of-society approach to disaster relief response in West Africa and Operation ness is critical to the success of U.S. relief working effectively with the United Sahayogi Haat in support of the 2015 •• efforts and in increasing the positive Nations (UN), international organi- Nepal earthquake response. opinions and understanding international zations, and nongovernmental orga- partners have of the U.S. Government nizations (NGOs) during response DOD and Disaster Response and the Defense Department. operations The Defense Department is a learn- Disaster preparedness activities can also coordinating with the affected ing organization, and thus much has •• directly benefit DOD in numerous ways: nation’s civilian and military changed in the 10 years since the authorities.10 Pakistan earthquake concerning how it

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 DiGiovanni 49 Figure. The Disaster a focus on Phase 0 disaster prepared- activities and disaster relief remains lim- Preparedness Engagement ness. Focusing on being prepared and ited and fragmentary. This must change. System practicing for response with other We need to assess the competencies that nations, the UN, international organiza- our military must possess to perform ss Engagem dne ent tions, and NGOs can assist in a better, these missions and then develop learning re Sy pa st re em more coordinated response when disas- outcomes and training courses to build P GCC r (D te s Engagement P ter strikes and action is required. To this these competencies. Certain courses may a E s S i Framework ) end, I propose that DOD consider a be brand new. Others may be adaptations D GCC Exercise Policy framework for a systematic approach to of existing training. We must partner with Framework disaster preparedness (see figure). the other U.S. agencies, for instance, to The proposed model, the Disaster look for opportunities for senior leaders Partner Theatre Preparedness Engagement System across the spectrum to participate in each Nation Campaign Training Planning (DPES), is a low-cost, high-impact, other’s training and exercises and to con- U.S. Forces targeted, and integrated approach to en- duct technical and leadership interchange Training hancing DOD preparedness engagement forums with the UN and NGOs. The M e ss asu ene using all-hazards disaster preparedness development of a Just-In-Time Massive R re of Effectiv ese ysis training and exercises as a platform. In Open Online Course for military disaster arch and Anal response to a disaster, the first hours and response pre-deployment training in days are critical. Responders must arrive support of joint task forces should be •• Use smaller footprints, which are and be operational as quickly as possible. considered.12 As part of this U.S. forces generally repeatable and low cost, The ability to do this is greatly enhanced training, we must ensure our personnel and can be innovative ways to engage when time and effort are put into pre- are familiar with the 2011 Department of partners. paredness activities prior to an event. Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief •• Assist other nations in building capa- DPES would systematize this activity at (Handbook for JTF Commanders and bilities and bridging gaps between the combatant command level to derive Below).13 Cultural awareness and inter- their militaries and civil sectors. the benefits previously mentioned for personal relationship skills can be trained •• Engender trust and foster enduring DOD, the combatant commands, U.S. through cultural awareness and risk relationships with other nations. forces, and other nations. An outcome communication training. Consideration •• Support combatant command access would be ensuring that DOD response is should be given to development of a in areas where traditional military-to- timely and effective and that U.S. forces qualification or skills identifier for forces military activities may be limited. consistently know and understand their with this training. Additionally, we should •• Aid in obtaining knowledge of roles within disaster relief. It would en- seek to develop a HA/DR qualification the laws, institutions, systems, and hance the integration of ongoing disaster or skills identifier for forces with training capacities of partner nations, which preparedness activities into broader U.S. and experience in disaster relief. assists combatant commands in Government and DOD efforts, increase Combined U.S.–Host-Nation planning and preparing for support the cost effectiveness of these activities, Disaster Preparedness Training. While operations. support combatant command Phase 0 di- primarily a method for engaging other •• Ensure U.S. forces are adequately saster preparedness activities, and enable nations, combined disaster preparedness trained and ready. evaluation and measures of effectiveness training deserves its own analysis and •• Enhance the timely response and of disaster preparedness activities across activity. This is an opportunity to explore effectiveness of U.S. forces during the department. host-nation organic capabilities and crises. where U.S. capabilities can complement Suggested Components or fill gaps, the development of disaster A Call for Preparedness Initiating an all-hazards DPES requires response game plans, and the practice of and Systemization a development process that supports such skills as humility, empathy, and re- collaboration, facilitates a deeper spect in addition to the more traditional After a disaster, minutes and hours understanding of future challenges and skills of planning and logistics. count. The timeliness and harmoniza- opportunities, and produces desired Across the globe, DOD conducts tion of our effort will save lives. So how effects. The system should contain disaster training with others either bilater- does DOD become more proactive several components to enhance DOD ally or through regional mechanisms. The within given authorities in support of activities worldwide. normal method of engagement is the the U.S. effort? National security priori- U.S. Forces Training. Despite en- conduct of episodic tabletop or full-up ties and budgetary constraints argue hanced and expanded knowledge and exercises. Although episodic engagement for a more systematized, consolidated skills building in after action reports, is fairly pro forma, under DPES, a series approach to preparedness activities with current U.S. forces’ training for Phase 0 of skills-based disaster preparedness table

50 Commentary / A Way Ahead for DOD Disaster Preparedness JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Marine Medium Tilitrotor Squadron 265, attached to 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, departs JS Hyuga in support of Japan’s relief efforts following earthquakes near Kumamoto, April 19, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Gabriel B. Kotico) exercises with train-the-trainer modules affected nations, the UN, international determine or realize the return on their could be developed for DOD-wide use organizations, NGOs, and others has investment of resources. Disaster pre- to support disaster preparedness game been the topic of numerous disaster paredness activities with partner nations planning and bilateral operational harmo- response after action reports. The rec- require a commitment of resources over nization. Courses must be skills-based and ommendations addressing these areas time to fully realize benefit. This could easily modified to reflect regional/local of concern focus on planning before be problematic in a DOD system where culture and language requirements. This disasters occur. To that end, a DOD-wide personnel move every 2 to 3 years and would be a cost-effective way for DOD to framework with templates developed for in a field where a wide variety of U.S. support other nations engagement with use by commands to support integration departments, UN agencies, international an operational focus across the globe and of disaster-related activities into current organizations, and NGOs are active. enhance command disaster preparedness exercise structures would support com- The importance of personal con- activities. Enabling local and regional mand efforts if and when they are called nections in the implementation of a actors to support long-term capability upon to respond. Exercising disaster successful response has been highlighted growth enhances sustainability of combat- response would deepen relationships with in a number of studies and after action re- ant command theater campaign plans. It key agencies, organizations, and nations. ports. Well-developed, integrated security would also boost regional cooperation Additionally, it would help determine the cooperation activities related to disaster and interoperability if personnel in dif- best methods for communications and preparedness could support developing ferent nations were to train and exercise integrated planning and analysis prior to relationships with key actors in partner to the same standards. Training together, a response. Exercising together, whether nations. They could also support building using programs such as the National through combatant commands or the knowledge of institutions, bureaucracies, Guard’s State Partnership Program, al- State Partnership Program, allows for a and the individuals in charge to support lows common knowledge of terminology, common knowledge of terminology, ca- pre-disaster and operational planning. capabilities, practices, and procedures. pabilities, practices, and procedures. A DOD-wide framework based on Geographic Combatant Command Geographic Combatant Command the best practices and successful initia- Disaster Preparedness Exercise Disaster Preparedness Engagement tives from DOD and other U.S. agencies Framework. The ability to integrate, Framework. Disaster preparedness would support the development and coordinate, plan, and communicate engagements can sometimes appear implementation of truly integrated with other Federal agencies, potentially ad hoc, with commands struggling to all-hazards disaster preparedness

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 DiGiovanni 51 strategy would assist in drafting sample language and methodologies for use by all commands, and for implementation in theater campaign plan, regional plan, and country plan development. Policy in Support of DOD Foreign Disaster Preparedness Engagement. As previously stated, there is much in the way of policy to support foreign disaster relief—but limited policy for preparedness-specific activities. The 2012 Department of Defense cable “Policy Guidance for DOD Humanitarian Assistance Funded by the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid Appropriation” details the approved use of the appropriation for disaster pre- paredness activities under humanitarian assistance programming.14 Further elabo- ration of clear sample policy language for use of DOD assets and varied funding authorities in support of partner nation all-hazards disaster preparedness engage- ment and U.S. forces training would support the long-term efforts of com- mands in this arena. A Means to Collect, Analyze, and Report Measures of Effectiveness. Finally, DPES must include the development of measures of effectiveness for both the Office of the Secretary of Defense, related to accomplishment of DOD-wide goals for disaster preparedness initiatives, and for the combatant commands, which require well-defined, user-friendly evalu- ation and measurement tools to assess their partner-nation disaster prepared- ness engagements, U.S. forces training, and exercises. Development-based methodologies for measurement may be considered as the system matures, as it would assist with DOD integration into Aerial view of Balakot, Jammu, and Kashmir, Pakistan, showing widespread devastation caused by U.S. interagency efforts. Identification of earthquake on October 8, 2005 (UN/Evan Schneider) funding mechanisms to conduct rigorous engagements. Its structure should conduct disaster preparedness engage- assessments would also be required. include a method of needs analysis, ments. These activities are prioritized strategic planning, and development of within respective theater campaign plans Conclusion partnerships as well as the development to varying degrees. Numerous lessons- The implementation of DOD-wide of capability-building plans with outcome learned studies recommend enhancing systematization of disaster preparedness goals, funding streams, implementers, Phase 0 activities and aligning security would help address some of the issues and measures of effectiveness. cooperation programming to build in- I experienced responding to the 2005 Geographic Combatant Command ternal disaster management capabilities Pakistan earthquake in future disaster Theater Campaign Plan Sample in partner nations. Studying commands response efforts. Pre-disaster work with Language. Many geographic combatant where disaster preparedness activities civilian and military actors would pro- commands and their components already are successful and fully integrated into actively create a game plan for disaster

52 Commentary / A Way Ahead for DOD Disaster Preparedness JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 response and develop the relationships Research Institute, 2008), 107, available at MilitaryReview_20101231_art015.pdf>. . Pakistan,” Joint Force Quarterly 44 (1st Quarter ing of the participating nations’ capabili- 2 Earthquake Engineering Research Institute 2007), 22. ties. Disaster preparedness engagement, (EERI), The Kashmir Earthquake of October 8, 12 The main and sub-learning blocks for training, and exercises, as well as an 2005: Impacts in Pakistan (Oakland, CA: EERI, the Just-in-Time Massive Open Online Course February 28, 2006), 1, available at . 1. Situation Report the international disaster response com- 3 Paul W. Phister, Jr., et al., Pakistan Earth- a. Consolidated open-source news (RSS munity, would enable the joint task force quake Case Study (2009), 1, available at . etc.); d. Relief effort demographics and 4 Ibid. what their capabilities are (other U.S. agen- ment, personnel, and capabilities. 5 EERI, 1. cies, host-nation military, other countries, According to one report, the “re- 6 Ibid. nongovernmental organizations, academia, corded incidence of natural disasters 7 Phister et al., 1. industry, the United Nations, others); e. and, more critically, large-scale disasters 8 EERI, 1. Surviving services and host-nation capabili- (10,000–99,999 people killed or af- 9 House of Representatives, Everest Trembled: ties (military, power, water, food, medical, Lessons Learned from the Nepal Earthquake police and fire, infrastructure (airports, fected) around the world has risen in Response, Hearing before the Subcommittee seaports, structures, roads, sanitation, tele- 15 the past 20 years.” Thus, DOD will on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on phone, Internet); f. Contracting of services continue to be called upon in support of Foreign Affairs, 114th Cong., 1st sess., May 20, (food, sanitation, supplies); g. U.S. point of large disaster relief efforts as a part of an 2015, 8, available at . a. Government and political dynamics; b. We must keep moving forward in the 10 Jennifer D.P. Moroney et al., Lessons from History and culture; c. Religious dynamics; effort to shift disaster relief lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts d. Host-nation population and military sen- identified into lessons anticipated and in the Asia-Pacific Region (Santa Monica, CA: timents toward the United States; e. Border implemented. We must better prepare RAND National Security Research Division, nation dynamics; f. Health and disease U.S. forces at all levels throughout International Security and Defense Policy issues; g. Legal status. Center, 2013), available at ; Gary a. Showing “humility, empathy, and re- improve our response when disaster Cecchine et al., The U.S. Military Response to spect”; b. Cross-cultural relations [“show- strikes. Furthermore, we must embed the 2010 Haiti Earthquake: Considerations for case session”]—this activity will use the Vir- individual and unit preparation within Army Leaders (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Ar- tual Cultural Awareness Training (VCAT) if a larger approach to all-hazards disaster royo Center, Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources the affected nation is in the database (there Program, 2013), available at ; Rockie VCAT deploys game-based learning; tool. Programs and activities that are suc- K. Wilson, Operation Tomodachi: A Model for storytelling; simulation; intelligent tutoring; cessfully supporting long-term disaster American Disaster Response Efforts and the Col- first-person host-nation and U.S. personnel preparedness goals must be highlighted lective Use of Military Forces Abroad (Cambridge: interviews to provide self-paced learning, and broadened across DOD. Practical Harvard University, January 2012), available at feedback, and remediation; c. “Business” eti- ; Department of Defense (DOD) Office of a humanitarian mission; e. Setting up a coali- Enhanced pilot projects and programs are Inspector General, Most Geographic Combatant tion command and control logistics center; required to demonstrate ideas and test Commands Effectively Planned and Executed f. Working with the host nation and other the effectiveness and value of disaster pre- Disaster Relief Operations, but Improvements first responders—building trust and interper- paredness activities across DOD and the Could be Made, Report No. DoDIG-2012-119 sonal relationships; g. Interfacing with the (Alexandria, VA: DOD Inspector General, Au- affected population and local government; combatant commands. Now is the time gust 14, 2012), available at ; of force for self-defense. holders and willing partners and develop Center for Excellence in Disaster Management 4. Staying connected and updating the MOOC. and fund systemic disaster preparedness and Humanitarian Assistance, Lessons from Civil- 13 Department of Defense Support to Foreign activities. The Disaster Preparedness Military Disaster Management and Humanitar- Disaster Relief (Handbook for JTF Commanders ian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) (Joint and Below), GTA 90-01-030 (Washington, DC: Engagement System detailed in this ar- Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam, HI: Center for Ex- DOD, July 13, 2011), available at . tarian Assistance, January 24, 2014), available 14 Policy Guidance for DOD Humanitarian at ; P.K. (Ken) Keen et al., “Foreign ington, DC: DOD, May 7, 2012), available at 1 Sharon Wiharta et al., The Effectiveness Disaster Response: Joint Task Force-Haiti

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 DiGiovanni 53 Sailors load supplies into MV-22 Osprey from Marine Medium Tiltroter Squadron 262 on flight deck of USS George Washington in support of Operation Damayan, November 18, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Liam Kennedy)

n November 6, 2013, Haiyan The U.S. Pacific (known locally as Yolanda) O became what many described as the strongest storm on record to make landfall.1 According to the U.S. Command Response National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Haiyan had winds of up to 200 miles per hour, with gusts to Super Typhoon of up to 225 miles per hour. Haiyan affected 9 out of the 17 regions in the Philippines. With over $86 million in Haiyan total U.S. assistance, the U.S. military response efforts comprised more than 13,400 military personnel, 66 aircraft, By Thomas Parker, Sean P. Carroll, Gregg Sanders, Jason E. King, and Imes Chiu and 12 naval vessels, which delivered over 2,495 tons of relief supplies and evacuated more than 21,000 people. More than 1,300 flights were completed Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Parker, USMC, is the J35 Crisis Response Branch Chief in the Directorate in support of the relief effort, delivering of Operations at U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). Lieutenant Colonel Sean P. Carroll, USMC, served as a Ground/Special Operations Forces Planner in the Operations Directorate (J3) at Headquarters goods and services to approximately 450 (HQ) USPACOM and was part of the USPACOM Deployable Joint Force Augmentation Cell. Colonel sites.2 As of July 2014, the U.S. Agency Gregg Sanders, USAF (Ret.), serves as a Joint Training Specialist in the Operations Directorate at for International Development (USAID) HQ USPACOM. Lieutenant Colonel Jason E. King, Canadian Army, is the Canadian Liaison Officer to USPACOM and is the International Coordination Team Lead in the J35 Crisis Response Branch. Dr. estimated that a total of 16 million Imes Chiu is an Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. people were affected by Haiyan.3

54 Commentary / U.S. Pacific Command and Super Typhoon Haiyan JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Many humanitarian aid experts and typhoon were used, providing alternate When Haiyan slammed into the Philip- military leaders noted that civil-military means to coordinate operations while pines, many prepositioned stocks were coordination was some of the best they the major communication simply depleted. had seen during the response to Super were down. Mainstream media, social As of April 3, 2014, authorities from Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines from media, and citizen journalism played the Philippine National Disaster Risk November to December 2013. In total, a significant role as well in informing Reduction and Management Council the United States participated in relief responders of the appropriate courses (NDRRMC)—a working group of efforts together with 57 other nations of action for the employment of U.S. various governmental agencies, nongov- and 29 foreign militaries. Specifically, resources. ernmental organizations, and civil and the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Many noted the impressive demon- -sector groups that use the UN Assistance (OFDA), U.S. Pacific stration of Haiyan lessons learned put Cluster Approach in disaster manage- Command (USPACOM), and the into action in the more recent response ment administered by the Office of U.S. Embassy in Manila demonstrated to Typhoon Hagupit, which began as a Civil Defense under the Department clear understanding of their roles and Category 5 storm before weakening to of National Defense—estimated the responsibilities as evidenced by their Category 3 when it hit the Philippines typhoon had left 6,293 people dead and effective coordination. Moreover, U.S. in December 2014. The resiliency of 28,689 injured, with more than 4 mil- Government entities provided assistance the Filipino spirit continues to impress lion individuals displaced. The number that reflected their unique capabilities domestic and foreign media. The of houses damaged by Haiyan totaled appropriately scaled throughout the re- commitment of foreign humanitarian as- 1,140,332, of which more than half sponse phase. sistance actors who came to the aid of the (550,928) were completely destroyed.5 The USAID/OFDA Disaster Philippines after Haiyan clearly demon- Assessment Response Team coordinated strates the increasingly globalized nature Relief Efforts with the humanitarian community and of disaster response. In the coming years, The Philippines is a collection of more validated and transmitted requests for the challenge to find more innovative than 7,000 islands separated into 81 military assistance to Department of ways to increase investment in disaster provinces in three main geographi- Defense (DOD) responders on the preparedness and to better integrate and cal divisions: Luzon (north), Visayas ground. With the exception of a few days leverage local capabilities and capacities (mid), and Mindanao (south). Haiyan of water production in Tacloban, DOD with international response will remain. traversed the Visayas region, where focused mostly on large-scale operations, most of the affected areas were located, using its unique capabilities to deliver Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) for nearly a full day. Tacloban, located “wholesale” transportation and logistics Haiyan entered the West Philippine Sea on the island of Leyte, Cebu City on support. USAID/OFDA was one of the at 4:40 a.m. on November 8, maintain- Cebu Island, and Roxas City on Panay first donors to the World Food Program, ing its strength throughout the day as Island were the three other major areas enabling its role as the lead coordinator it moved across the central part of the affected by the typhoon that served of the United Nations (UN) logistics country, weakening only late in the as principal centers of regional relief and emergency telecommunications afternoon the following day.4 The storm efforts. Cebu, located in the central clusters and as the co-lead of the food tracked from the east directly across the Visayas, was the primary logistics hub security cluster with the UN Food and eastern, central, and western Visayas for the Philippines and other interna- Agriculture Organization. regions, destroying large swathes of tional relief efforts. International dona- Key lessons learned from previous territory spread across a number of dif- tions were processed in the one-stop disasters improved the speed and quality ferent islands. Leyte and Samar were shop inside Cebu’s Mactan-Benito of overall U.S. interagency coordination. hardest hit, with 90 percent of the Ebuen Air Base and then distributed Most notably, personnel with previous infrastructure destroyed in Tacloban to affected areas. Manila, located in disaster response experience who had City, Leyte’s largest urban center. The Luzon, was the focal point for central personal connections with other major typhoon overwhelmed regional capacity coordination among the major respond- players in the relief efforts considerably at a time when the national government ing organizations, with cluster coordi- expedited interagency and transnational had just faced two major calamities that nation meetings taking place in each relief efforts. The informal professional had drained its resources and signifi- of the major cities in areas affected by networks among relief workers that were cantly stressed the in-country supply Haiyan. The United States established built during common training and exer- chain: the civil conflict in Zamboanga its command operations center (COC) cises greatly facilitated the trust needed and Basilan on the southern island of at Manila’s Villamor Air Base, home of for effective and efficient cooperation, Mindanao in September 2013, and the the Philippine air force. This air base particularly in the early response phase. magnitude 7.2 earthquake in Bohol in shares runways with the Ninoy Aquino Several communication avenues for the the central Visayas region, which lay International Airport. responders and for those affected by the along the path of Haiyan, in October.

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Parker et al. 55 Sailor carries relief supplies to guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens (CG 63) during Operation Damayan, November 16, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Ricardo R. Guzman)

Within the U.S. Strategic Response the AFP. The MNCC provided common The Philippine government issued Framework, USAID/OFDA was as- situational awareness between the AFP a request for humanitarian assistance to signed as lead Federal agency (LFA) and assisting foreign militaries, facilitated the U.S. Government on November 9 for providing foreign humanitarian as- information sharing, and ensured the ef- (Washington, DC, time). USPACOM sistance (FHA) and coordinating U.S. ficient use of military support locations, directed Marine Corps Forces Pacific responses internationally. USAID/ capabilities, and coordination.6 to lead military relief operations OFDA has numerous response options in the Philippines, with 3rd Marine outside of DOD to provide immediate Lesson 1: Immediate Request Expeditionary Brigade (3rd MEB) serving support, including money, resources, for Assistance and Forward as the tactical mission commander on the commodities, and deployment-ready Deployed Assets Saved Lives ground, and ordered deployment of the humanitarian experts and advisors across Haiyan destroyed critical infrastructure USS George Washington and elements of the U.S. Government. The catastrophic that was essential to support relief Carrier Strike Group 5 (CSG 5) to the impact of Haiyan, however, required far operations, including airports, seaports, Philippines. greater capacity and capability than these roads, communications systems, power On November 10, within 6 hours response options could provide. Unique distribution networks (electrical and of authorization from USPACOM, 3rd DOD airlift capabilities in particular fuel), and other key resources. Though MEB “suitcase staff,” consisting of the became a key enabler for the entire re- difficult to calculate with precision, it commanding general, G3, sergeant sponse operation. is likely that the immediate steps taken major, public affairs officer, and two Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo by the Philippine government and communications Marines, deployed (popularly known as Camp Aguinaldo), corresponding USAID-USPACOM to the Philippines. Upon arrival, the the military headquarters of the Armed decisive actions in the early hours of the MEB established the COC at Villamor Forces of the Philippines (AFP) located response kept morbidity and mortality Air Base and began coordination with in Quezon City, Manila, also hosts relatively low, despite the catastrophic the AFP, Joint U.S. Military Assistance the NDRRMC and the Multinational impact of the storm and the millions of Group–Philippines, and USAID/OFDA Coordination Center (MNCC) led by people displaced. personnel who had arrived several days

56 Commentary / U.S. Pacific Command and Super Typhoon Haiyan JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 before Haiyan hit. The immediate de- interagency task force, while comprised when host-nation prepositioned goods ployment of the 3rd MEB and the rapid of less than 100 individuals, “clawed their were exhausted by recent disasters. These civil-military coordination that followed way back to the airport inch by inch” forward-deployed assets and capabilities meant humanitarian aid missions could to assess the conditions for the entry allowed for the immediate civil-military begin promptly upon the declaration of a of the responders and relief supplies in coordination needed to establish and national calamity by Philippine President Tacloban. Colonel Padilla recounted: execute a rapid response plan with the Benigno Aquino the next day. Philippine government. The USPACOM Deployable Upon reaching the airport hours after Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell being drenched, tired, hungry and with Lesson 2: Centralized Planning (DJTFAC) deployed and played a [a] minimum of equipment salvaged from and Decentralized Execution critical role in setting up an operational the devastation, the AFP and interagency Facilitated Coordination joint headquarters, aligning operational [task force] mustered the remaining per- A hub-and-spoke concept of operations design and assessment plans, establish- sonnel in the airport and linked up with was stood up 18 hours after approval ing an operational rhythm with the AFP, the surviving Philippine Air Force Tactical from USPACOM to deliver USAID OFDA, and UN, and implementing the Operations Group (PAF TOG) contingent humanitarian supplies from the primary USPACOM FHA concept of operations (whose camp at the airport grounds was to- hub at Villamor Air Base to Tacloban, (CONOPS). DJTFAC provided joint tally destroyed) and began to painstakingly Guiuan, Borongan, and Ormoc in expertise, regional and local expertise, clear the runway. Leyte and Samar. U.S. military aircraft and detailed knowledge of USPACOM enabled USAID/OFDA to conduct the organization and processes. It provided This effort paved the way for the first PAF needs and damage assessments required rapid stand-up and execution to establish C-130 flights that brought the initial inter- for relief planning and coordination Joint Task Force (JTF) 505. Although agency and NDRRMC assessment team, without delay. DOD civil-military coor- some geographic combatant commands medical teams from the AFP and limited dination focused primarily on airlifting do not have a DJTFAC, it proved an in- medical supplies to the city of Tacloban. supplies to affected areas for onward dispensable capability for the USPACOM Their efforts too became the enablers that distribution. response to Haiyan. allowed for the first group of U.S. forces to The first shipment of USAID/ On the same day, November 10, arrive there the following day. If not for OFDA relief commodities arrived in the the Joint Special Operations Task these men and women whose sacrifices got Philippines on November 12, and U.S. Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P),7 located lost when more prominent responders ar- military forces began regular distribution in Mindanao, about 600 miles south of rived, none of the follow-on and similarly of these commodities on November 13, 5 the affected region, began conducting critical activities could have happened.9 days after the storm made landfall. Assets aerial surveillance to assess airfields, ports, from the aircraft carrier USS George routes, and distress signals, and obtain- The combined Philippine-U.S. ef- Washington and CSG 5 commenced relief ing information critical for search and forts resulted in a capability that allowed operations on November 14. rescue operations in the affected areas of tactical military forces to provide im- Determining the allocation of re- Leyte, Samar, and the Western Visayas.8 mediate relief, while the government and sources and the use of DOD assets was JSOTF-P, which performs an advise- humanitarian aid community organized critical to the relief efforts. Satisfying and-assist role to Philippine security and prepared capabilities to deploy. On requests for assistance was based primar- forces throughout the southern part of November 11, President Aquino issued ily on field assessments. Manila served as the country, sent the first U.S. military Presidential Proclamation No. 682 de- the main aerial port of debarkation for personnel to respond. It also provided claring a state of national calamity—the U.S. efforts due to its focus on wholesale critical needs and damage assessment to same day USAID humanitarian relief support of operations, while the govern- the operational plans of the responders. supplies started arriving into Tacloban, ment and humanitarian actors focused According to witnesses on the 535 miles south of the COC at Villamor on performing humanitarian assess- ground, the AFP and the interagency task Air Base. ments, administering medical care, and force, despite having lost family members, In the initial hours of Typhoon engaging in direct distribution of relief extricated themselves from the rubble Haiyan, the U.S. military, working commodities. to clear the initial runway, providing alongside AFP counterparts, was able The decision to use Manila as a hub the “initial main door” that allowed the to respond quickly due to the many avoided burdening the affected areas in entry of the first group of U.S. forces into prepositioned U.S. assets throughout the the Visayas with internal logistics needs Tacloban airport. According to Colonel region. Military assets based in locations and freed up space for humanitarian Restituto Padilla, Jr., the AFP liaison near the Philippines enabled responders actors to operate in the affected areas. officer to USPACOM, the AFP Vice to provide rapid provision of lifesaving Personnel in Manila, comprised of U.S., Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Allan assistance in the immediate aftermath Filipino, and international humanitar- Luga, recounted how the AFP and the of the storm, made particularly critical ian personnel, made frequent visits to

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Parker et al. 57 affected areas. Responding organizations Tacloban residents had access to clean been established sooner, but rather that and coordination mechanisms in the drinking water by this time, and hygiene the right course of action was planned for affected areas were somewhat slow in kits began reaching various municipali- and decided upon at the outset to ensure setting up due to the magnitude of the ties. In Cebu, less cargo was arriving daily that the appropriate C2 is employed. devastation, necessitating coordination in and fewer people were requesting trans- Manila. port. After MITAM requirements were Lesson 4: International Missions were cleared in Manila satisfied, the U.S. military response to Coordination Team by the OFDA mission tasking matrix this disaster was nearly complete. Synchronized Effective (MITAM). Forces and assets returned JTF and USAID/OFDA leaders International Support to base in Luzon at the end of each day recognized that the emergency phase The International Coordination Team to receive orders for the following day. of relief operations terminated on or (ICT) serves as an enabling mechanism President Aquino assumed direct control about November 26. While there was a for the effective and speedy provision of the relief operations (at one point significant multinational military effort, of military capabilities and resources based directly out of Tacloban for several U.S. forces limited their efforts to the to support international efforts in the days), but they largely operated out of emergency phase, with U.S. command USPACOM area of operation. Operat- Manila for the duration of the response and control (C2) conducted largely out ing from the headquarters at Camp efforts. of Manila. Other foreign militaries arrived Smith, Hawaii, the ICT meets regu- later and focused a large amount of effort larly (Phase 0: bi-annually) and on an Lesson 3: Direct Planning on what could be considered the recovery ongoing basis during a crisis situation to Ensure Command and and rehabilitation stages of the operation, (Phase 1–5: minimum daily) for the Control Are Part of Course with a major focus on all activities in the purpose of joint planning, sharing infor- of Action Analysis mission area. mation, and creating a synchronized USPACOM ordered the activation By the time JTF 505 fully activated holistic awareness of the theater among of JTF 505 on November 16 to lead for this crisis, almost all USAID/OFDA- USPACOM international military the tactical mission, replacing the 3rd requested U.S. military assistance had liaison officers (LNOs). MEB. Lieutenant General John E. been delivered. The JTF supported While the ICT meetings are open Wissler, commander of III Marine requirements established in one final to all staff and strive to be as inclusive Expeditionary Force (III MEF), OFDA MITAM to deliver relief com- as possible, the core structure dur- assumed command of JTF 505, which modities. Key considerations in the JTF ing Operation Damayan included the established operations in the Philip- 505 after action report included sug- USPACOM DJ3 (Chair); a Canadian pines on November 18 and reached full gestions on ways to improve agility and LNO (Deputy-Chair); a Japanese operational capability on November 20. effectiveness in manning, equipping, LNO; the Philippine LNO and Deputy (III MEF is the parent command of 3rd training, and readiness. LNO; an Australian LNO; a British MEB.) JTF 505 led U.S. military relief Through the employment of the LNO; representatives from USPACOM operations until it was disestablished on most appropriate C2 option for the com- directorates, including training, plans, December 1, 2013. mander and staff, in conjunction with logistics, information technology, finance, After 6 days of full operational ca- component input, unnecessary transition and operations; the OFDA representa- pability, JTF 505 presented a transition delay during execution was minimized. tive; the Foreign Policy Advisor; and an confirmation briefing to the USPACOM USPACOM opted initially to command All Partners Access Network (APAN) commander on November 26. It stated its relief operations through its Marine representative. that “unique DOD capabilities [were] Service component (U.S. Marine Pacific) Originally stood up in November no longer required” and recommended instead of directly activating a JTF. 2013 in support of Operation Damayan, mission transition through first observ- Once the establishment of a JTF had the ICT serves as a one-stop shop for ing relief operations with U.S. Navy and been decided, it took several days before international LNOs to clarify their roles, Marine Corps amphibious forces in an adequate command, control, and com- help posture international military sup- “operational reserve” role, able to react munications were set up between the JTF port appropriately before the urgent to any sudden emergent requirements, and HQ USPACOM. formal host-nation request for assistance, and, second, by disestablishing the JTF While the various C2 arrangements and avoid potential confusion with the and releasing all major U.S. forces for and the shift between them did not nega- MNCC team during crisis situations. redeployment by December 1. tively affect operations, it did not enable Intended to provide a proactive, strategic, According to OCHA Situation a more rapid response. In mega-disaster and high-level operational perspective, Report No. 13, relief operations scaled scenarios in which it is not always clear the ICT paves the way for the smooth es- up substantially, especially in Tacloban how long the response phase will last, a tablishment of the MNCC by alleviating City, with access and logistics dramati- key consideration from the Haiyan expe- the initial burden of the affected nation cally improving by November 19.10 All rience is not whether a JTF should have to collect, organize, and identify overlaps,

58 Commentary / U.S. Pacific Command and Super Typhoon Haiyan JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Marines carry injured Filipino woman on stretcher for medical attention at Villamor Air Base, Philippines, November 11, 2013 (DOD/Caleb Hoover)

gaps, and potential opportunities across practices across all partner nations to pro- staff processes, event flow and decision the full spectrum of response operations mote alignment with USPACOM allies point descriptions, operational plan- during the critical lifesaving rapid re- and partner militaries, particularly before ning team processes, transition assess- sponse phase. a crisis makes landfall. The ICT also as- ment templates, and other supporting To be effective, the ICT core mem- sists in the creation, review, and revision documents.11 bers collect and monitor five main aspects of military response plans, CONOPs, The USPACOM FHA CONOPS of international military-related contribu- the dissemination of relevant operational is the authoritative reference for tions during a crisis: information, and the coordination of USPACOM FHA operations, actions, sourcing additional military support of and activities. This document builds initial government and military •• strategic theater military requirements. the strategic and operational construct intents vis-à-vis projected support for planning, preparing, executing, and current capabilities in the region, •• Lesson 5: Preplanned Scalable assessing FHA operations, and will be their locations, and their projected Force Packages Optimize applied in situations when U.S. agencies duration(s) of stay Humanitarian Assistance/ request DOD assistance (for example, determining where, when, and •• Disaster Relief Support foreign disaster relief, pandemic and for how long capabilities will be Based on lessons learned from Opera- emerging infectious diseases, and chemi- deployed tion Damayan, the newly revised and cal, biological, radiological, and nuclear information requirements to better •• comprehensive USPACOM FHA accidents). This CONOPS provides: enable deployments and support CONOPS discusses in detail the stra- any support required to facilitate prescriptive USPACOM guidance •• tegic framework, strategy and policy •• movement into theater. to military commanders performing considerations, mission statement, com- FHA operations In addition, the ICT provides a plat- mander’s intent, lines of effort (LOE), form for sharing lessons learned and best various frameworks for each LOE,

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Parker et al. 59 •• a framework to inform partner requests, especially during the initial first landfall. This allowed JTF 505 to nations on USPACOM support state of operations, to better identify begin disestablishment. Remaining true during FHA operations which Service components will fulfill to the United Nations Office for the •• a baseline for the development which requirements. Ensure that the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and conduct of training to prepare MITAM is accessible and can handle Guidelines on the Use of Military and USPACOM commanders and forces the high volume of use from all Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief to execute FHA operations. constituents. (Oslo Guidelines), DOD assets provided •• USPACOM had the appropriate unique capability in the Haiyan response Lesson 6: Other Tactical interagency advisors collocated with efforts when it was clear that no compa- Considerations the HQ USPACOM staff, and this rable civilian alternative existed. greatly enhanced the command’s When this unique capability was no Operational insights captured in the unified action during Operation longer required, DOD began to phase after action reports include lessons Damayan. Combatant commands out its operations in coordination with learned and best practices in major should ensure their own person- the affected nation. The timeliness of the disaster response operations. Respond- nel are appropriately staffed with DOD response as the last-in and first-out ers across different service components interagency advisors pertinent to resort speaks to the importance of mutual reported the following lessons that their area of operations. They should training and readiness, such as the an- could be adapted to other geographic also initiate the situational aware- nual bilateral Philippine-U.S. Balikatan combatant command operational envi- ness group at the earliest point after military exercise, to allow for combined ronment and disaster scenarios: the identification of a major storm planning, interoperability, and a speedy •• Coordination and correspondence system and establish the operational and smooth transition of operations. during an FHA response should be planning team at least 24 hours prior More than a year had passed since unclassified as much as possible to to landfall for greater mission analysis Haiyan made first landfall on November maximize information-sharing. If and course of action selection. 8, 2013, in Eastern Samar, when we cannot communicate, we cannot •• Units and organizations must iden- Typhoon Hagupit (known locally as coordinate. Operating in the Secret tify stakeholders and LNO locations Ruby), the second most intense tropical Internet Protocol Router Network at the onset of a crisis. LNOs should storm in 2014, threatened the same area. resulted in wasted time and effort, be emplaced immediately to ensure Hagupit intensified to Category 5 on delaying shared situational awareness situational awareness, coordinate December 4, 2014, before weakening with partners. operations, and ensure mutual to Category 3 when it made landfall in •• Ensure communications are in place support. Eastern Samar. This time, the Philippines prior to major transition. Prioritize •• Develop a simple checklist to deter- applied lessons learned from Haiyan. the deployment of equipment as mine the capabilities of airfields in While a total of 4,149,484 persons necessary to ensure sufficient com- the affected area(s). This checklist were affected, only 18 deaths were munication capability is available to could be used to calibrate the reported.12 More than 1 million people support the anticipated growth of C2 required U.S. footprint. evacuated to 3,640 shelters in advance requirements. of the storm’s landfall, an impressive feat •• Ensure that the J5 rapidly establishes Conclusion in any country. The preparation activities joint planning groups at the onset of of the local and national governments, Within 2 weeks, the emergency operations to provide timely return including the prepositioning of road response phase of the humanitarian to Phase 0. clearance teams, were applauded by nu- crisis was essentially over. While the An assessment framework needs to merous international governmental and •• U.S. military ceased major operations be extant at the onset of operations. nongovernmental experts and officials. on November 26, some contributing- The incorporation of an assessment In suggesting best practices in the country military assets continued to stay framework into the FHA CONOPS Haiyan response, this article aims to on the ground in the affected areas sup- will help to ensure assessments are provide insights into the effectiveness of porting Philippine government efforts. possible at the onset of an event. the U.S. response to a mega-disaster such The commitment of assisting actors Ensure proper procedures to as Haiyan. It hopes to inspire other geo- •• who came to the aid of the Philippines determine the supported valid graphic combatant commands to adapt clearly demonstrated the increasingly requirements by USAID/OFDA. some of the organizational models and globalized nature of mega-disaster Confirmation of OFDA requests tactical approaches suggested herein for response. down to the Service components their particular environments. It also aims Despite the magnitude of the damage was initially difficult to obtain. There to start a dialogue on ways to achieve and its wide reach across multiple islands, is a need for a real-time formal- unity of effort in a complex catastrophic recovery began 2 weeks after Haiyan’s ized reporting process of all OFDA scenario. As a testament to U.S. partners

60 Commentary / U.S. Pacific Command and Super Typhoon Haiyan JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Marines with Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 offload KC-130J Super Hercules at Clark Air Force Base, Philippines, during Operation Damayan, November 22, 2013 (U.S. Marine Corps/Caleb Hoover) and allies, the commitment of the United attachments/article/1329/Effects_of_Ty- phoon Haiyan (Yolanda), Echo Crisis Flash No. States to assist, advise, and stand ready to phoon_YOLANDA_(HAIYAN)_SitRep_ 8, November 20, 2013, available at . vosocc.unocha.org/Documents/29895_ help its partners is best captured in the 5 Ibid. ECHOFlash8.pdf>. words of President Barack Obama: “One 6 Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command, 11 Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command. of our core principles is when friends are “U.S. Pacific Command Foreign Humanitar- 12 NDRRMC, “NDRRMC Update: SitRep in trouble, America helps.”13 JFQ ian Assistance (FHA) Concept of Operations No. 27 re Effects of Typhoon ‘Ruby’ (Hagu- (CONOPS),” November 19, 2014, avail- pit),” December 19, 2014, available at . as_of_19DEC2014_0600H.pdf>. 7 At the request of the Philippine govern- 13 “President Obama Speaks on Typhoon 1 “Update #2—NASA’s TRMM Satellite ment, the Joint Special Operations Task Force– Haiyan,” USAID.gov, November 14, 2013, Sees Super-typhoon Haiyan Strike Philippines,” Philippines (JSOTF-P) assists and advises the available at . northwestern-pacific-ocean/>. and sustaining counterterrorism operations 2 “Super Typhoon Haiyan,” State.gov, in Mindanao as part of Operation Enduring available at . 8 U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force, 3 “Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda),” USAID. “JSOTF-P’s Support to the Government of gov, available at . the Philippines Typhoon Haiyan Relief Effort, 4 National Disaster Risk Reduction 08–22 November 2013,” presentation, Camp and Management Council (NDRRMC), Smith, Hawaii, December 9, 2014. “NDRRMC Update: SitRep No. 108 Effects 9 Brigadier General Restituto Padilla, Jr., of Typhoon ‘Yolanda’ (Haiyan),” April 3, AFP, interview, January 8, 2013. 2014, available at

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Parker et al. 61 Baltic battalion soldiers during city battle training day in San Gregorio, , October 24, 2015, during Trident Juncture 2015 (NATO/Siim Teder)

popularity through social media if they #SocialMediaMatters are to effectively shape the information environment during modern military operations. Lessons Learned from In September and October 2015, mul- tinational participants in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exercise Exercise Trident Juncture Trident Juncture learned firsthand the im- portance of social media as a component By Gregory M. Tomlin of the engagement warfighting function on today’s battlefield. Led by Allied Joint Force Command in Brunssum, the ith the ubiquity of inex- into host-nation newspapers and radio Netherlands, Trident Juncture involved pensive smart phones and broadcasts, it is now imperative that command posts in Canada, Norway, W Internet access, increasing they consider online methods to reach , and Spain participating in a numbers of people around the globe— the widest audience targeted by their complex scenario ostensibly set in north- especially youth—glean as much of contemporary information campaign. east Africa. According to the road to war, their news as their entertainment from Recognizing this paradigm shift, head- the fictitious country of Kamon invaded social media platforms. For informa- quarters from the brigade to combat- the neighboring country of Tytan to build tion operations (IO) professionals long ant command levels must understand a “protection zone” for ethnic Klorids, a accustomed to incorporating messages how to establish credibility and gain minority in Tytan but the ethnic majority in Kamon. Kamon’s President Wekawu also blamed the Tytan government for Major Gregory M. Tomlin, USA, is a Brigade Fire Support Officer in the 1st Armored Division, 1st Stryker constructing dams that limited the flow of Brigade Combat Team. He holds a Ph.D. from The George Washington University. the Nile River into Kamon, a pretext for

62 Commentary / #SocialMediaMatters JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 war in Wekawu’s view. Under the author- security concerns. This comment enabled and prioritized a road-paving project for ity of a United Nations (UN) Security the brigade spokesman to engage in a Tigray during the division Information Council resolution, NATO deployed an virtual conversation through a series of Activities Working Group. Two days Allied Joint Force Command to restore comment posts. More importantly for later, military engineers arrived to widen the Tytan border and improve stability the information campaign, it allowed shoulders and fill potholes. The division throughout the region. the spokesman to insert focused talking public affairs officer (PAO) issued a press NATO simulation designers uploaded points about respect for the rule of law release about the project and quoted the two social media applications onto the and ethnic tolerance that would have brigade commander: “We are pleased exercise’s Intranet, and controllers en- sounded like platitudes if written as inde- to help improve the local infrastructure couraged friendly players at all echelons pendent posts. because we know that transportation to create profiles. Opposing force and matters to the people of Tigray.” Chaz’s neutral players also established their own Trending messaging proved so effective that it not accounts. Most participants immediately Like the popular application, only shaped the division’s civil-military recognized the format of the two applica- Chatter enabled users to transform a affairs priorities, but the brigade com- tions. “Chatter,” akin to Twitter, limited topic into a trend through the use of mander used Chaz’s own hashtag in his users to 120-character posts. “Facepage,” the # hashtag. Leveraging this feature public statement as well. This presents a akin to Facebook, did not bound a user’s generated interest in a topic that, as part worthy challenge to IO planners: How post to a specific word count, and it in- of an information campaign, influenced does one become @ChazfromTigray one- cluded options to paste photos and links the local population to support a spe- self and generate effective hashtags that to other Web sites. The dynamism that cific initiative. Optimally, the friendly will co-opt neutral or enemy application these applications brought to Trident forces headquarters would exploit this, users to support the command’s lines of Juncture necessitates the utilization but during Trident Juncture the best effort? of both platforms in future command validation of the hashtag’s effectiveness Showcasing the engineers’ efforts post exercises. IO specialists, nonlethal as an information multiplier stemmed to improve the roads of Tigray through targeting officers, and, perhaps most from its use by a neutral player. social media should not be confused with importantly, commanders became aware Chatter handle @ChazfromTigray used the information endstate. Broader objec- of the consequential impacts—both the hashtag “#TransportationMatters” tives to increase local support for NATO good and bad—of social media within to influence a multinational division to forces operating in Tytan, respect for the the modern information dimension of fund a road project in the fictitious Tytan rule of law, and trust in the indigenous warfare. province of Tigray. When the exercise government underlay this civil-military Foremost, Trident Juncture demon- began, Chaz’s initial postings complained investment in local infrastructure. strated that the dissemination of canned about the excessive time that it took for Immediate methods for measuring the talking points through social media is no him to drive to work due to poor roads influence of the project on local behavior more persuasive than when parroted by in his province. As the division uncoiled and attitudes toward NATO and the a patrol leader to the resident of a host- from its port of entry, Chaz complained Tytan government included monitoring nation village. Simplistic messages such about NATO forces causing greater social media sites for trending hashtags as “NATO is here under authorization of congestion and increased destruction related to the allied military presence, a UN Security Council resolution” failed to the roads, thereby extending his ethnic tolerance, and pro-Tytan in- to gain the joint task force headquarters’ commute even further. The division stitutions and leaders. The sharing or profile a significant following on Chatter headquarters responsible for Tigray reposting of a headquarters’ original post or Facepage. Without “friends” following province did not comment on Chaz’s about Tigray infrastructure could also a command on social media, NATO mes- posts, but other Chatter users did com- indicate whether Tytans noticed the road sages did not enter many personal online ment on his blurbs, mostly to jeer him project or considered it to be an authen- streams and quickly disappeared beneath for harping on the monotonous topic of tic gesture of NATO’s commitment to the din on the application’s main page. #TransportationMatters. However, each improving their country. Like the incorporation of talking time that someone commented on Chaz’s points in face-to-face engagements, IO account or brought his name into their Competing with White Noise officers must be prepared to weave their own posts, they inadvertently increased Exercise controllers did not anticipate messages into interesting social media Chaz’s popularity. By the end of the first the popularity of Chatter swelling to postings. For example, an official Chatter week of the exercise, @ChazfromTigray more than 600 active accounts during post by the U.S. brigade mentioning became the second most popular profile Trident Juncture. This challenged the that the commander met with a town (according to Chatter’s own metric) out joint task force headquarters to main- mayor to discuss security concerns invited of 600 active accounts. tain popularity and develop a following a comment from one host-nation user An IO analyst on the division staff of “friends.” Most Chatter accounts dis- who asked the brigade to detail specific noticed Chaz’s popularity on Chatter cussed wildly irrelevant topics in lieu of

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Tomlin 63 Marines with Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response–Africa and Royal Marines with 45 Commando conduct patrol during Trident Juncture 15, October 23, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Kaitlyn V. Klein) the conflict between Kamon and Tytan. The controllers’ reaction proved un- they removed a third of the Chatter Some Chatter users—most notably fortunate. If they believed that by limiting profiles. One theory for the lack of @RegisKT, the handle used by the the “white noise,” including several vocal Facepage’s popularity could be that anchor of Kamon Today’s nightly news opponents to NATO, they could enable Chatter constrained users to write terse, broadcast—clearly opposed NATO’s PAOs and IO officers to more effectively 120-character posts, while Facepage interference in regional affairs. Simula- shape the information environment, then permitted its members to enter long tion designers produced a daily Kamon they removed reality from the simulation. messages or paste entire media stories Today newsreel to propagandize against Although robust for a NATO exercise, determined by social media users as NATO and the Tytan government, and 600 profiles is a paltry sum compared droll. In several instances on Facepage, Regis immediately followed up with to the millions of Twitter and Facebook lengthy messages from a unit headquar- Chatter posts that included bellicose users who will generate white noise in a ters about NATO efforts to improve the quotations from President Wekawu and real-world theater of operations. PAOs security situation in Tytan elicited the misinformation about allied military and IO officers must begin to consider same comment from followers: “Too efforts. By the eighth day of the exer- seriously the challenges of navigating long to read.” Similarly, the appearance cise, Regis had become the third most around the white noise and how to re- of daily Facepage rants by Kamon Vice popular Chatter account, while official spond to the most blatant information President Izkaok received wide criticism: NATO accounts trailed in comparison. attacks against NATO in social media. “Blah, blah, blah, this is propaganda.” A Applying the joint task force head- typical Izkaok posting follows: quarters’ own metric, the enemy was Pith versus Rant winning the information campaign. As During Trident Juncture, Facepage did WE ARE WINNING THE KLORID a response, exercise controllers closed not generate the same level of popularity WAR ON ! Yesterday’s about a third of the Chatter accounts as Chatter among exercise participants, success by the Kamon People’s Army to and prevented Intranet users from cre- and controllers did not delete the most secure an airfield in Tytan has enabled ating new profiles. vitriolic Facepage accounts, even after our benevolent President Wekawu to send

64 Commentary / #SocialMediaMatters JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Landing craft air cushions transport U.S. Marines and Portuguese marines from the USS Arlington Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group toward Pinheiro Da Cruz beach to participate in combined amphibious assault exercised as part of Trident Juncture 15, October 20, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Jeraco Jenkins) essential humanitarian aid to our Klorid immediately recognizable as propaganda. In one instance, a group of Tytan brothers who have starved under the Tytan Neither NATO nor the enemy spokes- men determined to exacerbate ethnic regime. Kamon has created a safety zone man effectively messaged through this tensions, impersonated police officers and for all people oppressed by NATO in Tytan. medium, and neither gained a significant massacred dozens of ethnic Klorids in a Our field commanders report that, in every following of friends. Exercise control- Tytan village. The allied division responsi- Tytan village they liberate, citizens have lers did not remove the vice president’s ble for that province in Tytan considered joined their brothers in the fight for Klorid profile, despite the highly critical nature the incident a matter for local authorities justice. Mark my words: We will run the of his posts, because they did not deem to handle and chose not to make any NATO occupation forces back into the this account as threatening—hence effec- public statements, for fear of drawing Red Sea. The imperialists will return to tive—as compared to other anti-NATO attention to the atrocity in their area of their decadent homes in Europe and North profiles on Chatter, such as @RegisKT. operations. Within hours of the massacre, America lamenting their grievous mistake The juxtaposition of the enemy’s @RegisKT exploited the division’s silence of giving into their carnal desires to be- Facepage and Chatter messages indicates when he posted on Chatter: “KT News come colonial masters again. The NATO how powerful a pithy message in social Alert—President Wekawu: ‘I weep for the Generalissimo will never take our Nile media can be at confounding PAOs, IO loss of 75 defenseless Klorids murdered in life waters! NATO will never destroy the officers, intelligence collection managers, cold blood today by Tytan police.’” Greater Klorid Nation! Let us be eternally and even operation officers. While readers Regis did not post his message about grateful that Providence has bestowed upon could shrug off Izkaok’s rants as delu- the massacre of ethnic Klorids until after us our president at this moment in Klorid sional or desperate, on three occasions two other host-nation Chatter users history. Fear not! President Wekawu will during the exercise, the Kamon Today mentioned rumors of the atrocity. The protect us all! newsman’s Chatter posts enabled the declarative nature of his “News Alert” led enemy to gain an information advantage, the division intelligence collection man- The Facepage application’s format forcing NATO to respond to its adver- ager to include Regis’s Chatter post in his made the vice president’s diatribes sary’s highly successful spin. open-source intelligence report. The post

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Tomlin 65 Two pilots assigned to 71st Rescue Squadron at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, fly C-130J Hercules during rescue and refueling training near Beja Air Base, Portugal, October 23, 2015, in support of Trident Juncture 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Luke Kitterman) also generated numerous responses about information environment when @RegisKT occurred only after learning from Chatter what occurred in the village and specula- posted more breaking news: “KT about the attack, rather than utilizing its tion that NATO’s silence surrounding News Alert—President Wekawu orders own collection assets to be the first to the incident equated to the West’s cal- Kamon People’s Army to initiate artil- inform the Tytan people about the com- lous indifference toward ethnic violence. lery barrage of NATO battle positions in mencement of a Kamon offensive across Although the division commander chose western Tytan.” the international border. a passive approach to handling the mas- Regis used a Tytan Radio transcript A final example of @RegisKT forcing sacre with the media, the sheer volume released 30 minutes earlier on the the multinational headquarters onto the of Chatter posts led one international exercise’s Intranet “Newsweb” as his information defensive occurred when journalist to contact the division PAO source. The transcript cited several vil- he posted on Chatter the nationality of directly. In a major Canadian newspaper lagers in western Tytan who called in to the first NATO pilot shot down during the following day, the reporter criticized the radio station to report the impact of the exercise: “Tonight on KT News at NATO severely for moving too slowly to Kamon artillery shells near their com- 2200: Exclusive video of the first POW respond to the incident and questioned munity. However, no one on the division in Klorid War on Imperialism; American the multinational division’s ability to staff had monitored Newsweb closely pilot shot down over Kamon.” Regis stabilize Tytan. enough to recognize that Regis had based his post about the captured pilot The atrocity should have taught divi- taken a real media scoop out of context, on a Newsweb video that reported the sion collection managers to monitor local by insinuating that Kamon’s preemptive downing of a NATO fighter over Kamon. chatter on social media more carefully, attack would destroy battle positions oc- NATO headquarters would not confirm since the expansiveness of the area of cupied by NATO forces poised to invade the nationality of the pilot, so Regis operations prevented allied forces from Kamon. Regis made the Kamon military claimed to have an American (eventually patrolling its entirety. However, a few days operation sound defensive in nature. As we learned that the pilot served in the later, the headquarters missed a second a consequence, the allied headquarters’ Canadian Air Force). Exercise controllers opportunity to proactively shape the delayed response to enemy indirect fire deleted Regis’s account immediately after

66 Commentary / #SocialMediaMatters JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 this posting, in lieu of allowing a senior information campaign, real-world appli- PAO to respond. Even if the headquar- cations such as Facebook should not be New from ters chose to remain silent, the failure of discounted summarily by IO planners in Kamon News to produce the video of an future command post exercises or deploy- NDU Press American pilot that night on its nightly ment operations. Internet surfers in some for the Center for the Study of newscast would have destroyed Regis’s cultures continue to appreciate reading Chinese Military Afffairs credibility. Indeed, the newsman’s follow- detailed articles, and scholars and policy- Strategic Forum 290 ing on Chatter would have evaporated on makers in most societies expect access to Posing Problems Without an its own without the need for a control- open forums where thoughtful discourse Alliance: China-Iran Relations after ler’s heavy hand. is not restricted to a 120-character post. the Nuclear Deal During the Cold War, for example, Voice by Joel Wuthnow Worthy Training Tools of America found that its audience in the China is In future exercises, simulation control- Soviet Union overwhelmingly favored poised to lers and commanders must allow social lengthy monologues on U.S. foreign increase eco- media to play out naturally. Control- policy read by American broadcasters. In nomic and lers would never delete “Red Air” Latin America, on the other hand, regular diplomatic from a simulation if the air component listeners to the Voice preferred short cooperation command failed to gain air superiority news updates that they could listen to at a with Iran as prior to the ground forces crossing the cafe during a midday coffee break. a result of line of departure. Rather, the ground A final consideration for IO planners sanctions commander would have to face the will be to ensure that they understand the relief under dangers of enemy aircraft targeting his time required for higher headquarters to the recent Iran nuclear deal, though troops and vehicles as he maneuvered approve Military Information Support a close geopolitical alignment toward an objective. Likewise, com- Operations messages for dissemination, between the two states is unlikely. manders cannot pretend that trends as well as themes to avoid in such mes- Sino-Iranian relations will remain on social media are merely white noise sages. During a unilateral mission, U.S. limited by several enduring con- during an operation, for they could planners serve under a single chain of straints, including China’s desire directly affect the alliance’s lines of command that may make it easier to gain for positive ties with other states, effort. The information dimension of approval for new message nominations its pursuit of energy diversification, warfare must be mastered by developing in a matter of hours. But multinational and its need for regional stability. a following of inquisitive international operations may require the approval of Renewed Chinese arms sales to Iran observers and host-nation friends on messages through separate national com- could constitute an emerging chal- social media platforms who seek on their mand authorities that could easily delay lenge for the United States. This own to navigate around the white noise. the approval of new messages for days. could increase Iran’s antiaccess/ It would be optimal to contract with Not only might messages in support of area-denial threat to U.S. military a marketing or public relations firm to NATO operations require the approval forces and create proliferation risks. play the opposing force and host-nation of the North Atlantic Council, but also U.S. officials should press Chinese population on social media. A tech-savvy individual nations might reserve the right interlocutors to avoid exporting business would present PAOs and IO to review them independently. Factoring advanced weapons, which could officers with the most sophisticated in- a realistic review process into an IO plan- embolden Iran to conduct a more formation environment based on current ning timeline could encourage officers brazen foreign policy that would online trends. During the exercise’s train- to nominate messages and themes early threaten China’s fundamental need up and after action review process, the in the operations cycle and to formulate for regional stability. civilian experts could also coach PAOs memoranda of understanding to expedite and IO officers responsible for develop- the approval process for new messages ing a headquarters’ official social media during current operations. Such advanced messages. Although a costly investment, considerations could empower PAOs this approach would prevent participants and IO officers whose responsibilities from leaving an exercise with a false sense remain essential to proactively shaping the of bravado about their ability to shape an information environment before another information environment of only several @RegisKT befuddles a friendly headquar- hundred profiles. ters through his social media popularity While the experience during exer- and mistruths. JFQ Visit the NDU Press Web site for cise Trident Juncture made Facepage more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu seem irrelevant for advancing NATO’s

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Tomlin 67 Soldiers of Chinese People’s Liberation Army 1st Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division, July 12, 2011 (DOD/Chad J. McNeeley)

China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA Organizational Reforms

by Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow

n the past few months, China has transformation of PLA institutions, Major Organizational Reforms announced a series of major reforms force structure, and policy that will be Prior to the reforms, the PLA’s organi- to the organizational structure of the ongoing through 2020. In pursuing I zation was based on a model imported People’s Liberation Army (PLA): the these reforms, China’s leaders hope from the Soviet Union in the early Central Military Commission (CMC) both to tighten central political control 1950s.1 Its three main pillars included has been revamped, the four general over a force that was seen as increas- the following: (1) three services (army, departments dissolved, new service ingly corrupt and to build the PLA into navy, and air force) and the Second headquarters created, and five new a credible joint warfighting entity. Yet Artillery Force (SAF), an independent theater commands established in place important obstacles remain, and it may branch responsible for China’s con- of the seven military regions (MRs). be years before the implications of these ventional and nuclear missiles; (2) four These changes are part of a sweeping reforms come into full view. general departments—General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), General Logistics Dr. Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs (CSCMA), Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. Dr. Joel Wuthnow is a Department (GLD), and General Arma- Research Fellow in CSCMA. ments Department (GAD); and (3)

68 Features / China’s Goldwater-Nichols? JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 seven geographic MRs, listed in pro- Figure 1. PLA Structure Prior to Reform tocol order: Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Lanzhou, with subsidiary units drawn CCP Politburo State Council from the services. The CMC stood atop Central Military Commission (Chairman, Vice Chairmen, these pillars and exercised the highest Members) command authority in the PLA.2 This structure is depicted in figure 1. Over the years, the PLA made only CMC Subsidiary Organs General Office Ministry of incremental changes to this system. Past Discipline Inspection Commission National Defense reforms revised the MR system (most Audit Bureau recently in 1985), created new general departments (the GAD in 1998), and added an independent branch (the SAF in 1966).3 Yet due in part to bureau- General Staff General Political General Logistics General Armaments cratic resistance to more comprehensive Department Department Department Department changes, the PLA remained a fundamen- tally ground force–centric organization that lent itself to single-service opera- PLA Second tions. A key weakness was an outdated PLA Navy Military Regions PLA Air Force Artillery command and control (C2) structure in Headquarters Shenyang Headquarters Headquarters which the services, rather than theater Beijing Lanzhou commanders, possessed operational au- Jinan thority during peacetime. This hindered Nanjing the development of a force capable of Guangzhou Chengdu conducting modern joint operations. In late 2015 and early 2016, CMC chairman and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping Ground Forces Fleets Air Forces Missile Forces announced the most wide-ranging re- structuring of the PLA since 1949. The reforms included the following changes to the PLA’s three main organizational extensive portfolio was dispersed among commands (战区),8 listed in protocol pillars (see figure 2).4 several new CMC departments. Its core order: the Eastern, Southern, Western, Service Reforms. On December 31, C2 function was transferred to a new Northern, and Central theaters.9 These 2015, Xi announced three changes to the Joint Staff Department (JSD), while its commands are headquartered in Nanjing, services: (1) establishment of national- sub-departments responsible for training, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Shenyang, and and theater-level headquarters for the , and strategic planning each Beijing, respectively.10 The theaters are ground forces, which previously had been became first-level departments directly aligned against land and, where applica- collectively led and administered by the under the CMC. The GPD, GLD, and ble, maritime security challenges in their general departments; (2) elevation of the GAD became the CMC Political Work, respective geographic areas; for instance, SAF to the status of a full-fledged service Logistics Support, and Equipment the Eastern Theater Command covers the renamed the PLA Rocket Force; and (3) Development departments, respectively. Taiwan Strait and East China Sea, while establishment of a new Strategic Support The GPD’s law enforcement functions the Southern Theater Command covers Force (SSF), whose missions likely include were transferred to a new CMC Political the South China Sea.11 As with the MRs, operations in the “information domain,” and Legal Affairs Commission, while its theaters have subordinate units drawn including space, cyber, and electronic war- oversight of party discipline in the PLA from the individual services. fare activities.5 The SSF is not a service per moved to a strengthened CMC Discipline se, but rather an independent force along Inspection Commission. The GAD’s China’s Goldwater-Nichols? the same lines as the former SAF.6 Science and Technology Commission, The reforms affected not only individual CMC Reforms. On January 11, responsible for defense innovation, was organizations but also the lines of 2016, Xi revealed that the general depart- placed under direct CMC oversight.7 authority connecting the PLA’s major ments had been replaced by a new CMC Theater Reforms. On February components. Chinese sources describe structure comprised of 15 departments, 1, 2016, Xi announced that the MRs the revised division of labor with the offices, and commissions. The GSD’s had been replaced by five new theater following formula: the CMC and its

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Saunders and Wuthnow 69 Figure 2. PLA Structure after Reform or the Indian Ocean) will apparently be centrally directed by the JSD in Beijing.17 Second, the PLA retains the CMC as its CCP Politburo State Council highest decisionmaking body and does Central Military Commission not have a U.S.-style commander in chief (Chairman, Vice Chairmen, Members) equivalent. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the reforms have strengthened Xi Jinping’s role within the CMC (under CMC Subsidiary Organs what is being labeled a “CMC chairman General Office Ministry of Joint Staff Dept. National Defense responsibility system”). Third, the PLA Political Work Dept. remains a Leninist military whose primary Logistics Support Dept. responsibility is defending CCP rule. Equipment Development Dept. Strategic Training Management Dept. Unlike the U.S. military, where unit com- Support Nat’l Def. Mobilization Dept. manders exercise sole authority, the PLA Discipline Inspection Commission Force Political & Legal Aff. Commission retains political commissars and party Science & Tech. Commission committees that are supposed to play Strategic Planning Office a role in all key decisions. Given these Reform & Organization Office Support to Int. Military Cooperation Office Theater Commands differences, the new PLA C2 structure Audit Bureau might best be described as Goldwater- Organ Affairs Gen. Management Bureau Nichols with Chinese characteristics.

The Broader Military Theater Commands PLA Rocket PLA Army PLA Navy PLA Air Force Reform Agenda Eastern Force Headquarters Headquarters Headquarters Southern Headquarters The PLA’s organizational restructuring Western is only one piece of a broader trans- Service Northern Nuclear forces Headquarters: formation of the PLA being pursued Central still report Administrative directly to CMC under Xi Jinping. The current round of but not Operational PLA reforms was launched at the Third Control Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013, in which the party elite adopted a sweeping program of national 18 Ground Forces Fleets Air Forces Missile Forces reform. Military reforms were dis- cussed as an integral part of the overall reform program, with advocates arguing that China could not achieve prosper- subsidiary departments will provide Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.14 ity without a strong military. However, overall management, the theaters will This act resulted in a C2 structure for the building a strong military would require focus on operations, and the services U.S. military in which authority flows from several fundamental changes, including will manage force building (军委管总、 the President and Secretary of Defense to to the PLA’s size, structure, human 战区主战、军种主建).12 In effect, the the commanders of the regional unified resource policies, professional military PLA will have two distinct chains of combatant commands, who lead joint education (PME) system, budgeting command: an operational chain passing forces within their respective theaters.15 processes, and defense industrial base. In from the CMC to the theaters to the Service chiefs were given an advisory role, short, the party decided that the PLA’s troops, and an administrative chain with responsibilities to “organize, train, “software” needed to be updated. flowing from the CMC to the service and equip” troops. This bifurcation of After the Third Plenum, the PLA set headquarters to the troops.13 authority appears similar to the evolving about crafting a specific reform plan. This The nature of the reforms suggests PLA distinction between operational and process was led by a CMC military reform that the PLA is moving toward a more administrative chains of command.16 leading small group chaired by Xi Jinping. modular, U.S.-style C2 arrangement in Nevertheless, the new PLA C2 system Intellectually, PLA analysts from organi- which operational commanders develop has some key differences with the U.S. zations such as the Academy of Military force packages from units that are trained system. First, unlike the U.S. combat- Sciences and National Defense University and equipped by the services. In particular, ant commands, which span the globe, studied lessons from Chinese history and the PLA restructuring has drawn com- the theaters cover territory only within assessed how foreign militaries, especially parisons to the U.S. military following China. Operations far beyond China’s the U.S. and Russian armed forces, are or- the Goldwater-Nichols Department of borders (such as those in the Middle East ganized for modern warfare.19 Politically,

70 Features / China’s Goldwater-Nichols? JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Chinese troops during military parade marking 70th anniversary of victory of “Chinese People’s Resistance against Japanese Aggression and World Anti-Fascist War” at Tiananmen Square, Beijing, September 3, 2015 (EPA/Wu Hong)

the PLA carried out a major propaganda Changes will also be made to the active a means of rebuilding the party’s image offensive to cultivate a reform mindset duty, reserve, , and People’s Armed and a weapon against opponents. Since among rank-and-file PLA personnel.20 An Police force structure. Other changes Xi assumed office, there has been a drum- anti-corruption campaign was also under will involve PME reforms, new personnel beat of stories stressing the need for the way within the PLA, targeting both senior policies, and new military laws, rules, and party to exercise “absolute leadership” and more junior officers (known colloqui- regulations.23 The reforms are slated for over the military; this was a major theme ally as “tigers” and “flies”). This latter completion in 2020. The table repro- at the October 2014 PLA Political Work effort served to put the PLA on notice duces the PLA’s reform agenda. Conference at Gutian.24 Reiteration of that resistance to reform would not be this principle suggests continued leader- tolerated. Reasons for Reform ship concerns about control over the A reform plan was ultimately agreed The PLA restructuring can be under- military. The anti-corruption campaign on at a CMC reform work meeting in stood as the product of two basic con- within the PLA has implicated a num- November 2015 and codified in a CMC siderations: the need to tighten political ber of senior officers, including former document published on January 1, 2016, control over the PLA, and the impera- CMC vice chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo titled “CMC Opinions on Deepening tive to enhance the military’s ability to Boxiong, both of whom were expelled National Defense and Military carry out modern joint operations. from the party. Stories have circulated Reforms.”21 The document makes clear Tightening Political Control. The from Chinese military sources indicating that the PLA’s organizational changes main political drivers of the reforms are that Hu Jintao was a “figurehead” who are only the first steps in a 5-year reform the desire to tighten civilian political never succeeded in establishing full au- agenda. The next step is a downsizing control over the PLA and the need to thority over the military, and that Xu and (announced in September 2015) that deal with rampant corruption inside the Guo had used their positions to isolate will reduce the force from 2.3 million military, including in the promotion sys- Hu from decisions and to accept massive to 2 million members. This will likely tem. These reflect Xi’s general tendency bribes in exchange for promotions.25 disproportionately affect the ground toward centralizing authority and his use The need to strengthen party con- forces and noncombat personnel.22 of the anti-corruption campaign as both trol and tackle corruption in the PLA is

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Saunders and Wuthnow 71 Table. PLA Reform Agenda, 2015–2020 command right of the military are concen- Reform Area (English) Reform Area (Chinese) Topics Target Date trated in the [Communist Party of China] Reform Central Military Committee Central Committee and in the Central Leadership departments, military services, Military Commission.28 领导管理体制 2015* Management System logistics system, equipment development system The “CMC chairmanship responsi- Establish two-level joint command Joint Command and bility system” is distinguished from the 联合作战指挥体制 system, reform joint training, 2015† Control System establish theater commands so-called CMC vice chairman responsibil- Reduce force size by 300,000, ity system allegedly practiced under Jiang Military Scale reducing noncombat personnel, and Hu, where many routine duties were 军队规模结构 2016‡ Structure reduce officer billets, phase out old handled by the CMC vice chairmen.29 In equipment contrast, “all significant issues in national Adjust force structure, optimize Force Composition 部队编成 2016 defense and army building [are] planned reserve force, reduce and decided by the CMC chairman,” and Cultivating New-Type Enhance professional military 新型军事人才培养 2016 “once the decision has been made, the Military Talent education chairman conducts ‘concentrated unified People’s Armed Police Adjust People’s Armed Police command and control 武装警察部队指挥管 leadership’ and ‘efficient command’ of command and control and force 2016 system and force 理体制和力量结构 the entire military.”30 structure composition A second element in the reforms is Reform personnel system, budget to eliminate the general departments Policy System 政策制度 management and procurement 2017–2020 and move most of their functions to system, salary and welfare system the CMC. This change is intended to Developing Civil- Enhance management of civilian- 军民融合发展 2017–2020 reduce the autonomy of the heads of the Military Integration military integration departments and make them directly ac- Reform military regulations and No Date Military Legal System 军事法治体系 military justice system Provided countable to the CMC chairman. A third element in the reforms is to *Although the “Opinions” states that changes to the leadership management system were move a number of supervision mechanisms completed in 2015, the Central Military Commission (CMC) reforms were not announced until the second week in January 2016. See “CMC Opinions on Deepening National Defense and Military such as auditing and discipline inspection Reforms,” Xinhua, January 1, 2016. to the CMC level, where they can be †Reforms to the two-tiered joint command system, composed of the CMC and theater commands, more independent of potential “command were not announced until January and February 2016, respectively. influence” and thus more effective. Until ‡Although the CMC reform outline lists 2016 as the completion date for the downsizing, a PLA November 2014, the Audit Bureau was spokesman has stated that it would be complete by the end of 2017. See “China to Cut 300,000 Troops by 2017,” Xinhua, September 4, 2015. under the GLD, which was responsible for most PLA expenditure (and was one of the most corrupt parts of the system).31 The clear, but the means of rectifying these system and auditors) or ineffective (party CMC Discipline Inspection Commission problems depend on the diagnosis of committees and military courts). will enforce party discipline by sending their root causes. One problem was in- This diagnosis of root causes explains investigation teams to party units through- adequate supervision of the PLA by top a number of political aspects of the re- out the PLA. The commission should party leaders, with Jiang Zemin to blame forms. Xi has a more assertive leadership have greater independence and authority for elevating corrupt officers such as Xu style than Hu and appears to be much since it will now be a CMC commission and Guo to their positions as CMC vice more successful in exercising authority rather than part of the GPD. In a speech chairmen and Hu at fault for his inability over the PLA.27 But as in other aspects introducing the reforms, Xi stressed the to exercise control over them as CMC of governance, he has emphasized the importance of regulating power within the chairman.26 A second concern is that PLA need for centralizing authority. The first military, stating that “decision-making, political work has been inadequate and “basic principle” in the “CMC Opinions enforcement, and supervision powers party organs within the PLA were inef- on Deepening National Defense and should be separate and distributed in a fective in exercising party control. A third Military Reforms” is: manner that ensures they serve as checks problem is that senior PLA officers at the and balances on each other but also run in CMC, the general departments, and the to consolidate and perfect the basic principles parallel.”32 A PLA expert argued that the military regions had too much power and and system of the Party’s absolute leadership new arrangement would “better safeguard were not always responsive to orders from over the military, . . . comprehensively imple- the authority of discipline inspection and the center. Fourth, the institutional mech- ment the Central Military Commission auditing departments and ensure that they anisms of supervising the PLA were either chairmanship responsibility system, and can independently and fairly exercise their corrupted (in the case of the promotion ensure that the supreme leadership right and supervision duties.”33

72 Features / China’s Goldwater-Nichols? JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Another element of the reforms is from the United States and regional over naval fleets and MR air forces (which, to increase the reliance on formal laws antagonists, such as Japan, Vietnam, and in theory, would have been transferred and regulations that specify how military the Philippines, especially along China’s to joint commanders during wartime). leaders should carry out their work. This maritime periphery. These develop- This authority now rests with the the- is described as a shift toward more stan- ments meant that China would need to aters. In addition, conventional missile dardized and systematic work methods improve its ability to conduct high-end forces under the Rocket Force—which that reduce a commander’s autonomy joint operations in multiple domains, in- were previously centrally controlled by (and the resulting potential for arbitrary cluding by establishing a permanent joint the CMC—are now under the author- or corrupt decisions) and produce “ad- C2 mechanism.39 ity of the theaters.45 This allows theater ministration according to the law.” This The organizational reforms promote commanders to integrate conventional effort will be supported by the establish- joint warfighting in several ways. First, by precision-strike missiles into joint opera- ment of a Political and Legal Affairs establishing a “two-level joint operational tions, such as island-landing campaigns Commission at the CMC level, which will command system” with decisionmaking or counter-intervention operations. promulgate regulations and oversee the nodes at the CMC and theater levels.40 Commanders will also likely be able to military court system.34 This C2 system will operate in both draw on SSF units responsible for space, Enhancing Joint Operations. A sec- peacetime and wartime, giving China cyber, and electronic warfare operations. ond consideration driving the reforms is an ability to quickly transition to a “war the desire to increase the PLA’s ability to footing” when needed.41 One innova- Implications and Obstacles carry out joint operations on a modern, tion is the creation of joint operations In the near term, the reforms are high-tech battlefield. This has long been command centers both in Beijing (man- bound to create some degree of organi- a goal for Chinese military planners, who aged by the JSD) and within each of the zational disruption, as new operational were inspired initially by the U.S. military’s five theaters. These centers have several and administrative relationships are successful joint operations during the first roles, including developing operational established, new commanders assume Gulf War.35 The PLA subsequently devel- plans, carrying out 24/7 watch func- responsibility, and PLA personnel seek oped joint campaign doctrine, created a tions, maintaining situational awareness, to understand where they fit in the joint logistics system, and conducted an managing joint exercises, and providing new structure and what their duties increasing number of cross-service exer- a communications hub linking theater will be. A further complication will be cises.36 However, PLA analysts contend commanders with service component implementation of the force reduction, that the absence of a permanent joint C2 commanders and combat units.42 which will require the Chinese gov- mechanism, combined with the continu- Second, the reforms enhance joint ernment to find new employment for ing dominance of the ground forces, has operations by creating separate na- more than 10 percent of current service stunted progress toward achieving a true tional- and theater-level ground force members.46 Although the PLA will have joint warfighting capability.37 Xi Jinping headquarters. This means that CMC to continue to respond to perceived himself noted, in 2013, that establishing a departments and theaters—divested of security threats, it may spend the next joint C2 system should be given “primary responsibility for army affairs—are fully few years focused inward, putting the importance,” explaining that “we have “joint” organizations, staffed by what in reforms into practice. If this is the case, given much consideration to joint C2, but the U.S. system would be considered as we might expect to see less appetite fundamental problems remain . . . estab- “purple-hatted” officers. Chinese media within the PLA for outward-focused, lishing a CMC and theater command joint sources note, for instance, that the PLA’s risk-acceptant behavior. C2 system requires urgency and should new joint operations command centers Over the longer term, however, the not be delayed.”38 are staffed by personnel drawn from all PLA reforms could result in a leaner, Changes in the PLA’s assessment of the services.43 Nevertheless, in the near more effective warfighting organization. the operational and strategic environ- term, the dominance of the ground The creation of a permanent joint C2 ment strengthened the case for greater forces is likely to remain as senior CMC structure, in addition to other changes— jointness. China’s 2015 defense white and theater command positions remain such as more realistic, combat-oriented paper, titled China’s Military Strategy, filled by army officers.44 A test of China’s training, tighter control of PLA finances, noted that the PLA needs to be able to ability to move toward a more effective stronger PME, a dedicated SSF respon- fight and win “informationized local joint system will be its ability to rotate sible for electronic warfare and operations wars” (信息化局部战争), referring to navy, air force, and rocket force officers in the space and cyber domains, a force the evolving nature of modern warfare into joint command positions. structure that places more emphasis on featuring, among other things, a greater Third, the reforms facilitate joint naval and aerospace forces, and anticipated emphasis on cyber and space opera- warfighting by placing forces from all the advances in long-range precision strike tions, and on long-range precision-strike services at the disposal of theater com- and other capabilities—could all give the systems. The white paper also described manders. Previously, service headquarters PLA more confidence and capacity to exe- growing external security challenges exercised peacetime operational control cute joint operations in multiple domains.

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Saunders and Wuthnow 73 This could create new and more complex Given the potential obstacles, as well as including battle zones, war zones, and strategic regions. This paper adopts the term theater challenges for U.S. and allied forces oper- significant lingering uncertainties about the commands to follow the terminology used in au- ating in the Asia-Pacific region. reforms, it is far too soon to make any con- thoritative People’s Republic of China English- However, there are also several rea- clusive judgment about the likely impact of language media. sons to question the positive impact of the reorganization on PLA operational ef- 9 “China’s Military Regrouped into Five the reforms on PLA operational effective- fectiveness. Moreover, as David Finkelstein PLA Theater Commands,” Xinhua, February 1, 2016, available at . joint war-fighting. Potential obstacles may not be known until far beyond the 10 “Army Adjustment and Establishment could include the following: formal completion date of 2020.49 This Completed in Five Theater Commands,” PLA should not be surprising, as the U.S. Daily, February 4, 2016, available at . the three decades following Goldwater- 11 predominantly by ground force “Experts: The Five PLA Theater Com- Nichols. Current PLA reforms are likewise mands Have Clear Goals, With the South- officers. This introduces the problem part of a long-term generational process east Coastal Front Being the Key Link of that army perspectives, interests, 专家:五大战 that has no real end point. JFQ Future Military Operations” [ and biases may continue to frustrate 区目标清晰 东南沿海是作战重点], Global efforts to build a genuinely joint Times [环球时报], February 2, 2016, avail- force. Much will depend on the able at . PLA’s ability to foster jointness in the 12 “CMC Opinions on Deepening National force through means such as joint 1 For a discussion, see David Shambaugh, Defense and Military Reforms” [中央军委关于 PME, joint billets, and rotational Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, 深化国防和军队改革的意见], Xinhua, January assignments between the services. and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California 1, 2016, available at . 2 For an overview, see Kenneth W. Allen, “In- 13 “Army Adjustment and Establishment modern joint force, competition for troduction to the PLA’s Organizational Reforms: Completed in Five Theater Commands,” PLA resources and influence might con- 2000–2012,” in The PLA as Organization v2.0, Daily, February 4, 2016, available at . “Introduction to the PLA’s Administrative 14 Finkelstein, 18. For a discussion of the growth continues to slow, placing a and Operational Structure,” in The PLA as contents and impact of the Goldwater-Nichols premium on access to scarce budget- Organization, Reference Volume v1.0, ed. James Act on the U.S. military, see James R. Locher ary resources. C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (Santa III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” Joint •• Lack of combat experience. China Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 1–44. Force Quarterly 13 (Fall 1996), 10–16; and 4 has taken several necessary steps For excellent initial analysis of the reforms, James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The see David M. Finkelstein, Initial Thoughts on Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (Col- toward a credible joint warfighting the Reorganization and Reform of the PLA (Ar- lege Station: Texas A&M University, 2002). capability, including developing joint lington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2015), 15 For the formal delineation of responsibili- doctrine, conducting joint exercises, available at ; and Kenneth W. Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, ture. However, lack of experience in Allen, Dennis J. Blasko, and John F. Corbett, DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013), available Jr., “The PLA’s New Organizational Structure: at . undertaking real-world joint combat What Is Known, Unknown, and Speculation See especially II-9, which defines the operational operations could hamper the PLA’s (Part 1),” China Brief 16, no. 3 (February and administrative command relationships in the ability to field a strong joint force.48 4, 2016), available at . C2 structure. See, for example, Xu Sanfei, CMC (which is technically an organ 5 “Expert: PLA Strategic Support Force “Seizing Opportunities to Speed the Pace of of the CCP Central Committee), a Key to Win Wars,” PLA Daily, January 6, Reforms Affects the Development and Future of political commissars, and Party com- 2016, available at . 28, 2014, available at . the “absolute leadership” of the 7 “China Reshuffles Military Headquar- This article consists of an interview with PLA party. The need for Party consulta- ters,” Xinhua, January 11, 2016, available at Academy of Military Sciences president General tion and unity could reduce the flexi- . Strategic Preparations Must the PLA Take in a 8 The Chinese term zhanqu (战区) has Period of Transition” [转型期中国军队要做哪 especially at the operational level. several possible English-language translations, 些战略准备], National Defense Reference [国防

74 Features / China’s Goldwater-Nichols? JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 参考], October 27, 2015, available at . Senior Colonel Wang is deputy director of news.singtao.ca/toronto/2015-03-10/ departments was increasingly “unconducive” to the PLA National Defense University’s Strategic world1425970399d5474726.html>. establishing a joint C2 structure. See Science of Research Department. 26 In addition to the stories cited above, Chi- Military Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: Academy of 17 “PLA Sets Up Overseas Operations Office nese press reports claimed that Hu Jintao rarely , 2013), 201. to Strengthen Overseas Rapid Reaction,” PLA visited his CMC office, in contrast to Xi Jinping, 38 “Xi Jinping: Build a Modern Military Daily, March 25, 2015, available at . The Different Styles of Jiang, Hu, and Xi,” in available at . The article provides quotes from Xi’s nhua, November 15, 2013, available at . 28 “CMC Opinions on Deepening National 39 China’s Military Strategy [中国军事战 19 For details, see David Liebenberg and Joel Defense and Military Reforms.” 略], PRC State Council Information Office, Wuthnow, “Navigating the Dangerous Shoals: 29 Sun Chiaye [孫嘉業], “Who Is Responsible May 2015, available at . Military Reform,” paper presented at the 2014 委誰負責?], Ming Pao [明報], January 29, 2015, 40 Ibid. CAPS-RAND-NDU PLA conference, Arlington, cited in James Mulvenon, “The Yuan Stops Here: 41 “Zhang Junshe: Creating New Theaters VA, November 22, 2014. Xi Jinping and the ‘CMC Chairman Responsibil- Better Protects National Sovereignty” [张军 20 For instance, in August 2014, the PLA ity System,’” China Leadership Monitor, no. 47 社: 重新划设战区可更好维护国家主权], China released a circular to all personnel encouraging (Summer 2015), available at . at . Senior Consciously Dedicate Oneself to Reform” [坚 31 Minnie Chan, “Xi Jinping Shifts Control Zhang is vice president of the PLA Naval Re- 决拥护改革积极支持改革自觉投身改革], PLA of PLA Audit Office to Military’s Top Decision- search Institute. Daily [解放军报], August 11, 2014, available at making Body,” South China Morning Post, 42 “Starting with a New Style Under Flut- . com/news/china/article/1633802/xi-jinping- New Theater Commands” [开局新风起 猎猎 21 “CMC Opinions on Deepening National shifts-control-pla-audit-office-militarys-top- 战旗红—东南西北中五战区成立伊始见闻新 Defense and Military Reforms.” decision-making>. 华网], Xinhua, February 2, 2016, available at 22 For a discussion of previous force reduc- 32 “Xi Urges Breakthrough in Military Struc- . PLA’s Organizational Reforms,” 34. available at . 44 “China’s Military Regrouped Into Five of “regularization” (正规化). For an overview, 33 “Military Experts Interpret National PLA Theater Commands,” Xinhua, February 1, see Thomas A. Bickford, “Regularization and Defense and Military Reforms” [军事专家解读 2016, available at . Survey 40, no. 3 (May–June 2000), 456–474. available at . direct CMC supervision. Over Army,” Xinhua, November 1, 2014, 34 “CMC Opinions on Deepening National 46 To be sure, the Chinese government available at . Also see James Mulvenon, “Hotel Gulf Wars,” in Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ enterprises to provide employment for ex-PLA Gutian: We Haven’t Had That Spirit Here Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy personnel. “State-Owned Enterprises Not Since 1929,” China Leadership Monitor, no. Kamphausen (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Allowed to Refuse Veterans,” PLA Daily, De- 46 (Winter 2015), available at . al., Institutional Changes of the Chinese People’s news/2015-12/29/content_6835935.htm>. 25 Cheng Li, “Promoting ‘Young Guards’: Liberation Army: Overview and Challenges (Al- However, this requirement will conflict with The Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leader- exandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2002); efforts to run most state-owned enterprises on a ship,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 48 (Fall Dean Cheng, “Zhanyixue and Joint Campaigns,” commercial basis, and is likely to be resisted. 2015), available at ; Min- James Mulvenon and David M. Finkelstein Huntington, “Interservice Competition and the nie Chan, “Hu Jintao’s Weak Grip on China’s (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, Political Roles of the Armed Services,” Ameri- Army Inspired President Xi Jinping’s Military 2005); and Mark Cozad, “PLA Joint Train- can Political Science Review 55, no. 1 (March Shake-Up,” South China Morning Post, March ing and Implications for Future Expeditionary 1961), 40–52. 11, 2015, available at ; “Major General Broke the News: Xu content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/ China, ed. Andrew Scobell et al. (Washington, Caihou Went Over the Head of Hu Jintao to CT451/RAND_CT451.pdf>. DC: NDU Press, 2015), 1–4. Sell a Military Region Command for Twenty 37 The 2013 edition of the Academy of Mili- 49 Finkelstein, 18. Million” [少將爆料:架空胡錦濤 徐才厚標價 tary Science’s doctrinal teaching volume Science

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Saunders and Wuthnow 75 French soldiers with French Foreign Legion’s 6th Light Armored Brigade assault objective during bilateral seize-and-capture training exercise with U.S. Marines on Quartier Colonel de Chabrieres, , May 29, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Christopher Mendoza)

What It Means to Be Expeditionary A Look at the French Army in Africa

By Michael Shurkin

ormer U.S. Army Chief of Staff well as more scalable, tailorable, and also evoked the imperative of having an General Raymond Odierno regionally aligned. General Odierno’s “expeditionary Army.”2 What, however, F elaborated a vision for the Ser- successor and the current Army Chief do these terms mean? What would it vice’s future that left many questions of Staff, General Mark Milley, similarly take for the Army to realize the gener- unanswered. Specifically, he called for has spoken of the need for the Army als’ vision, and what, if any, are the the Army to be more expeditionary as to be “agile,” “adaptive,” and “expedi- associated risks? tionary,” and to have an “expeditionary A recently published RAND study mindset.”1 Lieutenant General Gustave of French army operations in Mali in Michael Shurkin is a Senior Political Scientist at Perna, writing in the March–April 2013 noted that in many ways, France’s the RAND Corporation. 2016 issue of Army Sustainment, has army epitomizes the characteristics

76 Features / A Look at the French Army in Africa JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 General Odierno and General Milley have Among other capabilities, Odierno rapidly shape conditions in the operational highlighted. It is a living example of a called on the Army to be the following: area, and operate immediately on arrival technologically sophisticated force that exploiting success and consolidating tacti- capable of task organizing at increas- checks all of the generals’ boxes; it does •• cal and operational gains. Expeditionary ingly lower levels to execute “small well precisely the things the generals call capabilities are more than physical at- footprint” operations on the U.S. Army to do. Studying how tributes; they begin with a mindset that capable of rapidly deploying scal- the French army has organized itself and •• pervades the force.7 able force packages, with the smaller operates provides insight into what their packages capable of rapidly reas- ideals might mean in concrete terms for The U.S. Army Training and sembling into larger formations as the U.S. Army and the associated ben- Doctrine Command’s 2015 pamphlet required efits—but also the implied compromises The U.S. Army Operating Concept: oriented to stress small-unit leader- and risks U.S. planners need to consider. •• Win in a Complex World, which bears ship that thrives in an environ- When comparing the strengths of the Odierno’s signature and reflects the ment of dispersed, decentralized French and U.S. armies, it must be ac- Future Force 2025 project, builds on the operations knowledged that there is little the French above by adding scalability, tailorability, aligned regionally so that operating can do that the ever-adaptable U.S. Army •• and the ability to manage in austere envi- units are familiar with local cultures, cannot. However, the Army’s general- ronments. It defines expeditionary as “the personalities, and conditions. purpose forces arguably are not designed ability to deploy task-organized forces on and organized to deploy and fight on a Odierno’s priorities later found ex- short notice to austere locations, capable small scale (at the brigade level or below), pression in the “Army 2025” concept. of conducting operations immediately and the Army normally does not create According to a white paper published in upon arrival.”8 The pamphlet also adds company- and battalion-size units from January 2014, the Army has to “operate a new term, expeditionary maneuver, multiple parent organizations, something differently.” It has to operate “decentral- defined as “the rapid deployment of task the French do routinely. There is usu- ized, distributed, and integrated.” It also organized combined arms forces able to ally a cost incurred when organizations must be “mission tailored,” with units transition quickly and conduct operations do things they are not designed to do.3 organized with the “capabilities needed of sufficient scale and ample duration American planners, moreover, appear for a specific mission and environment.” to achieve strategic objectives, aims to to have different understandings of Units also must be “engaged regionally.” turn the enemy out of prepared posi- what constitutes “enough” in terms of At the top of the agenda, however, is a tions or envelop forces from unexpected force protection, vehicle protection, revised force design featuring “optimized directions.”9 capabilities, and so forth.4 The French, combat units (BCT [Brigade Combat Turning now to the French army, we in contrast, operate on a small scale by Team] 2025)” intended to meet several find that it embodies many of the desired design and doctrine and appear to have objectives, among them being “more attributes mentioned above. Of particular an altogether different understanding of effectively mission tailored” and “region- interest, however, is not the degree to sufficiency. ally aligned.” The Army should have which the French army is expeditionary, “increased expeditionary capability” and but rather what the French example im- Envisioning Expeditionary be a “more expeditionary force” that plies for U.S. Army assumptions, as well In February 2013, General Odierno nonetheless “has retained capability.”6 as the risks involved if it were to become presented his vision of the future in an What the text does not provide is more like the French. article in Foreign Affairs, along with insight into how the force must change to issuing the more official 2013 Army be “more” of in so many ways. The most Operation Serval Strategic Planning Guidance.5 The prominent question, however, remains The French Operation Serval began on Army, he noted, changed as a result of the meaning of the word expeditionary. January 11, 2013, the day after Islamist a decade of operations in Afghanistan The fullest definition dating to just prior militants who had already seized control and Iraq. It needed, in effect, to be to the Future Force 2025 project can over northern Mali began an offensive recentered. The top priority was restor- be found in the 2012 Army Doctrine that threatened the nation’s capital, ing the Army’s conventional capabilities Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land Bamako. France first responded by and retaining its value as a deterrent Operations: committing to the fight special forces associated with its ability to deploy and (SF) assets that were already in the sustain indefinitely large formations Expeditionary capability is the ability region. While the SF focused on stop- capable of defeating any adversary. to promptly deploy combined arms forces ping the offensive and rallying Malian However, for a variety of reasons, the worldwide into any area of operations army defenders, France rushed general- force could not simply revert to what it and conduct operations upon arrival. purpose troops into theater. The first to had been in the 1990s. On the contrary, Expeditionary operations require the arrive—also on January 11—were units it had to be something altogether new. ability to deploy quickly with little notice, flown in from Chad, where they had

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Shurkin 77 been engaged in a long-running opera- proportionately larger support element. ments, and they have no strategic lift tion. Other units drove in from Côte What the French do—and what they of their own. However, the French— d’Ivoire, while still more units began have designed their army to do—is perhaps in light of their weak logistical arriving from France. measure out their forces in small incre- capabilities—arguably have made a By January 15, the French had ments and aim for “just enough.” That virtue of necessity by designing their stopped the militants’ offensive and involves, among other things, the ability forces to deploy and operate on a small begun advancing north to seize control to disaggregate and re-aggregate forma- scale and tailor their forces to meet spe- over the broad strip of land on either side tions on the fly as well as the will to cific needs. of the Niger River, commonly referred to accept a good deal of risk. The French pushed modularity to as the Niger Bend because of the river’s well below the brigade level. They did curving path. The Bend includes north- The Numbers this in the 1990s as part of a number of ern Mali’s most populous towns, Gao Setting aside the unknown number sweeping reforms intended to transform and Timbuktu. The French employed of SF troops who were present in the army from a large -based fast-moving armored columns combined Mali before Serval began, the French continental force designed to fight the with airborne and air-land operations, contingent in Mali—whose north- Soviet Union into a smaller, more expedi- coordinated with SF and with air support ern half alone is roughly the size of tionary force. (By law, the French military from the French air force. The French France—started at zero. Moreover, could not deploy conscripts overseas, took Gao on January 25 and Timbuktu rather than first gathering strength and thereby forcing the army to rely on an 4 days later. They kept moving quickly, then committing to the field à la Opera- “army within the army” consisting of fully securing distant Kidal—the epicenter of tion Desert Shield, the French fielded volunteer formations that historically had Tuareg militancy—by January 31, and their units as they arrived in theater, a colonial vocation. Chief among them Tessalit on February 8. The campaign often company by company, platoon by are the Foreign Legion and the “Troupes climaxed in February and March as platoon. For example, the first non-SF de Marine,” or Marines, who in the 19th French and Chadian forces converged on group to arrive in Mali was a 200-man century were part of the French Navy.) the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains, where sous-groupement tactique interarmes The French understood that in order to remaining militants made a last stand. (SGTIA), a company-scale combined pack as much capability as possible into a By late spring, the “major combat op- arms task force that was detached from smaller force, that force would have to be erations” phase of Serval was complete. a battalion-size groupement tactique modular and flexible.11 The army dissolved Serval continued on a smaller scale until interarmes (GTIA), or combined arms its divisions in favor of brigades, which it officially came to an end on July 15, task force, operating in Chad. Two days became force providers, and placed regi- 2014, when it was subsumed into a new later, another SGTIA arrived from Côte ments at the center of gravity. The French regional counterterrorism operation, d’Ivoire by road. The largest single for- in 2015 revived its divisions, but opera- Barkhane. Nine French soldiers lost their mation to arrive in Mali as a group was tionally speaking, there is little change, lives fighting in Mali between January 11, a full GTIA of mechanized infantry that and what really matters now as in 2013 2013, and July 15, 2014. reached Dakar, Senegal, by ship, and are the French army’s task-organized and The French in Mali demonstrated then drove the rest of the way. scalable battalion- and company-level task a number of features of interest to this The total force reached roughly 3,400 forces, GTIAs and SGTIAs. article. These include the French army’s by the end of January and 5,300 by the Published French army doctrine approach to task organization, which is end of February. Of those, according to defines GTIAs and SGTIAs as task-or- related to how the French organize their the French military, 1,500 were support ganized combined arms forces designed force; France’s prioritization of mobil- personnel, or 28 percent of the overall to operate autonomously and indepen- ity over protection; the army’s regional force.10 Several experts on U.S. Army op- dently according to their commanders’ alignment; and finally its expeditionary erations consulted for this study indicated intent; the objective is decentralized culture, which relates to all of the above. that a comparable American force (that and distributed operations in keeping is, with comparable capabilities) would with maneuverist doctrine and mission Task Organizing have required a larger logistical tail of ap- command.12 The French in Mali demonstrated an proximately 40 percent, suggesting that SGTIAs and GTIAs have the same ability to tailor their forces, deploying the United States would have had to field structure but are different in terms of relatively small task-oriented forma- a larger force overall. scale. SGTIAs are composed of a core of tions. Although it is difficult to compare four platoons—three infantry and one the French and American armies, in GTIAs and SGTIAs armored, or vice versa—together with our assessment of the French forces The French deploy in small numbers a command element and those support deployed to Mali compared to U.S. in part because they would struggle to elements deemed necessary, often includ- norms, we believe that the Americans do otherwise. Their forces are few and ing some indirect fire capability as well as would have sent a larger force with a are overcommitted to overseas deploy- joint fires coordinators of various possible

78 Features / A Look at the French Army in Africa JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 French soldier sits aboard U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III en route to Mali, where French forces were fighting extremists who took control of much of north of country, January 20, 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Nathanael Callon) types. A captain commands the force. there, which included everything from different formations with different com- GTIAs are larger, composed of four com- indirect fire to human terrain teams. The mand structures on the fly, as the mission panies—three infantry and one armored, GTIAs and SGTIAs in Mali were smaller evolved.13 or vice versa—with a command element and in fact did not comply with the doc- In the case of planned deploy- and those support elements deemed nec- trinally mandated 3/1 structure, reflecting ments, such as those that were slated for essary. A colonel commands. Additional some combination of commanders’ esti- Afghanistan, GTIAs and SGTIAs are platoons or companies can be tacked on mation of the force size required and unit more homogenous with respect to home as needed up until the task force reaches availability. For example, GTIA 3, which regiments and brigades. They also train a limit of eight. In Mali, several GTIAs participated in the Adrar des Ifoghas and deploy together as SGTIAs, cycling operated simultaneously, each with dis- offensive in northern Mali in February through France’s national training centers tinct areas of operation or missions and 2013, consisted of three companies (one as such. In addition, French officers are all under the command of a brigade-level mechanized infantry, one armor, and trained to function in and command headquarters established in theater, led by one engineering). It also had an artillery GTIAs and SGTIAs. Commanding a brigade commander. Thus, the French component consisting of two Caesar SGTIAs, for example, is part of the for- created a provisional Serval brigade. Only self-propelled howitzers and four 120mm mal training for French army captains, some of the forces participating in the op- mortars, communications and electronic which includes working with officers erations, it should be noted, are from the warfare elements, and tactical drones. of other branches to ensure that they brigade commander’s home brigade. The GTIAs and SGTIAs in Mali know enough about how the others do The exact composition of GTIAs often have drawn from a diverse array of their jobs to understand how to work and SGTIAs varies according to mission regiments. They routinely bring soldiers effectively with them. Presumably, col- requirements and the resources at hand. from regular line regiments together with lective and individual training of this sort SGTIAs in Afghanistan reportedly were marines and legionnaires, infantrymen reduces the turbulence that might be as- large and diverse owing to the numerous with cavalry troops, sappers, artiller- sociated with cobbling units together on requirements associated with operating ists, and so forth, structuring them into the fly in response to emergencies.

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Shurkin 79 blindé multi-rôles, or VBMR) and the EBRC, which are due to enter service by 2020, are heavier than the vehicles they are intended to replace and offer greater protection, including add-on armor kits. However, they remain roughly in the Stryker weight class (the VBCI weighs in at 25.6 tons, and the VBMR and EBRC are expected to be lighter or roughly the same). French develop- ers have focused on maintaining their predecessors’ mobility while enhancing their capabilities, primarily by means of technology-enabling networked warfare. The VBCI, VBMR, and EBRC ostensibly will exercise high degrees of situational awareness and fight in close coordination with networked dismounted infantry, other vehicles, artillery, and air support.15 Interestingly, there appears to be a current within the French army that favors lower technology vehicles such as the venerable VAB, AMX-10RC, and ERC-90. For example, Colonel Michel Goya, a leading French military analyst, has argued in the past that perhaps cheaper, simpler weapons would be preferable because their lower cost would Mobility vs. Protection been tested with a 120mm gun, accord- enable the army to invest more in quan- The French army operates a vehicle fleet ing to one report.14 tity and training.16 With regard to Mali, that is well suited for precisely the kinds The French assess that mobility is the French claim to have found that the of operations it conducted in Mali. To more important than protection, and they low-tech nature of the vehicles used there be more specific, France has mechanized gamble that being able to move quickly was a virtue. Most of the French vehicles nearly all of its units, using relatively provides more protection than heavier in Mali—with the notable exception of light, wheeled armored vehicles that can armor. French doctrine emphasizes rapid the VBCI and arguably the Caesar and be transported in C-130s and C-160s as coordinated movements calculated to VBL—are old and slated for replacement well as driven long distances over poor maintain the operational initiative—pre- or at least modernization. The French quality roads and cross country. While cisely the kind of campaign the French now state that their outdated equipment lacking the level of protection of main conducted in Mali. This approach worked proved less delicate and easier to fix in the battle tanks and heavy infantry fighting there, although it is not clear how well field than newer equipment.17 vehicles such as the American Bradley, French armored units would hold up But not everyone was pleased by the the wheeled armor units of the French against a more sophisticated enemy performance of the aging vehicles. The army provide considerable firepower equipped with antitank guided missiles GTIA 3 commander, for example, com- for their weight class, especially when (ATGMs) or other standoff precision mented that the roughly 30-year old VABs compared with the U.S. Stryker. French weapons. We also must wonder if the and AMX-10RCs were “breathing their light tanks, armored personnel carriers, French would make the same tradeoff if last” and that their “performance reached and infantry fighting vehicles (véhi- they had more robust logistical capabili- a level that was at times preoccupying and cule blindé de combat d’infanterie, or ties, including a fleet of C-17s. makes their replacement indispensable VBCI) are equipped with 105mm guns The French nonetheless have doubled for continuing to conduct engagements (AMX-10RC), 90mm guns (ERC 90), down on their commitment to light at this level of difficulty.”18 The problem, and 25mm automatic cannons. The armor as they modernize. The VBCI, however, appears to have been the ve- armored reconnaissance and combat which entered service recently and hicles’ age, not their level of sophistication, vehicle (engin blindé de reconnaissance et has been deployed to Afghanistan, the as has been confirmed by recent reports.19 de combat, or EBRC), slated to replace Central African Republic, and Mali, and Particularly important to the the AMX-10RC within the decade, has the multirole armored vehicle (véhicle French are the relatively light logistical

80 Features / A Look at the French Army in Africa JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 U.S. Airmen and French soldiers load equipment inside U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III in Istres, France, January 21, 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Nathanael Callon) requirements associated with light fighting in the Adrar des Ifoghas moun- that the French had little in the way of wheeled armor. Indeed, given the gener- tains described the operations in terms excess sustainment capacity. Any savings ally poor infrastructure in countries such of “roughing it.” It commented that the such as that which might have come from as Mali and France’s weak logistical capa- army had been in the field for a month using wheeled versus tracked vehicles bilities, anything that reduces the logistics and noted that the logistical support probably helped a great deal. burden is an advantage. was providing water, food, and fuel, but France’s choice of vehicles also gives French logistical capabilities, it otherwise the troops were left to get by its army a degree of flexibility regarding should be made clear, were stretched to as best they could. It was “the price to how it gets its units to the theater of their extreme limits in Serval, even with pay for taking so many people so far in so operations and moves them around once airlift borrowed from allies. The troops little time.”22 Colonel Bertrand Darras, there. Most vehicles arrived in theater that France rushed to Mali initially had who at the time was with the French by air, but a significant portion drove with them only the essentials (in many Ground Forces Command, commented to Mali from points elsewhere in West cases, 3 days’ worth of food and 9 liters that the troops in Mali after a few weeks Africa. As mentioned, some reached Mali of water), and the subsequent focus of in the field resembled “Napoleon’s army by driving from Senegal or Côte d’Ivoire. logistical efforts remained on providing before the Italian campaign” more than Once in theater, the French units the bare essentials (food, water, fuel) as they did a fully equipped modern force had to cover a lot of ground. For ex- troops raced north and east.20 France also because of the condition of their equip- ample, the commander of GTIA 3 in assumed responsibility for sustaining the ment, uniforms, boots, and so on. They Mali boasted that his battalion, during Chadian force; it may well have done the had no air conditioning, showers, or 6 weeks of operations, remained almost same for some of the other African con- toilets, Darras stated, and had trouble entirely “in the zone of operations, near tingents in theater. sleeping because of the heat: “We dis- or in contact with the enemy, without In late March 2013, a leading defense regarded all standards to keep the high returning to base, without technical blogger reported, based on his contacts momentum required to destroy as much pauses, and without conducting repairs.” in the French army, that ground troops of the enemy as we could.”23 He continued, “Each vehicle traveled were just barely keeping their vehicles The statements about Serval contain a 2,500 to 5,000 km” off-road and on dif- in working order.21 A news report of the great deal of bravado, but they make clear ficult terrain.24

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Shurkin 81 French soldier discusses objectives with U.S. Soldier during field training exercise in Arta, Djibouti, March 16, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Kate Thornton)

Regional Expertise loyal to General Haji ag Gamou, whose locally, should be sourced locally. In the The French army is, for all intents and men provided the French with invaluable case of water and fuel, the French literally purposes, a regionally aligned force. help, primarily by scouting and translat- knew whom to call and had pre-existing Setting aside their long colonial experi- ing. Working with ag Gamou’s men did contracts with regional suppliers.25 ence on the continent, the French know not come without risk, however, given Africa well. All French army units rotate that he represents a particular faction Expeditionary Culture through Africa on 4-month “short- within Tuareg society and has a long A less tangible yet significant factor duration missions.” France’s explicitly history of conflict with other Tuareg in French operations in Mali is the expeditionary brigades—that is, the his- notables, particularly ones hailing from expeditionary culture that serves the torically “colonial” units that conduct Kidal and the elite clans of the restive French army well when operating at a the lion’s share of the country’s overseas Kel Adagh confederation. What must small scale with limited resources. This operations—also conduct 2- or 3-year be stressed, though, is that the French might be particularly true of France’s “long-term missions” in Africa. almost certainly knew what they were specifically expeditionary units, most The payoff was evident in Mali, where doing and understood all the pertinent if not all of which historically have the French were able to make up for their ramifications and risks. The French, had an explicitly colonial vocation, own small numbers in part by calling in other words, arrived in Mali already most obviously the marines and the upon regional and local allies, with whom knowing the human terrain and did not Foreign Legion. These, it should be they know how to work effectively. The have to race to get up to speed. stressed, are not SF (although there most obvious example was the 2,250- Another way in which regional exper- are French marine SF regiments as well man Chadian contingent, which played tise paid off was France’s ability to rely on as commando-qualified legionnaires) an important role in some of the most regional bottled-water suppliers (pre-cer- but rather general-purpose forces with intense fighting in the campaign. Also of tified by the French health service) and a long-standing expeditionary mission note is the French army’s work with the fuel providers. The French operate with and outlook. Since the reforms of the Tuareg contingent in the Malian army the rule that whatever can be sourced 1990s, however, this expeditionary

82 Features / A Look at the French Army in Africa JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 culture is also apparently true of the his- have become familiar in Afghanistan. ties a luxury. Thus, it operated in Mali torically continentally focused regiments According to a French marine who had at or beyond the limits of its sustain- that now share responsibility for over- been involved in Serval, for example, ment capabilities with a force structure, seas deployments and rotate through the U.S. Army can fight “properly” in vehicles, and other elements carefully Africa alongside the former colonials the sense that it can think in terms of and optimistically calculated to be and distinguished themselves in Opera- going about an operation the best way. little more than sufficient: just enough tion Serval. In contrast, he stated, the French army troops, just enough force protection, Among the aspects of colonial opera- sees itself as having to make the best of just enough helicopters, just enough tions that arguably have some relevance whatever resources may be available. vehicles with just enough capabilities, for today is the small size of French Thus, he explained, planning for Serval and so forth. deployments, the degree of autonomy was an exercise in thinking through what According to the French senate, for that unit commanders exercised, the high was and was not available and coming to example, the VABs and VBCIs used degree of risk they accepted, and their terms with the associated risk. in Mali were not equipped to counter interest in leveraging local knowledge. Goya carried the argument further improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for French colonial forces were invariably and defined the American approach to the simple reason that those that were small and relatively ill resourced, reflect- warfare in terms of detecting the enemy, so equipped were all in Afghanistan.29 ing France’s priorities (protecting the locating it, and then using firepower to Moreover, although VBCIs offer better homeland) and its determination to destroy it—“fire maneuver,” he termed protection and other capabilities than any colonize cheaply or not at all. Badly it. This compares with destroying the of the other vehicles used in Mali, only outnumbered and for the most part enemy through combat, or “combat 36 VBCIs were used there, compared operating autonomously and without the maneuver,” which is riskier. The French with 177 venerable VABs. There were so possibility of timely reinforcements or see fire maneuver as a luxury, something many VABs and other out-of-date light- relief, colonial commanders—often just one can do when one has the means. armor vehicles in Mali partly because the captains and below—learned to leverage According to Goya, France’s Ground French had been gambling that they were local knowledge. Indeed, France owes its Forces Command has gone so far as to good enough. If they thought otherwise, success in northern Mali during the co- express the desire that the French army they presumably would make replacing lonial period in part to the commanders’ post-Afghanistan “de-Americanizes” so them a higher priority.30 As it happened, practice of attending to local politics and as not to retain the “bad habits” picked the enemy did not make effective use of the human terrain so as to better deploy up fighting alongside the U.S. military. its antitank weapons or IEDs and did not divide-and-conquer tactics, forge military “We learned a lot of methods from the possess ATGMs. But the French could alliances, and so on. Commanders knew Americans,” he stated. Another officer, not have been certain that would be the whom to trust, whom to promote, and a legionnaire who had participated in case. whom to push aside. multiple African and Afghan deploy- Similarly, the airborne operation in The French analyst Goya, a former ments, similarly expressed concern that Timbuktu featured a night-time combat marine, argues that much of the outlook the French army had learned some bad drop of 250 lightly armed legionnaires, and practices of France’s colonial units lessons in Afghanistan with regard to a risky enterprise in the best of circum- have survived and serve them well today. fighting “American-style warfare,” in stances. The French seem not to have had He describes today’s marine regiments’ the sense that infantrymen worked in good intelligence regarding the threat approach explicitly as “colonial” and close conjunction with drones, satellites, on the ground, for they conducted the defines it in terms of a “global approach” and aircraft providing close air support. drop to block retreating fighters but en- that involves not just tactics, but also France cannot afford to fight like that, he countered none. The French could just as mixing in with the population and un- stated, and besides, it was contrary to the easily have underestimated the threat as derstanding the entire context in which experience of most French officers most they overestimated it.31 one is operating.26 When asked about of the time, who have to operate in the Finally, the French cut things close institutional continuity from the colonial field with few resources.28 with respect to three key requirements: era, another marsouin (the French equiv- fuel, water, and medical support. French alent of leatherneck) questions cultural Accepting Risk doctrine regarding fuel is that one should continuity yet notes that French marine Waging war on the cheap necessarily never go below a 10-day reserve. Ten regiments today operate in the same con- translates into risk, especially if one days is the French army’s red line. In ditions as in the past, suggesting that, in favors close combat, as the French the first month of Serval, however, the effect, they operate in the same way.27 officers above claim. In contrast to the French, who often raced well ahead of French officers interviewed by the U.S. Army, which can be described as a their logistical elements, operated with author also draw a distinction between “belt and suspenders” institution, which 24 hours of reserve. Any “rupture,” how they are taught to operate and often uses backup or redundant systems, moreover, would have taken 12 hours to the “American way,” with which they the French army considers such ameni- address.32 The French also struggled to

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Shurkin 83 U.S. Airman communicates with French air force pilots during tactical exercise in Djibouti, February 24, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Kate Thornton) keep the most forward-deployed troops the same time when in fact they could •• sub-brigade modularity in northern Mali supplied with water only support 2.35 French officers also •• relatively light armored vehicles that and at times fell below the required 10 disclosed that they were not capable of emphasize mobility over firepower liters per man, per day. The extreme heat providing the “golden hour” standard of •• an institutional and command reduced significantly the lift of aircraft, medical support called for by French doc- culture accustomed and suited to obliging the French to rely on convoys of trine for all of the operations going on at austerity trucks.33 There, the problem was that the the same time. In at least one instance, •• greater acceptance of risk. bottled water reached Gao in containers, they had to choose not to provide golden If we break apart the first point, mod- but the trucks that took the water north hour coverage to one operation to pro- ularity, we find important differences with of Gao could not handle containers, and vide it to another.36 respect to training and the authorities and there was a limit to how many crates of The French army is a living example responsibilities bestowed upon company bottled water could be loaded on their of precisely the kind of force General commanders, which facilitate the kind beds before they fell off while driving Odierno and General Milley have envi- of decentralized and distributed opera- over the rough terrain (there are no sioned for the future of the U.S. Army. tions associated with mission command. paved roads north of Gao). The French The French force has demonstrated that Indeed, French officers interviewed for a would not have managed had they not it is adept at deploying small, scalable, separate study on interoperability claim jury-rigged walls for the truck beds using task-organized forces that can disag- to be on the extreme end of the mission wooden pallets.34 gregate and re-aggregate on the fly; command scale relative to their North Similarly, the French have a rule re- it has a force structure well suited for Atlantic Treaty Organization Allies with garding the amount of medical support expeditionary operations; and it leverages respect to the degree of autonomy and that must be on hand for a given number deep regional expertise. It also has an responsibility they invest in lower ech- of soldiers. In Mali at a certain point, expeditionary culture. Associated with elons and their commanders. according to the French G-4, doctrine these characteristics are elements that Whereas the French appear confi- dictated that they needed to have the distinguish the French army from the dent that their success on the battlefield ability to perform 12 major surgeries at American:

84 Features / A Look at the French Army in Africa JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 and low casualty rates demonstrate the Apache unit without the full panoply of support çois Cornut-Gentille,” Assemblée Nationale, elements and a large contingent intended to July 8, 2014. proficiency of their military, we are re- provide force protection. See Bruce Nardulli et 20 Céline Brunetaud, “La chaîne soutien en minded of Napoleon’s alleged remark al., Disjointed War: Military Operations in Koso- opérations: À coups d’expédition,” Terre Info that the quality he looked for the most vo, 1999 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002). Magazine, May 2013, 10. in his generals was that they be lucky. 5 Raymond T. Odierno, “The Force of 21 Philippe Chapleau, “Rusticité et ingéni- Moreover, Serval does not shed light on Tomorrow,” Foreign Policy, February 4, 2013, osité: Malgré tout, les véhicules tirent la langue available at . The same blogger put the number of vehicles conventional conflicts or to provide the 6 “Army Vision—Force 2025 White Paper,” operated by the Serval brigade at 730, includ- conventional deterrent power that U.S. U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center, ing 150 VABs, 100 VBLs, 36 VBCIs, and 20 commanders and French defense policy January 23, 2014, 2. AMX-10RCs. alike call for. 7 Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, 22 Etienne Monin, “Les derniers jours de Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: la guerre dans l’Adrar au Mali—France Info,” Given the French example, it appears Headquarters Department of the Army, 2012), France Info, March 25, 2013. that moving the U.S. Army toward being 1–7. 23 Bertrand Darras, email to author, April more expeditionary would require revisit- 8 The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in 28, 2013. ing decisions regarding force structure, a Complex World, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 24 Gougeon, 48. the kinds of armored vehicles the Army U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 25 Interviews with French logistics officers, 2014, 44. March 2015. uses, and how it task-organizes. Does the 9 Ibid., 15. 26 A 2010 issue of the French military BCT structure make the most sense? We 10 French army G4, email to author, May publication Doctrine Tactique refers to this must also question the premise that one 5, 2015. as “global maneuver” and associates it with can be more expeditionary while retain- 11 For more on French army reforms and counterinsurgency. See “La Manœuvre globale: ing all other capabilities. Given limited the embrace of modularity in the 1990s, see Cadre général de la contre rebellion,” Doctrine Paul Brutin, “L’Armée de terre, les réformes, Tactique, no. 19. resources, we would have to give up l’armée de demain,” La Jaune et la Rouge: 27 Interview with Frédéric Garnier, October something. In this case, it might mean Revue mensuelle de l’association des anciens élèves 2, 2013. losing some ability to conduct large-scale et diplomés de l’école, November 1997, available 28 Personal communication with a legion- conventional warfare or quite simply at ; François Lecointre, “De la Larcher, Rapport d’information fait au nom vehicle design. Becoming more like the fin de la guerre à la fin de l’armée,”Institut de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la French would also mean having a culture Jacques Cartier, September 5, 2012, avail- défense et des forces armées par le groupe de premised on austerity and learning to be able at ; Michel Klein, “Armée de Terre: l’autorisation de prolongation de l’intervention fight than what one considers ideal. In armée d’emploi,” Fondation pour la Recherche des forces armées au Mali (article 35 de la Con- Stratégique, February 14, 2007. stitution), French Senate, April 16, 2013, 20. the end, having a “small footprint” in 12 FT-02, Tactique Générale (Paris: Centre 30 The planned replacement for the VAB is the French way would mean assuming de doctrine et d’emploi de forces, 2008), the VBMR, which has not yet entered produc- greater risk. JFQ 41–43. See also FT-04, Les fondamentaux de la tion. manœuvre interarmes (Paris: Centre de doctrine 31 The last time that particular unit, the et d’emploi de forces, 2011). 2nd REP, did a combat jump was at Kolwezi, 13 Notes “Par les airs et par la piste: L’ouverture Zaire, in 1978, when 450 legionnaires jumped du théâtre Serval,” Béret Rouge, May 2013. in daylight into a city held by hostile forces and 14 “Scorpion Excites French Combat Ve- took fire as they jumped. The legionnaires were 1 “Advance Policy Questions for General hicle Industries,” Defense Update, n.d. outnumbered and outgunned and spent the day Mark A. Milley, USA, Nominee for Chief of 15 Ministère de la Défense, “Le programme in firefights. Five were killed. Staff of the Army,” July 21, 2015, available at SCORPION,” Armée de Terre, March 16, 32 Interview with French G4, Paris, Febru- . 16 Michel Goya, “Dix millions de dollars 33 Interview with French logistics officer, 2 Gustave Perna, “Projecting an Expedition- le milicien: La crise du modèle occidental de Lille, France, February 3, 2015. ary Army,” Army Sustainment, March–April guerre limitée de haute technologie,” Politique 34 Interview with French logistics officer, 2016, 2–3. Étrangère, no. 1 (2007), 201. Lille, France, February 2, 2015. 3 For a discussion of some of the turbu- 17 “L’engagement des forces préposition- 35 Interview with French G4, Paris, Febru- lence associated with task-organizing to reflect nées en Afrique,” Béret Rouge, May, 2014, 6. ary 5, 2015. assigned missions that differ from designed mis- 18 François Marie Gougeon, “Témoignage 36 Doctrine d’emploi des forces terrestres en sions, see Christopher G. Pernin et al., Readi- d’un chef de corps engagé dans l’opération zones desertiques et semi-desertiques (edition ness Reporting for an Adaptive Army (Santa Serval,” Opération Serval: Le retour de la provisoire) (Paris: Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi Monica, CA: RAND, 2013). This work details manœuvre aéroterrestre dans la profondeur des Forces, 2013), 43; Philippe Roux, “RAND ways in which units have had to scramble to re- (Paris: Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Corporation Conference: French Army Update design themselves to meet changing operational Forces, 2014), 50. Sahel Operation ‘Serval’ Lessons Identified,” requirements and the associated turbulence. 19 Le mantien en condition opérationnelle PowerPoint presentation, RAND, Arlington, 4 Task Force Hawk is a classic example of des matériels militaires: des efforts à poursuivre VA, October 23, 2013. the Army’s institutional resistance to “going (Paris: Cour des comptes, 2014); Ministère de small” and to deploying only a portion of an la Défense, “Question No. 47347 de M. Fran-

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Shurkin 85 Sailor assigned to guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy carries Haitian child during site assessment as part of Operation Unified Response following 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti, January 12, 2010 (DOD)

he central theoretical concept in all life sciences is adaptation, Sharpening Our T the idea that things change over time. Unlike other species, we humans have the full benefit of a dual system Cultural Tools for of inheritance; that is, we use (or are shaped by) both biological and cultural systems of adaptation. Both systems Improved Global work in a similar way. Through the process of sexual reproduction, we inherit genetic traits from our parents, Health Engagement and through the process of learning, we inherit culture from our social group. Culture is a central concept in the study By Suzanne Leclerc-Madlala and Maysaa Alobaidi of human beings, and its existence has played a major role in the success of our species, including our success with combating, controlling, and containing disease. Today, all societies, from the most Dr. Suzanne Leclerc-Madlala is a Technical Advisor to the U.S. Agency for International Development. technologically simple to the most ad- Dr. Maysaa H. Alobaidi is a Research Scientist at the Henry M. Jackson Foundation for the Advancement vanced, have medical systems comprised of Military Medicine/Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine.

86 Features / Sharpening Our Cultural Tools JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 of three basic interrelated parts.1 These to what could be called a bio-moral to successfully navigate complex cultural include a theory of the etiology (causa- system—that is, where illness and misfor- environments will increase the potential tion) of sickness; a method of diagnosis tune are understood as resulting from for these positive, longer term impacts. based on the etiology theory; and the a moral infarction of some sort. Such is There is room for improvement in most, prescription of appropriate therapies, the case throughout sub-Saharan Africa if not all, U.S. Government agencies both curative and palliative, based on where the failure to honor one’s dead for this level of work. One extensive the diagnosis. As aspects of culture, these relatives, to supply sufficient wedding review of 2,000 short-term medical mis- parts are subject to change over time as gifts, or to conduct a ritual according sions revealed that better planning and they are continuously influenced by other to tribal prescription is a serious moral preparation in the areas of cross-cultural cultural systems, and they continuously infarction widely believed to be at the communication and the contextual reali- appropriate elements from other medical root of many illnesses. This bio-moral ties of mission sites were among the top traditions. For example, it is not unusual way of thinking helps to explain how it needs identified for ensuring an optimal today to find Zulu traditional healers in is possible for people to accept modern outcome.4 As we move into a future of South Africa who don white lab coats and scientific medicine while at the same growing global demand for medical ser- practice out of city offices with comfort- time continuing to seek diagnoses vices brought on by, among other things, able waiting rooms and pantries full of and prescriptions from the traditional new and re-emerging diseases, high-qual- herbs labeled and bottled in a modern system. ity cultural training needs to become a format. The services of these healers Modern biomedicine focuses more on more central component to preparations continue to be in high demand, and immediate causation—for example, which for medical diplomacy and engagement. their practices continue to adapt. Despite pathogen is causing which symptoms— centuries-old efforts by missionaries, gov- while traditional bio-moral systems focus How to Sharpen Our ernments, and others to discourage belief more on ultimate causation—who or Cultural Tools in and support of indigenous medical what is responsible for this negative state For global health engagements, the systems, these systems persist. of being. The different medical systems ultimate goal is to build bridges and The medical landscape in most attempt to address the problem at differ- establish ongoing relations to influence countries is characterized by medical ent levels. Traditional healers are sought change through meaningful dialogue pluralism, a situation whereby several dis- to help answer questions of ultimate cau- and opportunities to develop a shared tinct medical systems coexist from which sation, and dire cultural consequences can vision and a roadmap toward develop- people can choose to seek health assis- be expected should the patient ignore the ment.5 Achieving this goal is contingent tance.2 While people may prefer one type healer’s advice. As a result, people often upon adequate preparation for engage- of medical system to another and interact see no real conflict between taking the ment in cross-cultural environments. exclusively with that system when they medicines prescribed by modern doctors Part of current preparation involves are ill, a more common pattern, particu- while at the same time following through the imparting of knowledge of existing larly in non-Western societies, is to move with rituals and medicine prescribed by beliefs and behaviors related to health between medical systems in an effort to traditional healers. and illness within a particular cultural take full advantage of any and all thera- All of this presents special challenges context. This part, however, is only the pies that might help. Medical syncretism to governments of developing countries tip of the iceberg. If cultural preparation is the term used by anthropologists to trying to build a modern medical sector for global health engagements is left at describe how people mix and match visits and a modern economy. that, one risks amplifying rather than to local clinics and use of modern medi- is a key area of service delivery upon diminishing barriers to cross-cultural cines with visits to local healers and use which people judge their governments.3 competence by perpetuating stereotypes of potions blessed by ancestors or deities. Building relationships with partner na- of other cultures and encouraging atti- Ultimately, human beings are pragmatic tions that help to strengthen and improve tudes of cultural superiority. Knowledge creatures, and their pragmatism applies as modern health services may not only alone is not enough. much to their health-seeking behavior as contribute to the stability of nations but Underlying this sense of cultural supe- it does to other aspects of life. also help to build faith in modern systems riority is a lack of understanding of how more generally. Positive experiences with these beliefs and practices were produced Challenges and Opportunities the modern medical system could have within their particular cultural context While medical pluralism continues to an important spill-over effect that acts as and the function they perform for those grow in step with modernization and a catalyst for the modernization project. who practice them.6 The view that tra- increased globalization, cultural consid- These experiences would likely make peo- ditional health beliefs and practices are erations often weigh on people when ple more open to other modern systems, something inferior from the past and are illness or misfortune strikes. In contrast including education, commerce, and a complicating factor in direct conflict to our Western biomedical system, culture. Equipping global health prac- with the Western approach to health many non-Western societies subscribe titioners with the skills or tools needed care is prevalent among many health

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Leclerc-Madlala and Alobaidi 87 As part of Operation Tomodachi, U.S. Navy physician with III Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) examines Japanese woman in school being used as internally displaced persons camp for residents affected by earthquake and tsunami that struck mainland Japan, March 11, 2011 (DOD) professionals.7 This sense of cultural need to align with policies such as the predominantly focuses on knowledge superiority is also driven by an incorrect 1994 United Nations Plan of Action for acquisition. While beneficial, this type assumption that health professionals are the Elimination of Harmful Traditional of training neglects other key aspects of objective and value-free individuals who Practices Affecting the Health of Women learning, mainly, attitudes and the soft are immune to cultural differences. In and Children—bearing in mind that skills deemed critical for engaging in reality, everyone, health professionals blind adherence to some practices has a cross-cultural context. Theoretically, included, is culturally bound to some made possible large-scale violence against cultural learning should enable global extent.8 By focusing predominantly on women and girls over the course of health practitioners to adapt and function knowledge of other cultures while ignor- many centuries. While careful efforts are effectively within any cultural context, ing that this knowledge, no matter how required to alter or eliminate harmful no matter how different it is. Beyond extensive, is shaped by the bias of their practices, Western pressure for change is cultural knowledge, cross-cultural adapt- own culture, health professionals face sometimes heavy handed and insensitive ability and effectiveness require certain an increased risk of cultural misunder- and often perceived as imperialistic. More personal attributes and enabling skills. standing and miscommunication, which strategic approaches are needed that help Accordingly, the design and development ultimately may result in damaged rela- people to understand that it is possible to of cultural learning resources should tar- tions and failed engagements. give up harmful practices without giving get three primary domains. Nonetheless, health professionals up meaningful aspects of their culture. Cultural Self-Awareness. Cultural have a responsibility not to remain passive These efforts are usually most effec- learning is aimed at helping practitioners about harmful traditional practices in the tive when they originate, or at least are explore their own cultural identity and name of a utopian vision of multicultural- perceived to originate, from within the recognize their unconscious assumptions, ism. Some practices clearly violate rights culture that practices them.9 biases, and prejudices toward people with to health, life, dignity, and personal For many in the health professions, different cultural backgrounds.10 Every integrity, while others are patently harm- knowledge-based cultural learning is society is made up of different social ful to health. Our health engagements appealing given that their education groups with which people identify and

88 Features / Sharpening Our Cultural Tools JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 from which they derive their norms and values. Identification with various social groups provides the basis for defining one’s cultural identity.11 It is only by understanding and articulating their own cultural identity that health profession- als are able to understand the diverse cultural identities within a particular population and determine their relevance to health.12 This kind of understanding prepares practitioners to be able to de- termine which of these identities is more salient in influencing health beliefs and behavior. Practitioners who lack cultural self-awareness are less likely to accept that all cultures are equally valid and that no one culture is inherently better or worse than another. Lacking the cultural finesse acquired through cultural learning, they are more likely to impose their values and beliefs on others out of an uncritical sense of cultural superiority, leading to ways of interacting that foster disrespect and distrust and undermine good relations. This can be a challenging aspect of the cultural learning process, as practitioners do not always see the immediate rel- evance of cultural self-awareness to their practice. Most practitioners approach cultural learning with the expectation to learn about other cultures and do not appreciate the value of critical reflection on their own cultural background. While motivating practitioners to embark on this aspect of cultural knowledge remains a challenge, it is fundamental to the learning needs for maximally effective engagements in global health. Cultural Knowledge. Only after establishing conscious awareness of them- selves as cultural beings are practitioners able to obtain and effectively integrate information about the culture of certain population groups, including information Afghan boy brings younger sister to receive toiletries given out by Afghan, Coalition, and U.S. Servicemembers assigned to Special Operations Task Force–West, near Mirmandab, Afghanistan, about their health-related beliefs and val- April 7, 2011 (DOD/Marcus Quarterman) ues. As previously discussed, all cultures have a set of beliefs to explain what causes the dearth of readily available information Cultural Skills. Learning how illness, how it can be cured or treated, about culture-specific health beliefs and to gather cultural information that is and who should be involved in the heal- practices, it is important to emphasize relevant to health without applying it ing process. More important than the that there is more variation within cul- stereotypically to all members of a par- knowledge of what these beliefs and prac- tural groups than across groups.13 An ticular culture is another critical skill that tices are is the understanding of how they expected outcome of cultural knowledge is emphasized throughout the learning were produced, what sustains them, and acquisition is being able to discern that process. Other skills emphasized include if they are in some ways harmful. While variation and to determine the key vari- interpersonal skills such as flexibility, the tendency to generalize exists due to ables that impact on health. openness, and the ability to look at the

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Leclerc-Madlala and Alobaidi 89 world through a different lens, as well difficulties in incorporating cultural learn- Health: Diseases, Programs, Systems, and Policies, ed. Michael Merson, Robert Black, and Ann as communication skills including lan- ing in the pre-deployment training cycle Mills (Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett, 2006). guage skills and the ability to interpret due to busy schedules, in sustaining gains 7 Kevin G. Neill, “In the Shadow of the various forms of verbal and non-verbal in capabilities achieved through training, Temple: Cross-cultural Sensitivity in Interna- communication unique to different and in bringing about policy changes tional Health Program Development,” Ethnic- cultures.14 Learning to apply method- to institutionalize and secure ongoing ity and Health 5, no. 2 (2000), 161–171. 8 Peter Adler, “Beyond Cultural Identity: ologies from the field of anthropology system-wide support for cultural training. Reflections on Multiculturalism,” inCulture would be especially relevant and a useful Nonetheless, in a globalized world Learning, ed. Richard Brislin (New York: East- skill for cultural learning. For example, where the health of nations is increas- West Center Press, 1997). practitioners can be taught the skills ingly interdependent, sharpening our 9 Lauren Hersh, “Giving Up Harmful for asking questions in ways that reveal cultural tools for improved global health Practices, Not Culture,” Advocates for Youth (February 1998), available at . trained to make observations and recog- U.S. Government remains the largest 10 Ibid. nize behaviors that are an indication of funder and implementer of global health 11 Fred Jandt, “Defining Culture and deeply held cultural values. Techniques programs worldwide, with support for Identities,” in An Introduction to Intercultural for prompting conversations that elicit global health involving many different Communication, 7th ed., ed. Fred Jandt (Thou- sand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2013). what anthropologists call the “unspoken departments and agencies.16 Equipping 12 Collins O. Airhihenbuwa, Health and rules” that inform and guide behavior, in- all our practitioners with a sound under- Culture: Beyond the Western Paradigm (Thou- cluding but not exclusively those related standing of the interplay between culture sand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995). to health, can be taught. Developing and heath, knowledge of local disease 13 Josepha Campinha-Bacote, “Many Faces: cultural skills is a lifelong process that etiology, and the skills to succeed in Addressing Diversity in Health Care,” Online Journal of Issues in Nursing 81 (2003). requires continuous exposure to other increasingly complex contexts of medical 14 Rohini Anand and Indra Lahiri, “Inter- cultures with simultaneous self-reflection pluralism will bolster our efforts to build cultural Competence in Health Care: Develop- and reconstruction of cultural boundar- bridges and create shared visions for the ing Skills for Intercultural Competent Care,” in ies. Comprehensive training that makes future with partner nations. Cultural The SAGE Handbook of Intercultural Compe- better use of anthropological expertise learning needs to be accelerated and tence, ed. Darla K. Deardorff (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2009). would allow practitioners to fully exploit embedded in training programs if we 15 Center for Disaster and Humanitarian the potential of this process. are to have the kind of forward medical Assistance Medicine (CDHAM), “Culture and diplomacy and engagements that maxi- Communication in Global Health,” CDHAM Opportunities and Challenges mize our effectiveness and contribute Symposium, Bethesda, MD, 2014. 16 The extended military engagements in to enhancing our national reputation Aizen J. Marrogi and Saadoun al-Du- laimi, “Medical Diplomacy in Achieving U.S. Iraq and Afghanistan brought increased abroad. JFQ Global Strategic Objectives,” Joint Force Quar- attention to the lack of cultural capa- terly 74 (3rd Quarter 2014), 124–130. bilities within the joint medical force. This heightened attention resulted in Notes dedicating resources to determine the 1 required competencies for culture and Peter J. Brown, Understanding and Apply- ing Medical Anthropology (Mountain View, CA: communication within the joint medical Mayfield Publishing, 1998). forces and creating training programs to 2 Ibid. develop these competencies.15 System- 3 World Health Organization (WHO), wide discussions are currently under Technical Discussions—The Role of Government way to develop core competencies and in Health Development, EM/RC53/Tech. Disc. 1 (Geneva: WHO, July 2006), available evidence-based standards and best at . nication for global health and to expand 4 Alexandra L.C. Martiniuk et al., “Brain the availability of training to all military Gains: A Literature Review of Medical Missions health personnel. to Low and Middle-Income Countries,” BMC Health Services Research 12, no. 134 (2012), In spite of this positive momentum, available at . these is the significant diversity within 5 The U.S. Government Engagement in the joint medical forces in terms of pro- Global Health: A Primer (Menlo Park, CA: Kai- fessional background, specialties, and ser Family Foundation, January 2012), available at . requirements for different groups within 6 Ali Hyder and Richard Morrow, “Culture, the system. Other challenges include Behavior, and Health,” in International Public

90 Features / Sharpening Our Cultural Tools JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Servicemembers provide cover after tactical air insertion with Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter at Fort Dix, New Jersey, April 10, 2014 (U.S. Air National Guard/Matt Hecht)

The Primacy of COG in Planning Getting Back to Basics

By Steven D. Kornatz

enter of gravity (COG) continues War). They discuss how this theory is tive to a course of action (COA). This to be a popular topic in military too complex to be used by U.S. military is not to assert that proper employment C journals, blogs, and lectures. planners. However, the painstaking of COG methodology is always easy. Many recent discussions have tended to discussion of Clausewitz is done at the Application in certain scenarios may be ambivalent at best toward the value expense of missing the fact that the be complex, but the important aspect of the concept of COG. Several of these refined, modern-day view of COG is a of COG methodology is that when dialogues present detailed contrarian critical concept for planners to under- properly employed, it is the founda- views to the validity of Carl von Clause- stand and apply. When done correctly, tion of and gives direction to COA witz’s much analyzed theory of COG COG planning methodology is the development. (or Schwerpunkt, as presented in On primary practical way to link an objec- Root of the Problem Some planners and many senior staff Captain Steven D. Kornatz, USN (Ret.), is a Professor in the College of Operational and Strategic officers lack detailed knowledge of and Leadership at the U.S. Naval War College. confidence in the value and practical use

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Kornatz 91 U.S. Soldiers with 2nd Cavalry Regiment study map in preparation for convoy through area near Amberg, Germany, en route to U.S. Army Europe Joint Multinational Readiness Center’s Hohenfels Training Area in Germany, October 16, 2012, during Saber Junction 2012 (DOD/Markus Rauchenberger) of COG methodology. This comes pri- while the theory of COG is sound, it a source of massed strength—physical or marily from three factors: overreliance does not answer modern-day methodol- moral—or a source of leverage, whose on Clausewitz’s COG theory, differing ogy questions. degradation, dislocation, neutralization, doctrinal definitions of COG-related Differing Definitions. Joint or destruction would have the most decisive terms, and varying joint and Service Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation impact on the enemy’s or one’s own ability doctrinal COG methodologies. Planning, defines center of gravity as a to accomplish a given military objective; Present-Day Relevance of COG. “source of power that provides moral or tactical, operational, and strategic centers Clausewitz’s theory is touted as the foun- physical strength, freedom of action, or of gravity are differentiated; each center of dation for the U.S. military’s application will to act.”2 It was only a short time ago gravity is related to the corresponding mili- of COG in current planning doctrine. that each Service had its own definition of tary objective to be accomplished.4 While Clausewitz’s theory may provide COG. While it is significant that Service some foundational legitimacy to the and joint COG definitions now align, While both of these definitions use concept, it has little value in establishing the definition itself is too generic to be of language similar to the current joint defi- detailed practical application of COG value to planners. nition, Vego’s in particular presents three for planners, particularly at the opera- Modern-day COG theorists have components that are critical to practical tional level of war. For the many reasons their own variations on the definition, application by planners. His statement recently presented by Dale Eikmeier, which obviously had some influence on that “destruction would have the most military planners need to be much less the current joint definition. Joe Strange decisive impact on the enemy’s or one’s concerned with Clausewitz’s history and proposed defining COG as “primary own ability to accomplish a given mili- theory of COG than with the more criti- sources of moral or physical strength, tary objective” ties COG directly to the cal value and application of contemporary power and resistance.”3 Milan Vego de- objective and also specifies that a COG COG methodology.1 In other words, fined COG as: exists for both the enemy and oneself. In

92 Features / The Primacy of COG in Planning JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 arguing that “tactical, operational, and pal force/entity that accomplishes the explicitly accomplishes the objective, strategic centers of gravity are differenti- objective at a specified level of war. and the remainder of the surface ships ated; each center of gravity is related to No matter which COG methodology (aircraft carriers, destroyers, supply ships, the corresponding military objective to is employed, planners cannot rely on a patrol vessels, and so forth) are merely in be accomplished,” Vego clarifies that checklist mentality to implement COG support. Knowing the value of detail in COGs exist at each level of war and are in their work; they must have an inter- determining critical strengths and criti- tied to specific objectives tasked to each nalized understanding of why COG is cal weaknesses to the COG process will level of war. important to their efforts and confidence yield more discrete and effective COG COG analysis methodology in Navy in a clear methodology to conduct its identification. This will allow for more Warfare Publication (NWP) 5-01, Navy identification and analysis. Understanding focused analysis and clarity in COA de- Planning, combines the aspect of Vego’s the usefulness of COG comes from velopment. The determination of both writings that indicates how to identify appreciating that its identification is a CSs and CWs is crucial not only because a COG with Strange’s writings on how process that determines what (a force or it narrows down the list of potential to attack/defend it. However, Navy entity) accomplishes a stated objective. COGs (COG comes from a list of CSs), doctrine uses some of the same terms as The “thing” that accomplishes the objec- but also because the list of CWs will sup- joint doctrine but defines them differ- tive is critical to planners because it must port determination of CVs later in the ently. Critical factors are defined as critical be dealt with, directly or indirectly, to methodology. strengths (CSs) and critical weaknesses preclude an adversary from accomplish- Once the COG is identified, the CC/ (CWs) in NWP 5-01, but are comprised ing its objective. Likewise, the thing that CR/CV method of analysis presented of critical capabilities (CCs), critical accomplishes our friendly objective must by Strange comes into play. This part of requirements (CRs), and critical vulner- be given a priority of effort, be sustained, the methodology is how planners take an abilities (CVs) in JP 5-0. and be protected for us to be successful. identified COG and ascertain the things Varying Methodologies. Various Vego’s writings provide a credible that are critical to attack (or defend), methodologies exist in doctrine that at- method to identify a COG by determin- which are clearly linked to undermining tempt to describe the practical application ing CSs and CWs that are essential to the COG. This becomes the foundation of the COG concept for use by planners. accomplishing the objective.8 The COG of the COAs. To be valid, each proposed These methodologies mostly rely on is identified as the CS that actually ac- COA must neutralize (defeat, destroy, Strange’s writings to determine how to complishes the stated objective. After and so forth) the enemy’s identified attack (or defend) a COG. The identi- listing the critical strengths, planners can COG and must protect and support the fication of a COG, however, is glossed analytically go down the list one by one identified friendly COG. Further COG over in most doctrine (NWP 5-01 is an and ask, “Does this critical strength ac- analysis, to the level of CVs, provides exception).5 Some doctrinal methodolo- complish the objective?” If the answer is details of susceptible aspects of critical re- gies tend to take a critical concept and “yes,” then it is a COG. If the answer is quirements that can undermine a COG. make it overly complex. Examples include “no,” then it is probably a critical capabil- With this understanding, COA develop- JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation ity or critical requirement and possibly ment ensues, with planners employing of the Operational Environment, which a critical vulnerability. The complexity innovation to propose different ways describes a COG as originating in a nodal arises in identifying critical strengths. (the how) to neutralize the enemy COG system where it “typically will not be a Planners must ensure they are as detailed while defending the friendly COG. This single node in the system, but will consist as possible in listing CSs to be as dis- is the reason for the primacy of COG to of a set of nodes and their respective crete as possible in the identification of planning: it links an objective to CVs that links”6 with no explanation as to how a COG. This is essential, particularly at provide the foundation for the COAs (see to identify the system, and Air Force the operational level of war and the com- figure 1). Doctrine Document 3-0, Operations and ponent (domain-related) level where a NWP 5-01 does an effective job Planning, which recommends synthe- COG will typically be a specific force. For of describing the CC/CR/CV COG sizing four different methodologies to example, if Combined Force Maritime analysis methodology, but it is too vague identify and analyze COGs.7 Component Commander (CFMCC) in stating, “Many of these elements planners are working to identify a friendly (CCs) are often found in the joint func- Practical Application COG in the maritime domain where an tions.”9 Planners must go to the six joint Practical application requires a practi- objective is seizure of an island, some (or operational) functions (command cal definition of COG. The current critical strengths may be identified as and control, intelligence, sustainment, doctrinal definition is rather ambigu- ships, mines, and integrated air defense movement and maneuver, fires, protec- ous. Based on the military application systems. The term ships, however, may be tion) to begin their COG CC analysis. of COG analysis, a simpler, reasonable too general. Based on CFMCC maritime Common problems in resolving the CCs definition follows: COG is the princi- objectives, the landing force (amphibi- arise from two challenges. First, plan- ous ships and Marines) may be what ners forget the necessary linkage that

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Kornatz 93 U.S. Soldiers with 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, approach objective during squadron-level field training exercise at Tapa Training Area, Estonia, April 6, 2016 (U.S. Army/Steven M. Colvin) must be maintained from objective to resources that allow the CC to enable the CV is not the logistics ships; it is their COG to CC. For each identified CC, the COG to accomplish the objective. In the vulnerability to submarine attack. The linkage question, “Does this CC enable above example, logistics ships, ship-to- planners must determine how to mitigate the COG to accomplish the objective?” shore connectors, ammunition, and food that vulnerability in COA development must be asked. Without this linkage, the are resources that allow the CC (sustain to protect the ability of the COG to ac- value of the process will break down. combat force ashore) to enable the complish the objective. Otherwise, the Second, planners often simply list the six COG (landing force) to accomplish the commander will assume tremendous risk joint functions as the CCs and move on. objective (seize the island). This analytic to mission success (see figure 2). This also undermines the value of the linkage must be maintained for COG process. In our example, if the landing analysis to be useful. Is COG Analysis Too Difficult? force is identified as the friendly COG The analysis continues further with Some recent articles propose doing that seizes an island (objective), just stat- determination of CVs. They are not CRs; away with or dramatically altering COG ing “operational sustainment” as a CC is they are “an aspect of a critical require- analysis in planning. Lawrence Freed- too general—this means everything is a ment which is deficient or vulnerable to man suggests that instead of analyzing priority for sustainment. A more refined direct or indirect attack that will create COGs, planners should answer the CC associated with operational protec- decisive or significant effects.”10 For the question, “What is the position you tion may be to “sustain the combat force friendly COG, CVs are aspects of CRs wish to reach?”11 Jeff Becker and Todd ashore.” This provides a more discrete that must be protected or mitigated. Zwolensky expound upon Freedman’s view of priorities for sustainment in the For the enemy, CVs are aspects of CRs writings and recommend replacing COA. Additionally, there often are mul- that will provide for indirect attack of COG with “joint maneuver.”12 While tiple CCs associated with a joint function. the enemy COG. In our example, a CV intriguing, neither of these assertions Similarly, a linkage must be main- may be the susceptibility of logistics ships provides a practical methodology for tained from CCs to CRs, which are the to submarine attack during transit. The planners to link COAs to an objec-

94 Features / The Primacy of COG in Planning JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 tive. Freedman’s “position you wish Figure 1. Linking OBJ to COA Through COG Analysis to reach” sounds like just another way of stating an objective. Likewise, to be COG ID COG Analysis useful, Becker and Zwolensky’s corol- lary to Freedman must identify what OBJ CS COG CC CR CV COA “joint maneuver” will be used against. In all likelihood, it will be a COG. Dale Eikmeier and, more recently, Jan Rueschhoff and Jonathan Dunne proposed determining CCs first and Figure 2. then working backward to identify the COG because COG identification is Enemy CVs: basis in COA to indirectly attack enemy COG in order to preclude enemy accomplishing obj difficult to do.13 In practical application, Friendly CVs: aspects that must be protected how can one identify CCs that enable a in COA in order to accomplish obj CV COG to accomplish an objective without CR CV first identifying the COG that actually CC Critical COG CR CV accomplishes the objective? Certainly, Strengths CC the objective-COG-CC-CR-CV-COA OBJ Critical linkages allow for a verifying “backward Weaknesses look” after the analysis has been com- Susceptible pleted. However, trying to identify a CS: Capability “Thing” that Endstate Means that Things that allow aspects of the essential to COG after determining CCs weakens the Goal accomplishes enables COG to a CC to enable the things that allow a accomplishing obj the obj accomplish COG to CC to enable the value of the linkage-based requirements obj: related to accomplish COG to of the COG analysis components. Op Functions the obj accomplish CW: capability the obj that is inadequate On a practical level, planners must to perform be able to rationalize and recommend to as intended the commander the best employment of Example resources that will allow us to accomplish Susceptible aspect Friendly force that of sustainment our objectives while precluding the enemy Friendly seizes island of COG from accomplishing theirs. The important Op Level obj Sustain forces ashore Supply ships ASW protection Landing Landing fact to remember is that COG analysis Seize island Locate enemy forces Storage Slow speed force ISR force is a component of planning that focuses C2 widespread forces depots Time to offload the efforts of planners. It is not an elusive Long SLOC COA tasks escort ships & ASW “search for the knockout blow,” but sim- aircraft to protect supply shipping ply a planning tool (albeit a complex one at times) that underpins a COA. How else can planners determine and prioritize objectives. When possible, planners become subordinate objectives (see figure what to attack and defend? Additionally, should be innovative in COA develop- 3). Objectives at one level necessitate the COA must be assessed in execution to ment in using non-COG (friendly) tasks to subordinates. These tasks become verify that the COG linkages determined resources to degrade or defeat the enemy objectives to that subordinate level, in planning are in fact proving successful. COG, allowing the friendly COG to necessitating determination of a COG Taking the COG linkages into execution, focus on accomplishing the friendly that accomplishes the nested subordinate we have a cyclical pattern: determine objective. For example, using friendly objective. Complexity arises at the higher objectives, identify COG, plan to attack/ airpower to degrade enemy infantry levels of war when the COG may not be a defend COG, execute the plan, assess the forces (enemy COG) that are defending military force. plan, and adapt the plan (by revisiting an island (enemy objective) will enable Vego states, “The true value of center objectives and so forth). Without COG the friendly landing force (COG) to of gravity may be the framework the con- analysis, planners will be taking a shot in more readily seize the island (objective). cept provides for thinking about war. In the dark at what to attack/defend. Independent COG analysis by the J2 (for other words, the process of determining Another potentially confusing point the enemy) and planning team (for the centers of gravity may be as important is that the friendly COG does not neces- friendly) will keep friendly and enemy as the product.”14 This underpins the sarily attack the enemy COG directly. COGs from being intermixed, allowing idea that COG analysis is for planning. Friendly and enemy COGs must be more innovation in COA development. It gives planners something on which to analyzed separately in planning since they COGs at each level of war are based focus the use of resources. In execution, are based on specific friendly and enemy on tasks from higher headquarters that however, staffs must use assessment to

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Kornatz 95 Figure 3. Objective Nesting and COG ID at All Levels of War •• To limit confusion, planners should COG Examples: use level-of-war modifiers when National Strategic Level discussing and briefing COG (for OBJ COG/ECOG POTUS/SECDEF/CJCS (POTUS/SECDEF/CJCS) example, combatant commander “Will of People” – Democracy Task “LDR & cronies” – Autocracy COG, theater-strategic COG, joint task force COG, operational COG, Theater-Strategic Level (CCDR) COG/ECOG USEUCOM USPACOM USCENTCOM OBJ “Coalition” maritime COG, and so forth). •• When planners truly understand Task COG, the concept and methodology Operational Level (High) (JTF) are valuable and usable across the OBJ COG/ECOG TSC CJTF “Major Force” range of military operations. Task COG identification and analysis are Operational Level (Low) critical aspects of planning that enable OBJ COG/ECOG CFLCC CFMCC CFACC (Component) “Domain Related Force” planners and decisionmakers to have Task clarity in linking objectives to COAs. Tactical Level Without detailed use of the COG OBJ COG/ECOG CTF CTF CTF “Immediate Force Threats” concept, planners may propose COAs that are not directly linked to the stated HHQ Task to Subordinate objective. COG methodologies must OBJ Subordinate Subordinate OBJ COG/ECOG be understood deeply to ensure COG is given appropriate consideration through- out the planning process. JFQ determine if the plan (based on COG ning team members to commanders) to analysis) is trending toward accomplish- know and believe: ing the objective. If not, the COG A COG is based on and linked to an Notes analysis may be in error (that is, the •• objective; indeed, it is what accom- CVs may not be as clearly linked to the 1 plishes an objective. Dale C. Eikmeier, “Give Carl von Clause- COG and objective as planners originally witz and the Center of Gravity a Divorce,” COG identification and analysis thought), and a branch plan may need to •• Small Wars Journal, July 2, 2013, available provide the foundation for COA be implemented. at . All doctrine agrees that a COG is COG is a planning concept; objec- 2 Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation related to an objective. Objectives exist •• tives or capabilities may change in Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, at each level of war, and objectives are ac- August 11, 2011), xxi. execution, necessitating re-analysis of complished by a COG. Joint and Service 3 Joe Strange, “Centers of Gravity and COGs. doctrine COG methodologies should Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clause- A great part of the value of COG witzian Foundation So We Can All Speak the be much more similar than they are cur- •• analysis to planners are the discussion Same Language,” Perspectives on Warfighting rently. The methodology must have two nd and debate that arise from conduct- no. 4, 2 ed. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps parts: identification (what accomplishes University, 1996), 43. ing the analysis. an objective) and analysis (how to attack/ 4 Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare: Because they are based on objectives, defend it). Strange’s analysis methodol- •• Theory and Practice (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval COGs exist at each level of war and War College, 2009), VII-13. ogy (CC, CR, and CV) is common in each domain; this necessitates 5 Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 5-01, within Service and joint doctrine and COG analysis by all joint task force Navy Planning (Washington, DC: Headquar- logical. The problem that arises is what ters Department of the Navy, December 2013), components. may be the most important aspect of appendix C. Identification and analysis of COGs 6 COG methodology: identification of a •• JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of must be done as discretely as pos- the Operational Environment (Washington, DC: COG. This is where Vego’s methodology sible for focus and clarity in COA The Joint Staff, May 21, 2014), IV-11. is particularly valuable. Just because COG 7 development. Air Force Doctrine Document 3-0, analysis is difficult to do well does not Operations and Planning (Washington, DC: Do not assume that the friendly mean it should not be used. It is the prac- •• Headquarters Department of the Air Force, COG will be used to defeat the tical way to tie an objective to a COA. November 9, 2012), 111–117. enemy COG; this may be an inef- 8 Vego, VII-15–VII-24. ficient use of resources. 9 NWP 5-01, C-3. What Really Matters 10 •• Multiple varying objectives may JP 5-0, GL-8. The following are COG-related ideas 11 Lawrence Freedman, “Stop Looking for necessitate multiple COGs. that are critical for planners (from plan- the Center of Gravity,” War on the Rocks, June 24, 2014, available at

96 Features / The Primacy of COG in Planning JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 New from NDU Press for the Center for Strategic Research Strategic Forum 293 National Security Reform and the 2016 Election by Christopher J. Lamb and Joseph C. Bond Over the past 20 years, there has been a sea change in senior leader views on national security reform from skepticism to support. Nine major studies argue the national security system cannot generate or integrate the capabilities needed to manage security problems well. The system is “broken.” Yet there are major ob- stacles to reform. However, two key prerequisites for success are in place: galvanizing cases of unsustainable performance, and in-depth problem analysis that reveals the origins of the same. A third prerequisite is committed leadership. With that in mind, the authors identify several reasons why Presidential candidates should embrace national security reform during the 2016 campaign.

Australian Army Lieutenant and Gunner from 8/12 Regiment coordinate fire support as U.S. Marine from 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment looks on during Combined Joint Live Fire Exercise on Townshend Island during Talisman Sabre 2011 (Australian Army/Janine Fabre)

com/2014/06/stop-looking-for-the-center-of- Rueschhoff and Jonathan P. Dunne, “Centers gravity/>. of Gravity from the ‘Inside Out,’” Joint Force 12 Jeff Becker and Todd Zwolensky, “Go Quarterly 60 (1st Quarter 2011), 120–125. Ahead, Forget Center of Gravity,” War on 14 Vego, VII-14. the Rocks, July 9, 2014, available at . 13 Dale C. Eikmeier, “A Logical Method for Visit the NDU Press Web site for Center-of-Gravity Analysis,” Military Review more information on publications (September–October 2007), 62–66; Jan L. at ndupress.ndu.edu

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Kornatz 97 Marines storm SS Mayaguez to recover ship (DOD/Michael Chan)

Abandon Ship Interagency Decisionmaking During the Mayaguez Incident

By Richard B. Hughes

The struggle on was, in a sense, a metaphor of the entire : an action begun for what seemed a good and noble purpose, which quickly degenerated into an ugly, desperate fight, micromanaged from no less than the office of the President of the United States.

—Ralph Wetterhahn The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War

n the spring of 1975, ’s ship and its crew. The focus of this effort Commander Richard B. Hughes, USNR, communist govern- became an assault on Koh Tang, a small currently serves as a Reservist supporting the ment seized a U.S. merchant ship, the island in the Gulf of Thailand approxi- Naval History and Heritage Command in Navy I Combat Documentation Detachment 206 in SS Mayaguez, leading the United States mately 30 miles from the Cambodian Washington, DC. to mount a joint operation to rescue the mainland.1 Despite the notable evolu-

98 Recall / Abandon Ship: Revisiting the Mayaguez Incident JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 tions in joint and interagency doctrine May 13. The crew was initially moved a plan to seize the island and retake the in the more than 40 years since this there as well, but the following day they U.S. vessel. They also authorized U.S. incident, it remains strikingly relevant were taken by fishing boat to the port of aircraft to sink any Cambodian gunboats because of the nature of the challenges it Kompong Som on the Cambodian main- in and around the island.11 On the after- presented to interagency decisionmakers: land.5 By this time, some 12 hours after noon of May 14, a fourth NSC meeting a short timeline, limited intelligence, the Mayday call, U.S. P-3 Orion surveil- was held and a military plan approved.12 forces not tailored to the mission, an lance aircraft were already keeping the SS Less than 5 hours later (now the unpredictable opponent, and fevered Mayaguez under observation. morning of May 15 in Cambodia), a public interest. At the time, the “Maya- President Ford initially learned of the force consisting of 170 U.S. Marines, guez Incident” was generally viewed as a seizure at his morning briefing on May 12 transported via eight U.S. Air Force heli- success.2 A more sober review, however, (it was already evening in Cambodia), and copters, launched from Utapao to assault shows that the military operation nearly the NSC met at approximately noon that Koh Tang, with the intent of recovering ended in disaster. A close examination same day. Because the United States had the SS Mayaguez and its crew. Based on of interagency decisionmaking reveals a no diplomatic relationship with the Khmer his intelligence briefing at Utapao, the series of pitfalls, including intelligence Rouge government, overtures were made commander of the assault force believed failures, poor interagency communica- to try and contact them via China.6 The that 18 to 20 Khmer irregulars and their tion, and incomplete assessment of risk. NSC reconvened at 10:30 a.m. on May families were garrisoned on Koh Tang, These factors led the National Security 13. During this meeting, the President with less than 100 total people on the Council (NSC) to make decisions was informed that the SS Mayaguez island.13 The Defense Intelligence Agency that had little chance of furthering was anchored at Koh Tang and that a (DIA), however, believed that “[p]ossibly President Gerald Ford’s foreign policy military aircraft had observed what were 150 to 200 Khmer Communists were objectives and that placed U.S. forces at thought to be at least some members of on the island, armed with 82mm mor- grave risk. Military and civilian leaders the crew being moved to the island itself.7 tars; 75mm recoilless rifles; 30-caliber, would do well to review the lessons of Following this meeting, the President 7.62-mm, and 12.7-mm machineguns; this crisis, lest they make the same mis- directed the U.S. military to intercept any and B4W41 rocket[-]propelled grenade takes in the future. vessels approaching or leaving Koh Tang. launchers.”14 The first helicopters crossed Various military assets were moved closer the beach shortly after dawn local time The Incident to the area, including the aircraft carrier and immediately received heavy fire from It was only 12 days after the fall of USS Coral Sea and the destroyer USS prepared positions. Of the first wave of Saigon, the sobering end to U.S. Harold E. Holt. In addition, U.S. Marines eight helicopters, three were shot down involvement in the Vietnam War. Con- stationed in the Philippines and U.S. Air and the other five received heavy battle fidence in U.S. military power was at a Force helicopters from Nakom Phanom, damage. (Two never returned to base and low ebb and the Watergate scandal had Thailand, converged on Utapao, the clos- none participated in subsequent opera- propelled Gerald Ford into the White est Thai base to Koh Tang.8 tions.) While the original plan envisioned House.3 In Cambodia, the Khmer Late that evening (now the morning that all U.S. forces would land within 10 Rouge, a murderous new anti-American of May 14 in Cambodia), a third NSC minutes, only 131 Marines landed during communist government, had come meeting was convened. At the same time, the course of 17 insertion attempts made into power in Phnom Penh less than U.S. aircraft attempted to stop the fish- over 3 hours. Even more troubling, they a month earlier. On May 12, 1975, at ing vessel, which was moving the crew found themselves in isolated and compro- 4:03 p.m. local time, the U.S. Defense to Kompong Som. Although orders mised positions.15 Attaché in , , after were to sink such vessels if they did not Minutes after the assault began, consulting with the U.S. Ambassador, turn around, the U.S. pilots had spotted the USS Holt pulled alongside the SS dashed off an intelligence message to “Caucasian faces” on board and held Mayaguez and placed a security force Washington. The message relayed a their fire.9 After warning shots and even on board, but found no one there. At Mayday call from a privately owned tear gas were unable to make the boat almost the same time—and perhaps cargo vessel of U.S. registry that had reverse course, real-time communica- spooked by the flurry of American air initially been received by an affiliated tions allowed President Ford to make activity and the loss of a number of patrol company in Indonesia: “Have been the decision whether to sink the vessel boats—the Cambodian government in fired upon and boarded by Cambodian or allow it to proceed. He elected to let Phnom Penh ordered the crew of the armed forces at 9 degrees 48 min. it move inside the 12-mile boundary of SS Mayaguez released. At approximately N/102 degrees 53 min. E. Ship being Cambodian territorial waters and proceed 10:00 a.m. Cambodian time, the USS towed to unknown Cambodian port.”4 to the mainland.10 Still convinced that at Wilson, another destroyer that had just The Cambodians, after initially taking least some of the crew was on Koh Tang arrived on the scene, intercepted a Thai the vessel to the nearby island of Poulo or still aboard the SS Mayaguez, the NSC fishing vessel with the entire crew of the Wai, then moved it to Koh Tang on discussed military options, coalescing on SS Mayaguez onboard.16

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Hughes 99 Marine and Air Force pararescueman of 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (in wet suit) run for Air Force helicopter during assault on Koh Tang Island to rescue U.S. merchant ship SS Mayaguez and crew, May 15, 1975 (DOD)

The crew’s recovery, in some sense, after a full headcount was taken following island assault.20 The costs of attack- brought the crisis to an end, but the as- evacuation. How they died will likely ing Koh Tang were significant, with sault on Koh Tang was now unfortunately never be fully known, although author a total of 68 casualties.21 In fact, this a pitched battle. A second wave of 100 Ralph Wetterhahn makes a convincing could have been much worse, since, Marines from Utapao was landed around case that they survived on the island, as described above, the evacuation of noon local time as the force attempted only to be later captured and executed by the Marines nearly ended in complete to consolidate its precarious positions. Khmer forces there.18 disaster. How did this happen? Certainly Shortly thereafter, they were advised to there were errors in tactics and execu- disengage and prepare for extraction. Analysis of Interagency tion, but the errors by strategic leader- What followed was a desperate effort to Decisionmaking ship were much more telling.22 retrieve all the Marines before nightfall. At the time, the Ford administration’s To better consider how this decision- Only through the extraordinary heroism actions during the Mayaguez Incident making evolved, it is useful to consider of the Marines, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. were seen as broadly successful: the the perspectives and contributions of Navy close air support, naval gunfire sup- crew was returned safely, no pro- some of the key players at the NSC level. port (including machine gun fire from the tracted hostage situation ensued, and These include the Department of Defense gig of the USS Wilson), and astonishing it appeared that the U.S. military had (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency flying by the U.S. Air Force H-53 heli- cowed the Cambodian communists.19 (CIA) and Intelligence Community copter crews was this accomplished. The Hindsight paints a different picture, broadly, and Department of State. We final account of the attack on Koh Tang however. Although the low-risk air must also determine whether their contri- was sobering: 15 killed in action, with 3 attacks on Kompong Som and Cam- butions coalesced into a well-integrated missing and 49 wounded. These numbers bodian naval vessels were effective in strategic perspective that balanced risk to do not include an additional 23 Air Force influencing the Cambodians, the U.S. and reward for the national interest. personnel killed in a May 13 helicopter ground assault was ill advised, a risky crash during preparations for the attack.17 insertion of poorly prepared troops on Department of Defense The three Marines missing in action were an island where none of the crew was DOD, including the Joint Chiefs of initially believed to have been on the heli- ever located. The crew’s release was Staff and the commander in chief of copters; their absence was discovered only made in spite of, not because of, the Pacific Command (CINCPAC), had a

100 Recall / Abandon Ship: Revisiting the Mayaguez Incident JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 critical role to play during Mayaguez a C-130 pilot during the operation, later machine guns, and rocket-propelled decisionmaking. They had to plan for stated, “On Wednesday (early morning, grenades. Although neither of the and prepare to execute operations as May 14th DC time), I knew, or thought I more accurate estimates ever reached well as advise President Ford of his knew, from the intelligence brought back the operational commander, at least options and their military viability and by our A-7 pilot that the Mayaguez crew the IPAC estimate was available to risk as the NSC process evolved. In the was not on Koh Tang. But this was not the NSC.30 Colby often characterized first area, DOD acquitted itself well. so clear back in Washington.”27 Despite 100 troops as the upper end of enemy Assets were moved into the area quickly this new and important information, the strength. During the NSC meeting on and a true joint effort was made to focus remained on Koh Tang. May 13, he noted, “Our estimate was coordinate U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Regarding the timing of operations, that there were 2,000 in Kompong Marine Corps forces to respond to the Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger Som. There is not a large force on the crisis. On May 13, 1975, the day follow- initially reflected the cautions articulated island [Koh Tang].” When President ing the seizure of the ship, DOD pro- in the paper, informing the President that Ford responded, “Do you think we can vided an options paper to the President, “we need the morning of the 16th for a figure with 100?” Colby replied, “Yes. showing three scenarios for recovery of coordinated assault.” When Secretary of The KC [Khmer Communists] have just the SS Mayaguez and its crew.23 This State proposed an assault arrived in power. They probably have paper provided reasonable advice about on the morning of May 15, Schlesinger not had time to man the island more the timing of any attack on Koh Tang noted, “the problem with that is that fully.” The director’s written update, and/or the Mayaguez, appearing to the Coral Sea will not be there.” But as provided to the President (and briefed favor waiting until at least the morning Colby and others urged quicker action, verbally) to the NSC on May 14, did of May 16 for any assault. It noted that Schlesinger changed course, stating, “We not provide any substantial update on with such a delay, “[h]elicopter-borne will be prepared to go on the morning the Cambodian forces on Koh Tang assault operations could be conducted of the 15th.”28 By the time of the NSC itself, focusing instead on the Cam- from the deck of the [USS] Coral Sea,” meeting on May 14, the acting head of bodian order of battle at Kompong by then expected to be within miles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Som.31 This was in spite of a request Koh Tang, thus significantly lowering C. Jones, was committed to an assault at the Director of Central Intelligence the risk of conducting operations from that evening (the following morning, morning meeting on May 14 for a Thailand, 190 nautical miles distant. It Cambodian time).29 This advancement in full update of the Cambodian order also advised that the operation “be given the timeline created significant new risks of battle, which certainly should have additional time for the working of the for the operation, robbing the Marines of alerted Colby to the more accurate DIA diplomatic process.”24 an extra day to plan, forcing the helicop- estimate.32 In aggregate, the CIA direc- Unfortunately, because the DOD ters to operate from Utapao (a 1.5-hour tor’s briefs to the NSC left the impres- paper was provided to the NSC before flight from Koh Tang) rather than the sion that the Marines would encounter the sighting of crewmembers headed for USS Coral Sea, and restricting the tactical only token resistance. General Jones the Cambodian mainland, it assumed the air support available in the initial phases also seemed unconcerned when briefing crew was either aboard the Mayaguez of the operation. the proposed action on the afternoon of or on Koh Tang. There is no evidence May 14, either unaware or unconcerned that the paper was ever updated in light The Intelligence Community that his assault force would be taking of this new information. Likewise, the These risks were amplified because on heavy weapons–capable forces that discussions at the NSC on the evening CIA Director Colby and others did would leave it outgunned.33 The Joint of May 13 (after “Caucasians” had been not articulate the full extent of the Chiefs of Staff certainly mirrored the spotted being transferred to Kompong threat during the NSC meetings. U.S. confidence of on-scene commanders, Som) took no notice of the crew’s loca- intelligence produced three estimates who still had access only to the earlier tion, focusing instead on how soon an of military strength in the course of estimates of 20 soldiers with no heavy assault on Koh Tang could be launched.25 the crisis. An initial Intelligence Pacific weapons.34 Even the earliest analyses By the time of the NSC meeting on (IPAC) estimate severely underesti- of the operation concluded that intel- May 14, CIA Director William Colby mated Khmer Rouge strength on Koh ligence failures occurred at all levels.35 provided the best update available on Tang at only 10 to 20 soldiers. A May the crew’s whereabouts, advising the 13 IPAC assessment was closer, estimat- The State Department President that “the Cambodians have ap- ing 100 soldiers, with 75mm recoilless The State Department also had a role parently transported at least some of the rifles, machine guns, and rocket launch- to play during NSC meetings and was American Crew from Koh Tang Island ers. A May 12 DIA estimate was almost ably (or at least powerfully) represented to the mainland, putting them ashore at perfect, estimating that there was a by Secretary Kissinger.36 Yet Kissinger Kompong Som port at about 11:00 last total of 150 to 200 soldiers armed with seemed to focus more on military rather night, Washington time.”26 David Mets, 82mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, than diplomatic options,37 leaving this

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Hughes 101 Marine captain prepares to fire on and destroy important equipment on disabled HH-53 to prevent its capture by Cambodians (U.S. Air Force/Ronald T. Rand) key aspect of national power unex- State also had indications that the particularly well during this crisis. Indeed, plored. The only efforts by the State Cambodians were wavering and that Secretary Kissinger was the biggest advo- Department to use diplomacy consisted more time might be useful. A cable sent cate for the use of force, so much so that of providing a message to the Khmer by the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on May Christopher J. Lamb believes that he was Rouge via the People’s Republic of 14 (addressed to the State Department aware of the U.S. Embassy Tehran’s cable China, both in Washington and in and CINCPAC Hawaii, among others) and made a conscious decision not to Beijing.38 Although diplomatic commu- titled “Chinese Embassy Tehran believes share it with his NSC colleagues.44 nications with the new (and decidedly Mayaguez to be freed soon” provided anti-American) government in Phnom evidence that the Chinese were pressur- Strategic Perspective Penh were extraordinarily difficult, ing the Khmer Rouge to release the vessel If strategy is balancing ends, ways, there were potential avenues, including and crew.42 Just before the American means, and risk, then the Mayaguez broadcasts in Khmer helicopters lifted off to assault Koh Tang, Incident is a stark example of how these and Cambodian representatives in Paris the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information can become unbalanced. By failing to and Moscow. State, however, did not Service monitored a domestic radio properly account for risk, senior leaders pursue either of these avenues.39 During broadcast by the Cambodian minister of jeopardized a serious strategic setback. the initial NSC meeting, virtually all of information indicating they would release The desired (and achieved) result of Secretary Kissinger’s comments related the SS Mayaguez and order the ship to having the vessel and crew returned was to which, not whether, military actions depart Cambodian waters.43 Neither of certainly critical to the United States, needed to be taken.40 At the next day’s these nascent indications that there might reeling from geopolitical setbacks in meeting, Kissinger was absent, and be room for a repatriation of hostages Vietnam and a general public percep- Under Secretary of State for Political without military action was ever discussed tion that U.S. military power was at Affairs Joseph Sisco represented the State at the NSC. The role of State in the NSC low ebb. But the President should have Department. Sisco did not utter a word was to serve as the subject matter expert known that the military plan presented during the 45-minute meeting, and no on and advocate for diplomacy, yet the to him had huge risks for the American diplomatic options were discussed.41 record shows they did neither of these forces and presented little to no chance

102 Recall / Abandon Ship: Revisiting the Mayaguez Incident JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 of recovering the entire crew. The plan, ganization Act of 1986 and the con- forces alongside regular naval forces has as drawn up, called for assaulting Koh sequent successful joint operations of come a long way. In light of these suc- Tang in spite of the fact that no one the past several decades. Yet the issues cesses, it is hard to imagine an operation knew the location of the hostages with that plagued national leadership during as chaotic as the Mayaguez Incident in any certainty. Indeed, the evidence that the Mayaguez Incident do not seem the current joint environment.53 did exist suggested that the crew was not so antiquated when viewed alongside Yet perhaps the most enduring lessons on Koh Tang, a fact perhaps explained those that have confronted more recent of Mayaguez are those related to the abil- by the strong focus of the decisionmak- U.S. administrations: intelligence not ity of the NSC to rapidly and effectively ers on recovering the ship itself.45 They reaching the correct decisionmakers, the synthesize the collective knowledge of may also have been focused on avoiding failure of policymakers to discuss criti- the various stakeholder agencies into a a repeat of the 1968 Pueblo Incident, cal information at the NSC, policy and truly national perspective. Especially dur- a significant black eye for American operational risks that seem foolish in ing crises that occur in the “gray area” prestige.46 In any event, not carefully hindsight, and an imbalanced focus on between war and peace, the NSC must accounting for the crew’s whereabouts one instrument of national power. formulate and realistically evaluate ap- introduced serious risks to U.S. foreign Could the same mistakes be made proaches that utilize all the instruments policy. If the crew had not been released, again? Certainly the current emphasis on of national power to resolve a crisis. I the costly assault on Koh Tang would joint doctrine and joint education is of argue that it is in this area that the biggest certainly have been perceived by many as some help. The plans presented by DOD failures of Mayaguez occurred. Issues foolish and ineffective, recovering only during the Mayaguez Incident were the that were known inside each agency an empty ship and leaving the Khmer result of an embryonic joint planning (for example, the actual location of the Rouge still in possession of the crew. The process that unraveled under the stress of hostages or that a hastily assembled force crew likely would have made for useful short-fused planning efforts. My own ex- of Marines would be attacking a well- hostages for the Cambodians, even had periences as a planner at the International defended island) were never substantially the empty ship been recaptured.47 Security Force Headquarters and Interim discussed at the highest levels. The plan Perhaps more importantly, senior Joint Command in Afghanistan would to end the crisis was focused exclusively decisionmakers poorly understood the lead me to believe that we could do on the military instrument of national military risks of the assault.48 The helicop- better, especially at the tactical level. power, despite indications that diplomacy ter assault by lightly armed Marines with Likewise, important changes within the might have a role to play. Risks to mis- no combat experience into well-defended Intelligence Community have occurred sion and negative policy implications of landing zones against a battle-hardened in the past 35 years. Intelligence support mission failure were never articulated and and determined foe with heavy weaponry to operations has certainly improved, evaluated by the NSC. went in many ways better than it should and lessons learned from the terrorist Is the current interagency deci- have. It could just as easily have ended attacks on September 11, 2001, among sionmaking environment substantially with the Marines being completely over- others, has led to community-wide changed from that of 40 years ago? run.49 Although the evacuation efforts efforts to break down interagency stove- Without the congressional pressure that avoided this grim turn of events, the pipes.52 Likewise, the 1987 standup and led to Goldwater-Nichols, USSOCOM Marines left behind on Koh Tang (assum- subsequent evolution of U.S. Special and other military reforms, the NSC ing they did survive and were captured Operations Command (USSOCOM), role in the interagency decisionmaking by the Cambodians, as noted above) still which had its origins in the disastrous process has remained advisory rather could have been exploited as hostages mission to res- than directive, creating an environment and propaganda tools.50 In short, the cue American hostages held in Iran in in which individual agencies may be military assault on Koh Tang incurred April 1980, has significantly enhanced more worried about protecting their risk that was not justified to achieve the the military’s ability to rapidly and ef- equities than working toward a common ends desired. This is especially true since fectively plan such operations. In recent objective. In this environment, synthesis a more nuanced approach might have years, USSOCOM and the Joint Special of information and the instruments of yielded the same result; especially telling Operations Command have shown an national power must occur on an ad hoc is that a more multifaceted approach was ability to quickly assimilate intelligence basis. Equally troubling, such disconnects not even considered.51 and manage risk to execute short-fused at the strategic level also create obstacles operations, such as the much publicized to collaboration in the field. Recent Conclusions Operation Neptune Spear, which resulted operations in Iraq and Afghanistan bear One can be forgiven for viewing the in the death of Osama bin Laden in May witness to the ongoing challenges in get- Mayaguez Incident as a relic of a 2011. The actions against the Somali ting the State Department and military bygone era; after all, it occurred nearly pirates who hijacked the MV Maersk staffs to work together effectively to 40 years ago, before the Goldwater- Alabama in 2009 also demonstrate that integrate the instruments of national Nichols Department of Defense Reor- the employment of special operations power, leading some to say that “the time

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Hughes 103 the most seasoned joint planner or com- mander needs to check his assumptions and ensure that new data do not conflict with the underpinnings of their opera- tional design. Since the SS Mayaguez crisis, the need for carefully integrated interagency operations that balance all el- ements of national power and judiciously assess risk on an ongoing basis has only increased. However, many national lead- ers believe we are no better at meeting such demands today than we were 40 years ago. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers argues, we “have to realize that the United States’ interagency and national security apparatus, as currently organized, can’t deal effectively with the threats of the twenty-first century.”55 Perhaps, then, what the Mayaguez Incident teaches us— and we have been slow to learn—is that better national security decisionmaking will not occur simply by electing more talented leaders. It requires serious orga- nizational reforms similar to those that have served to improve joint planning and special operations. JFQ

Notes

1 Koh is Khmer for island, so the article avoids the redundant construction Koh Tang Island. 2 The American public and press gener- ally approved of the operation, and President Ford’s rating in the Gallup Poll increased from Marines reboard USS Harold E. Holt (DE-1974) from SS Mayaguez after merchant ship’s recovery, Koh 39 to 51 percent. See The Kennedy School of Tang Island, Cambodia, May 14, 1975 (DOD/Michael Chan) Government, The Mayaguez Incident (Boston: President and Fellows of Harvard College, has come to look to a new, more effective to focus on singular solutions (military or 1983), 22. operational model.”54 While the NSC has otherwise) that do not take into account 3 President Gerald Ford’s pardon of former certainly contributed to unity of perspec- all aspects of complex policy challenges. President in September 1974, tive at the strategic level, it continues to In the interim, joint leaders would be along with a poor economy and foreign policy setbacks, had made him an unpopular fall well short of unity of effort among well advised to ensure that interagency President. Ford’s approval rating was only agencies, which is essential to effective stakeholders are present, critical, and 39 percent in , and Americans did strategy and decisionmaking. Instead, we vocal in planning efforts, and that advice not generally view him as the solution to the rely on “lead-follow” relationships be- provided to national leadership reflects Nation’s woes. See Robert J. Mahoney, The tween agencies, often leading to strategic a whole-of-government perspective. Mayaguez Incident: Testing America’s Resolve in the Post-Vietnam Era (Lubbock: Texas Tech solutions dominated by one instru- During Mayaguez, agencies were cer- University Press, 2011), 3–5. ment of power. Until we have a reliable tainly present at NSC discussions, but 4 The Kennedy School of Government, 1. framework that integrates the resources they fell short in the critical and vocal 5 Government Accountability Office each element of government brings to categories; diplomatic cables were not (GAO), The Seizure of the Mayaguez: A Case bear, we will continue to have strategic evaluated, the whereabouts of hostages Study in Crisis Managment (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 63–64. blind spots. These can lead national and enemies’ dispositions were not fully 6 These efforts at least appeared unsuccess- decisionmakers, like those in the Ford ad- discussed, and perilous military plans ful as the Chinese returned diplomatic notes, ministration during the Mayaguez crisis, were left unquestioned. Likewise, even but some scholars speculate that some of these

104 Recall / Abandon Ship: Revisiting the Mayaguez Incident JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 communications may have reached the Khmer unreliable tactical communications (especially ment of State, U.S. Embassy Tehran Cable government, possibly via its embassy in Beijing. across Service lines); inadequate pre-mission 14MAY750856GMT: “Chinese Embassy See Richard G. Head, Frisco W. Short, and planning; employment of forces outside of their Tehran Believes Mayaguez to Be Freed Soon,” Robert C. McFarlane, Crisis Resolution: Presi- training and doctrine; chaotic and incomplete Digital National Security Archive, 1975. dential Decision Making in the Mayaguez and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; 43 GAO, 124. Korean Confrontations (Boulder, CO: Westview and poor plans for supporting fires were noted 44 Lamb, 123. See also Christopher J. Lamb Press, 1978), 145; see also Mahoney, 216. in several immediate reviews of the action. See and Alexandra A. Singer, The Mayaguez Crisis 7 Gerald R. Ford, National Security Council GAO, 59–61; CINCPAC Command History, Mini Case Study (Washington, DC: Project on [NSC] Minutes, May 13th, 10:22am, 1975 10–20; and Patrick, 21–22. National Security Reform Case Study, 2009), (Washington, DC: The White House, 1975), 2. 23 Department of Defense, Possible Scenarios 4–7. 8 GAO, 115–126. for Recovery of Ship and Crew, Options Paper 45 Lamb, 81. For a more detailed analysis of 9 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 13th 10:40pm, 2. (Quantico, VA: Ford Library, 1975), 2. the tension between the objectives of ship and For specifics of the aircraft and pilots’ observa- 24 Ibid., 2. crew, see also Lamb and Singer, 5–7. tions, see also Commander in Chief, U.S. 25 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 13th, 10:40pm, 46 Lamb, 202. See also Lucien S. Vanden- Pacific Command Headquarters (CINCPAC 1–23. brouke, Perilous Options (New York: Oxford HQ), Command History Branch, CINCPAC 26 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 14th, 3:52pm, 3. University Press, 1993), 83–84. Command History, 1975, Appendix VI, Top 27 David A. Mets, “Last Flight from Koh 47 Vandenbrouke makes a strong case that Secret, Declassified May 8, 1980 (San Fran- Tang: The Mayaguez Incident a Generation President Ford and others were clearly aware cisco: CINCPAC HQ, 1976), 17. Hereafter, Later,” Joint Force Quarterly 45 (2nd Quarter that this was a real, perhaps even likely, out- CINCPAC Command History. 2007), 112. come. Vandenbrouke, 83. 10 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 13th 10:40pm, 28 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 13th, 10:40pm, 48 Vandenbrouke notes that “[u]nder the 2–5. The boat in question was a Thai fishing 12–14. best of circumstances, the difficulty of conduct- vessel with Cambodian guards; the terrified 29 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 14th, 3:52pm, ing a successful operation with units that have Thais wanted to turn around, but were forced 7–9. never worked together, drawn from services on at gunpoint by their Cambodian captors. 30 Christopher J. Lamb, Belief Systems that never train together, is great.” He goes See Ralph Wetterhahn, The Last Battle: The and Decision Making in the Mayaguez Crisis on to detail the NSC’s poor understanding of Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1989), these risks. Ibid., 88–90. War (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 129–130. For additional details on intelligence 49 The Joint Chiefs, After Action Report, Inc., 2001), 104–106. messages at the CINCPAC level, see also Ma- 19. 11 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 13th, 10:40pm, honey, 251–255. 50 These Marines were initially listed as 5–23. 31 Director of Central Intelligence, National MIA, and their status was later changed to 12 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 14th, 3:52pm, Security Council Intelligence Briefing, “Cam- KIA. Ibid., 21. See also GAO, 65. When they 1–27. bodian Forces during Mayaguez Incident,” were initially discovered missing, a search by 13 CINCPAC Command History, 19. U.S. National Archives and Records Adminis- the crew of the USS Wilson was unsuccessful. A 14 GAO, 89–92. tration (NARA), 1975. proposed SEAL Team insertion to search fur- 15 Urey W. Patrick, The Mayaguez Operation 32 Director of Central Intelligence, Memo- ther was considered but voted down. Mahoney, (Washington, DC: Center for Naval Analy- randum, “The Rescue of SS Mayaguez and Its 179–180. sis–Marine Corps Operational Analysis Group, Crew,” NARA, 1975, 12. 51 While decisionmakers during the Maya- April 1977), 10–13. 33 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 14th, 3:52pm, guez Incident were justifiably concerned about 16 GAO, 125 7–9. a long-lasting hostage standoff such as had 17 CINCPAC Command History, 19. 34 In addition to multiple intelligence esti- occurred with the USS Pueblo in 1968, a more 18 Wetterhahn believes, based on interviews mates, a hastily organized command and con- recent example, the 2001 Hainan Incident, in with a Cambodian who commanded the Khmer trol structure contributed to poor situational which a U.S. EP-3 ARIES II crew was held by troops at Koh Tang, that awareness. In at least one instance, an Air Force the People’s Republic of China, demonstrates Joseph N. Hargrove was wounded, captured intelligence officer who had access to higher that a “pause” for diplomacy can be more ef- shortly after the initial battle, and then execut- enemy troop strength numbers was rebuffed fective than a purely military solution, especially ed by gunshot. According to the same source, when he attempted to provide them to those when backed by a credible military response. Private First Class Gary Hall and Private Danny planning the assault. See Mahoney, 251–255. 52 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “The Cultural G. Marshall were captured by a Khmer patrol 35 Patrick, 21. Revolution in Intelligence: Interim Report,” on the island some days after the battle and 36 “It is not surprising to find that Ford, Washington Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2008), 47–61. transported to Kompong Som where, a week pushed into office by the Watergate scandal, 53 Sean D. Naylor, “A Triumph for JSOC,” later, on orders from Phnom Penh, they were relied heavily on Kissinger to formulate foreign Defense News, May 9, 2011, 11. beaten to death with a B40 grenade launcher. policy. . . he was undoubtedly strongly influ- 54 Dennis Blair, Ronald Neumann, Eric See Wetterhahn, 277–289. enced by Kissinger’s opinion.” See Lamb, 63. Olsen, “Fixing Fragile States,” The National 19 Head, Short, and McFarlane, 147–148. 37 Lamb notes, “A diplomatic settlement Interest, September–October 2014. See also B. 20 On the other hand, air attacks, both on rated a very poor second on the list of American Baylor, J. Burington, B. Davis, R. Goehring, Cambodian naval vessels and on Kompong Som priorities, especially for the Secretary of State, “Iraq: A Case Study in Building Civil-Military by the Coral Sea, did appear to influence Cam- who headed off such a development as best he Capacity, 2007–2010,” Prism 1, no. 3 (2011), bodian decisionmakers. See Mahoney, 157. could.” Lamb, 246. See also Mahoney, 25. 137–138; Rudra Chaudhuri and Theo Farrell, 21 Eighteen Marines, Sailors, and Airmen 38 GAO, 66. “Campaign Disconnect: Operational Prog- were killed in the attack on Koh Tang, although 39 Ibid., 67–68. ress and Strategic Obstacles in Afghanistan three Marines were initially listed as MIA, with 40 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 12th, 12:05pm. 2009–2011,” International Affairs 87, no. 2 50 wounded. See After Action Report: Rescue 41 Ford, NSC Minutes, May 13th, 10:22am. (2011), 284–287. of the SS Mayaguez and Its Crew (Washington, 42 Although the cable’s insight came via a 55 Richard B. Myers, Eyes on the Horizon: DC: The Joint Staff, May 19, 1975), 21. Pakistani diplomat, it still should have given Serving on the Front Lines of National Security 22 A poor command and control structure; decisionmakers some degree of pause. Depart- (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 301.

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Hughes 105 National Insecurity: American him much injustice. He has also proved Leadership in an Age of Fear that he can clearly and dispassionately By David J. Rothkopf determine what makes for an effective PublicAffairs, 2014 foreign policy process and, conversely, 496 pp. $29.99 what practices lead to inevitable disap- ISBN: 978-1610393409 pointment. This reputation is reinforced with the publication of his latest book, and National Insecurity: American Leadership What Good Is Grand Strategy? in an Age of Fear. While Bob Woodward Power and Purpose in American has access to senior sources for his books, Statecraft from Harry S. Rothkopf has the trust of—and therefore Truman to George W. Bush access to—the Bush and Obama adminis- By Hal Brands trations in order to tell their stories. Cornell University Press, 2014 Rothkopf recounts the challenges 288 pp. $29.95 faced by subsequent U.S. administra- ISBN: 978-0801452468 tions, beginning with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and continuing to the current Reviewed by Brian C. Collins confrontation with ISIL, and examines America’s inconsistent response in this new era in which, he states, “Our nation magine the following scenario: [sees] threats everywhere.” Furthermore, The President of the United States he shares the views of national security commits our military to confronting I advisors who almost universally attribute a difficult challenge in the Middle East. the policy missteps of the last decade to With mounting losses and growing the inability of the wider national security economic costs, the American people community to embrace creative strategic and their representatives in Congress thinking. become increasingly critical of and Strategic thinking manifests itself as, vocal in their opposition to administra- of course, strategy. The strategic hurdles tion policies. This criticism centers on faced by the Bush and Obama adminis- charges that the President and his advi- trations in the Middle East—“the place sors are operating without a clear plan of where,” according to Rothkopf, “good action and have no strategy to speak of. intentions go to die”—were many and It is a scenario that has played out are particularly noteworthy. Bush, for ex- numerous times: in 1983 in the wake ample, embraced a two-state solution as a of President Ronald Reagan’s decision means for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian to intervene in Lebanon; in 2006 as the conflict only after he realized that there U.S. occupation of Iraq, under President was little choice otherwise if peace were George W. Bush, ground on; and now as to be achieved. The lack of a consistent President Barack Obama grapples with plan and a sporadic approach to engage- how to confront and defeat the Islamic ment with both parties, however, resulted State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). What in upset allies (Israelis) and the electoral should we make of these examples? Is legitimization of a stated enemy (Hamas). having a strategy as important as many Rothkopf argues that inconsistency presume, or is claiming a lack of strategy has likewise plagued the reaction of the simply an overblown excuse to score po- Obama administration to the events of litical points? Two recent books make the the Arab Spring. Despite delivering an compelling case that not only is having a inspiring speech in Cairo near the start of strategy important, but it must be adapt- his first term, the promise the people of able and modest if it is to consistently the Middle East perceived failed to mate- produce positive policy outcomes. rialize. In particular, the Egyptian people While it would be correct to label found the official American response to David Rothkopf as a historian and a keen the revolution that began in their country observer of the U.S. national security in 2011 to be confusing and somewhat apparatus, such a simple description does schizophrenic. Rothkopf describes an

106 Book Reviews JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 administration struggling without a clear The incompatibility of desire and plan for what it should do. Expressions of reality was not unique to the Bush ad- NEW from support by the Obama administration for ministration, however. Indeed, for all the regime of Egyptian President Hosni of their foreign policy acumen, Richard NDU Press Mubarak were followed by rhetorical Nixon and his National Security Advisor, for the Center for Strategic Research support for the opposition democracy Henry Kissinger, also are cited by Brands Strategic Forum 288 movement, creating an atmosphere of as having aspired to unattainable goals. The Rising Terrorist Threat in incredible frustration and confusion. This proves to be the strongest theme of Tanzania: Domestic Islamist Militancy Despite Obama’s good intentions, the Brands’s book and is best captured in the and Regional Threats Egyptian military, proponents of secular last of his 10 suggestions for approaching by Andre LeSage democracy, and Islamist factions today the challenge of strategy development share a common mistrust of the United and execution: Keep expectations realis- The growing States. tic. As he writes, “Strategy . . . can never number Strategy is meant not only to define be a game of perfect; it can only be a of militant intention, but also to articulate the ways game of good enough.” Islamist and means to achieve stated aims. In Together, these two books clearly attacks in What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power demonstrate that having a clear and Tanzania and Purpose in American Statecraft from concise strategy increases the chances for demonstrates Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush, policy success. Any strategy, however, a nascent Hal Brands helps readers understand must also be nuanced enough to permit terrorist the fundamental elements of an effective flexibility and modest enough to be threat that can undermine peace strategy. A renowned academic at Duke achievable. Both Rothkopf and Brands and stability in yet another East University and an accomplished author, do an admirable job—intentionally or African country. Local and regional Brands answers the question “What does not—of confronting cynics who claim dynamics could create a “perfect a good strategy look like?” He begins that strategy development is a wasted storm” that would exacerbate with a working definition of grand strat- effort because of the dynamic nature of the threat. If its issues remain egy and examines the difficulties common world events. JFQ unaddressed, Tanzania is likely to its formulation and execution. He then to experience the same security examines in detail four cases, centered on trends as Kenya, where, with the the administrations of Presidents Harry Lieutenant Colonel Brian C. Collins, USMC help of external support, local (Ret.), recently concluded a 20-year career as a capabilities have been developed Truman, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Combat-Decorated Infantry Officer. He serves as and George W. Bush, that outline strat- the Director for Policy at Business Executives for to conduct increasingly deadly egy from birth to execution and through National Security in Washington, DC. attacks that affect U.S. and other to assessment. Even more critically, they foreign interests. In response, the bring into sharp focus the advantages of a United States needs to focus policy- clear and concise grand strategy, and the level attention on the situation deleterious consequences of a poor—or in Tanzania and invest additional even absent—strategy. intelligence, law enforcement, and The foreign policy of the Bush ad- strategic communications efforts ministration, for example, illustrates the to combat the spread of violent disastrous results of a poorly planned extremism. and executed strategy. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, Bush implemented a new grand strategy of aggressive democratization in the Middle East generally and in Iraq specifically. Although U.S. goals in Iraq were clearly communicated, Bush and his advisors failed to apply appropriate resources and take the required actions to achieve the goals that had been set. This included an American military victory in Iraq that “was incompatible with the type of war it Visit the NDU Press Web site for wanted to wage.” more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Book Reviews 107 ests in a multigenerational war against that the United States has lost its will, violent extremism. commitment, and sense of collective Reader alert: this is not a feel-good sacrifice for the latter. But what “victory” book for military officers, civil servants, looks like in this age of global insurgency or government officials (of either party) remains as elusive in the real world as it who want to rationalize the and does in the book. its putative contributions to the broader Nevertheless, Kilcullen is at his best global counterterrorism campaign. when sharing his strategic thoughts, Kilcullen calls Iraq “the greatest strate- which are presented around five major gic screw-up since Hitler’s invasion of themes. Russia,” and the start of a great strategic Kilcullen contends that by 2005 the unravelling that continues unabated United States should have been in full today. As he puts it, “The West’s strategy stride implementing a counterterrorism after 9/11—derailed by the invasion “disaggregation” strategy that he helped of Iraq, exacerbated by our addiction write. The strategy’s core tenet was that to killing terrorist leaders, hastened by the defeat of al Qaeda required linkages precipitate withdrawal from Iraq and between various groups in the al Qaeda Afghanistan, opportunism in Libya, and global network to be systematically passivity in the face of catastrophe in broken by targeting the “central players’ Syria—carried the seeds of disaster within ability to control their franchises, and it. And until that strategy changes, those partner with local governments to defeat disasters will continue.” This from a man threats in their own jurisdictions.” These Blood Year: The Unraveling of who advised General David Petraeus in partnerships would involve “calibrated ca- Western Counterterrorism Iraq and served as counselor to Secretary pacity building” with local governments of State Condoleezza Rice. On this note, to help reduce or eliminate preexisting By David Kilcullen readers looking for a primer on how to grievances used by al Qaeda to attract re- Oxford University Press, 2016 speak truth to power will not be disap- cruits and elicit support from sympathetic 288 pp. $24.95 pointed. Kilcullen is unsparing in his populations—in other words, nation- ISBN: 978-0190600549 criticism of senior leaders, U.S. partners, building. Kilcullen, however, refrains Reviewed by Thomas C. Greenwood and those who believe selective strategic from calling it that. engagement (my terms, not his) versus The disaggregation strategy was never active (his words) is possible fully implemented, however, because the tudents of strategy and defense in a world without . twin insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan policy who have closely tracked Kilcullen quickly hooks the reader dominated the policy debate, becoming, S the since 9/11 by recalling the capture of Mosul, Iraq’s in Kilcullen’s words, “a hole in the heart will find David Kilcullen’s new book second-largest city, by ISIL in June of Western strategy” because it distracted both enlightening and discouraging. 2014, a mere 12 days after President leaders from focusing on other virulent It is enlightening because he carefully Barack Obama announced to West Point al Qaeda franchises around the world. weaves years of field study, scholarly cadets that they might be the first class Perhaps. Given that Iraq and Afghanistan research, and thoughtful analysis into a since 9/11 not to see combat in Iraq or were where our troops were engaged, compelling work that is rich in insights Afghanistan. Kilcullen is perplexed, if though, it is possible that both countries and brutally honest in its judgments. not aghast, that the President thought would have remained the top priorities Yet it is discouraging nonetheless. After the war against al Qaeda was largely of the day, receiving a preponderance of taking the reader on a rich journey over. President Obama, in fact, failed to attention and resources irrespective of the through the rise and fall of al Qaeda, mention ISIL—the new threat that was proclaimed strategy. the emergence of the Islamic State of already wreaking havoc in Syria, Iraq, and Kilcullen also criticizes the tactics Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an analysis the broader Middle East—a single time in and operational design used to fight al of the inconclusive campaigns in Iraq his speech. How could any commander Qaeda and ISIL. He argues that the and Afghanistan, the collapse of order in chief with the largest intelligence ap- light counterterrorism footprint initially in the Middle East, the brutal civil war paratus in the world be so naïve about an used with success by the George W. in Syria, and the largest dislocation of ongoing conflict? Bush administration in Afghanistan was since World War II, he offers The West Point speech serves as not the correct approach in Iraq, Libya, the reader few policy recommendations Kilcullen’s backdrop for one of the Yemen, and elsewhere. Why? Because of on how we might rediscover strategic book’s key observations: leaving a war its over-reliance on the use of unmanned clarity and advance U.S. national inter- is not the same as winning it. He posits aerial vehicles, surveillance, and raids to

108 Book Reviews JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 kill or capture high-value targets. Instead, to ISIL’s sophisticated use of social media Kilcullen believes more robust ground to mobilize mass support. New from forces were essential to helping protect Moreover, the description of ISIL’s local populations from terrorists, training warfighting tactics alone is worth the pur- NDU Press and advising indigenous security forces, chase price of the book. Here, Kilcullen for the Center for the Study of and bolstering host-nation capacity for is masterful in illustrating the combined Chinese Military Affairs self-governance. In his view, more boots arms prowess of an army that employs Strategic Forum 289 on the ground would have engendered guerrilla (irregular) operations to entice An Empirical Analysis of Claimant trust-based interpersonal relationships its enemies to mass into lucrative targets Tactics in the South China Sea within and among tribes. This would before striking with the speed, shock, and by Christopher D. Yung and have provided more space for security firepower traditionally ascribed to only Patrick forces and local governing structures to the best modern ground forces in the McNulty acquire increased legitimacy with the West. Given that no military force in the China, local populations, thereby marginalizing Middle East today is capable of matching Taiwan, shadow governments being established ISIL in combined arms operations, by Vietnam, the by the terrorists. what mechanism do we seal its defeat? Philippines, Kilcullen cites the 2007 Iraq Surge As noted previously, Kilcullen con- , as evidence that light counterterrorism cludes his book with the discouraging and Brunei operations are ineffective. He correctly (but accurate) assessment that U.S. have used notes that the Surge, rather than the vic- counterterrorism strategy has failed and a a wide variety of tactics to protect tory it is often portrayed as, was instead complete re-think is therefore warranted. and advance their maritime territo- a moral and tactical necessity, as Iraq True enough. And while the insights rial claims in the South China Sea. and the United States were unable to he outlines in the epilogue serve as use- China is the most active user of the convert military success into political ful maxims, they are not realistic policy nine categories of tactics identified stability. Nonetheless, he contends that if prescriptions for a nation that has other in this paper, with the exception of the United States had not left Iraq pre- priorities, including rising strategic pow- legal actions, and accounts for more maturely, a different outcome may have ers, to worry about. At the same time, than half of all military and paramili- emerged. the country remains war weary enough tary actions since 1995. This reflects wishful thinking on the to stay in denial about what will be re- The unclassified database used author’s part because political stability quired to defeat ISIL, and averts its eyes in this analysis undercounts military was never attainable so long as Nouri al- from a humanitarian crisis that threatens and actions, but cap- Maliki, then the prime minister of Iraq, European unity. Given these forces at tures enough activity to provide a remained in office as Tehran’s surrogate. play, any future counterterrorism road- representative sample. A classified Furthermore, it is not self-evident how map should start with the proposition version that captures more activ- the United States could have deposed offered by security expert Audrey Cronin: ity would improve the potential him earlier had the decision to do so “Wars pursued at odds with political real- to develop the database into an been made. This is the dark side of coun- ity cannot be won.” To do otherwise risks Indications and Warning tool to terinsurgency and nation-building: the repeating the folly of the last 15 years. JFQ assist in monitoring and managing reliance upon weak or corrupt leaders. tensions in the South China Sea. The chapters dealing with an adap- tive enemy are among the book’s best. Colonel Thomas Greenwood, USMC (Ret.), is on the Editorial Board of Joint Force Quarterly. Kilcullen describes how ISIL emerged He served 31 years as a Marine Infantry Officer, from the ashes of al Qaeda, found sanctu- including in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and has ary in Syria, and began waging war to served on the staff of the National Security Council for three Presidents. establish its “Caliphate.” Equally riveting, however, is his analysis of guerrilla terror- ism (that is, infiltrating attackers into a target country rather than organizing and training them first in other countries), urban siege, remote radicalization, and leaderless resistance. Space does not allow for a full dissection, but serious readers will note the evolution of the threat from Visit the NDU Press Web site for the days of Osama bin Laden hiding out more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu in a in the mountains of Afghanistan

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Book Reviews 109 The U.S.-China Military become more professional, better edu- Scorecard: Forces, Geography, cated, and more highly trained. and the Evolving Balance But how are they doing, really? Both of Power 1996–2017 of these excellent books document, By Eric Heginbotham et al. in convincing detail, the growth of an RAND Corporation, 2015 increasingly formidable Chinese force 430 pp. $61.00 posture. Neither concludes that China ISBN: 978-0833082190 has caught up with, much less surpassed, U.S. military capabilities that can be and brought to bear around Taiwan or the China’s Military Power: South China Sea, the two scenarios at Assessing Current and the core of each book’s assessment. They Future Capabilities make clear, however, that the days when By Roger Cliff the United States could cavalierly sail Cambridge University Press, 2015 two aircraft carriers into the seas around 362 pp. $32.99 Taiwan, as it did in 1996, confident that ISBN: 978-1107103542 the PLA was virtually helpless to do any- thing about them, are long gone. Reviewed by Thomas McNaugher In keeping with its title, the RAND report rates the U.S.-China military balance over time (1996, 2003, 2010, ver the past 20 years China’s 2017) and across 10 mission areas: military spending, a low priority Chinese attacks on air bases; relative air in the 1980s, has grown, in real O superiority; U.S. airspace penetration; terms, at roughly 11 percent per year. U.S. attacks on air bases; Chinese anti- At the same time, the focus of China’s surface warfare; U.S. anti-surface warfare; military strategy has pivoted sharply U.S. counter-space; Chinese counter- from an army-centric “people’s war space; cyberwar; and nuclear stability. under modern conditions” aimed to RAND’s analysts use an array of models blunt a Soviet attack from the north- to assess the outcome of conflict in each west to an air and naval force–centric mission area, highlighting the changing emphasis on “local wars under informa- balance over time in “stoplight” charts tionized conditions” along the coun- that convey U.S. or Chinese advantage. try’s long coast, with the United States U.S. readers will be pleased at the as the principal adversary. It has been total absence of “red stoplights” (major a prodigious transformation, modeled Chinese advantage) on these charts, even after—and surely provoked by—the in 2017. Indeed, RAND finds that the U.S. military’s own transformation. U.S. military’s ability to attack Chinese And from a distance, China seems air bases (should the President choose to be doing remarkably well. A largely to do so) has actually improved since obsolete inventory of 1950s Soviet 1996, due in large part to the purchase of weaponry—“the world’s largest mili- stealth aircraft and a number of standoff tary museum,” as one wag put it—has missiles. Still, in the Taiwan scenario, been replaced by an array of far more all major U.S. advantages disappear sophisticated weapons: a prototype “fifth after 2003. The authors estimate that in generation” fighter, an aircraft carrier today’s environment, “a war for Taiwan (with one or two more on order), diesel would be a short, sharp, and probably and nuclear submarines, air defense desperate affair with significant losses on and surface-to-surface missiles of ever- both sides” (p. 332). Even more alarm- increasing range and accuracy including ing, they see “a series of tipping points” the notorious DF-21C, and an antiship in China’s favor that might, in the Taiwan ballistic missile meant to keep U.S. car- scenario, “come as early as 2020” (p. riers outside the so-called First Island 342). Chain. On the personnel front, a shrink- U.S. forces fare better in the scenario ing People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has involving the Spratly Islands, according

110 Book Reviews JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 to the authors, because “the PLA’s abil- experience since the decidedly unmemo- and wisely in a broad range of capabili- ity to control military events diminishes rable invasion of Vietnam in 1979. ties aimed at handling “local wars under rapidly beyond the unrefueled range of Where data are not readily available, informationized conditions,” leaving jet fighters and diesel submarines” (p. Cliff gets creative. Unable to survey little out of its investment portfolio. 322), and U.S. platforms have more Chinese soldiers about their military cul- (Moreover, it helps to be behind as the room to maneuver around these islands ture, for example, he instead gathers the second mover; the U.S. military has than they do around Taiwan. Neither views of former U.S. military attachés to charted the course here fairly well.) While China’s “Great Wall of Sand” that it is Beijing. The results are internally consis- the Chinese are moving forward, they building in the South China Sea nor its tent and plausible, but not quite the real “aren’t there yet.” Recently announced new carrier make much difference against thing. It is no wonder that we so often military reforms will facilitate further U.S. forces. Their value, one assumes, lies settle for counting hardware and things, development by creating what amounts mainly in pressuring the local states. despite the obvious limitations. to combatant commanders in five military Roger Cliff reaches a roughly similar Like RAND’s authors, Cliff runs theaters, each with the power to train and view of the U.S.-China military balance, through hypothetical “wars” over Taiwan plan jointly for serious contingencies. albeit from a different angle and using and the Spratly Islands, deducting 20 per- Changes in China’s military forces, mostly different evidence. Unsatisfied cent from China’s presumed quantitative its more aggressive behavior (especially with the longstanding tendency to as- effectiveness to account for its organiza- in the South China Sea), and Asia’s sess adversaries by counting systems and tional shortcomings. It is perhaps for this economic dynamism have all encour- people, Cliff wants to know if the PLA reason that his conclusion is slightly rosier aged a needed U.S. “rebalance” toward can actually use its new and more modern than RAND’s: The United States and Asia. Such a rebalance is hard to afford, systems to their full capacity. He adapts Taiwan together can stymie a Chinese however, when U.S. defense spending the U.S. military’s DOTMLPF (doc- attack on Taiwan without striking bases continues to emerge, almost as an after- trine, organization, training, materiel, on the Chinese mainland. (In fairness, thought, from a squeeze between tax leadership and education, personnel, and although the RAND team models attacks cutters and entitlement defenders. While facilities) framework and adds organi- on Chinese air bases, they make clear both books are aimed at defense experts zational culture. Devoting one chapter that the decision to strike inside China and will make richly rewarding reading to assessing each factor as it has evolved “would be made at the highest political for that audience, one hopes they realize since the 1990s, Cliff concludes that so level” and would be based partly on po- a much wider readership as well. JFQ far, at least, China’s aspirations to field litical considerations.) a modern, high-tech force have outrun Although the United States “wins” its organizational capabilities. The PLA’s in these models, there is little comfort Dr. Thomas McNaugher is Senior Visiting Professor and Director of Studies at the organizational structure and culture dis- in these “victories” for U.S. military Georgetown University Security Studies Program. courage the flexibility and independence analysts. Cliff and RAND’s authors agree: needed to run the kind of “disjointed, China is performing impressively as it non-linear operations” U.S. forces dem- works to catch up to the United States onstrated in 1991 and 2003. militarily. Cliff identifies no “tipping Cliff’s approach is a necessary cor- point,” but it is clear that warfare around rective to the desire of military analysts Taiwan is destined to become even more to count things, and he brings to it a unpredictable in the years ahead. That remarkable command of the literature fact inevitably brings nuclear weapons on military effectiveness generally and into the picture. The United States has China’s military specifically. Where data gone from near nonchalance about its are available, his chapters yield important ability to defend Taiwan conventionally insights; the education levels of China’s to concerns about a scenario in which soldiers, for example, have been rising, the United States and China would in- and by 2020 the PLA overall will be evitably have to manage strategic risk in better educated than American soldiers the fight. That change, one suspects, has (p. 119). In addition, the PLA’s training done more to raise questions about U.S. has become more realistic, even incor- “extended deterrence” in East Asia than porating the use of “opposing forces” modest changes in China’s nuclear forces. for ground, air, and air defense units (p. More broadly, by charting the evolu- 194), although it scarcely emphasizes tion of China’s military capability over jointness (p. 133). Above all, however, time, both books highlight the seemingly the PLA lacks any serious combat relentless nature of China’s military de- velopment. Beijing has invested heavily

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Book Reviews 111 U.S. Marines with Special-Purpose Marine Air- Ground Task Force-Crisis Response–Africa and Royal Marines with 45 Commando clear rooms during combined operation part of exercise Blue Raptor in Frasselli, France, November 20, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Keonaona C. Paulo)

The Multinational Interoperability Council Enhancing Coalition Operations

By Michelle L. Pryor, Thomas Labouche, Mario Wilke, and Charles C. Pattillo, Jr.

hroughout history, coalitions operation as part of an alliance or coali- multinational forces is imperative to have played an important role in tion, rather than engaging in operations achieving mission success. To be suc- T military operations. In today’s on their own.1 Whether the operation cessful in the anticipated complex and globalized world, nations are becom- involves an established alliance or an ad shifting operating environment, coali- ing even more likely to take part in an hoc coalition, interoperability between tion forces must identify and address potential strategic and operational challenges and interoperability concerns Colonel Michelle L. Pryor, USAF, is the Joint Staff J3 Chief of Multinational Operations Division and well in advance. This requires an invest- Multinational Interoperability Council Executive Secretariat. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Labouche, ment in areas of common doctrine French Army (Foreign Legion), is a Liaison Officer to the Joint Staff J3 Multinational Interoperability development, coalition planning, exer- Council. Lieutenant Colonel Mario Wilke, German , is a Liaison Officer to the Joint Staff J3 Multinational Interoperability Council. Charles C. Pattillo, Jr., is the Deputy Chief for the Multinational cises, and experimentation. Early iden- Operations Division and Multinational Interoperability Council Executive Secretariat. tification of the potential challenges

112 Joint Doctrine / The Multinational Interoperability Council JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 can improve the speed and quality of uncertain, complex, and dynamic, and we focus beyond interoperability to embrace decisionmaking and enhance unity of must continue to adapt to these changes.6 a more inclusive look at challenges within effort within a coalition. The Multina- To respond to these threats, coalition contemporary operations. The MIC also tional Interoperability Council (MIC), members must have an awareness, retained its focus to: led by senior operators of the member understanding, and appreciation of the facilitate the formation of coalitions nations, focuses on understanding and other participating nations and organiza- •• by identifying and mitigating strate- addressing contemporary strategic and tions capabilities within the context of gic inhibitors operational challenges and risks. multinational/coalition operations. By set the conditions for stronger coali- understanding each other’s capabilities •• tions and enhanced interoperability Focus on Coalition Operations and having an awareness of identified for future operations Today, many nations are working obstacles to overcome, coalition members promote national actions to resolve together in various coalition efforts can work together more effectively and •• issues related to coalition operations throughout the world. Moreover, maximize the benefits of coalition opera- and interoperability support for coalition operations within tions. This is particularly true in the case provide a range of accessible peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and of an ad hoc coalition where members •• information to enhance coalition military conflict continues to grow. may not have trained together extensively operations From a doctrinal standpoint, the U.S. during peacetime. By fostering a coalition collaborate with other multinational National Security Strategy emphasizes operating culture, the MIC intends to •• interoperability fora. the importance of engaging with our identify and address potential operational allies and partners as well as other challenges now rather than waiting until To be a MIC member, a nation must state partners, nonstate and private a crisis. demonstrate the competence and capabil- actors, and international institutions.2 ity to lead a coalition and multinational This engagement helps advance both The Multinational operation, evidenced by leadership and political and military objectives. Key Interoperability Council involvement in recent coalition opera- advantages to operating as a coalition The MIC provides a unique, senior tions; the willingness to commit resources include an increased level of accept- operator–led multinational forum to to leading and/or supporting coalition ability and legitimacy to military action, understand and address contemporary operations; and the willingness to commit burden-sharing of operational costs, strategic and operational challenges and sufficient personnel and resources to par- shared resources, shared expertise, and risks. The MIC’s objectives are to build ticipate in all MIC meetings. The MIC niche capabilities.3 Merging the capa- relationships to enhance mutual trust aims to remain responsive, flexible, and bilities of different military forces adds and understanding of national perspec- credible in understanding and addressing depth through strength in numbers and tives and to influence the development contemporary strategic and operational breadth through additional capabilities, of operational practices to enable more challenges and risks. To keep this quality, as well as providing access to national effective coalition operations. the MIC needs to have a finite number of and/or regional infrastructure, logistics, The MIC originated from an October member nations.7 and information.4 1996 multinational symposium entitled The MIC also maintains a close work- While many advantages exist for mul- “C3I for the Coalition Task Force.” ing relationship with the North Atlantic tinational and coalition operations, these Ministries and departments of defense Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied operations gather diverse entities whose participants from Australia, Canada, Command Transformation, NATO Allied national interests, military capabilities, France, Germany, the , Command Operations, and European definitions of success, and risk tolerance and the United States recommended the Union Military Staff, as well as New may differ. Additionally, multinational establishment of an operator-led council Zealand. Representatives from these diversity may present challenges through to provide oversight of coalition interop- organizations or nation may attend MIC capability gaps in standardization, erability and assist in the implementation meetings through an invitation as an doctrine, rules of engagement, informa- of approved actions. The council’s inau- observer when the MIC considers their tion-sharing capabilities, training, and gural meeting was in October 1999, and participation as being mutually beneficial command and control.5 Despite these in May 2005 joined the MIC as the in supporting a specific topic or area of complexities, multinational and coalition seventh member nation. interest. operations are increasingly preferred The MIC’s purpose continues to The MIC principals are senior flag of- not only because of individual nations’ evolve with early emphasis placed on ficer/general officer operators from each resource constraints but also because they identifying interoperability issues and MIC nation empowered to discuss na- reinforce legitimacy to operations in an facilitating the exchange of relevant tional perspectives and address operational international setting. information across national boundaries challenges and risks across the contem- The future operating environment to support multinational/coalition opera- porary operating environment. The U.S. for coalitions will be even more volatile, tions. Recently, the MIC expanded its MIC principal is the Joint Staff Director

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Pryor et al. 113 Marines attempt to break through wall of Bulgarian and Serbian soldiers during riot control course of Platinum Wolf 15 at South Base, Serbia, November 19, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Derrick Irions) for Operations. The MIC principals meet operational challenge, the goal is to at- officers from other MIC member nations semi-annually and are responsible for de- tain an agreed-upon position by seven (currently from France and Germany) fining and articulating the MIC’s strategic nations when possible. If consensus is not serve as the MIC ES staff. direction and for providing guidance and possible, the AOs identify any differing directing appropriate actions to the action national positions and caveats to establish Products officers (AOs) directly or through the a baseline of similarities and differences While the MIC provides some of its steering group (SG). of national positions. This process assists project results directly to operators, The SG is composed of O6/NATO in developing a mutual awareness, un- national staffs, or other multinational OF5 representatives from each MIC derstanding, and appreciation among the organizations, many project results member nation. They are responsible participating member nations. are located in the main product that for coordinating and executing tasks The MIC executive secretariat (ES) captures the MIC’s work: the Coali- assigned by the MIC principals and staff is responsible for managing and tion Building Guide (CBG), whose providing guidance, oversight, and coordinating the day-to-day business purpose is to assist MIC member direction to the AOs to accomplish the activities for the MIC and serves as the nations, as a coalitions’ lead nation, MIC’s work as directed and approved by central point of contact for the MIC and their potential partners to work the MIC principals. Additionally, MIC principals, SG, and AOs. As a unique more effectively together in a coalition AOs act as national points of contact permanent structure, the MIC ES is the operation. It aims to offer guidance to who coordinate the respective national primary contact for outreach activities a lead nation, a designated coalition analysis of contemporary operational risks and external engagement, coordination, force commander and the national staffs and challenges as directed by the MIC and communication with non-MIC or coalition task force staffs in build- principals and identify solutions and/or nations, organizations, and other mul- ing and sustaining effective coalitions.8 prepare recommendations for approval tinational organizations. Two U.S. The CBG also attempts to provide a by the principals. When addressing an members along with two foreign liaison common framework of reference by

114 Joint Doctrine / The Multinational Interoperability Council JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Peruvian, Mexican, Chilean, Colombian, and U.S. ships transit in formation as part of Unitas 55-14 in Pacific Ocean, September 16, 2014 (DOD/Adam Henderson)

identifying some of the essential factors operating environment, humanitarian/ coalition military forces and other gov- associated with the coalition-building disaster response, communication and ernment departments, nongovernmental process to inform participating nations information systems, strategic communi- organizations, and international agencies as to what to expect. The CBG does not cation, and cyber defense.11 to plan, communicate, and operate in a constitute official policy or doctrine, collaborative environment throughout all nor does it represent a definitive staff A Way Ahead phases of an operation. planning or military decisionmaking Historically, major focus areas for the Civil-Military Cooperation. Civil- guide. The MIC acknowledges NATO MIC included using a comprehensive military relationships are important to joint doctrine, unless otherwise specifi- approach, developing civil-military the success of a comprehensive approach cally directed, as the default doctrine cooperation within coalitions, and and overall multinational operation.13 for planning and conducting coalition emphasizing cultural awareness and The outcomes of recent and current operations. Additionally, U.S. Joint competence. These areas will continue operations clearly demonstrate that Publication 3-16, Multinational Opera- to play a dominant role in the success civil-military relationships must be con- tions, captures information from the of coalition operations. As we move sidered to understand the compatible, CBG with regard to coalition planning. toward the future, areas such as expand- supportive, and competing interests The CBG consists of three volumes. ing information-sharing, preparing of each represented element, as well as Volume I, Military Strategic Overview, for ad hoc coalitions (rather than only how best to coordinate, deconflict, and covers the fundamentals of coalition previously established coalitions), and interface the military forces with the local building.9 Volume II, Strategic Design increasing collaboration between multi- population, other governmental agen- and Planning, covers the principles of national organizations will also play an cies, and the international humanitarian planning coalition operations at the stra- important role in coalition successes. community. Effective relationships and tegic level by addressing the broad lines Comprehensive Approach. coordination with the wide range of of recommended organization, processes, Interoperability extends to integrating civilian organizations, local populations, and tools for a coalition to ensure more the political, security, development, rule governments, and military forces are es- robust cohesiveness within the coalition at of law, human rights, and humanitarian sential. These activities require resources, the strategic military level.10 Volume III is dimensions of international missions. arrangements, and activities in support a compilation of separate MIC documents This integration describes a comprehen- of the mission, which fosters liaison, co- that cover key coalition challenges and sive or whole-of-government approach, operation, and coordination with entities risks to consider when building and sus- exploiting cohesion and realizing coali- outside of the multinational force. taining a coalition. The volume’s separate tion synergies.12 The comprehensive Coalition commanders and their staffs and distinct chapters allow planners and response must be based on a shared un- must have an awareness, understanding, staffs to select an individual section for derstanding of the problem and universal and appreciation of how military opera- quick reference. Chapter topics include commitment to resolve it. A comprehen- tions are typically embedded in a larger but are not limited to the future coalition sive approach centers on the ability of all context of civil-military interaction. It

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Pryor et al. 115 B-1B Lancer takes off from strategic coalition air base Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, to conduct combat operations April 8, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/James Richardson) is imperative to inform potential civilian To operate in such an environment the task.15 Information-sharing is essential partners on the vision and views of mil- requires the support and trust of other to enable early planning, intervention, itaries concerning such a civil-military friendly, neutral, or other groups in and preventative work resulting in ef- framework and a method to crisis preven- the surrounding area or from other fective and timely responses to crises, tion, , and postconflict governmental or nongovernmental while also providing for the collective activities. The incentive for a successful organizations to avoid inappropriate be- security and well being of a coalition. As civil-military effort is twofold: first, mo- havior and ideally to gain the trust of the nations move toward increased partner- tivation to avoid duplication of efforts people and to understand their claims ship and integrated services, professional including spending unnecessary energy and their needs. and confident information-sharing is and resources, and second, recognition Cultural aspects or cross-cultural becoming more important to deliver- that the goals of military and civilian or- differences, their knowledge and applica- ing the benefits of these arrangements. ganizations are most often co-dependent tion, and the evaluation and synthesis Information-sharing reduces duplication even though their realization may not of these subjects will remain relevant in of effort while maximizing strengths and always be simultaneous. current and future coalition operations capabilities of responding forces; it should Cultural Awareness and Competence. not only when operating in close prox- be necessary, proportionate, relevant, Coalition operations will take place imity to foreign populations but also in accurate, timely, and secure. A proper in complex operational environments all kinds of operations where the military information exchange environment with a multitude of actors, where op- might be involved.14 enables rapid transfer of information to posing forces and the population are Information-Sharing. Information- appropriately designated receivers, while intermingled in a way that it is hard to dis- sharing is a recurring lesson identified rigorously protecting information from tinguish among the different stakeholders. from many recent operations and there- unauthorized disclosure and release. Coalitions by themselves could be more fore key to the MIC’s goal of delivering Focus on Ad Hoc Coalitions. Today’s challenging due to the number of nation- better, more efficient military capabilities rapidly changing global landscape has alities they are likely to encompass. that are coordinated around the needs of given rise to the development of more

116 Joint Doctrine / The Multinational Interoperability Council JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 ad hoc coalitions consisting of groups coalition operations challenges and risks of nations and or organizations working from respective national perspectives, New from together outside of previously established ultimately helping to shape more effective alliances. In the future, greater consid- coalition operations. JFQ NDU Press eration needs to be given to developing for the Center for Strategic Research procedures for quickly establishing an ad Strategic Forum 292 hoc coalition and determining interop- Notes Supporting Democracy in Erdogan’s erability concerns for such situations. Turkey: The Role of Think Tanks 1 This will continue to be a challenge Multinational Interoperability Council by Richard H.M. Outzen and Ryan (MIC), Coalition Building Guide, Volume I: Schwing as national involvement within ad hoc Military Strategic Overview (Washington, DC: coalitions will vary from one coalition The Joint Staff, 2015). Fifteen years operation to the next. 2 National Security Strategy (Washington, into the era Continued Collaboration. We must DC: The White House, 2015). of President 3 continue to expand our knowledge of MIC, Coalition Building Guide, Volume Recep Tayyip III: Future Coalition Operating Environment other multinational organizations that (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2012). Erdogan, are dedicated to solving multinational 4 MIC, Coalition Building Guide, Volume I. U.S. influence interoperability challenges to work to- 5 MIC, Coalition Building Guide, Volume on his inner gether toward a shared solution for the III (2012). circle and 6 future, capitalize on mutually beneficial Ibid. support base, 7 MIC, Membership Policies and Procedures lessons learned, and eliminate duplicative (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2015). the new gen- work. The MIC maintains coordination 8 MIC, Coalition Building Guide, Volume I. eration of Turkish strategic thinkers, with various multinational groups includ- 9 Ibid. and the Turkish public at large has ing but not limited to the Washington, 10 MIC, Coalition Building Guide, Volume diminished rather than improved. DC–based Multifora, which is comprised II: Strategic Design and Planning (Washington, U.S. interests would be better DC: The Joint Staff, 2015). of nine separate organizations address- 11 Information on these MIC documents, served by avoiding confrontation ing various aspects of multinational as well as other MIC products, is available at and maintaining close military- interoperability, multinational plan- . to-military cooperation while also ning augmentation team, coalition 12 MIC, Coalition Building Guide, Volume pressing for democratization in a interoperability assurance and validation, I. patient, low-profile manner. The 13 MIC, Coalition Building Guide, Volume multinational information operations III: The Military Contribution to Stabilization emerging Turkish think tank sector experimentation, and the multinational Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, offers opportunities for doing just capabilities development campaign. 2013). that. The sector has grown dra- 14 MIC, Coalition Building Guide, Volume matically over the past 20 years and Coalition operations continue to III: Cross Cultural Awareness and Competence offers a window for better under- (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2015). shape and become the norm for the 15 MIC, Coalition Building Guide, Volume standing the revolution in Turkish military’s involvement in activities III (2012). strategic thinking that now perplexes and engagements around the globe. many American observers. Engaging Thus, it is essential to gain an aware- Turkey’s think tanks would support ness, understanding, and appreciation democratization. of each potential partner’s capabilities, limitations, and culture in advance of operations to enhance the success of future multinational coalition operations. Therefore, mutual trust attained through relationships during peacetime is likely to foster more efficient interaction when building and sustaining a coalition opera- tion. Beyond common doctrine, similar equipment and shared interests, the human factor plays a vital role in effective partnerships and remains an essential ele- ment in coalition success. In this regard, the MIC offers a unique opportunity Visit the NDU Press Web site for for senior operators to build essential more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu relationships and understand and address

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Pryor et al. 117 Marines with Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, convoy light-armored vehicles across beach as Navy landing craft, air cushion with Assault Craft Unit 4, departs beach of Sierra del Retin, Spain, during Spanish Amphibious Bilateral Exercise 2014, February 24, 2014 (U.S. Marine Corps/Austin Hazard)

The Tao of Doctrine Contesting an Art of Operations

By G. Stephen Lauer

Pity the theory that conflicts with reason!

—Carl von Clausewitz

ccording to Army Doctrine space, and purpose.”1 With this defini- In contrast to ADP 3-0, however, Army Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified tion, the U.S. Army broke with both its Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, A Land Operations, “Operational prior doctrinal paradigm of an opera- Unified Land Operations, emphasizes art is the pursuit of strategic objec- tional level of war and the joint model the joint definition, acknowledging an tives, in whole or in part, through the in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint operational level: “Operational art is arrangement of tactical actions in time, Operations, of the three levels of war.2 applicable at all levels of war, not just to the operational level of war.”3 Thus, a contested delineation of operational art entered the cognitive space of schools Dr. G. Stephen Lauer is an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. He is a retired U.S. Marine Corps Infantry Officer and served as the first Chief of Florida Domestic and commands throughout the Army. (Homeland) Security from 2001 to 2004. This article is not specifically about

118 Joint Doctrine / The Tao of Doctrine JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 whether there should or should not be limitations imposed by budgets, policy emergence. Seen in this light, doctrine, an operational level of war; rather, it is and politics, and strategic limitations. as the Tao itself, becomes understood as concerned with the concept of “doc- The external discourse involves explora- a living form, agile enough to flow and trine” and its relationship to history tion of its relationship with allies, but adjust to the demands of the complex, and theory in the context of an opera- more importantly with a presumed or adaptive system model that we teach is tional art. constructed antagonist. In essence, the character of modern warfare. Absent While definitions of operational art doctrine is the result of this discourse this understanding, and training to imple- appear in self-described doctrinal manu- applied to an institution’s perception of ment such, doctrine becomes a rigid als, do they describe, in fact, a doctrine of its own historical continuity in action, and stilted endeavor. It binds and blinds operational art? Can one prescribe art in pending its next engagement. Doctrinal the force to the requirement to flexibly doctrine? These questions lie at the heart manuals then anticipate the near future adapt its use—to be more correct than of the contest engendered by the dual and assume its usefulness in the future incorrect in the new environment, to measures changing the Army doctrinal environment. Since we cannot predict adapt immediately to the new context, definition of operational art and dropping the future, we anticipate at least a level and then to embrace and disseminate an the operational level of war, both within of utility that will suffice in planning as emergent consensus that allows for the a joint philosophical and doctrinal com- we assess a potential commitment. agility and responsiveness necessary to position that retains that level. The term Because of this future uncertainty, save American lives in battle. The need doctrine may be the most overused in doctrine presents the practitioner with for this agility becomes an embedded and the military lexicon.4 It can describe any the problem of anticipating and adapt- emergent purpose of institutions such as written manual of guidance for any size ing to the new environment in the most the School of Advanced Military Studies. force in either a training or combat envi- expeditious manner. This includes the This is the education of the art, the ronment. This article offers an approach possibility that what is “next,” requiring imagination, of the student. to make clear where the term doctrine can adaptation, may be so radically different Throughout On War, Carl von most effectively be located in relation to from the anticipation as to constitute a Clausewitz described these qualities as an art of operations within the framework crisis, requiring an essential rethinking necessary for a commander at any level, of the policy aim, allowing greater preci- of expected conditions.6 The options in but especially for those most senior offi- sion in its expression and clarifying its adaptation lie on a spectrum from the cers commanding a theater of operations, relationship to the larger concept of mili- need for minor procedural modifications for example.7 The use of the terms art tary ends, ways, and means—the context to a response to a fundamental surprise and judgment was intimately tied to the of strategy, operations, and tactics. and the recognition of the need for a nature of war and its conduct.8 Judgment new doctrinal paradigm. This demand was the end result of both an individual’s Anticipation, Adaptation, underscores the view that doctrine is pri- talent and his personal experience of Emergence marily authoritative as a means to provide war, or vicarious experience in the study The words anticipation, adaptation, a common historical understanding for of history in the development of an in- and emergence evoke a flow of move- the forces, the means, going into action formed intuition and the willingness to ment in experience, as in the concept of anew. Doctrine cannot extend beyond follow one’s path despite the distractions Tao, useful to describe both the purpose the anticipation of a near future because and uncertainty inherent in the clash of and evolution of doctrine.5 History the context of the approaching conflict or wills, driving our present understanding and theory bind the term doctrine in commitment environment, especially the of complexity in war.9 His understand- time as a statement of the institutional future opponent’s will, requires a nearly ing resonated with the philosophy of understanding of the current nature immediate adaptation of the doctrine to Immanuel Kant. It was the realm of the and form of warfare in the context of the new contextual circumstances. irrationality of genius: an internal and external discourse. The This adaptive response to the internal discourse starts from analysis of environment requires recognition, a Hence the concept of genius corresponds to the most recent employment of forces learning response, of the imperative what Kant sees as the crucial thing about and capabilities of the Army. Second, for emergence and change within the aesthetic taste, namely that it facilitates the dialogue anticipates a resonance new environment, at whatever level the play of one’s mental powers, increases with all other individual Services, as this is recognized. The old discourse the vitality that comes from the harmony well as with the conceptual joint force, crystallizes in time and space with the between imagination and understanding, including exploration of its results and engagement of an opposing will—the and invites one to linger before the beauti- effects by schools, in publications, and new external discourse—seeking to adapt ful. Genius is ultimately a manifestation within official and unofficial papers itself to the new situation. An emerging of this vivifying spirit for, as opposed to the and correspondence. Finally, this doctrine, concurrent with its dissemina- pedant’s rigid adherence to rules, genius interchange includes American societal tion through the force, enters again the exhibits a free sweep of invention and thus expectations and constraints, especially process of anticipation, adaptation, and originality that creates new models.10

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Lauer 119 instruction that follows from general theo- retical or technical knowledge. . . . Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is radically undog- matic; who, because of the many experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new experiences and to learn from them. The dialectic of experience has its proper fulfillment not in definitive knowl- edge but in the openness to experience that is made possible by experience itself.12

The manifestation of the com- mander’s art lies, in doctrine, in the joint concept of a commander-centric philosophy of command and the U.S. Army mission command concept with its split between the art of command and the science of control.13 There are few concrete differences between the two concepts of command. The Army defines mission command as “the exercise of au- thority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”14 JP 3-0 describes mission command as “the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and inde- pendently to accomplish the mission.”15 Nothing in these words denies the essence of the development of the art and judgment of the commander. Both include the admonition that control, rd st Marine mortarman assigned to 3 Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion “Wolfpack,” 1 Marine through synchronization, is immanent Division, during tactical training briefing during Integrated Training Exercise 2-16 at Marine Corps Air 16 Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, January 23, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Efren Lopez) in this dialogue. As both the art of command (commander-centric) and Thus, the development of judgment involves not merely applying the universal the science of control, synchronization, depended upon the openness of the indi- principle according to which it is judged, exist together, the opportunity exists for vidual to adapt: but co-determining, supplementing, and one to dominate the execution of any correcting that principle.11 operational structure. At what level of Judgment is necessary in order to make a command is a subordinate empowered to correct evaluation of the concrete instance. In the context of this presentation, break synchronization if he or she sees an . . . Every judgment about something in- the “principle” is the nature of doctrine: opportunity? tended in its concrete individuality (e.g., As operations become more complex the judgment required in a situation that Agility and flexibility of mind, then, at the granular, local level within a theater calls for action) is—strictly speaking—a became a product of one’s experience, one’s of operations, and especially in light of judgment about a special case. That means art: Experience stands in an ineluctable the tight control of rules of engagement nothing less than that judging the case opposition to knowledge and to the kind of inherent in our post–World War II wars

120 Joint Doctrine / The Tao of Doctrine JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 of limited aim, how much freedom can Figure. Overarching Theory of War: Human, Social, Political, a commander be allowed to make these Economic, and Technological Phenomenon nonsynchronous decisions? This is es- pecially so when a single judgment by a junior officer or enlisted leader may lead Theory of Warfare to significant political and policy risk, Encompasses what is possible to even if that decision was within the small apply in the current context unit leader’s understanding of the com- mander’s intent. Clausewitz noted that the more limited the political aim, the Realm of Ends: Why less effort demanded to achieve that aim, The Purpose—from and the less involved the population, the Policy to Emergent application of violence as the fundamental Strategy nature of the phenomenon of war appears Domain Realm of Ways: Philosophies more politically effected and derived, and How The Operational of War less military in its execution. Political and Philosophy—The Art policy risk17 dominates the concerns of the military instrument— Realm of Means: Application The Doctrines of How and with But the weaker the motives and the ten- the Forces what means for what Purpose sions, the less will the tendency of the military element, the tendency to violence, coincide with the directives of policy; the Educating the imagination as the more, therefore, must war be diverted from means to adapt the organization to the new/next warfighting environment—to its natural tendency, the greater is the know what to change—at any realm. distance between the political object and the aim of an ideal war, and the more does war seem to become political.18

Thus, in limited war, mission com- The commander, in effect, becomes I propose to paraphrase Clausewitz’s mand as a doctrine becomes ever more instrumental in preventing the recogni- use of the term realms and apply it to difficult to execute. Rules of engagement tion of changes in the new environment a description of the ends, ways, and in the 21st century reflect more directly and adaptation therein, relying on strict means in a discussion of doctrine, phi- the concerns of politics and policy, not execution of known doctrine and syn- losophy, and theory.21 With the model the use of violence to attain a political chronization to avoid errors in judgment. shown in the figure, we can more aim, limiting operational and tactical The clarification of the terms doctrine, accurately place the role and function flexibility.19 This is especially the case philosophy, and theory, then, may provide of doctrine in the realm of the means when the consequences of junior leader a way for senior commanders to arrive at as against the philosophy that guides decisions, or unfortunate or unexpected solutions permitting both the adaptation the art of operations in the realm of the soldier actions, resonate in negative policy necessary to save lives and the control ways. Each in turn relates to the realm impacts for the theater commander and necessary to achieve the policy aim. of the ends, wherein lies the policy aim. the policymaker. The location of operational art lies in Whereas the Tao of doctrine implies Placing Doctrine in Context the discourse between policy and the an inherent ability to adapt doctrine to If all things written in a green (or blue tactical means. It is from this discourse conditions in the new context, this same or black) manual are doctrine, how do that an emergent strategy appears. The doctrine, in its application in wars of lim- we distinguish and bring to clarity the purpose of this emergent strategy, then, ited aim, appears to have just the opposite concepts that underlie the new defini- is to achieve the aim of policy in the effect. If the commander of the joint tion of operational art and the end of application of the ways that ties the tac- force cannot survive junior leader devia- the operational level of warfare? As tical to the strategic in consonance with tions from synchronization, including the Clausewitz noted, a purpose of theory that policy. rules of engagement, adapting when and is to “clarify concepts that have become, Furthermore, we can see the rela- where he believes essential to the conduct as it were, confused and entangled.”20 tionship of “domains” whose Service of the mission and the protection of the To distinguish those things that are philosophies of warfare guide the doc- lives of soldiers, doctrinal adaptation doctrine from those that may more trines of the forces, as well as the true through judgment becomes problematic. succinctly be defined as philosophy, role of the joint philosophy of warfare

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Lauer 121 that attempts to bind the whole in terms especially when those tenets become President Franklin D. Roosevelt, such as of unified action, which again cannot substitutes for understanding the nature Army Chief of Staff General George C. be so prescriptive as to constitute a doc- of such expression by a commander. The Marshall, to determine the means neces- trine. The domains not associated with precepts that may be used to illustrate sary to carry the war onto the European a Service include the means associated the characteristics of art may only define continent, as well as the ways necessary with space and cyberspace and may include the nature of the canvas and the tools to achieve the strategy that emerged information as a human domain element. necessary for its creation. These are never to defeat the German war machine in Limiting the term doctrine to the realm sufficient to identify and restrict the na- northwest Europe.26 Chester of the means makes clear the distinction ture of the imagination employed by the Nimitz had the same responsibility in the that the word art implies a location in the commander in his manifestation of the Pacific theater of operations and a similar realm of ways and ends—the art of opera- art of command. relationship to policy with President tions lies in the ways the actions of the Roosevelt and Admiral Ernest King as means relate to the realm of ends—the An Operational Artist the Chief of Naval Operations.27 General why or purpose, through a military strat- Who is this operational artist? Current Douglas MacArthur met personally with egy, to which the means aim. Operational doctrine as written in ADP 3-0 states President Harry S. Truman in ongoing art, then, lies in the realm of ways, not that anyone can be doing this in any discourse to determine the aims and the the doctrinal frame for the manner and formation at any level of command.24 means necessary to the emergent strategy methods of the employment of the The figure, however, implies something determined to achieve those aims in the means—the inherent complex interaction entirely different—the operational Korean theater of operations.28 General at the tactical level that constitutes the artist is the person tasked with both the William Westmoreland met alike with flow of fires and movement, the art of authority and responsibility to decide President Lyndon Johnson and his chief battle maneuver in direct contact with an and order the ways in which the means civilian policy advisors such as Secretary enemy’s will during the engagement. will be employed, within the defined of Defense Robert McNamara also to In contrast, an operational art may policy aim. How do we identify this determine the policy aims and the means best find definition as a philosophy person in terms of modern warfare necessary for these aims through ways within a theory of war, a philosophical and experience? Who is the person deemed essential to accomplish the emer- understanding of a theory of warfare that given the authority to negotiate for the gent strategy in Vietnam.29 highlights the imagination of the com- means with which to achieve the policy At its most basic level, theory fails to mander in the determination of the ways aim? In the Afghanistan context, that explain and differentiate that which is in which to employ the means to achieve person would have been the joint task unclear if everyone (and everything done policy. If, as Clausewitz noted, art is an force commander (of the International at every level) is potentially an operational expression of talent and experience, then Security Assistance Force), the person artist. The mission, placement, and rules the ways cannot be limited by doctrine.22 who met with the Secretary of Defense of engagement provided to the tactical This fits an understanding in our times to obtain and clarify the war policy and means can only come from the person that Clausewitz’s definition of strategy as to coordinate that understanding with tasked with the determination of the ways the use of the engagement to achieve the and for the means available to him.25 In in which the means act to achieve policy. ends of policy fulfills a theoretical place- this location, defined by authority and It is in the theater of operations, where ment of operational art in that locus, the responsibility within a delimited theater the joint force commander is in discourse realm of the ways.23 of operations, lies the role that must with policy in the determination of the Using this model, a definition of allow and expect the adaptation of the means required to achieve policy aims, operational art emerges as a philosophy doctrine of the means to facilitate the that strategy emerges and operational art for the employment of the means to emergence of doctrine specific to the resides. achieve a strategic aim derived from, new environment. Thus, the location of and in concert with, a policy/political the art of operations in the realm of the Philosophy, Not Doctrine aim that provides its purpose and logic. ways drives the placement of an opera- To paraphrase Michael Howard, it is Operational art is an expression of the tional artist as the person charged with not simply a matter of not getting the imagination of the commander. It is ef- this role. doctrine too wrong at first contact in a fected as an understanding of the ways Examples of this placement abound new environment; it is the recognition in which to orchestrate the actions of in the history of theater of war com- that the doctrine of the means, by its the means—the forces that must act—to mands both during World War II and nature, will and must change once in achieve the policy aim in a warfare char- after. As the Supreme Allied Commander contact with a new environment.30 The acterized by uncertainty created by the of the European theater of operations, force must be capable of such anticipa- clash of wills with thinking, complex, General Dwight D. Eisenhower routinely tion and, through this understand- adaptive opponents. This art cannot interacted with policymakers. These ing, to immediately adapt, and then be defined by doctrinal lists of tenets, included military representatives of to embrace the emergence of a new

122 Joint Doctrine / The Tao of Doctrine JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Marines with 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion suspend from special-purpose insertion and extraction rope after being extracted from jungle during patrol at Training Center on , Okinawa, Japan (U.S. Marine Corps/Mark W. Stroud) doctrine. This further underscores the military forces.” See Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, DC: The Joint Staff, 2010). Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint 5 These terms first arose in a conversation importance of the art inherent in the Staff, August 2011), I-13. Marine Corps and in the “hayloft” at the School of Advanced development and adaptation of the ways joint doctrine offer a similar construct of the Military Studies (SAMS) between the author, that are solely the responsibility of the operational level of war. Marine Corps doctrine Rick Herrera, and Kurt Taylor, a member of artist whose task lies in what we call the notes, “The operational level of war provides the SAMS Lyceum, from a question concerning operational art—a philosophy—not a the linkage between tactics and strategy. It the purpose and evolution of doctrine. Clari- is the discipline of conceiving, focusing, and fication of the relationships therein belongs to JFQ doctrine. exploiting a variety of tactical actions to realize discussions with Jeff Kubiak, Bob Tomlinson, a strategic aim. With that thought as our point and Chris Marsh, then also of the “hayloft.” of departure, this publication discusses the Mark Calhoun also provided a thoughtful Notes intermediate, operational level of war and the review of an early draft of this article. Here, military campaign which is the vehicle for orga- Tao means “The world . . . is the efficient cause 1 Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) nizing tactical actions to achieve strategic objec- of itself. It is resolutely dynamic, autogenera- 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, tives.” See Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication tive, self-organizing, and in a real sense, alive. DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, (MCDP) 1-2, Campaigning (Washington, DC: . . . a “pathway” that can, in varying degrees, October 2011), available at . 3 Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, what the world is, and how it is.” See Roger 2 “The operational level links the tactical Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: T. Ames, Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare, trans. employment of forces to national and military Headquarters Department of the Army, May Roger T. Ames (New York: Ballantine, 1993), strategic objectives. The focus at this level 16, 2012), 4-1. 50; “The tao ‘can be understood as the natural is on the design, planning, and execution of 4 Doctrine is “[f]undamental principles by order of the universe,’ and people can act in ac- operations using operational art: the application which the military forces or elements thereof cordance with the ‘way’ by attempting to live in of creative imagination by commanders and guide their actions in support of national objec- harmony with those around them and with the staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and tives. It is authoritative but requires judgment natural forces at work in the universe. People experience—to design strategies, campaigns, in application.” See JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary are supposed to live in accord with the way, in and major operations and organize and employ of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, harmony with the world around them, by living

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Lauer 123 Senior Airman inspects parachutes on a C-130 Hercules aircraft during Red Flag–Alaska 14-3 at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, August 5, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Chad C. Strohmeyer) according to the precept of wu wei, or nonac- 15 JP 3-0, II-2. 27 Ibid., 288–289 (map), 305, 312, 367. tion. What is meant by this is not that people 16 ADP 3-0, 9, 13; JP 3-0, II-3. The Pacific Ocean Areas included the South- do nothing, but that action should be effortless 17 Alan C. Lamborn, “Theory and Politics west Pacific Area under Douglas MacArthur, and in harmony with the natural forces at work in World Politics,” International Studies Quar- within United States Strategic Direction, by in the universe. It is therefore ‘effortless doing,’ terly 41, no. 2 (June 1997), 191–197. structure under Admiral William Leahy “as or ‘acting without acting’ (wei wu wei).” See 18 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. titular head of the Joint Chiefs.” Christopher Marsh, Religion and the State in by O.J. Matthias Jolles (New York: Random 28 Max Hastings, The (New Russia and China: Suppression, Survival, and House, 1943), 17. York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 121–123. Revival (New York: Continuum, 2011), 152. 19 Emile Simpson, War from the Ground 29 Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost 6 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the Viet- Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of (Sydney, Australia: Scribe Publications, 2013), nam War (Berkeley: University of California Chicago Press, 1996), 84; , 54–56, 74. Press, 1999), 234, 324; and H.R. McMaster, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map 20 Clausewitz, 132. Dereliction of Duty (New York: Harper Collins, the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 21 Ibid., 149. 1997), 244–245. 2002), 30–31. 22 Ibid., 146–147. 30 “I am tempted to declare that whatever 7 Clausewitz, 111, 146. 23 Ibid., 128. doctrine the Armed Forces are working on, 8 Ibid., 147–149. 24 “Operational art is not associated with a they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to 9 Ibid., 102. specific echelon or formation, nor is it exclusive declare that it does not matter that they have 10 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and to theater and joint force commanders. Instead, got it wrong. What does matter is their capac- Method, trans. and rev. Joel Weinsheimer and it applies to any formation that must effectively ity to get it right quickly when the moment Donald G. Marshall, 2nd rev. ed. (London: arrange multiple, tactical actions in time, space, arrives. It is the task of military science in an Continuum Publishing Group, 1989), 46. See and purpose to achieve a strategic objective, in age of peace to prevent the doctrine being too also Kant’s Critique of Judgment, 1790, Part I, whole or in part.” See ADP 3-0, 9. badly wrong.” See Michael Howard, “Military §46-49. 25 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Science in the Age of Peace,” RUSI Journal 11 Gadamer, 34–35. Secretary at War (New York: Knopf, 2014), 119, no. 4 (March 1974), 4. 12 Ibid., 350. 344–358, 367–386. 13 ADP 3-0, 13. 26 Paul Kennedy, Engineers of Victory (New 14 Ibid., 6. York: Random House, 2013), 235–236.

124 Joint Doctrine / The Tao of Doctrine JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore camp comprised of Naval Support Element, Army Task Force 24, and Marine Corps 4th Landing Support Battalion Charlie Company participates in cooperative training exercise involving Moroccan military and 14th Marine Regiment in execution of ship to shore movement of cargo and equipment during Exercise African Lion 2011 (U.S. Navy/Jonathan Pankau)

Joint Engineers Launch New Knowledge-Based Management Program

By Brian E. Griffin

fter more than 3 years in devel- Operating Picture (JECOP). Its in order for end-users to quickly gather opment, the Joint Staff Logis- purpose is to aid combatant command and analyze location data for a variety A tics Directorate will field its first and Service engineers with steady- of purposes including data summary, joint engineering computer applica- state planning, programming, and the trend analysis, infrastructure plan- tion: the Joint Engineer Common synchronization of engineer efforts for ning, and decision support. The portal worldwide military operations. The also provides users access to real-time JECOP portal serves as a collabora- authoritative data linked to strategic Colonel Brian E. Griffin, USA, Ph.D., is Deputy tive knowledge management tool that direction via map-based displays and Division Chief of the J4 Engineering Division on depicts network information on a map user-defined views. the Joint Staff.

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Griffin 125 spending a significant amount of time and resources on rewriting a specialized contingency planning module, such as the Joint Engineer Planning and Execu- tion System (JEPES). However, JEPES will not go away. Instead, the rewrite of the JEPES module will become the second phase of this development effort. The JEPES module and JECOP portal will complement one another. In short, JECOP is a steady-state planning tool, and JEPES will continue to be a contingency planning and execution module within Global Combat Support System–Joint.

Strategic Concept JECOP can be used to improve the transfer of knowledge by leveraging visualization methods to produce a shared understanding of requirements and the operational environment. It performs deductions and helps facili- tate action, and its system architecture is designed to enable collaboration among widely separated planners at all command echelons. The JECOP portal is not a database. As such, it will not serve as a repository of execution infor- mation or an asset management, sched- uling, or accounting tool. While JECOP may support deliberate or crisis action planning processes, it does not have the sufficient detail to build products such as a time-phased force and deploy- ment data. Instead, the JECOP portal serves as a program of record designed to pull data from multiple databases and produce results much faster, more detailed, and more accurate than using spreadsheet software or with a stubby st Soldier assigned to 331 Transportation Company locks in portion of Trident pier during Combined/ pencil and calculator using planning Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore naval exercise on Korean Peninsula, April 15, 2013, intended to improve logistics interoperability, communication, and cooperation between the United States and factors. In doing so, JECOP provides South Korea (U.S. Navy/Elisandro T. Diaz) authorized users a comprehensive, up-to-date picture of U.S. engineering Background tools for joint engineers to manage activities and events worldwide. The concept for JECOP grew out of activities and events within their respec- So how does JECOP work? Engineer the recommendations from an Engineer tive areas of responsibility. In an effort capabilities enable joint operations by Capability Assessment, which identi- to address this capability gap, the Joint facilitating freedom of action necessary fied a competency gap in knowledge Operational Engineer Board authorized for the joint force commander to meet management. This was attributable to the development of a common operat- mission objectives. During steady-state stove-piped legacy information systems, ing picture to support the combatant operations, engineers primarily focus on lack of fused visibility and limited commanders’ theater campaign plan preparing the operational environment to access, inability to present a common in December 2012. This decision rep- receive large numbers of forces for future picture, and limited decisionmaking resented a change in approach from joint operations. Some examples of joint

126 Joint Doctrine / Joint Engineers Launch New Program JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 engineering include the improvement of infrastructure, environmental and energy considerations, exercise-related construction, humanitarian and civil assistance projects, the construction of bases, and other support to ongoing joint and multinational operations. A majority of these projects are managed by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, and Air Force Civil Engineer Center, and then stored in their historical archives. JECOP pulls relevant data from the Services’ databases and other open source data sets, then translates the project addresses into geo- coordinates on a map. The JECOP portal uses a simple icon to denote engineer construction efforts across the command. In addition to displaying data on a map, JECOP aims to link requirements found st in the theater campaign plans (TCPs) that Soldier assigned to 331 Transportation Company works to bring last sections of Trident causeway together during Combined Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore military exercise on the Korean Peninsula, support combatant commanders’ long- April 18–28, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Anthony R. Hayes) term vision of their areas of responsibility. Commanders use their TCP to synchro- critical information against the opera- to this knowledge allows Service engineers nize activities along complementary lines tional environment that enables joint to engage combatant command engineers of effort to allocate resources and assess engineering staffs to arrange disparate early in the master planning processes progress toward achieving the endstate. facts into a logical and understandable to identify resourcing requirements Besides connecting activities to objec- construct. So, for example, a senior leader and inform respective Service personnel tives, JECOP aids commanders and their may ask the engineering staff to update operations and maintenance and bud- engineering staff to achieve a shared com- a staff estimate in country x. By display- get submission. Additionally, the smart mon understanding of the operational ing basic information on a map coupled directory provides Active, Reserve, and environment. Within the TCP, the the- with critical information requirements, National Guard engineers with the tools ater posture plan provides an important JECOP serves as a starting point of to view potential construction projects in link to the resources necessary to imple- reference for joint engineers to use their each combatant command that may be ment a commander’s strategy. The plan intuition to identify candidate actions ideal for troop construction projects using is comprised of three elements: forces, and elements of operational risk, as well a multi-component engineer approach in footprints, and agreements—all essential as develop solutions. This capability can support of command initiatives. to supporting current operations, security help significantly reduce the options to cooperation, and other steady-state activi- a few core scenarios that can be further An essential challenge for joint engi- ties. Commanders rely on well-placed analyzed to derive a recommendation. neers in the future is to meet increasingly footprints, which consist of basing, facili- The smart directory structure displays demanding logistics requirements with ties, infrastructure, and prepositioned time, geography, funding type, execution constrained resources during steady-state equipment, to enable operational reach, method, cost, and other resources to allow operations. Knowledge management is flexibility, and depth throughout their the users to dynamically choose which a way to close the information gap and areas of responsibility. In support of groups of information to display. When gain a greater understanding of the exist- steady-state planning, joint engineers more detailed information is required, a ing environment because it facilitates and must acquire knowledge of critical terrain link is provided to take the user to the ap- accelerates processes in a resource-con- information such as runway dimensions propriate database. Another benefit of the strained environment. The JECOP portal at potential aerial ports of debarkation or smart directory is the ability to communi- is the first step in creating an engineer- the harbor depths at potential sea ports cate a shared vision among stakeholders. centric, knowledge-based network where of debarkation to support the future For example, JECOP provides the com- everyone benefits from information- movement of forces. A majority of this batant command the ability to time phase sharing. Embracing JECOP presents an information can be found on open source specific engineering activities and events opportunity for the engineer community Web sites. The JECOP portal facilitates associated with the development of site x to build a collaborative, innovative, and the transfer of knowledge by displaying over the course of 3, 5, or 10 years. Access knowledge-sharing culture. JFQ

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Griffin 127 Marines and Sailors participate in military drill in hangar bay of aircraft carrier USS Nimitz as part of Marine Corps professional military education course, May 10, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Derek A. Harkins)

JPME II Available at Satellite Sites

By Kenneth Pisel

oint Professional Military Educa- Joint Qualified Officer and eligible for in presenting their curricula.2 The tion, Phase II (JPME II) is a promotion to O-7.1 This requirement result is that JPME II is now exportable J career milestone for joint warf- generates a high demand signal for to sites away from the traditional resi- ighters and was designed and imple- JPME II, but that demand is tempered dential campuses. Preserving academic mented to assist with the development by constraints in both the law and the outcomes and associated resource of military leaders. The Department of existing infrastructure. The National requirements will determine how this Defense (DOD) Joint Officer Manage- Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) flexibility allows the schools to best ment Program mandates JPME II for for fiscal year 2016 modified the support the joint warfighter. an officer to be designated a Level III language in Title 10 U.S. Codes that define JPME II and authorized JPME Background II–granting institutions (for example, To understand where JPME II may Dr. Kenneth Pisel is the Satellite Program Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) and be heading, it is vital to understand Manager in the Joint and Combined Warfighting Service war colleges) greater flexibility its origin and the processes that led to School at the Joint Forces Staff College.

128 Joint Doctrine / JPME II Available at Satellite Sites JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 the current state. The genesis of JPME thus it specified in law that JPME II shall Satellite Program a home that had suf- II is the Goldwater-Nichols National be not less than 12 weeks. As a result, ficient separation between the students Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 the 2005 NDAA implemented 3 modi- and the gravitational pull of their staff (GNA).3 GNA created a bifurcated fications to the JPME II model: (1) the jobs. From 2013 to 2015, the JCWS system of JPME, with the first phase JPME II course at JFSC was reduced to Satellite Program completed 12 classes (JPME I) presented at the Service staff 10 weeks in length, enabling a 4th class at JSOU and collected the data required colleges and the second (JPME II) to be conducted each year; (2) senior to support the Congressional decision in presented at the National Defense Uni- Service colleges were given authority to the 2016 NDAA. With that authority, versity (the former Armed Forces Staff grant JPME II; and (3) JPME II could the satellite program pilot has now been College (AFSC), JFSC’s predecessor). be taught only in an in-residence format. expanded to other CCMD sites. As with any legislation, the details for This final change reflected Congressional GNA’s implementation were refined belief that direct student interaction Academic Program over time. The seminal event in this was indispensable in achieving joint The decision to use the 10-week model process was 1989’s Panel on Military acculturation.6 offered distinct advantages. The stu- Education of the 100th Congress. Concurrently in 2005, then– dents would not need to focus on their Chaired by Representative Ike Skelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff staff jobs and the JPME II program the panel defined JPME II: General Peter Pace published a White simultaneously, and the model required Paper on joint officer development with almost no adaptation to the curricu- Phase II curriculum at AFSC should a vision for all O-6s to have completed lum. In addition, the satellite classes build on Phase I and concentrate on the JPME II.7 This vision created a challenge. begin on the same day as the resident integrated deployment and employment of With the senior Service colleges now program and the lessons proceed at the multi-service forces. The course should pro- granting JPME II, the total output for same pace. vide time for: (1) a detailed survey course all venues increased to just over 2,100 The course is not specifically tailored in joint doctrine; (2) several extensive personnel per year. In today’s reduced to the CCMD; it presents enduring case studies or war games that focus on the force, there are more than 18,000 doctrinal planning concepts that, like the specifics of joint warfare and that involve Active Component (AC) and Reserve Norfolk-administered course, provide theaters of war set in both developed and Component (RC) O-6s and 48,000 students with foundational material to underdeveloped regions; (3) increasing the O-5s.8 Thus it was obvious that demand work across regions, domains, and func- understanding of the four service cultures; and capacity were incompatible. tions. When compared to the resident and (4) most important, developing joint With a need to increase capac- JCWS program, the satellite curriculum attitudes and perspectives.4 ity and with the personnel tempo has only two unique elements. First, (PERSTEMPO) at record levels, the because the students are not in a tempo- While the language of the Committee National Defense University/JFSC was rary duty status, the administrative time on Armed Services states that joint tasked in 2006 to develop innovative required for out-processing is eliminated. attitudes and perspectives are “most alternative approaches for presenting This efficiency enables the satellite important,” this idea cannot be JPME II. Having received proposals for seminar to graduate the afternoon before overemphasized. The inculcation of programs of 40 to 52 weeks that would the Norfolk class. More significant is joint attitudes and perspectives (now utilize hybrid or night-school formats, the requirement to adapt two lessons to commonly referred to as “joint accultura- the combatant commanders and the Joint the satellite site. JCWS employs a case tion”) is the single element that makes Chiefs of Staff favored a satellite program study and staff-ride of the Yorktown JPME II unique, provides significant that replicated the JFSC’s 10-week course Revolutionary War battlefield in southern added value, and drives how it is pre- of instruction. The concept was presented Virginia to achieve learning objectives for sented. The Committee went on to to Congress, and the 2012 NDAA autho- teaching the basic concept of operational define Skelton’s four pillars for a JPME II rized a 5-year test of the satellite-campus art and introducing the elements of program: a joint curriculum, taught by a model at two combatant command operational design. Aside from it being joint faculty, to a joint student body, in a (CCMD) headquarters.9 Tampa, Florida, an excellent scenario for the academic re- program under the Chairman’s oversight. was chosen because it offered the head- quirement, Yorktown is also close to the Additionally, the Committee determined quarters for both U.S. Special Operations JFSC campus. that the acculturation process required 3 Command (USSOCOM) and U.S. Similar scenarios were developed for months to achieve.5 Central Command (USCENTCOM). each satellite site with the exception of With the guidance from the Panel Of nearly equal importance was the avail- the National Capital Region class, which on Military Education in hand, DOD ability of academic space within the Joint will use Yorktown. For USCENTCOM/ attempted to implement JPME II using Special Operations University (JSOU). USSOCOM and U.S. Southern a 9-week curriculum. Congress did not A classroom at JSOU gave the Joint and Command, the Second Seminole War view 9 weeks as equivalent to 3 months; Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) of 1835–1842 is the case study, with

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Pisel 129 Colonel Lenny Richoux, 18th Wing vice commander, addresses group of students and instructors from Japan Self Defense Force Joint Staff College at as part of Japan’s year-long advanced professional military education program, February 3, 2010 (U.S. Air Force/Christopher Hummel) staff rides to the Dade and Loxahatchee and functions, JPME II is a program in composed of a cross-section of students battlefields, respectively. U.S. Northern which the students build on the basic from different CCMDs, the Joint Staff, Command used Bent’s Old Fort National curriculum through regular facilitated Service staffs, and other agencies. The Historic Site in Colorado to analyze and unfacilitated discussion and discourse diversity of classroom discussions and the Brigadier General Stephen Kearney’s among themselves. The seminar com- resultant student Rolodexes are beneficial march down the Santa Fe Trail into New position at the satellite sites thus reflects throughout their careers. Conversely, at the start of the Mexican War Congressional direction for joint accul- the satellite seminar students tend to in 1846. General Sterling Price’s 1864 turation. Like seminars in Norfolk, the be primarily from the local CCMD, campaign into Missouri and the Union goal for each satellite seminar is to have limiting the diversity of knowledge and defense of Fort Davidson in the battle of 16 uniformed students (both AC and discussion. It does, however, provide Pilot Knob, Missouri, will support U.S. RC), with a one-third air-land-sea Service more immediate networking across the Transportation Command. U.S. Pacific mix. There will also be a slot for an inter- directorates within that CCMD, a notice- Command will employ a staff ride to national officer and a U.S. Government able student-stated benefit of the satellite multiple sites as they look at the attack civilian. If the international officer and seminars that have already been executed on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, civilian are not available, those slots will in Tampa and Colorado Springs. from the Japanese operational perspective. be filled by uniformed students. Finally, U.S. Strategic Command will uti- While the PERSTEMPO benefits for The Way Forward lize the Strategic Air and Space Museum the students are significant at the satel- Ultimately, the future of JPME II in Ashland, Nebraska, and execute a case lite locations, the diversity of available comes back to the law. There are three study on the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. networking opportunities and student-in- sections of Title 10 U.S. Code that Because joint acculturation is argu- fused perspectives from other commands, drive JPME II. Congress modified ably foundational to true integration regions, and staffs represents a downside. § 2154 to relieve the restriction on of our Armed Forces across domains In residence at JFSC, each seminar is resident-only JPME II.10 This change

130 Joint Doctrine / JPME II Available at Satellite Sites JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 opened the door for a satellite program Table. and for blended-learning options. Class 16-4 Class 16-1 Class 16-2 Class 16-3 However, Congress did not modify § Sep–Nov 2016 Jan–Mar 2016 Mar–Jun 2016 Jun–Aug 2016 11 12 2155 or § 2156. The former man- USEUCOM/ USNORTHCOM USTRANSCOM USSTRATCOM dates that neither the student nor the USAFRICOM faculty distribution of the senior Service Class 17-4 colleges’ JPME II programs may exceed Class 17-1 Class 17-2 Class 17-3 Sep–Nov 2017 60 percent of home Service (that is, the Jan–Mar 2017 Mar–Jun 2017 Jun–Aug 2017 USSOCOM/ Army War College may not be more USPACOM USSOUTHCOM National Capital USCENTCOM than 60 percent Army), and the remain- ing Services must be proportionally rep- resented. The latter mandates that the to many joint warfighters who would for Fiscal Year 2005, H.R. No. 108-491 (to principal course of instruction at JFSC is th nd otherwise not have the opportunity. The accompany H.R. 4200), 108 Cong., 2 sess., a 10-week resident JPME II program.13 May 14, 2004. challenge is that JPME II is academically 7 This change indicates two things. CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development rigorous and directly competes with re- First, any of the JPME II institutions (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs, 2005). sponsibilities at home. While the CCMD 8 Defense Manpower Data Center, available can field a satellite program (although chief of staff can give the students top at . so). Second, these same institutions can 9 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense place of duty, students and their families develop a blended program for JPME II. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. must understand the academic require- 10 Today, only the Army War College and Joint Professional Military Education: ments of the course. The original vision Three-Phase Approach, USC 10, Pub. L. 108- JFSC (that is, Advanced Joint Professional in 2006 was to expand the opportunities 375, § 107-2154 (2011). Military Education (AJPME)) have 11 for warfighters to complete JPME II and Joint Professional Military Education blended programs. The challenge for Phase II Program of Instruction, USC 10, Pub. to improve quality of life by offering the the Army will be to draw enough other– L. 108-375, § 107-2155 (2011). course at CCMD HQ sites. As visions and 12 Service students and faculty to meet the Joint Forces Staff College: Duration of resources changed over the last decade, Principal Course of Instruction, USC 10, Pub. 60/40 mix requirement defined by law. only the quality of life element remains; L. 108-375, § 107-2156 (2011). The value of the satellite and, poten- 13 currently, 8 percent of JCWS graduates National Defense Authorization Act for tially, the hybrid AJPME program, is to Fiscal Year 2016. per year attend the satellite program. 14 those who will be able to complete JPME More information about the satellite Though a small percentage of satellite II without increasing family separation program is available at . ronment. Plans for 2016 and 2017 are in Norfolk and completely immersing defined by available funding. There will themselves in academics, the majority of be one satellite seminar in each of the students were happy they completed the four classes each year. satellite seminar without needing to leave Plans for 2018 and beyond are still their families for 10 weeks. JFQ undetermined. It is likely that there will be an operational pause to assess lessons learned and actual costs for all sites before Notes the long-term schedule is determined.14 Staff officers interested in pursuing 1 Department of Defense (DOD) Instruc- JPME II at a CCMD satellite site should tion 1300.19, Joint Officer Management (JOM) contact their respective J-1 approximately Program (Washington, DC: DOD, March 4, 90 days before class is scheduled to start. 2014). 2 Committee on Armed Services, National The goal is to submit student nomina- Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, tions to the Services for approval not later H.R. Report No. 114-102 (to accompany H.R. than 60 days before each class begins. 1735), 114th Cong., 1st sess., May 5, 2015. Staff officers in the National Capital 3 Ibid. 4 Region will need to coordinate directly Professional Military Education: Hearings before the Panel on Military Education of the with their individual Services for informa- Committee on Armed Services, 100th Cong., 1st tion about that satellite class. and 2nd sess. (1990). 5 Ibid. The satellite program is an innovative 6 Committee on Armed Services, Ronald approach to making JPME II available W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act

JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Pisel 131 New from Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision (to be signed within 6 months) NDU Press JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations Strategic Forum 291 JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations Korean Unification and the Future of JP 3-0, Joint Operations the U.S.-ROK Alliance by David F. Helvey JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats Unification JP 3-04, Joint Shipboard Helicopter and Tiltrotor Operations of the Korean JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination Peninsula would remove JP 3-13.4, Military Deception the primary JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations threat that JP 3-20, Security Cooperation has animated the U.S.– JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks Republic JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations of Korea (ROK) alliance for over JP 4-08, Logistic Support of Multinational Operations 60 years, but it need not require termination of the alliance. An alli- JP 5-0, Joint Planning ance between the United States and a unified Korea would, at a macro JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) level, reinforce the international JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support liberal democratic order. At a micro level, it could help ensure security JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations on the Korean Peninsula during the JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence process of integrating the North, JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction assist in the defense of Korea, and serve as a platform for multilateral JP 3-07, Stability security cooperation. A future alli- JP 3-13.3, Operations Security ance should be a part of planning JP 3-14, Space Operations for Korean unification and should consider the purpose of the alliance, JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare its roles and missions, coordinating JP 3-34, Engineer Operations structures, and presence (if any) of JP 3-41, CBRN Consequence Management U.S. troops. JP 3-42, Joint Explosive Ordinance Disposal JP 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water

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132 Joint Doctrine JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 NEW from NDU Press Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War NDU Press, 2015 • 488 pp.

This volume began as two questions from General Martin E. Dempsey, 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: What were the costs and benefits of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what were the strategic lessons of these campaigns? The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University was tasked to answer these questions. The editors composed a volume that assesses the war and analyzes the costs, using the Institute’s considerable in-house talent and the dedication of the NDU Press team. The audience for this volume is senior officers, their staffs, and the students in joint professional military education courses—the future leaders of the Armed Forces. Other national security professionals should find it of great value as well.

The volume begins with an introduction that addresses the difficulty of learning strategic lessons and a preview of the major lessons identified in the study. It then moves on to an analysis of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq from their initiation to the onset of the U.S. Surges. The study then turns to the Surges themselves as tests of assessment and adaptation. The next part focuses on decision- making, implementation, and unity of effort. The volume then turns to the all-important issue of raising and mentoring indigenous security forces, the basis for the U.S. exit strategy in both campaigns. Capping the study is a chapter on legal issues that range from detention to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. The final chapter analyzes costs and benefits, dissects decisionmaking in both campaigns, and summarizes the lessons encountered. Supporting the volume are three annexes: one on the human and financial costs of the Long War and two detailed timelines for histories of Afghanistan and Iraq and the U.S. campaigns in those countries.

The lessons encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq at the strategic level inform our understanding of national security decisionmaking, intelligence, the character of contemporary conflict, and unity of effort and command. They stand alongside the lessons of other wars and remind future senior offi- cers that those who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them.

Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Books/LessonsEncountered.aspx JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE EIGHTY-TWO, 3RD QUARTER 2016

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JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Our understanding of the importance and keeping peace is of women in building Around and activists are the globe, policymakers empower women as working to National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, informed by a wide range of experts, from diplomats to military officials and from human rights activists to development professionals.together The goal of this book is to bring these diverse voices. As leaders in every region of the world recognize, no country can reach its full potential without the participation of all its citizens. This book seeks to add to the chorus of voices working to ensure that women and girls take their rightful place in more prosperous world. safer, building a stronger, Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Books/WomenontheFrontlinesofPeaceandSecurity.aspx agents of peace and to help addressagents of peace and as survivors the challenges they face of conflict. When women are important in peace negotiations, they raise involved issues that might be otherwise When women are overlooked. educated and enabled to participate in every societies—from aspect of their growing the economy to strengthening the security sector—communities are more stable and less prone to conflict. Women on the Frontlines of Peace and Security of Peace on the Frontlines Women Foreword by Hillary Rodham Clinton and Leon Panetta NDU Press, 2015 • 218 pp. This book reflects President women’s Obama’s commitment to advancing Barack participation in preventing conflict and keeping peace. It is inspired by the countless the frontlineswomen and girls on a difference who make every day in their communities and societies by creating opportunities and building peace. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked