UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Santa Barbara

Emotions in Polybius’ Histories

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Classics

by

Regina Marie Loehr

Committee in charge: Professor Robert Morstein-Marx, Chair Professor John W.I. Lee Professor Helen Morales Professor Craige B. Champion

June 2017

The dissertation of Regina M. Loehr is approved.

John W.I. Lee

Helen Morales

Craige B. Champion

Robert Morstein-Marx, Committee Chair

May 2017

Emotions in Polybius’ Histories

Copyright © 2017

by

Regina M. Loehr

iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my advisor Robert Morstein-Marx I owe deep gratitude for always finding and appreciating “the light under the bushel” in my dissertation and in all stages of my graduate career. I appreciate his ceaseless guidance in helping me improve as a scholar and professional both with his quick and thorough feedback and through the example he provided as a scholar and mentor. I thank my dissertation committee, Craige Champion, John Lee, and Helen Morales, for their critiques, advice, and patience. The Classics Department at UCSB provided invaluable support for me in this process. Glenn Patten’s seminar on sovereignty and bestiality sparked my interest, and I greatly appreciate his encouragement and direction with the seminar paper which through the Classics Department’s reception and feedback led to this project. Any errors which remain in this project are wholly mine. The Classics Department and particularly Sara Lindheim took great care to support me in participating in the Regular Program at the American School of Classical Studies at Athens at the outset of this project, for which I am grateful. The Dumas Travel Awards and the American School’s Fowler Merle-Smith Fellowship also aided me in this formative stage. UCSB’s Graduate Division provided support in the middle of my writing with its Dissertation Writing Workshop, and the Graduate Division Dissertation Fellowship aided me in the final stages.

I also am grateful to the supportive Classics graduate students at UCSB, especially the dissertation writing group formed this year who motivated me in the last push and my officemate Brett with whom I enjoyed working through difficult concepts. Angela Holzmeister not only supported me with her friendship but also always helped me refine my thoughts with her critical questions. I appreciate the support and feedback of my friends from the American School, particularly Elizabeth Baltes, whose conversations stimulated me to aim for high standards, and Danielle Bennett and Mike McGlin, who both supported me in the writing process when they too had to write their own dissertations.

Lastly, I need to thank those who supported me on a personal level, always renewing my strength and confidence to finish this project: Frances and Randy Hahn, who became my Santa Barbara family (as well as Emerita advisor), Tess Hackney, who always kept encouraging me even in the midst of her own challenges, my siblings who thought that my becoming a Classicist was cool, my Grandma whose love and strength provided a model for me, and most of all my parents who supported me through everything despite not knowing who Polybius was: their endless love and encouragement in this unfamiliar path convinced me that I could do this.

Sicut in agro . . .

iv VITA OF REGINA M. LOEHR

May 2017

Education

2017 Ph.D. Classics, University of California, Santa Barbara Dissertation Title: Emotion in Polybius’ Histories

2012 M.A. Classics, University of California, Santa Barbara

2010 B.A. Classics, Truman State University

Papers Presented

2017 “Popular Emotion and Positive Change in Polybius VI.5-9,” Stanford Historiography Jam, Stanford, CA 2014 “The People and their Emotions in Polybius' Cycle of Constitutions (VI.5-9),” Classics Department Colloquium, University of California, Santa Barbara 2012 “Druidic Relations: Bridging Gaul and Rome,” Borderlands Graduate Conference, University of California, Santa Barbara 2012 “Caesar’s Druids: Reflections of the Roman Pontificate,” American Philological Association Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, PA

v ABSTRACT

Emotions in Polybius’ Histories

by

Regina M. Loehr

In this dissertation I investigate how emotions work in Polybius’ Histories, his account in Greek of Rome’s rise to supremacy. My argument that moral and rational principles often underlie emotions in the Histories challenges both the Classical dichotomy between emotion and reason and commonplace assumptions that emotions were inherently negative. Moreover, emotion is essential in Polybius’ project of history and for his historiographical theory: Emotions play a crucial role in causation, critically connect moral principle to action in human behavior, and contribute to the educative value of history. Emotion for Polybius is educative for his readership in two ways. Emotions in the historical narrative teach the audience to observe and judge the characters’ reactions to emotions as correct or incorrect. Not only does Polybius present the emotions of his characters, but he also uses history to inculcate a sense of correct, normative emotion in his audience.

In Chapter 1, I identify important features of emotion drawn from the modern social sciences, providing a critical vocabulary through which I analyze key passages from the Histories, such as Philip V’s first sack of Thermum. From an analysis of emotional features, it becomes clear that Polybius judges characters above all by the import, appropriateness, direction, and proportionality of their emotion. In Chapter 2, I analyze how Polybius’ emotional vocabulary compares with that of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and David Konstan’s recent analysis in The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks. In Chapter 3, I investigate emotions at work in changes of a state’s governing regime. In Polybius’ theory of the cycle of constitutions, the people’s collective emotional reactions repeatedly spark change from a worse state form to a better one until the end of the cycle. Similarly, in the downfall of Agathocles, the usurping prime minister of Egypt, the people’s emotions both reaffirm positive communal values and (perhaps paradoxically) lead to extreme violence in overthrowing Agathocles’ regime. My analysis in Chapter 4 turns to the prominent role emotions play in causing war between states: how do emotions motivate wars, especially in the paradigm case of the Second Punic War? I look at the justifiability of anger as a cause of war and its implications for Polybius’ theory of history. In the conclusion, after I recap and summarize my findings, I briefly address how the historian tries to inculcate in his readers the appropriate emotional response to certain situations, examining in particular Polybius’ remarks about pity in the Achaean War of 146 BC. For Polybius, emotions play an important role in human decision-making, justifying and prompting individuals’ actions, explaining why states change from worse to better, linking the outbreak of wars to past events, and guiding the readers to develop a correct sense of emotional behavior. .

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... vi

1 Introduction ...... 1

2 Polybius’ Emotions in Context ...... 38

3 The People’s Moral Emotions: Internal State Change ...... 97

4 Anger as a Cause of War ...... 164

5 Conclusion ...... 221

Bibliography ...... 237

vii Chapter 1

Introduction

Achaeus, a rival contender for the Seleucid throne, was betrayed and caught trying to escape from Sardis under siege in 213 BC. His extremities and head were cut off and his body impaled. His captor, King Antiochus III, wept at Achaeus’ startling change of fortune.

Antiochus’ army, however, felt and exhibited such joy that Achaeus’ wife, Laodike, realized that

Achaeus was caught and despaired, surrendering Sardis shortly thereafter. Within this narrative provided by the Greek historian Polybius of the 2nd century BC, Achaeus’ demise sets off chain reactions of emotions which stimulate concrete results, influence important decisions, and shape the readers’ judgment of the scene.1

The highly emotional story of Achaeus’ capture raises the issue of emotion in Polybius’

Histories. When, where, how, and why do these emotions arise, and how does Polybius draw attention to them? What motivates emotion in Polybius’ narratives? How does it spark reactions, and how does it reflect a character’s qualities or a community’s values? What relationship do emotions have with rationality or morality? How do they stimulate violence? In what cases does Polybius approve of emotion and why?

Most scholars assume that, in Polybius’ view, emotions have purely irrational and destructive force, although a few scholars recognize that Polybius does not treat all emotions negatively.2 This project takes the issue of Polybius’ usage of emotion in the Histories as its central critical issue. I aim to show that references to emotion often positively shape his historical narrative, provide the criteria for the success and morality of characters, actions, and even historians, and aid the historian in guiding his readers to becoming intelligent statesmen and citizens of a new world centered on Rome. Emotion has not often received central

1 Polyb., VIII.15-21, 36. 2 Marincola 2013, Erskine 2015. 1 treatment in scholarship on historiography, but the genre of history can provide a rich source of reflection on ancient emotion: history took as its subject and data set reality and actual events, unlike the genres of philosophy or poetry, on which current studies on ancient emotion focus.

Of course, the historian’s rhetoric and guiding hand shape the narrative, so that his text does not recreate the historical people, decisions, and emotions exactly as they happened, but the value of history for understanding ancient views on emotions should not be so underestimated.

Place in Scholarship

Currently there is a large trend in studies on ancient emotions. These studies take

Aristotle’s definitions of emotions in Book 2 of the Rhetoric as their starting point, beginning with William Fortenbaugh’s Aristotle on Emotion in 1975.3 David Konstan significantly contributed to emotion studies with The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks in 2006, which closely examines Aristotle’s definitions of each emotion and then compares these definitions to emotions in Classical Greek literature. Konstan finds that Aristotle conceived of emotions as cognitive, i.e., involving rational thought processes, and as social. He traces similar portrayals of emotion in tragedy and oratory.4 After Aristotle, studies focus on the Hellenistic philosophies of emotion and identify a therapeutic focus in these, following notable scholarship in the 1990s on

Hellenistic philosophy by Martha Nussbaum and Julia Annas.5 Many scholars focus on the

Stoics’ unique definition of emotions as judgments, along with the Epicureans’ conception of emotion as an unnecessary but natural desire.6

3 See on Aristotle and Plato on emotions, Caraone 2007, Cooper 1999a, Fortenbaugh 1975, 2008; Gross 2006, Konstan 2006, Koziak 2000, Lorenz 2006, Price 2009, Sokolon 2006, and Warren 2014. 4 For examples from tragedy, see Konstan 2006, 59-65, 105-109, 247-251. For examples from oratory, see Konstan 2006, 65-68, 125-128, 203-210. 5 Nussbaum 1994, 2001; Annas 1992, 1993. 6 On the Stoics’ views on emotions, see Baltzly 2013, Bett 1998, Brennan 1998, 2003; Cooper 1999c, 2005; Gill 2009, Graver 2007, Irwin 1998. On Epicureans’ views on emotions, see Annas 1989, Armstrong 2003, 2008; Cooper 1999b, Gill 2009, Konstan 2014, Procopé 1998. For both philosophies in general, see Algra, Barnes, Mansfeld, and Schofield, eds. 1999, Baltzly 2013, Brennan 2005, Cooper 2012, Inwood, ed. 2003, Konstan 2014, 2 After studies on emotion in philosophy, scholars have branched out into culture and literature.7 Tragedy as defined and explored in Aristotle’s Poetics centers on eliciting the emotions of pity and fear and explores the extremities of human emotional experience.8 Rhetoric too features emotions, especially in its attention to pathos as one of the components of persuasion, seen in Aristotle’s choice to define emotions in his rhetorical treatise, for example.9 Orators strove to elicit particular emotions in their attempt to persuade their audiences, and both their speeches and rhetorical treatises reflect this goal.10 Lastly, the two volumes of Unveiling Emotions opened up the study of emotions in material culture.11

Besides studying emotion by genre, scholars have written on individual emotions.

Douglas Cairns’ seminal study on shame opened the field for further work on individual affects.12 Anger, beginning with Achilles’ rage in the Iliad, holds an exceptional place in scholarship.13 What seem like more noticeable or mainstream emotions – anger, pity, love – received full treatment first, and the seemingly less typical (or noticeable) emotions, such as envy, spite, jealousy, have also attracted scholarly attention.14 Last of all, positive emotions, such as joy, hope, and gratitude, and the opposite, disgust and melancholy, have recently seen

O’Keefe 2010, and Warren, ed. 2009. On other Hellenistic philosophies on emotions, see Aune 2008, Bett 1998, and Thom 2008. 7 On ancient emotions in general, see Cairns 2008, Cairns and Fulkerson 2015, Knuuttila 2004, Konstan 2006, and Konstan 2013. On emotions in literature, see Braund and Gill, eds. 1997, Braund and Most, eds. 2003, and Harder and Stöppelkamp, eds. 2016. 8 See Arist., Poet.; see recently Visvardi 2015 and Harder and Stöppelkamp, eds. 2016. 9 On Aristotle’s emotions and rhetoric, see Cooper 1994, Cooper 1999a, Fortenbaugh 1975, 2008; Frede 1996, Furley and Nehamas, eds. 1994, Garsten 2006, Garver 1994, Konstan 2006, 2007; Nieuwenburg 2002, Price 2009, Remer 2013, Rorty, ed. 1996, and Sokolon 2006. 10 On emotion and rhetoric in general, see Garsten 2006, Gill 1984, Graver 2002, Konstan 2007, Oliver 2006, Remer 2013, Rorty, ed. 1996, and Wisse 1989. 11 Chaniotis and Ducrey, eds. 2012, 2013. See too Hamilakis 2013. 12 Cairns 1993. See too Konstan 2003 on shame. 13 On anger: Armstrong 2008, Braund and Most, eds. 2003, Erskine 2015, Faraone 2003, Harris 2001, Kalimtzis 2012, Koziak 2000, Lebow 2015, Ludwig 2009, and Lynch and Miles 1980. 14 On anger see above, note 6. On pity, see Konstan 2001, Lateiner 2005, Marincola 2003, and Sternberg Hall, ed. 2005. On envy, see Kaster 2005, Konstan 2003, Konstan and Rutter, eds. 2003, and Walcot 1978. On regret, see Fulkerson 2013. 3 increased attention.15 Studies on emotion also focus on time periods and cultures, such as

Classical Athens and Republican Rome.16

My study of emotions in Polybius is intended to contribute to both the literary and cultural history of emotion. First, the genre of history provides a contrast to poetic and rhetorical genres since history self-consciously claims to represent what really – or likely – happens.17 The historian also chooses to portray emotion, although constrained by concern for the truth and plausibility. History can offer a picture of how persons understand the working of emotions in actual events rather than abstract thought or openly fictitious or mythological literature. Second, my study of emotion in Polybius not only provides a view of emotion as close to the proverbial man-on-the-street’s conception of emotion, but also illuminates an important period in the cultural history of emotion, the Hellenistic period. Current works conceive of the Hellenistic period as “overemotional,” particularly in its philosophy, art, and

(lost) “tragic” historiography.18 As I stress later, Hellenistic philosophies should not be taken as exemplifying common thought on emotion. They theorize and idealize emotion for their own purposes. Polybius’ history, however, provides a facet of the Hellenistic period not considered in the larger discussion about Hellenistic emotion: the emotions which drove individuals and states to both honorable and ignoble behavior.

Emotions in both ancient and modern history, however, are touched on lightly. David

Levene addressed emotion in Tacitus’ Histories and how scholars can view both the characters’

15 On positive emotions, see Caston and Kaster, eds. 2016, Fulkerson 2015. See Lateiner and Spitharas, eds. 2017 on ancient disgust. 16 On Athens, see McHardy 2008, Sternberg Hall, ed. 2005, and Visvardi 2015. On Rome, see Kaster 2005. On other studies of cultural emotions, see Cairns and Fulkerson, eds. 2015, Fitzgerald, ed. 2008 and Munteanu, ed. 2011. 17 See Marincola 1997, 175-216, on the ancient historian’s self-presentation. 18 See, for example, Erskine 2003, 2, on the general perception of the Hellenistic age as more degenerate than the Classical period. See Fitzgerald 2008 on the prominence of emotion in Hellenistic philosophy. See Hunter 2003, esp. 491-493 on emotion in Hellenistic literature. See too Green 1990, 92-118 and Daehner and Lapatin, eds. 2015 on realism or naturalism in Hellenistic art, which includes emotion. 4 emotions and the emotions which the audience feels.19 John Marincola in his article “Beyond

Pity and Fear” challenges the contrast between history and tragedy in the Poetics and see it as limiting for scholarship. He encourages going beyond these two paradigmatic emotions: “I will argue, however, more strongly that we need to alter the perspective with which we approach the issue of the emotions in history, to break free of the bonds of pity and fear, and to examine instead the way in which all the emotions were used by all the ancient historians, and for what purposes they were used.”20 William V. Harris adds to the debate between positivistic history and history based on empathy, which arose prominently in discussions of how to write the history of the Holocaust, summarized in LaCapra’s Writing History, Writing Trauma.21 Even

Tacitus’ famous statement at the beginning of the Annales, to read history “sine ira et studio” has been addressed by many scholars, but not as a testament to emotion per se (or the lack thereof) in history but as a discussion of bias.22

Moreover, historical scholarship on antiquity is not alone in marginalizing the role of emotions. Few studies in history in general focus on emotion, limited mostly to the Medieval

Ages and the French Revolution.23 Such a trend finds parallels in the study of emotions in international relations.24 Realism, the dominant theory in studies of international relations, with its focus on rationality and calculation as the basis of all human decision-making, has been shown by Neta Crawford to ignore the central importance the theory places on fear as a motivator.25 While fear represents a rational calculation of strength and represents a concern for

19 Levene 1997. 20 Marincola 2003. 21 Harris 2010. See LaCapra 2001 for discussion of these types of history. Harris concludes that empathy for subjects in ancient history does not facilitate the modern study of ancient history. 22 See especially Luce 1989. 23 See Febvre 1973, Harris 2010, Hunt 2006, LaCapra 2001, MacMullen 2003, Reddy 2001, and Rosenwein 2002. 24 On emotions in politics and International Relations, see Ahäil and Gregory, eds. 2015, Crawford 2000, Flam and King, eds. 2005, Goodwin and Polletta, eds. 2001, Mercer 2005, Ross 2006, and Sasley 2011. 25 Crawford 2000; see Eckstein 2006, 50-52, on fear in Thucydides. See too Mercer 2005 on psychology’s effect on rationality. 5 survival, scholars still fail to recognize the potential rationality of emotion.26 Crawford draws attention to the fact that “theories of international politics and securities depend on assumptions about emotion that are rarely articulated and which may not be correct.”27 Crawford details the areas in which emotions play a part in international relations and their absence in scholarship.28

The collection Emotion, Politics, and War similarly describes the state of study of emotions in international relations as thin.29 This volume presents itself as a step towards identifying and analyzing the key roles emotion plays in war.

One reason why emotion is absent in studies on in ancient history is the privileging of seemingly “pragmatic” historians, who seem to fit most closely of the ancient historians with the ideal of objective, scientific, Rankean history. In this view, Thucydides provides the ancient precedent both for objective historiography and for Realism. He was perceived to promote cold calculation, expediency, and rationality to the detriment of “subjective” factors such as morality and emotion. Polybius follows Thucydides, in this account of historiography. Polybius’ bureaucratic style of writing, meticulous attention to detail, careful examination of sources, emphasis on rationality (λογισμός), and both practical and reasoned digressions all contribute to this reputation. The postmodern study of “rhetorical” historiography challenges the seemingly straightforward and pragmatic nature of ancient historians’ approaches and emphasizes the literary construction of their texts.30 These two extremes of believing ancient historians’ claims

26 See Crawford 2000, 120-129, for a detailed discussion of Realist scholars who have made statements about emotions without drawing attention to the emotion itself. 27 Crawford 2000, 116. 28 Crawford 2000, 130-154. 29 Ahäil and Gregory, eds. 2015. See especially the Introduction by Crawford. 30 See Woodman 1988 and White 1973 for seminal works in this field. See Grethlein 2013, Dench 2009, and Marincola 2009 more recently. See too Hau 2016 for a recent reappraisal of the Greek historians and their moral purpose. 6 to relate the truth and events “as they really happened” and of seeing the ancient histories as

“purely” literary constructs still spark debate in the field of ancient historiography.31

This debate affects the study of emotion in ancient historiography. Even in historiographical scholarship which deemphasizes the truth claims of the ancient historians, emotions do not feature. Nevertheless, emotion provides the opportunity to study the choices a historian makes in crafting his narrative, for no external source can prove the existence of emotion in a historical event. Even eye-witness accounts rely on interpretations of outward expressions which can only be inferred as emotive.32 Thus, the ancient historian chooses to include emotion in his narrative and makes an interpretive move rather than a report of fact.

Nonetheless, historians did not have the freedom to create emotions entirely from nothing; their own claims to portray events as truly as they can constrain them to incorporate emotions in understandable and plausible ways. Polybius himself criticizes a Roman historian, Fabius Pictor, for misrepresenting emotion and thus warns his and Fabius’ readers not to trust Fabius’ histories too readily.33 Because ancient historians endeavored to portray the events as plausible, as opposed to outright fictitious and mythologically-based literature, their portrayals of emotion should be close to what their contemporaries (and also the man-on-the-street) would recognize as the ancient Greek equivalents of “anger”, “pity”, “fear”, and so forth.

One subgenre of ancient historiography did supposedly highlight emotions – “tragic” historiography from the Hellenistic period.34 In particular, Duris of Samos and Phylarchus

(apparently) engaged in a sensationalized, overwrought version of history which Polybius first among many criticized and actively pushed back against with his own style of history. Polybius

31 See recently Batstone 2009 and Lendon 2009, which are paired in the Cambridge Companion to Roman Historians. Both Batstone and Lendon see and portray the issue as one of polar opposites, although most scholarship tends to fall in between the extreme views. See Marincola 2001, 3-8, for a summary of the issue. 32 See Woodman 1988, Ch. 1 on how different perspectives can create varying interpretations of events in history. 33 Polyb., III.8.9. See Chapter 4. 34 On “tragic history” in general, see above all Schepens and Bolansée, eds. 2005, and Bringman 1997, Dreyer 2000, Eckstein 2013, Gowing 2010, Marincola 2003, 2011, 2013; Rutherford 2007, Sacks 1981, and Wiemer 2013. 7 criticizes Phylarchus for including the details of wailing women and children at the fall of a city so as to invoke sympathy and sadness for the characters.35 He rebukes those who sensationalized the fall of Agathocles of Egypt, narrating beyond what was proper for the genre of history and beyond what this particular character and scene merited.36 Partly from this very criticism of others’ style, Polybius represents a pragmatic historian. Because the “tragic” historiography of the Hellenistic period forsook the Thucydidean, pragmatic model of history, it has been assessed as a lesser, more degenerate form of history.37 Recently, however, John

Marincola and others have criticized the existence of a genre of “tragic” history and refined the terms of criticism.38

One might think that the historian who criticizes the overemotional styles of other historians and their dramatization of certain events may shun any emotional usage or element in his own work. In fact, in reading Walbank’s A Historical Commentary on Polybius one would hardly know Polybius described or used any emotions.39 Polybius does use and portray emotions, however, just as often as his historiographical predecessors Herodotus, Thucydides, and

Xenophon.40 Polybius’ usage of emotion may seem to challenge his reputation as a pragmatic

35 Polyb., II.56-58. See too Walbank 1960, 216-234. 36 Polyb., XV.36. 37 See Marincola 2001, 110-112, on this trend. 38 See especially Marincola 2013; Baron 2013 and Eckstein 2013. 39 I investigate 47 passages throughout this dissertation in some depth (with at least two sentences) which involve emotions. Walbank in his Historical Commentary on Polybius mentions emotion in only 11 of these, completely omitting any discussion of emotion in 36 passages. Of the eleven, he focuses on how to translate the phrase with the emotion in four, compares the passage with emotion to another passage in three (and none of the referred sections address the emotion), and in one cites emotion merely in a discussion of Polybius’ sources. The three remaining passages, in which Walbank actually discusses the emotion as such, involve the “wrath of the Barcids” in two passages, and Phylarchus’ tragic historiography in the last passage. It seems fair to say that emotion as such did not interest Walbank. 40 A basic search reveals that Thucydides alone portrays emotions more frequently than Polybius. For the number of occurrences of emotions of anger, hatred, resentment, indignation, pity, and fear: Herodotus – 137, Thucydides – 413, Xenophon – 202, and Polybius – 516. Since Polybius’ extant text is at least 42% larger than any of the other historians, I measure these frequencies in relation to the size of their text. The amount of the terminology for emotion, per total word count comes to these percentages: Herodotus uses these emotional terms .074% of his total words, Thucydides uses these emotion terms .274% of the time, Xenophon uses these emotion terms .163% of the time, and Polybius uses these emotion terms .162% of the time. However, this statistical comparison of their usages does not take into account the possibility of differing terminologies for emotions. 8 historian, as opposed to “tragic” historiography associated with emotion.41 Studying how

Polybius portrays and uses emotion in his own historical narrative calls these categorizations into question: Polybius uses emotions for his “pragmatic” goals of teaching statesmen honorable behavior.

Scholars have assumed that for Polybius emotion fell on the wrong side of a dichotomy with reason. Emotion, it is said, characterizes the barbarian, the woman, the common person, the mercenary: that is, emotion represents the opposite of the good aristocratic man. Arthur M.

Eckstein changed the field of Polybian studies with his monograph Moral Vision in the Histories of

Polybius.42 Eckstein argues that Polybius did not present an amoral, Machiavellian perspective on history but rather morality and a concern for aristocratic ethos pervade and characterize his

Histories. “Hyperemotionality” played a part in Eckstein’s characterization of those of whom

Polybius disapproved. Eckstein states that “[e]very multitude is unstable in character, and filled with totally lawless desire, unreasoning anger, and violent passion.”43 Indeed, “uncontrolled emotion was to him the most prevalent – and dangerous – characteristic of the masses and their

Moreover, comparison of fairly regularized terms throughout ancient Greek, such as ὀργή and its cognates, the terms for fear, φόβος, δέος and their cognates, and pity ἔλεος, reveal differing usages (and presumably emphases) for these emotions between the historians: Herodotus rarely uses these emotional terms in comparison to the others: he represents anger 16 times (80% fewer occurrences than Polybius), fear 78 times (68% fewer times than Polybius), and does not cite pity. Thucydides, however, frequently uses fear 317 times (28% more occurrences than Polybius, which is notable as Polybius’ text is a little over twice the size of Thucydides’ text), uses anger prominently 60 times (only 25% fewer occurrences than Polybius), but uses pity only once. Xenophon provides a balance between Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ emotional usages: He uses anger 28 times, fear 153 times, but pity only once. Moreover, Xenophon’s overall number of emotional usages is closely parallel to Polybius’ overall number of emotional terms at .162% and .163% of their total word count, respectively. To make further conclusions or generalizations about these historians’ usage of emotional terms is not warranted from such statistical evidence, however. Further analysis needs to be grounded in contextualizing these terms in the passages, particularly when not every usage may correspond to what we would call emotion. 41 Ramsay MacMullen in Feelings in History, 2003, represents a dissenting voice to this statement. He endeavors to show the close connection between emotion and motivation implicit in Thucydides and Roman Republican historians, such as Nikolaos. MacMullen ties this significance to the scientific understandings of emotion. 42 Eckstein 1995. 43 Eckstein 1995, 136. 9 conduct.”44 Barbarians “always acted out of blind passion,” and women are characteristic of

“hyperemotionality.”45

I disagree and argue that Eckstein was incorrect to assume that emotion was inherently negative in Polybius. In arguing that “honor – both in the public sphere and as an inner feeling

– was to Polybius more important” than a standard of success (by any means), Eckstein himself employs emotional language.46 In particular, in his second chapter, Eckstein argues that

Polybius’ own feelings and emphasis on emotions demonstrate his deep concern for morality, although Eckstein never explicitly acknowledges the role of emotion itself in this connection.

So, Eckstein tells us that “Polybius expresses bitter anger,” and mentions “Polybius’ angry criticism” and “an idea about which he felt very strongly.”47 These emotional phrases seemingly do not register as ‘emotional’ but ‘moral’ to Eckstein. Thus Eckstein employs emotion and describes Polybius as feeling emotions to exemplify Polybius’ morality but does not characterize

Polybius, although he shows emotion, in any way similar to his description of “hyperemotional” masses, barbarians, and women.

Craige Champion in his monograph Cultural Politics in Polybius’s Histories examines the trajectory of the decline of Roman culture in the Histories. Similarly to Eckstein, Champion analyzes the language of barbarology and ochlocracy (rule of the mob) as a paradigm by which to evaluate groups of people in the Histories. Champion shows how Polybius portrayed the

Aetolians, Gauls, and Illyrians as barbaric, and shows the connotations associated with this: irrational, impulsive, uncivilized, passionate, and so forth.48 Champion does not assume that emotion in general is as inherently negative as Eckstein does throughout his work. He does,

44 Eckstein 1995, 131. 45 Eckstein 1995, 123, 152. 46 Eckstein 1995, 9. 47 Eckstein 1995, 52, 24, 22. 48 Champion 2004a, 30-66. 10 however, use an emotional term, thumos, as the shorthand for all language of barbarology, which thus implies that he assumed emotion on some level was part and parcel of this negative characterization.

I disagree with the assumption that emotion was necessarily a negative element. This assumption takes into account neither the various manifestations of emotion nor its variable motivations and results. I accept Eckstein’s identification of Polybius’ moral vision and aristocratic ethos. Likewise, Champion’s argument about the politics of cultural indeterminacy with which Polybius complicates the portrayal of the Romans as at times sharing in barbaric thumos and at times in Hellenic logismos, reason, informs my analysis of Polybius’ text. That is, I take what Eckstein describes as Polybius’ aristocratic ethos and Champion’s descriptive category of logismos as the frame or model by which Polybius judges emotional behavior. I differ from them by analyzing emotions themselves rather than understanding emotions as naturally irrational.

Last of all, the study of emotions in Polybius’ Histories is intrinsically important.

Emotions pervade Polybius’ Histories. They influence individuals’ and groups’ decisions, motivate uprisings and coups, spark wars, and reflect characters’ moral values. In explanatory passages, they justify and exemplify normative human behavior. In sum, in Polybius’ text emotions form a vital part of the process of history, and they serve as useful and significant material for the historian for making sense of events. Polybius’ use of emotion and his view of how important emotion is for history justify studying emotions in his text in and of itself.

Fundamentals of Emotion

Defining emotion is a notoriously difficult task: “The question ‘What is an emotion?’ has haunted philosophers and psychologists for many years.”49 The ambiguity of emotion is

49 Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 1. See also Deigh 2009, Cowie 2009, and de Sousa 2009 for explorations into defining emotion. 11 closely tied to the imprecision of thought and expression of emotion. The prevalence of emotion in popular thought hinders a constrictive and concise theoretical definition which encompasses all the nuances of this term – despite many attempts by philosophers.50 The rigor of thinking about emotions in the modern social sciences provides a way into investigating emotions in ancient history. The social sciences provide clear terminology and dissect the components of emotion in order to clarify how it works. The goal of studies of emotion in the social sciences, that is, to investigate how emotions actually work in lived experience and thus provide a normative view of human emotion, thus falls closer to the purpose of history than do ancient philosophies. Moreover, the modern social sciences illuminate how emotions can coalesce with morality and rationality. This is important because it means that emotion can be more than just inherently negative. In this section, I introduce fundamental terms for discussing emotions in a precise way and examine selections from Polybius’ Histories to demonstrate the salience of these features and style of analysis. I aim to illustrate the usefulness of studies of emotion in the modern social sciences for an analysis of ancient historiography.

Emotions generally share basic features: someone feels them, someone or something stimulates them, they are about something one cares about, and they cause some expression or result. Studies of modern emotion use the terms subject, object, import, and result to describe these factors.51 The subject feels the emotion; they experience it, it is theirs. For example, when

Polybius narrates that the Achaeans grow indignant (ἠγανάκτει) with Aratus after he disastrously mismanaged their campaign against the Aetolians at Caphyae, the Achaeans are the subject of the emotion.52 They feel indignation. The object of an emotion is the person or thing

50 For major studies on the (differing) nature of emotions, see Ekman and Davidson, eds. 1994, Goldie 2000, Helm 2001, Prinz 2007, Solomon, ed. 2004, Ben-Ze’ev 2000. For an introduction to the study of modern emotions, see Deonna and Teroni 2012, de Sousa 2014, and Goldie, ed. 2009. 51 Helm 2009, 1-15 and de Sousa 2014, Section 3. 52 Polyb., IV.14.2. 12 for or against whom the subject feels their emotion.53 The subject directs their emotion towards the object with the result that the objects ‘receive’ the emotion, so to speak. In our example,

Aratus is the object of the Achaeans’ indignation, for they grow indignant at him. Objects frequently stimulate the emotion in the subjects, with the result that the objects seem to cause the emotion and so have more agency in the situation. However, the emotion’s subjects and objects do not necessarily correspond with grammatical or active subjects and objects. In terms purely of who has the emotion, those who feel it have actual agency in how they (re)act to their emotion; hence, they are regarded as the subjects. Moreover, emotions tend to lead to further action.54 They stimulate subjects to make decisions and to act in ways they otherwise would probably not have acted. The Achaeans’ indignation leads them to be sharply opposed to

Aratus, which motivates his rivals to accuse him, leading to further actions.55

Within this discussion and example, an important feature of emotions, intentionality, stands out. Emotions display intentionality in that they have objects.56 The emotion is directed towards a person a thing. Intentionality is a characteristic of emotion which can distinguish it from other psychological and affective states, such as feelings, moods, dispositions, and sensations.57 In the Histories, this distinction between emotion with intentionality and other affective states without intentionality holds true. Positive emotions, such as joy or gladness, however, seem objectless and do not lead to future action, distinguishing these emotions from

53 For examples of nonhuman objects, see III.112.2, III.46.11, XV.12.4, XVIII.37.7. 54 See Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 1-15, and Greenspan 2000, 475ff. on the crucial role of emotion as a motivator for action. 55 Polyb., IV.14.1-2. 56 Intentionality in modern studies of emotion does not refer to intending to have or create an emotion. See below for characters’ intentions to create emotion. 57 See below for further details. The affects of shock (κατάπληξις/ἔκπληξις), confidence (θάρσος), and hope (ἐλπίς) which dominate the military narrative seem generally to indicate a disposition or more succinctly a mood rather than occurrent emotions. See Goldie 2000, 16-27, de Sousa 2014, Section 3, and Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 4 on limiting emotions to feelings with intentionality. See for the occurrences and uses of shock, Mauersberger 2.1.375, 1.3.1323-1327, 1.2.732-734, 1.2.946-947. See for shock, 1.3.1136-1137, 1.3.1156-1157. See Chapter 2 for ἐλπίς. 13 the major emotions of Polybius’ text.58 In our example, the Achaeans’ indignation has intentionality because they direct it against an object, Aratus. However, as the passage continues, they redirect their indignation. Aratus sways the Achaeans to pardon him, which caused them to redirect their indignation to his rivals, who tried to capitalize on the Achaeans’ indignation by accusing Aratus.59 Thus, the intentionality of the Achaeans’ indignation changes:

Aratus ceases to be the object of their emotion and his rivals become the objects. In this situation, the Achaeans either found their emotion misdirected at Aratus or found the rivals’ actions more egregious than Aratus’ in relation to the Achaeans’ values, the import of their indignation.60 Misdirection of emotions does not occur nearly as frequently as correctly directed emotions, which makes the Achaeans’ indignation and Aratus’ role as object particularly important here. Polybius uses the misdirection of emotion to reflect positively on the character of Aratus. As the object of a negative emotion, indignation, Aratus calmly appealed to the

Achaeans’ values and engineered the transference of indignation to his own rivals, proving himself an emotionally competent statesman.

Import in modern studies describes what the emotion is about.61 It motivates someone to feel the emotion. In our example, Aratus’ strategic failure and consequent loss of the lives of

Achaeans constitute the import of the Achaeans’ indignation. Moreover, Polybius lists four faults Aratus committed in his recent political and military leadership, making explicit why the

Achaeans grew indignant at Aratus: he took office too early, released the army while the

Aetolians were in Achaea, engaged them while unprepared, and conducted the battle poorly.62

Polybius assumes that the Achaeans valued the lives of their troops, their military aims against

58 See Chapter 2. 59 Polyb., IV.14.7-8. 60 Their original motivations for their emotions were still correct; the justifications used for evaluating the emotion changed. 61 See Helm 2001, 60-122 for this terminology. Ben-Ze’ev 2000, on the other hand, prefers the terminology of ‘concern’, while Helm 2009, 4ff. adds ‘focus’ as a definition for import. 62 Polyb., IV.14.2-6. 14 the Aetolians, and honorable standards of behavior in warfare. Aratus failed to provide any of these, and this stirred the Achaeans’ indignation. The Achaeans’ value of life, victory, and honor make up the implicit imports of their indignation against Aratus, the object, but his political failures also make up the explicit import. Polybius rarely defines the import of an emotion so explicitly, and, compared to the other features discussed, it is difficult to identify clearly because import represents a value of the subject rather than a concrete person, thing, or event. Causes as identified in history are closely related to import, for causes represent an agent’s reason to act, just as import represents the subject’s reason to feel.63

The import of an emotion represents the basis for the emotion’s justification and appropriateness in that it is usually a moral value that the subject holds: subjects feel an emotion for a reason.64 For example, near the beginning of the Social War, Philip V makes a surprise attack on the Aetolian capital of Thermum.65 Philip’s plan to make a surprise attack on

Thermum receives a favorable evaluation from Polybius: Aratus, one of Polybius’ most positively portrayed characters, approves and promotes Philip’s plan, while Leontius, who we know is complicit in a scheme to foil all of Philip’s actions, argues against it.66 Thus, Polybius portrays the project to attack Thermum as the best and most prudent choice by a general. After

Philip takes Thermum and has his men heap up all the extra moveable property, Polybius remarks that up to this point all was done nobly and justly (καλῶς καὶ δικαίως).67 However, he censures the next action,

“for, taking thought for what the Aetolians did in Dium and Dodona, they burnt the stoas and destroyed the rest of the dedications, which were luxurious in their ornamentation and of which some were crafted with much care and expense. But not only did they destroy the roofs with fire, but they also razed them to the

63 See Chapter 4 for emotion and causation. 64 See Chapter 3 for how Polybius thought emotions had reasons behind them. 65 Polyb., V.6-12. 66 Polyb., V.6-8. See Walbank, HCP 1.546-549 on Philip at Thermum. 67 Polyb., V.9.1. 15 foundation. And they overthrew also the statues, not less than 2,000, and they also destroyed many statues, except those which had dedications to the gods or were in the gods’ images.”68

Although Polybius describes Philip’s religious restraint with these statues, Philip seems to have gone too far. Polybius specifies that Philip was driven by anger (ὀργή) in his judgment and criticism of Philip’s behavior, placed later.69

Philip cared about the sanctuaries at Dium and Dodona, thought that the Aetolians acted wrongfully, and thought he had justly and appropriately punished them through his reciprocal destruction at Thermum.70 The import of the emotion, Philip’s valuing of religion and the religious centers of Dium and Dodona, and the event which provokes his anger, namely the

Aetolians’ actions against Philip’s interests, are deeply intertwined. Polybius frequently mentions both why subjects feel an emotion and what provokes subjects to feel emotion, but he does not distinguish these factors separately as import and motivation. Polybius does not consistently mention both aspects and often assumes his reader already knows why an action motivates a particular emotion. For Philip’s anger, Polybius does not specify why Philip cares about Dium and Dodona; the moral principle, or import, is assumed. However, for an analysis of the workings of ancient Greek emotions, the identification of import as an underlying value which motivates the emotion is an important distinction from the identification of the event which

68 Polyb., V.9.2-3. λαβόντες γὰρ ἔννοιαν τῶν ἐν Δίῳ καὶ Δωδώνῃ πεπραγμένων τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς τάς τε στοὰς ἐνεπίμπρασιν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἀναθημάτων διέφθειρον, ὄντα πολυτελῆ ταῖς κατασκευαῖς καὶ πολλᾶς ἐπιμελείας ἔνια τετευχότα καὶ δαπάνης. οὐ μόνον δὲ τῷ πυρὶ κατελυμήναιτο τὰς ὀροφάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατέσκαψαν εἰς ἔδαφος. ἀνέτρεψαν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀνδριάντας, ὄντας οὐκ ἐλάττους δισχιλίων · πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ διέφθειραν, πλὴν ὅσοι θέων ἐπιγραφὰς ἢ τύπους εἶχον. 69 Polyb., V.12.1. δῆλον γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ὡς εἰκὸς ἦν αὑτῶν μὲν καταγινώσκειν, τὸν δὲ Φίλιππον ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ θαυμάζειν, ὡς βασιλικῶς καὶ μεγαλοψύχως αὐτοῦ · χρωμένου τῇ τε πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὀργῇ. 70 Polyb., V.9.6. 16 sparks the emotion. The import explains why a character felt an emotion; the motivating event explains when and under what circumstances the subject felt an emotion.71

Emotions can be appropriate to their import and the event which stimulates the emotion.72

If the emotion accords with the import, it is appropriate. To turn back to our previous example,

Aratus argued that the Achaeans’ response and scale of indignation constituted an inappropriate response: the Achaeans should not have felt such indignation.73 Polybius, on the other hand, shows that Philip V rightfully felt anger against the Aetolians for their previous desecrations, and

– had he stopped his destruction with the moveable property – he would have acted correctly as a result of his appropriate anger.74

Closely related to appropriateness is the concept of proportionality in modern social sciences. Both appropriateness and proportionality measure whether an emotion is correctly aligned with moral values. The appropriateness of an emotion refers to whether the emotion itself is a correct response to the event which stimulates the subject’s emotion, whereas proportionality refers to whether the action resulting from the emotion correlates to the emotion.

In other words, appropriateness looks back from the emotion to motivation and proportionality looks ahead to the result of the emotion. These terms differ only minutely, but this distinction allows for a nuanced reading and appraisal of emotions and their subjects in the Histories. In the case of Philip V’s destruction of Thermum, Polybius finds Philip’s response to his anger disproportionate.75 Philip went too far in his anger by destroying sacred structures; thus his reaction was disproportional. Nevertheless, the narrator does not characterize Philip’s anger itself as inappropriate: he rightly grew angry at the Aetolians’ destruction at Dium and

71 This is parallel to Polybius’ distinction of looking back to causes of wars as separate from the event (ἀρχή) which begins them, III.6-7. See Chapter 4. 72 For interpretations of appropriateness in emotions, see D’Arms and Jacobson 2000, 65-90, Deigh 2009, 1-15. 73 Cf. Polyb., XI.28, where Scipio Africanus argues away the causes for the mutineers’ indignation. 74 Polyb., V.9.1. Cf. V.12.1. 75 Polyb., V.9.7. ἐμοὶ δὲ τἀναντία δοκεῖ τούτων. 17 Dodona.76 Presumably destroying only the secular structures would have marked a proportional response for his anger. In this passage, we can evaluate the difference between appropriateness and proportionality.77 Philip overreacted to his appropriate anger.78

Misdirection occurs when the subject directs their emotional response towards the wrong object. Philip V both responded disproportionately and misdirected his anger and its resulting action. He acted disproportionately by destroying too much. He grew angry at the

Aetolians, the correct objects of his anger, but misdirected his response to another object, the

(property of the) gods. Both of these features center on the same action: he destroyed the gods’ belongings. In this case, Philip’s misdirection and disproportional response mutually reaffirm each other.79

Polybius’ final remarks, nevertheless, both clarify his purpose and at the same time complicate this application to Philip V. Polybius says, “for committing the same fault as the

Aetolians’ impieties, and because of his passion (θυμός), healing evil with evil, Philip thought that he did nothing wrong.”80 Philip often blamed the Aetolians Scopas and Dorimachus for their lack of restraint and unscrupulousness (ἀσέλγεια, παρανομία), often bringing up their impiety (ἀσέβεια) against the divine. But he himself, doing the very same, did not think that he

76 Polyb., V.9.1: Καὶ ἕως μὲν τούτου πάντα κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ἐπράττετο · τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα πῶς χρὴ λέγειν οὐκ οἶδα. 77 Scipio Africanus, speaking to his mutinous troops in Spain, argued that they felt indignation inappropriately, going through each potential motive for their indignation and how it was unjustified, XI.28. This is discussed further in Chapter 2. 78 Polybius emphasizes the wrongness of Philip’s actions at Thermum, V.9-12. 79 Orators in the Histories make this interconnection between misdirection and disproportionality the foundation of their arguments. In particular, speakers who attempt to assuage the Romans’ anger towards various Greek communities argue that the Romans react with disproportional anger. See Erskine 2015 for an analysis of this strategy. See Walbank 1965 and Wooten 1974 on the rhetoric of the speeches in Polybius. 80 Polyb., V.11.1. 18 would create the same reputation as they had among his audience.81 Thus, Philip erred because he committed the same wrongs as the Aetolians with his tit-for-tat strategy.82

Polybius explains why he condemns Philip by an appeal to proper conduct within war.

He specifies that according to the laws and rights of war, generals can take away and destroy enemies’ forts, harbors, cities, soldiers, ships, produce, and anything else like these which, when lost, would weaken the enemy and which would enhance one’s own strength when gained.83

Destroying what does not weaken the enemy or strengthen oneself is clearly the work of a mad passion (θυμοῦ λυττῶντος).84 Polybius explains further that good men wage war not to eliminate the enemy but to correct him, and thus a good man should direct his attention and actions against wrongdoers, not innocents.85 These sentiments reflect Polybius’ philosophy on the correct method of making war, and thus demonstrate that Philip did not meet Polybius’

(personal) standards. Philip destroyed more than would aid him in the war.86

Polybius makes one last point to prove that Philip V’s actions were not beneficial, both practically and morally. He remarks that one could recognize Philip’s mistake if one takes the

Aetolians’ perspective and thinks about how they would be disposed if he had acted differently.

Polybius states emphatically that he thinks they would have had the best and most humane opinion of him (βελτίστην καὶ φιλανθρωποτάτην [διάληψιν]), knowing what they did at

81 Polyb., V.11.1-2. 82 Philip had no moral issue with his behavior, Polybius specifies, which implies that such a realist strategy was a viable and accepted view at the time. See Eckstein 2006 on the prevailing realist atmosphere in the interstate relations of the Hellenistic period. 83 Polyb., V.11.3. Cf. Plat., Rep. 5.470A-471A. See Walbank, HCP 1.549. 84 Polyb., V.11.4. Dorimachus’ actions at IV.67.1-4 fall into this category: they go beyond what Polybius determined necessary in war. 85 Polyb., V.11.5. Cf. Seneca’s Stoic purpose of correction in De Ira. See too Cic., De Off. 1.35. 86 While it is clear that Philip destroyed too much, Polybius’ comment that one should not harm the innocent does not particularly apply to Philip’s case. Polybius does not narrate that he killed or enslaved any inhabitants. In targeting civic buildings, he presumably could have harmed the innocent, except that he harmed the public buildings of the Aetolian League which had declared war against him. Polybius’ stringent distinctions between civilian and military targets find parallels with modern just war theory. See Lazar 2016, Parts 4.1-4.3, and Walzer 2015, especially Part 3. 19 Dodona and Dium and realizing Philip could have done anything he wanted at Thermum, rightly.87 In this counterfactual example, Philip would have chosen to do nothing similar to them because of his mildness and magnanimity. Polybius concludes his criticism of Philip by stating, “for it is clear from these [arguments] that they were likely to blame themselves on the one hand, but on the other to approve of Philip and wonder at his magnanimity and kingliness when he showed piety to the divine and anger towards them (χρωμένου τῇ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον

εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὀργῇ).”88 In this concluding statement Polybius makes clear that Philip’s anger was an appropriate response. If he had directed it correctly – towards the

Aetolians (πρὸς αὐτοὺς) instead of the divine (πρὸς τὸ θεῖον) - his anger would have also been proportional too, as the correct response against the Aetolians. Thus, in the end, it becomes apparent that anger as such was not Philip’s mistake: he misdirected a disproportionate response, committing a twofold error.

One categorization commonly utilized in discussions of emotion concerns rationality and irrationality, and this is a central concern in Chapter 3.89 This dichotomy between rationality and irrationality has pervaded scholarship on Polybius until recently.90 However, in Polybius’ text emotions do not fall directly and automatically onto one side or the other. Rather, analysis of

87 It is remarkable that Polybius argues – optimistically – that the Aetolians would think like this, reflecting and changing their view. Polybius, in his imagined scenario, attributes to them three important factors: that they recognized their own faults at Dium and Dodona, that they would have recognized the correct direction of Philip’s anger towards them but also his restraint, and that they would have fundamentally changed their opinion of Philip because of this. In short, Polybius assumes the Aetolians would have seen and respected the same ethical logic as Polybius. Polybius’ own account of the Aetolians’ behavior and their set of values contradicts this view. Within this scenario, they celebrated Scopas’ destruction at Dium as the work of a noble hero, IV.62.4. The Aetolians are one of the last peoples to whom one would expect Polybius to attribute rational reflection and recognition of his ethical standards; see Champion 2011. This paradox – rational and reflecting Aetolians – either marks an inconsistency in his thought or strengthens Polybius’ point: even the Aetolians could have recognized Philip’s restraint, and so his actions reflect even more poorly on himself for failing to see this. Moreover, Polybius’ argument about what the Aetolians “clearly” (δῆλον) would have thought demonstrates that Polybius assumed that all people were capable of such rational reflection and even thought that people were more disposed to reach his ethical and rational conclusion than any other conclusion. 88 Polyb., V.12.1. 89 See Greenspan 1988 and 2000 for good discussions of reason’s relationship to emotion. 90 Eckstein 1989 and 1995, 22, 24, 52, 57, 73. 20 emotions and their motivations, appropriateness, and proportionality provide a foundation for the categorization of emotion. In fact, Polybius seldom explicitly distinguishes emotion as rational or irrational.91

With most instances of emotion, Polybius simply narrates its occurrence, but sometimes

Polybius narrates a character’s intention to cause or create emotion in another character. Their success in this intent often contributes to a favorable portrayal of the one who intends to create emotion. Hannibal intends to and succeeds in creating emotion in others most of all in the surviving text of the Histories.92 Characters who try to manipulate others’ emotions and fail, on the other hand, suffer and generally are portrayed in a negative light. For example, the new and young tyrant of Syracuse in 215 B.C., Hieronymus, immediately takes steps to reverse his predecessor Hiero’s policy of steadfast dedication to Syracuse’s alliance with Rome and against

Carthage. Instead, Hieronymus chooses to support Carthage and, in his choices, causes indignation to the Romans. Polybius makes clear that Hieronymus chose poorly in his reply to the Roman embassy which came to him as a courtesy to preserve their alliance.93 Hieronymus’ causing the Romans indignation aligns with his other negative traits and incompetence, leading to his swift demise, as Polybius is quick to tell us.

Generally, people feel emotions on their own account and for others. Here I shall call emotions felt on one’s own behalf personal. For example, the powerful Seleucid courtier

91 Of the emotions of anger, hatred, indignation, resentment, and pity, examples of explicitly rational emotions: ὀργή II.56.13 (someone), XXI.31.7 (Romans in Athenian’s speech), XXX.31.12 (Romans in Astymedes’ speech); μῖσος IX.39.1 (Of hating folly, in Lyciscus’ speech); δυσαρέστησις III.26.6 (someone). Explicitly irrational emotions: ὀργή V.49.3 (Hermeias), VI.56.11 (people); δυσαρέστησις VII.5.6 (Hieronymus). Rationality will form a major topic of Chapter 3. 92 For example, Hannibal often intends to create emotions, contemplates using others’ emotions, and creates emotions: III.13.6, III.17.5, III.34.4, III.51.13, III.52.6, III.54.7, III.60.10, III.60.13, III.61.4, III.61.5, III.62-63, III.69.3, III.78.5, III.89.1, III.90.12, III.94.7, III.101.4, III.111.3, III.111.5, VI.58.9-10, IX.4.7, IX.6.1, IX.22.5, XI.3.6, XV.19.3, XV.19.6. Scipio Africanus seems to succeed also. 93 Polyb., VII.5.6. 21 Hermeias grew angry at his rival Epigenes for speaking up against his plans.94 Hermeias grew angry on his own behalf. By contrast, external observers feel pity for Achaeus, a rival to

Antiochus III for the Seleucid throne, after he was captured and killed despite his best efforts.95

These observers feel an emotion on the behalf of another person, Achaeus. These observers also hate Achaeus’ betrayers – not because the betrayers harmed the observers themselves, as would be the case with a personal emotion – but because the betrayers harmed Achaeus, with whom the observers sympathize. These emotions, the observers’ pity and hate, are reflective, for, implicitly, the subjects reflect upon another’s situation and at least consider how they would feel in the other’s situation.96

In fact, Polybius narrates this type of reflective emoting when he describes how

Antiochus III, Achaeus’ enemy, reacts when Achaeus is brought to him bound.97 Antiochus,

Polybius says, remained silent for a long time then burst into tears. For he reflected on the vicissitudes of fortune and how Achaeus just before had been at the prime of his life in his power and fortune, but now was reduced to nothing.98 Antiochus’ reflection leads him to react with raw emotion – an outburst of tears. This reflection and emotive response by Antiochus is employed by Polybius to enhance his character. He shows wisdom not customary in a young king, and his reflection on fortune hearkens back to Herodotus’ narrative of Solon’s advice to

Croesus and Croesus’ subsequent reversal of fortune.99 Antiochus, on witnessing such a reversal

94 Polyb., V.49.3. 95 Polyb., VIII.36.9. 96 The process of reflection happens almost instantaneously. Damasio 1994, and Greenspan 1988, both discuss the temporality of emotional processes. See Stueber 2017 for an overview on modern views of empathy. See Chapter 3 for an analysis of the reflective process of emotions in Polybius’ Histories. 97 Polyb., VIII.20. 98 Polyb., VIII.20.9-10. παρεισελθόντων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὸν Καμβύλον καὶ καθισάντων τὸν Ἀχαιὸν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν δεδεμένον, εἰς τοιαύτην ἀφασίαν ἦλθε διὰ τὸ παράδοξον ὥστε πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἀποσιωπῆσαι, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον συμπαθὴς γενέσθαι καὶ δακρῦσαι. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔπαθεν ὁρῶν, ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τὸ δυσφύλακτον καὶ παράλογον τῶν ἐκ τῆς τύχης συμβαινόντων. 99 Herod., I.29-33 and I.86-87. Cf. Scipio Aemilianus’ tears at the fall of Carthage: Polyb. XXXVIII.20-22 (from App., Pun.132). 22 at Croesus’ former capital, Sardis, shows himself to have good moral character and to be a thoughtful student of history through his reflective emotion.100

The categories of personal and reflective are not mutually exclusive. Reflective emotions often reflect back to the subject, and so are also personal emotions; altruistic emotions do not feature in Polybius’ text, and Polybius narrates how emotions are often inherently reflective, even when they seem to be directed wholly on another’s behalf.101 Similarly, subjects can feel emotions for a community rather than only for an individual. Often they feel for their own group, making these communal emotions an extension of personal emotion.102 Reflective emotional processes share striking similarities to Polybius’ theory of the learning process and profit of history, i.e., to reflect on the experiences of people of the past and apply their situations to oneself in order to learn the best judgment and response.103

Emotions are experienced concurrently throughout the Histories as one would expect in a portrayal of reality, although theories of emotion have difficulty addressing the nuances of combined emotion. Most often the same subject feels similar and related emotions, such as anger and hatred.104 One subject can feel multiple emotions simultaneously. For example, after the Achaean Callicrates returned from an embassy to Rome, Polybius says that anger and hatred were made manifest against him.105 In this example, the Achaeans feel complementary

100 This characterization of Antiochus as a thoughtful and reflective king does not persist throughout the Histories. By the time of his war against Rome, Polybius chastises Antiochus for his poor life choices. In general, Polybius treats Antiochus III and Philip V fairly even-handedly throughout the Histories, praising and chastising them as their behavior dictates. 101 See especially IX.10.9 for this process explicitly. See too IV.6, VIII.36, XV.17.1-2. These examples will all be discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3. Pity comes closest to an altruistic emotion in the Histories, but Polybius explicitly describes the process of pity as reflective back on one’s own circumstances. See Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 3 for their nonexistence; see for the existence of altruistic emotion, Konstan 2006, 85 and Tappolet 2009. 102 Kelly, Iannone, and McCarty 2014. 103 Polyb. III.31. See Chapter 4. 104 Polyb., I.82.9, VI.7.8, IX.10.10, XV.17.2, XV.30.1. See the discussions of each of these emotions in Chapter 2 on their differences. 105 Polyb, XXX.29.1. 23 emotions, as anger and hatred are both negative feelings, at the same time.106 Later in the same section, Polybius states that such was the indignation (προσκοπή) and hatred (μῖσος) against

Callicrates that children in the street called him a traitor.107 Anger, hatred, and indignation together characterize the intensity of the Achaeans’ reaction to Callicrates. These similar emotions combine and are directed against the same object.

In other passages, seemingly opposite emotions occur simultaneously in response to the same event.108 Studies on modern emotion call this feature of emotions multidimensionality.109

Let us move back to the example of the capture of the Seleucid rival Achaeus.110 The observers who felt pity for him and hatred for his betrayers felt multidimensional emotions. Not only did they experience multiple emotions simultaneously, but they felt very different kinds of emotions with different objects. Likewise, after the Romans conquer Syracuse, Polybius describes how observers feel when conquerors overstep the bounds of propriety in taking spoils.111 He says that instead of feeling happy for the conquerors, observers pity the conquered.112 Polybius explains that they feel resentment (φθόνος) for the conquerors, pity the conquered through self- pity and reflection, and grow to resent, hate and be angry with the conquerors.113 This digression provides us with one of the densest emotional passages of the Histories and thus a prime example of multidimensionality.114 The observers feel five emotions in response to what they see: pity (ἔλεος), resentment (φθόνος), self-pity (σφᾶς αὐτούς ἐλεεῖν), hatred (μῖσος),

106 See Chapter 2 for the distinctions between anger and hatred. 107 Polyb., XXX.29.7. 108 See Ben-Ze’ev 2000 for modern scholarship on the combinations of emotions. 109 See de Sousa 2014, Section 4, on multidimensionality. 110 Polyb., VIII.36.9. 111 Polyb., IX.10.1-12. 112 Polyb., IX.10.7. Cf. Polybius’ reception of Philip V at Thermum, above. 113 Polyb., IX.10.10. 114 Examples of multidimensionality with select emotions (ὀργή, μῖσος, αἰσχύνη, all indignation, φθόνος, ἔλεος, and θυμός): 8 emotions: IX.10; 7 emotions: VI.6; 6 emotions: XV.25; 5 emotions: VI.7, XV.17, XXI.31, XXX.29; 4 emotions: VI.9, XI.28, XXX.31; 3 emotions: I.57, II.56, XXVII.7, XXXVIII.1; 2 emotions: I.31, I.82, II.8, III.7, III.31, IV.4, V.11, VIII.8, VIII.36, II.59, VII.5, IV.14, XV.30, XXIII.15, XXIV.7, XXXVIII.16. 24 and anger (ὀργή). Some of these emotions, like reflective self-pity and pity, feed into each other. In sum, however, they present the complexity and depth of an observer’s reaction to and judgment of the situation Polybius describes.

Emotions share many affinities with other cognitive and affective phenomena.

Categories in English such as moods, dispositions, feelings, sensations, desires, and beliefs all overlap in features with emotions. All studies of modern social sciences meet the problem of defining an emotion versus a mood or other cognitive state, and variations of definitions and categorizations abound.115 Terms which I have chosen not to discuss fall into different narrative patterns and have structurally different effects in Polybius’ text.116 Polybius does not define the difference between emotions and dispositions, moods, feelings, or sensations – unsurprisingly, for he writes narrative history, not philosophy. In English, these affective phenomena lack the intentionality of emotion.117 Emotion seems to have a more prominent cognitive element than moods, feelings, or dispositions, in that emotions involve values, thinking, and rationality rather than purely bodily affect, as Damasio has persuasively shown in neuroscience.118 Polybius qualifies desires and beliefs with their own distinct terminology, ἐπιθυμίαι and δόξαι respectively. Beliefs and desires share intentionality with emotions, but they do not share the

115 For example, compare Ekman’s classification of basic emotions by facial expression, 1994, to Greenspan’s rationally-based emotion, 1988. See especially Deonna and Teroni 2012 and de Sousa 2014, Section 2-6, for introduction and bibliography. 116 Likewise, what we think of as moods, dispositions, and other cognitive states differ structurally from our general thoughts about emotions in English. Limiting my discussion to emotion, as circumscribed by intentionality and the rest of the features discussed, allows coherent and meaningful discussion and analysis of Polybius’ use of terminology which naturally falls into this category of emotion. The lack of clear distinctions further blurs the categorization of terms in ancient Greek. Scholarship on modern emotions works to define and explore these categories and their intersections. See de Sousa 2014, Section 1, for an overview of this topic and bibliography. For this project, I briefly note these categories and how they differ from the conception of emotion in order to limit this study in a meaningful way. 117 Goldie 2000, 141-175, de Sousa 2014, Section 3, and Ben-Ze’ev 2009, 8-9. 118 Damasio 1994. I address a few terms from the Histories which fall between these categories in Chapter 2. 25 same motivations or results, and they lack the affective element of emotion.119 While desires share the basic attributes (subject, object, import) and other implicit characteristics, such as a combination of physical and cognitive reactions or factors, they work differently from emotions in the Histories. Desires can create emotions, but they themselves often lack the kind of motivation based on values, which emotions have.120 In Chapter 3 we examine examples of the differences between the categories of desires and emotions.

The Stoics and Epicureans, Polybius’ philosophical contemporaries, conceptualized emotions as judgments and as desires, respectively. The Hellenistic philosophies of emotion respond to Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories of emotion.121 They are designed to provide an explanation for how emotions work within the soul and how they should (not) affect the ideal sage’s state. Emotions, for the Hellenistic philosophers in general, stimulate interest in how they fit into different parts of the soul, how they affect rational thought, and how they need a therapy to be moderated or eliminated.122 Polybius, on the other hand, does not address where emotions are seated in a person, whether the ‘spirited’ part of the soul like Plato, or with more cognitive placement, as Aristotle.123 Occasionally Polybius will mention that someone felt an emotion τῇ

ψύχῃ.124 However, these instances do not seem to provide conclusive evidence for any particular theory of the seat of emotions for Polybius. Rather, these specifications seem to add emphasis to the depth of feeling.

119 See Deonna, and Teroni 2012, for further on these differences and de Sousa 2014, Section 10 on the Stoic foundation for the convergence of belief and emotion. Polybius differs from the Stoics in this and other matters, as discussed below. 120 Helm 2009, especially pages 2-3. 121 See Fitzgerald 2008, 29-47, on the history of emotion in Hellenistic philosophy and a list of known (but lost) works on the passions particularly. See Fortenbaugh 2008, for Aristotle’s effect on Hellenistic philosophy of emotion. For the history of emotion generally, see Knuutila 2004, and Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen (eds.) 1998. I do not address the Cynics’ and Skeptics’ (lack of) theory of emotion; see Aune 2008 and Bett 2008 for these. Plato’s views on emotion are less systematic than Aristotle’s; see the Philebus for his fullest discussion. Aristotle’s fullest discussion of emotion comes in Book 2 of his Rhetoric. 122 Nussbaum 1994. 123 Lorenz 2006. 124 Polyb. I.87.1, II.23.7, III.116.13, IV.54.3, V.74.3, IX.21.1, XIV.6.8, XVIII.41.4. 26 The Stoics in particular concerned themselves with the internal step-by-step process of emotions.125 They thought that first an appearance or perception appeared, to which one crucially had to assent. This internal step of assent held the most important – and controversial

– role in the Stoics’ general theory. 126 Assent marked the transition between the pre-emotion feeling and emotion proper. Sages never assented to these feelings and so remained free from emotions and their impulses and troubles. Sages practiced and habituated themselves to withholding assent when pre-emotions arose.127 In contrast to Polybius and ordinary language,

Stoics subordinate all emotions to conscious rational judgment.

The emotions in Polybius’ Histories do not conform to this internal model, mostly because the narrative lacks attention to internal decisions. Instead, Polybius only notes the result of any internal process of coming to have an emotion. This leaves this most noted and important focus of the Stoic philosophy of emotion out of the Histories, the conscious rational consent to an emotion, and so it makes any definite conclusion on Polybius’ convergence or divergence with this Stoic theory ultimately unknowable. Nevertheless, the rationality which lies behind emotions in Polybius’ Histories represents a similar strand of thought, that rationality and emotions worked together. However, the Stoics aimed to eliminate emotions, as irrational disturbances, from the life of the sage. The sage would recognize an emotion and not assent to it, thus correctly identifying it as irrational and unnecessary. In a few passages in the Histories, some characters show greater explicit control over their emotions, which may imply some form of control comparable to Stoic assent.128

125 See Baltzly 2013, Section 5. 126 Brennan 1998, Knuuttila 2004, Cooper 1999c. 127 See Knuuttila 2004, and Cooper 1999c for discussion of Stoic theory of this emotional process. 128 See for example, Polyb. XX.10.7. Polybius does not present any attempt to master emotion rationally, per se, to my knowledge. 27 Stoics also categorized emotions four ways: according to temporality and according to preference. Pleasure (ἡδόνη) is the present preferred emotion, desire (ἐπιθυμία) is the future preferred emotion, fear (φόβος) is the future unpreferred emotion, and pain (λύπη) is the present unpreferred emotion.129 These classifications can be helpful for analyzing some emotions in the Histories, but they do not map onto Polybius’ narrative use of emotions. Instead, the Histories’ emotions function in much more diverse ways than these four basic emotions, as we shall see in Chapter 2.

Epicureanism, on the other hand, treats emotions as one form of desire, alongside pleasures and pains.130 Emotions can draw away from the Epicureans’ goal, ἀταραξία, freedom from disturbance. Thus, they can be detrimental to life quality.131 For the sage Epicurean, only necessary and natural desires are needed, but they can also enjoy in moderation natural but unnecessary desires. Emotions are subsumed usually into the category of natural but unnecessary desires.132 As with Stoic classifications, the emotions in Polybius’ Histories could be analyzed through an Epicurean lens, to see if the characters feel these emotions for the right amount and reason (i.e., to vary the sage’s state of pleasure), but this does not come intrinsically to Polybius’ narrative, for Polybius evaluates one’s emotion based on its accordance with his moral standard of aristocratic behavior and Hellenic values, whereas Epicureans evaluate emotion based on whether it creates a change in pleasure or else disturbs one’s freedom from distress.

Where Polybius’ theory of emotions shows the greatest correspondence with the

Hellenistic philosophies comes in their focus on therapy. The Hellenistic philosophies in general

129 Brennan 1998, Gill 2009, Knuuttila 2004. 130 See Annas 1989, Cooper 1999b, Procopé 1998, Konstan 2014 on Epicurean beliefs of emotion. 131 In general, Epicureans do not dissect internal emotional functions as the Stoics do, but they evaluate emotion by how it affects their pleasure and pain. 132 See especially, Cooper 1999b, and Procopé 1998, for discussion of this aspect of Epicureanism. 28 strove to provide their adherents with strategies to live their lives the best they could with respect to the individual school’s highest good, and this includes moderating or regulating emotions in some way or another.133 Polybius specifically aimed to teach and lead his target audience of future statesmen to successful careers in the political world as he knew it. This included moderating or recognizing emotions as well.134 Philip V, as we have seen, did not moderate his emotion of anger, whereas we saw Aratus recognize and moderate the Achaeans’ indignation.

Studies of modern emotions commonly distinguish emotions from dispositions and moods through duration. Emotions are characterized by their brevity, as occurring in the moment, whereas dispositions and moods last much longer than emotions.135 Ancient Greek does not seem to distinguish these affective states as thoroughly as modern psychology. In other ancient Greek accounts, emotions can lead to and create dispositions.136 Polybius describes emotion in terms of nouns and verbs much more than with adjectives.137 This exhibits a tendency to think of emotions and affective states not as descriptive of an inborn tendency but as particular to events or moments. This aligns more with the modern conception of emotions as occurrent rather than dispositional, but the emotions Polybius describes sometimes extend far beyond the particular moment or occurrence, such as the (in)famous ‘wrath of the Barcids’, which extended from the end of the First Punic War in 241 B.C. to the beginning of the Second

133 Nussbaum 1994, Annas 1992. 134 See III.31, with discussion in Chapter 4. 135 See Deonna and Teroni 2012, 104-109 for more discussion on this distinction. 136 This is seen in Theophrastus’ Characters or in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. 137 Out of 274 total occurrences of anger, hatred, resentment, indignation, and pity, Polybius uses verbal forms 50.7% of the time, nouns 46.7% of the time, and adjectives and adverbs 2.6% of the time. All seven occurrences of adjectives or adverbs are forms of pity. Compare these statistics to forms of fear, which occurs slightly less than the combined total of the above emotions. Of this emotion, Polybius uses a verb 45.9% of the time, nouns 46.5% of the time, and adjectives or adverbs 7.6% of the time. 29 Punic War in 218 B.C.138 Emotions for Polybius do not serve to describe a person’s inherent character so much as a function in a specific event. When Polybius describes the anger of Philip

V, for example, he never calls Philip “prone to anger” or implies that Philip’s disposition in and of itself is angry, although Philip feels instances of anger more than any other individual in the

Histories. Philip’s response to his moments of anger – by reacting disproportionately, for instance – characterizes his behavior and character at that time, but Polybius certainly attested to the ability for character to change, not least in Philip V’s case.139 Subjects feel emotion not because they necessarily have an inherent disposition to feel such an emotion but because they react to an event, and this reactive emotion can remain latent for a duration of time until a later situation awakens the residual emotion.140

Polybius does not limit which characters feel emotion. Both individuals and groups feel emotion.141 Arthur Eckstein in Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius states that emotion typically characterizes barbarians, women, and the masses.142 In my detailed study of the emotions of anger, hatred, indignation, resentment, and pity, these groups do not feel emotions more often than their opposites, i.e., aristocrats, generals, citizens, politicians, Greeks, the civilized. The

Aetolians, Illyrians, and Gauls combined – stereotyped as irrational and barbarous – feel emotion less often than either the Achaeans or the Romans.143 These stereotypical “barbarian” peoples thus do not display more emotional dispositions than the representatives of civilization,

138 Polyb., III.9.6-III.10.6. See Chapter 4 for a full discussion. 139 Polyb., V.13. See too McGing 2013. 140 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. See too, von Scheve 2013. 141 See especially de Sousa 2014, Section 11, for recent bibliography on studies of collective emotion. In Chapter 3 I address collective emotion in detail. 142 Eckstein 1995, 119. On barbarian emotion, 123-124, on the masses’ emotions, 131-132, on emotions of women, 152. 143 Aetolian, Illyrian, and Gallic emotion – 17 occurrences, Achaean – 23, Roman – 44. 30 the Achaeans and the Romans.144 Likewise, individuals in positions of power feel emotion just as much as those of lower status.145 The measure of emotion and its effects does not conform to traditional Polybian categories of identity. Polybius judges characters in their emotion in why they feel the emotion, how they exhibit it, and how they react to it. Thus, the stereotypical

“barbarian” peoples may feel anger similarly to the representatives of civilization, but they display barbaric behavior when they feel emotion inappropriately, misdirect their response, or respond disproportionately.

Polybius does not limit emotion to adult humans. Hannibal’s elephants, for example, become afraid as they cross the Rhone River on their journey to Italy.146 Polybius provides little explanation for the elephants’ fear. Modern evolutionary theory of emotions, which stems from

Darwin’s work on emotions and now centers around Paul Ekman’s studies on facial expression of emotion, categorizes fear as a basic emotion.147 Ekman and others categorize six basic emotions which each share similar facial expressions from humans around the world, regardless of culture.148 The Stoics’ theory of affects, or προπάθη, shares similarities with modern evolutionary theory of basic emotions (πάθη).149 For Stoics, propositional thinking was necessary for the assent needed for emotion proper. Only adult human brains were capable of such propositional thinking. However, Stoics thought that children and animals were capable of

144 Champion 2004a draws out the complexity of the Romans’ portrayal in the Histories, as in a spectrum between barbarian and Greek, but the Romans also often contrast the Illyrians, Celts, and Aetolians throughout the narrative. 145 Because of how rarely women even appear in the Histories, it is difficult to compare their emotion to men’s with statistics. Out of 274 occurrences of anger, hatred, resentment, indignation, and pity, women feel emotion only three times: thus, they feel only 1.0% of the emotions mentioned. The people, whether τὸ πλῆθος, οἱ πολλοί, ὁ δῆμος, or πάντες, do feel emotion rather often, 33 times of the stated 274 occurrences. See Walbank 1995, for the uses of these terms. 146 Polyb., III.46.11, and XV.12.4, where elephants flee the battle because of fear. See Konstan 2006, 22, 26, and 129 on Aristotle’s willingness to attribute fear as an emotion to animals as well, particularly due to their basic nature. 147 For accounts of this evolutionary theory of emotions, see De Sousa 2014, Section 4, Ben-Ze’ev 2000, 104-112, and Ekman and Davidson, eds. 1994, especially Part 1. 148 Konstan 2006, 1-40, especially 7-16, as well as Fierke 2015, 46, complicates Ekman’s universalism by pointing out the Anglocentric identification of emotions with the English terms “fear”, “anger”, etc. See especially Wierzbicka 1999 on the importance of language in understanding emotion. 149 See below for a fuller discussion of Polybius’ relation to Stoic theories of emotion. 31 feeling affects, such as fear. They reconciled these two factors – children’s and animals’ lack of propositional thinking with the fact that they still felt and exhibited “emotions” in ordinary language – by denying fear the status of a proper emotion, which required assent.150 Polybius’ portrayal of the elephants’ fear can be reconciled with Stoic theory by reference to the emotion’s import: the elephants have no underlying value or rationale for their fear, as Polybius makes clear when some elephants fall into the river with no harm to themselves.151 Polybius’ narration of the elephants’ fear enables us to take a crucial look into the applicability of Stoic philosophy in the Hellenistic world, but at the same time it shows us the distinction between philosophy and historiography. Polybius narrates emotion whereas the Stoics observed, theorized, and expounded upon the same phenomenon and classified it as affect rather than emotion proper.

Where Polybius described in a few sentences how elephants typically or actually (were thought to) have felt fear, philosophers interpreted and analyzed such assumptions and observations of actuality to develop theories distinguishing and justifying the place and role of emotion in human life. Polybius uses ordinary language, rather than engaging in philosophy.152

The question of whether emotions are constructed by culture and society or whether all humans feel the same basic emotions divides current studies in emotions.153 Does Polybius portray emotions as constructs exclusively belonging to one’s culture, so that “Gallic anger” differed from “Roman anger,” or do all of the characters in his Histories feel the same human repertoire of emotions? I argue that Polybius portrays emotions as universal. He does not characterize any emotion as a fixed trait of any group, despite scholarly claims that barbarians

150 For this type of Stoic distinction, see Armstrong 2008, Brennan 1998, and Gill 2009. 151 Polyb., II.46.11-12. The elephants’ fear could have been based in a concern that they would come to harm, but Polybius’ quick dismissal and straightforward narrative seems to dismiss this rationale for the elephants. 152 Likewise, Polybius does not seem to extrapolate human behavior from animals’ behavior. See VI.5 and Chapter 3 for one analogy based in animal behavior. 153 See de Sousa 2014, sections 7-8, on the major theories. See Fierke 2015, 46-49, for an exceptional summarization and reconciliation of these views, which I find parallel to Polybius’ view of emotion. 32 and other non-aristocratic elite group felt emotions more.154 However, Polybius saw emotions as occurrent: they happen rather than define or describe. This may suggest something about

Polybius’ basic way of thinking about emotions. In English, the phrases “the angry man” and

“the man who is angry” have slightly different connotations: the first can apply to the man’s disposition as a habitually angry person. The latter, “the man who is angry”, applies to the moment: the man is angry now, at this particular time. So too, Polybius’ use of emotional nouns and verbs shows his underlying understanding that emotions apply to a situation rather than describe and depict a habitual identity.155

Moreover, Polybius’ theorizing passages attest to his belief in common, universal human behavior and emotion. He often explains an emotion or judgment (often both) through a generalizing τις.156 Whenever he expounds in depth on general human behavior, including emotion, he writes on a universal level. At the beginning of his Book Six, Polybius lays out his theory of how humans first form a community and how a state in nature would change governmental forms.157 This, alongside his other explanatory passages on emotions, assumes that all people naturally behave in the same way regardless of culture. When external factors, such as climate, geography, and culture influence people, their progress and state forms differ, and presumably the import for and reaction to emotions and result differ too.158 That is, the values underlying emotion can be different and largely determined by culture.

There is one major argument against Polybius’ universality. Polybius, it is agreed, wrote for an audience of Greeks and Romans, and more specifically, for Greek and Roman elite

154 In fact, if any one group were to be pointed out as emotional, it would be the Romans, against all assumptions and trends previous scholars, such as Eckstein 1995, have identified. 155 So Polybius narrates Philip V’s anger instead of describing him as angry, mentioned above. 156 Polyb., I.14.4 (twice), II.7.3, III.26.6, XXXVIII.1 (twice). See Chapter 5. 157 Polyb., VI.4-9. 158 Thus, people feel emotions for different specific reasons and react differently based on culture, but the script or expression of emotion remains the same. See Kaster 2005, especially his Introduction, on the analysis of scripts and their potential to elucidate the workings of emotion. 33 statesmen.159 Whenever he uses generalizing terminology, such as his generalizing τις-statements or passive periphrastic constructions (‘one must’), he may conceivably refer only to this inclusive target audience. I would respond, however, that we can never distinguish this intent on

Polybius’ part from the text itself without making large assumptions. For example, Polybius does not – and perhaps cannot – distinguish in ancient Greek how the Aetolians feel indignation differently from the indignation of Antiochus III’s court against Hermeias or from the Achaians’ or Roman indignation.160 Polybius’ universal theorizing, such as the rise and development of human community, cannot only refer to his all male, aristocratic target audience, for he describes the typical, universal behavior of children, parents, rulers, subjects, and aristocrats. In sum, we can conclude that Polybius portrays emotions as universal.

This is not to say that, for Polybius, culture had little to do with emotional behavior – quite the contrary. Like Polybius’ political theory of the development and degeneration of human communities, so too the emotional behavior of humans is a universally applicable foundation, which variables such as culture, environment, and other influences can affect.161

While all characters in the Histories feel emotions with similar types of motivation, expression, and resulting action, culture shapes the characters’ responses. In other words, characters may follow the same basic emotional script but react differently because of the import particular to their culture.

For example, the Epirotes and Philip V became indignant with the Aetolians, who had attacked the Messenians despite being officially at peace and in alliance with them.162 Polybius says, “they immediately felt indignation at what the Aetolians did, but they were not very

159 See Eckstein 1995, Ch. 1 and Champion 2004a, Introduction on Polybius’ audience. 160 Polyb., V.107.6, V.56.4, IV.76.5 and XI.28. 161 Polyb., VI.9.3, VI.10.2-5. 162 Polyb., IV.16.1-2. When I refer to the Epirotes for the sake of simplicity in discussing this passage, I mean to included Philip V as well. 34 surprised at it because it was nothing out of the ordinary, since they were used to the fact that the Aetolians did this kind of thing.”163 For this reason they were not too angry (διόπερ οὐδ᾽

ὠργίσθησαν ἐπὶ πλεῖον), and so they decided to remain at peace with the Aetolians.164 This implies that normally humans would be surprised and act upon their indignation at the Aetolians for such behavior. Exceptionally, the Epirotes do not act purely because of cultural factors: the

Aetolians’ habitual injustice has changed the Epirotes’ natural urge to act upon indignation.

Their failure to act upon their natural indignation reflects poorly on both the Aetolians and the

Epirotes. The Aetolians, as usual, behave contrary to established and accepted norms for behavior, which Polybius censures throughout the text, and have worn down their neighbors’ natural inclination to reject and censure such behavior.165 Although the Epirotes felt indignation, their cultural norms shape their (lack of) reaction to it.

Polybius next states that the Aetolians not only are unique in their uninhibited urge to plunder but even grow indignant at others who call them to account for such behavior.166

Aetolian cultural standards underlie their indignation, which normally would not be felt by the

Aetolians but by their victims. Culture changes the import for the Aetolian indignation, but the emotion of indignation itself is not ostensibly different from the universal form of indignation: the Aetolians grow indignant because what they valued and thought right, plundering, was threatened.

163 Polyb., IV.16.2. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν πεπραγμένοις παραυτίκα μὲν ἠγανάκτησαν, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐθαύμασαν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν παράδοξον, τῶν εἰθισμένων δέ τι πεποιηκέναι τοὺς Αἰτωλούς. 164 Polyb., IV.16.3. 165 See especially Champion 2004a, 129-135, 140-143. 166 Polyb., IV.16.4. Αἰτωλοὶ γοῦν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ χρώμενοι, καὶ λῃστεύοντες συνεχῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολέμους ἀνεπαγγέλτους φέροντες πολλοῖς, οὐδ᾽ ἀπολογίας ἔτι κατηξίουν τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσεχλεύαζον, εἴ τις αὐτοὺς εἰς δικαιοδοσίας προκαλοῖτο περὶ τῶν γεγονότων ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία τῶν μελλόντων. Cf. V.107.6. 35 Culturally-specific values underlie emotions beyond the Aetolians’, who often represent the foil to what Polybius considered normal.167 At the end of the Second Punic War, Hannibal pulls down a speaker who was arguing to the council for the Carthaginians to continue the war after the battle of Zama.168 The Carthaginian senators grow angry with Hannibal, who then explains his actions and apologizes for his incompetence in cultural norms at home since he lived most of his life abroad and at war. The Carthaginian senators grew angry precisely on the basis of cultural standards. However, Hannibal as a Carthaginian should have shared such cultural standards. He did not because he lived a different lifestyle, away from his own native culture and home. Hannibal’s misunderstanding stemmed not from a disjuncture in the emotion of anger itself or because he was not Carthaginian but from the cultural import in terms of his life. Hannibal’s cultural disjuncture with his own people highlights the degree to which Polybius did not subscribe to cultural relativism: lifestyle and behavior influenced the Carthaginians’ anger and Hannibal’s mistake, rather than inborn national tendencies. Moreover, Hannibal successfully explained his behavior and mitigated the Carthaginians’ anger, demonstrating his excellence in emotional intelligence.169

Conclusion

In this section, we identified features of emotion, providing a critical vocabulary through which we analyzed key passages from the Histories, such as Philip V’s first sack of Thermum.

From an analysis of emotional features, it is clear that Polybius established parameters for judgment of characters by reference to the appropriateness, direction, and proportionality of emotion. Using the specific terminology of emotion in the modern social sciences provides

167 Champion 2011. 168 Polyb., XV.19.3. 169 Scipio Africanus also demonstrates excellent emotional intelligence; see, for example, X.18, XI.28. I use the term “emotional intelligence” deliberately, for Hannibal utilizes the skills which modern handbooks on emotional intelligence promote: awareness and active engagement in negotiating emotions. See esp. Goleman 1995, Bradberry and Greaves, 2009. 36 direction to the study of ancient emotions, particularly in the ancient historians, whose portrayal of emotion both has to be plausible and is a choice by the historian to affect the flow of events.

In the next chapter, we shall see how Polybius uses each of his emotional terms to affect his narrative, and we shall contextualize this usage in the ancient world by comparison with

Aristotle’s Rhetoric. I also survey the individual emotions in the Histories and compare them to the analysis in David Konstan’s The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks. In Chapter Three, I investigate emotions at work in changes of a state’s governing regime. In Polybius’ theory of the cycle of constitutions, the people’s collective emotional reactions repeatedly spark change from a worse state form to a better one until the end of the cycle, and in the downfall of the usurping prime minister Agathocles of Egypt, the people’s emotions both reaffirm positive communal values and paradoxically lead to extreme violence in overthrowing Agathocles’ regime. My analysis in

Chapter Four turns to external changes: how do emotions motivate wars, especially the Second

Punic War? I look at the justifiability of anger as a cause of war and its implications for

Polybius’ theory of history. In the conclusion, I recap and summarize my findings and touch on the historian’s treatment of emotion as a persuasive, historiographical tool rather than on characters’ emotions within the historical narrative, briefly examining Polybius’ arguments about pity in the Achaean War of 146 BC.

37 Chapter 2

Polybius’ Emotions in Context

In this chapter I seek to contextualize Polybius’ use of emotions. This is a twofold task.

I survey and analyze Polybius’ usage of emotions within the Histories. In this part of my analysis,

I show that emotions play important and nuanced roles within the narrative of the Histories.

Polybius’ text includes a variety of emotions, which have their own specific usages but which also fall into several categories of related emotions. These categories are negative, anticipatory, positive, and reflective emotions. I organize this chapter around these categories to illustrate

Polybius’ understanding and portrayal of emotion.

The other part of my analysis contextualizes Polybius’ use of emotion externally, in comparison with the emotions defined by Aristotle, as analyzed by David Konstan. In his work

The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, Konstan discusses the nature of emotions and establishes

Aristotle’s view on πάθη and their nature.170 Konstan bases his work on the list of emotions

Aristotle provides, and he uses this to compare and contrast ancient Greek emotions with modern conceptions of emotions.171 This chapter and dissertation differs fundamentally from

Konstan’s project in that Polybius provides no definition of what counts as an emotion.

Therefore, I had to choose what counts as an emotion. My list differs from Aristotle’s and

Konstan’s, addressing other emotive vocabulary, such as δυσαρέστησις, or words often translated with modern emotions, such as ἔλπις.172 My analyses of the individual emotions in

Polybius clarify these choices and the nuances for each of these categories of emotions and compare Polybius’ usages of emotions with Aristotle’s. The difference in emotions not only

170 Konstan 2006. Fortenbaugh 1975 is the seminal work on ancient emotion, which investigates Aristotle’s Rhetoric. See too Cooper 1999a, for the rhetorical context’s importance for Aristotle’s theory. 171 Konstan 2006., 15. 172 I omit discussion only of λυπή, which Konstan addresses although Aristotle does not specifically include it in his list. 38 shows a difference in focus between Aristotle and Polybius, the philosopher and the historian, but also complicates our understanding of ancient Greek emotion and its workings. Polybius’ historical text from the Hellenistic period broadens the range of ancient emotional vocabulary and presents a unique data set for understanding how emotions work, through the historian’s description of reality.

Konstan’s work The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks also finds points of convergence with the emotions in Polybius’ Histories. Throughout, Konstan emphasizes the competitive, social context for emotions and their importance in creating, maintaining, and changing people’s reputations and place in society. He often allows room for variety in an emotion’s function in

Classical literature beyond Aristotle’s definitions in the Rhetoric. Konstan emphasizes and explores the important cognitive and cultural factors of emotions in ancient Greek. However,

Aristotle’s description of emotion and Konstan’s Homeric, tragic, oratorical, or Roman elegiac examples differ from the patterns in Polybius’ Hellenistic text.

Konstan deliberately avoids the Hellenistic world because he sees its emotions as fundamentally different from those of the Classical period in two important features: individualism and the court. He writes,

“If the Hellenistic period was characterized, as many scholars have claimed, by a novel spirit of individualism, it may have been accompanied by a new interest in private sensibilities, in which emotions were imagined as detached from external causes and reducible – at least according to philosophers – to an ineliminable disturbance of the soul. What is more, in the suspicious atmosphere of court society, where people tend to assume a demeanour comfortable to the pleasure of the ruler, there is a new premium placed on identifying an inner emotional state from the close examination of outer signs.”173

Konstan thus rationalizes the turn to individualism and inner emotive states, which he briefly discusses in Hellenistic art and philosophy and focalizes through the political lens of a monarchical court. Although Polybius’ world was originally dominated by the Hellenistic

173 Konstan 2006, 31. 39 monarchs and later by the Roman state, which functioned in the Greek world much like a

Hellenistic monarch, Polybius himself grew up and lived in a Greek city-state, which was part of federations of city-states.174 Moreover, his Histories describe many different types of states, not just court societies. His usage of emotions reflects this background. If court society entailed the internalization and dissimulation of feelings, Polybius’ text does not represent this on the whole.

Sometimes he does represent the emotions of those at court as faked, but his narrative does not portray this as the dominant understanding of emotion.175 Moreover, unlike art and philosophy,

Polybius portrays characters’ feelings in relation to external events, which greatly affect and are affected by these feelings. Internalized emotion had little to do with Polybius’ historiographic purpose; reactive, socially-embedded emotions, on the other hand, did. While “[d]emonstrating a connection between Aristotle’s cognitive approach to the pathê and a cultural tendency in classical, as opposed to Hellenistic, Greece to regard emotion as a reaction rather than an inner state to be disclosed” formed one of Konstan’s goals, it is one of my goals in this chapter to demonstrate the evaluative, social, and often moral role of emotions in Polybius’ Hellenistic text, thus nuancing our understanding of emotions in the Hellenistic world and the history of ancient

Greek emotions.176

Emotion

The word which philosophers used to describe emotion, πάθος, seldom occurs in the extant Histories. The six times Polybius does use this term in the extant text it denotes generalized experience, occurrence, or feature.177 Polybius uses πάθος to describe natural

174 See especially Gruen 1984, on Rome and its correlations with the Hellenistic world. 175 Polyb., IV.87.4, V.26.13, XV.17.1-2. Compare the “court” society depicted in Tacitus’ Annales, which emphasize secrecy, dissimulation, and constant fear, as compared to Polybius’ politically-diverse world. 176 Konstan 2006, 31. 177 Polyb., III.53.2, III.86.6, X.4.7, XI.29.9, XXXIV.3.10, XXXVIII.1.4. Cf. Polybius’ widespread usage of παθεῖν, “to experience.” See Mauersberger 2.1.187-189. 40 features such as the conditions in the Strait of Messina or the regular character of the sea.178 It also denotes general suffering, as from illness, ambush, loss, or the destruction of war.179 The scant use of this term by Polybius highlights the divergence of the purpose of history from philosophy. Whereas the field of philosophy burgeoned with works entitled Περὶ Παθῶν in the

Hellenistic period and beyond, Polybius’ Hellenistic history ignores the specialized theories and definition of πάθη altogether.180 Although Hellenistic philosophy diverges from Classical philosophy in its focus on common or popular issues, particularly in a therapeutic manner, philosophy in the Hellenistic period continued to diverge from commonplace or popular conceptions of emotion.181

Polybius uses πάθος clearly in the sense of emotion once. When Scipio Africanus wanted to run for aedile, although he was too young, he told his mother, who was religious, that he dreamed twice that he and his brother were aediles together.182 She wished for that, overcome by womanly feeling (τῆς παθούσης τὸ γυναικεῖον πάθος).183 This statement conveys what we typically associate with emotion: Scipio’s mother is overcome by emotion at such a prospect. Polybius characterizes this feeling as typical of a woman. Moreover, Polybius’ portrayal of Scipio’s mother corresponds with his characterization of the Roman people in their superstition. Both put great importance in religiosity.184 This example of πάθος also puts emotion on the other side of a dichotomy with reason. Those who unquestioningly believe in dreams and divine inspiration, and who subscribe to religion in short do not partake in Polybius’

178 Polyb., ΧΧΧΙV.3.10, and XI.29.9. 179 Polyb., III.53.2, III.86.6, XXXVIII.1.4. 180 Fitzgerald 2008, 1-26, discusses the works on emotions in Hellenistic and Imperial Greek thought. 181 I am not claiming that the literary genre of historiography does indeed reflect and embody everyday concepts and vocabulary completely accurately; far from it, for history was literature for the elite. I am arguing that historiography portrays everyday, popular concepts and vocabulary more than philosophy does. 182 Polyb., X.4. See Walbank, HCP 2.199-200 on the historical inaccuracy of Polybius’ anecdote. Cf. Liv., 25.2.6-8. 183 Polyb., X.4.7. 184 The mother’s religiosity: X.4.4; the Roman People’s: X.5.5-8, VI.56.6-15, where Polybius approves religion as of utmost importance for the coherence of the Roman state. 41 rationalist view. Polybius explains that Scipio rationally and cleverly planned this tale and manipulated his mother’s and the people’s beliefs, as did the ancient Romans who set up the state’s religious practices in order to contain and control the masses.185 People who subscribe to such religiosity, like Scipio’s mother, may be susceptible to “τὸ γυναικεῖον πάθος.” This includes the masses, and so this passage and its πάθος support Eckstein’s observations about

Polybius’ portrayal of women and of the masses as irrational, subject to emotion, and uneducated.186 However, it is important to recall that this is the sole usage of πάθος as an emotion.

1. Negative Feelings

The first cognitive category of emotions in Polybius’ Histories that I shall address are emotions with negative affect. These emotions – passion, anger, hatred, indignation, resentment, jealousy, and shame – are not always or inherently negative in a moral or rational sense, although none feel good.187 One often feels indignation, for example, because one perceives that an injustice has occurred. Anger, hatred, indignation, resentment, and shame all are often connected to a subject’s sense of morality and values. Nevertheless, these individual emotions each have unique connotations and features.

Passion/Spirit

I begin with the term θυμός, which relates to emotion but which I would not classify as an emotion, for reasons we shall see below. Aristotle does not address θυμός as an emotion. In

Classical philosophy, θυμός more often denoted a part of the soul rather than an emotion.188

185 Polyb., VI.56.9-12, X.5.6-7. 186 Eckstein 1995, 150-157 (women), 129-140 (masses). 187 “Negative” can refer both to affect and to morality. Whenever I refer to “negative emotions”, I mean the first category, emotions with negative affect, which feel bad, but which are not necessarily negative in a moral sense. I will make clear when I refer to emotions which contradict morality. 188 See Koziak 2000 for a history of θυμός in Archaic and Classical Greek. 42 For Plato, for example, the θυμός constituted the middle part of a person’s soul, which could either be drawn down to base desires through the appetitive part of the soul, or it could be drawn to enlightened values by the rational part of the soul.189 Aristotle follows Plato in specifying θυμός as part of the soul, with his own divergences.190 Although neither Aristotle in the Rhetoric nor Konstan characterize θυμός as an emotion, θυμός is treated often as the paradigmatic emotion in Polybian scholarship.191

Craige Champion, in Cultural Politics in Polybius’s Histories, analyzes Polybius’ contrast between Hellenic logismos and barbaric thumos.192 What follows is necessarily a simplification of

Champion’s analysis. Characters exhibit Hellenic logismos when they act rationally and nobly, and they demonstrate barbaric thumos when they behave irrationally, impulsively, and driven by personal desires. Champion argues that some characters demonstrate Hellenic logismos much more frequently than barbaric thumos, and vice versa. While certain groups demonstrate a dispositional inclination to one side or the other, all characters are capable of either, and some, most notably the Romans, follow a trajectory from one type of behavior to the other throughout the Histories.

Champion provides an appendix on Polybius’ uses of λογισμός and its cognates, but he does not provide a parallel appendix for Polybius’ usage of θυμός, nor does he define this term within Polybius’ text.193 However, Champion’s understanding of thumos becomes clear from analysis of his text. Champion takes two passages as central to his conception of thumos. The

189 See Lorenz 2006 on the soul’s divisions. 190 See Koziak 2000, 81-99, for Aristotle on θυμός. See too Sokolon 2006. 191 Θυμός does not appear even in Konstan’s index. See Eckstein 1989, esp. 7, 11-12. Erskine 2015 too treats θυμός as emotion and synonymous with ὀργή in his discussion of Polybian anger. 192 Champion 2004a. 193 He does provide an appendix on ochlocracy and the language of barbarology, but this does not include θυμός even in the list of negative traits, 241-244. I use “thumos” to refer to Champion’s use of this term rather than to refer to an occurrence of the term in Polybius’ text. 43 Celts’ decision to fight the Romans at II.35.3 followed their θυμός rather than λογισμός.194

Next, the people in a state with a degenerative mixed constitution follow forceful θυμός (and irrational ὀργή) in pressing for more power, driven by their personal greed.195 The first passage exemplifies the preference of θυμός over λογισμός by barbarians, and the second shows the irrationality, violence, and greed which accompany θυμός in the masses, particularly within a degenerative, ochlocratic state.196 Through these and more passages, Champion correlates thumos with irrationality, irresolution, impulsiveness, courage, passion, violence, personal ambition, aggression, and desires. He describes thumos as barbaric, shortsighted, unreflecting, mindless, intemperate, rash, vainglorious, and grasping. Although Champion does not conflate all these terms at once to describe a passage, these terms provide an idea of what thumos represents to

Champion, who constructs a network of associations rather than a definition. For Champion, thumos represents a gambit of negative characteristics, behaviors, and vices which Polybius used repeatedly to characterize actors. Champion’s characterization fits broadly with my analysis of

Polybius’ text. In this section, I aim to synthesize Polybius’ usage of θυμός to fill out

Champion’s analysis, addressing some subtleties and nuances within Polybius’ own usage which do not fit comfortably within Champion’s generalization.

Θυμός in Polybius’ Histories is akin to English “passion.” It is something one has or which can come over one, one can arouse in another, and it does not necessitate an object. In

English, “passion” is often thought of as irrational, violent, unpredictable, and impulsive. In other works in ancient Greek, it stands in as a general term for all emotion, much as passion is

194 Champion 2004a, 117, 139. 195 Polyb., VI.56.11. Champion 2004a, 89, 118, 121, 185, 202, 232. 196 Champion, however, takes this statement out of context by claiming “every multitude is for Polybius full of lawless desires, unreasoned passions, and violent,” citing this passage as evidence, 89. I analyze this passage, its context, and its emotions in further detail in Chapter 3. 44 sometimes used as a synonym for emotion in English.197 However, Polybius does not use

θυμός exactly in this sense. “Passion” in English does not function as an emotion in the same way as hatred, anger, or indignation, for instance, but indicates some more general overwhelming by the senses. So too θυμός functions differently from the emotions, such as

μῖσος, ὀργή, or δυσαρέστησις. The way characters act upon θυμός differs from the more typical emotional reactions.198 It is irrational, contrasted to rationality, or is outright mad.199

Polybius matches θυμός with βία several times.200 Sometimes θυμός motivates characters to act unexpectedly or impulsively.201

Of the emotions, anger (ὀργή) coexists with θυμός most frequently, but they are not synonymous.202 Ὀργή can contribute to and exemplify one’s θυμός, but only five times are they correlated.203 Of these five passages, three involve Philip V’s actions at Thermum, which we discussed in part earlier. However, in this context Polybius only directly unites ὀργή and θυμός in a parallel construction, ὀργὴ καὶ θυμός, once. The other instances help illuminate the differences between these two terms.

In discussing a second raid on Thermum, Polybius narrates that “Philip V then worked out his passion wrongly (κακῶς δὲ τότε χρώμενος τῷ θυμῷ): for dishonoring the divine when angry (ὀργιζόμενον) at men is a sign of complete insanity.”204 Θυμός characterizes Philip

197 See Koziak 2000, Lynch and Miles 1980. 198 Θυμός provides the cause for action just as often as it has a cause itself.For instances with a clear cause, see Polyb., III.29.1, IV.7.8, V.10.3, V.16.4, XV.4.11. 199 Polyb., II.21.2, II.30.4, II.35.3, III.15.9, III.81.9, V.11.4, VI.7.3, VI.56.11, VIII.8.1, XVI.1.2. 200 Polyb., VI.44.9, VI.56.11. 201 See II.30.4, V.11.4, V.76.3, XX.6.11 for unexpectedness. See II.19.10, II.21.2, II.30.4, III.82.2, V.16.4, V.76.3, XVIII.37.7, XX.6.11 for impulsiveness. 202 Polyb., III.10.5, VI.56.11, VI.57.8, XI.7.2, XVI.1.2, XVI.28.8. See Erskine 2015 also for a discussion of their similarities and differences, although he concludes, against my analysis, that they are nearly synonymous. 203 Polyb., VI.56.11, XI.7.2-3, XVI.1.2, XVI.28.8, XXXVIII.18.10. 204 Polyb., XI.7.2-3. κακῶς δὲ τότε χρώμενος τῷ θυμῷ · τὸ γὰρ ἀνθρώποις ὀργιζόμενον εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἀσεβεῖν τῆς πάσης ἀλογιστίας ἐστὶ σημεῖον. 45 V’s response, which Polybius equates with madness. Anger occurs temporally before Philip’s use of θυμός: he grows angry at men before he acts with thumotic madness, a response to that very anger. As we discussed previously, Philip’s motivations for his anger were not irrational or inappropriate. We noted that he errs in choosing to avenge sacrilege with sacrilege, a moral failure. Similarly, here Philip has grown angry (ὀργιζόμενον) at the Aetolians, but his incorrect response is characterized by θυμός. Θυμός and not ὀργή provides the negative, irrational, and thus condemned force to Philip’s behavior, and thus Polybius criticizes Philip’s θυμός by correlation with madness.

Later in the Histories, Polybius says, “Philip V, rejoicing as if gratifying his mad passion

(χαριζόμενος γὰρ οἷον εἰ λυττῶντι τῷ θυμῷ), directed his anger (ὀργή) more against the gods than against men.”205 This passage again condemns the same behavior as before – a misdirected and thus disproportionate response to anger. Philip uses his anger incorrectly, a sign of his mad θυμός. Again θυμός guides Philip to act wrongfully and irrationally on his anger.

Thus, θυμός holds negative and irrational connotations which anger, ὀργή, does not inherently hold.

However, Polybius does use θυμός in the context of war without these inherently negative connotations. Most notably, Hamilcar’s θυμός drives him to seek to prepare a new war with the Romans after the unsatisfactory ending of the First Punic War.206 His θυμός motivates

Hamilcar to expand Carthaginian power in Spain and arose because Hamilcar had acted as a good leader, undefeated in Sicily. Hannibal likewise is lifted up in his θυμός to continue his

205 Polyb., XVI.1.2. χαριζόμενος γὰρ οἷον εἰ λυττῶντι τῷ θυμῷ, τὸ πλεῖον τῆς ὀργῆς οὐκ εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς διετίθετο. 206 Polyb., III.9.6-7. 46 operations within the Second Punic War, and Scipio Africanus at the end of the Second Punic

War uses his θυμός and sharpness as favorable qualities of a general.207

Θυμός does not act like the other emotions and thus should not be taken to represent

Polybius’ views on emotion in general. It serves more as a disposition, character trait, or even mood than an emotion.208 Polybius directly contrasts using θυμός with using reason several times.209 Other emotions do not fall into the rationality-irrationality divide, but θυμός generally denotes irrationality.

Anger 210

Aristotle claims that one feels anger, ὀργή, because of a perceived slight either from one’s equal or from an inferior.211 Thus, ὀργή is immediate and personal.212 Konstan notes that

Aristotle’s definition is remarkable, at least in comparison to the idea of anger in English. It is reducible to a desire for revenge and provoked by a slight.213 Konstan notes the restrictiveness of slighting as the only cause of anger. He traces examples of injustice as a potential cause as well.214 Slighting, according to Konstan’s analysis of Aristotle, can only provoke ὀργή in superiors; inferiors do not feel ὀργή when slighted because their status leaves them no room for retaliation, a crucial component of Aristotelian ὀργή: “[f]or Aristotle, what counts as

207 Polyb., III.34.7 (Hannibal), XV.4.11 (Scipio Africanus); see too XVIII.37.7 (Flamininus spoke θυμικώτερον). Each of these examples features a strong general whom Polybius portrays favorably throughout the text, while Flamininus is an exception, and each occurs in a military setting. Other passages show a lack of directly resultant negative outcomes, but these do not necessarily mean that θυμός is rational. 208 See II.21.2, II.33.2, II.35.3, III.9.6, III.15.9, XV.33.10, and XX.11.5 (as a false characterization at this point) for examples of θυμός as characterization. 209 Polyb., II.35.3, VI.7.3, VIII.8.1. 210 For all the emotions, my analysis includes all forms of the emotional term, but I shall refer to each emotion in the text by the noun form for consistency, unless Polybius never uses such a form (for example, ἀγανάκτησις). 211 Arist., Rhet. 2.1378a.30-32. Konstan 2006, 41-75. 212 Konstan 2006, 47. 213 Konstan 2006, 43-46. 214 Konstan 2006, 65. 47 belittlement depends on status: if your position is inferior, it is no insult to be reminded of it.”215

Konstan postulates that Aristotle so limited his definition of anger to make room for his unique use of indignation, τὸ νέμεσαν.216

However, Polybius’ usage differs from Aristotle’s limitations. Inferiors, for example, grow angry at superiors in the Histories regularly; their lower social or defeated status does not lead them to endure passively others wronging them.217 When Polybius discusses the improper conduct of removing works of art by conquerors, for example, observers with no clear social status markers grow angry and hate those who are successful conquerors.218 In this example,

Polybius comments that these observers pity the defeated precisely because their defeat reminds the observers of their own defeats and misfortunes. This would place them in an inferior position relative to the conquerors, as they assume the place of the conquered. More explicitly, the defeated Carthaginians grow angry at Rome for taking Sardinia after the First Punic War.219

While the Carthaginians presumably grow angry because they think that Sardinia is theirs, they clearly are inferior to Rome in power and thus cannot take steps to prohibit Rome or to avenge themselves immediately.

Aristotle’s focus on individuals eliminates the complications which attributing emotions to a group entails. While he does not explore the nuances of how collective emotion works on a psychological level, Polybius in his attribution of emotions to states acknowledges the importance of emotion beyond interpersonal relations. Aristotle, in describing individuals’ emotions, relies heavily on the concept of status and hierarchy in society. No such set system of status exists for groups in Polybius’ Histories in the same way as it does for the individual. Not

215 Konstan 2006, 55. 216 Konstan 2006, 68. 217 Polyb. I.67.5-6, II.8.12-13, III.7.1, III.9.7, III.10.5, III.78.5, IV.4.4, IV.4.7, VI.4.9, VI.56.11, IX.10.10, XV.25.20(13), XV.25.25(18), XV.27.1, XV.30.1, XVI.1.2, XVI.1.4, (possibly XXX.29.1 – impersonally formulated). 218 Polyb., IX.10.10. 219 Polyb., III.10.5. 48 only formal states in the Histories feel anger beyond Aristotle’s definition, but also non-political groups: the women of Alexandria grow angry at Ptolemy V’s first regents, mercenaries grow angry at their employees, and the common people grow angry at their rulers.220

In the Histories, characters eventually retaliate, such as the Aetolians, who worked to provoke the war between the Romans and Antiochus III, and Hannibal and the Carthaginians, beginning the Second Punic War.221 As one of the most potent emotions in the Histories, ὀργή shapes the narrative dramatically. In fact, ὀργή, along with its common companion μῖσος, acts as a catalyst for important regime changes and for the causes, pretexts, and outbreaks of wars.222

Appropriate and rational ὀργή, as well as irrational ὀργή, occur. A desire for revenge may motivate ὀργή sometimes, but it does not seem to be the only motivation for ὀργή. Ὀργή in both positively- and negatively-portrayed subjects seems to arise from witnessing another take advantage of a situation and breach social protocol, usually drastically.223 Traditionally good characters, or those who best exemplify Eckstein’s aristocratic ethos and Champion’s Hellenic logismos, such as the Achaeans and the Romans, grow angry and are the objects of others’ anger.

Of the groups who grow angry, the Romans feel anger the most of all, with Romans growing angry twenty times.224 Moreover, they cause anger in others second most frequently, only behind the Aetolians, who cause anger ten times, with nine attestations in the extant text. This statistical preponderance of Roman anger, however, does not mean that the Romans were more

220 Polyb., XV.30.1; I.67.5-6, I.70.4, I.82.9; VI.4.9, VI.7.8, VI.56.11, VI.57.8. All of these examples involve those whom Eckstein characterizes as irrational, barbaric, and a threat to social order. While some of these instances demonstrate this (such as the mercenary examples), the rest of these challenge the lack of moral social order and aim to rectify this disjuncture. See Chapter 3 for this latter analysis and Chapter 4 for the former. 221 Polyb., III.3.3, III.7.1. 222 Regimes are changed clearly three times, wars break out through ὀργή six times; three times (III.7.1, III.78.5, IV.49.4) Polybius explicitly gave ὀργή as the causation for the war. See Chapter 4. 223 Cf. Konstan 2006, 65ff., with injustice as a cause of anger in Classical literature, beyond Aristotle’s limitations. 224 This includes the group Romans, individual Romans, and the Senate. Six times anger is attributed to the Romans in speeches. 49 irascible and therefore more aggressive by nature.225 Polybius structured his history around the

Romans, so it is likely that they as the main characters frequently are associated with anger or any emotion.226 Even though the statistical evidence of Roman anger should not be overstressed, this predominance does reflect on the Romans. Roman anger increases in the later books and does correlate with Champion’s observations of Roman decline.227 Romans grow angry exceptionally often and are the objects of anger rather often.

On the other hand, groups whom scholars associate with anger do not have strong records of growing angry: Aetolian anger is mentioned four times, Illyrian anger three times, and Gallic anger only twice.228 These groups represent the traditionally negative, barbaric irrationality which Polybius abhors. Anger in itself, then, does not form a key component of their irrationality.229

Philip V, the individual who by far feels the most anger in the Histories, demonstrates the possibility of both negative and positive anger.230 As noted above, Polybius faults Philip V in his anger at Thermum not for feeling anger, but for his wrong response. Philip continued such behavior throughout the Histories, misdirecting his anger and reacting disproportionately, often wronging the gods and destroying places overzealously.231 After the end of the Second

225 See Eckstein 2006 for an argument against Roman exceptionalism, contra Harris 1979, who argued for exceptional Roman aggression. See too Harris 2010, 15, who takes Polybius as evidence for the Romans’ emotionally-driven aggressiveness. 226 In addition, two of the preserved four groups of Constantinian excerpts are the embassies to and from the Romans, making them central to the narrative more than any other single group. See Moore 1965 on the manuscript tradition. 227 See Erskine 2015 for an analysis of this later Roman anger. 228 All of these instances are addressed in Chapter 4. 229 Interestingly the Aetolians provoke or receive anger most often. Their inability to mitigate others’ anger and give due weight and consideration to others’ values does reflect poorly on them, and their prime status as objects of anger can attest to their characteristic short-sightedness and lack of diplomacy. Polyb., IV.16.3, IV.29.7, V.12.1, XX.10.7, XXI.25.11, XXI.29.29, XXI.31.3 (twice), XXI.31.7, XXI.31.8. 230 Philip V feels anger eight times: V.12.1, V.15.9, XI.7.3, XVI.1.2, XVI.1.4, XV.28.8, XVIII.36.4, XXII.13.2. Hermeias as an individual feels the most anger after Philip V, with three instances. Collectives more often feel anger, with the collective Romans (sixteen times) and the people (eight times) feeling anger more than or as often as Philip V. 231 Polyb., V.12.1, XI.7.3, XVI.1.2, XVI.1.4, XXII.13.2. 50 Macedonian War, Amynander, the king of Athamania, Macedon’s neighbor to the southwest, and an ally of Rome, requested that the Romans to stay in Greece. For, he says, when they will have left, Philip would vent his anger on him.232 Philip had a reputation for overworking his anger even among his contemporaries.

However, Philip acts positively on his anger during the Social War in Greece and imprisons his companions, Megaleas and Krinion, who, we as the external audience know, were part of Apelles’ internal plot to ruin Philip’s affairs.233 By stopping them, the young and (mostly) noble Philip took a great step towards eradicating this coup.234 Later in the Histories, Polybius takes a surprising turn by praising Philip in a war against Attalus and Rhodes, just after he praised them and criticized Philip. Polybius self-consciously defends his turn, reminding his readers that a good historian must distribute praise and blame as characters’ behaviors merit.235

For, he continues, Philip, although having suffered defeat, immediately and vehemently changed to meet the circumstance, and succeeded in opposing Attalus and the Rhodians, most of all acting on his anger and passion (τὸ πλεῖον ὀργῇ καὶ θυμῷ).236 Polybius praises this determination and perseverance in the face of harsh circumstances. Thus, Philip’s ὀργή (and even, it seems, θυμός) could have positive results – provided he react correctly.

Hatred

In the Rhetoric, Aristotle distinguishes hatred (μῖσος) from anger (ὀργή) in a series of statements. First, anger is felt against individuals, hatred against groups of people. Second, anger can be curable, hatred is inexorable. Third, an angry person wants to hurt his object, while a hater wants to cause his object evil, and the angry person wants to see his revenge while the

232 Polyb., XVIII.36.4. 233 Polyb., V.15.9. 234 On young Philip V, see McGing 2013. 235 Polyb., XVI.28.5. 236 Polyb., XVI.28.8. 51 other is not concerned with revenge. Fourth, anger necessitates pain for the subject where hatred does not. Lastly, an angry person can come to pity his object, for all he wants is to see his object suffer, while the hater cannot come to this state, for he wants his object not to exist.237

In this list, two features stand out: the specificity and temporality of these two emotions.

For Aristotle, anger requires specificity of object, motivation, and result. Anger must be directed at a specific individual, must be a response to a specific slight, and thus must require a specifically equal or proportional response or vengeance. In terms of temporality, anger differs from hatred in its limited time frame from the moment of motivation to the fulfillment of a proportional response. This view justifies Aristotle’s comment that an angry person can come to pity his object, for the anger only lasts until a proportional reaction occurs. Hatred, according to Aristotle, lacks both specificity and temporality in these senses.

For Polybius, μῖσος does not differ so starkly from anger. Ὀργή sometimes stimulates

μῖσος, and it is correlated often with μῖσος in the Histories.238 Polybius’ portrayal of hatred differs from Aristotle’s and Konstan’s claim that μῖσος arises only against groups, not individuals as such.239 Konstan observes that μῖσος can be directed against an individual (contra

Aristotle), a type, or a collective, and this holds true in the Histories.240 Konstan argues that ὀργή occurs specifically against a person while μῖσος can occur against someone as a member of a group not for any other reason than that they share attributes the subject identified in another member of that group.241 Polybius does not observe such specifications. 242 Instead, Polybius’

237 Arist., Rhet. 2.4, 1382a1-14, analyzed by Konstan 2006, 185-200. 238 Ὀργή as motivation for μῖσος: IX.10.10, XV.30.1. Ὀργή as parallel with μῖσος: I.82.9, VI.7.8, XV.17.2. 239 Polybius’s passage on traitors is the best example of μῖσος against a type of people: XVIII.15.13; see also V.98.7, XV.17.2 (with ὀργή), XVI.14.9. 240 Konstan 2006, 186-191, rationalizes Aristotle on hating only groups. 241 Konstan 2006, 186-191. 242 Most often in the Histories, positively-portrayed characters hate. 27 out of 37 are arguably positively-portrayed characters, and 19 out of the 27 are victims of injustice or suffering or are observers and sympathizers with these who suffer unjustly. 52 usage reflects assumptions inherent in ordinary language. Both ὀργή and μῖσος are felt against individuals and groups.243 Moreover, Polybius seldom omits the motivating cause for μῖσος.244

In commenting on Philip V’s destruction at Thermum, Polybius provides the gnomic statement that “it is a sign of a tyrant that he is hated by his subjects and that his subjects hate him.”245 This statement most closely matches Aristotle’s distinctions and Konstan’s discussion of μῖσος, in that Polybius makes a statement about a generalized tyrant. This statement is meant to apply to all tyrants. Hatred also helps Polybius explain kinds of behavior in his digressions on traitors, fake sufferers (usually courtiers), conquerors, and the good man.246 However, Polybius does not make such sweeping or generalizing statements about hatred often. Within the narrative, Polybius portrays hatred as the motivation of characters’ behaviors. Hannibal kills all men in their prime on his campaign in Picenum because of his natural hatred of the Romans, those in Antiochus III’s court help against the courtier Hermeias because of their hatred of him, the Sidetai choose not to help the besieged Pednelissans because of their hatred of the

Aspendians (who do help), and the Megarians ally with the Achaean League because they hate the Boeotian state.247

243 It is felt more often against groups than against individuals, but as stated above, Polybius does not leave out why characters feel hatred. Examples against individuals: V.11.6, V.56.9, VIII.8.1, XV.23.7, XV.25.11(8), XV.25.23(16), XXII.8.8, XXX.29.1, XXXII.6.6. Hatred against groups: I.14.4, I.82.9, III.86.11, V.11.6, V.73.4, V.98.7, VI.7.8, VI.9.1, VI.43.4, VII.3.2, VIII.36.9, IX.10.10, IX.29.12, IX.39.1, XV.17.2, XV.27.3, XVIII.15.13, XX.6.7, XXX.29.2, XXX.29.7, XXXIII.20.1, XXXVIII.3.4. More distinctly, individuals feel hatred far less than groups do: I.14.4, III.86.11, V.11.6, IX.39.1. 244 Polybius omits specifying the motivation for anger nine times (out of 37 occurrences): I.14.4, I.82.9, III.3.20, III.86.11, V.11.6, VII.3.2, XV.25.11(8), XVI.14.9, XVIII.15.13. 245 Polyb., V.11.6. 246 Polyb., I.14.4 (good man), V.98.7 and XVIII.15.13 (traitors), IX.10.10 (conquerors), and XV.17.2 (false sufferers). 247 Polyb., III.86.11, V.56.9, V.73.4, XX.6.7. 53 Hatred, μῖσος, in the Histories occurs most often of the emotions in a multidimensional context.248 Hatred appears alongside anger (ὀργή, never θυμός), indignation (δυσαρεστεῖν,

ἀγανακτεῖν, and προσκόπτειν), or ill-will (φθόνος). Hatred is set in contrast with loving

(φιλεῖν and συναγαπᾶν) or pity (ἔλεος). Thus, μῖσος seems to exemplify the combined force of negative emotion, and in this sense agrees with Aristotle’s definition of μῖσος as general.249

Different types of hatred exist: μῖσος, the most dynamic type which I focused upon most,

ἀπέχθεια, which shares a more neutral, less potent, and more calculated meaning of “enmity” than “hatred” and comes up more often in terms of state rivalries and alliances, and lastly

ἔχθρα, which seems to pertain more exclusively to rivalry than hatred.250

Indignation

Konstan begins his discussion of indignation by noting that the term which Aristotle defines, τὸ νέμεσαν, “was not commonly conceived of as an independent emotion in Aristotle’s time.”251 Konstan traces the usage of τὸ νέμεσαν in ancient Greek literature: it was archaic by

Aristotle’s time, increasingly referred to the divine in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, but increased in usage by later authors such as Diodorus Siculus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus,

Plutarch, and Second Sophistic authors.252 Aristotle defined τὸ νέμεσαν as a pair with φθόνος.

While φθόνος was felt when one’s equal achieved something better regardless of merit, τὸ

νέμεσαν was felt when another appeared to succeed undeservedly.253 Polybius uses τὸ

248 14 of 37 instances of hatred occur with other emotions: with ὀργή: I.82.9, VI.7.8, IX.10.10, XV.17.2, XV.30.1, XXX.29.1; with indignation: VI.78, VIII.8.1, XV.25.23(16), XV.27.3, XXX.29.7; with φθόνος: VI.7.8, VI.9.1, IX.10.10; against love: I.14.4, XVI.14.9, XXXIII.20.1; against ἔλεος: VIII.36.9, XV.17.2. 249 See more on hatred as a combination in Chapter 3. 250 See for a detailed list and usages of ἀπέχθεια and ἔχθρα and their cognates, Mauersberger 1.1.165, and 1.2.1067-1069, respectively. 251 Konstan 2006, 111. For full discussion of indignation, see 111-128. 252 Konstan 2003, 77-78. 253 Konstan 2006, 112-113. 54 νέμεσαν not in Aristotle’s restricted sense but as a manifestation of divine displeasure, which fits Konstan’s observations from Classical and Hellenistic literature.254 While Konstan translates

Aristotle’s use of τὸ νέμεσαν as “indignation”, Aristotle’s definition cuts off many connotations and usages of the modern concept(s) of indignation. Because Konstan addressed Aristotle’s theory of emotions in the Rhetoric, he did not investigate the concept of indignation in ancient

Greek beyond τὸ νέμεσαν.255 Polybius, however, in his Histories portrays indignation with a variety of terms.

Throughout the Histories, indignation sparks dynamic change rather than providing the last thrust, as anger and hatred tend to do. Indignation seems to mark the first level of offense taken at transgression of social and moral standards. Several words denote “indignation” to different degrees: δυσαρεστεῖν, ἀγανακτεῖν, προσκόπτειν. These Greek terms, which all convey a sense of indignation generally, are reflective, like sympathy. They shade from being dissatisfied and taking offense to nearly feeling disgust, and occur in important theoretical passages but also with many diverse usages in narrative episodes.

Characters feel righteous indignation (ἀγανακτεῖν) when someone oversteps their bounds, often harming or at least insulting the subjects of indignation in the process.256 Most often characters take what belongs to another for themselves, causing their victims to feel indignant, ἀγανακτεῖν. In the Mercenary War, the Carthaginians took for themselves supply ships and crews who were destined for the Romans, causing the Romans to feel indignation

(ἀγανακτεῖν).257 Reciprocally, the Romans took Sardinia at the end of the same war, causing

254 Polybius uses νέμεσαν twice, in the context of justice and the divine: XII.23.3., XXVII.8.4. 255 Konstan’s 2003 article on nemesis and phthonos, though not focused on Aristotle’s use, still addresses only these terms. 256 See Polyb., I.83.7, I.88.9, II.46.4, II.59.2, IV.3.11, IV.14.2, IV.16.2, VIII.8.1, VIII.24.3, XV.27.3, XVIII.35.6, XX.10.7, XXIV.7.5, XIV.7.7, XXV.5.1, XXXII.13.4, XXXVIII.9.3. 257 Polyb., I.83.7. 55 the Carthaginians to feel indignant (ἀγανακτεῖν).258 Sometimes characters do not grow indignant over material goods and physical loss but over (perceived) insults. The Roman Senate became indignant (ἀγανακτεῖν) with the treachery and deception of the Dalmatians and at the

Achaeans’ disrespect to Roman envoys, both late in the Histories.259 To feel indignant together with others, συναγανακτεῖν, always demonstrates positive character. All four instances in the

Histories concern characters who grow indignant on behalf of those who have suffered.260

Συναγανακτεῖν denotes a sense of sympathy, a strong feeling of sympathetic and moral indignation on behalf of another.

The meaning of προσκοπή falls between taking offense, resentment, or disgust.261 This emotion, προσκοπή, clearly marks a deeper level of indignation than δυσαρέστησις, for several times Polybius states “οὐ μόνον δυσαρεστεῖν . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ προσκόπτειν.”262 Polybius uses

προσκοπή to portray the depth and vehemence of a character’s indignation, which carries similar connotations as resentment and disgust.263 Often paired with μῖσος, προσκοπή seems to last for a long duration.264 The active usage of προσκοπή emphasizes the causation of the emotion, rather than the subjects’ feeling and experience of it. Isocrates, according to Polybius, caused the Greeks offense at his talkative and accusatory nature.265 Conversely, Polybius explains his choice of varying his proper name with first person pronouns by stating that he

258 Polyb., I.88.9. 259 Polyb., XXXII.13.4 and XXXVIII.9.3, respectively. 260 Polyb., II.59.5 (readers – intended by Phylarchus), IV.7.3 (Achaeans), IV.76.5 (Achaeans), VI.6.6 (observers). 261 Polyb., I.31.7, V.7.5, V.49.5, VI.6.2, VI.6.6, VI.6.8, VI.7.8, VII.5.6, IX.26.8, XXIV.12.3, XXVII.7.10, XXVIII.7.11, XXX.29.7, XXXI.10.4, XXXII.2.5, XXXIII.12.5, XXXVI.12.2, XXXVIII.4.4, XXXIX.1.3. 262 Ibid., I.31.7, VI.6.2, VI.6.6, VII.5.6. 263 It is challenging to identify something as disgust within Polybius’ text. I think that προσκοπή comes closest to this feeling of the vocabulary of the Histories because it conveys such a deep-seated negative feeling. Like disgust, it is socially and culturally specific to keeping oneself and one’s state clean of immoral or offensive influences. See Ahmed 2004, 82-100, for a nuanced interpretation of the cultural work of disgust. See Lateiner and Spatharas, eds. 2017, for ancient notions and examples of disgust. 264 Polyb., VI.7.8, XXX.29.7. 265 Polyb., XXXII.2.5. 56 does not want to cause any offense in his readers.266 However, προσκοπή, outside of this active sense of causing offense, can also mean to take offense at someone or something. In his character assessment of Hannibal, Polybius explains that because Hannibal had to abandon some places which he had promised to protect, some people resented (or were disgusted with) his impiety (προσκόπτοντες οἱ μὲν ἀσέβειαν), while others condemned his savagery.267

The term δυσαρεστεῖν and its cognates occur much more frequently in the Histories than ἀγανακτεῖν or προσκόπτειν. To analyze a range of this term δυσαρεστεῖν, I shall address its varied usages in Book Three. In this book, Polybius uses δυσαρεστεῖν three times:

III.8.9, III.26.6, and III.112.2. In the last example of the Book, III.112.2, δυσαρεστεῖν describes Lucius Aemilius’ feeling towards the suitability of the land near Cannae for battle against Hannibal. Just as with emotional vocabulary in English, so too emotional vocabulary in

Greek does not always convey a strong sense of emotion.268 A translation of “indignation,” let alone “resentment” or “disgust”, would not convey the correct sense here, whereas

“dissatisfaction” would.269 In this passage, δυσαρεστεῖν denotes Aemilius’ disappointment and dissatisfaction with the topography rather than a moral reaction of disapprobation, as

δυσαρεστεῖν would usually entail. However, Polybius chose δυσαρεστεῖν instead of another term for dissatisfaction.270 Aemilius’ reaction of δυσαρεστεῖν shows his thoughtfulness and accords with the correct judgment about the topography, thus strengthening his characterization

266 Polyb., XXXVI.12.2. 267 Polyb., IX.26.8. I prefer “resentment” to “disgust” because it is difficult to distinguish the viscerality of “disgust” from the text. Ahmed 2004, 82-100, argues for the effect of disgust as something which invades oneself. Polybius’ usage of προσκοπή seems to come closest to this threatening of one’s integrity. 268 Compare the saying in English, “what a pity,” which often expresses not a feeling of pity but perhaps a slight disappointment. 269 This passage is fairly unique in that it concerns an inanimate object as the object of the emotion. 270 Polybius could have used δυσχεραίνειν or βάρεως φέρειν, for example. For these as frequent senses of dissatisfaction (and not an emotional, moral response) in Polybius, see Mauersberger, 1.2.593, and 1.1.315 (under B.), respectively. 57 as a sensible general. His sense of δυσαρεστεῖν coincides with his rationale that the Romans should not do battle against Hannibal in this spot, which turned out – counterfactually – to be the correct attitude.

The other two passages involve in some way or another the beginnings and causes of wars (1st and 2nd Punic Wars). First, III.8.9, concerns the beginning of the Second Punic War.

Here Polybius is arguing against other writers’ depictions of the causes and outbreak of the war, taking Fabius Pictor’s account into detail.271 He draws out how Fabius’ account contradicts itself: for, he says, Pictor attested that the Carthaginians felt indignant with Hannibal

(δυσαρεστεῖν), but that their deeds, in Pictor’s same account, did not accord with this evaluation and emotional response against Hannibal. Polybius’ criticism stems from this contradiction between feeling and action. To make his criticism have force, the congruence between these must be strong. For Polybius, it must seem natural and almost necessary that after one feels δυσαρεστεῖν, they act upon such a feeling. However, in Pictor’s account, says

Polybius, the Carthaginians grew indignant, δυσαρεστεῖν, at Hannibal’s actions in Spain but did not act at all in accordance with such feelings: thus, they were not indignant with Hannibal in the first place.

The other passage, III.26.6, deals with the beginnings of the First Punic War. This occurs in a digression wherein Polybius comments on and critiques Hannibal’s, the

Carthaginians’, and the Romans’ pretexts and arguments for the start of the Second Punic War.

Within the example, Polybius is concerned mainly with justice and what was right, appealing to most (right-thinking) people’s sensibilities. Polybius states that those who consider that the

Romans allied with the Mamertines, who had broken treaties, and that the Romans had thus

271 See Walbank, HCP 1.310-311 for an analysis of Fabius’ version. 58 acted contrary to their own response to the Rhegian betrayers and allies of the Mamertines, would grow indignant (δυσαρεστεῖν) at the Romans’ crossing to Sicily.

As a final example of the nuances of δυσαρεστεῖν, let us investigate how Scipio

Africanus uses and shapes a sense of δυσαρεστεῖν in his speech to his mutinying soldiers in

Spain. 272 In this speech, Scipio Africanus establishes a series of reasons for revolt and then eliminates them. That soldiers feel indignant or are dissatisfied (δυσαρεστεῖν) with present affairs is the second of Scipio’s list of three reasons, and it is the reason for which Scipio thinks his soldiers revolted.273 He then focuses on the reason why the soldiers feel indignation. He states that they are indignant that he did not provide their food allowance. But, he counters, he did pay them what they were owed while he was their leader. Perhaps it is over past debts from

Rome?274 Scipio elides answering this claim directly but rather shifts his attention to the correct response to this indignation. If past arrears from Rome motivated the soldiers to grow indignant and thus to revolt, Scipio asks if it would not have been better to call on and speak with him about it or at least to gather their friends to aid them in their claim, rather than to revolt from their country and home.275 At this point, Scipio demonstrates the moral superiority of this choice, talking to him, over revolting through comparison with mercenaries, emphasis on the high stakes of citizen fighters, such as his audience, and analogy with parricide in response to a debt.276 Scipio concludes this portion of his speech by asking again what they were indignant at. He takes their choice not to speak with him as evidence that they had no reason or claim to indignation at all.277

272 Polyb., XI.28-29. Cf. Livy’s version of Scipio’s speech, Liv. 28.27.2-28.29.8. 273 Polyb., XI.28.1-3. 274 Polyb., XI.28.4-5. 275 Polyb., XI.28.6. 276 Polyb., XI.28.7-10. 277 Polyb., XI.28.11. 59 In this speech, the use of δυσαρεστεῖν means something between “dissatisfaction” and

“indignation”. Scipio focuses his attention on the motivations for the soldiers’ feeling and on their response to it. Scipio’s interest in why the soldiers feel indignation (δυσαρεστεῖν) reflects the significance of an emotion’s import and rationality. By skipping directly from motivation to the impropriety of revolting, Scipio challenges the import of the soldiers’ indignation. He contrasts mercenaries fighting for pay with citizens fighting for their families and country.278

This contrast challenges the mutineers’ concern over owed pay and implies that they should care more about their families and country, i.e., what should be the true import for any emotion they have. In this shifting of import, Scipio directly points out that they responded disproportionately to their indignation. They chose to revolt when conversation with him would have been a proportional response. Moreover, by shifting the import, Scipio denies their claim to feel indignation appropriately; they should not have felt indignation based on such motivating factors as pay instead of the safety of their loved ones. Scipio directly eliminates indignation from the picture when he says that the mutineers really had no reason. Scipio’s speech centers on the convergence of rationality and indignation. He takes their disproportionate response and avoidance of the easier, proportionate response as evidence for a lack of reason for indignation.

Thus, Scipio’s speech highlights important factors for δυσαρεστεῖν. Motivation, import, and response are essential for this emotion, as well as for ἀγανακτεῖν and προσκόπτειν. Unlike

ἀγανακτεῖν and προσκόπτειν, δυσαρεστεῖν represents a lighter version of “indignation,” as etymologically ‘dis-pleasure’ (δυσ-αρεστεῖν), and thus closer to dissatisfaction and thus easier to assuage. However, it still carries the moral implications of indignation, which, in this passage,

278 See VI.52.3-8 for Polybius’ similar arguments about the superiority of the Roman politeia over Carthage’s. 60 Scipio argued did not exist for the mutineers, and thus they should not have felt indignation proper.

Resentment

Konstan relates φθόνος, which he translates as “envy”, to his form of “indignation”, τὸ

νέμεσαν.279 Together they represent the opposite of pity. Aristotle defines φθόνος as pain at an equal doing better. Konstan qualifies Aristotle’s stance, stating that “phthonos is the only one

[emotion] that he treats as unqualifiedly negative,” for the subject only feels this emotion because the object is doing better, not because the object does not deserve better.280 However, Konstan situates Aristotle’s approach to φθόνος in his interpretation of φθόνος in Classical Athenian democracy. According to Konstan, φθόνος did not carry entirely negative overtones in the context of Classical Athenian democracy, but rather it functioned to regulate the behavior of the rich and powerful, thus embodying “a natural response to a systemic inequality” through its use in social movement.281 He rationalizes Aristotle’s hostility through his suspicion of egalitarian democracy and states, “it was thus natural that he should have regarded phthonos as a vice endemic to democracy, one that is excited by the prosperity of those we deem our equals.”282

Φθόνος has a complex function in the Histories which does not neatly fit into Konstan’s classification. It shares similarities with Konstan’s examples of Archaic usage, meaning something more like ‘begrudge’ than Konstan’s emotionless ‘deny’ or ‘refuse.’283 However, it is not merely an egalitarian and democratic emotion, as Konstan claims for it during the Classical

279 Konstan 2006, 111-128. Forms of indignation occur with φθόνος at II.46.2 and VI.7.8. 280 Konstan 2006, 113. 281 Konstan 2003, 80-86, gives a fuller exposition of this democratic context, but is reiterated at Konstan 2006, 119- 127, in comparison with Aristotle’s view. 282 Konstan 2006, 127. 283 Konstan 2006, 118-122. 61 period and for Aristotle’s particular understanding.284 Konstan describes φθόνος as completely negative and well-suited for the mob.285 Neither of these observations works straightforwardly in Polybius’ Histories.

Moreover, φθόνος does not carry the same connotations as “envy” in the Histories, which is a common translation. As mentioned above, it describes someone holding grudges, or begrudging someone something, or it can indicate a sense of offense created by someone’s attempt to overreach their social status in some manner.286 Lower classes, social peers, and superiors feel φθόνος in the Histories. In several passages, φθόνος provides intriguing cases of multidimensionality, combining variously with indignation, anger, hatred, and even pity.287

Φθόνος most often represents resentment of others’ improper use of power, success, wealth, or other resources.

In a few generalizing statements, Polybius describes φθόνος in terms similar to the sense of “envy” in English. “For φθόνος from wealth gives birth to plots and causes the greatest changes in physical and mental health.”288 Polybius likewise explains that “brilliant and extraordinary deeds give birth to deep φθόνος and sharp slanders.”289 Φθόνος seems thus to provide a check against reaching too far and overstepping the bounds of human achievement, similar to Konstan’s observations of Classical Athenian φθόνος. The better one does, the more difficult it becomes to succeed and fare well because of φθόνος.

284 Konstan 2006, 119, 125ff. 285 Konstan 2006, 127. 286 For a meaning of ‘begrudge,’ see Polyb. V.42.8, VI.58.5, XI.6.8, XI.34.3. For a meaning more of ‘offense,’ see I.36.3, II.45.1, II.46.2, V.41.3, V.46.8, V.50.7, VI.7.5, VI.7.8, VI.9.1, VI.9.11, VII.8.4, IX.10.6, IX.10.7, IX.10.10, IX.10.12, IX.29.11, XIII.2.5, XVIII.41.4, XXIII.12.8, XXVIII.7.5, XXXIX.8.2. 287 Polyb., II.46.2, VI.7.8, VI.9.1, VI.9.11, IX.10.6, IX.10.10, IX.29.11. 288 Polyb., XVIII.41.4. 289 Polyb., I.36.3. 62 In these passages and in fact most instances of the emotion φθόνος in the Histories,

Polybius focuses on the object of φθόνος, not the subjects. This marks a great divergence from the modern notion of “envy” in English. Through its connotations as one of the “Seven Deadly

Sins” of Christianity, envy in English symbolizes a fault on the part of the subject, the one envying; it is the one who envies who sins. Polybius does not focus on the subject who feels

φθόνος. In five passages he mentions individuals or the Aetolians as a people when they feel

φθόνος, and in these passages feeling φθόνος reflects these characters’ negative traits.290

However, in the remaining seventeen instances of φθόνος and φθονεῖν, all attention falls upon the object of φθόνος. In this majority of instances of φθόνος, the subject is not stressed or even mentioned explicitly, and in these, a negative reading of the subjects of φθόνος often contradicts the meaning of the passage.

The most notable passage concerning φθόνος is Polybius’ description of how observers react to conquerors when they overstep the bounds of propriety in despoiling the defeated. The

Romans’ conquest of Syracuse forms the context and inspiration for this theorizing digression.291

Polybius explains that it is agreed that one would call it a fault to abandon conquerors’ customs and to imitate the losers’, stimulating the resentment (φθόνος) which follows such behavior and which most of all scares those in superior positions. For, he continues, an observer does not deem happy (μακαρίζει) those who take others’ property, since he feels resentment (φθόνος), and some pity arises in him for those who lost their property.292

290 Polyb., II.45.1 and II.46.2 (Aetolians), V.41.3 (Hermeias), IX.29.11 (Antigonus Doson, in Chlaeneas’ speech), and XIII.2.5 (Scopas). 291 Polyb., IX.10. This passage is often discussed in terms of the Roman triumph and the degenerative importation of Hellenic luxury into Rome: see Beard 2007, 178-181; Champion 2013, 146; Davies 2013, 327; Eckstein 1995, 229-230, 245-246; Gruen 1984, 308, 345-346; Gruen 1992, 94-98; Gruen 2013, 260; McGing 2010, 41, 159-160; Walbank HCP II.134-136. 292 Polyb., IX.10.6-7. 63 This emotion, φθόνος, tends to arise against those who have or want more than they should.293 Here, the victors have and take more than they should. Polybius took it for granted that people – the normative “man on the street” – automatically and naturally feel φθόνος in response to victors overreaching the bounds of propriety, despite their legitimate power. In this moment, Polybius appeals to an abstract sense of morality, which forms the base for this

φθόνος. Polybius strengthens his generalized “resentment following such actions” (τὸν

ἐξακολουθοῦντα τοῖς τοιούτοις φθόνον) as a resentment “which is most frightening of all for superiority” (ὃ πάντων ἐστὶ φοβερώτατον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς). The emotion φθόνος most potently afflicts those who are in a superior position. This usage and analysis shares clear similarities with Konstan’s analysis of Classical φθόνος. However, Konstan stresses the egalitarian and democratic nature of this emotion, while in this passage, as elsewhere in the

Histories, φθόνος is felt by those who have no claim to equality. Again, this emphasizes the object of the emotion much more than the subject: the subject’s social status matters hardly at all, but the object is focalized and criticized for not understanding their status.

This usage is paralleled in other passages of the Histories: the kings in the anacyclosis acted following reason in accordance with their subjects’ good, but the hereditary tyrants did not act in accordance with how their power was originally acquired by the kings.294 This stirred up

φθόνος along with many other negative emotions.295 Likewise, the most recent Syracusan tyrant

Hieronymus failed to act according to the principles his predecessor Hiero II – who had

293 The subjects feeling the emotion evaluate what constitutes “more than they should”. Throughout the Histories, this is evenly divided between correct and incorrect evaluation: three times characters feel φθόνος against others in accordance with Polybius’ portrayal and thoughts on these figures, and four times characters wrongly feel φθόνος against characters whom Polybius sympathizes with and defends. Together with Polybius’ portrayal: V.41.3 (of Hermeias), V.46.8 (of Molon), XIII.2.5 (of Scopas); Against Polybius’ appraisal: II.45.1 (Aitolians), II.46.2 (Aitolians), IX.29.11 (Antigonus Doson in Chlaineas’ speech), XXVIII.7.5 (some Achaians). 294 Polyb., VI.7.7. 295 Polyb., VI.7.8. 64 exceptionally avoided all φθόνος – had established along with his power in Syracuse and

Sicily.296 Hieronymus fell due to his failure to adhere to Hiero’s principles.297 Like Hiero, those who act worthily of their status, adhering to original principles, avoid φθόνος and receive praise from Polybius. His hero, Philopoemen, exceptionally stands outside of φθόνος, strong evidence for Polybius of Philopoemen’s great character.298 The passage at IX.10 over victors fits this pattern. By not following their original, successful principles, the conquerors forfeit their just claim to higher status because they emulate unworthy customs. Thus, they attract φθόνος.

Jealousy

Konstan includes ‘jealousy,’ ζηλοτυπία, although Aristotle does not address this terminology.299 Polybius, likewise, rarely uses ζηλοτυπία, and when he does it does not denote

English “jealousy” so much as rivalry.300 Konstan discusses the Stoics’ emphasis on ζηλοτυπία as jealousy at another having what another has.301 Konstan then turns to Polybius and discusses his attitude to courtiers. Konstan takes Polybius’ general disparagement of courtiers and their new kind of slander, invented to further their rivalries and greed (ζηλοτυπία καὶ πλεονέξια) as part of the turn towards court culture.302 In this context, ζηλοτυπία means something close to

“invidious rivalry”, as Konstan observes. Despite Polybius’ distaste for courtiers in general and criticism of them, the court did not form a central concern for him, let alone the emotions specific to it, such as ζηλοτυπία.303

296 Polyb., VII.8.4. However, Hieronymus does not explicitly in the extant text invoke φθόνος. 297 Polyb., VII.7-8. 298 Polyb., XXIII.12.8. Attalus also exceptionally avoids φθόνος, XVIII.41.4. 299 Konstan 2006, 219-258. 300 Polyb., IV.87.4, XVI.22.6, XXIX.7.2. 301 Konstan 2006, 223-224. 302 Polyb., IV.87.4; Konstan 2006, 225. 303 Of course, this statement is not definitive given the fragmentary preservation of Polybius’ text. However, the majority of the extant text, especially the books surviving complete, 1-5, does not give court society and its emotion a central role in the Histories. 65 Shame

Shame, αἶδος or αἰσχύνη, is a felt sensation, according to Aristotle in Konstan’s analysis.304 However, αἰσχύνη rarely entails a felt component in Polybius’ Histories.305 It does correspond with Konstan’s observation that it constitutes an outward-oriented judgment; that is, external observers’ judgment forms the crucial motivating factor for the subject’s feeling shame.306 Αἰσχύνη completely concerns social reputation and virtue in the Histories, but

Polybius does not focus on it as an emotion felt by the subject when perceiving an impression of others’ negative judgment. Instead, Polybius engages in teaching his audience in what context it would be appropriate and socially responsible to feel shame. Often the narrator or external observers note the shame which follows such actions.307 The subject does not internalize the feeling of shame, but rather Polybius wants the audience to feel shame themselves should they pursue the same course of action.308 In the Histories, αἰσχύνη and αἰσχρός denote shame.

These terms have high moral content, and whenever they are used, they are meant to chastise bad behavior and inculcate good morals. Appropriateness features prominently in this emotion, and in fact shame might be described better as the emotion of inappropriateness.

Should αἰσχύνη be called an emotion? Αἰσχύνη is more of a moral judgment than an emotion. Αἰσχύνη, as a moral judgment, comes from the perspective of an observer or the

304 Konstan 2006, 90-109. Polybius never uses the term αἶδος. Konstan discusses this term briefly as an Archaic Greek term for shame, 93-98. See Cairns 1993 for a detailed analysis of this term. 305 Examples of internalized shame in Polybius’ Histories: VIII.12.6 (Aratus), IX.18.9 (Philip V); focalized through others: II.46.1 (Aetolians), VI.46.3 (Cretans); lack of internalized shame: VI.56.2 (Carthaginians), IX.3.6 (Aetolians), XII.13.3 (Timaeus), XV.20.1 (Philip V and Antiochus III); negated, for a positive result: IV.20.11 (Achaeans), XII.13.11 (Demetrius of Phaleron). 306 Konstan 2006, 90. See Ahmed 2004, 101-121, for a detailed analysis of the process of shame, which finds parallels for Polybius’ usage. 307 For some examples, see III.20.7, III.116.13, IV.31.7-8, IV.58.11, V.58.5, VI.44.6, VIII.9.9, VIII.10.2, VIII.11.1, VIII.11.8, IX.18.9, XI.2.7, XI.2.11, XI.5.3, XI.5.7, XI.12.3, XII.13.1, XII.13.3, XIV.5.10, XV.10.3, XVI.20.1. For a full list of αἰσχύνη, its cognates, and its uses, see Mauersberger, 1.1.29-31, 1.1.98, 1.3.1301, and 2.1.15. 308 In several cases, such as III.81.6, III.84.6, XVIII.53.4, those who would have to internalize the feeling of shame are dead. 66 narrator, and it reflects back to the observer’s own values and standards. As with many of the emotions, with αἰσχύνη the ones eliciting the judgment of αἰσχύνη do not recognize their own shame. In fact, their ignorance often motivates identification of αἰσχύνη by the narrator or observer. Since αἰσχύνη in this form lacks any feeling, it works more as a moral or a judgment than an emotion. Who would feel this shame, after all? The narrator or observer would not.

The characters viewed are oblivious to their αἰσχύνη, even though they should have felt it. In these cases, no true subject experiencing and feeling the emotion exists.

However, in four cases, internalized shame with strong feeling occurs.309 Polybius centers directly upon the issue of emotional, felt shame versus detached judgmental αἰσχύνη in describing Aratus’s dying by poison at Philip V’s orders. As Philip unsuccessfully attacked

Messene, Polybius says, he showed great lack of restraint against those closest to him (εἰς δὲ

τοὺς ἀναγκαιοτάτους τῶν φίλων τὴν μεγίστην ἀσέλγειαν ἐναπεδείξατο).310 For, through a slow-acting poison, Philip killed Aratus, who felt that Philip’s attack of Messene was wrong

(δυσαρεστηθέντα τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ πεπραγμένοις ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ).311 To add to the scale of

Philip’s wrongdoing, Aratus knew that Philip was poisoning him.312 Polybius sums up that “thus modesty is a great and noble thing,” when Aratus, although the victim, felt ashamed at what was happening, rather than the perpetrator, Philip (μᾶλλον ὁ παθὼν τοῦ πράξαντος ᾐσχύνετο τὸ

γεγονός).313 This charged statement lays bare the usual working and understanding of shame:

309 Polyb., II.46.1, VIII.12.6, XII.13.11, XV.23.5. This is out of 43 occurrences of shame vocabulary. Half of these four instances, XII.13.11 and XV.23.5, are negative statements, indicating that the character did not feel shame, thus reducing the number of occurrences of the felt emotion of shame even further. 310 Polyb., VIII.12.1. 311 Polyb., VIII.12.2-3. 312 Polyb., VIII.12.4-5. 313 Polyb., VIII.12.6. οὕτως ἐστὶ μέγα τι καὶ καλὸν χρῆμα μετριότης, ὥστε μᾶλλον ὁ παθὼν τοῦ πράξαντος ᾐσχύνετο τὸ γεγονός, . . .. Aratus in some ways feels shame on behalf of Philip, much as in English usage one feels embarassment for someone. This ‘feeling for’ someone else reflects the subject’s sense of morality, here Aratus’ superior sense of morality by comparison to Philip V’s lack. 67 the perpetrator of a wrong should feel shame, not the victim. Clearly Polybius thought that

Philip should have felt shame. His actions met with disapprobation by the narrator and by observers, yet Philip clearly did not experience internalized, reflective shame. Aratus, on the other hand, felt the emotion of shame, even though his actions did not merit disapprobation – rather the opposite: he stuck by Philip and aided in so many great exploits, which fact further highlights Philip’s shamelessness.314 Aratus’ shame thus exalts the nobility and virtue of his character, to Philip’s discredit.315

2. Anticipatory Emotions

Fear and hope feature throughout the narrative of the Histories. Stoics classified fear and hope together as the two future-oriented emotions, incorporating either negative or positive affect. In Polybius’ Histories, these two emotions, along with the affective states of courage and shock, occur often within the narrative of military events. They both affect characters’ military and political decisions. As opposed to the negative emotions above, fear and hope do not share a strong connection to moral evaluation.

Fear

Fear to Aristotle represented pain at some future event.316 For one to fear something however, the threat has to be close, for people do not fear something that is remote.317 Konstan clarifies that fear acts as a response to a danger, especially to an enemy in a position to do one harm.318 For Aristotle and Konstan, fear represents the most universal of all emotions, for even

314 Polyb., VIII.12.6-7. 315 This is particularly the case as this passage begins Polybius’ death notice of Aratus. See Pomeroy 1986 on Polybius’ death notices in general, although he does not address Aratus at length, in part because this passage does not survive in whole. 316 See Konstan 2006, 129-155, for his full analysis of fear. 317 Arist., Rhet. 2.5 1382a21-25; discussed by Konstan 2006, 130. 318 Konstan 2006, 133. 68 animals feel it. However, for humans, Aristotle also found that fear led people on the whole to become more deliberative, not irrational.319

Polybius’ usage of fear, whether φόβος or δέος, corresponds to Aristotle’s description of fear.320 All the fear words (φόβος, δεδιότες, etc.) are intentional: the subject feels fear of someone or some situation. Φόβερος goes the opposite way, but is also intentional: the subject causes fear in an object. Fear can be a tactic (“scare tactics” literally), a motivator for positive or negative ends, a sign of strength, youth, desperation, or inexperience. Characters intend to create fear most often of the emotions, and the vocabulary for fear reflects this type of usage, with both active and passive forms.321

Marie-Rose Guelfucci in her article “La peur dans l’oeuvre de Polybe” synthesizes

Polybius’ usage of fear in the Histories.322 She argues that Polybius utilizes fear for a political purpose: good generals manage fear, while bad ones do not. Guelfucci focuses most on Roman generals, although other leaders manage fear also. For example, Hannibal deliberately instills fear (φόβος) in others.323 Hasdrubal also, at Cannae, utilizes the Numidian cavalry due to its excellence in causing φόβος to those fleeing, an action which Polybius praises.324 Demetrius of

Pharos also recognizes the Romans’ fear of Carthage and tries to use it to his advantage, thus showing good generalship in understanding his enemy.325 Moreover, Guelfucci notes the prominent use of fear in Book 6 of the Histories. Fear imposes restraint on the different

319 Konstan 2006, 135. 320 See Guelfucci 1986 for a full analysis and interpretation of fear in Polybius’ Histories. 321 Polybius describes feeling fear much more often (78.5% of the occurrences of fear terminology) than causing or intending fear (21.5%), but this differs immensely from all the other emotions, which almost never phrased in the active sense. The terminology used for causing fear or intending fear include φόβερος, φόβος (which also refers to subjects feeling fear, based on context), and ἐκφοβεῖν. All forms from δέος and all other forms of φόβος refer to feeling fear. 322 Guelfucci 1986, 227-237. 323 Polyb., III.51.13, III.60.10, III.94.7. 324 Polyb., III.98.6. 325 Polyb., III.16.2. 69 components of the Roman mixed constitution, deterring the People, Senate, or consuls from overstepping their allotted powers. Fear also compels the Roman soldiers to maintain their renowned discipline. In sum, Guelfucci persuasively draws out the political importance of fear in Polybius’ account of Roman institutions and in the Histories as a whole.

After the battle of Trebia early in the Second Punic War, the defeated general, Tiberius

Gracchus, sent a deceptive report to Rome.326 However, the news trickled into the city that the

Romans had lost, and Polybius describes the extensive preparations that they began.327 For,

Polybius explains, the Romans become most fearsome (φοβερώτατοι) when a true fear

(ἀληθινὸς φόβος) surrounds them.328 Here, the ἀληθινὸς φόβος does not have a stated import. One has to read in ‘for survival’ or something similar from the context. A system of fear exists here: the Romans both cause fear and feel fear. Not only that, they cause fear because they feel fear. Moreover, the object of φοβερώτατοι is left unstated. Such a generalizing statement comes closest to Polybius using emotion to depict a group’s identity or disposition.

The context, however, warns against reading this too generally: Polybius is explaining why the

Romans immediately began such extensive preparations.

Fearing (δεδιότες) saves the Carthaginians at one point in their crossing of the Alps, says

Polybius.329 He states that they would have all been destroyed if they were not afraid. Because they feared the treachery of some inhabitants in the Alps, the Carthaginians prepared for a surprise attack, placing the heavy infantry in the rear, which the Gallic tribe indeed attacked.

Fear motivates the Carthaginians here to make strategic decisions, saving, as Polybius attests,

326 Polyb., III.75.1. 327 Polyb., III.75.2-7. 328 Polyb., III.75.8. 329 Polyb., III.53.1. ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ ἂν ἄρδην ἀπολέσθαι συνέβη τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν, εἰ μὴ δεδότες ἀκμὴν ἐπὶ ποσὸν . . . 70 their whole force.330 Fear, even though not planned here, can cause beneficial results. However, it is not necessary for anyone, even a good general, to recognize, let alone control, the fear for it to have positive effects, as seen here. Interestingly, Polybius does not mention τύχη even though this type of situation would fall under its jurisdiction, as what happened was not controlled by people.331 Lastly, Polybius emphasizes repeatedly the fear Romans feel about their catastrophe at Cannae.332 This suits his narrative purpose in marking Cannae as an extraordinary event.333 It dramatizes the desperation of the situation and helps to justify his decision to discuss

Rome’s constitutional strengths.

Hope

Ἐλπίς is perhaps the most difficult emotional term to identify and characterize in

Polybius’ Histories. Though often translated as “hope,” ἐλπίς, or more often ἐλπίδες, share meanings with hope, expectation, plans, fortunes, and prospects, in a very real, material sense and cover the nuances between these terms.

For the Stoics, hope, as the preferred future emotion, represented the opposite of fear.334

In a recent article, Laurel Fulkerson analyzed the working of ἐλπίς within Plutarch’s texts, focusing on the Lives.335 Fulkerson notes the wide ground that this term covers in Plutarch’s corpus, between “hope” and “expectation,” comparable to Polybius’ usage. She rationalizes the convergence of these meanings by postulating that “my best guess about what is likely to happen

330 Gulefucci 1986, 232ff., notes that δείδειν leads to a better appraisal of the situation more often than φοβεῖν. 331 See especially Walbank 2011 on Fortune. 332 Polyb., III.107.15, III.112.6, III.118.5-6. 333 See recently McGing 2010, 17-50, on Polybius’ structure and how it relates to his content. 334 I do not discuss the Stoics’ present ‘emotions’ of pleasure (ἡδονή) and pain (λύπη). Konstan does not address ἡδονή either. See Mauersberger, 1.3.1110 for Polybius’ usage of this term. Aristotle uses λύπη to denote pain, and Polybius’ rare use of this terminology follows suit. Konstan redefines λύπη as grief, which does not find traction in Polybius’ text. See Mauersberger, 1.4.1498-1499 for Polybius’ usage of this term. 335 Fulkerson 2015, 67-86. Neither Konstan nor Aristotle address the potential emotion, ἐλπίς. See however, Caston and Kaster, eds. 2016, for recent scholarship on hope in Classical literature. 71 is, very regularly, likely to be also the thing I would most like to happen.”336 In this optimistic interpretation, the two senses of “expectation” and “hope” thus inform each other. A word in

English which comes close to covering this nuance is “prospect,” which implies waiting on or expecting something positive in the future. In her analysis of Plutarch’s corpus, Fulkerson found that Plutarch used ἐλπίς three to four times more frequently in the Lives than in the

Moralia.337 This trend, which Fulkerson ties to a correlation between ἐλπίς and action, finds backing in Polybius’ usage, for he mentions ἐλπίς more often than ὀργή, μῖσος, φθόνος,

δυσαρέστησις, τὸ ἀγανακτεῖν, προσκοπή, and ἔλεος combined.338 Moreover, Polybius tends to mention ἐλπίς in narrative military contexts rather than the digressions or explanations in which we often see the other emotions.

States trust in the ἐλπίδες of themselves or their allies and share the same ἐλπίδες as their allies, where the English word and feeling of “hopes” does not fit as well as “expectations” or “goals”.339 Their ἐλπίδες are not anything ethereal or insubstantial; rather, they are the foreseeable outcome and future result of the state’s actions. “Fortunes” makes a better translation here. It conveys in English both the risk and chance involved and also the future orientation. “Fortunes” seems to refer to more material concerns than “hopes” do. Another potential translation might be “chances” or “prospects,” as when a commander or state chooses

336 Fulkerson 2015, 68. 337 Fulkerson 2015, 70. 338 Polybius uses a form of ἐλπίς or ἐλπίζειν over 375 times, whereas the emotions of anger, hate, indignation, resentment, and pity occur a total of 274 times. For a full list of ἐλπίς and ἐλπίζειν, their uses, and their cognates, see Mauersberger 1.2.756-761, 1.2.1017-1018, 1.3.1354; and for its negated or opposite forms 1.1.119, 1.1.162-163, 1.2.589. In my lists of passages and statistics for this terminology, I make no claim of comprehensiveness due to the large amount of material and thus greater room for error. I intend instead to provide as near a complete list of passages and usages as I can to show the representativeness for this term. 339 For examples which refer specifically to the ἐλπίδες found in alliances, which has a material sense of “fortunes” or “resources”, see I.44.6, I.55.1, I.62.4, I.82.3, I.82.6, I.83.1, IV.17.8, IV.51.8, IV.55.4, IV.60.8, V.51.11, maybe V.74.8, VII.3.8, VIII.15.8, IX.32.3, IX.32.11, IX.37.5, IX.39.6, X.37.5, XI.20.6, XIII.2.1, XIV.7.7, XV.24.4 (twice), XXI.11.12, XXI.41.4, XXII.4.1, XXVII.3.3, XXVIII.2.3, XXIX.3.5, XXIX.7.8, XXIX.8.3, XXX.5.8, XXX.5.16, XXX.20.4, XXXI.14.4, XXXVI.9.10, XXXVIII.7.9. 72 to follow a line of action based on the prospect or chance of a better outcome.340 These examples come close to an unemotional meaning of “expectation”.341 Ἐλπίδες of salvation (τῆς

σωτερίας) come closer to our conception of hope as an emotion.342

Perhaps part of the difficulty with distinguishing “hope” as an emotion from

“expectation” or some other such translation arises from its calculated nature in the narrative.

Feeling appears to play no role or a very small one in ἐλπίς.343 Calculations dominate everything about ἐλπίς in Polybius’ Histories, a fact we may not find comfortable in English usage, as we usually hope when we cannot (or choose not to) reason out and make decisions to change our lives accordingly. We hope when we have no control. We have difficulty with the connotations of ἐλπίς from our own preconceptions of the dichotomy between reason versus emotion.

A good example of the ambiguity ἐλπίδες have in meaning between expectation and hope comes in Scipio Africanus’ speech to his mutinying troops in Spain, in which we analyzed his deconstruction of δυσαρεστεῖν.344 After Scipio eliminated indignation as a valid reason for why the soldiers revolt, he turned to the third in his list of general reasons soldiers revolt – to strive for greater and nobler prospects (μειζόνων . . . καὶ καλλιόνων ἐλπίδων). Scipio challenges the soldiers to think of when Rome had more benefits, prosperity, and more prospects (ἐλπίδες) for the soldiers.345 He brings up a counterargument, couched in the words of a despondent person (τις τῶν ἀπηλπικότων), that Rome’s enemies have more profits and greater and steadier prospects (μείζόυς καὶ βεβαιότατ’ἐλπίδες).346 Scipio responds by asking

340 Examples from Book I: I.20.1, I.21.5, I.27.12, I.36.5, I.37.6, I.49.10, I.61.5, I.66.12, I.71.3, I.87.1. 341 For “expectation” as the best meaning in Book I: I.44.4, I.53.12, I.66.5. 342 See for this specific phrase, ἐλπίδες τῆς σωτερίας, II.35.1, III.96.3, III.109.11, IV.86.5, VI.58.9, VI.58.11, VIII.17.9, VIII.19.2, XI.1.8, XI.17.5, XVIII.25.4, XXII.8.12, XXIX.19.8, XXX.32.8, XXXVIII.7.8. 343 Of Book I, the occurrences of ἐλπίς with the most “hope” connotations are I.56.9 and I.67.1. 344 Polyb., XI.28-29. 345 Polyb., XI.29.1. 346 Polyb., XI.29.2. 73 who these enemies are. He states that Andobales and Mandonius, two native leaders in Spain, had revolted from the Carthaginians before and now are traitors to their Roman alliance. He snidely comments on how noble it would be to trust them and thus betray one’s country.347

Moreover, Scipio tells the soldiers that they have no power comparable to the Romans. The mutineers do not have ἐλπίδες even of conquering Spain, with or without Andobales.348 As with his refutation of the soldiers’ indignation, Scipio ends by questioning the existence of their

ἐλπίδες at all.349

Throughout this passage, ἐλπίδες can be translated as “prospects”, “hopes”,

“expectations”, or even “plans”. There is little resemblance to emotion. Instead, as throughout the narrative in general, ἐλπίδες function as a part of calculation. Thus, the Romans, according to Scipio, can say they have better prospects (ἐλπίδες) than their enemies, in an objective sense.

Scipio denies any grounds for the soldiers’ ἐλπίδες, again using the features of emotion to deny the soldiers any rationale for their revolt.

What we tend to think of as “hopeful” in English, i.e., a positive outlook and wish for the future, fits the usage of εὔελπις by Polybius much better than ἐλπίς. In the Histories, characters become εὐέλπιδες over events they did not expect to happen so positively, and they modify their behavior to try to take advantage of their positive turn of affairs. In negotiations to end the war between the Aetolians and the Romans, Polybius says that the Aetolians all became

εὐέλπιδες at the outset, with the Roman commanders seeming willing to negotiate terms.350

However, their hopefulness leads to greater disappointment, for the Romans do not offer any

347 Polyb., XI.29.3-4. 348 Polyb., XI.29.5. 349 Polyb., XI.29.6. 350 Polyb., XXI.4.11. 74 better terms than those already offered.351 Their hopefulness, then, only leads them to a deeper disappointment than they would have experienced. Later in the Histories, the Achaeans become

εὐέλπιδες at what seems to be a favorable state of affairs for them with the Romans, and so they send another embassy to ask the Romans to release those Achaeans detained after the Third

Macedonian War, of whom Polybius was one. The Romans deny this request. While I doubt that Polybius disapproved of the Achaeans’ embassy, especially since Polybius himself pressed for the release, he still portrayed actions based on feeling εὐέλπιδες as likely to fail.352

3. Positive Emotions

Positive emotions, though frequent in the Histories, play a very small part in the dynamics of the narrative.353 They do not motivate or produce change. These emotions function more as dispositions or sentiments than emotions, as they lack some major characteristics of typical emotions such as intentionality or result. They do function, however, to provide passages with description and to enhance the continuity of the narrative. Characters who feel positive emotions choose to continue their plans and actions. Thus, positive emotions influence the narrative, but in a manner opposite to typical emotions.354

The feeling of ἀσμενίζω/ἀσμένως is a lighter disposition which does not drastically affect the turn of events.355 People continue upon their path or plans when they are ἄσμενοι. It is a sentiment or description fit for a child.356

Joy, χαρά, occurs solely as a result: it does not motivate further action.357 For example, the Greeks at the Isthmian Games nearly kill Flamininus in expressing their joy.358 This comes

351 Cf. XXI.2. 352 See Erskine 2012 and Henderson 2001 on Polybius’ situation as a detainee. 353 Polybius is unusual compared to Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon for his large use of the terminology for positive emotions. Of the terms covered below, these three historians combined use terms for these emotions 93 total times. Polybius cites the same terms 342 times. 354 See Caston and Kaster, eds. 2016 for new scholarship on positive emotions in particular. 355 See Mauersberger 1.1.241 for a full list of usages. 356 Polyb., III.11.7. 75 the closest example in the Histories to joy as a motivation for future action, but in this passage, joy merely motivates expression of the emotion itself: danger to Flamininus was a side effect, clearly unintended, of the emotion.359 Joy as a result always follows something directly, but it does not directly lead to future action. It is wholly concerned with the recent past and present.360

At the end of the Second Punic War, Polybius describes the return of Scipio Africanus to Rome and explains why he received great pomp and goodwill appropriately: “for the Romans never hoped to expel Hannibal from Italy nor to relieve the danger over themselves and their relatives; but at that time seeming already not only to be securely free from all fear and trouble but also seeming to rule over their enemies, they did not cease from joy.”361 Here we observe several aspects of positive emotion. It comes at the successful termination of a negative state of being (φόβου καὶ περιστάσεως). It is a response to the unexpected (οὐδέποτε . . .

ἐλπίσαντες). Lastly, this positive emotion clearly represents a result. The only actions to come from the joy are intended solely as expressions of emotion, not as actions with further, pragmatic consequences. This may seem intuitive that people in a positive emotional state do not want to change their positive state of affairs, but it deserves mention in contrast to the other emotions studied.

357 As seen in all of these passages, where joy is purely a result: I.20.1, I.34.12, I.36.1, I.44.4, I.44.6, II.4.6, II.50.5, III.62.9, III.70.1, III.74.10, III.87.5, III.96.6, III.103.1, V.2.6, V.14.10, V.15.1, VI.58.13, VIII.17.2, VIII.24.11, VIII.29.11, X.5.4, X.14.1, X.17.8, XI.3.5, XI.33.7, XV.4.8, XV.5.13, XV.22.1, XV.32.4 (twice), XVI.23.4, XVI.25.4, XVIII.24.6, XVIII.45.1, XVIII.46.11, XX.8.2, XX.12.3. See Mauersberger, 3.2.1011-1012, 3.2.1007-1009, 2.1.314- 315, and 3.2.776 for joy and its cognates. 358 Polyb., XVIII.46.11. 359 Eckstein 1995, 131, uses this passage as an example that all emotion is disruptive. 360 Perhaps this simplicity attests to its status in Stoic theory as a pre-emotion, and as such one which sages could feel appropriately. 361 Polyb., XVI.23.4. Οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἂν ἐλπίσαντες Ἀννίβαν ἐκβαλεῖν ἐξ Ἰταλίας οὐδ’ ἀποτρίψασθαι τὸν ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων κίνδυνον, τότε δοκοῦντες ἤδη βεβαίως οὐ μόνον ἐκτὸς γεγονέναι πάντος φόβου καὶ περιστάσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οὐ κατέλιπον χαρᾶς. 76 Konstan argues that, for Aristotle, χάρις denoted “gratitude”.362 Konstan, interpreting

Aristotle, finds that χάρις needed to occur directly in response to an action to be an emotion, as opposed to a favor. Konstan finds that Aristotle postulates a specific definition for χάρις which suits his own theoretical and rhetorical purposes, but which does not find many parallels within literature.363 Polybius uses χάρις not in a restricted sense as Aristotle advocates, but as a term which often denotes a concrete favor, thanks, grace, as well as gratitude.364 This term, χάρις, functions as a calculated, not felt, sentiment in Polybius’ Histories. “Thanks” can often serve as a fitting translation, but again the reciprocity and calculated, pragmatic nature of χάρις renders it, much like ἔλπις, as not much of an emotion.365

Gentleness

Aristotle defines πρᾳότης as the opposite of anger. Konstan translates πρᾳότης as

“satisfaction” because it thus represents the feeling one experiences after revenge, which

Aristotelian ὀργή necessitates.366 This definition and its translation into English as “satisfaction” relies on the dichotomy Aristotle establishes between opposite emotions and relies on the specificity of his definition of ὀργή. Konstan discusses how this specific concept is found – and not found – in Classical literature. Konstan notes that in ancient Greek literature no uniform definition prevailed, ranging from concepts of gentleness, calm, satisfaction, self-importance, and even confidence. Konstan demonstrates that Aristotle made a forced argument and

362 Arist., Rhet. 2.1385a16-b10. Konstan 2006, 156-184. 363 Konstan 2006, 165. 364 Clearly distinct examples of favor: I.31.6, IV.38.10, IV.51.2, VI.11a.7, IX.29.7, XI.6.3, XII.8.1, XII.25e.3, XV.8.12, XV.21.7, XV.23.2, XV.25.31(23), XVI.14.8, XVI.21.9. XVI.21.12, XX.5.12; gratitude/thanks: II.6.4, II.58.5, III.109.12, III.111.3, V.40.2, V.56.4, V.88.4, V.104.1, VI.6.2, VI.8.2, IX.30.6, IX.35.1, X.34.5, XX.5.11; kindness/grace: II.11.5. See Mauersberger, 3.2.1007-1009, 1016-1022 for full examples of the usage of χάρις and its cognates. 365 A translation closer to the English conception of “thanks,” which can be heartfelt or calculated and polite, is the term εὐχαριστία in Polybius. See Mauersberger, 1.2.1049 for this term and its cognates. 366 Konstan 2006, 77-89. 77 characterized πρᾳότης with the sense “satisfaction” has in English in order to match πρᾳότης as the opposite of ὀργή.367 Instead, Konstan sees πρᾳότης function in Classical literature as a quality which leads to Polybian φιλανθρωπία and Roman clementia.368 Polybius’ usage of

πρᾳότης does not contrast with ὀργή, although it does contrast with behavior guided by

θυμός.369 This term generally denotes a positive trait, demonstrating mildness and clemency.

Πρᾳότης functions more like a dispositional trait than an emotion.370

Polybius’ narrative of the release of Iberian hostages from the Carthaginians to the

Romans’ credit displays the nuances of πρᾳότης.371 After Hannibal departed for his Italian campaign, he left Bostar in charge of the Carthaginian forces at Saguntum, where he also left hostages taken from the Iberian leaders who did not have sons to accompany him to Italy.372 An

Iberian ally serving with Bostar, Abilux, was wealthy, of good repute, and loyal to Carthage, but he saw the Roman successes in Spain and considered their prospects (ἐλπίδες) better than those of the Carthaginians. Polybius comments that Abilux contemplated his betrayal of the

Carthaginians with an Iberian and barbarian rationale (συλλογισμὸν Ἰβηρικὸν καὶ

βαρβαρικόν).373 Because he thinks he will become influential with the Romans if he betrays the Carthaginians, Abilux plots to release the Carthaginians’ Iberian hostages to the credit of

Rome. Abilux observes that Bostar is naturally mild (πρᾷος τῇ φύσει), and so he argues to

Bostar that he should release the Iberian hostages because the Romans are drawing near and because such a release would gain the Carthaginians much-needed goodwill from the Iberians, to

367 Konstan 2006, 77-83. 368 Konstan 2006, 88. 369 Polyb., V.11.3. Philip II did not act τῷ θυμῷ but used the opportunity of his victory at Chaeronea to display his πρᾳότης and μεγαλοψυχία. 370 See Mauersberger, 2.2.659-660. 371 Polyb., III.98-99. 372 Polyb., III.98.1-2. 373 Polyb., III.98.3. 78 which Bostar agrees.374 At this point, Abilux crosses to the Roman camp and makes the same argument: that if Abilux betrayed the Iberian hostages, the Romans would benefit and gain the goodwill of the Iberians and a good reputation.375 The Romans agree, and after Abilux receives the hostages from Bostar, he goes to the Roman camp, receives rewards from them, and then proceeds to the Iberian cities, releasing the hostages in Rome’s name and praising the Romans’ mildness and magnanimity (πρᾳότης καὶ μεγαλοψυχία).376 When the Carthaginians hear of

Abilux’s treachery, Bostar barely escapes with his life, being judged to have acted more naively

(παιδικώτερον) than a man of his age should.377

Throughout this narrative, Abilux both controls events and forms the focus for the passage. Abilux decides to betray the captives for Rome, sees that Bostar is mild and acts on it, and frames the Carthaginians’ and Romans’ decisions with his speeches. Polybius explicitly calls

Abilux’s rationale, treachery, barbaric. This shows his disapproval, and Abilux’s behavior both in becoming a traitor and double-crossing for his own benefit finds other parallels disapproved by Polybius.378 Thus, Polybius implies that Abilux’s considerations and plan should not be emulated, though Abilux seems to have profited at the time. Next, Polybius frames Bostar’s mild disposition through Abilux’s perspective: Abilux sees that Bostar is πρᾷος by nature. This usage of πρᾳότης seems more like a disposition than an emotion, for it implies Bostar is habitually and inherently mild. Moreover, Abilux judges he can take advantage of Bostar beccause he is πρᾷος – naive – by nature. Abilux indeed succeeds in deceiving Bostar, which costs

Bostar dearly: Polybius tells us that the Carthaginians blamed Bostar so much that he almost lost his life. Clearly, having a mild (πρᾷος) disposition can have negative effects.

374 Polyb., III.98.5-11. 375 Polyb., III.99.1-6. 376 Polyb., III.99.7. 377 Polyb., III.99.8. 378 Cf. Polybius’ portrayal of Bolis the Cretan, who betrays Achaeus, VIII.15-20. See too XVIII.13-15. 79 Despite this, Abilux speaks of πρᾳότης as a positive and desirable trait. He boasts of the Romans’ πρᾳότης καὶ μεγαλοψυχία to the Iberians, showing that πρᾳότης was actually the goal of this episode – both the Carthaginians and the Romans wanted to release the hostages to gain such a reputation.379 Moreover, both Bostar and the Romans react in the same way to

Abilux’s similar speeches. Since Bostar’s mild disposition led him to trust Abilux, the Romans too could be said to share this quality in their trust of Abilux. Thus, they both can be characterized as πρᾳότης in a sense: they both acquiesce to Abilux’s arguments and, because of their desire to show πρᾳότης, are both susceptible to whatever outcome he decides.

Thus, πρᾳότης has a complicated role in this passage. Bostar fails and suffers for his

πρᾳότης, but the Romans benefit for their identical decision and their πρᾳότης. In Polybius’ text, πρᾳότης is a desirable and positive trait, but, when one like Abilux takes advantage of it, it can lead to negative results. The Romans, in their mildness, thus present themselves as a potential target through this desirable and honorable trait.

Love

While Konstan includes φιλία in his description of emotions, Polybius did not treat

φιλία as an emotion but as a marker of alliance, or as with a friendly disposition status.380

Konstan does not address ἔρως, which could have provided a useful contrast to Polybius’ rare but charged uses of this terminology.381

Polybius treats ἔρως as an impediment to a statesman. Whenever he mentions the emotion ἔρως or uses the verb ἐρᾶν, it is a sign of undue bias for a historian or a sign of

379 See Polyb., V.11.3 for a parallel case of these two terms linked together as positive traits. 380 Konstan 2006, 169-184. See for Polybius’ use, Mauersberger 3.2.917 and 918-923. 381 Polyb., I.14.2, II.43.3, V.28.5, V.28.8, V.34.10, VII.11.8, VIII.10.4 (in quotation), XII.26.4 (in quotation), XX.8.2, XXIII.5.9, XXXI.23.4-5. 80 depravity and extreme unsuitability for a monarch or citizen.382 Men who fall in love (ἔρασθαι) simultaneously lack good judgment.383 Polybius often links ἔρως with drinking and music.384

Polybius commonly correlates love with drinking to provide evidence of the subject’s bad disposition and character. In this case, the emotion itself becomes inherently negative: Polybius uses ἔρως as evidence for why an individual deserves censure or repudiation.

The most common form of love is ἐρώμενος, the beloved in a homoerotic relationship.

Polybius mentions ἐρώμενοι five times. In all but one of these, the ἐρώμενος reflects the bad habits and character of their lovers. For example, Apelles, the crooked and scheming courtier of

Philip V, finally faces punishment for his plots against Philip and his allies.385 Polybius says that

Philip imprisoned Apelles, his son, and his ἐρώμενος, and that a few days later these lost their lives, as they deserved. Clearly, the ἐρώμενος was implicated and punished just for his association with Apelles.386 Likewise, Polybius extols Scipio Aemilianus’ moderation and prudence as a youth when most young Roman men were engrossed with ἐρώμενοι or hetairai, paying even a whole talent for an ἐρώμενος.387 Associations with an ἐρώμενος reflected poorly on a character.

In all these common usages, the ἐρώμενος is never named. However, in an exceptional usage, Polybius calls Philip V the ἐρώμενος of the Greeks when he was young because of his eager promotion of their interests.388 Polybius qualifies this phrase, saying that it is extravagant

(ὑπερβόλικον) but also most pertinent (οἰκειότατ’) to describe Philip V this way. Unlike his

382 Polyb., I.14.2, V.34.10 (Ptolemy IV), VIII.10.4 (Sardanapalus), XXIII.5.9 (Deinocrates of Messene). 383 Polyb., XII.26.4, XX.8.2. 384 Polyb., V.34.10, VIII.10.4, XX.8.2, XXIII.5.9, XXXI.25.4-5. 385 Polyb., V.28.5-8. 386 Polybius does not specify whether he participated actively in the coup. 387 Polyb., XXXI.25.4-5. 388 Polyb., VII.11.8. 81 other uses of ἐρώμενος, Polybius uses this phrase as a political metaphor to describe as clearly as possible the intensity of the Greeks’ affections for Philip V, and he has to turn to an erotic relationship as a hyperbolic but fitting analogy.

However, this emotional relationship carries additional connotations of power and character. As seen in the other Polybian examples, the ἐρώμενος has little power or agency and is dependent on his lover for political status. Apelles’ ἐρώμενος, for example, has no other identity except his relationship to Apelles, and in this role he is held accountable for and complicit with Apelles’ deeds. By calling Philip the ἐρώμενος of the Greeks, Polybius implicitly transfers this dependence and potentially places him in a position of lower status than them.

Polybius is explicit in using this term as a metaphor; however, that does not necessarily negate the connotations implicit in the term. Polybius’ other examples of ἐρώμενοι, such as Scipio

Aemilianus’ avoidance of them, imply that this relationship between the Greeks and Philip reflects poorly on their dispositions or characters: the Greeks, being too caught up with affection for Philip, may have made mistaken choices due to their infatuation.

This interpretation of this passage contradicts the usual reading.389 In context, these negative connotations counter Polybius’ main point that Philip’s character changed over time from better to worse, under different influences. Philip as the ἐρώμενος of the Greeks was at his best: he heeded the advice of Aratus, Polybius’ hero of the Achaean League, and he took great pains to defend the Greeks and promote their interests against the threats of Aetolians and

Sparta.390 After this, Philip’s character turned for the worse, and he lost the Greeks’ affection.

In this context, the negative connotations of ἐρώμενος and ἔρως in general contradict Polybius’

389 For example, Eckstein 1995, 226-227 uses this passage as indicative of Polybius’ idealization for a monarch, in accordance with Hellenistic norms of kingship. McGing 2010, 161, calls Philip V here “hugely successful.” 390 Aratus has his faults and Polybius does not hide these, but here Polybius is introducing Aratus in a highly favorable and exemplary way. 82 larger point. In calling Philip the Greeks’ ἐρώμενος, he emphasized the esteem and goodwill of the Greeks for Philip, which enhanced Philip’s character. However, understanding the connotations of such erotic terminology and relationship highlights the flawed and shaky foundation of this relationship and both foreshadows the later degeneration of Philip’s character and casts the Greeks’ relationship with Philip in a critical light.391

Polybius provides a contrasting political metaphor of ἔρως. In introducing Aratus, the

Achaean League hero, Polybius says that from the beginning Aratus was an ἐραστής of the

Achaeans’ policy (προαίρεσις).392 This represents the only usage of the term ἐραστής, the lover in a pederastic relationship, in the Histories. Once again Polybius relies upon the intensity and strength of the emotional relationship to elucidate Aratus’ political stance. In this passage,

Polybius does not qualify his term as a metaphor or analogy; Aratus simply is (γεγόναι) an

ἐραστής of the political policy. The direct nature of this relation emphasizes the strength of

Aratus’ ardor for the Achaean League. He acts as an ἐραστής would act to promote the interests of his beloved. As with the metaphor of Philip as an ἐρώμενος, this usage carries political connotations. Aratus holds a position of superiority over the Achaean League as its

ἐραστής. Polybius’ politicized usage of ἐραστής here recalls Thucydides’ politicization of ἔρως in the Funeral Oration of Pericles in Book 2 of his history. Pericles encourages the citizens of

Athens to become ἐραστεῖς of their city, doing whatever needs to be done to win her approval.393 Aratus in Polybius’ text seems to fulfill this Periclean ideal, which, however, provided a failed model in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War.394

391 In fact, the following sections look forward to Philip’s change of character to the worse and the influence of bad advisors. 392 Polyb., II.43.3. 393 Thuc., 2.43.1. Walbank in his Historical Commentary on Polybius does not note this parallel. 394 See Ludwig 2009, 296-298 on Thucydides’ model of failed political love. See also Sissa 2009, 287-292 for political love in Thucydides. 83 4. Reflective Emotions

Reflective emotions, in the restricted sense I am using this term, describe emotions which necessitate reflection on another’s condition. This reflection elicits a response of fellow- feeling. This includes empathy, sympathy, and pity, each of which involve differing degrees of reflection and fellow-feeling. While the Greek terms on which the words “empathy” and

“sympathy” are based do not necessarily correspond to the modern concepts, Polybius does describe reflective emotional processes which relate to the modern emotions.

Sympathy and Empathy

Empathy for Polybius is denoted by the term συμπάθεια.395 The difference between empathy and sympathy is a disputed matter.396 In the Histories, συμπάθεια and its cognates

(συμπαθής, συμπαθεῖν) cover the ground between both of the English concepts of sympathy and empathy. Antiochus III feels what we would call empathy when he sees his rival Achaeus bound and helpless in front of him and reflects on the frailty of human prosperity. Antiochus

III’s tears exhibit his emotional state of empathy.397 In describing Roman customs which preserve virtue, Polybius states that the performance and similarity of those dressed as the deceased at Roman funerals infuse empathy (συμπάθεια) into the whole audience, so much so that the family’s loss seems to become a public loss.398 This instance of συμπάθεια creates a correspondence of feeling and the public’s identification with the family. This passage emphasizes that family and the public are the same here, which is the defining feature of empathy in modern studies.

395 The Greek root for English “empathy,” ἐμπαθεία, emphasizes the zeal or impassioned nature of an action in Polybius and is used only once, XXXI.24.9, when Scipio Africanus expresses how much he wants Polybius to accompany and advise him like his older brother. 396 See Lamm and Silani 2014 for recent discussion in modern social sciences and Stueber 2017 for its use in modern philosophy. See Pinker 2011, 571-593, for a recent assessment of the history of the term and concept of empathy. For discussion based in ancient emotion, see Konstan 2001. 397 Polyb., VIII.20.9. Other instances of empathy: II.56.7, XXVII.9.5. 398 Polyb., VI.53.3. 84 Otherwise, συμπάθεια can range towards the English concept of sympathy.399

Agathocles of Egypt thinks that he has made his mercenaries συμπαθεῖς to none of his predecessors in the Alexandrian court because he alone enlisted and paid them and because he got rid of his previous rivals in one way or another.400 Phylarchus, a Hellenistic historian whom

Polybius criticizes, endeavored so much to make his readers sympathetic to his characters that he provided extreme details of suffering unnecessarily.401 In both of these examples, Agathocles and Phylarchus intended to create emotion in others for themselves and, Polybius implies, failed.

In both circumstances, the intent to create sympathy reflects poorly on these characters.402

However, one could inculcate sympathy to good effect. Polybius states explicitly that Scipio

Africanus was naturally talented at making those he called upon to be sympathetic or good- willed to him and his endeavors.403

A form of empathy, perspective taking, appears in the Histories when Scipio Aemilianus famously sheds tears when viewing the fall of Carthage at the end of the Third Punic War in 146

BC.404 Polybius relates that Scipio Aemilianus, although the conquering general, cried and quoted Homer on the destruction of Troy but referring to his own city, Rome. Scipio’s reflection on the fall of Carthage, similar to Antiochus III’s reflection on his rival Achaeus’ fall from the height of prosperity to ignominious capture, mark Scipio as a good student of history: he reflected on the past fall of Troy, related it to the present circumstance of Carthage, and applied it to his own city of Rome in the future.405 Such perspective taking is part of the process

399 Again, I should stress the lack of clear, agreed distinctions between the two terms in English. 400 Polyb., XV.25.18. 401 Polyb., II.56.7. See Eckstein 2013 and Levene 1997 for further discussion. See too, Chapter 3. 402 Cf. XV.17.1-2 on the importance of genuineness to create emotion. 403 Polyb., X.14.10. This example seems to have less emotional depth than the other examples. 404 Polyb., XXXVIII.22, which is actually preserved in Appian’s Punic Wars, 132. See Maibom, ed. 2017 on definitions and components of empathy. See especially Maibom 2017a and 2017b on defining perspective taking versus other forms of empathy. 405 See Spaulding 2017 for a discussion of the cognitive forms of empathy. 85 of empathy, as defined in modern studies. Scipio’s emotional reaction of crying further exemplifies his empathetic concern.

Pity

Aristotle and Polybius share views on pity, ἔλεος. Aristotle defines pity as a pain elicited from observing genuine suffering.406 He specifies that the subject must be able to relate to the one pitied; the same misfortune must present a potential threat on some level to the subject.

Thus, Aristotle thinks that those who have lost everything cannot feel pity, for they do not

(think that they) have anything to lose. Likewise, those at the height of prosperity cannot feel pity because they think that nothing bad could happen to them. Moreover, one cannot pity those close to one, for then, Konstan interprets, the affect fades from pity to a self-oriented form of sympathy.407 Konstan summarizes Aristotle’s conception well: “to experience pity one has to recognize a resemblance with the sufferer, but at the same time not find oneself in precisely the same circumstances.”408

For Polybius, pity (ἔλεος) correlates closely with Aristotle’s parameters. External observers most often feel pity in the Histories, which aligns with Aristotle’s call for distance between subject and object.409 Polybius’ focalization of pity through an external observer allows the audience, also in the position of external observers, to recognize the similarity between themselves and the sufferers. That is, the observers see the one pitied and, because Polybius establishes them as pitiable, reflect in such a way as to understand how and why the character is pitied.

406 Arist., Rhet. 2.1385b11-20. Konstan 2006, 201. 407 Konstan 2006, 211-213. 408 Konstan 2006, 202. 409 17 out of 39 instances of pity come from an external observer. 86 Ἔλεος is a complex emotion in the Histories, for it is characterized by different and potentially contradictory processes, or scripts.410 Polybius does not resolve the ambiguity of

ἔλεος, pity. Ἔλεος has positive repercussions but also can denote shameful conduct. It is related to ὀργή, μῖσος, αἰσχύνη, and φθόνος.411 Polybius juxtaposes ἔλεος with ὀργή, especially in discussing writers’ aims: they want to arouse ἔλεος or ὀργή, but according to

Polybius, they cannot arouse ἔλεος logically (εὔλόγως) or ὀργή appropriately (καθηκόντως) by their “tragic” means, for these writers do not examine or narrate history’s causes.412 The writers clearly have distance from the events they depict, aligning with Aristotle’s observations about pity. Polybius faults the writers for misunderstanding the rationality behind emotion.

They fail to understand that pity – and anger too – arise for a reason, and so the narration of an event needs to address this reason in some way in order to elicit the emotion. Artificial construction of details alone will not elicit emotion properly.

Like δυσαρεστεῖν, ἔλεος occurs in response to an external situation and another’s condition, which then is reflected back to oneself. The feeling resulting from applying another’s condition to one’s own situation becomes pity. 413 By comparison, ὀργή occurs as a personal feeling, oriented through oneself, and concerning only oneself or one’s community. Recall that, in his discussion of impropriety by conquerors, Polybius explicitly lays out this process: “But whenever their prosperity increases and the victor gathers to himself all the others’ property, and he calls in some way those deprived to a display of these things, the evil is doubled. For no

410 See Kaster 2005, 8-10. 411 ὀργή – II.56.13, IX.10.9-10, XV.17.2; μῖσος – VIII.36.9, IX.10.9-10, XV.17.2; αἰσχύνη – XIV.5.10, XI.10.3. φθόνος – IX.10.7. (With a judgment of happiness or blessedness, μακαρίζειν – III.62-63.) 412 Polyb., II.56.13. On “tragic” historiography, see Marincola 2013, Eckstein 2013, and Schepens and Bollansée, eds. 2005. 413 Not altruistic emotion, but emotion stimulated by another person’s circumstances. 87 longer do the viewers pity the others, but they pity themselves, remembering their own misfortunes.”414 Pitying, in this theory, requires self-reflection.

Polybius qualifies when pity makes an appropriate response. First, when people suffer from no fault of their own, intelligent people pity and pardon them. Otherwise, if some people brought on their own disaster through folly, intelligent people blame and reproach them.415

Polybius distinguishes pity as a response only to undeserved suffering, as opposed to meritted suffering. Later Polybius strengthens this assessment when speaking of courtiers. He specifies that we are moved by pity when we observe someone genuinely overcome by the magnitude of his troubles. However, when someone fakes such suffering in order to elicit pity, which

Polybius often sees courtiers do, we only grow angry and hate him.416 Again Polybius distinguishes pity as appropriate only in response to genuine suffering. However, those who deserve reproach and blame for suffering because of their own folly differ from those who fake their display of suffering: the latter do not necessarily suffer. They err not in the cause of their suffering but in their display. These parameters constrain how appropriate a response pity is.

Others respond with pity only to undeserved suffering, displayed genuinely.

Polybius’ discussion of the Abydenes’ decision to commit mass suicide at the threat of

Philip V’s capture of their city illustrates this point.417 For, Polybius says, one would blame

Fortune over the Abydenes’ misfortune, because Fortune immediately (παραυτίκα) straightens the downfall of those in misfortune, as if pitying them (οἷον ἐλεήσασα), by granting victory together with safety to the hopeless. However, for the Abydenes, Fortune had the opposite

414 Polyb., IX.10.8-9. Ἐπὰν δὲ καὶ προβαίνῃ τὰ τῆς εὐκαιρίας καὶ πάντα συνάγῃ πρὸς αὑτὸν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ταῦτα συγκαλῇ τρόπον τινὰ τοὺς ἐστερημένους ἐπὶ θέαν, διπλάσιον γίνεται τὸ κακόν. Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοὺς πέλας ἐλεεῖν συμβαίνει τοὺς θεωμένους, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς, ἀναμιμνησκομένους τῶν οἰκείων συμπτωμάτων. 415 Polyb., II.7.1-3. 416 Polyb., XV.17.1-2. 417 Polyb., XVI.32. 88 disposition.418 Fortune should have pitied the Abydenes because they did nothing to deserve

Philip V’s attack and siege. Moreover, they took steps to fight against him nobly, and they as a whole decided on the honorable (and thus more preferable) course of mass suicide as opposed to shameful surrender.419 Pity as a response to undeserved and unexaggerated suffering was appropriate for the Abydenes’ situation, although such pity from Fortune failed to materialize in this particular situation.

However, in a different process, pity can also carry connotations of shame. While shame and pity seem to entail opposite judgments of the object – reproach and sympathy –

Polybius uses both to describe the same action, namely, men throwing away their weapons and fleeing while being killed.420 Near the end of the Second Punic War, when Scipio Africanus has set fire to the Carthaginian camp unexpectedly in the night, all the rest of the Carthaginian men and animals in the camp died wretchedly (ἀτυχῶς) and pitifully (ἐλεείνως) from the fire.421

Some of these men dying pitifully also died shamefully (αἰσχρῶς) and full of reproach

(ἐπονειδίστως), trying to escape the fire and being killed, though defenseless, by the enemy.422

The objects do not act nobly, but the situation and misfortune surrounding them genuinely overwhelm them as to cause pity. Living well and honorably to the end – a common Polybian theme involving discussion of αἰσχύνη – has import with the audience and narrator, and so they judge that those men die shamefully in throwing away their arms.423

418 Polyb., XVI.32.5. See too, Polyb., XV.5.10. 419 Later some Abydenes change their minds, supplicating and surrendering to Philip V, XVI.33.4-5. 420 Polyb., XIV.5.10-11, XV.10.3. 421 Polyb., XIV.5.10. 422 Polyb., XIV.5.10-11. αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ μυριάδες ἀνδρῶν, ἵππων, ὑποζυγίων, ἀτυχῶς μὲν καὶ ἐλεεινῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀπώλλυντο: αἰσχρῶς δὲ καὶ ἐπονειδίστως ἔνιοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν, τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς βίαν φεύγοντες, ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων διεφθείροντο, χωρὶς οὐ μόνον τῶν ὅπλων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἱματίων, γυμνοὶ φονευόμενοι. 423 This interpretation seems extremely harsh, even for Polybius, who tends to promote pardon for those caught by circumstances, such as the Carthaginian soldiers were. For this sentiment, see VIII.36 (on Achaeus). 89 Moreover, for an aristocratic male, invoking pity did not receive social approbation.

Scipio Africanus tells his troops before the battle of Zama at the end of the Second Punic War that those who flee battle have the most shameful and most pitiable life left.424 Scipio leaves no room for distinction between these two termsof shame and pity. Falling prey to such circumstances in the first place, and thus becoming pitiable, was considered shameful and dishonorable. Not suffering unforeseen, utterly destructive, and inescapable misfortune also holds import for the audience and narrator, so they also pity those men who have no options but to die one way or another. These sentiments create the multidimensional emotional response of shame and pity.

The Celtic duel displayed for the Carthaginian army before their first encounter with

Romans in Italy provides a narrative of ἔλεος in action.425 Hannibal devises the Celtic duel to have more impact than a mere speech would, and through his speech he leads his soldiers to internalize the reflective process of pity. Polybius is explicit that Hannibal planned this emotional demonstration: Hannibal kept these Celtic prisoners and deliberately malnourished and maltreated them for this purpose.426 Before his first encounter with the Romans in Italy and after his journey across the Alps, Hannibal orchestrated a duel between Celtic prisoners to encourage his soldiers. He set up a lottery for the Celts to see which prisoners would fight, and he set out splendid arms for them to win. After the duel, Polybius narrates that the Celts either deemed happy (μακαρίζειν) the ones winning and the ones dying, and that they pitied (ἤλεον) those continuing to live in such wretched conditions (i.e., themselves).427 Here emotion functions as a judgment: the Celts express their approval and disapproval of others through

424 Polyb., XV.10.3. 425 Polyb., III.62-63. Cf. Liv., 21.40-44. 426 Polyb., III.62. 427 Polyb., III.62.9-10. 90 emotion. Next, Polybius notes that the Carthaginians feel the same way (τὸ παραπλήσιον).428

The observers do not pity the one who dies, but only the ones who live, especially in their maltreated state.429

Now Hannibal, having established the situation as he intended, gives a speech identifying these reactions and applying them as appropriate to their current condition facing battle with the

Romans.430 He says that Fortune brought the Carthaginians to the same predicament as the

Celtic prisoners: they could win or die, or they could become prisoners taken alive.431 The rewards for winning against Rome were higher, for they would become the most fortunate

(μακαριωτάτους) of all people. Dying while fighting over the noblest hope would be to experience no evil, but to survive would be, like the Celtic prisoners, to suffer every evil and misfortune.432 Hannibal rationalizes the Carthaginians’ choice, noting the impossibility of returning home alive after defeat. For, he says, just as all deemed happy (ἐμακάριζον) both the winner and the one dying, and as they all pitied (ἤλεον) the living, they should consider that the same outcome lies before them in their own lives. Therefore, they should go forth to the contest to win or die trying. Hannibal relates his soldiers – if they choose to survive defeat – to the abused Celtic prisoners, whose lives are so miserable that they all wished to be freed from it by death.

In Hannibal’s speech, the emotion is not just external or reflective; the audience who felt those emotions are now in the situation of the other, and they are judged based on their own behavior. Thus, Hannibal himself puts his audience in the situation of those winning, dying, or living in misery, and they are made to feel for themselves what spurred them to deem happy,

428 Polyb., III.62.11. 429 One may criticize Hannibal (and Polybius) of trying to create a “tragic” scene in the manner of Phylarchus. See II.56-61. 430 Polyb., III.63. 431 Polyb, III.63.1-4. 432 Polyb., III.63.4-6. 91 μακαρίζειν, and feel pity, ἐλέειν, for the others. Since they are no longer just exterior judges or bystanders of the situation, the emotions differ slightly: Hannibal describes them as the happiest themselves, μακαριωτάτους, (instead of deeming others happy) or as without any hope, οὐδὲ . . . ἐλπίσαι, which then may be the opposite, internalized, felt form of ἔλεος: others pity those who are in a situation without any hope left for them. This passage demonstrates the emotional mastery by Hannibal (and Polybius for his framing and narrative of it): Hannibal mimics the process of sympathetic emotion with his rhetoric, and carefully planned through his choice to stage the duel in the first place. This, then, is truly successful emotional rhetoric.

Polybius’ text, as we now have it, ends with the Achaean War, which began and ended in

146 BC with the destruction of Corinth, dissolution of the Achaean League, and establishment of a new, Roman-sanctioned constitution.433 Pity features in Polybius’ prelude to his narration of the war itself. Polybius argues that the Greeks in the Achaean War suffered more than any previous Greek disaster and that they both brought it upon themselves and deserved the blame

(or at least those responsible deserved blame). Polybius contrasts the Greek disaster with the concurrent fall of Carthage in the Third Punic War, in which the Romans destroyed the city and the Carthaginian people themselves.434 Polybius states that the suffering of the Carthaginians was thought to be the greatest (μεγίστου πάθους), but he asserts that someone might consider the Greek experience not less but even greater than the Carthaginian disaster.435 For, he explains, the Carthaginians gave posterity some last place for a defense of their resistance, but

433 Book XXXIX apparently covered the reconstruction period of Greece, after their loss, including Polybius’ prominent role in aiding and persuading the Greeks to accept the Roman terms. See Morstein-Marx 1995 on the debated role of Rome in the Achaeans’ governance after the war. 434 Polyb., XXXVIII.1.6. 435 Polyb., XXXVIII.1.4. δοκοῦντος γοῦν μεγίστου πάθους γεγονέναι τοῦ περὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους οὐκ ἔλαττον ἄν τις ἡγήσαιτο, κατὰ δέ τι μεῖζον τὸ περὶ τὴν Ἑλλαδα τότε συμβάν. 92 the Greeks gave no reasonable starting point for those who wish to help them.436 Moreover, the

Carthaginians, being destroyed entirely in their downfall, had no experience of their future ills, but the Greeks looking on their own disaster pass on to future generations an unjustifiable misfortune.437

Polybius lists what to him, and plausibly his audience, thought were the worst Greek disasters – Xerxes’ invasion and destruction of Athens, Athens’ loss to Sparta after the

Peloponnesian Wars, Sparta’s loss to the Thebans after the Battle of Leuctra in 371 BC, the

Spartans’ expulsion of the Mantineans, Alexander’s destruction of Thebes, and Macedon’s

“enslavement” of Chalcis, Corinth, and other cities by the Antigonids.438 In these cases,

Polybius emphasizes the light punishment or (relatively) quick recovery of the sufferers, and he stresses the blame that fell on the victors, or at least the lack of blame for the sufferers.

Moreover, Polybius highlights the advantage of others’ pity for overcoming these misfortunes.

He concludes that these all suffered misfortunes but did not bring disaster on themselves.439

Polybius emphasizes injustice (αδίκως) and undeserved suffering (τὰς τῶν παραλόγως

ἠτυχηκότων περιπετείας) in judgments of pity, whereas he clearly thought that the Greeks brought on their own disaster, but Polybius also stresses that those who survive are pitiable, like

Hannibal’s Celtic prisoners.440 The Greeks thus are more pitiable not only because they suffered more genuinely or undeservedly, but also because they ‘chose’ to survive, similar to the Celtic prisoners. That is, the Greeks’ situation becomes more pitiable because of its inherent shamefulness. These two conflicting ideas demonstrate the complexity of pity in the Achaean

436 Polyb., XXXVIII.1.5. 437 Polyb., XXXVIII.1.6-7. 438 Polyb., XXXVIII.2.1-3.4. 439 Polyb., XXXVIII.3.6-7. Unfortunately, the sections in which Polybius explicitly justifies how and why the Greeks’ loss in the Achaean War was the worst disaster are lacunose, XXXVIII.3.9-13. See Walbank, HCP 3.688. 440 Polybius consistently characterizes their decisions and conduct as thoughtless, ignorant, unreflecting, mistaken, and mad. For some examples, see XXXVIII.3.8-13, XXXVIII.10.12, XXXVIII.11.6, XXXVIII.18.7-8. 93 War: Polybius’ statement aligns with the model of pity from genuine, undeserved suffering, as shown in II.7.1-3 and XV.17.1-2, while Polybius’ argument that the Greeks brought their own disaster and deserve more pity as survivors aligns with the second model of pity, denoting a shameful state of suffering, seen with the Celtic prisoners in III.62-63. Both types of pity arise in Polybius’ argument about the Achaean War.

Conclusion

The categorizations of emotions into groups, and not dichotomies, helps illuminate patterns in the processes of emotions in Polybius’ text. The negative emotions often involve moral evaluation, and they are not necessarily negatively judged. The anticipatory emotions of fear and hope connect common narrative events, especially military affairs. These emotions help explain behavior but not evaluate it on a moral level. Likewise, the positive emotions work in common ways throughout the narrative, denoting the fruition and result of an action. Lastly, the reflective emotions which denote concepts of empathy, sympathy, and pity function similarly to the negative emotions in their role in moral evaluation. Reflective emotions also work to draw the audience, observer, and subject of the emotion in to understand and relate to another in a different situation. Such a process teaches the audience which characters and in which situations pity (and sympathy) deserve to be felt.

Moreover, Polybius complicates Aristotle’s 4th century definitions of emotions. Polybius’ overall usage of emotions shows a sensitivity to their social role: characters feel emotions in response to events and with regard to what they value. Polybius does not use certain concepts at all, such as αἶδος or τὸ νέμεσαν, uses terms without emotional senses, such as φιλία, λύπη, or

πάθος, and rarely mentions other terms, such as ζηλοτυπία. On the other hand, Konstan does not address terms which Polybius does use, sometimes prominently, in an emotional sense, such as θυμός, προσκοπή, ἀγανακτεῖν, δυσαρέστησις, ἔλπις, χαρά, ἔρως, or συμπάθεια.

94 Nevertheless, Aristotle and Polybius use similar terminology as well. They agree in most points in their usage of αἰσχύνη, φόβος, and ἔλεος. They both use ὀργή, μῖσος, φθόνος, χάρις, and

πρᾳότης, but their usages differ. Aristotle’s specificity in his definitions, such as for ὀργή and

πρᾳότης, does not find parallels in Polybius’ more varied use. Likewise, Aristotle’s structuring of pairs of opposite emotions does not find a parallel in Polybius’ usage, whose use of emotions falls into similar categories rather than precise dichotomies.

These differences in terminology highlight two factors: genre and time. First, Aristotle established his list of emotions in a philosophical treatise on the art of rhetoric. He set them as a guide for which emotions an orator should try to elicit in certain situations. This philosophical- rhetorical purpose differs greatly from Polybius’ dual historiographical purpose of portraying events realistically and of educating future statesmen about typical human behavior through past events. Polybius recorded each instance of emotion as he thought suitable and plausible within the historical narrative. Second, the difference in time and context between Aristotle and

Polybius influences their usage of terminology. Aristotle, already archaic in his usage of some terms, addressed terms which suited his audience in the late Classical period. Polybius, however, wrote in the second century B.C, when the ordinary usages and nuances of terms probably differed from Classical uses.441 Konstan’s analysis of Aristotle in the context of Classical Greek literature provided a basis for comparison for Polybius’ use of terminology and concepts in his

Hellenistic history. Comparison helps to ground Polybius’ use of emotions in a Hellenistic context - as compared to a purely cross-cultural analysis in comparison with emotions in

English.

The survey highlights the frequency and usages of emotional terms in the Histories, and provides a basis for examining the key role of emotions in significant passages. Through such

441 See Dubuisson 1985 on the particulars of Polybius’ language and grammatical constructs. 95 an overview one can observe the variation of usages of emotion and their importance for portraying events and characters in specific ways. It should be clear that, for Polybius, all emotions do not fall solely on the irrational, impulsive, and negative side of a dichotomy with reason and civilized virtues. Relatedly, a whole range of characters feel the same kinds of emotions, not just stereotypes of “hyperemotional” barbarians, women, and masses. All characters in the Histories are subject to feeling emotion; how they react to emotion differentiates them. Polybius’ favorites, such as the sensible statesmen and generals Aratus, Hannibal, and

Scipio Africanus, show emotional intelligence in both senses of the popular phrase: they most often show emotional awareness of their own emotions, by reacting appropriately and sensibly to their own emotion, and they both navigate and manipulate others’ emotions for their own benefit.442 Characters who do not demonstrate such emotional awareness (usually of their own emotions, let alone those of others), such as Philip V, receive Polybius’ disapprobation.

Collective groups often feel emotion too, a fact that neither Aristotle nor Konstan addresses at length, and a topic which we shall address in the next chapter.

442 See Goleman 1995, and Bradberry and Greaves 2009, for accounts of the popular concept of “emotional intelligence.” 96 Chapter 3

The People’s Moral Emotions: Internal State Change

This chapter moves to an investigation of combined hate, anger, and indignation from our investigation of the individual emotions. These emotions together demonstrate that emotions can be rational, through their close connection with morality.

Rationality has traditionally been juxtaposed with emotion, both in ancient philosophy and in modern preconceptions. Ancient philosophies often identify emotion with a lesser part of the soul than the rational part. Plato’s theory of a tripartite soul places the emotions within the middle part, which can either follow reason or desire.443 This theory of the place of emotion at least acknowledges that emotions could align with rationality. However, as we shall see, Plato does not correlate emotion with reason or with positive results in his constitutional theory.

Likewise, the Hellenistic philosophies of Epicureanism and Stoicism took emotion to be an element to control or repress, whereas reason represented the highest element of a human.444

While this brief summary necessarily overlooks many significant details of these theories, the dichotomy between reason and emotion has loomed large in both ancient thought and in scholarship on the ancient world.

Only in the last few decades have scholars explored and elucidated the close connections between emotion and reason. Namely, Patricia Greenspan’s 1988 work, Reason and Emotion, provides a philosophical defense of how emotions are rationally justified. The highly influential work of Antonio Damasio, especially his 1994 book, Descartes’ Error, provides neuroscientific evidence for the importance of emotion on reason and vice versa. More recently, scholars have

443 See Knuuttila 2004, especially Ch. 1.1-1.3, on Plato’s division of the soul and how it affects his theory on emotions. 444 For the study of emotion in Hellenistic philosophy (and their relations to Plato and Aristotle), see the essays in three edited volumes: Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen 1998, Cooper 1999, and Fitzgerald 2008. 97 debated the exact moral nature of emotions.445 I show that these modern topics of emotion and rationality and of emotion and morality find an ancient analog in Polybius’ Histories.446

Polybius’ reputation for pragmatism can obscure the implications of his thought, especially regarding emotion, but we should not let his genre of history constrain our exploration of this issue. In writing history instead of philosophy, Polybius provides us with a unique perspective on emotion: how emotion works or seems to work in typical human behavior. In his theory of typical human behavior and state formation, Polybius presents human emotion as working together with reason to distinguish humans from animals, developing coextensively with a sense of morality, and creating a sense of community out of formerly unrelated individuals. In his narrative, Polybius provides a glimpse into how rational and moral emotions shape the course of historical events.

For this chapter, I focus on the three emotions of indignation (δυσαρέστησις, τὸ

ἀγανακτεῖν, προσκοπή), hatred (μῖσος), and anger (ὀργή). These three emotions combine to exemplify rational and moral values, and they are important in three other ways. First, indignation, hatred, and anger combine significantly. These emotions appear most frequently together of all the emotions in the Histories. In the passage of the cycle of constitutions in VI.5-9 and 57, anger, hate and indignation occur 14 times, while in the discussion of Agathocles’ downfall in XV.25-33, they occur 13 times. This makes up 12.8% of the total number of occurrences of these three types of emotion throughout the entire Histories. For comparison,

445 See, for example, D’Arms and Jacobson 2000, Helm 2001, and Prinz 2007. 446 It is paradoxical because Polybius did not self-consciously fashion a coherent theory of how emotions work. He recorded his view of normative human behavior, including emotions. His work is not a philosophical treatise or sociological study, as the modern studies which parallel his observations are. 98 any other combination of any of these three emotions with any other emotion whatsoever through the rest of the Histories makes 8.8% of the total occurrences of these three emotions.447

Second, their combination causes internal change in states. Polybius sets up his theory of human behavior and state formation as a theory of how states change and explicitly decline, internally, without external influences. These three emotions both identify decline and motivate change. Third, these combined emotions are felt by a collective. In my first chapter, I mentioned that Polybius does not seem to portray group or collective emotion differently from how individuals feel emotion. Unlike modern studies on emotion, Polybius seems unconcerned about how exactly a group can feel the same exact emotion, much as he seems unconcerned about how a group entity can intend, or have a common mind.448 However, in Polybius’ theory and narrative, who exactly constitutes the collective group is important: the people (whether ὁ

δῆμος, οἱ πολλοί, τὸ πλῆθος, or even πάντες). The people feel anger, hate, and indignation, which have rational and moral foundations. Through their collective emotions, as we shall see, the people are not inherently condemned as worthless for politics or denigrated as irrational.449

Rather, as a community, they value social morality over self-interest. Nevertheless, the ruling

447 Per emotion, these two passages in VI and XV make up 8.5% of the total occurrences of anger, 20.5% of the total occurrences of hatred, and 13.4% of the total occurrences of indignation. I.e., 12.8% of the anger, hate, and indignation in the Histories occur in VI.5-9 and 57 and XV.25-33, while 8.8% of the anger, hate, and indignation in the rest of the Histories occur with another emotion.) Thus, VI.5-9 and 57 and XV.25-33 present a majority of the combined anger, hatred, and indignation of the work (59.2% of the combined anger, hatred, and indignation with any emotion. The passages with the closest amount of anger, hatred, and/or indignation combined are: 5 occurrences: XXX.29 (on Callicrates), and V.42-50 (on Hermeias); 4 occurrences: I.67-69 (mercenaries in Mercenary War) – only anger, XI.28 (Scipio’s speech to the mutineers) – only indignation; and XXI.29-31 (Embassy to ask off Roman anger against Aetolians) – only anger; 3 occurrences: IX.10 (on Syracuse) – plus pity and ill will, XV.17 (on eliciting pity) – plus pity, XXXI.31 (Astymedes’ speech to the Roman Senate) – only anger. Through this comparison to the next highest groupings of anger, hatred, and/or indignation, the 14 occurrences in VI.5-9 and the 13 occurrences in XV.25-33 are remarkable. The length of these two passages may explain the great difference between them and the next highest occurrences (5), but nevertheless, no other passage even in extension comes close. See Erskine 2015 addresses XXI.29-31 and XXX.31on Roman anger. 448 These are some of the most recent issues in modern emotion studies. For studies directly on collective emotions, see Konzelmann Ziv 2009, Salmela 2012, and von Scheve and Salmela, eds. 2014. On issues of group responsibility, intentionality, guilt, and mind, see Gilbert 2000; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, eds. 2001; Flam and King, eds. 2005; Tollefsen 2006; Tuomela 2007; Schmid 2009; Smiley 2011; Schweikard and Schmid, 2013; von Scheve 2013. 449 As is the general observation in Polybian studies. See especially Eckstein 1995, 129-140, and Walbank 1995. 99 power can corrupt this communal unity and cause the people too to degenerate. Lastly, these communal, combined emotions create positive change within the state. The people preserve social morality, seen in their negative emotional reactions to rulers’ excesses, and tend to act as a catalyst for positive social and political change.

In this chapter, I analyze two major passages of internal state change caused by emotions. The first is Polybius’ famous cycle of constitutions, or anacyclosis, in Book VI. Here two different but intimately linked processes of collective emotion are at work: humans develop morals and a sense of community first through emotions, and then these same emotions and the social values they uphold create the dynamic changes of the anacyclosis itself. The second major passage comes in Book XV with the downfall of Agathocles’ regime in Ptolemaic Egypt. This passage provides a crucial historical narrative by which we can view the emotional processes found in the anacyclosis at work.

Part I: Anacyclosis

Polybius highlights Book VI as the much-awaited discussion of the politeia, or political system, of Rome in the context of Greek political theory. While this fragmentary Book contains much on Roman institutions such as military camps, funeral orations, and religious scruples, along with comparison to other states’ constitutions, the extant text begins with a theory of how states change from one constitution to another and revolve back in a cyclical manner, called the anacyclosis.450 Polybius’ anacyclosis provides a theoretical model for internal changes of politeia in a hermetically sealed state. For the state Polybius sets up in VI.5-9 has no neighbors, no foreign relations, nor any other external influences and factors to manage. It only has internal

450 This discussion is referred to specifically at III.2.6, III.118.12, and V.111.10. Some recent works at least partially on the sixth book include: Eckstein 1995, esp. ch. 7-8; Hahm 1995; Blöser 1998; Walbank 1995, 1998; Lintott 1999, 23-26, 218; Williams 2000; Champion 2004a; Candau Morón 2005; Zecchini 2006; McGing 2010, 171-177; Baronowski 2011, esp. ch. 8-9; Longley 2012; Erskine 2013; Seager 2013; Thornton 2013. Scholarship on the anacyclosis specifically: Ryffel 1949; Cole 1964; Podes 1991; Hahm 1995; Blöser 1998; Walbank 1998; Williams 2000. 100 factors, and thus Polybius is able to illuminate the changes inherent in it by nature, as Polybius explains with an analogy to rust and woodworms:

“For just as rust is an inborn evil to iron, and woodworms and termites to wood, even if the iron and wood should escape from all external evils, they are destroyed through the rust and woodworms inherent in their natures, so in the same way some evil is born in each of the state forms and pursues it: tyranny for kingship, oligarchy for aristocracy, and animalistic ochlocracy for democracy. It is impossible for all this not to change in this way over time.”451

Within the anacyclosis Polybius provides two key emotional processes. The first traces how emotions stimulate the formation of social norms and the human community itself. The second provides theoretical examples of how Polybius envisioned the process of dynamic change between different rules and state forms within an isolated state. These changes hinge upon the people’s emotions. According to Polybius, since social morality underlies both the people’s emotional reactions and demonstrates rationality, the people’s anger, hatred, and indignation paradoxically align with rationality, a point which sets Polybius’ political theory apart from his Greek philosophical predecessors on constitutional change. In addition, the people’s emotional reactions trigger changes of state forms. They signal the degeneration to a worse state form, stimulate the destruction of that worse form, and both cause and direct the creation of a better state form.

Modern scholars have often disparaged Polybius’ theory.452 Polybius, according to most of these views, could not reconcile a cyclical pattern, a biological pattern, and the theory of the

451 Polyb., VI.10-3-5. Καθάπερ γὰρ σιδήρῳ μὲν ἰός, ξύλοις δὲ θρῖπες καὶ τερηδόνες συμϕυεῖς εἰσι λῦμαι, δι' ὧν, κἂν πάσας τὰς ἔξωθεν διαϕύγωσι βλάβας, ὑπ' αὐτῶν ϕθείρονται τῶν συγγενομένων, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν συγγεννᾶται κατὰ ϕύσιν ἑκάστῃ καὶ παρέπεταί τις κακία, βασιλείᾳ μὲν ὁ μοναρχικὸς λεγόμενος τρόπος, ἀριστοκρατίᾳ δ' ὁ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, δημοκρατίᾳ δ' ὁ θηριώδης καὶ χειροκρατικός, εἰς οὓς οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ οὐ πάντα τὰ προειρημένα σὺν χρόνῳ ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταστάσεις κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον. 452 Brink and Walbank 1954, 97: “It is in many respects a failure.” Von Fritz 1954, 67: “The cycle theory . . . presented by Polybius is anything but profound. It is a gross oversimplification.” Cole 1964, 456; Momigliano 1969, 27: this section “is a big digression.” 101 more stable mixed constitution.453 David Hahm, however, has offered the most recent substantial contribution to the analysis of the anacyclosis.454 Particularly, he identified heredity as what begins the process of decline.455 While Hahm persuasively analyzes the beginning impetus for change to the worse, he stops short of analyzing the rest of the process of state change in such detail.456 My analysis, in seeking to lay out how the people’s rational emotions change the state for the better, supplements Hahm’s observations.

Two different cycles exist in the anacyclosis: the larger overall cycle progresses through all seven forms (namely, primitive monarchy, kingship, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, ochlocracy, and back to primitive monarchy), and the inner three cycles cycle from good to bad within the types of rule: rule by one, by few, or by all.457

Polybius begins the anacyclosis narrative with a clean slate of the world and human race, after some massive disaster.458 Humans first gather into herds like animals and follow a bold, courageous, and strong leader, called by scholars the primitive monarch.459 When humans have congregated, the development of social values occurs. After this system of social behavioral standards develops, the primitive monarch begins to take heed in his leadership of the society’s

453 Walbank 1943, 74; Brink and Walbank, 102, 115. Frank Walbank in particular focuses on what he identifies as the two questions of Book Six: how Rome was so successful and how states decline. He concludes that Polybius was uninterested in decline. See also Walbank 1980, 50; Alonso-Núñez 1986, 22. 454 Hahm 1995. 455 Hahm 1995., 22-28. While Hahm analyzes this aspect of the anacyclosis in greater detail, Ryffel 1949, 190-195, places great importance in the generational aspect of the anacyclosis as well. 456 After a crisis of inheritance, the rulers turn to desires, which Williams, esp. 131-136, describes as a sign and symptom of wealth. According to her, wealth underlies all moral degeneration, even where Polybius does not mention wealth at all. 457 Erskine 2013, 240, calls the anacyclosis a “chaotic cycle” in contrast to the “stability and clear divisions of responsibilities” in the Roman constitution. See Hahm 1995, 13-15, for a logical explanation of this cyclical and biological system. 458 Polyb., VI.5.5-6. Ryffel, 191-192, notes the strong parallelisms with Plato in the beginning of human society from disaster to herds to civilization. Particularly, cf. Pl., Protag. 320c8-322d5. However, in the Protagoras, the myth notably attributes the development of justice to Zeus, rather than to natural human development and reason, as Polybius does. 459 Polyb., VI.5.7-9; Walbank, e.g., uses the term ‘primitive monarch’ for this leader consistently. Polybius does not give him a title but describes that the strongest and most daring takes the lead (τοῦτον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ κρατεῖν ), VI.5.7. 102 new moral standards.460 As this happens, the aims, benefits, and morals coalesce between the ruler and the people, which distinguishes kingship from primitive monarchy: “Kingship comes into being surreptitiously from monarchy whenever reason (logismos) takes over the leadership in place of bravery and strength.”461 The kings rule by rational thought instead of brute force and use their power to improve public affairs.462

Through the three inner cycles of constitutions, the processes of dynamic change occur in very similar ways. The good forms – kingship, aristocracy, and democracy – are governed for the good of the subjects.463 The constitutions begin to change to the worse forms – that is, tyranny, oligarchy, and ochlocracy, respectively – when new rulers without experience inherit power.464 Heredity and bad upbringing often emerge in Aristotle and Plato’s works as causal factors for decline, especially in tyranny.465 Aristotle notes how easy it was to despise hereditary kingships and therefore how much easier it was for faction to develop.466 Plato attributes to new rulers the need to differentiate their lives from their fathers’.467 Heredity in Polybius’ narrative also accounts for the beginning of dynamic change.468 Then the rulers turn to fulfilling their personal desires. Desires contribute largely to the downfall of rulers and state forms in Greek

460 Polyb., VI.6.10. 461 Polyb., VI.6.12. “βασιλεὺς ἐκ μονάρχου λανθάνει γενόμενος, ὅταν παρὰ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἰσχύος μεταλάβῃ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ὁ λογισμός.” Hahm 1995, 19; 2000, 468. βασιλεία is a change in relations to a “shared conception of ‘what is just and admirable’.” 462 Polyb., VI.7.1-5. VI.7.3: The people “ποιοῦνται μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων καὶ βασιλείων οὐκέτι κατὰ τὰς σωματικὰς καὶ θυμικὰς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς τῆς γνώμης καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαφοράς.” 463 Polyb., VI.7.4, 8.3, 9.4. 464 Polyb., VI.7.6, 8.4, 9.5. Hahm 1995, 22-28. 465 On heredity, see Arist., Pol. 4.1292 a39f., 1313 a10-1316 a16, who states that power from heredity is easiest to despise, and so quickest to be overthrown. See Champion 2004a, 88-89; Hahm 1995, 22-28; McGing 2010, 173. On bad upbringing as a key to bad rule, see Plato, Leg. 3.694d, 695e. 466 Arist., Pol. 5.1313 a10f. Polybius writes a narrative of decline into tyranny, not a philosophical treatise with fuller explanation of a theory like Aristotle or Plato, much to modern scholars’ discontent (von Fritz, Cole, Alonso- Núñez). In doing so Polybius gives the causal chain of events, often without explanation. See Hahm 2000, 462, with detailed references to scholarship on philosophical sources. 467 Pl., Rep. 8.545-546, 550d-551a, 555-557, 562e-563b. 468 Hahm 1995, 22-28. 103 philosophy.469 They represent abandonment of the public welfare for private advantage.470 In tyranny and oligarchy, the people react with hatred, anger, indignation, and resentment to the bad rulers’ private indulgences. This reaction destroys the bad constitutional form and establishes a good form of a new type of rule: aristocracy after tyranny and democracy after oligarchy. The last state in the cycle, that of democracy’s perversion into ochlocracy, or mob rule, leads to the complete dissolution of the state.471 After that, the people rediscover a primitive monarch, and presumably the larger cycle restarts.472

The Emotions in the Development of Social Norms

In the development of human society emotion acts as the catalyst for human distinction from the ways of the animal flocks.473 Emotion creates the first identification of individuals with others, stimulating group formation. Through emotion, humans form a set of social norms, which define and solidify group identity into a community and later a state.

Polybius gives three examples of how morals develop: that of a disrespectful child, a harmed benefactor, and a rewarded public protector.474 In all three, Polybius focalizes the narrative through the bystanders. The moral conceptions of τὸ καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, what is good and just, develop in the people through these examples, for Polybius begins by stating:

469 For the role of desires as central to the downfall of the ruler, see Pl. Plt., 301 b10; Rep. 8.562d-e; Leg. 3.691A, 695b, 701b; Arist. Pol., 5.1310 b40f. 470 Polyb., VI.7.3. See Arist., Pol. 3.7.1279 b3-b10, Eth. Nic. 8.1160 b2-11, on how a tyrants looks to his own good, but a king looks to his subjects’ good. See too, Champion 2004a, 88-99; Hahm 1995, 16ff. 471 The term ‘ochlocracy’ is generally used by scholars to refer to the degenerate form of democracy in the anacyclosis. Polybius does not use the term ὀχλοκρατία in this section itself, but he does call degenerate democracy ochlocracy in the summary at VI.4.6 and .10, as well as the degenerate mixed constitution this at VI.57.9. In this section, at VI.9.7, Polybius says that the state turned “εἰς βίαν καὶ χειροκρατίαν.” For the purpose of clarity, I use the term “ochlocracy” to refer to the degenerate form of democracy in the anacyclosis. 472 Polyb., VI.9.9. 473 Polyb., VI.6.1-9 and VI.5.4-10, respectively. 474 Hahm 1995, 20, reduces these examples to an ethics based on reciprocity of benefit. 104 “And then for the first time a notion of good and justice came to humans, and likewise a notion of their opposites.”475

Polybius continues his explanation:

“For, whenever a child who has reached its prime does not show gratitude nor gives protection to those by whom it was brought up, but on the contrary undertakes in some way to speak badly or act badly against them, it seems clear that those who live near, witnessing the parents’ care and sufferings on behalf of their children and their attention and nourishing of them, take offense and are indignant (δυσαρεστεῖν καὶ προσκόπτειν).”476

In this passage Polybius focuses on the negative emotional reactions of indignation and offense

(δυσαρεστεῖν καὶ προσκόπτειν). So far, people have behaved like beasts: they follow a strong leader for their own protection, and they are naturally inclined to have sex. Now they recognize harm to someone else and think that it is not right. Emotion, indignation at harm to another, is the mechanism by which humans recognize and are impelled to pursue what is good and just in society. Whereas they may have thought it wrong for themselves to suffer harm before, now they extend this moral notion of right and wrong to others. For Polybius, emotion both reflects and gives birth to a concept of justice.477 The child’s lack of respect stimulate the bystanders to judge good and bad treatment implicitly based on what Hahm calls a “reciprocity of benefit;” that is, the bystanders expect the children to give reciprocal gratitude in return for the parents’ care of them.478

Polybius then explains the bystanders’ reaction:

475 Polyb., VI.5.10. “καὶ τότε πρώτως ἔννοια γίνεται τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις.” von Fritz, 55, calls τὸ καλὸν καὶ δικαίον “enlightened self-interest.” 476 Polyb., VI.6.2-3. “ὁπότε τις τῶν ἐκτραφέντων εἰς ἡλικίαν ἱκόμενος μὴ νέμοι χάριν μηδ’ ἀμύναι τούτοις οἷς ἐκτρέφοιτ’, ἀλλά που τἀναντία κακῶς λέγειν ἢ δρᾶν τούτους ἐγχειροίη, δῆλον ὡς δυσαρεστεῖν καὶ προσκόπτειν εἰκὸς τοὺς συνόντας καὶ συνιδόντας τὴν γεγενημένην ἐκ τῶν γεννησάντων ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ κακοπάθειαν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὴν τούτων θεραπείαν καὶ τροφήν.” 477 The observers theoretically already have some sense of justice – that harming one’s benefactor is inherently wrong, but Polybius does not draw back to this level; he goes back only to the level of emotion to explain why people do not like others to harm their benefactor. In this explanation, grounded in human behavior and narrative, Polybius neatly avoids the philosophical complexities of a notion of justice. 478 Hahm 1995, 21. 105 “For, since humankind differs from the other animals in that they alone partake in thought and rationality (νοῦ καὶ λογισμοῦ), it is clear that they probably do not pass over the aforementioned difference [in treatment], just as among the other animals, but that they take notice of what happened and take offense (δυσαρεστεῖσθαι) at those present, foreseeing and considering that a very similar thing would happen to each of them.”479

Polybius correlates rationality (λογισμός) with humans’ ability for reflection and predictive application to their own potential situations.480 Because the bystanders can reflect and reapply a situation to themselves, humans are developing social and moral sensibilities. For Polybius, this rational ability to reflect governs their reactions of sympathy and indignation.

The second example leads to the development of duty and a sense of justice.

“And indeed whenever one man, who received assistance or aid from another in terrible situations failed to give thanks to his rescuer, but even undertook to harm this man at some time, it seems clear that those who saw this would take offense and be indignant (δυσαρεστεῖσθαι καὶ προσκόπτειν) with such a man, feeling sympathy (συναγανακτοῦντας) for their neighbor, and considering something similar in their own cases.”481

Once again, onlookers reflect on the situation, apply it in their minds to themselves, and feel indignation (δυσαρεστεῖσθαι καὶ προσκόπτειν) and sympathy (συναγανακτοῦντας). Even these reflective and sympathetic emotions are at heart personal, and not altruistic. Emotions distinguish what one cares about or what one values, and therefore demarcate personal valuation. However, by feeling emotions for others in the same group, these individuals greatly

479 Polyb., VI.6.4. “Τοῦ γὰρ γένους τῶν ανθρώπων ταύτῃ διαφέροντος τὼν ἄλλων ζῴων ᾗ μόνοις αὐτοῖς μέτεστι νοῦ καὶ λογισμοῦ, φανερὸν ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς παρατρέχειν αὐτοὺς τὴν προειρημένην διαφορὰν καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ἀλλ΄ ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τὸ γινόμενον καὶ δυσαρεστεῖσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι, προορωμένους τὸ μέλλον καὶ συλλογιζομένους ὅτι τὸ παραπλήσιον ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν συγκυρήσει.” Polybius’ verb of “considering,” συλλογιζομένους, demonstrates the rational nature of humans, as a cognate of λογισμός. See Champion 2004a, 258. 480 This correlates with Champion’s observations that the most frequent usage of λογισμός in the Histories is what he defines as “reasoned reflection and consideration,” 2004a, 256-257. Throughout, my use of the term ‘rationality’ aligns with both Polybius’ and Champion’s observations of this term, especially in the above definition and usage. 481 Polyb., VI.6.6. “καὶ μὴν ὅταν που πάλιν ἅτερος ὑπὸ θατέρου τυχὼν ἐπικουρίας ἢ βοηθείας ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς μὴ νέμῃ τῷ σώσαντι χάριν ἀλλά ποτε καὶ βλάπτειν ἐγχειρῇ τοῦτον, φανερὸν ὡς εἰκὸς τῷ τοιούτῳ δυσαρεστεῖσθαι καὶ προσκόπτειν τοὺς εἰδότας, συναγανακτοῦντας μὲν τῷ πέλας, ἀναφέροντας δ’ ἐφ’ αὑτοὺς τὸ παραπλήσιον.” 106 increase their self-identification with the others as a group and contribute greatly to the actual formation of this community, even if such a group did not exist before their shared emotions.482

Polybius explains the significance of this example next: “From these [circumstances] some notion of the meaning of duty (τοῦ καθήκοντος) comes about for everyone: this is the foundation of justice.”483 Community and the common good play a larger role through this example, as both are benefited. At this point Polybius is stressing the development of a sense of community rather than power-oriented reciprocity, so it is more important that the savior here and in the next example decide to help others, taking into their consideration the good of the community over their own personal good.484 The development of the social values of duty and justice represent a greater cognizance of the common good and the importance of the wider community: people care about others.

Third, Polybius gives an example of an experience actually acted upon by bystanders.

“Likewise in turn, whenever someone gives protection for everyone in terrible situations, and he withstands and halts the attacks of the fiercest animals, on the one hand it is likely that such a man meets with signs of goodwill and honor from the multitude, but on the other that one who does the opposite to him meets with condemnation and indignation.”485

In this example, the people create through their reactions a system by which they decide whom to punish or reward.486 This takes one step closer to a political state, with a system of rewards

482 As found in modern studies of emotion: Helm 2014; Kelly, Iannone, and McCarthy 2014, 180-181; Krueger 2014, 156-159. 483 Polyb., VI.6.7. “Ἐξ ὧν ὑπογίνεταί τις ἔννοια παρ’ ἑκάστῳ τῆς τοῦ καθήκοντος δυνάμεως καὶ θεωρίας · ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος δικαιοσύνης.” 484 In all other examples, the two people or groups exist in a relationship based on an imbalance in power: one of them is obligated to show gratitude to the more powerful. 485 Polyb., VI.6.8. “Ὁμοίως πάλιν, ὅταν ἀμύνῃ μέν τις πρὸ πάντων ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς, ὑφιστῆται δὲ καὶ μένῃ τὰς ἐπιφορὰς τῶν ἀλκιμωτάτων ζῴων, εἰκὸς μὲν τὸν τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἐπισημασίας τυγχάνειν εὐνοϊκῆς καὶ προστατικῆς, τὸν δὲ τἀναντία τούτῳ πράττοντα καταγνώσεως καὶ προσκοπῆς.” 486 See also Polyb., VI.14.4, where he stresses the importance of rewards and punishments for a state in his discussion of the people’s role in the Roman politieia: “for in the state the People (ὁ δῆμος) alone has control over honor and punishment: by only these are dynasties, states, and in a word the whole of human activity held together.”. Τιμῆς γάρ ἐστι καὶ τιμωρίας ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ μόνος ὁ δῆμος κύριος, οἷς συνέχονται μόνοις καὶ δυναστεῖαι καὶ πολιτεῖαι καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶς ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος. 107 and punishments.487 In the anacyclosis’ proto-state, the people choose willingly to support the primitive monarch, thus moving beyond the realm of power as only brute force. Polybius qualifies this example: “From this in turn, a certain reasonable theory of shame, good conduct, and of the difference between them formed in the people, and the one was followed with eagerness and imitation because of its advantage, and the other was shunned.”488 Communal interest becomes the measure for imitation and likewise for reward. What is beneficial, τὸ

συμφέρον, determines the system of social behavior – what behavior to imitate or shun.

The good of the community in this example is privileged over the good of the individual, at least in the sense of personal safety and self-interest (personal gain). Through this example

Polybius describes the development of a crucial cultural virtue: putting the good of the country

– here the community of other humans – above one’s own personal concerns. Moreover, we see communal good encompassing personal benefit: those who behave this way receive praise and honor, certainly forms of personal benefit.489 Since they receive this praise and honor for prioritizing the common good, their personal benefit falls within the common good. That is, they

487 Walbank 1972, 26, says τὸ πλῆθος, as used in this episode, VI.6.8, exemplifies the political public of a democratic state. Walbank 1995, 203, writes “the people – οἱ πολλοί, ὁ ὄχλος, or ὁ δῆμος – do not normally assume the initiative.” He adds, 214, “[t]hey are there to be played on, easily swayed, liable to lawless passions, irrational rage and violent anger.” However, while Walbank here focuses on the role of the Roman people specifically and gives examples of terms other than τὸ πλῆθος, his comments nonetheless may be (or not, see below) pertinent to the anacyclosis. In this passage, these comments describe the exact opposite of the situation of people Polybius describes, who take heed, follow reason, take action, but do not overreact in their distribution of merits. Compare where Walbank 1998, 49, comments concerning the anacyclosis itself: “In each case it is the people who overthrow the corrupt rulers and then hand over power” and adds that “the social base is always ‘the people’ and the circumstances leading to the violent change are of a moral nature, namely corruption in the rulers, which arises naturally” (p. 281). Thus he notes the social and moral importance of the people, although he does not identify or analyze how it is their emotions which paradoxically reflect morality and rationality. 488 Polyb., VI.6.9. “Ἐξ οὗ πάλιν εὔλογον ὑπογίνεσθαί τινα θεωρίαν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχροῦ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ τῆς τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφορᾶς, καὶ τὸ μὲν ζήλου καὶ μιμήσεως τυγχάνειν διὰ τὸ συμφέρον, τὸ δὲ φυγῆς.” 489 See Morstein-Marx 2009, 117-122, on this pattern within Roman Republican culture. On p. 122 his discussion of the bene meritus in Roman terms parallels Polybius’ description of the savior in this passage: the phrases “bene meritus in rem publicam (“one who has served the state well”) and bene meritus de re publica (“one who has earned the gratitude of the state”) . . . refer to the same kind of man and the same kind of actions, but the former stresses his services to the community and the latter emphasizes the debt the community owes him as a consequence of those very actions.” So too the protector receives praise and serves the state all at once, though the Polybian terminology does not reflect this as subtly as the Latin. 108 cannot achieve this particular valued kind of personal gain without aiding the community’s interests. We see this form of meritocratic and patriotic virtue throughout the Histories, but

Polybius singles out how Romans perfected the institutionalization of this form of virtue.490

Although τὸ συμφέρον is often opposed to τὸ καλὸν, a meaning of “expediency” or pure self-interest rather than moral right is out of place here in Polybius’ theory, for the example to be emulated for its ‘advantage’ involves great personal risk – coming head to head with the attacks of the fiercest beasts on others’ behalf. Τὸ συμφέρον makes much more sense as

“beneficial” on a wider, more communal scale of advantage. The common good triumphs over pure self-interest. Τὸ συμφέρον contributes to the communal benefit of the community by safeguarding its interests, which include the interest of its individual members.491 Those reflecting back onto their own situations do so at this point as a member of the community: they are considering what would happen to them in such a situation if the group did not uphold and reaffirm its values and standards.492

These values, the public good and the system of acceptable social behavior, constitute the development of moral principles in the people. What is more, these principles and social standards are the indications of humans’ rationality (νοῦς καὶ λογισμός).493 Indignation or sympathy towards others demonstrates that the people possess and use their notions of what is right and just. Through reacting emotionally in adherence with their social values, humans

490 See Polyb., VI.52-55 on the Roman funeral and the example of Horatius Cocles. Polybius tells how Horatius Cocles, a young Roman nobleman, faced enemy attacks in order to preserve the state and disallow them to cross the bridge into Rome. Horatius dies facing the enemy “counting the safety of his country and the glory to come about this exploit of his of more importance than his present and remaining life.” Polyb., VI.55.3. περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενος τὴν τῆς πατρίδος ἀσφάλειαν καὶ τὴν ἐσομένην μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτὸν εὔκλειαν τῆς παρούσης ζωῆς καὶ τοῦ καταλειπομένου βίου. 491 See Tuomela 2007 on an important analysis of how communal interest is built off of the interest of individuals. Communal interest encompasses to a large degree individuals’ self-interest. At VI.54.4-6 Polybius specifically praises the Romans for inculcating such a strong desire to consider the common good as (and above) one’s own interest. See Gilbert 2000, for a different view of group responsibility, plural subject theory. 492 This aligns with the theory of Salmela 2012, 39: collective emotion is formed when one believes others also care and share the same concerns, which can be overlapping private concerns. 493 Polyb., VI.2.3. 109 develop a sense of community. Likewise, the authority of the primitive monarch changes to align with the community’s values. As the people value rational and moral conduct, so too the primitive monarch adapts his behavior from rule by brute force to rule in accordance with communal values, or else he loses his position as monarch.494 Through this alignment with the people’s rationally-based social norms, the primitive monarch becomes a king.

Through these three successive examples, Polybius explains how a system of social norms and conceptions of moral principles develops. These examples are designed to describe how the community of people and the new state diverge from the ways of animal flocks.495 It is humans’ possession of rationality, the ability to reflect and predictively apply another person’s situation to oneself, that distinguishes humans from animals and which promotes the good of the community over purely personal interest at the expense of others.

Polybius’ ancient theory of the beginning of human society and its development of moral standards finds a parallel in modern philosophical theory. Bennett Helm’s 2014 article

“Emotional Communities of Respect” provides a useful, modern parallel for how emotions form a community and its norms.496 Helm’s theory contends that “reactive emotions play a fundamental role in constituting distinctively human communities in part because they constitute our respecting each other and our reverence for the community itself, such that I respect you and revere the community only as one of us.”497 In addition, these reactive emotions are rational emotions.498 In Helm’s view, emotions have import for the subject; that is, they are “about”

494 Polyb., VI.7.1-3. 495 Polyb., VI.6.4. 496 Helm 2014, 47-60. I chose this theory of collective emotion in particular because it is highly appropriate to Polybius’ own method of narration, is more easily understandable and generally applicable, and does not rely on highly specialized terminology. Salmela 2012 provides a comparable model and theory of collective emotion which does not fulfill these standards but which would be beneficial to compare to Polybius’ ‘theory.’ 497 Helm 2014, 48. 498 Helm 2014, 51-53. 110 something the subject cares about.499 Emotions are rational and intelligible responses based on the emotion’s import.500

Reactive emotions occur in a social dimension as “normally responses to how we or other members of a community treat each other.”501 Helm gives resentment, gratitude, guilt, approbation, and indignation as stereotypical examples of reactive emotions. All of these reactive emotions ensure that community members take responsibility for their actions and are expressed to call attention to one’s respect (as either transgressed in the case of resentment, or highlighted, as with gratitude). Thus, according to Helm, reactive emotions “are bound up with seemingly moral notions like respect and dignity” for members of a community bound by norms.502 As Helm explains,

“it should be clear that resentment and other reactive emotions, as ways of holding others accountable to the norms of the community, simultaneously involve a commitment to the standing of the perpetrator as responsible to those norms. Moreover, they also involve a commitment to the dignity of witnesses as members of the community insofar as they call on witnesses to respond with appropriate vicarious reactive emotions, a call that is rationally connected to further reactive emotions such as resentment when witnesses fail to respond, or gratitude when they do in notable ways. In short, we cannot dissociate your commitment to your own dignity as a member of the community to your commitment to that of all other community members.”503

Therefore, membership in a community is created by reactive emotions. Helm’s account of reactive emotions, communal respect, and rationality parallels Polybius’ theory of the anacyclosis.

The same social norms and moral priorities that developed at the beginning of the community in Polybius’ anacyclosis play a large role in the characterization of and transition

499 Helm 2014, 49. 500 Helm 2014, 49-50. 501 Helm 2014, 48. 502 Helm 2014, 51. 503 Helm 2014, 54. 111 between state forms. These behavioral standards regulate the people’s emotional reactions against tyranny and oligarchy, but not against ochlocracy.

Tyranny

After kings ruled, using and demonstrating their rationality and in accordance with their subjects’ good, their descendants turned away from these principles:

“But when they took up their rule from inheritance, they found everything safe and secure already, and provisions more than sufficient for their nourishment. Then indeed, they follow their desires because of the abundance of resources and suppose that leaders must have different clothing from their subjects, have different and elaborate enjoyment and preparations of their food, and be unopposed in their sexual practices and intercourse, however improper.”504

In the transition into tyranny, the rulers “follow their personal desires” (ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις

ἑπόμενοι). Personal indulgence contradicts the norms of the social behavioral system: personal satisfaction instead of attention to the public good would not receive marks of honor from their subjects, the community, as happens with the kings.505

The next step brings in the subjects’ perspective.506 Φθόνος, προσκοπή, μῖσος, and

ὀργή arise from the rulers’ indulgence of their private, physical desires to the community’s detriment.507 “When resentment and indignation arose against some rulers and when against others hatred and inimical anger were kindled, tyranny came about from kingship, and the

504 Polyb., VI.7.6-7. “Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐκ διαδοχῆς καὶ κατὰ γένος τὰς ἀρχὰς παραλαμβάνοντες ἕτοιμα μὲν εἶχον ἤδη τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, ἕτοιμα δὲ καὶ πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν τὰ πρὸς τὴν τροφήν, τότε δὴ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ἑπόμενοι διὰ τὴν περιουσίαν ἐξάλλους μὲν ἐσθῆτας ὑπέλαβον δεῖν ἔχειν τοὺς ἡγουμένους τῶν ὑποταττομένων, ἐξάλλους δὲ καὶ ποικίλας τὰς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἀπολαύσεις καὶ παρασκευάς, ἀναντιρρήτους δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν μὴ προσηκόντων τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείας καὶ συνουσίας.” 505 Polyb., VI.7.3. In terms of Helm’s theory, the tyrants self-consciously separate themselves from the community, and so also separate from its values. 506 Polyb., VI.7.8. 507 Cf. Pl., Rep. 8.569, who emphasizes the tyrant’s cruelty, and narrative passages in Polybius’ Histories on the emphasis on a tyrant’s cruelty: X.26, XIII.6-8. In the larger narrative, Polybius more often emphasizes the cruelty of advisors and demagogues: XIII.4, XV.24a-36, XVI.21-22, XXIII.5, XXVIII.3-5, XXXII.5-6. 112 beginning of its downfall emerged along with the formation of a plot against the leaders.”508

Only when the subjects have shown that they disagree with the rulers’ actions does a change of constitutional form occur.509 Thus, Polybius’ state crucially consists of both the ruler and the ruled, and good governance depends on the whole community’s coherence.510

While the tyrants turn to private indulgence (ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ἑπόμενοι), the subjects’ emotional reactions of hate, anger, indignation, and ill will lead them to public action (ἐγεννᾶτο

καὶ σύστασις ἐπιβουλῆς).511 However, the tyrants’ desires to have different standards of clothing, food, and sex were not based on the rational reflection characteristic of the moral principles of the human community.512 They implicitly did not consider the effects of their actions on others – like the disrespectful child and the harmful or cowardly men.513 The people’s response of φθόνος, προσκοπή, μῖσος, and ὀργή, on the other hand, was based on rational social behavioral standards.514 They felt φθόνος, προσκοπή, and μῖσος for the tyrants, and function analogously to the bystanders in the original community, who felt resentment and

508 Polyb., VI.7.8. “Ἐφ’ οἷς μὲν φθόνου γενομένου καὶ προσκοπῆς, ἐφ’ οἷς δὲ μίσους ἐκκαιομένου καὶ δυσμενικῆς ὀργῆς, ἐγένετο μὲν ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας τυραννίς, ἀρχὴ δὲ καταλύσεως ἐγεννᾶτο καὶ σύστασις ἐπιβουλῆς τοῖς ἡγουμένοις·” Polybius’ use of the plural for tyranny is somewhat perplexing, but I take it to refer to plural states in general at this universal stage of development. 509 By comparison, in oligarchy (VI.8.5-6), Polybius reverses his narration of the change for the worse from his narration of tyranny. Here he first narrates the change to oligarchy then the popular emotional reactions. Both changes (oligarchy and tyranny) are narrated with μέν . . . δέ clauses. By correlating these events in such a clause, Polybius shows how very closely connected they are. 510 Hahm 2000, 467. 511 Polyb., VI.7.7-8. On these both as psychological explanations, see Walbank 1972, 40-43, 58-59, 157-159; Podes; and Hahm 2000, 467. For other, similar examples of psychological explanations, see Pl., Rep. 8.555d9-e2; Arist., Pol. 5.1312 b17-19. See Hahm 2009, for psychological motivations throughout Greek philosophy on constitutions. 512 The tyrants desired fancy clothes, sumptuous food, and sex based purely on their own self-interest. As such, their desires were rational in accomplishing their own goals, but their logic does not fall within λογισμός or γνώμη developed in the bystanders, that is, in line with the communal sense of morality, as Polybius has been emphasizing. Polyb., VI.6.11-7.5. 513 Polyb., VI.6.2-3, 6.6. 514 Cf. some narrative sections where several of these emotions arise in subjects against others, usually in positions of greater authority: Ibid., IX.10 (the siege of Syracuse), XV.25-30 (Agathocles), XVIII.15 (traitors), XXX.29 (Callicrates), XXXVIII.4-11 (Greece’s downfall). 113 indignation.515 The negative emotions here arose from feelings of moral indignation. The subjects act upon those emotions to fulfill a beneficial, practical purpose: they remove a bad ruler and reestablish the state led by those who heeded social behavioral standards. The subjects, therefore, serve as a foundational source of rational social and moral values, based on fair treatment, in their reactions. The people’s emotions themselves stem from the ruler’s transgression of their sense of morality, τὸ καλὸν. Since that system and morality exemplifies the application of human reason towards the social good, the reactions against the tyrants align with and demonstrate rationality.516 In this way, emotions and rationality align.517

Self-interest can also clearly be at play in the people’s reactions of φθόνος, προσκοπή,

μῖσος, and ὀργή. However, their self-interest coalesces with the social and moral standards.518

Like the earlier bystanders, they may reflect upon the others’ negative situations and have absolutely no wish to be in the same place themselves. However, they do not fully follow their own self-interest to the degree of individual, personal indulgence as the rulers do, without concern for others. This moderation is explained and motivated by social morality.519 The superiority of collective benefit over self-interest distinguishes the people as a reserve of social morality and as the deciding factor in constitutional change.

In addition, Polybius identifies the change into tyranny at the same time as the beginning of its destruction (ἀρχὴ δὲ καταλύσεως ἐγεννᾶτο καὶ σύστασις ἐπιβουλῆς τοῖς

515 The people – or at least some members of this community – are not merely bystanders or observers of the tyrants’ depredations but suffer personally as well. However, the importance of bystanders, or witnesses is crucial; see Helm 2014, 51-59. 516 This view contrasts with the dichotomy of emotion versus rationality found in other Greek philosophical texts on constitutional change. 517 See Greenspan 2000, on how emotions function in rational plans and for rational effects by focusing on rational, moral indignation in certain moments, not necessarily consciously. Damasio 1994, focuses on the neurological connection between emotional reactions and the ability to reason. Contra Hahm 1995, esp. 16. 518 Greenspan 1988 gives a detailed exposition of how exactly this works. See also Tuomela 2007. 519 As Helm’s theory of the community of respect demonstrates. 114 ἡγουμένοις).520 Emotions of hatred and resentment symbolize both the completion of the change to the worse, when the people recognize the lack of social morality in the rulers, and they stimulate the demise of that worse constitution through plots.

Emotional reactions lead to the creation of the new, better state form of aristocracy:

“The form of aristocracy in turn took up a beginning and birth: for the people, as if giving thanks to those who destroyed the monarchs, used these men as leaders and handed over their affairs to them.”521 These leaders follow the social and moral principles and use their power for the benefit of the whole community: “The new aristocrats first enthusiastically did nothing more energetically than managing the common good (τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος), and they undertook everything carefully and diligently, both the private and public affairs of the crowd.”522 Without the people’s preservation of social rules and moral principles through their emotional reactions, a better state form would not have come about. Although the aristocratic elite lead the revolt against the tyrants, the people react, provide the decisive impetus, and choose to turn over their affairs to them.523

The aristocracy and people both provide good examples of positive reactive emotions at work here: they reaffirm the community’s social norms through their personal reactive emotions. The people give gratitude to the aristocrats for their leadership in the actions taken in

520 Polyb., VI.7.8. Walbank, HCP I.656, notes this. 521 Polyb., VI.8.1-2. “τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας αὖθις ἀρχὴν ἐλάμβανε καὶ γένεσιν · τοῖς γὰρ καταλύσασι τοὺς μονάρχους οἱονεὶ χάριν ἐκ χειρὸς ἀποδιδόντες οἱ πολλοὶ τούτοις ἐχρῶντο προστάταις καὶ τούτοις ἐπέτρεπον περὶ σφῶν.” 522 Polyb., VI.8.3. “Οἱ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀσμενίζοντες τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν οὐδὲν προυργιαίτερον ἐποιοῦντο τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος, καὶ κηδεμονικῶς καὶ φυλακτικῶς ἕκαστα χειρίζοντες, καὶ τὰ κατ’ ἰδίαν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τοῦ πλήθους.” Joy here may be a good example of contagious emotion. Here it is definitely reciprocal, felt in response to the people’s choice of them as leaders. Joy in particular is one of the most contagious emotions, so it would make sense if the leaders and people all shared the affect of joy in the positive state form of aristocracy, as juxtaposed to the negative atmospheres of tyranny. 523 It is logical that the next form must be aristocracy in Polybius’ narrative. They exhibit courage and leadership just as the first monarch and king did. They rule with rationality. So, they are the next best element as leaders (προστάτας) for the people who would not be satisfied with a monarch any longer: “τὸ μὲν τῆς βασιλείας καὶ μοναρχίας εἶδος ἄρδην ἀνῄρετο” (VI.8.1). 115 response to their own negative emotional reactions. The aristocracy, likewise, feel glad at this honor. Both positive emotions reaffirm the community in its adherence to their social norms.524

Oligarchy

After the aristocrats hand power over to their descendants, the turn into oligarchy involves a turn to various private desires, as with the tyrants.525 Next, Polybius mentions the people’s reactions of φθόνος, μῖσος, and ὀργή.526 These reactions against oligarchs and tyrants mirror the reactions of προσκοπή and κατάγνωσις in the bystanders earlier: their negative emotions originate in the people’s social behavioral standards, as both the tyrants’ and the oligarchs’ passions and the disrespectful and harmful examples oppose the public good through the outrageous treatment of others.527 Emotional reactions serve as a spark for rational, strategic planning and the overthrow of the oligarchs.528

In VI.9.2, Polybius describes what happens to the oligarchs and implicitly also the tyrants

(οὓς μὲν φονεύσαντες, <οὓς δὲ φυγαδεύσαντες,>).529 The earlier passions and reactions lead up organically to violence in the overthrow of the rulers. The (sanctioned) violence can be seen

524 Compare Helm 2014, 54 (quoted above). 525 Polyb., VI.8.5-6. “ὁρμήσαντες οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλαργυρίαν ἄδικον, οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ μέθας καὶ τὰς ἅμα ταύταις ἀπλήστους εὐωχίας, οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν γυναικῶν ὕβρεις καὶ παίδων ἁρπαγάς, ταχὺ δὲ κατεσκεύασαν ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσι πάλιν τὰ παραπλήσια τοῖς ἄρτι ῥηθεῖσιν · διὸ καὶ παραπλήσιον συνέβαινε τὸ τέλος αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι τῆς καταστροφῆς τοῖς περὶ τοὺς τυράννους ἀτυχήμασι.” Specifically, some oligarchs turn to greed and unjust love of money (πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλαργυρίαν ἄδικον), a desire which did not occur in tyranny, but one which Plato and Aristotle closely connected with oligarchy. Williams 2000, 131-148, esp. 132-133, states that this causes all degeneration. Both Aristotle and Plato cite greed as a common factor in oligarchies: Pl., Rep. 8.547b2-3, 8.550d-551a, 8.555c-e; Arist., Pol. 5.1302a38-b3, states that faction underlies all constitutional change. With the new oligarchic rulers, excess characterizes all of their desires (ἀπλήστους). They are all aimed towards self-indulgence rather than justification of their right to rule. Cf. Arist., Eth. Nic. 8.1160 b12-16, on self- oriented rule. Perhaps the oligarchs jostled for position with each other, which could not happen in tyranny. 526 Polyb., VI.9.1, VI.4.9. 527 Polyb., VI.6.3, VI.6.5, VI.6.6. Ryffel, 193, connects the two reactions in the people against tyranny and oligarchy and ties them loosely to morality, but he does not link these reactions with the development of social values and the emotions at the beginning of the community. 528 See Greenspan 1988, 7-14 and part II, on emotions as adaptive, that is, as the foundation for rational planning. See Greenspan 2000, esp. 469-475, on how emotions fit into longer term rational plans without losing their force in the moment. 529 Added by Casaubon. Printed in all recent editions. This phrase provides a correlative δὲ to the μὲν clause. 116 to represent a more natural state where strength and might play the most important roles.530 The paradox in this stage comes from the fact that the violence stems from and backs the people’s reactions, which are based in their social sensibilities. So, the demise of the worse constitutions starts with offended social values but concludes with force and political (and for some, personal) annihilation. Bestial traits, such as strength and violence resurface for the overthrow of the worse form, and so do not belong solely on the other side of a dichotomy with reason.531 The processes of dynamic change, with social values backing emotions and the violence which results, shows this nuance.532

The people’s reactions create democracy out of oligarchy. The people decide to take over affairs themselves (τὴν δὲ τῶν κοινῶν πρόνοιαν καὶ πίστιν εἰς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς

ἀνέλαβον).533 The people do not tolerate transgressions of their moral principles, whether considered unjust (τὴν ἀδικίαν) or from other oligarchic abuses. Thus the people step up to establish a better state.

Ochlocracy

Democracy begins on the premise that all the people would rule and keep in mind the public good, found in the accepted social behavioral standards preserved in the people thus far.

In democracy, the people no longer represent the ruled subjects, but are themselves rulers.

However, throughout democracy’s degeneration into ochlocracy, Polybius identifies two groups

530 Cf. Polyb., VI.5.7-9, VI.6.12. 531 Such as seen in Pl., Plt. 301b10ff., 301a; Rep. 8.556b9-c1; Arist., Pol. 4.1292a32. 532 Violence in constitutional change: Hdt., 3.82; Pl., Rep. 8.566a, 8.557a2-5: Δημοκρατία δή, οἶμαι, γίγνεται ὅταν οἱ πένητες νικήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀποκτείνωσι τῶν ἑτέρων, τοὺς δὲ ἐκβάλωσι. 533 Polyb., VI.9.3. 117 of rulers: those whom I shall call the ambitious people (ζητοῦσι πλέον ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν·

μάλιστα δ’ εἰς τοῦτ’ ἐμπίπτουσιν οἱ ταῖς οὐσίαις ὑπερέχοντες) and the crowds.534

This symbolizes a split in the collective group. Even though the people, formerly the ruled or subjects in the state, now rule and share power, a dichotomy splits them into a more active group of politicians, who seek recognition and power, and the multitude. Considerations of social norms and group benefit are also shattered: reflection back to oneself as part of the community – and therefore to uphold the social norms for potential future personal benefit – no longer applies because that in-group (as defined by its norms) no longer exists as such. Now, multiple groups with divergent (self-)interests, needs, and norms exist.535

Also, the state forms of democracy and ochlocracy do not feature the language of emotion in Polybius’ narrative. However, I consider it imperative to include an analysis of this cycle’s dynamic change to contrast and so emphasize the critical importance of the emotions in the rest of the anacyclosis. Ochlocracy brings into perspective just how much the emotions and their underlying values truly matter to the human community.

After power has been inherited and personal desire for more power has arisen, the ambitious group begins the degeneration into ochlocracy.536 Polybius specifies that the richer group (οἱ ταῖς οὐσίαις ὑπερέχοντες) especially falls into wanting more than the rest (ζητοῦσι

πλέον ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν), but he does not completely exclude the crowds by his specification

“especially” (μάλιστα). That fits into the sequence of this decline, for those with more already

534 Polyb., VI.9.5. I alter my vocabulary for “τὸ πλῆθος” and “οἱ πολλοί” among “people,” “ruled,” or “subjects” to clarify the difference between the ruling groups and to emphasize the people’s new role as rulers as opposed to the ruled. See Walbank 1998, esp. 203-204, on these words in the anacyclosis. 535 See Kelly, Iannone, McCarthy 2014, 181-183, who note that intragroup differences may lead to further cooperation, but which also may lead to a split of common interest and thus hinder group productivity. 536 Polyb., VI.9.5. 118 have an advantage in surpassing others.537 However, they do not convince the people that they should have more (μὴ δύνωνται δι’ αὑτῶν), as the level of decline is only beginning.

The ambitious people destroy their affairs by “enticing and corrupting the crowds in every way” (δελεάζοντες καὶ λυμαινόμενοι τὰ πλήθη κατὰ πάντα τρόπον), particularly through bribery.538 The crowds represent both those whose decisions matter in the government and those whom the government should benefit, as remarked upon in the transition to democracy (τὴν δὲ τῶν κοινῶν πρόνοιαν καὶ πίστιν εἰς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀνέλαβον).539 The ambitious people corrupt (λυμαινόμενοι) the collective whom all public affairs concern, and so they contribute directly to the decline of democracy into ochlocracy.

In the next section, VI.9.7, the need for fame (διὰ τὴν ἄφρονα δοξοφαγίαν) of the ambitious rulers conditions the others to taking bribes (δωροδόκους καὶ δωροφάγους

κατασκευάσωσι τοὺς πολλοὺς).540 The people (τοὺς πολλοὺς) seem merely the objects of the ambitious people’s efforts. Plato, in an extended bee analogy, likens the poorer sections of democracy to the complacent drone bees, always reliant on their poor and ambitious friends’ efforts.541 Polybius’ model follows this to a degree. The more ambitious ochlocrats condition the crowd to take a more passive role in the state, but they still do not possess full ruling power, and so they perpetuate ochlocracy. The people still do share in power to rule the state, despite their complacency, and so the ambitious politicians never can assume full, autocratic power.

Ochlocracy continues because the people still hold nominal authority to rule as democrats.

537 See Williams, esp. 131-136, on the prevalence of this vice. 538 Polyb., VI.9.6. In the summary of the anacyclosis, Polybius mentions that ochlocracy comes about “Ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτου πάλιν ὕβρεως καὶ παρανομίας” (VI.4.10). These two vices (ὕβρεως καὶ παρανομίας) exemplify different factors than “τὸ φιλαρχεῖν” specifically. However, they function more as terms characterizing the whole process of ochlocracy elaborated in VI.9.5-9. 539 Polyb., VI.9.3. Cf. VI.8.3. 540 This helps to qualify how the ambitious people ruin their own affairs, VI.9.6. On the word δοξοφαγία, see Walbank, HCP I.657. This is the only usage in the extant Histories of Polybius. 541 On complacency as characteristic of the crowds, see Pl., Rep. 8.564; Arist., Pol. 5.1303a13. On ambition as characteristic of demagogues, see Pl. Plt., 301 b10f., Arist. Pol., 5.1312 a21. 119 Nevertheless, the crowds degenerate through their own actions too. They no longer represent subjects who preserve social rules and moral principles, as the people did in tyranny and oligarchy. The crowd becomes accustomed to taking bribes (δωροδόκους καὶ

δωροφάγους κατασκευάσωσι τοὺς πολλοὺς). Instead of reacting emotionally to the ambitious people’s efforts to further their own personal interests (διὰ τὴν ἄφρονα

δοξοφαγίαν), the people also fall prey to pursuit of personal gain, coopted by the ambitious group. No indignation or hatred arises. Because the crowds share in ruling power, they have lost their role as a reservoir of social morality and source of resistance. Power corrupts the people, destroying their sense of community and hence any constraint against their pursuit of self-interest.

Polybius further expands on the significance of personal gain at public cost. In VI.9.8, the people live on others’ property (τὰ ἀλλότρια). In the other worse constitutional forms, this stage would involve the subjects, but now no group represents the ruled, whose emotions brought correction to the state, and all forsake social values.542 Most importantly, the crowd takes action as sovereign power in its degenerate, complacent state. This condition recalls the negative examples at the beginning of social values, which formed from people’s ability to put themselves in others’ places and to feel moral indignation at any mistreatment of others.543 The crowds live parasitically for their own private welfare at others’ expense, shown by their consumption of τὰ ἀλλότρια and living ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πέλας. They represent those who mistreat others without reflection, and do not represent the ruled people or bystanders, who had decisively brought about the change for the better in earlier cycles.

542 Here may be an instance of the importance of the imbalance in power relationships. No reciprocity or gratitude is due to a more powerful party; therefore, the state degenerates into ochlocracy. 543 Polyb., VI.5.10-6.9. 120 During these processes Polybius notes the change from democracy to ochlocracy.544

Democracy is destroyed (καταλύεται) and is changed into force and violent rule (μεθίσταται

δ’ εἰς βίαν καὶ χειροκρατίαν ἡ δημοκρατία).545 The moment of constitutional change happens almost imperceptibly.546 Instead of the rulers’ irresponsible turn to private desires and resulting emotional indignation from the ruled, the change into ochlocracy involves pursuit of personal ambition in both ruling groups. Ochlocracy, contrary to tyranny and oligarchy, lacks any resistance from a ruled people who heed rationality and social standards and who are uncorrupted by the temptations of rule. The ruled people, who had assiduously remained a repository of the social values which formed the basis for a community, no longer exist as such.

The people do not reflect on their treatment of others and apply the others’ situation to themselves, thus forsaking rationality.547 They, as rulers of the ochlocratic state, become codependent and complicit with the ambitious people’s efforts to seek personal gain at public expense.

After they have chosen a leader, the people end or complete the rule of violence (τότε

δὴ χειροκρατίαν ἀποτελεῖ). This marks its peak, as the people’s emotions do for tyranny, except here the worse form continues on its trajectory, due to a lack of reactive emotions. The anacyclosis narrative reverts further to bestialization when the people choose a leader

(προστάτην) with the same characteristics of the primitive monarch and animal leaders

(μεγαλόφρονα καὶ τολμηρόν).548 Polybius’ statement about this man’s penury

(ἐκκλειόμενον δὲ διὰ πενίαν) echoes Plato’s description of the end of democracy into

544 Polyb., VI.9.7. 545 καταλύεται most often describes monarchs throughout the narrative, so this usage with democracy is unique. See Mauersberger, Vol. 1.4, 1312-1313. 546 See particularly Cole 1964, 462, and Walbank 1998, 218. Zecchini 2006, 23, identifies in passing two ‘intermediate’ stages between the larger stages of democracy and dissolution: “demagogia e ochlocrazia.” 547 Contra Polyb., VI.5.10-6.9. 548 Polyb., VI.9.8; Cf. VI.5.7-9: “τὸν τῇ σωματικῇ ῥώμῃ καὶ τῇ ψυχικῇ τόλμῃ διαφέροντα.” 121 tyranny.549 The leader can be seen as a demagogue, which both Plato and Aristotle identify as a factor in constitutional change.550 The ἐκκλειόμενος is mentioned as someone the masses choose, and he never actually functions as a subject in Polybius’ narrative. Polybius sets up this figure as the last step in a checklist of actions taken by the people before ochlocracy is completed. Polybius distinguishes the steps in the process clearly: the people take the

ἐκκλειόμενος as a leader, then indeed ochlocracy is completed, and then the people murder, and banish until, after they have turned to beasts, they find again a master and monarch. There are many temporal markers (τότε δὴ . . . καὶ τότε . . . ἕως) between the choice of the

ἐκκλειόμενος of ochlocracy and the discovery of the new monarch.551

With the characteristics of this ochlocratic, excluded leader, social rationality clearly has no place in ochlocracy.552 The crowd reverts to choosing a leader like the primitive monarch, before social values and rationality played a role in human life. The ambitious people do not use

549 See Pl., Rep. 8.562e-563b on the demagogue’s transition into a tyrant. In Polybius’ text, this man’s exclusion, “ἐκκλειόμενον δὲ διὰ πενίαν τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τιμίων,” complicates ochlocracy, since theoretically everyone is entitled to some place of rule, although the rich have a head start on laying hold of public resources. Choosing or following a leader in general took place also in the downfall of tyranny and oligarchy, except that the incensed subjects followed the leader, not the sovereign body. Thus, this does not represent a new entire step; rather, new details and meaning are added in the case of ochlocracy. 550 For the demagogue as bringer of state change, see Pl. Rep., 8.562e-563b, 567-569; Arist. Pol., 4.1297a1f., 5.1304 b19f., 5.1305 b22, 5.1306 b22f., 5.1310 b16f. 551 Thomas Cole, 462, interprets this figure, the ἐκκλειόμενος, as one existing within ochlocracy and also as the source of the slaughters, exiles, and land distributions. His agency in these last actions terminates the independent rule of the people. This interpretation anticipates the end of cheirocratia and transposes agency for actions done later, with the people (τὸ πλῆθος) still as the grammatical subject, back to the ἐκκλειόμενος. F.W. Walbank 1995, 218, interprets the end of ochlocracy thus: “Polybius does not say, though he perhaps implies, that this monarch, who in order to close the cycle has to correspond to the original leader of the primitive horde is the bold and ambitious poor man who has initiated the rule of violence.” Walbank assumes that the ἐκκλειόμενος controls the transition from democracy to cheirocratia. Cole and Walbank see the ἐκκλειόμενος figure as a major agent in either the beginning or the completion of cheirocratia. Polybius does not state either of these options so clearly. Walbank’s assumption that this figure does have a say in instituting the slaughters, banishments, and land redistributions seems very likely, but this figure cannot also be the primitive monarch. Polybius would not have used a verb of finding or discovering if the same man who had been the leader before were to be the new leader. 552 My description and definition throughout falls closer to Max Weber’s concept of “value-rationality,” which promotes action based in some belief or value, as opposed to his concept of “instrumental rationality,” which promotes action in service of our own desires. Weber specifies that value-rational action is done consciously for its own sake, which I do not think that Polybius’ text also depicts: the people may show value-rationality through their social rationality, but whether they self-consciously act for these particular reasons is dubious. See Kim 2012 for an overview of Weber’s thoughts rationality, and see Swedberg 2005, 126-127 and 287-288, for clear definitions and citations of Weber’s distinctions between value- and instrumental rationality. 122 reason or heed social values in their mindless hunger for distinction (τὴν ἄφρονα

δοξοφαγίαν), the crowds forsake social rationality in not caring how they treat others and private property, and the leader is chosen only for his more natural and animal-like traits

(μεγαλόφρονα καὶ τολμηρόν), not in combination with adherence to social rules and moral principles.553

The lack of rationality and social morality – and of the reactive emotions to reaffirm these, upheld in the ruled people of earlier state forms – leads to complete destruction of the political state, society, and semblance of human characteristics (ἀποτεθηριωμένον). This implies that the semblance of an organized human community ends altogether.554 In noting this end of the state, Polybius shows that ochlocracy differs significantly from tyranny and oligarchy.

There are no ruled people to act upon their social values, revolt, and overthrow the worse constitutional form. Clearly, the ruled people’s role as a reserve of social morality and their rational emotional reactions constitute a crucial factor in determining and ensuring good governance in the anacyclosis.

As is now clear from the preceding analysis, in Polybius’ narrative, emotion is given no place in the state form of ochlocracy. Collective emotion as rehabilitative for a state only works with the people uncorrupted by power. However, I have included its analysis because it serves as a crucial comparison for the other cycles. Ochlocracy and its demise defines the importance of the people as the reserve of social morality. Only those uncorrupted by power and rule preserve a sense of morality and demonstrate this through the reactive emotions of indignation, hatred, and anger.

553 Contrast the new aristocrats, who share traits of boldness but who crucially rule for the common good, VI.8.3. Cf., also, the new democrats, VI.9.2. 554 Walbank, HCP I.658, notes this cyclic return to the beginning of the cycle. Ryffel 1949, 196, seems to my knowledge to have first noted this return to the beginning of the cycle, particularly in terms of bestialization. 123 The Collapse of the Mixed Constitution

Lastly of this part, I examine the decline of the mixed constitution.555 In our extant text,

Polybius compares the Roman politeia’s exemplary institutions – such as the funeral oration,

Roman superstition, and faithfulness in oaths and finance.556 VI.57 concludes Polybius’ entire

Book Six “digression” (παρέκβασις) and covers the natural decline of a balanced politeia.557

Here, Polybius does not name the mixed constitution, nor does he directly mention the Romans, though they are the target case, as understood through context. While this section does not fall within the anacyclosis, the end of the mixed constitution follows a very similar process of moral degeneration leading to political demise, as found in ochlocracy and provides an addendum to

Polybius’ anacyclosis, as the exposition of how states naturally change.558

Other scholars have noted the similarities between this passage and the passage concerning ochlocracy.559 These are very important: a decline starting from heredity, desires and ambitions for private gain, and lack of rational judgment.560 Scholars have not specifically noted the absence of a ruled subject group who emotionally reacted against the rulers, according to their social values.

In the mixed constitution of VI.57 everyone has a share in ruling the state, just as in democracy and ochlocracy.561 While many issues could arise over how the power was actually

555 Polyb., VI.57. 556 Polyb. VI.43-52, for comparison of constitutions (including Crete, Thebes, Athens, Carthage, and Sparta; Polybius brings up Plato to dismiss such a comparison between real lived states and theory). See VI.53-56 for examples of virtuous Roman institutions, such as funeral orations, the valor of Horatius Cocles, superstition, and faithful oath-taking. See Moore 1967 on the fragments of Book VI; see below for my approach on reading a fragmentary passage. 557 Polyb., VI.57.1. 558 Alonso-Núñez, 20, points out that Rome’s ability to be everlasting is unclear – VI.57 implies that it is not, while VI.18 implies it is. VI.57’s decline and parallels to ochlocracy certainly outweigh the ambiguity, I think. The comment of Walbank 1943, 76, “In short, when he was considering the mixed constitution Polybius was not concerned with the question of ultimate deterioration,” is hard to understand in light of VI.57’s obvious interest in the decline of the mixed constitution. 559 Champion 2004a, 89-95; Cole, 480-481; Baronowski, 156; Longley, 75-78. 560 Champion 2004a, 89-96, 186-193; Hahm 1995, 42-45; 2000, 475-476; 2009, 191-197; Williams 136. 561 Polyb., VI.9.3. 124 wielded in these states, in Polybius’ theoretical construction the participation of all in a ruling position has a crucial effect on the process of decline. As noted with ochlocracy before, the social reaction to the rulers’ indulgence of private desires is missing, since the subject people are also absent. In the ‘pure’ mixed constitution, every group shares in power, so when a segment utterly disregards the balances established, civil strife, anarchy, and dissolution follow, as with ochlocracy.562

The process of change found in ochlocracy continues to recur in VI.57, as the people develop excessive desires for offices and other honors due to their ‘inherited’ prosperity from their forefathers’ conquests and world supremacy:

“For whenever the state, having come through many great dangers and after these has come to arrogant and unceasing power, it is clear that, since happiness dwells in it to a large extent, their lives become more luxurious, and the men become more competitive than necessary in offices and other pursuits.”563

Private gain leads to both ambition and complacency, and so the mixed state will eventually end from internal faction between its groups: “As these tendencies continue, the love of power and shame from lack of repute will begin the change to the worse, and in addition to these, ostentatiousness and extravagance will begin in their lives.”564 The qualities here mirror the want for more and private gain found in ochlocracy.565

Then, the people both react against and in accordance with those who want more than their share of power: “The people will make a start of the change to worse whenever they will

562 Lintott, 218, makes the interesting remark that stasis is embodied in Rome’s constitution, much like ochlocracy. 563 Polyb., VI.57.5. “Ὁταν γὰρ πολλοὺς καὶ μεγάλους κινδύνους διωσαμένη πολιτεία μετὰ ταῦτα εἰς ὑπεροχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀδήριτον ἀφίκηται, φανερὸν ὡς εἰσοικιζομένης εἰς αὐτὴν ἐπὶ πολὺ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν βίους γίνεσθαι πολυτελεστέρους, τοὺς δ’ ἄνδρας φιλονεικοτέρους τοῦ δέοντος περί τε τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιβολάς.” Polybius expounds more on the private desires and want for more power in VI.57.6-7. See Hahm 2000, 476. 564 Polyb., VI.57.6. “Ὧν προβαινόντων ἐπὶ πλέον ἄρξει μὲν τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς ἡ φιλαρχία καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀδοξίας ὄνειδος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ περὶ τοὺς βίους ἀλαζονεία καὶ πολυτέλεια.” See too Hahm 2009, 196- 197. 565 The terminology here is close to what Williams 2000 discusses and traces. These terms fall closer to desires than emotions. See Deonna and Teroni, 28-40 for modern distinctions between these categories; see Champion 2004a, 241-244 on the classifications of these terms within Polybius. 125 seem to be injured by [some ambitious people] because of their greediness, and flattered by

[other ambitious people], they are puffed up by flattery from the ambitious politicians’ love of power.”566 The people focus on their own personal interest in this passage. First, they, like the crowds of ochlocracy, do not reward the ambitious people in their greed. The people of the mixed constitution consider themselves wronged, and so would not deliberately reward others for that, as though they were following social behavioral standards. At the same time the people are flattered by others of the ambitious people (κολακευόμενος διὰ τὴν φιλαρχίαν), prioritizing their own personal gain, and hence abandoning their moral principles.567 The ambitious people rely on the people for more offices, and the people rely on the ambitious ones to flatter them and fulfill their private needs.

As with the turn into ochlocracy, the collective splits into separate in- and out-groups.

With this split, the shared collective norms (and emotions to reinforce and give valuation to them) also become disjointed. The ambitious people and the regular people prioritize differently and diverge in both their valuations and self-interest as member of the unified social group.568

After this, like oligarchy, excessive private desires invade public policy and through anger overturn the balance: “For then, having been provoked, and considering everything with passion, the people no longer will want to obey nor to have an equal share with the leaders but will want to have everything and the majority share itself.”569 Here the people grow angry

(ἐξοργισθείς), but they do so without recourse to morality, instead using only their passionate spirit (θυμῷ πάντα βουλευόμενος), unlike the people under oligarchy or tyranny. These people of the degenerating mixed constitution were injured then flattered because of the

566 Polyb., VI.57.7. “λήψεται δὲ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῆς μεταβολῆς ὁ δῆμος, ὅταν ὑφ’ ὧν μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι δόξῃ διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὑφ΄ ὧν δὲ χαυνωθῇ κολακευόμενος διὰ τὴν φιλαρχίαν.” 567 For the people’s turn to personal gain, see VI.57.8. 568 As analyzed also in modern studies; see Kelly, Iannone, and McCarthy 2014, 181-183. 569 Polyb., VI.57.8. “Τότε γὰρ ἐξοργισθείς, καὶ θυμῷ πάντα βουλευόμενος, οὐκέτι θελήσει πειθαρχεῖν οὐδ’ ἴσον ἔχειν τοῖς προεστῶσιν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτός.” 126 ambitious politicians’ greediness, but they go on to want the most for themselves (ἀλλὰ

[θελήσει ἔχειν] πᾶν καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτός) – the same vice they grew furious at! This type of anger, reliant on irrational deliberation, leads them to pursue their own, excessive personal interest, contrasting the negative reactive emotions of the anacyclosis, which supported communal values.

These people feel the right emotion for the wrong reasons. Moreover, the people deliberate in the wrong way, through θυμός and not λογισμός. As we noticed in Chapter 2,

θυμός throughout the Histories always is negative and irrational, and as such is unique among emotions in this work. In Polybius, desire, ἐπιθυμία, and passion, θυμός, both carry negative connotations.570 Here, the people wish to take more power for themselves, which undermines the balanced nature of this type of politeia: self-interest drives their emotions and deliberations, forsaking the communal values and the rationality which governed those.

Through this merging of emotional reactions with pursuit of personal gain, the change from the mixed constitution mirrors the dynamic changes into both democracy and ochlocracy, as Polybius states, “When this has happened, the state will take over the best of names, freedom and democracy, but it takes over the worst in deeds, ochlocracy.”571 While the occurrence of anger creates similarity to democracy’s origin, the social morality underlying emotions does not exist here in the decline of the mixed constitution. This absence of social morality as motivation shifts for the mixed constitution to the model of ochlocracy. Because the mixed constitution’s people lacked social behavioral standards and moral principles – and rational reactive emotions –

570 See Champion 2004a for further and detailed argumentation on this point. See especially the appendix on Polybian language of barbarism, 241-244, which includes addressing terms of excessive personal desires, not emotions. 571 Polyb., VI.57.9. “Οὗ γενομένου τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων τὸ κάλλιστον ἡ πολιτεία μεταλήψεται, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν, τῶν δὲ πραγμάτων τὸ χείριστον, τὴν ὀχλοκρατίαν.” 127 in their reasons for change, they too find themselves in a degenerate state, despite all the benefits of the mixed constitution.572

In ascribing an important role to the people and their emotions, Polybius’ description of constitutional change differs notably from his philosophical predecessors.573 For Polybius, rationality, inherent in social behavioral standards and moral principles, was exhibited by the ruled people in their emotional reactions to rulers’ excesses. The people and no one else retained their rational capacities of reflection and predictive application of a situation to themselves. When bad rulers provoked this sensibility, the people violently reacted with anger, hate, and indignation and actively transformed the state – until the final state of ochlocracy.

Plato and Aristotle, by contrast, do not appear to portray the people as a reserve of social values and moral judgment, nor do they portray the people’s emotions as rationally based. The subjects in Plato and Aristotle’s texts on constitutional change do react resentfully against the rulers, but they are motivated more by personal injury and self-interest, than by consideration of social and moral standards.

Plato, in his description of constitutional changes in Book Eight of the Republic, describes the resentment among the people as arising from personal wants, not concern for the common good. In particular, he describes the people as “Some owing debts, other having become injured, some suffering both, hating and plotting against those who took possession of their

572 Polyb., VI.57.9. See Champion 2004a, 75, 80-82. 573 Many commonalities exist, though: on heredity, see Arist., Pol. 4.1292 a39f., 5.1313 a10-1316 a16. On luxury as a cause of decline, Pl., Rep. 8.556 b-c; Arist., Pol. 5.1302 b3f., 1303 b33, 5.1305 b39. On passions, Pl., Plt. 301 b10; Pl., Rep. 8.562d-e; Leg. 3.691A, 695B, 701B; Arist., Pol. 5.1310 b40f. See Arist. Pol. 4.1301 b-1302 a, on the primacy of internal faction for constitutional change. On reactions: Pl. Rep., 8.555d9-e2; Arist. Pol., 5.1312 b17-19. On violence in transitions, Pl., Rep. 8.557a2-5, 8.566a; Hdt., 3.82. On ambition, see Pl., Plt. 301 b10f., Arist., Pol. 5.1312 a21. On demagogues in earlier Greek constitutional philosophy: Pl., Rep. 8.562e-563b, 567-569; Arist., Pol. 4.1297a1f., 5.1304 b19f., 5.1305 b22, 5.1306 b22f., 5.1310 b16f. For further summary of commonalities and research on Polybius’ sources, see Ryffel, esp. 186, 203-220, and Cole 1964. 128 property and against the rest, they love a revolution.”574 Personal debt and dishonor, and especially their personal loss of property at oligarchs’ hands, cause the people to hate and plot, besides the fact that they generally love new revolutionary things. The emotions here are personal and entirely self-interested, not the same sort of reactive emotions seen in the anacyclosis (and in Helm’s theory).

Aristotle, in Book Five of the Politics on the various causes of change of state forms, does not present the people as a collective foundation for rationally based social rules and moral principles, nor does he focus on reason as a basis for the emotions and reactions against rulers.

The insurgents focus on their self-interest in comparison with the rulers: “For they, both being dishonored and seeing other people honored, revolt.”575 He sums up revolt as stemming from inequality,

“For some, desiring equality, revolt since they think that they have less though they are equal to those with more, and others, desiring inequality and superiority, suppose that they do not have more but rather have equal or less, though they are unequal (and of these, some are stirred up justly, and others unjustly).”576

Both earlier authors tend to attribute constitutional change to personal desires and individual self-interest.577 Lastly, internal stasis for Aristotle and Plato is begun within the ruling class or by demagogic leaders, whereas for Polybius the ruled people first react emotionally, and

574 Pl., Rep. 8.555d9-e2. “οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες χρέα, οἱ δὲ ἄτιμοι γεγονότες, οἱ δὲ ἀμφότερα, μισοῦντές τε καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς κτησαμένοις τὰ αὑτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, νεωτερισμοῦ ἐρῶντες.” 575 Arist., Pol. 5.1302b11-12. “καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἀτιμαζόμενοι καὶ ἄλλους ὁρῶντες τιμωμένους στασιάζουσιν.” Cf. also 5.1302b21-23, 5.1302b25-27. 576 Arist., Pol., 5.1302a24-29. “οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἰσότητος ἐφιέμενοι στασιάζουσιν ἂν νομίζωσιν ἔλαττον ἔχειν ὄντες ἴσοι τοὶς πλεονεκτοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ τῆς ἀνισότητος καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς ἂν ὑπολαμβάνωσιν ὄντες ἄνισοι μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀλλ’ ἴσον ἢ ἔλαττον (τούτων δ’ ἔστι μὲν ὀρέγεσθαι δικαίως, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀδίκως).” This perception of the lack of equality where it should be comes close to the emotion of φθόνος, as I discussed in Chapter 1. See Konstan 2003 and Walcot 1978, esp. 30-31, on the development of the concept of equality with this emotion. This emotion, φθόνος, only is named once within Polybius’ anacyclosis, in the list of emotions rising against the tyrants, VI.7.8. 577 On personal desires and self-interest as a cause of decline: Pl. Rep., 550d7-9, 551a, 555c1-5; Polit. 301b10; Leg. 3.690e, 3.695b; Arist., Pol. 5.1302b1 ff. Besides this, they attribute the difference in good and bad constitutions not to a sense of social morality in the people but to adherence to law. While social values and laws surely have much in common, the language of Plato and Aristotle puts great emphasis on law where Polybius completely omits it. On lawlessness specifically as the cause of decline: Pl. Rep., 8.556a4-b4, 563d; Polit. 291e1-5, 294a, 301a-b; Leg. 3.701b; Arist., Pol. 4.1292a, 4.1293a32. 129 then leaders of revolt emerge from the nobler members.578 For Polybius, emotion stimulated the people with a reason to revolt and to bring about change for the better most of all because their moral sensibilities were offended.

The people’s reactions play a central role in Polybius’ model for internal state change, and they have a deciding role in how they are ruled and in how good governance is realized. In contrast to Aristotle and Plato’s emphasis on class in constitutional change, Polybius characterized state change with social morality. In accordance with Polybius’ practical educative purpose for the anacyclosis, this model could tell how personal action can affect how they are governed – through paying heed to social morality and acting against its transgressions.579

Nevertheless, Polybius’ models of the anacyclosis’ inevitable end in ochlocracy and the mixed constitution’s eventual demise warn that ruling power corrupts even the people, to the extent that they can no longer fulfill their moralizing function. Polybius argues that a public dispassionate about the transgressions of social behavioral standards by rulers only forsakes its moral duty and contributes to the decline of the state.

Part II: Agathocles’ Downfall

At XV.25-33, Polybius provides one of his most vivid and detailed narratives: that of the courtier Agathocles’ accession to power in Alexandria and subsequent downfall in 203 BC.

This passage falls in the category of extreme changes of fortune, a favorite theme of historians going back to Herodotus. It also exhibits similar emotional processes we analyzed in the anacyclosis. This passage provides a narrative parallel to the theory of Book Six through

578 See Polyb. VI.9.1. On internal origins of dissent, see Pl., Rep., 8.545d1-2, 546a1-5 556e5-6; Leg. 3.683e; Arist., Pol. 5.1301b1 ff., 5.1304a33 ff. and passim 1304-1313 in discussions of the various types of constitutional changes. 579 Polyb., VI.2.8-10, 3.4, 9.11. 130 emotions and their morality. I intend to show from Polybius’ narrative of Agathocles’ regime just how crucial emotions are for “the business of history,” in John Marincola’s phrase.580

Scholarship has not focused on the emotions involved in Agathocles’ downfall. Instead, scholarship has focused on how reprehensible the violence of the people is in this passage.581

Arthur Eckstein, in his discussion of Polybius’ negative opinion of the masses in Moral Vision in

Polybius’ Histories, uses this passage as the marker of the catastrophic involvement of the people in politics: “It is not surprising, then, that Polybius deemed that the success of an angry plēthos in interfering with the running of the state to be the gateway to catastrophe. The anger of the

Alexandrian mob in 203 leads to scenes of horror as the government of Agathocles is bloodily overthrown.”582 He further identifies aspects from this passage which exemplify the negative paradigms of the greed of mercenaries, Polybius’ contempt for demagogic leaders (with

Agathocles listed as an example), excessive drinking, and women’s emotional intrusion into public life.583 The Agathocles passage has been seen by others too as indicative of purely negative characteristics.584 All of these examples further Eckstein’s broader observations and purpose, but they are not considered in the context of the narrative episode. Eckstein’s comments particularly on the intrusion into politics by the people and by women do not take into consideration the causes Polybius attributes for such “intrusion.” In his discussion of human character, however, Eckstein does acknowledge causes: “The dark situation here is

580 Marincola 2013, 80. 581 McGing 2010, 28-29, 70, notes Polybius’ criticism of dwelling on unworthy characters such as Agathocles and on sensationalism only after ten long sections. Dreyer 2013, 211, however, comments on Polybius’ details as stemming from Ptolemaic court sources, and Polybius does note that other ancient writers covered this passage’s contents in his historiographical commentary section, to which other scholars tend to direct their focus. On a larger narratological scale, Champion 2004a, 147, classifies Agathocles as one among many failed individuals in the extant Books VII-XV. All these scholars do not center their analyses on this particular passage, but rather use it as an example of a (negative) observation. See also Walbank 1972, 111-112; Walbank 1990, 231; Marincola 2013, 84-85. 582 Eckstein 1995, 132. This stance ignores the blood-stained nature of the government which is “bloodily overthrown.” Further on popular intrusion into politics, see 132-136, 247. 583 On the greed of mercenaries, Eckstein 1995, 125-127; Polybius’ contempt of demagogic leaders (with Agathocles), 139; excessive drinking, 141, 286-287; and women’s emotional intrusion into public life, 152-153. 584 Walbank 1979, 59; Eckstein 1995, 37, esp. 136, 151-152, 246; Champion 2004a, 28; McGing 2010, 28-29. 131 exacerbated by yet another human trait: just as people react with loyalty to kind treatment from the powerful (4.33.7), so they tend to react with hatred to the cruel and arrogant treatment of the powerful,” using Agathocles as an example for this trait.585 Eckstein’s focus both in this statement and throughout lies with the violent result of people’s emotions, not the causes and their underlying values. Whether Polybius would approve or disapprove of the result of the people’s “intrusions” does not concern Eckstein in this work.

I emphasize the moral role of the people, who are the subjects feeling these collective emotions. The people’s emotions reaffirm human society’s basic social and moral norms. The reactive emotions in XV.25-33 function in the same ways as the emotions of the anacyclosis.

Communal values cause emotions in the people. When people perceive transgressions of others’ basic human rights and harm of innocent members of the community, they react emotionally, as do the people in Polybius’ theory of the anacyclosis. XV.25-33 relates the violent overthrow of

Agathocles after he usurps power as prime minister and abuses his subjects in this position. The people play a major role through their emotional reactions to these transgressions and in their motivation to violent action sparked by these emotions.

Unfortunately, Polybius’ narrative is fragmentary due to its preservation only in the

Byzantine Constantinian Excerpts and in the Excerpta Antiqua of Polybius’ manuscript tradition.586 The order of some of the episodes is still uncertain, and it is unknown how much of

585Eckstein 1995, 247. 586 The Constantinian Excerpts, compiled from Greek historians under Roman power by the Byzantine emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus in the 10th century, provide XV.25.1-2 and XV.20-25 in the De Virtutibus et Vitiis (Turonensis 980 ‘Peirescianus’), and XV.26a and XV.34.1-36.11 in the De Sententiis (Vaticanus gr. 73). Both of these Constantinian selections survive each in a single manuscript, both dating to the 10th-11th centuries. The Excerpta Antiqua, preserved in some manuscripts with the whole of Books I-V and in some manuscripts alone, provide XV.26-36.10. Thus, the only overlap between these two traditions is the historiographical digression from XV.34- XV.36.10. For the best analysis of Polybius’ manuscript tradition, see Moore 1965. 132 the rest of the passage has been lost.587 For these reasons, reconstructing the complete record of events and the causal connections between these events is difficult.588

Polybius is our main source for these historical events.589 However, Agathocles is attested elsewhere as a courtier of Ptolemy IV (who reigned from February 221 to August 204

BC). Besides the accusations of Agathocles’ being Ptolemy IV’s ἐρώμενος, which Tlepolemos makes in Polybius’ narrative, not much can be said about Agathocles’ earlier career, except that he is thought to have aided Sosibios and Ptolemy IV at the battle of Raphia and that he was a priest of Alexander in 216/215 BC.590

Emotions against Agathocles’ regime

Ptolemy IV and his sister-wife Arsinoë III died in mysterious and suspicious circumstances in autumn 204 BC, leaving a child, Ptolemy V, to become the next king.591

Sosibios, who died shortly thereafter, and Agathocles were named in a forged (πεπλασμένην) will as the boy’s guardians.592 Polybius says that after Sosibios and Agathocles ended the funerals and official mourning the real nature of Arsinoë’s death came out, for when all heard that she died, they inquired about how it happened. Since no one gave any other pretext, the true

587 See Maas 1949, 443-446, on reconstructing the order. 588 My focus, a moral one, aligns greatly with the Constantinian Excerpts of the De Sententiis (manuscript M), which Champion 2004a, 26 note 46, notes contains the largest amount of Polybian moralizing and digressive passages. 589 See Walbank, HCP II.434-437, 480-496 on the historical importance of Polybius’ narrative. Unfortunately, no other extant source focuses on these events. 590 See Walbank, HCP I.588 and HCP II.437-438 for citations and discussion. See Maas 1945, 74, on the papyri concerning Agathocles and his family. 591 Polyb., XV.25.1(3)-2(4). This passage is the main historical source for the succession of Ptolemy V and the deaths of Arsinoë III and Ptolemy IV. Polyb., XIV.12.5 creates suspicion that he recorded Ptolemy IV’s death here, in summer 204 BC, whereas the events of XV.25-33 were to have taken place that fall. See Walbank, HCP II.434- 437 on the details and issues of chronology. I use the numbering system used and order of the text from the latest critical edition (Budé) by Foulon and Weil, 2003. The Büttner-Wobst section numbers are in parentheses where they differ (as above), as this has been considered the standard edition. For the manuscript tradition here, see Walbank, HCP II.22-23; Foulon and Weil 2003, 7. 592 Polyb., XV.25.3(5). 133 manner (τὸ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν γεγονὸς) was stamped upon everyone’s minds.593 Arsinoë III’s suspected murder caused signs of mourning, interpreted as signs of emotion and especially hatred (μῖσος) against Agathocles.

Polybius does not doubt that Arsinoë was murdered, as seen in his narration of rumor

(or lack thereof) concerning it. This by itself does not specify murder, but later statements do.

At XV.25.2, Polybius lists those of whom Sosibios had arranged murders (ἀρτῦσαι φόνον), and

Arsinoë falls fifth in this list. At XV.25.12(9), in the context of Agathocles’ arrangement of governmental posts, Polybius introduces Philammon as “the one in charge of the murder of

Arsinoë” (Φιλάμμωνα τὸν ἐπιστάντα τῷ τῆς Ἀρσινόης φόνῳ). This assumes Arsinoë’s murder as well enough established to back the introduction of a new character.594 Lastly,

Polybius argues that the death of Deinon, a government official, was justified, in fact, as

Agathocles’ most just deed.595 Deinon had known about the plot to murder Arsinoë, did nothing, and later spoke of his regret for not trying to save her. Polybius’ entire tale about

Deinon presupposes the murder of Arsinoë by Agathocles’ regime.

Unfortunately our extant Polybian text only relates her (and Ptolemy IV’s) funeral and not the narration of their deaths. However, we have a fragment from John of Antioch, a sixth century Byzantine historian whose Historia mundi is also partly preserved in the Constantinian

Excerpts. John relates that Agathocleia, Agathocles’ sister, had Arsinoë killed after Ptolemy IV’s death (ἡ Ἀγαθόκλεια Ἀρσινόην διαφθείρει δόλῳ).596 John’s text specifies Agathocleia as

593 Polyb., XI.25.6(8). Τοῦ γὰρ θανάτου φωτισθέντος ὁ τρόπος ἐπεζητεῖτο τῆς ἀπωλείας · οὐκ οὔσης δὲ προφάσεως ἄλλης οὐδεμιᾶς, τῆς ἀληθινῆς φήμης προσπεπτωκυίας, ἀκμὴν δ’ ἀμφισβητουμένης, τὸ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν γεγονὸς ἐν ταῖς ἑκάστων γνώμαις ἐπεσφραγίσθη. 594 XV.33.11 echoes this phrase: τὸν Φιλάμμωνα . . . τὸν ἐπιστάντα τῷ φόνῳ τῆς βασιλίσσης. Philammon and his family’s deaths only occur because Arsinoë’s friends perceived him as her assassin. 595 Polyb., XV.26a.1. 596 John Ant. fg. 54. See Müller Fragmenta historicorum graecorum IV.558, along with Walbank HCP II.482. John’s text also states that Ptolemy IV put aside his queen for a hetaira. While the names do not consistently match up, it is clear that this refers to Arsinoë being put aside for Agathocleia. 134 initiating the murder of Arsinoë, which also implicates her in the guilt of Agathocles’ regime, and

Polybius too presupposes the murder of Arsinoë by Agathocles and Agathocleia. Lastly,

Polybius fully implicates Agathocleia in the demise of Arsinoë and the rise of Agathocles through his offhand statement identifying her at XIV.5. Here he is discussing the influence of courtesans and says of Agathocleia, “and over the king Ptolemy Philopator (IV) did not

Agathocleia the courtesan rule – she who also overthrew the entire palace (ἡ καὶ πᾶσαν

ἀνατρέψασα τὴν βασιλείαν)?”597 After the death of Arsinoë, the child Ptolemy V is entrusted to the care of Agathocleia and Agathocles’ mother, Oenanthe, reflecting Agathocleia’s further success in transferring power from the legitimate queen to herself.598 Agathocleia’s involvement, as reflected by John of Antioch and Polybius’s own hints, will hold significance for understanding why the people direct their emotions and violence against her and Oenanthe as well.599

The very first emotion of our passage arises at XV.25.8(10). The people, the

Alexandrian community, reflect upon Arsinoë III’s life and all that she undeservedly suffered: her orphanhood, the hubris against her while alive, and her assassination.600 This provokes tears, goodwill for Arsinoë, and hatred towards Agathocles’ regime.601 Because the people did not believe Arsinoë deserved to be murdered (or to suffer throughout her life), they hated the

597 Polyb., XIV.11.5. Τοῦ δὲ Φιλοπάτορος βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου οὐκ Ἀγαθόκλεια ἡ ἑταίρα ἐκράτει ἡ καὶ πᾶσαν ἀνατρέψασα τὴν βασιλείαν; 598 Polyb., XV.25.12. 599 Agathocleia is implicated further in Agathocles’ regime directly in the anger felt at XV.25.28(25), participates in his plea to the troops at XV.26.1 and in his withdrawal into the palace specifically at XV.31.13. 600 Polyb., XV.25.7(9). ἀνανεούμενοι τινὲς μὲν τὴν ὀρϕανίαν αὐτῆς, ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐν τῷ ζῆν ὕβριν, ἣν ὑπέμεινε, καὶ τὴν αἰκίαν, σὺν δὲ τούτοις τὸ περὶ τὴν τελευτὴν ἀτύχημα, εἰς τοσαύτην παράστασιν ἐνέπιπτον καὶ δυσθυμίαν ὥστε πλήρη γενέσθαι τὴν πόλιν στεναγμοῦ, δακρύων, οἰμωγῆς ἀκαταπαύστου. 601 Ibid., XV.25.8(10). Ταῦτα δ’ ἦν τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις οὐχ οὕτω τῆς πρὸς Ἀρσινόην εὐνοίας τεκμήρια, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα μίσους. “But these things were for those reckoning correctly not so much signs of goodwill towards Arsinoë but rather more [signs] of hatred towards Agathocles.” These two results of εὔνοια and μῖσος have different objects – Arsinoë and Agathocles. The tears’ meaning depends on the onlooker, placing key significance in an internal fourth party. So, opposite but complementary emotions can exist at the same time, such as pity towards one object and hatred towards another object, especially in a collective. 135 perpetrators. That is, they consider it wrong that Agathocles and his group caused Arsinoë to suffer. Thus we see in the very first negative reactive emotion a parallel to Helm’s theory of communal, third-party reactive emotion based upon moral standards. Harm to an innocent or even a benefactor is unacceptable, just as we saw in the development of the community in the anacyclosis.602

Agathocles counteracts the hatred against him by paying the soldiers two months’ wages as an indulgence.603 However, he fails to manage the emotions against him. While emotional management of others is not a dominant theme in the Histories, several successful leaders do directly influence and change others’ emotions towards themselves.604 Aratus in the assembly of the Achaians completely reverses their indignation against him, as does Hannibal with the anger of the Carthaginians.605 These successful leaders first acknowledge the negative emotions against them and then work to reestablish their position in society by bringing up and calling to mind the moral values which underlie such emotions. Agathocles recognizes the negative emotions against him but fails both to acknowledge them and to identify their underlying social and moral values.606 Here, Agathocles fails to recognize both the intensity of hatred against him and makes the wrong move: he assumes that for others, like himself, self-interest trumps emotional

602 Polyb., VI.6.2-9. See Helm 2014, 47-60. Although Polybius mentions both reactions of goodwill and hatred of the tears and mourning, one has greater effect in the subsequent narrative. Mῖσος proves more important than εὔνοια for the future, for this is the first of many times μῖσος is mentioned concerning Agathocles. This hatred seems latent already. It just takes some signs and right-thinking people to recognize its existence. Reflection on the undeserved suffering of Arsinoë III, to the benefit of Agathocles, causes the demonstration of this μῖσος. Those who reason correctly are the first to note this hatred, which plays a major role in the subsequent narrative. From this, we can say that rational thinkers thus also are expected to have keen awareness and recognition of emotions as well as other rational arguments. Emotional intelligence is important for Polybius’ world. 603 Polyb., XV.25.11. πρῶτον μὲν διμήνου τὰς δυνάμεις ὠψωνίασε πεπεισμένος τὸ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς μῖσος ἀμβλύνειν διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸ λυσιτελὲς ὁρμῆς αὐτῶν. 604 Polyb., XV.25.11, XV.25.23(20). IV.14.2-8; XV.19.3, XI.28, and XI.34.3 for the best examples of individuals’ successful management and negotiation of others’ emotions. See Guelfucci 1986, 227-237, on how masterful generals can and do manage fear consistently. 605 Polyb., IV.14.2-8; XV.19.3. 606 Thus, Agathocles, like the tyrants, separates himself from the community. He fails to feel any self-reactive emotion, such as guilt, as per Helm 2014, 54. 136 moralism.607 The pay Agathocles distributes only blunts the potency of the negative emotions but does not dispel the hate towards him; he certainly does not reverse the negative feeling against him as we saw Aratus do.608

After removing the esteemed and competent men, sending out his own friends on embassies, and enlisting his own group of mercenaries, Agathocles, similar to the tyrants and oligarchs in Polybius’ anacyclosis, gets excessively drunk and rapes matrons, brides, and maidens.609 Moreover, he carries out all these immoral and transgressive behaviors with the most vile ostentation.610 Such behavior resembles the transgressions observed throughout the anacyclosis, harming and taking undue advantage of others for one’s own self-interest.611

Polybius follows Agathocles’ behavior with this statement:

“From this with much indignation of all sorts occurring, but without any care or aid being offered, but the opposite, with outrage, arrogance, and negligence added on, again the previous hatred arose up in the many (τοῖς πολλοῖς) and all (πάντες) remembered the previous misfortunes concerning the royal house because of these people.”612

Agathocles clearly harms the women he rapes and their families.613 However, his actions not only stir indignation and hatred in these personal victims but in the many and all. The whole community feels the whole spectrum of feelings of indignation (πολλῆς μὲν καὶ παντοδαπῆς

607 An important note of interest in this sentence is the people’s inclination towards profit. This assimilates them to the people of ochlocracy (VI.9.5-8) and the degenerate mixed constitution (VI.57.6, VI.57.8). However, these people do not forget entirely their reactive emotions, nor the social values which underlie them. 608 Polyb., IV.14.8. Agathocles’ bribery works well enough for Agathocles to resume his usual habits, which in turn lead to our major instance of all three negative emotions at XV.25.26(23)-XV.25.28(25). 609 Ibid., XV.25.25(22). αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ τῆς νυκτὸς ἐν μέθῃ διέτριβε καὶ ταῖς τῇ μέθῃ παρεπομέναις ἀκρασίαις, οὐ φειδόμενος οὔτ’ ἀκμαζούσης γυναικὸς οὔτε νύμφης οὔτε παρθένου, καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἔπραττε μετὰ τῆς ἐπαχθεστάτης φαντασίας. 610 μετὰ τῆς ἐπαχθεστάτης φαντασίας. 611 Polyb., VI.6.2, VI.6.4, VI.6.6, VI.6.8, VI.7.7, and VI.8.5. 612 Polyb., XV.25.26(23)-27(24). “Ὅθεν πολλῆς μὲν καὶ παντοδαπῆς γινομένης δυσαρεστήσεως, οὐδεμιᾶς δὲ θεραπείας οὐδὲ βοηθείας προσαγομένης, τὸ δ’ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ προσεπαγομένης ὕβρεως, ὑπερηφανίας, ῥᾳθυμίας, ἀνεθυμιᾶτο πάλιν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ προϋπάρχον μῖσος καὶ πάντες ἀνενεοῦντο τὰ προγεγενημένα περὶ τὴν βασιλείαν ἀτυχήματα διὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τούτους.” 613 Agathocles’ habits of drinking and debauchery match the tyrants’ and oligarchs’; VI.7.7 and VI.8.5. See also for examples of this stereotype of tyranny, Pl., Leg. 3.695B, and as a ruling class fault, Arist., Pol. 1302a38-b3, 1295b9- 11. See Eckstein 1995, 286ff. on Agathocles as an example of drunkenness and debauchery and their role in leading to violence. 137 γινομένης δυσαρεστήσεως). Such feelings of indignation react explicitly (ὅθεν) to

Agathocles’ transgressions of communal standards of acceptable behavior. Agathocles’ behavior jeopardizes the community’s integrity and common respect: if the particular women whom

Agathocles raped and their families as members of the community are open to such disrespect and undeserved suffering, then no one in the community is guaranteed respect for their basic human dignity and safety.614 Polybius’ narrative traces the same behaviors Helm discusses in his philosophy of communal emotion and the course of human behavior in his own anacyclosis: the basis for the community, as a union of members with the same respect and safety guaranteed to all through adherence to moral socially-acceptable behaviors, has been nullified through

Agathocles’ prioritization of his self-interest and, implicitly, his claim of higher status, not subject to the communal codes of moral behavior.615 In this way, Agathocles transgressed the social norms of the community and therefore stimulated the negative reactive emotions of indignation and hatred.

In the rest of this passage, as with this episode, indignation is always directly tied to the moment of social transgression.616 Linking markers tie them together as explicit cause and effect.617 Through this backward-looking focus, indignation is concerned with social norms, justice, and morality. Indignation has little explicit drive towards action. Instead, indignation calls for remedy and recognition. Polybius even notes that some aid or remedy was expected

(οὐδεμιᾶς δὲ θεραπείας οὐδὲ βοηθείας προσαγομένης). No “aid” comes from Agathocles.

If Agathocles had noticed the indignation and cared about communal values, he could possibly have rectified the situation and restored the prevailing social values and standards of behavior.

They expect an expression of guilt and a subsequent attempt to remedy it from Agathocles. But

614 See Fierke 2015 on human dignity and emotion. 615 Helm 2014, 54-59. Compare the tyrants’ motives and behaviors at VI.7.6-7. 616 Polyb., XV.25.26(23) (δυσαρέστησις), XV.27.3 (ἀγανακτεῖν), XV.32.4 (δυσαρεστεῖν). 617 Polyb., XV.25.26(23): ὅθεν; XV.27.3: Ἐφ’ οἷς; XV.32.4: τὰ μὲν γὰρ . . . τὰ δὲ πάλιν. 138 he fails to feel or show any remorse, forsaking communal values through such a failure to show a “self-reactive emotion” in Helm’s terminology.618 Instead, the absence of acknowledgement from him signifies a substantial disagreement between himself and the community.619

Agathocles thus falls outside of the community and fails to note and abide by moral standards.

Not only does Agathocles disregard moral standards completely, but he adds insult to injury with his hubristic, predatory, and self-interested behaviors.620 With these behaviors

Agathocles rekindles the people’s hatred (ἀνεθυμιᾶτο πάλιν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ προϋπάρχον

μῖσος), which we first saw at XV.8(10).

In Polybius’ text as well as in the modern social sciences, hatred is perpetuated by memory of past transgressions and emotions.621 Emotional memory is a newer topic in the social sciences which analyze both emotion’s impact on memory accuracy and on the process of recalling emotions.622 In Polybius’ narrative, we see the process of emotional recollection at work, for the people recall their past feelings, a preexisting hatred, and this negative emotion resurfaces due to new but similar stimuli.623

At XV.25.27(24), the memory perpetuates hatred.624 This perpetuation of emotion through memory nearly ensures its continuance without cessation until it is appeased or resolved. Those who felt hatred without any adequate result do not continuously feel hatred

618 On first-person or “self-reactive emotions,” see Helm 2014, 51-52. Bring in to explain the need for guilt and why the lack of it is important: it breaks with communal values. 619 Helm 2014., 56. 620 Polyb., XV.27(24). τὸ δ’ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ προσεπαγομένης ὕβρεως, ὑπερηφανίας, ῥᾳθυμίας, ἀνεθυμιᾶτο πάλιν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ προϋπάρχον μῖσος. 621 Polyb., XV.7(9)-8(10), XV.25.27(24), and XV.27.3. 622 See, for example, von Scheve 2013, Brainerd, Stein et al. 2008, and Kensinger 2007. 623 This occurs without the complex process of rational reflection explicitly reoccurring, as per von Scheve 2013, 56- 63. 624 Polyb., XV.25.27(24). πάντες ἀνενεοῦντο τὰ προγεγενημένα περὶ τὴν βασιλείαν ἀτυχήματα διὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τούτους. “all remembered the previous misfortunes concerning the royal house because of these people.” In the first example of how a community and its moral values develop in the anacyclosis, VI.6.2-3, the third-party onlookers observed a child maltreating and disrespecting its parents, reflected that they themselves would not like such treatment if they were in the place of the parents, having taken such pains to raise the child, and so felt indignation. 139 thereafter, but rather they will feel unfulfilled hatred whenever they are reminded of and consciously remember this emotional experience, as happens explicitly in Polybius’ passage here.625

In the episode of Agathocles’ self-interested transgressions, anger surfaces. “But in that they had no public figure to take the lead worthy of mention, and through whom they would work out their anger towards Agathocles and Agathocleia, they kept quiet.”626 The lack of a leader sustains the negative emotions in the people.627 However, the people keep quiet because no suitable leader is present, betraying the presupposition that if he were present, the people could and would act on their anger.

The motivation of the anger is left unstated here. We already know that the murder of

Arsinoë, Agathocles’ rapes, and his further ostentatious display of power form the basis for popular indignation and hate. Agathocles’ generalized habits of drinking, debauchery, and hubris give Polybius cause to mention all three negative reactive emotions of indignation, hatred, and anger. Indignation comes first, directly tied to the moment of transgression, hatred comes next, as part of the cognitive reflection on previous similar circumstances, further intensifying the negative affect, and anger is narrated last in its tendency towards expectation of future action.

Anger, ὀργή, the last emotion to arise, is forward-looking and action-oriented.628

Characters expect the subjects of the anger, the people, to act on this emotion. Polybius notes

625 In Polybius’ passage, this also occurs explicitly at XV.27.3, where, through the act of hubris by Agathocles against Danaë, the people grew indignant more publicly and displayed their hatred clearly. This act’s entire purpose was to communicate their emotion of hatred. 626 Polyb., XV.25.28(25). “Τῷ <δὲ> μηδὲν ἔχειν πρόσωπον ἀξιόχρεων τὸ προστησόμενον καὶ δι’ οὗ τὴν ὀργὴν εἰς τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ τὴν Ἀγαθόκλειαν ἀπερείσονται, τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἦγον.” 627 Cf. the anacyclosis: VI.8.1, VI.9.1. 628 Polyb., XV.25.23(20), XV.25.28(25), XV.27.1, XV.30.1. 140 the lack of action-fulfillment concerning anger, unlike with indignation.629 Anger, and its impetus towards action, can be blocked, both intentionally and unintentionally. Anger also contributes directly to the hatred, which eventually does burst forth into violent action.

Next, Polybius tells us that Tlepolemos, then general in Pelusion, having figured out that

Agathocles and his regime were in charge in Alexandria, instead of a council of the leading citizens as he had thought, begins to plot against Agathocles due to their personal hostility

(ἔχθρα) and his confidence that he would make a better guardian for the king. Tlepolemos’ own drinking parties and slander of Agathocles arouse reciprocal slander from Agathocles.630

At this point, there is a break in this narrative, but our text resumes with Agathocles’ sentimental and sensational display, overwhelmed with tears and pleading to the Macedonian troops, entrusting the king to their care against Tlepolemos’ alleged conspiracy.631 Here,

Agathocles and Agathocleia fail at eliciting pity. 632 One could read an earlier fragment, XV.17, to explain Agathocles’ failure. At XV.17.1-2, Polybius explains one way in which ὀργή and

μῖσος are apt to arise together: from faked suffering. Polybius targets courtiers, who do not feel genuinely (αὐτοπαθῶς) but feign what they calculate will bring them profit.633 Agathocles

629 Polyb., XV.25.23(20), XV.25.28(25). Indignation could have been assuaged by recognizing it and its causes; with anger the causes have less weight: it only comes in to foreshadow a resulting action. 630 Polyb., XV.25.29(26)-40(37). 631 Polyb., XV.26.1-7. The breaks are due to a change in the main manuscript traditions, transferring from the Constantinian Excerpts to the Excerpta Antiqua. The order of the passages from the Constantinian Excerpts and how much of this passage has been lost are unknown. See Maas 1949, 443-448. 632 Unfortunately, we do not know what motivated Agathocles to make this failed plea due to the selectivity of the excerptions which provide this passage. 633 Polyb., XV.17.1-2. ὅταν μὲν αὐτοπαθῶς δόξῃ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν συμπτωμάτων, ἔλεον ἐκκαλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς ὁρῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσι, καὶ συγκινεῖ πως ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ὁ ξενισμός· ἐπὰν δὲ ϕαίνηται γοητείας χάριν καὶ καθ' ὑπόκρισιν γίνεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔλεον, ἀλλ' ὀργὴν ἐξεργάζεται καὶ μῖσος. “When one seems to be overcome by feeling because of the greatness of his misfortunes, he elicits pity from those who see and hear him, and the novelty moves each of us in some way. But on the contrary, whenever such behavior appears to happen for the sake of trickery and as an act, not pity but anger and hate are what he stimulates.” 141 also displays fake suffering; therefore, no pity arises.634 If XV.17.1-2 fully holds true here, ὀργή and μῖσος arise instead, though Polybius’ narrative at XV.26 does not specify this. So far, tears have been the deepest expression of sympathy and fullness of feeling. The city’s sympathizing with Arsinoë is thus quite potent, and it aligns with Book VI’s theory of how people reflect on others and apply the situation to themselves.635 Conversely, Agathocles’ tears involve no reflection, no genuine suffering, and no shared emotions, thereby lacking the same, genuine and sympathetic reception. Thus Agathocles perpetuates the morally-based, negative reactive emotions felt by the people against himself through his own emotional mismanagement.

Although he does occasionally recognize the negative reactions against him, he never acknowledges them or their underlying communal values.

In addition to his failed display of emotion, Agathocles ordered that Tlepolemos’ mother-in-law, Danaë, be shamefully dragged unveiled through the streets from the temple of

Demeter and put under guard in order to make manifest his hostility with Tlepolemos. This move backfires, for the people grow indignant (ἀγανακτεῖν) again and make public their hatred

(μῖσος) through graffiti.636 Agathocles and his group attempt to leave, but they fail through their own ineffective planning, and instead they take up tyrannical power, killing some rivals, imprisoning others.637

Polybius frames the episode of Danaë’s public shaming and imprisonment with reference to emotions. First, Polybius establishes the episode as an example for the anger against Agathocles: “Αnd some support for extending the anger both of the many and of

634 Polyb., XV.26.2; XV.26.8. The only divergence from XV.17.1-2 is that there is no explicit anger and hatred from this particular act. Perhaps that is because there already is latent anger and hatred, but it is interesting that Polybius chose not to remark upon the arousal of these emotions again. 635 Contrast the example of XV.25.9(6): the city of Alexandria, reflecting over Arsinoë and her misfortunes, fell into such despondency that it was full of mourning and tears. 636 Polyb., XV.27.1-3. Compare the prominent Roman example of people expressing their intense values in the case of Tiberius Gracchus. See Morstein-Marx 2012. 637 Polyb., XV.27.4-5. 142 Tlepolemos was contributed by Agathocles.”638 Agathocles merits the anger against him, because of his outrage against Danaë, for by this act he transgresses all standards of decency and community expectations and norms.639 Polybius ends the episode with indignation and hatred.640

As we saw above, indignation directly responds to transgression of the social and moral standards.641 Thus, the treatment of Danaë – transgressive, immoral, and self-interested – motivates communal reactions of negative emotion. The people respond with indignation to

Agathocles’ acts, in the same way the subjects under tyranny reacted with hatred, anger, and resentment.642 In this way, the people in XV.25-33 serve as a reservoir for a sense of social morality, much as the people within the anacyclosis did: both communities reacted emotionally in direct response to transgressions of their social norms.

At this point Polybius introduces the story of Moiragenes, a bodyguard suspected of collusion with Tlepolemos.643 Agathocles, as part of his assumption of tyrannical power, identifies Moiragenes as a threat because of his kinship and the rumor of his aid to Tlepolemos and gives orders to Nikostratos to detain and question him eagerly, applying every torture.644

Nikostratos has Moiragenes undressed and prepared for torture because he denied all allegations of his aid to Tlepolemos.645 Nikostratos receives a message and leaves the room without giving

638 Polyb., XV.27.1. Ἐγένετο δέ τι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν <τῶν> περὶ τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα συνέργημα πρὸς τὸ τὴν ὀργὴν ἐπιτεῖναι τήν τε τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τὴν τοῦ Τληπολέμου. 639 It is interesting that here Polybius does not invoke transgression against the gods, as he does in the case of Philip V’s despoliation of the sanctuary at Thermum, because Danaë was taken from the temple of Demeter. See for example, V.12, XI.7, XVI.1, XXIII.10. 640 Polyb., XV.27.3. Ἐφ’ οἷς τὸ πλῆθος ἀγανακτοῦν οὐκέτι κατ’ ἰδίαν οὐδὲ δι’ ἀπορρήτων ἐποιεῖτο τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν τὰς νύκτας εἰς πάντα τόπον ἐπέγραφον, οἱ δὲ τὰς ἡμέρας συστρεφόμενοι κατὰ μέρη φανερῶς ἐξέφερον ἤδη τὸ μῖσος εἰς τοὺς προεστῶτας. “In response, the crowd grew indignant, no longer privately nor did they talk secretly, but some by night wrote in every place, and others by day clearly already brought out their hatred towards the leaders.” 641 Polyb., XV.25.25(23). 642 Polyb., VI.7.8. 643 Polyb., XV.27.6-29.3. 644 Polyb., XV.27.6. 645 Polyb., XV.27.7. 143 any instructions to those standing ready to whip and torture Moiragenes.646 These cronies eventually all drift off, leaving Moiragenes alone, who runs off through the palace, eventually to find the Macedonian troops and tearfully persuade them of his situation and of the need to capitalize on the prevalent hatred to secure his, the boy king’s, and their own safety.647 They are persuaded and percolate through the rest of the troops until, not four hours later, troops and citizens were gathered, ready for action and revolution.648

The Moiragenes episode is the spark that ignites all the latent negative emotion. Even without explicit elicitation of emotions, Moiragenes’ episode provides the critical turning point in the entire passage.649 Moiragenes recognized the hatred of the people and called upon the elite troop corps, the Macedonians, to act upon it. He tells them that “there was clear destruction for them all unless they took advantage of the opportunity in which the hatred of the many peaked and all were ready for Agathocles’ punishment.”650 Like Agathocles earlier,

Moiragenes recognizes, identifies, and acts upon others’ emotion, but – unlike Agathocles –

Moiragenes seeks to exploit rather than counteract this emotion (συνάψωνται τοῦ καιροῦ).

From this point on, the actions resulting from the emotions, rather than the emotions themselves, drive the narrative.

646 Polyb., XV.28.3. 647 Polyb., XV.28.4-28.9. Cf. Agathocles’ failure to persuade these Macedonian soldiers, XV.26.3. 648 Polyb., XV.29.1-4. 649 Polyb., XV.27.6-29.1. It is interesting that Polybius does not narrate Moiragenes’ own feelings. He allows the narrative with its paradoxical turns to elicit such reflective emotion in the audience, including the internal audience. (While I do not focus on descriptive passages and how they might elicit audience emotion, this would be a good example of how this would work.) Polybius doesn’t need to say that Moiragenes was afraid; he would be illogical not to be in this situation. The audience senses this fear in a reflective way: they think about what they would feel in like circumstances. The audience presumably resents Agathocles, Nikostratos, and their cronies because they act unjustly and unjustifiably. Moiragenes (without saying it explicitly) implores the Macedonians to become indignant and join in feeling resentment towards Agathocles. His appeal and the context was conducive for eliciting emotions, although Polybius does not further depict these emotions or their implications for the audience of Macedonians. However, this argument exemplifies another line of thought for emotional processes in ancient narratives. 650 Polyb., XV.28.8. πρόδηλον γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσι τὸν ὄλεθρον, ἐὰν μὴ συνάψωνται τοῦ καιροῦ, καθ΄ ὃν ἀκμάζει τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μῖσος καὶ πᾶς ἕτοιμός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν κατ’ Ἀγαθοκλέους τιμωρίαν. 144 This story brings up several important issues. First it demonstrates Agathocles’ tyrannical power: he detains Moiragenes to be tortured based on an allegation (προσέπεσε

διαβολὴ κατά τινος Μοιραγένους).651 Next, it brings up the issue of Moiragenes’ identity. He is one of the bodyguard and related to the commander at Boubasos, Adaios.652 So he has an intimate position at the court, with access to the king, to protect him. In his detention and stripping, his status is entirely undermined. He was not a citizen at that moment, nor a member of the bodyguard or court, nor even a free man. He was treated as a criminal or slave. This indeterminacy of social status comes into greater contrast when he is left alone in the center of the state: he is left perplexed because he is excluded from all roles he should have had – free man, citizen, bodyguard. Yet he was left in the absolute center of the state, the inside of the palace. His position is thus a paradox: the excluded in the center of the state.653

His next move complicates his status. He runs out and persuades the elite troops to take action. Moiragenes becomes an unlikely leader for the movement against Agathocles. In the narrative thus far, one expects that Tlepolemos will become the long-expected leader for the people to work out their anger and hatred against Agathocles, but in our extant narrative, it is

Moiragenes who takes up this role and begins to act upon the people’s emotions.654 However,

Moiragenes’ indeterminate status puts him both outside the political and within it. He is like the excluded leader found in the state form of ochlocracy in the anacyclosis of Book Six, but he is also like the leaders of the overthrow of tyranny due to his somewhat high (former) status as a

651 Polyb., XV.27.6. 652 Polyb., XV.27.6. Walbank, HCP II.489 argues that Moiragenes was Macedonian and of the same status as the younger Sosibios. See Griffith 1968 for mercenaries’ status in the Hellenistic world in general. 653 My observations here have been inspired by Agamben 1998, 17-18. 654 XV.25.28(25). Τῷ <δὲ> μηδὲν ἔχειν πρόσωπον ἀξιόχρεων τὸ προστησόμενον καὶ δι’ οὗ τὴν ὀργὴν εἰς τὸν Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ τὴν Ἀγαθόκλειαν ἀπερείσονται, τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἔτι μίαν ἐλπίδα καραδοκοῦντες τὴν κατὰ τὸν Τληπόλεμον καὶ ταύτῃ προσανέχοντες. Regardless of the lost narrative of the events after XV.33, Moiragenes was certainly the first leader for acting upon the people’s emotions, as Tlepolemos was journeying towards Alexandria at that time. 145 royal bodyguard, and yet again he is like the one who leads the change into democracy by saying or doing something against the oligarchs.655 Moiragenes embodies traits found in the final stages of a degenerate state form as it begins to transition to a better form.656 Thus he lives in Polybius’ theoretical model and also complicates it through his more detailed, lived experience. He fits as a key figure in the overthrow of a degenerate government, completed by the fruition of emotion into action.

Moiragenes’ excluded status marks him as the special figure, in a unique position for recognizing the issues at hand. He can recognize the feeling of the people from an (insider) outside perspective: he no longer actually belongs as a member of the community of soldiers and citizens, but his own experiences of formerly belonging and of uniquely suffering firsthand enable him to identify and call upon the troops to take action. It is his paradoxical situation which bring the soldiers to believe and listen to Moiragenes.657 His status as an excluded figure – naked, nearly tortured, former bodyguard and citizen – determines his new role as the only one capable of changing the state, by activating the people’ emotions.

Moiragenes further demonstrates his changed and unique position by identifying the hatred of the people. He sees it through his third-party perspective. Ironically, only Agathocles has explicitly recognized the people’s hatred and tried to combat it in this passage.658 Here,

Moiragenes’ recognition of hatred provides the opportunity and stimulus for action. This marks

655 Polyb., VI.9.8 - ὅταν λάβῃ προστάτην μεγαλόφρονα καὶ τολμηρόν, ἐκκλειόμενον; VI.7.9 – οὐκ ἐκ τῶν χειρίστων ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν γενναιοτάτων καὶ μεγαλοψυχοτάτων ἔτι δἐ θαρραλεωτάτων ἀνδρῶν; VI.9.1 – κἄπειτα θαρρήσῃ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν τι κατὰ τῶν προεστώτων. 656 With the exception of ochlocracy, which does not get better. 657 Polyb., XV.28.6. Οἳ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἠπίστουν, τὰ δὲ πάλιν ὁρῶντες αὐτὸν γυμνὸν ἠναγκάζοντο πιστεύειν. Polybius expressly comments earlier on the paradoxical nature of Moiragenes’ situation, XV.28.1: Περὶ δὲ τὸν Μοιραγένην ἄφατον ἦν καὶ παράλογον τὸ συμβαῖνον. 658 Polyb., XV.25.11. 146 the climax of the entire passage. From the beginning negative emotions have built up over several examples, and finally here they find an outlet into action.659

Thus, Moiragenes’ episode holds a pivotal, marked position in this passage.660 The episode hearkens back to the anacyclosis of Book Six but also deviates in its realistic circumstances. This episode vivifies the crucial issue at stake of who constitutes the political.

Agathocles has the political power to detain and torture Moiragenes, but he stands outside of regular society as a tyrant figure. Moiragenes loses all status, and so, as one excluded from the state, is paradoxically able to create change in the political state. On the other hand, the

Macedonians, other troops, and citizens whom Moiragenes persuaded take up action as if they have a right to demand a change in the political state. In fact, all the people’s emotions occur due to a sense that the values underlying their community and respect as community members have been transgressed, and their taking up action based on those emotions completes their claim to a stake in the political state. Thus, emotions have an extended reach, justifying and exemplifying both their causal role in dynamic change and the people’s claim to a part in the political affairs and running of the state.

At this point, Polybius relates the story of Oenanthe, Agathocles’ mother, at the temple of Demeter, where she, distraught, sat alone.661 Some women who do not realize the political situation and gathering of the mob, try to speak comfortingly to her, but she shouts loudly at them, calling them monsters, wishing that they would one day taste the flesh of their children, and ordering her attendants to drive them away with beatings.662 Thus, the women left and cursed that woman to experience the same as what she threatened others, and their anger

659 Their violent action does not find completion until XV.33, however. 660 The passage does not continue in the extant Histories until XVI.21-22, and even that is murky, with reference mostly to Tlepolemos’ military competence and courtly incompetence. 661 Polyb., XV.29.8-30.1. Perhaps seeking asylum? Her behavior does not fit that of one seeking asylum, but she is aware of the state of affairs in the city, unlike some of the women at the temple and unlike Agathocles, and she does not actually leave the temple at the end of the episode: she drives others away. 662 Polyb., XV.29.10-13. 147 “doubled the hatred in the households (διπλάσιον ἐξεκαύθη τὸ μῖσος).”663 Agathocles gathers the king and Agathocleia in a closed-off part of the palace and, after failed negotiations, hands over the king, whom the Macedonians jubilantly take to the stadium. At this, the mobs rejoice at the king’s safety and presence, but they are pained and grow indignant (δυσαρεστεῖν) at the escape of those guilty, who had departed to their own homes from the palace.664 Sosibios’ son,

Sosibios, persuades the child king, already upset, to agree to handing over the guilty to the mob and removes the distraught boy from the riot.665

Up to this point, Polybius’ own narration gives positive, moral validity to the emotional reactions from the people. Never in this passage are these emotions themselves condemned.

Rather, the opposite: the similarity of their narration to the anacyclosis, in which the people’s emotions stimulate dynamic change for the better consistently and exemplify human rationality, the sense of the good and of justice, attests to the salutary and positive values which these same emotions represent in this narrative.666 Furthermore, the detailed stories which Polybius included (and are preserved) are framed so as to elicit disapproval of Agathocles’ management of affairs and sympathy with his victims.667 Polybius clearly denotes his disapproval and utter disdain for Agathocles in XV.34-36, going so far as to call him unworthy for history and bringing up others who displayed worthiness for history.668 From this stark negative judgment of Agathocles, we could surmise that Polybius sympathized with the people’s assessment of

663 Polyb., XV.29.14-30.1. Αἱ δ’ ἐπιλαβόμεναι τῆς προφάσεως ταύτης ἀπηλλάττοντο πᾶσαι, τοῖς θεοῖς ἀνίσχουσαι τὰς χεῖρας καὶ καταρώμεναι λαβεῖν αὐτὴν ἐκείνην πεῖραν τούτων ἃ κατὰ τῶν πέλας ἐπανετείνετο πράξειν. Ἤδη δὲ κεκριμένου τοῦ καινοτομεῖν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἐπιγενομένης καθ΄ ἑκάστην οἰκίαν καὶ τῆς ἐκ τῶν γυναικῶν ὀργῆς, διπλάσιον ἐξεκαύθη τὸ μῖσος. 664 Polyb., XV.32.4. 665 Polyb., XV.32.5-9. 666 Polybius does not designate this episode as an example of his theory in the anacyclosis in practice. The similarities between the passage of Agathocles’ downfall and the cycle of constitutions lies in an intratextual interpretation of the language of emotions rather than any explicit intention stated by Polybius. See Skinner 1988 on intentionality and consistency in texts. 667 Compare Polybius’ digressions throughout the narrative on arousing pity, XV.17-.1-2, for example. 668 See Walbank, HCP 2.493-495, on Polybius’ digression on Agathocles and Dionysius of Syracuse. 148 Agathocles as unworthy and morally-flawed. The people preserved the same moral values of communal interest over self-interest, of indignation at undeserved harm to innocents, and of rule in harmony with the subjects.

Violence, Emotion, and Moral Justification

Emotions finally break out into action, through extreme violence. The mob indulges their passionate cruelty on Agathocles, Agathocleia, their flatterers, and their families.669 They first taste blood with Agathocles’ flatterer, Philo, who rebukes the mobs and threatens punishment from Agathocles, as he was unaware of the situation. First he is reviled and pushed, his clothes are torn off, then he is stabbed and dragged to the middle of the stadium while still breathing.670 When Agathocles arrives in chains, some people run up and stab him through,

“becoming responsible for his escaping a fitting punishment.”671 The violence continues with

Agathocles’ associates. Agathocles’ sister Agathocleia, her sisters, and other family and associates were then brought into the stadium. Oenanthe was led naked on a horse from the temple of Demeter to the stadium. All these were humiliated and killed, as some bit or stabbed them, or they gouged their eyes and finally tore them limb from limb. For, Polybius explains,

“some terrible savagery exists in the irrational passions (θυμοὺς) in the people in Egypt.”672

Lastly, the supposed killer of Arsinoë, Philammon, is stoned to death in the street by Arsinoë’s friends, who also choke his son and kill his wife, naked, after dragging her into the road.673

669 Polyb., XV.33. 670 Polyb., XV.33.4-5. Τῶν δ’ ἀκουσάντων οἱ μὲν ἀπελοιδόρουν αὐτόν, οἱ δὲ προώθουν. Ἐπιβαλομένου δ’ ἀμύνεσθαι ταχέως οἱ μὲν τὴν χλαμύδα περιέρρηξαν, οἱ δὲ τὰς λόγχας προσερείσαντες ἐξεκέντησαν. Ἅμα δὲ τῷ τοῦτον εἰς τὸ μέσον ἑλκυσθῆναι μεθ΄ ὕβρεως ἔτι σπαίροντα καὶ γεύσασθαι τὰ πλήθη φόνου, πάντες ἐκαραδόκουν τὴν τῶν ἄλλων παρουσίαν. 671 Ibid., XV.33.6. ὃν εὐθέως εἰσιόντα προσδραμόντες τινὲς ἄφνω συνεκέντησαν ἔργον, ποιοῦντες οὐκ ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλ’ εὐνοούντων · αἴτιοι γὰρ ἐγένοντο τοῦ μὴ τυχεῖν αὐτὸν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης καταστροφῆ. 672 Polyb. XV.33.10. δεινὴ γάρ τις ἡ περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ὠμότης γίνεται τῶν κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἀνθρώπων. 673 Polyb., XV.33.11-12. 149 Polybius’ narration of the people’s violence against Agathocles aligns with my analysis of the emotions’ moral basis. Polybius does not condemn Agathocles’ own violent punishment but rather comments on its light nature: “some ran up and suddenly stabbed him as he entered, doing a deed not characteristic of enemies but of good-willed friends; for they became responsible for his escaping a suitable destruction (τοῦ μὴ τυχεῖν αὐτὸν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης

καταστροφῆς).”674 Polybius manifestly considered that Agathocles deserved a harsher punishment than being violently stabbed to death.675 However, because extreme violence surrounds Agathocles’ death, with the dismemberment of his friend Philo and the stoning of

Philammon’s family even by young girls, the “leniency” of Agathocles’ own death is overlooked.676

The Histories provide further examples of those who merit extreme violence in their punishment, like Agathocles. Polybius challenges the narration of Phylarchus, an earlier

Hellenistic historian, on the death of Aristomachus, the tyrant of Argos.677 According to

Polybius, Phylarchus narrates it as such: “Becoming Antigonus’ and the Achaians’ captive,

Aristomachus was taken to Cenchreae and was tortured to death on the rack, suffering most unjustly and terribly (ἀδικώτατα καὶ δεινότατα) of all people.”678 Phylarchus continues with

Aristomachus’ cries from the rack that night, the neighbors’ horror, disbelief, and indignation, and how they then ran to the house where he was.679 But Polybius counters this judgment of

ἀδικώτατα καὶ δεινότατα that Aristomachus suffered: “but I judge Aristomachus, even if he was guilty of nothing else against the Achaians, according to the manner of his life and his

674 Polyb., XV.33.6. 675. See Pinker 2011, on the (decreasing) history of violence. 676 Even Pomeroy 1986, 411, who discusses the deaths of the villains of the Histories deemed Agathocles’ death appropriate. 677 Polyb., II.59-60. 678 Polyb., II.59.1. “ὑποχείριον Ἀντιγόνῳ καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς γενόμενον, εἰς Κεγχρεὰς ἀπαχθῆναι καὶ στρεβλούμενον ἀποθανεῖν, ἀδικώτατα καὶ δεινότατα παθόντα πάντων ἀνθρώπων.” 679 Polyb., II.59.2. 150 offenses (παρανομία) towards his country, worthy of the greatest punishment (τῆς μεγίστης

ἄξιον κρίνω τιμωρίας).”680 After all, Aristomachus was a tyrant – the worst possible word to all!681 In fact, Polybius continues, “even if Aristomachus suffered the most terrible punishments, as Phylarchus states, in this way he did not even receive a suitable sentence for one day (ὅμως

οὐχ ἱκανὴν ἔδωκεν δίκην μιᾶς ἡμέρας).”682 Now, Polybius had a specific day in mind: the one on which Aristomachus had eighty Argive citizens tortured to death in front of their families based merely on a suspicion that they colluded with the besieging Achaian force.683 Clearly

Polybius’ standards for “cruel and unusual” or “ἀδικώτατα καὶ δεινότατα” differ widely from ours, and also Phylarchus’.684

But Polybius is not finished yet. He asserts: “for this very reason it must not be thought terrible if [Aristomachus] faced something similar, but rather it must be considered more terrible if he should die untouched, having no experience of these punishments (πολὺ δὲ δεινότερον, εἰ

μηδενὸς τούτων πεῖραν λαβὼν ἀθῷος ἀπέθανεν).”685 For Polybius, it is not morally wrong for Aristomachus to suffer extreme violence: it is morally wrong for Aristomachus not to suffer extreme violence. Finally, Polybius concludes that Aristomachus should not have died on the rack at Cenchreae in the night as Phylarchus says, but that he should have been marched around the Peloponnese and made an example of with his punishment (μετὰ τιμωρίας

680 Polyb., II.59.4. “ἐγὼ δ’ Ἀριστόμαχον, εἰ καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἕτερον ἥμαρτε, κατά γε τὴν τοῦ βίου προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν εἰς πατρίδα παρανομίαν τῆς μεγίστης ἄξιον κρίνω τιμωρίας.” 681 Polyb., II.59.6. “αὐτὸ γὰρ τοὔνομα [τύραννος] περιέχει τῆν ἀσεβεστάτην ἔμφασιν καὶ πάσας περιείληφε τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας.” 682 Polyb., II.59.7. “Ἀριστόμαχος δ’ εἰ τὰς δεινοτάτας ὑπέμεινε τιμωρίας, ὡς οὗτός φησιν, ὅμως οὐχ ἱκανὴν ἔδωκεν δίκην μιᾶς ἡμέρας, . . ..” 683 Polyb., II.59.7-10. 684 See Walbank, HCP I.260: “Phylarchus voices contemporary opinion better than P., who writes from the harder background of the second century, when the fate of Mantinea had become the common lot of captured towns.” See Eckstein 2013, 314-338, on the contrary. This distinction between Polybius’ standards and ours becomes important in assessing the passage. 685 Polyb., II.60.1. “διόπερ οὐκ εἴ τινι τῶν ὁμοίων περιέπεσε δεινὸν ἡγητέον, πολὺ δὲ δεινότερον, εἰ μηδενὸς τούτων πεῖραν λαβὼν ἀθῷος ἀπέθανεν.” 151 παραδειγματιζόμενον), and so lost his life.686 Instead, Polybius subtly notes, he died by merely being drowned by the Achaian officers at Cenchreae quietly in the night.687

Polybius sets up Phylarchus’ account of Aristomachus’ death as a paradigm for judging history wrongly. Phylarchus failed to take account of Aristomachus’ past and faults, namely being a tyrant. Instead, he chose to narrate Aristomachus’ death as Polybius does for an innocent Achaian tortured to death by Diaeus and Damocritus in the later Achaian War.688 For

Polybius, Phylarchus’ account is tantamount to pardoning and even forgetting Aristomachus’ deeds and life as a tyrant: deploring his death presumes he lived an innocent life. Rather,

Polybius wants Aristomachus’ major fault of pursuing the life of a tyrant publicized

(παραδειγματιζόμενον) through the horror of his death. Death proportional to one’s crimes becomes a work of history; it provides an example to avoid for Polybius’ readers.

In addition, Polybius makes an example of Aristomachus for the scale of his punishment. Phylarchus oversensationalizes Aristomachus’ death by appeal to the horror and cruelty of it. Polybius clearly did not buy it. Polybius approved of violence as a means of punishing and encouraged it in relation to the past life of the guilty: Aristomachus deserved worse.689 So too Agathocles deserved a fate worse than only being led in chains and stabbed to death.690 In these examples, Polybius does not find the punishment cruel; he blames those punished. They created an environment conducive for cruelty, violence, and violation of human

686 Polyb., II.60.7. “ὃν ὑποχείριον γενόμενον οὐκ ἐν Κεγχρεαῖς ἔδει τὴν νύκτα στρεβλούμενον ἀποθανεῖν, ὡς Φύλαρχός φησι, περιαγόμενον δ’ εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον καὶ μετὰ τιμορίας παραδειγματιζόμενον οὕτως ἐκλιπεῖν τὸ ζῆν.” 687 Polyb., II.60.8. Polybius subtly slips in this version of Aristomachus’ death only at the end, without comment. By narrating this in a simple statement, he takes any emphasis away from qualms about this type of death, which could also be seen as cruel. Modern scholars reflect Polybius’ offhand way of narrating the death: for example McGing 2010, 74: Aristomachus suffered “nothing more terrible than drowning;” Champion 2004a, 126: “The Achaeans did no more than to drown him” (my italics). 688 Polyb., XXXVIII.18.3. “δήσαντες καὶ στρεβλοῦντες προσεπαρτέρουν, ἕως διέφθειραν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐδὲν εἰπόντα τῶν ἐκείνοις προσδοκωμένων.” 689 Polyb., II.59.3, II.59.7, II.60.1, II.60.7. 690 Polyb., XV.33.6. “μὴ τυχεῖν αὐτὸν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης καταστροφῆς.” 152 norms.691 Aristomachus began the violence and extreme cruelty against others when he tortured eighty citizens in front of their families. Agathocles began and perpetuated an environment of violence and violation of universal human standards of behavior. For this, Polybius finds his punishment merited and even too lenient.

The Histories provide further examples of Polybius’ conviction that evildoers deserve bad deaths. At the conclusion of the Mercenary War, Mathos, the Libyan leader of the defeated mercenaries against Carthage, is led through Carthage by the young men, and his torture is displayed as a triumphal parade (τὸν θρίαμβον).692 Mathos received what Polybius wanted

Aristomachus to suffer. Polybius prefaces’ Mathos’ public torture with a approving judgment:

“those responsible for the revolt (Mercenary War) were punished deservingly (καταξίως).”693

At VIII.35, Polybius lists bad generals who should have died because of their poor leadership. Tiberius Gracchus, as consul and general in 212 BC in the Second Punic War, was killed in an ambush. He deserved this fate because he failed to consider his role as general, and so he stupidly risked his life needlessly in a scouting mission.694 Likewise, Archidamos, the king of Sparta before Cleomenes, suspected Cleomenes’ ambitions and so fled. But then he trusted

Cleomenes later, despite the lack of change in circumstances. He died for this, deservingly.695

The list goes on (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πλείους ἕτεροι).696 Polybius does not hesitate to cast judgment and often does so vituperatively. This difference and his conception must be considered when evaluating his judgment on the punishment of Agathocles and his regime, something not always considered in scholarship. We have seen that, according to Polybius’

691 Modern studies on violence explore this issue, which is at the heart of ‘structural violence.’ See, for instance, the examples in Vorobej 2016, 42-54, and extended discussion, 63-144. 692 Polyb., I.88.6. “τὸ γὰρ πέρας ἀγαγόντες οἱ νέοι τὸν θρίαμβον διὰ τῆς πόλεως πᾶσαν αἰκίαν ἐναπεδείξαντο τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάθω.” 693 Polyb., II.88.5. “ὥστε . . . τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς ἀποστάσεως τιμωρήσασθαι καταξίως · . . ..” 694 Polyb., VIII.35.1-2. 695 Polyb., VIII.35.3-5. “πῶς οὐκ εὐλόγως ἔμελλε τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐγκυρησειν;” 696 Polyb., VIII.35.9. 153 considerations, Agathocles deserved to be punished based on their past transgressions and own violence. Polybius specifies that Agathocles was inadequately punished in his death, similarly to

Aristomachus, whose punishment of being racked to death was insufficient in comparison to his crimes.697

When Polybius relates the deaths of the rest of Agathocles’ family and friends, Polybius explains (γὰρ) the violence against them with recourse to the Egyptians’ natural tendency to be savage or cruel (ὠμότης) instead of referring to the gravity of the Agathocleans’ crimes.698 He does not assert that those who suffered such extreme violence did not deserve it, nor does he bring in any moralistic or judgmental terminology other than the Egyptians’ cruelty (ὠμότης).

Moreover, Polybius says that such cruelty is characteristic of the Egyptians (τῶν κατὰ τὴν

Αἴγυπτον ἀνθρώπων), not of the people as a political group. To be clear, Polybius does not condone the complete dismemberment of the Agathocleans after the mob actually tastes their blood by biting them (alongside stabbing them and gouging their eyes out). Polybius’ acknowledgement of their cruelty judges this negatively. As such, Polybius implies that all the

Agathocleans did not deserve such an extreme and violent punishment as they received.

Nevertheless, Polybius refrains from such criticism as he used against Phylarchus, and he only impugns the Egyptians’ tendency towards savagery and not their uprising (in itself) for punishing those responsible both for Arsinoë’s death and for Agathocles’ outrages. In comparison with

697 Polyb., XV.33.6 – “μὴ τυχεῖν αὐτὸν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης καταστροφῆς”; II.59.7 – “ὅμως οὐκ ἱκανῆν ἔδωκεν δίκην μιᾶς ἡμέρας.” Compare also Mathos, I.88.5 “τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς ἀποστάσεως τιμωρήσασθαι καταξίως,” and Deinon, XV.26a.2 “τυχὼν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης τιμωρίας.” 698 Polyb., XV.33.10. (requoted:) δεινὴ γάρ τις ἡ περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ὠμότης γίνεται τῶν κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἀνθρώπων. 154 Polybius’ verdict on Aristomachus’ light punishment and his acerbic criticism of rival historians, this comment on the Egyptians’ savagery seems tame. 699

To get to the bottom of Polybius’ statement on the Egyptians’ savagery, we must examine this concept throughout the Histories.700 Throughout his narrative, Polybius sees

ὠμότης as negative. Ὠμότης, translated as savagery or cruelty, often appears alongside

παρανομία, lawlessness.701 These two qualities specifically characterize internal wars, such as the Mercenary War between Carthage and its mercenaries after the First Punic War and the

“Native War” between Egyptians and Ptolemy IV. 702 Bad rulers show ὠμότης alongside impiety, ἀσέβεια, and faithlessness, ἀθεσία. 703 All four of these qualities crop up together in a speech by Chlaineas, who maligns Philip V’s character by bringing up his ἀσέβεια, seen by his outrages (ὕβρεις) against the gods’ temples at Thermum, and his ὠμότης, exemplified by his faithlessness (ἀθεσία) and lawlessness (παρανομία) towards the Messenians.704 This passage contrasts ἀσέβεια and ὠμότης, where ἀσέβεια is offense towards the gods and ὠμότης a parallel offense against humans. Polybius corroborates this distinction when discussing Philip V and Antiochus III’s plan to divide up Ptolemy V’s kingdom for themselves.705 Polybius accuses these two kings of acting like beasts (θηριωδῶς), adding yet another association of ὠμότης, that with bestialization. Although Polybius thinks of ὠμότης as a distinctly human trait, it brings

699 See above for Polybius’ criticisms of cruel people and of people not punished worthily; for broader representations of Polybius’ virulent criticism, see Book XII, which is entirely criticism. See Eckstein 1995, 112- 113, 248-251, 274; Marincola 1997, 223-239; Marincola 2001, 133-140; Marincola 2013, 73-90; Pédech 1964, passim; Sacks 1981, Schepens and Bollansée, eds. 2005; Walbank 1962, 1-12; Walbank 1972, 33-65, esp. 34-40; on this renowned trend of Polybius. 700 See Mauersberger, 3.2, 1131-1132. 701 Polyb., I.88.3 (of the mercenaries in the Mercenary War against Carthage), IV.20.2 (of the Arcadians’ environment), IX.30.2 (of Philip V), XIV.12.4 (the Native War in Egypt), XV.22.3 (of Philip V), XXXII.5.5 (of the Epirot Charops). See too Hau 2016 on cruelty in Polybius as compared to Diodorus Siculus. 702 Polyb., I.88.1, XIV.12.4. 703 Polyb., VII.7.2 (Hieronymus), IX.24.8, 26.8 (Hannibal – when circumstances changed his character), IX.30.2 (Philip V), XV.20.4 (Philip V and Antiochus III), XVIII.17.3 (Nabis of Sparta), XXIV.15.2 (Pharnaces of Bithynia). 704 Polyb., IX.30.2. 705 Polyb., XV.20.3-4. 155 men closest to the level of beasts, in their lack of civilized behavior and ruthless pursuit of self- gain.706 Moreover, Polybius praised institutions which mitigated cruelty, such as the Arcadians’ education based in music which countered the harsh climatic conditions of the region.707 The

Cynaethans, continuously embroiled in internal strife and political bickering, did not adopt the

Arcadian institution of music and surpassed all the Greeks in cruelty and lawlessness – meeting with destruction rightly.708

Polybius qualifies judgments on ὠμότης and on punishment at II.56-58.709 Here

Polybius extensively criticizes Phylarchus’ historical narration of extreme punishment, that of the

Mantineans after their fall to the Achaians. First, Polybius claims that Phylarchus wished to make clear the ὠμότης of Antigonus Doson, Aratus, and the Achaians, and so he expounded on the sufferings of the Mantineans: drawing out the women’s strident lamentations, and the young children and despondent elderly being led into slavery.710 Here Polybius teaches that history should not be like tragedy, aimed at pleasure, and so history should not be filled with incidental

706 Polyb., I.81.7-11. 707 Polyb., IV.20-21, 708 Polyb. IV.20.2: ἄξιον βραχὺ διαπορῆσαι περὶ τῆς Κυναιθέων ἀγριότητος, πῶς ὄντες ὁμολογουμένως Ἀρκάδες τοσοῦτο κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς διήνεγκαν τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ὠμότητι καὶ παρανομίᾳ. 709 This passage has received much attention by scholars, focusing mostly on Polybius’ polemic and stance towards “tragic” historiography, as exemplified by Phylarchus, or on his excessive bias towards the Achaeans: see Walbank 1962, 1-12, McGing 2010, 71-74, and Marincola 2013, 74-77 for discussions on his polemic specifically and Walbank, HCP I.259-266 and Champion 2004a, 125-126 on Polybius’ Achaean bias here. McGing in particular argues that Polybius’ description of Aristomachus “is not rational, argument-based criticism but polemic,” p. 74. Although Polybius is engaging on polemic on two levels – against Phylarchus and his brand of historiography and against Aristomachus and his tyrannical lifestyle – his argument does rest on rational argument, for it must be plausible on some level to be persuasive to his audience. I would argue that his argument is based rationally on moral values which he espouses throughout his narrative, as seen in the examples I cite in this discussion. While it may be true, as per Walbank HCP I.260, that “Phylarchus voices contemporary opinion better than P.” on the harsh fate of Mantinea, I focus on Polybius’ perspective on cruelty and appropriate punishment. Polybius does endeavor to persuade his audience much more than he probably would have if they already agreed with his stance on the fate of Mantinea and on Aristomachus’ death, but this dissonance between Polybius and contemporary ideas of cruelty and punishment which contribute to the importance of seeing exactly what Polybius did think on this topic. See Eckstein 2013, for a new perspective on this passage, with which my analysis greatly aligns. 710 Polyb., II.56.7. “[Phylarchus] σπουδάζων δ’ εἰς ἔλεον ἐκκαλεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας καὶ συμπαθεῖς ποιεῖν τοῖς λεγομένοις, ἐις άγει περιπλοκὰς γυναικῶν καὶ κόμας διερριμμένας καὶ μαστῶν ἐκβολάς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις δάκρυα καὶ θρήνοιυς ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἀναμὶξ τέκνοις καὶ γονεῦσι γηραιοῖς ἀπαγομένων.” 156 details of no significance nor with exaggerations. History should give the causes and motives for actions and events, for otherwise one cannot appropriately feel pity or anger.711

Polybius justifies how important causes are for judgment with a few examples. “Who, for instance, does not think that it is terrible for a free man to be hit? But if this should happen to one who first used violence, it is thought that he suffered justly; but if the same thing is done for correction and as a lesson, those striking free men are deemed worthy of both thanks and yet more of praise.”712 Polybius approves and grants praise to violence done for good intentions.713

Polybius expands on this example: “And certainly to kill citizens is considered the greatest impious act and deserving of the greatest punishments; however, clearly one who kills a thief or adulterer is left untouched, and one who kills a traitor or tyrant meets with honors and distinctions among all.”714 In this second example he raises the stakes from a blow to murder.

What the victim had done in the past determines Polybius’ proscribed judgment: one who has stolen deserves his death, one who has been a tyrant deserves his death so much that it receives universal praise. Polybius sums up his point thus: “So in everything a final judgment on these

711 Polyb., II.56.13. “οὐχ ὑποτιθεὶς αἰτίαν καὶ τρόπον τοῖς γινομένοις, ὧν χωρὶς οὔτ’ ἐλεεῖν εὐλόγως οὔτ’ ὀργίζεσθαι καθηκόντως δυνατὸν ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων.” See Marincola 2013, 73-90, as a recent and persuasive analysis of Polybius’ criticisms of Phylarchus and tragic historiography. 712 Polyb., II. 56.14. “ἐπεὶ τίς ἀνθρώπων οὐ δεινὸν ἡγεῖται τύπτεσθαι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους; ἀλλ’ ὅμως, ἐὰν μὲν ἄρχων ἀδίκων χειρῶν πάθῃ τις τοῦτο, δικαίως κρίνεται πεπονθέναι · ἐὰν δ’ ἐπὶ διορθώσει καὶ μαθήσει ταὐτὸ τοῦτο γίνηται, προσέτι καὶ τιμῆς καὶ χάριτος οἱ τύπτοντες τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἀξιοῦνται.” 713 Thus, praiseworthy violence fulfills the same higher goals – correction and teaching a lesson – Polybius sets for history. The usage and Polybius’ views on violence differ greatly from common conceptions of violence today, one of which is the assumption that for something to count as “violence” it is inherently disapproved as such (or on first glance). See Vorobej, 1-62, on the assumptions (and issues) inherent in the modern usage of “violence.” 714 Polyb., II.56.15. “καὶ μὴν τό γε τοὺς πολίτας ἀποκτεινύναι μέγιστον ἀσέβημα τίθεται καὶ μεγίστων ἄξιον προστίμων · καίτοι γε προφανῶς ὁ μὲν τὸν κλέπτην ἢ μοιχὸν ἀποκτείνας ἀθῷός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τὸν προδότην ἢ τύραννον τιμῶν καὶ προεδρίας τυγχάνει παρὰ πᾶσιν. ” Polybius’ examples here align closely with Vorobej’s modern example of the Benevolent Attacker. However, Polybius is more concerned with the cause stimulating the action, whereas Vorobej focuses much more on the attacker’s intention. See Vorobej, 10-12,14-15, 22-27, 32, and 177. 157 cases does not rest in what results, but in the reasons and purposes of the agents and in the differences between these.”715 For Polybius, causes and intentions carry the most weight.716

Polybius returns to the Mantineans. He lays out the context of the Mantineans’ fall to the Achaians, and he reverses the intended goal of Phylarchus. Because the Mantineans treacherously invited the Spartans to massacre their friendly Achaian garrison, they deserved a far worse punishment than they received.717 In fact, all the Greeks should have praised the

Achaians’ punishment of the Mantineans and of their ἀσέβεια.718 But the Achaians only pillaged their property and enslaved the Mantineans, which happens even to the innocent in war.719

Thus, the Mantineans did not suffer any extraordinary or extreme punishment, but the norm for warfare in the Hellenistic Age.720

Polybius’ challenge to Phylarchus’ history of Mantinea’s fall provides a useful comparison for his own narrative of the punishment of the Agathocleans. Polybius rebukes

Phylarchus for lack of contextualization and attention to causes and motives, demonstrating his own careful attention to context and causes with Mantinea. The Mantineans’ treachery against the Achaians transgressed human norms of behavior and morals, which would have created exceptional anger.721

In the Agathocles passage, the context of Agathocles’ tyrannical abuse of power, the undeserved murder of Arsinoë III by Philammon, and the people’s indignation, hatred, and anger at these unacceptable and predatory behaviors all should inform our reading and judgment

715 Polyb., II.56.16. “οὕτως ἐν παντὶ τὸ τέλος κεῖται τῆς διαλήψεως ὑπὲρ τούτων οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τελουμένοις, ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς αἰτίαις καὶ προαιρέσεσι τῶν πραττόντων καὶ ταῖς τούτων διαφοραῖς.” 716 The statement at II.56.16 raises the issue of the difference between cause and final result, which I address later in this section. 717 Polyb., II.57-58, culminating with Polybius’ exclamations at II.58.8-9: “πηλίκης ὀργῆς ἐστιν ἄξιον; τί δ’ ἂν παθόντες οὗτοι δίκην δόξαιεν ἁρμόξουσαν δεδωκέναι;” 718 Polyb., II.58.10-11. 719 Polyb., II.58.10. 720 See Eckstein 2013, on this normality. 721 Polyb., II.58.8. 158 of the guilty party’s punishment.722 The Agathocleans’ hubristic treatment of members of the

Alexandrian community – including Agathocleia’s involvement in Arsinoë’s murder, Agathocles’ rapes of various women, the humiliation of Danaë being dragged through the streets,

Oenanthe’s beating of women at the temple, and even Moiragenes’ ignominious near-torture experience – all stimulated indignation, increased hatred, and ignited the anger ready to burst into action. These, the causes for the violence of XV.33, should inform one’s judgment on the punishments, according to Polybius’ own precepts of writing history and his criticism of

Phylarchus.

Moreover, Polybius thought that one’s associates and circumstances can affect one’s natural traits, including ὠμότης, as seen in a passage on Hannibal’s complex character.723

Polybius explains that one’s friends and close associates directly influence a person’s nature.

Here he brings up the infamous Hannibal Monomachus, who advised Hannibal to have the

Carthaginian army practice cannibalism in order to survive their Italian campaign.724 Although

Hannibal never implemented this suggestion, Polybius assures us, his cruelty (ὠμότης) in Italy can be attributed to the influence of Monomachus. In his narrative of the Carthaginian-

Mercenary War, Polybius states that people became like beasts and indulged their cruelty because of their leaders’ own transgressions and greed.725 Close or powerful people and their traits can affect the characteristics of others.

Polybius continues his discussion of how the circumstances themselves affected

Hannibal’s character and his ὠμότης. The way the Second Punic War progressed and the situations Hannibal found himself in affected his natural character, especially after the Romans

722 Polyb., XV.33. Due to the fragmentary state of the text, we have to infer for the directness of some of the causes. 723 Polyb., IX.22-26. 724 Polyb., IX.24.8. 725 Polyb., I.81.9-10. τέλος δ' ἀποθηριωθέντες ἐξέστησαν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ϕύσεως. . . . μέγιστα δὲ τῶν συνεργῶν, τὰς ἀεὶ τῶν προεστώτων ὕβρεις καὶ πλεονεξίας. 159 regained Capua during his Italian campaign.726 Because of the external circumstances of the war

– with Italian allies constantly defecting to Rome, the need for supplies, and thus constant pressure to keep moving – Hannibal had to betray his own promises to Italian towns and inhabitants, giving them up to plunder and depredation so that Hannibal, his own army, and his campaign would survive. Hannibal’s betrayal and abandonment of those who trusted him led some to accuse him of cruelty (ὠμότης).727 Polybius ends this discussion with the remark that, whatever we may think of Hannibal’s character, the Romans consistently found his character cruel.728

Polybius’ discussion of how circumstances influence character should inform our reading of the outbreak of violence in Alexandria.729 The Egyptians’ ὠμότης appears at a particularly marked moment: it erupted when they were punishing those guilty for killing Arsinoë, for harming members of the community, and for flouting established human norms of acceptable behavior. Circumstances prolonged Agathocles and his group’s iniquitous behavior, since they continued to escape retaliation and instead increased the people’s hatred, even escaping punishment when cornered in the palace.730 By the time the people could and did taste of blood and slaughter, they certainly had no inclination to show tolerance and humanity.731 Their violence occurred because the circumstances did not allow for an earlier, less violent outlet to their sense of indignation, that those who did wrong should be punished.732

726 Polyb., IX.26. 727 Polyb., IX.26.2-8. 728 Polyb., IX.26.11. 729 Polyb., XV.33.10. 730 Polyb., XV.31-32. For modern parallels of how circumstances prolong and inflame the depth of negative emotions (especially hate), see Flam 2005, and Halperin 2014. 731 Polyb., XV.33.1. “Τοῦ δὲ ποιεῖν αἷμα καὶ φόνους ἐγένετό τις ἐκ ταὐτομάτου καταρχὴ τοιαύτη.” Whereas they may have had this inclination, had their emotions and moral qualms been assuaged at an earlier point. 732 Polyb., XV.32.4, demonstrates their continued, unremitted indignation: “τὰ δὲ πάλιν δυσηρέστουν τῷ μῆ συνειλῆφθαι τοὺς αἰτίους μηδὲ τυγχάνειν τῆς ἁρμοζούσης τιμωρίας.” For their acts of violence, see XV.33.9. 160 As a final note, the violent actions of the Alexandrian mob eventually do bring about a change of governmental personnel, alleviating their situation of being prey to Agathocles and his family and friends’ excessive, transgressive, and tyrannical behavior.733 Although the downfall of the courtier Agathocles does not constitute a change of politeia, as Egypt remains a monarchy under the Ptolemaic dynasty, the same processes of popular emotion spark dynamic change (of personnel) within the state. With the arrival of Tlepolemos, the running of the Ptolemaic state still did not function as well as possible, but he did not engage in the same despotic and transgressive behavior as Agathocles: he was neglectful and financially irresponsible, but he did not abuse the people’s human dignity.734 The violent actions taken based on their negative reactive emotions did effect a change for the better for the people, despite the fact that their motivations were grounded solely in the past: to eliminate those responsible for the earlier state of affairs.

This narrative passage of XV.25-33 and the intensive role of emotions in creating violence and change of regime call into question moral justification. While excessive violence and cruelty do occur, the people followed through with morally based emotions. The people’s negative reactive emotions, based upon the community’s social standards of behavior and moral values, caused the violent downfall of Agathocles. Without the emotions, this historical event would not have happened, according to Polybius’ narrative. The individual emotions emphasized the hubris and transgression against the community’s sense of social norms, as with indignation, exemplified the prolonged negative affect as with hatred, and motivated future action, as with anger. The combination of emotions, almost synonymous with Polybius’ use of

μῖσος, intensifies the circumstances and passions to such a degree that excessive violence broke

733 I have used the word “regime” not to refer to a state form, or politeia, such as those in the anacyclosis, but to the members of the government associated with Agathocles. The dynamic change in Egypt was not an institutional change of politeia, such as from the anacyclosis, but a change of personnel. 734 Polyb., XVI.21-22. 161 out, challenging traditional political roles and bringing down punishment upon those whom the people decided needed to be punished. An analysis of how the emotions work in this passage helps to elucidate a new understanding of Agathocles’ downfall, not as a paradigm of government gone all wrong because of the “interference” of the people, but rather as an exemplum of how the people’s well-justified emotions can function as a trigger for salutary – though violent – action and a call for social reform, the overthrow of a corrupt regime, based upon communal human values.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have examined examples of how the collective and combined emotions of hatred, anger, and indignation create change within a state. In Book VI, the anacyclosis provided a model in which Polybius described the development of human society through communal emotional processes. Rationality and morality formed in and distinguished humans through emotional situations. Polybius then demonstrated the critical importance of these moral and rational emotions in the public sphere through the changes between bad and good politeiai. Collective emotions, formed from social norms and upheld in the people specifically, provide the linchpin connecting and justifying the dynamic changes in the anacyclosis theory.

The narrative of Agathocles’ regime in Egypt at XV.25-33 represents the most extended, entirely internal change in a state in the extant Histories. It exemplifies the processes of the anacyclosis, as collective emotions stimulate change for the better, but this passage adds nuance to the theory. The prolonged emotions of XV.25-33 combine after repeated transgressions of social norms and remembrances of past wrongs. The critical turning point from emotion to action is dramatized through the episode of Moiragenes and his recognition of the dynamic

162 power of collective emotion. Lastly, Agathocles’ downfall resulting from the accumulation of negative emotion against him created extreme violence.

Moreover, this passage draws out an issue easily overlooked in the anacyclosis: rationally and morally justified collective emotions cause extreme violence. Polybius makes clear that the final results of the emotion-stimulated processes of dynamic change were better on the whole than before for either the states of aristocracy and democracy in the anacyclosis or the state in

Egypt. These questions, raised and addressed to some degree in this chapter, continue to arise.

In the next chapter, I investigate emotions’ roles in external state change, namely, in war.

163 Chapter 4

Anger as a Cause of War

Emotions serve various purposes before, within, and after war. Anger most prominently of the emotions causes war. To contextualize the importance of anger in causation, I briefly examine the role of emotions during and at the end of war to provide an emotional context for understanding causal anger.735

Indignation and hatred feature in the course and conduct of war. Indignation motivates agents to enter war, change their alliances, or alter the course of their activities entirely. The

Achaeans and the Phigalians choose to enter in the Social War against the Aetolians from 220-

217 BC because of their indignation (συναγανακτοῦντες and δυσαρεστούμενοι).736 Similarly, the Megarians chose to leave the Boeotian League, twice, because they either grew indignant or hated the governance and politeia of the Boeotian League.737 Most notably, agents change their course of action because of indignation, whether it is they or some third party who grow indignant.738 For example, the Carthaginians in the First Punic War, after they suffered defeat and seemed without hope, grew indignant at the terms of the Roman treaty offered by

Regulus.739 They decided to continue fighting rather than succumb to what they thought were degrading terms. Polybius praises their decision to continue as honorable and thus implicitly deems the emotion praiseworthy.740 Shortly afterwards, the Carthaginians won a major victory, even capturing Regulus.741 Thus, indignation impacts the course of war through modifying

735 See Chapter 2 for the emotions which feature mostly during warfare, such as fear or shock. This chapter’s survey only includes those emotions which, as we have seen in the last chapter, have unique and varied roles in crucial moments of the Histories. 736 Polyb., IV.7.3, IV.79.5. 737 Polyb., XX.6.7-9. 738 Their own indignation: I.31.7, V.7.5; Others’ indignation: V.57.6, XVIII.9.1. 739 Polyb., I.31.7. οὐ μόνον δυσαρεστήσαντες τοῖς προτεινομένοις ἐπανῆλθον, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσκόψαντες τῇ βαρύτητι τοῦ Μάρκου. 740 Polyb., I.31.7-8. 741 Polyb., I.32-35. 164 agents’ decisions. Hatred explains agents’ behaviors rather than affecting the larger course of a war. Hannibal’s “inborn hatred of Romans” (μῖσος ἔμφυτον πρὸς Ῥωμαίους) explains why he ordered his troops to kill all adults they encountered in Picenum.742 However, besides explaining the ulterior motives for specific behavior, hatred does not have a consistent effect beyond this case.743

Polybius uses pity as a direct marker that wars should have ended. Pity reflects views on what is just.744 In a similar way, the lack of pity shows proportionality. For example, Polybius states that Utica left no room for pity or pardon from the Carthaginians, for despite its steadfast loyalty to Carthage this city had defected to the revolutionaries in the Mercenary War most inopportunely.745 The proportional punishment for Utica accordingly had to be high. Pity also acts to mitigate anger: the Aetolians consciously surrendered to Rome in order to draw greater pity to themselves from the Romans than if they had not surrendered (although they fail in this attempt).746 All these examples of pity occur at the end of war. Pity conveys a sense of justice that the response was (not) proportional to the sufferer’s faults, and pity denotes than an agent did not deserve to suffer to such an extent.747

742 Polyb., III.86.11. ταῦτα δ’ ἐποίει διὰ τὸ προϋπάρχον αὐτῷ μῖσος ἔμφυτον πρὸς Ῥωμαίους. 743 Compare for example, the people of Side’s choice not to send aid to the besieged city of Pednelissus, which was relieved without their aid, V.73.4. However, Polybius mentions that the Thebans capitalized on the hatred of Sparta’s allies to overthrow their hegemony, VI.43.4. This example, however, differs from the other two examples (of Hannibal and the people of Side) in that the Thebans’ and Spartans’ conflict did not constitute part of Polybius’ main historical narrative. 744 See Chapter 2. 745 Polyb., I.88.2. See for similar examples, XXX.8.3; XV.1.13 and XV.17.6 (both in Roman speeches to Carthage near the end of the Second Punic War). Compare the lack of pity for Agathocles in Book XV. See Chapter 3. 746 Polyb., XX.9.11. Philip V works to ensure that the Romans withhold pity and prolong their anger against the Aetolians at XXI.31.3. 747 See Chapter 2 for discussion of pity with shame in a context of aristocratic male honor. Pity also features at the end of the Achaean War between Rome and the Achaean League in 146 BC, both as a response to Roman anger and as a sign of ignoble behavior. Polybius repeatedly characterizes the Greeks as pitiable, both from the view of the narrator and from the Achaeans’ own perspective. Narrator: XXXVIII.1.3 and 7, XXXVIII.16.4 and 7, XXXVIII.17.7; Achaeans: XXXVIII.15.9. This pity encapsulates both senses of pity discussed above: the Achaeans acted ignobly in their fight against Rome, and this pity also stresses the need to end hostilities. However, it seems to me that Polybius deems this last point, the need for the end of war based on how much they ‘should have’ suffered, not by their actual behavior but by how he wished they had behaved. See Chapter 5 for a fuller discussion of the Achaean War. 165 Anger also profoundly shapes the course of events near the ends of wars. The Romans often are characterized as angry at the end of war.748 Andrew Erskine has analyzed these instances of Roman anger in detail, and much of my analysis follows his work.749 In particular, he notes how Polybius focalizes this anger through the objects’ perspective, not through the

Romans’ (or subjects’) perspective. Others, either the victims or third parties, see, try to appease

(παραιτεῖν), or strive to perpetuate the Romans’ anger.750 Only one time does a Roman manifest his own anger by taking all towns by force, and only once does the narrator note the quenching of Roman anger.751 Like the Carthaginians’ indignation in the First Punic War, anger changes characters’ decisions.752 Roman anger perpetuates war. This anger marks the implicit

Roman assessment that their opponents have not suffered enough and involves the idea of proportionality, that the means and ends of war should be proportional to what stimulated the war.753 The Romans continue their anger, often beyond any substantial resistance by the enemy

– at least in Polybius’ portrayal.754 The Romans deemed that the objects of their anger transgressed to a greater degree than these objects admit. The Romans’ anger thus marks the absence of a proportional punishment for their objects’ wrongdoing. Because Polybius frames

Roman anger through a Greek perspective, however, we never see or hear this defense of anger explicitly from the Romans themselves as a mark of proportionality.

748 From Book XX on, Romans are the subjects of anger 19 of 27 occurrences in the extant text: XX.10.7, XXI.25.11, XXI.29.29, XXI.31.3 (twice), XXI.31.7, XXI.31.8, XXI.34.8, XXII.5.6, XXII.10.13, XXX.4.2, XXX.23.2, XXX.31.12, XXX.31.13, XXX.31.17 (twice), XXXIII.7.3, XXXVIII.4.7, XXXVIIII.18.10. The exceptions are: XX.6.10 (Boeotians), XXII.11.8 (Achaeans), XXII.13.2 (Philip V), XXIII.11.2 (brothers), XXIII.15 (twice; people and cutters of trees), XXVIII.20.5 (Antiochus IV), XXX.29.1 (Achaeans). 749 Erskine 2015. 750 See (θεωρεῖν): XXX.4.2, XXX.23.2; struck by (καταπλήττειν): XXI.34.8; appease (παραιτεῖν): XXI.25.11, XXI.29.9, XXI.31.7-8, XXII.5.6, XXXVIII.4.7; perpetuate (καινοποιεῖν): XXI.31.3. See Erskine 2015, 113-116, for discussion of appeasing anger. 751 Polyb., XV.4.4 (Scipio Africanus), and XXXVIII.18.10. See too Erskine 2015, 123. 752 Erskine 2015, 124. 753 Walzer 2015, xxi-xxii, 127-133; Orend 2013, 62-63. 754 Erskine 2015, 109-113. With Aetolians: XXI.25.11, XXI.29.29, XXI.31; With Rhodians: XXX.4.2, XXX.23.2, XXX.31. 166 We do see the Greek view of proportionality. The Greeks constantly go to try to appease (παραιτεῖν) the anger of the Romans, showing that they thought that the offender and object of anger had suffered at least proportionately to their offense and that the war should have ended by that point.755 Polybius comments that all Greeks should endeavor to appease

Roman anger on each other’s behalf. 756 This attests to the overall disjunction between Roman and Greek perspectives on proportionality, a disjunction which Erskine’s article illuminates.

This passage implies that, on the whole, Romans had different standards for proportionality than

Greeks, and therefore Polybius thought that Greeks should all take steps to mitigate the negative effects of this difference.

Anger features often as a cause of war.757 The prevalence Polybius gives to anger as a cause may surprise some who are accustomed to think of Polybius as one of the most

‘pragmatic’ historians alongside Thucydides.758 Thucydides grants fear a large role as a motivator of war, and even attributes Spartan fear of growing Athenian power as the cause for the

Peloponnesian War.759 Arthur Eckstein argues that fear plays a large role in deciding to go to war and secure one’s survival in an anarchic interstate system.760 Eckstein also persuasively demonstrates that concerns of practical survival lay at the heart of Hellenistic warfare; prestige contributes to this basic goal. Scholars of Polybius have often imputed this type of realist worldview to Polybius himself.761 I am not arguing against this analysis of historical phenomena,

755 Polyb., 113-115. Greeks et al. trying to assuage Roman anger: XXI.25.11, XXI.29.29, XXII.5.6, XX.31 (speech designed to assuage Roman anger), XXXVIII.4.7. 756 Polyb., XXXVIII.4.7, discussed by Erskine 2015, 110. 757 See, for examples, I.67-70, I.82.9; II.8; III.3.3, III.7.1; III.9-13; III.40.8, III.78.5; IV.49. 758 See for example, most recently, Longley 2012. See Grethlein 2013, 224-267, for a juxtaposition of Polybius’ historical style with Thucydides’. Eight wars – in addition to those mentioned previously – begin after Book Five, and most of their causes are not discussed or extant. The Third Macedonian War is a notable exception, in that we do have a discussion of its causes at XXII.18. 759 Thuc., 1.23.6. 760 Eckstein 2006, 50-52, observes at least 16 instances of fear motivating characters’ decisions in Thucydides’ history. See Kauppi 1991, for further details. 761 Harris 2001, 20, Walbank 1972, 34-40. 167 but I want to highlight the importance Polybius attributes to anger as a cause, much more than fear, and the perceived slights which often spark this emotion.762 In the Histories, anger is often adduced as the pretext or the cause of war, can serve as both pretext and cause, or is occasionally felt in a chain reaction and thus causes war. Most notably, Polybius includes anger in the causes of the Second Punic War.

The Second Punic War, 218-202 BC, holds an important place in scholarship, since this war in particular is thought to have changed the balance of power in the Mediterranean and hence decided the fate of Roman history.763 Why and how this war began, then, is also crucial.

Scholarship has focused most on the issues of sources, treaties, and the timeline. Polybius is our major source for the outbreak of the war, supplemented by Livy, Diodorus Siculus, Appian, and

Zonaras’s epitome of Cassius Dio. The narratives of the pro-Carthaginian Philinus and of the

Roman senator Fabius Pictor, both of whom lived during this war, did not survive.764 Polybius’ narrative itself is fraught with historical inaccuracies – most notably (but not only) the position of the Ebro River in relation to Saguntum in Spain – but he nonetheless is regarded as the most reliable source because of his historiographical principles, access to Roman primary sources, and proximity in time to the war.765 Polybius provides a detailed discussion of all the Romano-

Carthaginian treaties he found in Rome which predated the Second Punic War, and these

Romano-Carthaginian treaties feature in both ancient and modern discussions and arguments

762 Fear motivates characters to take action very often in the Histories, but Polybius rarely cites it as the motivating factor, let alone official cause (aitia), of war: I.10.6 (Roman fear of Carthaginians), II.13.3 (Roman fear of Gauls), V.41.1 (Molon fears Hermeias’ cruelty), XXXVIII.10.10 (Achaeans falsely think Romans fear war in Greece). 763 For a start to scholarship on the outbreak of the Second Punic War, see Astin 1967; Baronowski 2011, 68-75; Beck 2011; Champion 2004a, 118-121, and 2011; Eckstein 1989, 1995, 101-105, 144, and 175, 2010, and 2012; Errington 1970, 26-32; Hoffman 1972; McGing 2010, 77-78; Rich 1996; Schwarte 1983; Sumner 1972, 469-480; Walbank, HCP 1.292-361, and 1983; Welwei 1977. See Rich 1996, note 1, and Beck 2011 for fuller bibliography. 764 Other contemporary sources, e.g., Sosylus, have also been lost. See Cornell 2013 and Frier 1999, esp. Ch. 11, on Fabius Pictor. On Polybius’ use as a cover text for fragmentary historians, see Baron 2013 and Schepens and Bollansée, eds., 2005. 765 See Hoyos 1998, 162-163, on the Ebro. 168 about the causation, beginning of, and responsibility for the First and Second Punic Wars.766 As we shall see, the causation and responsibility for the Second Punic War is never completely or successfully divorced from the First Punic War because of anger. David Potter in particular argues persuasively that the lack of envisioned goals and outcomes for the First Punic War led to its unsatisfactory result and hence directly contributed to the outbreak of the Second Punic War about twenty years later, which parallels in many ways the connection between the First and

Second World Wars in the twentieth century.767 Anger at the unsatisfactory result of the First

World War with the Treaty of Versailles similarly carried over to the outbreak of the Second

World War.

Scholars have seen anger as an obstacle for sensible judgment and action in Polybius. As noted in Chapter 2, anger, ὀργή, and its close associate passion, θυμός, often have been seen as characterizing barbarians, the uncivilized and uneducated, and groups of lesser social status – the masses, women, and mercenaries.768 Anger thus belongs with barbaric thumos and against

Hellenic logismos in the dichotomy Craige Champion observes.769 Hannibal’s “actions in the preliminaries to the [Second Punic War] demonstrate emotional, impulsive behavior, which in book 2 is characteristic of Illyrians and Gauls.”770 Thus emotion and impulse are indicative of the deficiencies of collective Carthaginian character at the start of this war.771 Likewise, William

766 See for differing positions on the treaties, Bellomo 2013, Eckstein 2010 and 2012, Erdkamp 2009, Heisserer 1985, Serrati 2006, and Walbank 1945. 767 Potter 2016. 768 Eckstein 1995, 118-160. 769 Champion 2004a. Champion discusses ὀργή in the context of ochlocracy and the dissolution of the mixed constitution, 89, 121, 185. 770 Champion 2004a, 102. 771 Champion 2004a, 103. Champion shows that the Carthaginians were further along on the path of decline than the Romans in the early books of the Histories, not that they had degenerated to a state of complete barbarity, however. He notes that the Second Punic War was “not a simple matter of logismos against thumos”, 117. However, emotion or passion served for Champion as a prime factor in Carthage’s irrationality in beginning the Second Punic War. See esp. 117-121 for Champion’s analysis of Carthaginian character in the Second Punic War. 169 Harris argues in Restraining Rage that Polybius thought that anger clouds judgment.772 Harris does not provide many examples for his broad statements about Polybius’ views on anger, and even doubts “if he had any.”773 Nevertheless, Harris contends that Polybius characterizes enemy rulers as wrathful and angry and associates them with barbarians.774 Arthur Eckstein argues similarly that anger was a crucial, determining factor in Polybius’ criticism of Hannibal when giving his pretexts for attacking Saguntum and beginning the Second Punic War.775 Eckstein argues that emotion in Polybius is always contrasted with reason and although he admits of combinations of reason with emotion, he still concludes that one always predominates.776

Eckstein’s argument revolves around the idea that for Polybius emotions were irrational and that acting upon them in war marked poor generalship and invited disaster. Moreover, Eckstein puts forth the idea that wars undertaken from “cold, rational calculation” receive Polybius’ approbation, and conversely wars “emerging from sheer, unrestrained emotion” receive his disapproval.777 Although Andrew Erskine analyzed the anger of the Romans in the later books of the Histories along different lines, as discussed above, he saw anger in the early books of the

Histories along similar lines as Champion, Harris, and Eckstein: anger characterizes Rome’s opponents, people who all can be called barbarians.778

I have found that non-Romans in Polybius feel anger and are stirred to war because of it, but that the Romans too were not immune to beginning war because of anger in Polybius’ narrative. The “barbarians” who feel anger and thus decide to wage war do not all do so

772 Harris 2001. 773 Harris 2001, 75. See too 270, note 19, for an unexamined citation of Polybius on anger as an example of “the classic stereotype” of angry women as derisive and contemptible, which does not fit the context (XV.30.1; we examined this in Chapter 3). 774 Harris 2001, 198-199, 240. 775 Eckstein 1989. 776 Eckstein 1989, 2. 777 Eckstein 1995, 57. 778 Erskine 2015. See too Erskine 2013 on the categorization of Carthaginians as barbarians in ancient Greek thought. 170 without reason and justifiability. Even Hannibal, whom Polybius criticizes, does not err in his anger as much as his folly in not citing Carthaginian anger at the unjust seizure of Sardinia by the

Romans as his reason for war. My argument in this chapter yet again challenges the dichotomy between barbarian and civilized: anger does not wholly belong on the barbarian side.

Characters often choose to go to war because of morally justified anger, which they feel for a reason. While some characters feel unjustified anger, I aim to complicate the negative identification of anger in the Histories in its significant role as a cause of war.

Polybius begins his history in Book Three with a detailed account of the causes of the

Second Punic War.779 He frames this discussion with his definitions of cause, pretext, and beginning and with an explanation of why causes are important for history. Thus, his discussion of the causes of the Second Punic War holds importance as the central case of causation in the

Histories. First, Polybius summarizes what he will cover in the Histories and why the Olympiad around 220 B.C. was so important as the start of his universal history: four wars began at nearly the same time and thence world affairs began to intertwine in a distinct way.780

Polybius frames his discussion of causes to refute claims that Hannibal’s capture of

Saguntum was the cause of the Second Punic War.781 Such an attribution of causation is the mark of someone ignorant of the difference between a beginning (ἀρχὴ) and a cause or pretext

(αἰτίας καὶ προφάσεως).782 Polybius continues, “I say that the beginnings (ἀρχὰς) of everything are the first attacks and the enactment of what has already been decided, but on the

779 Polyb., III.6-32. 780 Polyb., III.1-5. See Walbank 1972, 97-129, 1975, and 1994 on Polybius’ starting point and organization. 781 Polyb., III.6.1. 782 Polyb., III.6.6. ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ διειληφότων ἀρχὴ τί διαφέρει καὶ πόσον διέστηκεν αἰτίας καὶ προφάσεως, καὶ διότι τὰ μέν ἐστι πρῶτα τῶν ἁπάντων, ἡ δ’ ἀρχὴ τελευταῖον τῶν εἰρημένων. See on Polybius’ theory of causation, Beck 2011, 225; Derow 1982 and 1994, Eckstein 1989, 2-6, 1995, 57-59, and 2012, 208-209; McGing 2010, 76-80; Pédech 1964, 80-88 and 99-203; Walbank HCP 1.306-309, 1972, 157-164, and 1994. 171 other hand I say that causes (αἰτίας) are the thoughts which precede the decisions and plans

(τὰς προκαθηγουμένας τῶν κρίσεων καὶ διαλήψεων): I mean the ideas, plans, rationale about these, and how we come to deciding and setting off on some affair.”783 This description of the differences between a cause, a pretext, and a beginning provides a template by which we can distinguish potential causes.784

Polybius continues his discussion of causes for the Second Punic War by directly refuting the claims of Fabius Pictor. Fabius Pictor, according to Polybius, narrated that

Hannibal’s ambition and lust for power, which he took from Hasdrubal, his predecessor in Spain and brother-in-law, also caused the war. Fabius, Polybius says, depicted Hasdrubal as relatively independent from and even at odds with Carthage, aiming for monarchical power. Hannibal, because of this drive for power which he inherited from Hasdrubal, sought war with Rome independently from and against the wishes of Carthage. As we mentioned previously, Polybius faults Fabius’ views because the Carthaginian Senate did not show its indignation toward

Hannibal and hand him over to Rome to avoid war.785 Polybius cautions trusting all Fabius had to say based only on his status as a senator.786

Polybius returns to his main topic and lists the three causes, αἰτίαι, of the Second Punic

War: “The first cause must be considered the θυμός of Hamilcar Barca, the biological father of

783 Polyb., III.6.7. ἐγὼ δὲ παντὸς ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶναί φημι τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις τῶν ἤδη κεκριμένων, αἰτίας δὲ τὰς προκαθηγουμένας τῶν κρίσεων καὶ διαλήψεων · λέγω δ’ ἐπινοίας καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα συλλογισμοὺς καὶ δι’ ὧν ἐπὶ τὸ κρῖναί τι καὶ προθέσθαι παραγινόμεθα. Walbank, HCP I.159-160, notes and criticizes the vagueness of Polybius’ definition. Note that causes include both psychological states alongside rational calculations. See Walbank, HCP I.157-159, for how Polybius’ definitions of causation differ from Thucydides. 784 Polybius does not consistently label all causes, pretexts, or beginnings. He provides this section of definitions and examples to teach his readers, students and future statesmen, how to identify causes from beginnings. It would be redundant for him to have to identify all causes, pretexts, and beginnings fastidiously throughout the text in each individual case; his readers have the basic information which he thought necessary to make such identifications themselves. Scholars have disagreed on this completeness of instruction for identification. See Walbank HCP, I.305-309; Pédech 1964, 75-98; Walbank 1972, 157-164; McGing 2010, 76-80. 785 Polyb., III.8.9-12. See Chapter 2. 786 Polyb., III.9.1-5. 172 Hannibal. For he, undefeated in his soul in the war over Sicily, in that he seemed to have preserved his army around Eryx intact in the battles in which he took part, but also because of the Carthaginians’ loss in the sea battle, yielded to the situation, made the treaty, and remained in his anger (ἔμενεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀργῆς), always looking out for an opportunity.”787 Hamilcar, the father of Hannibal, served as a general for Carthage in the First Punic War, remaining in command of Eryx in western Sicily through the end of the war. After the First Punic War,

Hamilcar served as a general in the Mercenary War, 241-238 BC, and defeated the revolutionaries, after which he travelled to Spain to expand and solidify Carthaginian power and resources until his death in 229 BC. The Roman seizure of Sardinia and imposition of additional tribute on Carthage constitutes the second, and greatest, of the three causes for the Second

Punic War, according to Polybius.

“But when the Romans declared war against the Carthaginians after they resolved the Mercenary War, the Carthaginians first agreed to everything, thinking that they would win in their just claims, . . .. But when the Romans did not compromise, the Carthaginians, yielding to the situation and taking it hard, not having power to do anything, withdrew from Sardinia and undertook to pay another 1,200 talents in addition to the previous tribute. On account of this they averted war at that time. For this reason, this must be placed as the second and greatest (δευτέραν, μεγίστην δέ) cause of the later war.”788

787 Polyb., III.9.6-7. νομιστέον πρῶτον μὲν αἴτιον γεγονέναι τὸν Ἀμίλκου θυμὸν τοῦ Βάρκα μὲν ἐπικαλουμένου, πατρὸς δὲ κατὰ φῦσιν Ἀννίβου γεγονότος. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ οὐχ ἡττηθεὶς τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ τῇ ψυχῇ, τῷ δοκεῖν αὐτὸς μὲν ἀκέραια διατετηρηκέναι τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἔρυκα στρατόπεδα ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἐφ ὧν αὐτὸς ἦν, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἧτταν τοῖς καιροῖς εἴκων πεποιῆσθαι τὰς συνθήκας, ἔμενεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὀργῆς, τηρῶν ἀεὶ πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν. The reading of “ὀργῆς” is not entirely secure. The oldest manuscript, A, reads “ὀρ*ῆς”, while the other main manuscripts have “ὀργῆς”. However, all modern editions print “ὁρμῆς”, except for the Budé critical edition. I thus follow the manuscripts and the most recent critical edition. However, because of this ambiguity, I am not resting my argument for the emotion of anger as a cause of war on this part of the text, although it furthers the importance of emotion for persisting between the end of one war and the beginning of another. 788 Polyb., III.10.1, 3-4. Ῥωμαίων δὲ μετὰ τὸ καταλύσασθαι Καρχηδονίους τὴν προειρημένην ταραχὴν ἀπαγγειλάντων αὐτοῖς πόλεμον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς πᾶν συγκατέβαινον, ὑπολαμβάνοντες αὑτοὺς νικήσειν τοῖς δικαίοις, . . .. πλὴν οὐκ ἐντρεπομένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων, εἴξαντες τῇ περιστάσει, καὶ βαρυνόμενοι μέν, οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ ποιεῖν οὐδέν, ἐξεχώρησαν Σαρδόνος, συνεχώρησαν δ’ εἰσοίσειν ἄλλα χίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα πρὸς τοῖς πρότερον, ἐφ΄ ᾧ μὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκείνοις ἀναδέξασθαι τοῖς καιροῖς. διὸ καὶ δευτέραν, μεγίστην δέ, ταύτην θετέον αἰτίαν τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα συστάντος πολέμου. 173 The third cause for the Second Punic War, Polybius briefly says, is the Carthaginian confidence in their strength in Spain.789

Returning to the first cause, Polybius justifies how Hamilcar’s passion caused the war.

Hamilcar transferred his hatred of Rome to Hannibal with his oath of hatred.790 In this scene,

Hamilcar brings his young son Hannibal to a sacrifice and makes him swear an oath that he will always hate the Romans. Hannibal recalls this anecdote as an older man for Antiochus III, after

Hannibal had waged and lost the Second Punic War. Not only does Polybius provide this scene to his audience as evidence for the intensity of Hannibal’s hatred for Rome, but Hannibal himself presents it to Antiochus as evidence of his sentiments much later.

Polybius then turns to the narrative of events leading up to the Second Punic War. He briefly summarizes Hannibal’s energetic, successful, and popular leadership in Spain before the siege of Saguntum.791 The Romans, to whom the Saguntines had sent several pleas for aid, sent an embassy to Hannibal to warn him to stay away from Saguntum.792 Hannibal, young and passionate, replied that the Carthaginians were coming to the aid of those wronged by

Saguntum.793 Hannibal, however, sent to Carthage for further instruction, and the Roman embassy conveyed the same message to the Carthaginian senate as they had given to Hannibal, foreseeing war only in Spain.794

Polybius next narrates the siege and capture of Saguntum by Hannibal.795 When news of

Saguntum’s fall reached Rome, Polybius states that the Romans sent envoys to Carthage and

789 Polyb., III.10.6. ἣν δὴ καὶ τρίτην αἰτίαν νομιστέον, λέγω δὲ τὴν εὔροιαν τῶν κατ’ Ἰβηρίαν πραγμάτων Καρχηδονίοις. ταύταις γὰρ ταῖς χερσὶ πιστεύσαντες εὐθαρσῶς ἐνέβησαν εἰς τὸν προειρημένον πόλεμον. 790 Polyb., III.10.7-III.12. 791 Polyb., III.13-14. 792 Polyb., III.15.1-5. 793 Polyb., III.15.6-12. 794 Polyb., III.15.8, III.15.12-13. 795 Polyb., III.17. Polybius also narrates the Romans’ involvement with Demetrius of Pharos in the Second Illyrian War to shed light on his interpretation of the Romans’ perspective at the time: that they did not foresee or intend war against the Carthaginians beyond Spain and Africa, let alone in Italy. Narration of the Second Illyrian War: 174 argues against the view that the Roman Senate held a tense and secret debate at that time, on the grounds that such a debate was illogical.796 The Carthaginians, on receiving the Roman envoys, argued that no treaties bound their actions in Spain. The treaty of Hasdrubal with Rome, that the Carthaginians stay south of the Ebro, was not ratified at Carthage, and the treaty of Lutatius, made after the First Punic War and stipulating that neither would harm the other’s allies, also did not apply, so they argued. The Roman envoys replied that the Carthaginians should show that they are not guilty or else accept war.797

Polybius here digresses to clarify the issue of the treaties.798 He quotes or paraphrases three treaties which he found at Rome, the earliest of which he dated back to the beginning of the Roman Republic. After relating these three early treaties, Polybius reflects on the beginning of the First Punic War.799 In short, he found that the Romans did not breach a treaty in crossing to Sicily (nor did the Carthaginians earlier), for he did not find evidence of a prohibition of

Romans from Sicily or Carthaginians from all of Italy.800 Next, he reproduces the terms of the treaty between Rome and Carthage after the First Punic War, which were expanded after

Carthage’s Mercenary War, which demanded that Carthage pay indemnities and evacuate first

Sicily then Sardinia. Lastly, he gives the addendum of the treaty with Hasdrubal that the

Carthaginians not cross to the north of the Ebro in arms. Polybius then sums up his judgment about the justification of the Roman seizure of Sardinia: the Romans had no reasonable pretext or reason for taking Sardinia (οὔτε πρόφασιν οὔτ' αἰτίαν εὕροι τις ἂν εὔλογον).801

III.16, III.18-19. See on Saguntum, Astin 1967, Badian 1958, 47-52, Eckstein 1984, Harris 1979, 201-202, Hoyos 1998, 154-173, Walbank, HCP 1.170-172. 796 Polyb., III.20. 797 Polyb., III.21.1-8. 798 Polyb., III.21.9-III.27. 799 See Bellomo 2013, Eckstein 1980, Hoyos 2011, and Rood 2012 for recent scholarship on the First Punic War’s causes. 800 Polyb., III.26.4-7. 801 Polyb., III.28.1. 175 After this digression, Polybius returns to the Roman responses to Hannibal’s capture of

Saguntum. The Romans of his day, Polybius states, argue that, in sum, all the treaties and their terms were valid.802 Thus, Hannibal and the Carthaginians broke the treaty made by Hasdrubal in crossing the Ebro (although in fact they had not, for it was farther north than Saguntum) and by attacking Saguntum broke the treaty of Lutatius concluded after the First Punic War, over not harming the other’s allies. Finally, Polybius concludes his discussion of the causes of the Second

Punic War with his judgment: if one takes the destruction of Saguntum as the cause, the

Carthaginians were wrong, but if one takes the seizure of Sardinia as the cause, then the Romans were in the wrong.803

To wrap up this discussion of the causation of the Second Punic War, Polybius expresses how important causes were for history and its purpose of educating statesmen.804 Universal history in particular, because it covers a broader scope of events, times, and places, excelled at illuminating deeper causes.805

This entire passage is marked by two major aspects: the importance of causation for the project of history and Polybius’ attempts to argue against prevailing views, such as Fabius

Pictor’s. Throughout this passage Polybius argues against the view that Saguntum’s fall was the cause of the Second Punic War. He defines causes in a specific way, refutes Fabius, argues against interpretations of treaties, and provides evidence from the actual treaties at Rome to support his view all for this purpose. Thus, it is important to note what he does cite as the causes of the war and how they differ from what Polybius argued against. Polybius’ identifications of causes have repercussions for the responsibility, justice, and guiding rationale

802 Polyb., III.29. 803 Polyb., III.30. 804 Polyb., III.31. 805 Polyb., III.32. See Dreyer 2011, esp. 91-92 Kloft 2013, 13-24, Sacks 1981, 96-121, and Walbank 1972, 66-96, on Polybius’ genre of universal history. 176 or purpose of the Second Punic War. That Polybius includes anger in the causes, then, is notable. How justifiable this anger was is our first topic.

Justifiability

The very first reason for the war is an emotional element, θυμός. Θυμός elsewhere throughout the Histories denotes irrational, uncontrolled passion, aligning with themes of irrationality and barbarism.806 Here, however, θυμός takes on more Homeric connotations, referring to Hamilcar’s heroic courage and determination, in the context of not conceding defeat personally.807 Moreover, Polybius does not seem to disapprove of Hamilcar at all.808 He emphasizes the military accomplishment and noble steadfastness of Hamilcar in continuing to hold Eryx despite the Carthaginians’ losses. Hamilcar’s leadership preserves the morale of the soldiers at Eryx and maintains his anger, ὀργή.809 Hamilcar yielded to circumstance in signing the treaty with Rome to end the First Punic War, for Polybius says that “in these circumstances, when he had omitted nothing reasonable for saving those under his command, altogether sensibly and practically (πάνυ νουνεχῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς) he yielded to the present situation and sent envoys to discuss truces and a peace treaty.”810 Moreover, Polybius approves of

Hamilcar directly: “he very much did the work of a good and prudent leader.”811 Hamilcar’s status as undefeated, however, leads him to desire to wage war in the future. Hamilcar’s θυμός

806 Champion 2004a, Erskine 2015, 107. See too Chapter 2. 807 See Koziak 2000, 37-62, especially 53-55, for an overview of Homeric θυμός. 808 Eckstein 1989, 2-7, criticizes Hamilcar only in his θυμός here. Pédech 1964, 212, however, presents a positive picture of Hamilcar. 809 Polyb., III.9.7. 810 Polyb., I.62, especially I.62.5: ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιέστη τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τῶν κατὰ λόγον οὐδὲν ἔτι κατελείπετο πρὸς τὸ σῴζειν τοὺς ὑποταττομένους, πάνυ νουνεχῶς καὶ παργματικῶς εἴξας τοῖς παροῦσιν ὑπὲρ σπονδῶν καὶ διαλύσεων ἐξαπέστελλε πρεσβευτάς. Hamilcar exemplifies Polybius’ precepts for good generals, seen prominently in Hannibal’s own speech to Scipio at the battle of Zama about the vicissitudes of fortune (XV.5-8), and his speech to the Carthaginian senate to accept the Roman terms as a blessing considering their position at the end of the Second Punic War (XV.19). See especially IX.12-20 on Polybius’ precepts for good generalship. See too for discussion of these concepts, Eckstein 1995, 28-40. 811 Polyb., I.62.3. ὁ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἐποίησεν ἔργον ἡγεμόνος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φρονίμου. 177 continues on precisely because Hamilcar acted prudently (πάνυ νουνεχῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς), as a good general, by yielding to circumstances.

Thus, Hamilcar’s noble actions and passionate spirit (θυμός) contribute to the causation of the Second Punic War. While θυμός most often aligns with irrationality, barbarism, and excess, Hamilcar’s θυμός here aligns with his rationality, prudence, civility, and aristocratic nobility. Hamilcar follows what Arthur Eckstein identified as Polybius’ “aristocratic ethos”.812

His θυμός also drives him along this same noble pattern of behavior. Thus, θυμός in this passage differs from Polybius’ stereotypical usage of this term, although there are moments when θυμός can have positive effects in battle. For example, θυμός motivates soldiers to have courage and return to the fight, and the Gauls in particular fight with θυμός, terrifying their opponents.813

Polybius stresses the seizure of Sardinia as a reason for the Second Punic War throughout the text, and he also emphasizes the injustice of the Romans in this act.814 At one point he even calls this the “second war between Rome and Carthage, that over Sardinia” because the Romans had declared war on Carthage, although the Carthaginians decided to capitulate to the Roman demands, and so actual war was averted.815 The first part of Polybius’ explanation sets up a psychological frame through which to understand the rest of the actions:

812 Eckstein 1995, especially 21, 34-35, 43-44, 55, 91, 174-179, 192-193, and 274-275 on Polybius’ positive portrayal and admiration of Hamilcar. 813 See Polyb., II.19.10, II.30.4, IV.7.8. It may also have positive value in II.24.7 and XV.4.11. 814 Polyb., I.88.8-12, III.13.1-2, III.15.10-11, III.27.7-8, III.28.1-4, and III.30.4. However, Polybius’ narrative of the Mercenary War describes how the Carthaginians lost Sardinia to the mutinous mercenaries in detail at I.79. He describes Sardinia as lost to the mercenaries (not to the Romans) already at I.82.7 (τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν Σαρδόνα, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, ἐτύγχανεν ἀπηλλοτριωμένα), and even refers to the Romans’ refusal to accept Sardinia from the mercenaries at I.83.11 (τῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ Σαρδόνι μισθοφόρων, καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπέστησαν, ἐπισπωμένων αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν νῆσον οὐχ ὑπήκουσαν). Only at the end of the Mercenary War, I.88, do the Romans undertake to subjugate Sardinia and accept the mercenaries’ invitation. The Carthaginians protest that Sardinia still belongs to them, and the Romans use this and the Carthaginians’ preparations for war against the mutineers in Sardinia as a pretext to declare war on Carthage. 815 Polyb., III.28.1. οὕτως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δευτέρου πολέμου, καθ’ ὃν ἐποιήσαντο τὰς περὶ Σαρδόνος συνθήκας, οὔτε πρόφασιν οὔτ’ αἰτίαν εὕροι τις ἂν εὔλογον. 178 “Hamilcar took up the citizens’ anger (ὀργὴν) in addition to his own passions (τοῖς ἰδίοις

θυμοῖς).”816 Hamilcar’s adoption of the citizens’ anger provides insight into the unique nature

817 of θυμός in comparison with other emotional terminology. With Hamilcar, it appears that his

θυμός drove him to continue pursuing what he valued: his personal reputation as a general and his country’s well-being and strength. The citizens’ ὀργή, on the other hand, functions as we have seen ὀργή regularly function – as a response directly to a provocation, injustice, or slight.

Again, θυμός arises as a crucial part of the causation of this war. The seizure of Sardinia aggravated not only Hamilcar but also the citizens. Their anger, combined with Hamilcar’s personal urge (based in his aristocratic ethos) to renew war and redeem himself and his country, made the seizure of Sardinia a cause even more important than the sour ending of the First

Punic War.

The Carthaginians’ emotions, θυμός and ὀργή, appear rational.818 Not only did the

Carthaginians react to anger in response to the Romans’ injustice, but their anger follows the same rational paradigm as the emotions of the community in the anacyclosis, as we observed in

Chapter 3. They perceive that the Romans hurt their interests by taking Sardinia, thus committing injustice, and they react like the people of the anacyclosis with anger to this

816 This would be the only instance of θυμός in the plural with a single subject. It appears in the plural at I.81.8 (mercenaries), II.33.2 (Gauls), III.10.5, XV.33.10 (Egyptians), XXII.16.3 (men in general). This use of plural θυμοί with a singular subject may merely mean his “passions” as a plural. Otherwise it may align with the Platonic version of θυμός, as a part of the soul in which an individual feels emotion. 817 Koziak 2000; Lynch and Miles 1980; Champion 2004a, also declines to define θυμός. Erskine 2015,107, briefly distinguishes θυμός from ὀργή. See Chapter 2 for full discussion of their distinctions. 818 See Mercer 2005, for a recent assessment of rationality and emotion in modern decision making in international relations. 179 transgression.819 Things they value – territorial integrity, resources from Sardinia, and state autonomy – were challenged by Roman aggression.820

In all three of the causes of the Second Punic War, Polybius focalizes the causation of the war through a Carthaginian perspective.821 However, nowhere does a Carthaginian character attest to the causes Polybius identifies in III.9.6-10.6.822 Moreover, Polybius does not clearly present the Roman reasons for going to war. Even when Polybius addresses the Roman perspective at III.29, he does so in order to present and correct later Roman, revisionist, accounts of why and how this war began.823 The perspective Polybius chooses for the causes of

III.9.6-10.6 conveys his judgment.824 This focus both puts the decision for and beginning of war in the Carthaginians’ hands and centers upon the Carthaginian grievances and justifications. The

Carthaginians seem to have justice on their side: the Romans initially acted as unprovoked aggressors in taking Sardinia and imposing more tribute, and so the Romans were morally responsible for this war.

Finally, after his account of the treaties and the Romans’ legalistic causes, Polybius concludes his discussion of causes of the Second Punic War at III.30 with a judgment:825

819 Eckstein 1995, 101-102, stresses Polybius’ repeated disapproval and portrayal of Roman injustice in this circumstance. 820 In the anacyclosis, Polybius emphasized the congruence of reason with rule in accordance with the community’s good in mind. Here, the Romans take advantage of their power and the Carthaginians’ weakness for their own benefit, and thus they fall closer towards the role of the bad rulers of the anacyclosis. 821 Walbank 1972, 163; McGing 2010, 77. 822 Hamilcar hates the Romans (III.9.6-9), Hannibal adduces immediate pretexts concerning only Saguntum (III.15), and the Carthaginian Senate discuss minute details of a treaty (III.21). Thus, the true causes, even though conveying a Carthaginian and not Roman perspective, seem to lie at a remove from the historical events and narrative. 823 Polyb., III.29.1 stresses the difference between what the Romans said after Saguntum, which he presents as his straightforward narrative in III.20-21, and he gives what the Romans of his time gave in order to make his (moral) counterargument to these views. 824 What the actual agents may have thought or adduced as their reasons for war matter far less to Polybius, who discerns the causes as the historian with retrospect and a holistic view of the course of events. This retrospect, however, is not without drawbacks. See below. See Grethlein 2013 on historians’ perspectives. 825 These legalistic arguments circulated in the second century BC, as John Rich shows (1996), to justify the Roman’s behavior, especially in light of the Romans’ concern over Carthage before the Third Punic War. Polybius explicitly notes that he cites contemporary Roman views, not sentiments expressed by the Romans at the time, III.29.1. 180 “For this reason, if on one hand someone should make the destruction of Saguntum the cause (αἰτία) of the war, it must be assented to that the Carthaginians wrongly began the war, both according to the treaty by Lutatius, in which there must be safety from each for the allies of each, and according to the treaty by Hasdrubal, in which the Carthaginians must not cross the river Ebro in war. But on the other hand, if [someone makes the cause of the war] the acquisition of Sardinia and the tribute with this, it must be agreed altogether the Carthaginians with good reason (εὐλόγως) began the Hannibalic War: for having been compelled by the circumstances, they were repelling those who harmed them at the time as circumstances allowed.”826

If one considers the seizure of Sardinia the main cause of the war, as Polybius explicitly does at

III.10.3 (μεγίστην δέ, ταύτην θετέον αἰτίαν), then the Carthaginians waged war justly on

Rome. From a holistic view of Polybius’ account of the causes, the Carthaginians may be responsible for beginning war with the siege of Saguntum, but they are not morally responsible for causing the war.827 Those who wronged them are morally at fault. This perspective on causes emphasizes the emotional, anger and θυμός, and its justification. The most emotional causes also happen to be the most just and most appropriate causes for the Second Punic War, in

826 Polyb., III.30.3-4. διόπερ εἰ μέν τις τὴν Ζακάνθης ἀπώλειαν αἰτίαν τίθησι τοῦ πολέμου, συγχωρητέον ἀδίκως ἐξενηνοχέναι τὸν πόλεμον Καρχηδονίους κατά τε τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ Λυτατίου συνθήκας, καθ’ ἃς ἔδει τοῖς ἑκατέρων συμμάχοις τὴν ὑφ΄ ἑκατέρων ὑπάρχειν ἀσφάλειαν, κατά τε τὰς ἐπ’ Ἀσδρούβου, καθ’ ἃς οὐκ ἔδει διαβαίνειν τὸν Ἴβηρα ποταμὸν ἐπὶ πολέμῳ Καρχηδονίους · εἰ δὲ τὴν Σαρδόνος ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ τὰ σὺν ταύτῃ χρήματα, πάντως ὁμολογητέον εὐλόγως πεπολεμηκέναι τὸν κατ’ Ἀννίβαν πόλεμον τοὺς Καρχηδονίους · καιρῷ γὰρ πεισθέντες ἠμύνοντο σὺν καιρῷ τοὺς βλάψαντας. 827 Note that Polybius’ own account disregards the actual geography involved in the treaties, for Saguntum lay south of the river Ebro; see for example, Hoyos 1998, esp. 162-163. Champion 2004a, 119, calls Polybius’ discussion of causes “inconclusive” on the responsibility for the war. Champion states that “although this passage admits that the Roman seizure of Sardinia was an unjust and provocative act, it also shows that in any case Carthage actually initiated the war. In this regard this war is in accord with the pattern of the First Romano-Carthaginian, Illyrian, and Gallic wars: Rome is on the defensive.” Champion does not say explicitly that therefore the Carthaginians are responsible and the Romans have right on their side, but his analysis leads to that conclusion. Champion’s statement sets out the Carthaginians as the aggressors, and therefore as at fault in modern standards. (There are some major exceptions to this statement in modern times; see Walzer 2015, 51-126 for discussion of these cases.) Polybius, though he shares many views with modern just war theory, does not share the modern condemnation of aggressors and the support of those waging defensive wars. See Walzer 2015, 3-33, 51-73, on these subjects in modern just war theory. Baronowski 2011, 68-73, however, goes too far in dismissing aggression and the justice of one’s cause in the outbreak of the Second Punic War. He sees Polybius track the causes of this war back to Roman aggression and injustice in seizing Sardinia, but he concludes that Polybius’ admiration of imperialistic expansion outweighs these considerations. I disagree and have argued in this chapter that Polybius’ text shows great concern for the justice and the moral responsibility for wars. 181 Polybius’ view. Carthaginian anger, as a response to injustice, is therefore a morally justifiable cause for war.

Unjustifiable Anger

By contrast, on another occasion Polybius does attribute anger as a cause for war with explicit negative judgment. The Mercenary War, also variously called the Libyan War or

Truceless War, provides future statesmen a negative educational paradigm of the causal power of anger.828 At the end of the First Punic War, Carthage found itself in financial difficulties and had to pay many mercenaries. Originally, the commander Gesgo had sent back the mercenary soldiers from Sicily to Carthage in separate shipments so that the Carthaginians could pay them and let them disperse to their different homelands. This would alleviate the strain on Carthage to hold them and allow space between their shipments so that they could not gather and compare their experiences and pay.829 The Carthaginians, however, gathered them in Carthage, in the hopes of persuading them to cancel the Carthaginian’s obligation to pay them, thus potentially cheating them.

Since the mercenaries committed crimes indiscriminately while waiting in Carthage, the

Carthaginians sent them out to a camp at Sicca, not far from Carthage, and made them take their possessions and families.830 During their idle time at their camp at Sicca, the mercenaries began to meet and discuss the pay they were owed, figuring the sum extortionately. They began to make demands and, since the Carthaginians now realized their folly, they succumbed to every demand from the troops, sending supplies as appeasement. Thus, the Carthaginians attempted

828 Polyb., I.66-70. Gibson 2013, 159-179. 829 Polyb., I.66.2-4. Polybius approves of this plan as the correct way to handle these troops, I.68.2. 830 Polyb., I.66.6-12. This was the wrong move, Polybius notes: they should have kept their possessions and families in Carthage as a guarantee for good behavior. 182 to propitiate the mercenaries’ anger, but these troops kept coming up with new demands.831

Eventually, the Carthaginians sent a favored commander, Gesgo, who began to pay the mercenaries successfully by nation. At this point, the conflict could have ended, but it does not.

Two individuals, Spendius, a runaway Roman slave, and Mathos, a Libyan subject of Carthage, persuade the mercenaries of the Carthaginians’ deceit and provoke anger and war. Because he fears being deported to his Roman master, tortured, and killed, Spendius strives to reignite the anger of the mercenaries and prolong their dispute with Carthage.832 Mathos, likewise, fears that he will be called to account and punished for habitually stirring up disturbances.833 After being declared generals by the mercenaries, these two persuade the as yet unpaid Libyan troops that they alone as subjects under Carthage will bear the brunt of the Carthaginians’ anger once the rest of the mercenaries leave.834 The Libyans go to Gesgo and demand their pay, to which Gesgo retorts that they should ask their “General” Mathos to pay them.835 This immediately angers them so much that they loot his and the Carthaginians’ property in the camp, and, under

Spendius’ and Mathos’ leadership, they detain him.836 Polybius then sums up, “then already they clearly were at war against the Carthaginians.”837

831 Polyb., I.68.5-6. σπουδάζοντες ἐξιλάσασθαι τὴν ὀργὴν αὐτῶν, . . . ὑπισχνούμενοι ποιήσειν πᾶν ὅ, τι ποτ’ ἂν αὐτοὺς ἀξιώσαιεν εἰ κατὰ δύναμιν. ἦν δὲ πολὺ τὸ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν παρὰ τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἐπινοούμενον, ἅτε δὴ κατατεθαρρηκότων μὲν καὶ συντεθεωρηκότων τὴν κατάπληξιν καὶ πτοίαν τῶν Καρχηδονίων. Here appeasing the mercenaries’ anger is also a strategic move, to counter any future actions based on this hostility. 832 Polyb., I.69.4-5. 833 Polyb., I.69.6. 834 Note the lack of Carthaginian anger in the narrative. This is a case of disjuncture between emotions in speech from emotions in the narrative: Spendius and Mathos attribute anger to those whom they and their audience think are likely to be angry. 835 Polyb., I.70.3. 836 Polyb., I.70.4-5. οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωργίσθησαν ὥστ’ οὐδὲ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀναστροφὴν δόντες ὥρμησαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπὶ τὸ διαρπάζειν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν χρημάτων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συλλαμβάνειν τόν τε Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς μετ’ αὐτοῦ Καρχηδονίους. 837 Polyb., I.70.6. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπολέμουν ἤδη φανερῶς πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. 183 Spendius and Mathos succeed at inducing anger in the Libyans. They play upon the

Libyans’ fears and persuade them that Gesgo and the Carthaginians aim to injure them.838 Thus, the Libyans react vehemently to Gesgo’s snide remark because they perceive it as a slight to themselves and as indicative of Gesgo’s intention to harm their interests. Perceived slights play a central role in motivating the anger which characters use to justify waging war.839 Anger which motivates wars is often related to a perception of being slighted. The fickle character of the mercenary troops contributes to how quickly a perceived slight escalates into anger, and how such anger quickly escalates into violence.840

In the escalation to the Mercenary War, anger does not provide a justified reason to go to war according to Polybius’ moral standards. Polybius consistently portrays the mercenaries and their motives negatively. Polybius assumes the Carthaginians’ perspective, which necessitates viewing any such disruption of diplomatic proceedings as negative. Polybius emphasizes the Libyans’ overzealousness for their money (οἰομένων δὲ δεῖν ἀποδεδόσθαι

σφίσι, καὶ προσιόντων θρασέως) and their quick, unreasoned reaction of violence to Gesgo’s slight (οὐδὲ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀναστροφὴν δόντες ὥρμησαν . . .). The Libyans reacted only to their anger (ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωργίσθησαν ὥστ’ . . .), with no thought underlying this.841

Since the mercenaries’ anger can be justified only by reference to the slight by Gesgo and their

838 This is a plausible threat, for the Carthaginians did aim to insult them in removing them from Carthage, I.66.9. 839 For further examples, see II.8, III.7, IV.49, all discussed in this chapter; V.58.11 (Ptolemy III against Seleucids), and XX.6.10-11 (Boeotians against Megara). 840 Unlike the people in internal state communities, the mercenaries’ emotions are driven only by self-interest. We saw Agathocles temporarily succeed through paying the troops in Egypt in Book XV, and likewise we saw him fail to appeal to them in his tearful request to care about his safety and the boy king’s against the threat of Tlepolemos; Polyb., XV.25.13(20) and XV.26. Plato likewise represents mercenaries as only concerned about pay. In his linear narrative of constitutional change in the Republic, Plato writes that the tyrant establishes himself among citizens by enrolling foreign mercenaries dependent solely upon him, and when these bodyguard mercenaries do (eventually) begin to assimilate into the citizens’ community, the tyrant must do away with these and enroll new foreign mercenaries; Pl., Rep. 567d. See Trundle 2013 on mercenaries in the late Classical and Hellenistic age. 841 In the mercenaries’ case, words alone spark their anger, and they react with violence immediately. Recall the long periods of time between the first insults and harm from tyrants, oligarchs or from Agathocles, Agathocleia, and Oenanthe and the eventual outbreak of violence under some leadership. 184 desire for money, the outbreak of the Mercenary War provides a model of the “wrong” kind of anger: premature, based solely on personal gain and a slight, and acted upon rashly.842 They do direct their anger correctly at the Carthaginians, but their response is in no way proportional to the wrong they suffered.

The shared anger of the mercenaries differs greatly from that of the people in the passages examined in Chapter 3. The mercenaries as a group do not form a community: they do not seem to care if their members are harmed, for they stone any of their own members who attempt to speak at assemblies besides Spendius and Mathos.843 This difference is crucial in

Polybius’ presentation of the mercenaries’ character. The mercenaries react angrily because of prior persuasion by their demagogic leaders, Spendius and Mathos. In the anacyclosis and the popular uprising in Alexandria in Book XV, the people await a leader to direct their anger.

Within this episode, the mercenaries do not explicitly grow angry until Spendius and Mathos insinuate that Gesgo and the Carthaginians aim to insult them. Spendius and Mathos inculcate the mercenaries’ anger, unlike the leaders of the people in the anacyclosis and in Alexandria.844

The mercenaries’ anger thus also differs from the Carthaginians’ anger over Sardinia which caused the Second Punic War. The Carthaginians felt anger of their own accord over Sardinia,

842 The mercenaries’ anger does not meet Erskine’s criteria for justifiable anger: Erskine 2015, 108, 122. The mercenaries’ anger can be justified from their perspective: the Carthaginians wished to withhold their income. Anger based on this kind of injustice, taking advantage of the mercenaries by using their ‘labor’ but not paying them for it, clearly can be justifiable. Polybius, however, nowhere portrays the mercenaries’ anger in this way. He focalizes their anger through the Carthaginians’ perspective, frames the beginning of the Mercenary War as a didactic warning to those who hire mercenaries, and dismissively portrays the mercenaries’ claims and reckoning of their wages as inaccurate. 843 Polyb., I.69.10-14. I use “community” in the sense which Helm describes in his 2014 article – as a unified group which cares about its members. The mercenaries do not represent a community which cares for its members. The mercenaries who received their pay first and departed before the Libyans confronted Gesgo did not care about the others, and those who stayed did not care about the other members whom they stoned to death for attempting to speak. See I.69.3. 844 Critolaus and the other demagogic leaders of the Achaean League during its war with Rome also inculcate emotions in the people, XXXVIII.11.9. This also turns out very badly for him. See Champion 2004b on Polybius’ portrayal of demagogues. 185 and then Hamilcar, the opposite kind of leader from Spendius and Mathos, combined their anger with his own passion.

Polybius does not approve of the anger of the mercenaries. They feel anger for the wrong sorts of reason, money and an insult.845 They could have let this anger go and accepted the supplies and compensation from the Carthaginians. Gesgo exacerbated the situation with his taunt, but he does not appear to be wholly at fault in the narrative.846 Polybius provides details into the backgrounds and inclinations of Spendius and Mathos to illuminate their bad character. Their character motivates them to insinuate suspicions of Carthaginian bad faith and exacerbate the mercenaries’ angry reaction to Gesgo. Because Spendius and Mathos have bad intentions and character, their suggestion and the anger which it instills in the mercenaries are also negative.847

However, Polybius’ description of the outbreak of Rome’s First Illyrian War juxtaposes both unjustified and justifiable anger. Italian merchants complained to Rome about Illyrian depredations on their trading vessels, but now Illyrians even attack and kill Italian merchants on

845 In an anarchic world, insults required retaliation so that one would not be perceived as weak. See Eckstein 2006 on the anarchic atmosphere prevalent in the ancient world and particularly in the Hellenistic period. Polybius, however, emphasizes morality over Realist expediency when given the chance. Pure expediency, such as retaliating only because of a perceived insult and because of money, pales in comparison to reasons based in Polybius’ aristocratic values. See Eckstein 1995, especially Ch. 2 on Polybius’ moral values. 846 Unlike the mercenaries, Gesgo at least had some underlying reason for his slight. His strategy, however, completely backfired, and Gesgo later paid the price for this mistake, being mutilated and thrown into a ditch to die. Polyb., I.80.11-13. Moreover, Polybius describes Gesgo’s death as undeserved, I.80.5-10. 847 Likewise, Polybius conveys how the Achaeans began the Achaean War against Rome in 146 BC without due consideration or justifiable cause. Although Polybius’ account of the causes and pretexts do not survive, Polybius clearly presents the Achaeans as neither having moral grounds for beginning war nor using strategic prudence. The surviving narrative of the Achaean War is XXXVIII.1-4, 9-13, 14-18. He consistently characterizes the Greeks in this war with folly, madness, and lack of judgment: ἀγνοία: XXXVIII.3.13, XXXVIII.10.12, XXXVIII.11.16, XXXVIII.18.8; ἀνοῖα: XXXVIII.18.7, XXXVIII.18.8; ἀβουλία: XXXVIII.3.8; ἀπιστία: XXXVIII.3.10; ἀνανδρία: XXXVIII.3.10; ἀκρισία: XXXVIII.18.7; μανία: XXXVIII.18.8. Compare Champion 2004a’s Appendix A on the language of barbarology, 241-244. Their behavior and Polybius’ criticism in such start terms belies his view that this war too was unnecessary, foolish, and unjustified. Moreover, the Achaean War contains some anger. At XXXVIII.11.9, Critolaus the Achaean demagogue works anger and hatred into the mob, much as we see Spendius inculcate a quickness to anger in the Libyan mercenaries. See Champion 2004b on demagogues. At XXXVIII.18.10, Polybius states that because of the quick defeat of the Achaeans, Roman anger did not burn further, suggesting that they felt an appropriate and proportional anger to insult from the Achaeans. However, Polybius makes it clear that the Achaeans began and held responsibility for the war. 186 the Adriatic Sea.848 In response, Rome sends two ambassadors, a pair of brothers Coruncanii, to ask Teuta, Queen of Illyrians, to stop these piratic raids. Polybius says that Teuta received and listened to them haughtily, which upset the younger, fiery Coruncanius.849 He replied rightly, but not opportunely, says Polybius.850 His speech angers Teuta (ἐξωργίσθη) to such a degree that she sent assassins after the ambassadors’ departure to murder him.851 When news of his murder at Teuta’s behest arrives at Rome, the Romans also grow angry (διοργισθέντες) and prepare for war.852

Polybius characterizes first Teuta as angry: she reacts irrationally and passionately to the

Roman’s use of frankness, (ἡ δὲ γυναικοθύμως κἀλογίστως δεξαμένη τὴν παρρησίαν).

Teuta’s anger appears negative and unjustified. Polybius repeatedly characterizes Teuta with arrogance (ἀγερώχως καὶ λίαν ὑπερηφανῶς), womanly passion (γυναικοθύμως), irrationality (ἀλογίστως), desires, and greed, which all contrast with traditional aristocratic values.853 Like the Libyan mercenaries (and Gesgo), Teuta reacts immediately, responding

848 Polyb., II.8.1. See Walbank, HCP I.156-160 for the historical details of this event and the embassy that follows. Champion 2004, 112 and 140-141, identifies such behavior as the opposite of Roman communal values; the Illyrians use public resources for private gain. Both Gibson 2013, 177, and Walbank, HCP I.159, note the Romans’ failure to address earlier complaints from Italian traders and fit this into a trend of Romans storing up grievances to use later, seen especially with the murder of Octavius in Antioch, XXXII.2. 849 Polyb., II.8.7. ἡ δὲ Τεύτα καθόλου μὲν παρ’ ὅλην τὴν κοινολογίαν ἀγερώχως καὶ λίαν ὑπερηφάνως αὐτῶν διήκουε. I refer to this, the younger Coruncanius, as “Coruncanius” for the rest of the chapter, as the elder plays no significant role. 850 Polyb., II.8.9. ὁ δὲ νεώτερος τῶν πρεσβευτῶν, δυσχεράνας ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἐχρήσατο παρρησίᾳ καθηκούσῃ μέν, οὐδαμῶς δὲ πρὸς καιρόν. Walbank, HCP I.159, says that Coruncanius’ speech “has the appearance of a post eventum invention designed to glorify the victim of the subsequent outrage,” but his analysis does not address Polybius’ slight criticism of Coruncanius’ speech here at II.8.9. McGing 2013, 183, fills in Polybius’ implication that Coruncanius spoke rashly. 851 Polyb., II.8.12. ἡ δὲ γυναικοθύμως κἀλογίστως δεξαμένη τὴν παρρησίαν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐξωργίσθη πρὸς τὸ ῥηθὲν ὡς ὀλιγωρήσασα τῶν παρ’ ἀνθρώποις ὡρισμένων δικαίων ἀποπλέουσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπαποστεῖλαί τινας τὸν παρρησιασάμενον τῶν πρέσβεων ἀποκτεῖναι. 852 Polyb., II.8.13. 853 Polyb., II.8.7, II.8.12. For an example of desires and greed, see II.8.4, where she decides to send out her pirates because she saw the beauty and amount of the goods taken from Phoenike. See too for her negative characterization, Eckstein 1995, 154-156, 210. Teuta’s motives and character represent what Craige Champion calls “barbaric thumos,” the opposite of “Hellenic logismos”: Champion 2004a, especially 6, 70-75, 139ff. 187 arrogantly.854 She grew angry at the younger Coruncanius’ censure and threat to her dignity and piratic way of life. However, Polybius saw such a way of life and sense of arrogant dignity as unjustifiable, and so he portrayed Teuta, her response, and her anger as negatively as possible.

However, the Romans reciprocally grow angry. They grow angry at how Teuta manifests her unjustified anger in the murder of Coruncanius, an ambassador, and thus at how she commits an act of transgression of the interstate code of behavior (ὀλιγωρήσασα τῶν παρ’

ἀνθρώποις ὡρισμένων δικαίων).855 This anger directly causes the Romans to begin war against the Illyrians: “when the news of what happened arrived in Rome, growing angry at the lawlessness of the woman, immediately they were busy making ready their preparations, enrolling an army, and gathering a fleet.”856

Eckstein examines Teuta as an example of Polybius’ negative judgment against Rome’s opponents. “But what disturbs Polybius here is not so much opposition to Rome per se,” he says, “as poor-quality decision making: leaders who lose control of their emotions and act irrationally, thereby becoming derelict in their solemn duty to provide guidance to their polities during seasons of difficulty.”857 Eckstein’s analysis of Teuta rings true in this passage, but his analysis could apply equally well to the Romans: they, after all, grow just as angry

(διοργισθέντες) and immediately decide upon war from this anger. The Romans take no strategic consideration, beyond retaliation, in this narrative. The Romans are not characterized as “acting irrationally” or “becoming derelict” in their duty to protect their state, by either

Polybius or Eckstein. The Romans could be said to demonstrate “poor-quality decision

854 Moreover, Polybius treats Teuta’s gender as another negative characteristic: she cannot control her womanly passions (γυναικοθύμως) (χρωμένη δὲ λογισμοῖς γυναικείοις), and reacts without reflection (κἀλογίστως) (πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ γεγονὸς εὐτύχημα μόνον ἀποβλέπουσα); II.8.12 and II.4.8. 855 Polyb., II.8.12. Eckstein 1995, 196. 856 Polyb., II.8.13. προσπεσόντος δὲ τοῦ γεγονότος εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, διοργισθέντες ἐπὶ τῇ παρανομίᾳ τῆς γυναικὸς εὐθέως περὶ παρασκευὴν ἐγίνοντο, καὶ στρατόπεδα κατέγραφον καὶ στόλον συνήθροιζον. 857 Eckstein 1995, 210. Champion 2004a, 140, likewise sees Teuta’s ἀλογία as characteristic of a Roman enemy, although he does not make a similar claim about the emotion. 188 making” because they react to anger just as much as Teuta does. The crucial point, therefore, lies not in regulating emotions as such, but in the reasons for the emotions which elicit Polybius’ censure. Polybius does not call the Romans’ move to war “poor decision making,” for he sees their reaction to go to war as justified, just as their anger was justified.

Polybius saw the Romans’ anger as morally motivated, much as the anger of the people against despotic rulers in the anacyclosis and in Alexandria and the Carthaginians’ anger at the injustice they suffered with the loss of Sardinia. The Roman people grew angry at Teuta’s obvious transgression of international norms and her affront to their own dignity and status.858

This anger immediately motivated the Romans to prepare war against the Illyrians, and thus this passage confirms that Polybius portrayed anger as reasonable and justifiable for war. Anger in itself does not constitute a condemned, irrational, or unjustifiable motive for war.

Likewise, within the prefatory section of Book III, Polybius does not pass judgment upon the Aetolians for their anger in causing the war between Rome and Antiochus III. The

Aetolians grew angry because of the distribution of spoils and credit at the end of the Second

Macedonian War in 196 BC, when they aided Rome in defeating Philip V decisively at

Cynoscephalae. Polybius regularly presents the Aetolians as notoriously self-interested and habitually transgressing the norms of interstate relations.859 He likewise portrays in an unfavorable light their behavior and motives after the end of the Second Macedonian War, which they won together with Rome, and before the Romano-Syrian War.860 The near-barbarian

Aetolians never provide a model to emulate, but Polybius does not condemn the fact that anger

858 This, according to Realist theory, constitutes a real danger. See Morstein-Marx 2009, on claims of upholding dignity; see Eckstein 2006, 63-65, for this as a valid and common line of thought or threat in an atmosphere of interstate anarchy. See Champion 2013 on early Roman virtue, with some counterexamples; see Champion 2004a, especially 100-143, for further on Roman virtue and character throughout the Histories. 859 See for example, Polyb., IV.3, IV.16, and XIII.1. See Champion 2011 for a recent appraisal of Polybius’ portrayal of Aetolians. 860 Polyb., XVIII.34.6-8, XVIII.39, XVIII.45.1-9. Polybius elsewhere emphasizes their greed, turbulence, and dissatisfaction with Agelaus (the one Aetolian he portrayed favorably), V.107.5-7. 189 caused the war. Rather, he criticizes the selfish motivation and inappropriate direction of their anger.861 Anger as a cause as such does not seem to bother Polybius. Anger as a cause which stems from unjustifiable motives, however, does.

Polybius, his characters, and his audience regularly saw anger as a common and acceptable cause for war, yet scholars have seen and judged anger as an inherently negative term.

This is not so. Anger can certainly have unjustified motivations and also can lead to unjustified and immoral wars, as we saw in the case of the Mercenary War. Anger can have moral and justified motivations, such as that of the Romans against Teuta, who react to arrogance and lawless behavior – and unmoderated anger – with their own righteous anger. As with many emotions, anger as a cause of war should be evaluated with regard to its own motivation. So too, the passionate spirit of Hamilcar and the anger of the Carthaginians were motivated by a sense of honor and justice. Polybius made clear that Hamilcar acted nobly and rightly in first yielding to the situation at the end of the First Punic War and in persevering later. While we might expect Polybius to criticize holding onto and beginning a new war for such reasons as anger, he does not. Likewise, Polybius repeatedly stressed the injustice of the seizure of Sardinia, thus showing the anger that arose from it as rationally and morally grounded. Carthaginian anger was justified as a cause of the Second Punic War.

Pretexts

The justifiability of a cause for war mattered to Polybius, and pretexts, προφάσεις, represented justification for a character’s actions in the Histories. Pretexts, in their role as representing the justice of a character’s actions to the world, thus were important to Polybius as well. Donald Baronowski, however, argues against the value of pretexts for Polybius.

Baronowski sees pretexts as merely expedient, for giving a “feeble justification”, “clumsy

861 Thus, the Aetolians’ anger fails at fulfilling Erskine’s criteria for justifiable anger; Erskine 2015. 190 invention”, or “an unreasonable and false claim”.862 Pretexts merely covered up aggression – which Baronowksi argues Polybius approved – to external observers who knew better and recognized the deception anyway.863 While Baronowski correctly points to some “feeble justifications”, his argument is at odds with Polybius’ text, including the major passages

Baronowski addresses. Polybius put emphasis on the pretexts, precisely in their moral validity and thus good appearance to the rest of the world, therefore also having practical benefit.

Polybius does not quite distinguish a cause (αἰτία) from a pretext (πρόφασις) in his definitions at III.6-7. Rather, the distinction between cause and pretext becomes clear through his examples.864 A pretext is an aggressor’s public reason to go to war, while the cause represents what motivates his actions. Philip II’s pretext, for example, for his planned invasion of the Persian Empire was punishing the Persians for their transgression against the Greeks, while for the Romano-Syrian War, Antiochus III proclaimed the freedom of the Greeks as his pretext.865 Polybius’ choices here represent claims by the active party to the world, justifying their actions.

Polybius’ discussion of the beginning of the Third Macedonian War between Rome and

Perseus, Philip V’s son and successor, makes clear the typical relation between cause and pretext.866 Polybius criticizes others’ attribution of causes and emphasizes his distinctions between cause, pretext, and beginning. Others attribute the cause of the Third Macedonian War

862 Baronowski 1995, 17. He uses these terms as generalizations of all pretexts but cites III.6, III.15, and XXXVI.2 for his evidence. We shall address all of these passages below. 863 Baronowski 1995, 22. See Baronowski 2011 for his argument about Polybius on imperialism. 864 Those of Alexander the Great’s pretext to invade Persia and Antiochus III’s to come into Greece. 865 Polyb., III.15.10-11, III.30.3-4. The ostensible difference between the cause and pretext lies in the perspective: the character himself gives a pretext while the narrator identifies the cause, but the cause and pretext do not have to be different or separate, as we shall see. The historian relates the causes from a position of greater knowledge, for he can review the course of events in retrospect and determine the truth about what actually began a war. The characters, however, decide upon pretexts with their limited view of the foreseeable future; see Grethlein 2013, 224- 267, on Polybius’ prominent use of retrospect. Much more important is the similarity: pretexts present the justification of characters’ actions. Another option is that the pretext just represents the character’s public reason for his actions, while the cause is his (conscious) reason motivating him to act. 866 Polyb., XXII.18. 191 to a number of immediate events: the Thracian king Abrupolis’ expulsion, the invasion of

Dolopia, and Perseus’ actions at Delphi.867 Polybius disagrees with calling any of these a cause.

Instead, he says, they are all pretexts (for the Romans against Perseus). He says also that others likewise classify as causes the plot against Eumenes, the Pergamene monarch, and the murder of

Boeotian envoys, whereas Polybius calls these events the beginning of the war. Polybius, in contrast to the other writers, attributes the cause to Philip V, Perseus’ father: he planned to wage war against Rome but died before he could execute this plan, much like Philip II’s plan to invade Persia which was left to Alexander the Great, comparable to Hannibal’s inheritance of

Hamilcar’s plan and hatred.868

Polybius explains how crucial a suitable pretext is for entering war, morally and (thus) pragmatically. Polybius discusses the Romans’ decision-making leading up to the Third Punic

War. They had the strategic power to begin and wage war, but they delayed declaring war until they found a suitable pretext (πρόφασιν εὐσχήμονα).869 Despite the benefit and expediency of beginning war sooner, the Romans hesitated because of the importance of having a good reputation. Polybius approves the Romans’ consideration and privileging of pretexts.870 Not only does a good pretext give them the appearance of justice, he remarks, but it makes the

867 Polyb., XXII.18.1-5. The narration of most of these events do not survive in the extant text. Cf. Liv. 39.23-24, 41.22ff. See Walbank, HCP 3.205-209 on the historical events. 868 Polyb, XXII.18.10-11. Polybius does not specifically identify the cause, aitia, of the Third Macedonian War. He makes the correlation between Philip II and Philip V’s plans and emphasizes Philip V’s intent to wage war, with his preparations as evidence for this. This passage is preserved in the De Sententiis of the Constantinian Excerpts, and so the excerptor may have left out Polybius’ direct attribution of the cause. See Moore 1965 on the manuscript tradition. Livy records a similar transfer of the drive to war from Philip V to Perseus, 36.28-29, yet he also portrays Perseus as autonomous and as directing war more towards Eumenes than towards the Romans, 42.15. In Philip V’s speech, which Livy states are the reasons for the war, emotion is not mentioned explicitly, although it is clear to see Philip was disgruntled at the least, if not indignant and angry. Philip mentions, however, what we would call practical, strategic reasons for his complaint to Rome. Likewise, Eumenes’ speech, 42.11-12, which greatly influences the Roman Senate to declare war against Perseus, includes strategic and immediate events and considerations. Appian, Mac. 1.2-3, also puts emphasis on Eumenes as the object of Perseus’ attention. He also mentions that Rome did not want a popular and hard-working king as well as a hereditary enemy as their neighbor. 869 Polyb., XXXVI.2.1. πάλαι δὲ τούτου κεκυρωμένου βεβαίως ἐν ταῖς ἑκάστων γνώμαις καιρὸν ἐζήτουν ἐπιτήδειον καὶ πρόφασιν εὐσχήμονα πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός. 870 Polyb., XXXVI.2.2. 192 victory seem better and more secure.871 Lastly, Polybius stresses the judgment of external observers (περὶ τῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς διαλήψεως).872 Pretexts assume great importance in the appearance of justice to the rest of the world.873 Although Polybius does not mention anger in causing or characterizing this war in the surviving text of the Histories, this passage on the Third

Punic War provides evidence for the importance of both causes and pretexts, particularly in moral terms.874

To turn back to the Second Punic War, Hannibal justifies his presence at Saguntum to the Roman embassy with what Polybius calls “fabricated” and “illogical” pretexts.875 Polybius says,

“But Hannibal, as he was a young man full of impulsiveness for war, and successful in his endeavors, and stirred up in his long-time enmity against Romans, charged the envoys, as if concerned for the Saguntines, that the Romans, when the Saguntines were in civil strife just a few years before, in resolving it had some of the leaders killed unjustly: he said that the Carthaginians would not overlook those who had been betrayed (παρεσπονδημένους). For it was the Carthaginians’ ancestral custom not to overlook anyone being injured unjustly.”876

That Hannibal himself deemed these pretexts as worthy surely attests to their importance and usefulness as public justifications to Hannibal and the Carthaginians, contra Polybius. Clearly, immediate events and perceived injustices hold importance as legitimate reasons or pretexts for

871 Polyb., XXXVI.2.3. ἔνστασις γὰρ πολέμου κατὰ τὸν Δημήτριον δικαία μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦσα καὶ τὰ νικήματα ποιεῖ μείζω καὶ τὰς ἀποτεύξεις ἀσφαλεστέρας, ἀσχήμων δὲ καὶ φαύλη τοὐναντίον ἀπεργάζεται. 872 Polyb., XXXVI.2.4. See Chapter 5 on the importance of external observers. 873 For all this stress on pretexts, Polybius does not tell us the Romans’ pretext in this part of the extant text, again preserved in the De Sententiis of the Constantinian Excerpts. Compare XXXVI.5.1-6, where a Carthaginian argues for the necessity of choosing expediency over what is honorable in the dire situation of the Carthaginians in the Third Punic War. 874 Appian, Pun. 9.74, similarly states that the Romans tried to come up with a pretext for declaring war on the Carthaginians in the Third Punic War. He says that the Romans were hostile (δυσμεναίνοντες) towards the Carthaginians and used their action against Masinissa, in which they both lost overall and lost many lives, as a reason to go to war quickly against them, despite their embassies seeking peace. 875 Polyb., III.6-11. 876 Polyb., III.15.6-7. ὁ δὲ Ἀννίβας, ἅτε νέος μὲν ὤν, πλήρης δὲ πολεμικῆς ὁρμῆς, ἐπιτυχὴς δ’ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, πάλαι δὲ παρωρμημένος πρὸς τὴν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων ἔχθραν, πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνους, ὡς κηδόμενος Ζακανθαίων, ἐνέκαλει Ῥωμαίοις διότι μικροῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις, στασιαζόντων αὐτῶν, λαβόντες τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν [εἰς τὸ διαλῦσαι] ἀδίκως ἐπανέλοιντό τινας τῶν προεστώτων · οὓς οὐ περιόψεσθαι παρεσπονδημένους · πάτριον γὰρ εἶναι Καρχηδονίοις τὸ μηδένα τὼν ἀδικουμένων περιορᾶν. 193 going to war, and surely Hannibal would have considered them reasonable and suitable to his audience, of both Romans and Carthaginians and anyone observing the war, as well. Otherwise, they would not serve his purpose at all as pretexts.

However, Polybius severely criticizes these pretexts, something that he does not do for other – sometimes flimsier – pretexts.877 In other instances, claims to protect one’s wronged allies are both noble and acceptable as reasons to commence hostilities. Philip V’s motivations to participate in the Social War fall under this category, as do the Achaean League’s actions throughout the Histories. Polybius portrays Philip V in the Social War as a noble leader, even overcoming the disadvantage of being young, and therefore more prone to irrational and rash impulses.878 The Achaean League nobly takes up the Messenians’ just cause in the Social War, and the Messenians receive unrestrained censure from Polybius for their indecision in joining the allies against the Aetolian League, especially since they themselves were the wronged party.879

Despite the Messenians’ indecision, the Achaeans resolved to right the wrong done by the

Aetolian League and fight the Social War. Of course, the Achaean League had other motives for curtailing Aetolian power, particularly in the Peloponnese itself, but Polybius focuses on their nobility in defending those wronged and standing up for their allies.880 Lastly, the Romans commonly claimed it was their patriotic duty to defend those wronged and to support their allies, which Hannibal at III.15.6 claims in his pretexts is Carthaginian custom.881 Rarely does

877 Consider Antiochus III and the Aetolians, which Eckstein 1995, 57, uses as an example for weak pretexts. McGing 2010, 77, also discusses the unimportance of pretexts (though without this example). 878 See especially Polyb., V.77 and throughout Books IV-V in Philip’s campaigns in the Social War. See too McGing 2013, on Philip V as a good leader while young. Philip V’s later actions, after the Social War, do not fall in this category, however. 879 Polyb., IV.31-33. 880 Polyb., IV.7, especially IV.7.3-4. See Champion 2004a, especially pages 100-143, on Achaean virtues. 881 Compare Coruncanius’ speech at II.8.10-11. Coruncanius’ speech to Teuta also comes in a youthful outburst, much like Hannibal’s. Both tack on the line about their custom to aid wronged allies at the end of their speech. In both cases of the young Coruncanius and the young Hannibal, their claim does not have much backing and seems to exhibit the youthful rashness Polybius explicitly attributes to both. Nevertheless, the claim itself did hold weight as an argument in its own right; these two young men merely did not set up their speeches and argument to bring out the full potential of this claim. See Walbank HCP, I.159, for further examples and counterexamples. 194 Polybius criticize this tendency of the Romans, and when he does it is due to their choice of disreputable allies.882 In sum, Polybius’ criticism of the content of Hannibal’s pretexts contradicts Polybius’ tendency to praise this type of behavior. Polybius criticizes not the content, then, but Hannibal’s interpretive move.883

Polybius begins criticizing Hannibal for his succumbing to his youth, for he responded

“full of irrationality and forceful passion (θυμός).”884 As Craige Champion has noted, Polybius does not hold back on using language of barbarism and irrationality in this passage.885 Polybius continues:

“For this reason also, he did not use the true causes, but fled to irrational pretexts, which those who make light of duty are accustomed to do because of the urges in them. For how much better was it to think that the Romans must give back to them Sardinia and the tributes arranged together with this, which they took unjustly from them in taking advantage of the circumstances, and if not, to declare war? But now, keeping quiet about what the true cause was, and fabricating a nonexistent cause about the Saguntines, he seemed to begin the war not only irrationally but, even more so, unjustly.”886

Polybius accuses Hannibal of fabricating (πλάττων) these reasons rather than giving the real causes. The true reasons (αἰτίαι) for Carthage to go to war with Rome were better than what

Hannibal gave. Polybius ignores two key considerations: first, the realities underlying

Hannibal’s “fabricated” pretexts, which Walbank, for one, shows to be plausible, and second,

882 Polyb., III.26.6. 883 One could posit that Polybius is inconsistent in what he praises or blames based on who exactly he judges. This conclusion, that Polybius only blames those he does not agree with politically or whom it is expedient for him to blame, runs contrary to Polybius’ own precepts for a historian in I.14.4-5. Before coming to the conclusion that Polybius is inconsistent and fails to meet his own historiographical precepts, I prefer to investigate other options. 884 Polyb., III.15.9. καθόλου δ’ ἦν πλήρης ἀλογίας καὶ θυμοῦ βιαίου. Clearly, thumos here conforms to the typical negative connotations in Polybius, especially when modified specifically as “violent”. Hannibal, unlike Hamilcar, does not show prudence and swallow his emotion for the time being, providing us with a clear instance of inexpedient emotion. 885 Champion 2004a, 118-121. See too Eckstein 1995, 144. 886 Polyb., III.15.9-11. διὸ καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἀληθιναῖς αἰτίαις οὐκ ἐχρῆτο, κατέφευγε δ’ εἰς προφάσεις ἀλόγους · ἅπερ εἰώθασι ποιεῖν οἱ διὰ τὰς προεγκαθημένας αὐτοῖς ὁρμὰς ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ καθήκοντος. πόσῳ γὰρ ἦν ἄμεινον οἴεσθαι δεῖν, Ῥωμαίους ἀποδοῦναι σφίσι Σαρδόνα καὶ τοὺς ἐπιταχθέντας ἅμα ταύτῃ φόρους, οὓς τοῖς καιροῖς συνεπιθέμενοι πρότερον ἀδίκως παρ’ αὐτῶν ἔλαβον · εἰ δὲ μή, φάναι πολεμήσειν; νῦν δὲ τὴν μὲν οὖσαν αἰτίαν ἀληθινὴν παρασιωπῶν, τὴν δ’ οὐκ ὑπάρχουσαν περὶ Ζακανθαίων πλάττων, οὐ μόνον ἀλόγως, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀδίκως κατάρχειν ἐδόκει τοῦ πολέμου. 195 the fact that Hannibal was justifying his attack and treatment of Saguntum, not a potential war with Rome.887 Retrospection may have blinded Polybius to Hannibal’s foreseeable situation and goals at that moment in 220/219 BC.888

However, Polybius emphasizes the positive value of what he identifies as the true causes for use as Hannibal’s pretext. The injustice of the Romans’ seizure of Sardinia, imposition of additional tribute, and the anger from this serve as suitable, plausible, and beneficial pretexts for

Hannibal and the Carthaginians in Polybius’ mind. Despite Polybius’ affirmation that Hannibal and the Carthaginians had justice on their side, Hannibal’s poor choice of pretext makes his cause appear unjust. As Polybius specifies with the Third Punic War, pretexts are important for gaining the goodwill of others and for securing one’s victory.889 Hannibal failed in this because he did not cite the Romans’ injustice – and, implicitly, the anger associated with it – in his pretext.

While Polybius did not specify that Hannibal should have used anger as his pretext explicitly, the Gauls who join him in Italy do. They choose to begin hostilities against Rome “in word because of their anger against the Romans, but actually more so because of plunder.”890

Here Polybius distinguishes the pretext of anger from the cause: the Gauls use anger as a pretext, but self-interested material gain drives them to war. This example, though brief, demonstrates an essential assumption by both the Gauls and Polybius. They presume that anger is a suitable pretext (πρόφασις), or public reason, to go to war. Of course, many pretexts for war in the ancient world seem less than ideal or even coherent – not least Polybius’ own exemplary case for distinguishing causes, pretexts, and beginnings, that of Alexander’s invasion

887 Walbank fills in the details of the events Hannibal cited as pretexts, Walbank, HCP 1.319-324. Walbank is one among many historians whose work concerns the outbreak of the Second Punic War. See Rich 1996, 1 note 1, for the most comprehensive list of major contributions. See more recently Beck 2011. 888 On retrospection in historiography, see Grethlein 2013, especially 224-267 on Polybius. 889 Polyb., XXXVI.2.1-4. 890 Polyb., III.78.5. προφάσει μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ὀργήν, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον διὰ τὰς ὠφελείας. 196 into the Persian Empire.891 However, pretexts presented the outward justification of a state to the wider interstate community, in which appearance and reputation mattered. Therefore, pretexts had to have some form of plausibility as a reasonable justification.

Gauls, however, are often cast as the stereotypical barbarians.892 The Gauls’ anger seems morally unjustified when seen purely as an indication of their barbarian behavior.

However, their anger is grounded in their desire for retaliation against the Romans, who, as recently as 225 BC, had waged wars against them and taken their land. The conflicts between the Gauls and the Romans stretch back almost unabated to 390 BC.893 Considered within this background, the Gauls’ anger appears more justified, as part of retaliation, and less of a barbaric outburst. Anger seemed more plausible as a public explanation to wage war on the Romans than pursuit of material gain.894 Moreover, their underlying desire for retaliation, which causes their anger, seems reasonable. Anger, therefore, can stand as a suitable pretext or cause, when the context and motivations for the anger are considered, that is when it is justifiable. Hannibal, like the Gauls, could have cited his country and family’s anger against Rome as his pretext, for

Polybius considered Carthaginian anger justified.

However, the anger between the Aetolian Dorimachus and the Messenian Skyron, which formed Dorimachus’ pretext for stirring up the Social War, presents a negative paradigm for

891 Polyb., III.6.9-7.3. See Walbank, HCP 1.305-309. 892 See especially Champion 2004a, 113-115. 893 Polyb., II.18-35 details this series of Gallic-Roman conflict in summary form. In this period, the longest break from hostilities lasted only 45 years, according to Polybius. Moreover, in their recent interactions, the Romans even colonized and resettled the area, killing and displacing many Gauls. 894 In fact, Champion 2004a, 115, adduces this passage as describing a common Gallic pattern of behavior: “Gauls subordinate collective interests and communal concerns to individual desires.” Their prioritization of desire for plunder as a cause to anger, which represents their collective disgruntlement with the Romans, as a pretext fits this characterization. Champion’s definition of “collective interests and communal concerns” describes Polybius’ universal standards, as set out in his discussion of the prototypical human community in the anacyclosis. Thus, ὠφελεία, in denoting plunder, does not represent the good of the community rather than the benefit for an individual. However, within the context of this passage (and not the anacyclosis), ὠφελεία does represent a Gallic communal benefit in terms of what the Gallic community values, rather than Polybius’ universal standards. 197 anger as a pretext.895 The Social War was fought between the Aetolian League and its allies and the Achaean League, Macedonians, and their allies from 220 to 217 BC.896 According to

Polybius, a dispute between the Aetolian Dorimachus and the Messenians first initiated the conflict. The Messenians, who had put themselves under Aetolian protection, nonetheless suffered raids by bandits, until one raid resulted in the death of a Messenian landholder.897 The

Messenians consulted Dorimachus, the Aetolian commander in Messene, who had actually condoned and profited from the raids. A Messenian councilman, Skyron, proposed that

Dorimachus, as leader of their Aetolian protectors, should be held responsible for the damages from the raiding, and that he should not depart until he had paid damages for their losses.898

Dorimachus, angered (διοργισθεὶς) both at Skyron’s suggestion and the council’s agreement with him, responded vehemently that they were all fools, as they were speaking not only against him but also against the whole Aetolian League.899 Dorimachus’ response angered Skyron in turn (περιοργισθεὶς), who mocked Dorimachus by associating him with a notorious, emasculated Messenian local who resembled Dorimachus.900 Dorimachus then left for Aetolia, having paid the damages, and used no other pretext (οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην ἔχων εὔλογον

πρόφασιν) for making war against the Messenians.901

895 Polyb., IV.4. This scene shares great similarities with the angry interaction between Teuta and Coruncanius which sparked the First Illyrian War. 896 This war takes up most of the narration of Books IV and V. 897 Polyb., IV.3.8-4.1. 898 Polyb., IV.4.3. 899 Polyb., IV.4.4. 900 Polyb., IV.4.5. ἦν δέ τις κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς ἄνθρωπος ἀσυρὴς ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ, τῶν ἐξῃρημένων τὸν ἄνδρα κατὰ πάντα τρόπον. The reading of “ἐξῃρημένων” differs between the major manuscripts. The oldest, A, reads “ἐξηρμένων”, but the LSJ classifies this as a falsa lectio. The reading I have used, “ἐξῃρημένων”, “removed”, is found in the rest of the major manuscripts. However, the modern texts print “ἐξηρμένων”. 901 Polyb., IV.4.9. ἐπανελθὼν δ’ εἰς τὴν Αἰτωλίαν οὕτω πικρῶς ἤνεγκε καὶ βαρέως τὸ ῥηθὲν ὡς οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην ἔχων εὔλογον πρόφασιν δι’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις ἐξέκαυσε τὸν πόλεμον. Walbank, HCP I.453, downplays the importance of this episode: “the responsibility for the war is to be attributed neither to so small a group as Dorimachus and his colleagues, nor to an incident so trivial as this insult; these are clearly excuses for a policy already decided.” Despite this, Polybius portrays this instance as very important. Dorimachus – and Polybius – still thought it valid enough as a pretext. 198 The angry exchange in Messene between Dorimachus and Skyron serves as the pretext for the Social War in Polybius’ narrative.902 Polybius does not classify anything as a cause, αἰτία, specifically, although earlier he describes the Aetolians’ motives for desiring war. They live off their neighbors’ property, and they saw the youth of Philip V as a weakness which they could exploit.903 Aetolian greed and aggression due to the perceived weakness of Macedon seem to cause the war in Polybius’ narrative, even if he did not directly label it as the cause (aitia).

Thus identified, the Aetolians’ cause and pretext are similar to the Gauls’ cause and pretext in joining Hannibal in Italy against the Romans: greed and anger, respectively. The

Aetolians’ case furthers the conclusion that anger appeared more acceptable than greed as a public reason to join war. Anger can be justified, whereas greed cannot.

In this scenario, Dorimachus grows angry and uses Skyron’s jibe against him as the only pretext to go to war (ὡς οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην ἔχων εὔλογον πρόφασιν δ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοῖς

Μεσσηνίοις ἐξέκαυσε τὸν πόλεμον), similar to the Libyans’ angry response to Gesgo’s taunt before the Mercenary War and Teuta’s murderous response to Coruncanius’ frankness, and

Polybius implies that Dorimachus and the Aetolians should have had a better (εὔλογον) pretext.904 Polybius described Dorimachus after his return to Aetolia as sneaking around, making backroom deals with Scopas, the leading Aetolian, and setting off on war without the proper legislative measures and vote of the Aetolian assembly.905 If Dorimachus’ pretext was justified, he presumably would not have needed to bypass proper Aetolian measures for going to war, if we can trust Polybius’ hostile narrative against Aetolians. His actions cast doubt further

902 The beginning of the war occurred later when the Aetolians raided Achaea, and the Achaeans tried (and failed) to repel them. Polyb., IV.6-7, 9-13. 903 See also Champion 2004a, 129-137, on Aetolian characteristics in Polybius’ Histories. 904 Polyb., IV.4.9. Polybius does not specify the Libyans’ and Teuta’s anger as pretexts. They seem to be causes, and all three are sparked by insults. 905 Polyb., IV.5. Nevertheless, Polybius’ focus on Dorimachus in Aetolia draws attention away from the Aetolians themselves. They did have to agree to go to war. 199 on the justifiability of his pretext, even in Aetolia, which, we have noted, does not meet

Polybius’ standards for acceptable behavior. Consider, for example, Polybius’ description of the

Aetolians’ characteristics and behavior in plundering others: “so indeed the Aetolians live in this way of life and constantly plunder Greece, and, conducting unannounced wars against many, they do not deem their accusers worth giving a defense to, but they even revile anyone who calls them to account about what has happened or even about what they are about to do.”906

Polybius’ narrative of Dorimachus’ behavior smears the Aetolians, who did have agency in agreeing to war for their own, presumably less personal and petty, motives, against Polybius’ framing of the narrative.907

Through this scenario Polybius frames both Dorimachus and the Aetolians as beginning the war wrongly: Dorimachus wants war for personal, unjustified reasons, and the Aetolians began war without proper measures because of him. Of course, Polybius’ portrayal of

Dorimachus and the Aetolians puts their opponents in this war, the Achaeans, in a particularly favorable light by comparison. Moreover, Polybius’ highlighting of the Aetolian injustice against the Messenians leaves him the opportunity to call the Messenians’ inaction into question later.908

The particular details of this passage set a framework in which Polybius can cast doubt on

Dorimachus’ character and motivations, the legitimacy of the war for the Aetolians, and the

Messenians’ claim for neutrality during the war. Dorimachus provides a negative paradigm for

Hannibal: Dorimachus does not feel justifiable anger and does not use a pretext which will show justice and make victory secure.

906 Polyb., IV.16.4. Αἰτωλοὶ γοῦν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ χρώμενοι καὶ λῃστεύοντες συνεχῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολέμους ἀνεπαγγέλτους φέροντες πολλοῖς, οὐδ’ ἀπολογίας ἔτι κατηξίουν τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσεχλεύαζον εἴ τις αὐτοὺς εἰς δικαιοδοσίας προκαλοῖτο περὶ τῶν γεγονότων ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία τῶν μελλόντων. See especially Champion 2011 for Polybius’ nuanced portrayal of the Aetolians as the foil for the Achaeans. 907 See Grainger 1999 on the Aetolian federation and its constitutional procedures. 908 Meadows 2013 thinks that Polybius took this scenario from a local source because of all the details included in the passage. I think that Polybius included it for his own rhetorical purposes. 200 Skyron, on the other hand, feels anger and shares Polybian values: freedom of speech

(παρρησία), calling wrongdoers to account, and defending one’s people, property, and territory, values which we observed in the development and good state forms of the anacyclosis. Thus, when Skyron grows angry (περιοργισθεὶς) at Dorimachus’ impetuous and arrogant speech insulting the Messenians and threatening their city, Polybius does not explicitly criticize Skyron’s anger.909 Even Skyron’s mockery of Dorimachus, which Polybius decided worthy to quote in detail, is set as an appropriate response to Dorimachus’ bravado, for it succeeds in causing

Dorimachus to assent to pay damages and leave. Skyron grows angry at Dorimachus because the Aetolian failed at his duty to protect the Messenian community and actively harmed it. For these reasons, as well as Dorimachus’ disrespect for Skyron and the Messenians in his speech,

Skyron justifiably grew angry. Hannibal could have used his anger as a pretext successfully, which Dorimachus tried and failed to do.

As with anger as a cause, anger as a pretext can be acceptable to Polybius, his characters, and implicitly their audiences. Baronowski states: “since every pretext, even one that involves honor and morality, is by nature a diversionary artifice, it must be judged by the criteria of expediency, not of morality.” 910 This contradicts the emphasis Polybius himself puts on good pretexts: external observers judge a pretext as the moral justification of one’s cause, not for its strategic expediency. Polybius criticized Hannibal for his pretext not only as a “clumsy invention” but as a hindrance to his own cause: Hannibal portrayed his actions as unjust and therefore immoral, the opposite of the purpose of a pretext.

909 This is the only occurrence of περιοργίζεσθαι in the extant Histories, and is the earliest preserved usage of this verb in Greek. 910 Baronowski 1995, 17. 201 Emotion and Prudence

Emotion does not always oppose strategic prudence and expediency. Pretexts serve a moral purpose and thus provide characters with access to a better reputation, something of practical benefit even in the Realist theory of international relations.911 Polybius also shows how anger can – and should – combine with prudent considerations. Modern studies in international relations until recently contrasted strategic prudence with irrational and emotional decision making.912

All of the three causes of the Second Punic War involve emotion, and all three also attest to the Carthaginians’ strategic sensibilities. Hamilcar first postpones his drive for war – motivated by his θυμός and anger – until a better opportunity presents itself, which did not occur in Hamilcar’s own lifetime. This occurs commonly in Polybius: Philip II passed down the will to make war against Persia to Alexander, and Philip V passed down the preparations for war to Perseus, thus stimulating the Third Macedonian War.913 So too, Hamilcar, motivated by his emotions, passed down his drive to make war against Rome to Hannibal and the Carthaginians, who were willing supporters, given their own hatred and anger against the Romans. The

Carthaginians likewise averted war and acceded to the Romans’ demands for Sardinia and additional tribute:

But when the Romans declared war against the Carthaginians after they resolved the Mercenary War, the Carthaginians first agreed over everything, thinking that they would win in their just claims, . . .. But when the Romans did not compromise, the Carthaginians, yielding to the situation and taking it hard, not having power to do anything, withdrew from Sardinia and undertook to pay another 1,200 talents in addition to the previous tribute. On account of this they

911 See Eckstein 2006, 63-69, on the importance of reputation as practical for survival. 912 See Crawford 2000 for a review and reassessment of this trend. For recent studies which address the importance of emotion in international relations and decision making, see Mercer 2005, Ross 2006, and Sasley 2011. 913 Philip II: III.6.5, III.6.10-14; Philip V as originator of the Third Macedonian War: XXII.18. See below. 202 averted war at that time. For this reason, this must even be placed as the second and greatest cause of the later war.914

They strategically held back any negative feelings (καὶ βαρυνόμενοι μέν) and used prudence

(εἴξαντες τῇ περιστάσει; οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ ποιεῖν οὐδέν), even if they had justice on their side

(ὑπολαμβάνοντες αὑτοὺς νικήσειν τοῖς δικαίοις). The third cause, Carthage’s strength in

Spain, also exemplifies the Carthaginians’ strategic prudence. Because they did not act immediately on their justified anger at the loss of Sardinia, they began to create their power in

Spain. This cause alone focuses primarily on a pragmatic and strategic aspect, but it does not completely omit affect, as the Carthaginians confidently (εὐθαρσῶς) rely on their Iberian power. Now they had confidence in this power. Polybius relates emotions in these three causes in agreement with concerns about expediency. Anger can function together with strategic prudence: anger motivates agents’ decision to want to wage war, and since they have decided upon war, they use strategic prudence to maximize their probability of success, which Hamilcar and the Carthaginians did by building their power in Spain rather than accepting immediate war over Sardinia.915

Prusias I, the king of Bithynia, similarly delays in acting upon his anger until a suitable opportunity arose. His latent anger for the Byzantines motivated him to join Rhodes in a war

914 Polyb., III.10.1, 3-4. Ῥωμαίων δὲ μετὰ τὸ καταλύσασθαι Καρχηδονίους τὴν προειρημένην ταραχὴν ἀπαγγειλάντων αὐτοῖς πόλεμον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς πᾶν συγκατέβαινον, ὑπολαμβάνοντες αὑτοὺς νικήσειν τοῖς δικαίοις, . . .. πλὴν οὐκ ἐντρεπομένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων, εἴξαντες τῇ περιστάσει, καὶ βαρυνόμενοι μέν, οὐκ ἔχοντες δὲ ποιεῖν οὐδέν, ἐξεχώρησαν Σαρδόνος, συνεχώρησαν δ’ εἰσοίσειν ἄλλα χίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα πρὸς τοῖς πρότερον, ἐφ΄ ᾧ μὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκείνοις ἀναδέξασθαι τοῖς καιροῖς. διὸ καὶ δευτέραν, μεγίστην δέ, ταύτην θετέον αἰτίαν τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα συστάντος πολέμου. 915 Scholars dispute Polybius’ reasoning for Carthage’s determination to build their strength in Spain. See especially Hoyos 1998. Cf. the Carthaginians’ choice of putting aside the honorable course of resistance for expediency at the outset of the Third Punic War and Polybius’ praise of a Carthaginian’s argument for this, XXXVI.5.1-6. On the other hand, the Achaean leaders did not take either an expedient or honorable course of action in the Achaean War, and Polybius consistently characterizes their decisions and conduct as thoughtless, ignorant, unreflecting, mistaken, and mad. For some examples, see XXXVIII.3.8-13, XXXVIII.10.12, XXXVIII.11.6, XXXVIII.18.7-8. 203 against Byzantium in 220/219 BC.916 The Rhodians declared war on Byzantium for levying a toll on ships from the Black Sea. Prusias uses the Rhodians’ invitation and their causes for war as his pretext for making war against the Byzantines. For Prusias, however, deep-seated anger formed his cause. Polybius gives three reasons for this anger against Byzantium. First, the

Byzantines had voted to put up statues for Prusias but forgot about them. Second, the

Byzantines had endeavored to reconcile Prusias’ neighboring rivals, Attalus of Pergamum and

Achaeus, the Seleucid satrap of Asia Minor, which was not beneficial for Prusias. Lastly, the

Byzantines sent representatives to Attalus’ festival for Athena in Pergamum but neglected to send anyone to Prusias’ festival of Soteria when he invited them.917 Prusias felt anger against

Byzantium because of these perceived slights. He gladly joined the war with his anger lurking behind the pretext of aiding his allies, the Rhodians.918

In this passage Polybius does not explicitly condone or condemn Prusias’ motives or choice to go to war. Polybius stresses that the anger of Prusias was the actual cause for his decision to wage war. This, coupled with Polybius’ lack of judgment or negative portrayal of

Prusias I, supports the view that anger formed a suitable and usual cause for war, even if aiding his allies seemed to be a better choice in this case for a pretext than anger at past grievances.919

Prusias demonstrates the agreement of expediency and emotion. He does not forget his anger and initial motivation against the Byzantines, but he demonstrates strategic prudence by delaying until the Rhodians provide added strength and a pretext to commence hostilities against the object of his anger, Byzantium. Moreover, Prusias ensures a good reputation for coming to his allies’ aid, rather than seeming to act hastily due to perhaps trivial reasons. Prusias

916 This passage receives very little attention in scholarship. Walbank, HCP I.502-503, only focuses on the festivals, especially Prusias’ Soteria. 917 Polyb., IV.49.1-3. 918 Polyb., IV.49.4. διόπερ ἐκ πάντων τούτων ὑποικουρουμένης παρ’ αὐτῷ τῆς ὀργῆς ἄσμενος ἐπελάβετο τῆς τῶν Ῥοδίων προφάσεως. 919 Prusias I’s anger may have seemed less viable as a pretext than the Gauls’. Note that Prusias also did not take the initiative to begin war against Byzantium and ask the Rhodians for their support. 204 maximized his probability of success by waiting and gaining allies. This strategic delay paid off, for Prusias and the Rhodians quickly defeated Byzantium.920

By contrast, in the escalation to the Mercenary War, the mercenaries, Libyans, Spendius, and Mathos never allege strategic advantage as a reason to go to war. Polybius, in fact, acknowledges the strategic potential the mercenaries possess. They are close to Carthage, which is stripped of its manpower from the war. They consist entirely of experienced fighting men, and they even have Carthaginian resources – the pay from Gesgo and the confiscated funds – at their disposal. However, Polybius presents these considerations through the Carthaginians’ perspective: the mercenaries and their leaders do not notice, let alone cite, these strategic advantages.921 Strategic advantage and prudential considerations could have contributed to the reason for the mercenaries’ decision to go to war, but they do not: anger motivates the mercenaries.

Both Teuta and Dorimachus exemplify how characters act on emotion rather than strategy. Both the Romans and the Messenians diplomatically request Teuta and Dorimachus to take responsibility for the destruction of property and life, but Teuta and Dorimachus each grow angry and highlight their power, provoking anger in Coruncanius and Skyron. After these men’s

920 Polyb., IV.50-52. The war between Byzantium and the alliance of Rhodes and Prusias did not last long – Polybius narrated it in three sections. In comparison, Polybius spent six sections narrating the circumstances and reasons leading to the Rhodians’ deliberation of war, in addition to IV.49 on only Prusias’ motivations. Causation apparently held greater significance than the actual war or its result. Polybius also digresses on the geography of the Black Sea for five sections in relation to this war. Clearly the war held more significance in allowing Polybius to discuss other matters, whether causation or geography, in this part of the world than its intrinsic worth as a war narrative. Moreover, Polybius cites it as one of four contemporaneous wars, alongside the Second Punic War in the West, the Social War in Greece, and the War over Coele-Syria in the East. The beginning of these wars at approximately the same time marked the beginning of the confluence of world affairs for Polybius; Polyb.,III.2.1-5. Walbank 1972, 104, notes this importance of the wars in the 140th Olympiad for Polybius. 921 Polybius consistently focalizes the strategic advantages of the mercenaries through the perspective of the Carthaginians: the Carthaginians notice too late their own disadvantageous position in relation to the mercenaries. Likewise, Polybius emphasizes the carefree nature of the mercenaries in their move to Sicca, I.66.10-12. Note too, the Carthaginians’ failed attempts at reestablishing control and assuaging the mercenaries’ anger, and note how the passage traces the exaggerated and unnecessary inflammation of the mercenaries’ anger. See Polybius’ disapproval of the Carthaginians, I.66.6-12, I.68.2. 205 angry and outspoken responses, Teuta and Dorimachus angrily interpret Coruncanius’ and

Skyron’s freedom of speech as a personal provocation and decide to act because of their own anger: Teuta ignores international custom by assassinating Coruncanius, with no strategic gain feasible from this action, and Dorimachus sets in motion plans for war, motivated by this incident alone, Polybius says. In both cases, Teuta’s and Dorimachus’ anger marks the breakdown of diplomacy and leads to war.922

The Romans declare war on Teuta, spurred by their righteous anger. Dorimachus uses his personal anger as a pretext for his state, the Aetolian League, to make war on the Messenians and the Peloponnese. In the first scenario those feeling justified anger began war, while in the

Greek scenario those with unjustified anger begin war. The Romans’ anger drives them immediately to make strategic preparations. The Messenians differ starkly from the Romans in their actions, and Polybius later sharply criticizes their utter inactivity, characterizing them as

“ignorant and failing at what needed to be done, according to my judgment at least.”923 When the war is already in full swing, the Messenians continue to hold back from joining the alliance of the Achaeans and Macedonians against the Aetolians.924 The Romans immediately set forth in their preparations for war, and Polybius emphasizes their celerity (εὐθέως), which stems directly from their anger. The Messenians’ inactivity, on the other hand, reflects poorly on their character and calls into question how appropriate Skyron’s remarks and mockery of Dorimachus were.925 Polybius criticizes this failure to feel and act on sufficient anger.

922 This pattern of reciprocal anger between these passages is unique in the preserved fragments of the Histories. Only one other case of reciprocal anger survives, that between the Seleucid advisors of the young king Antiochus III, Hermeias and Epigenes, Polyb., V.42-50. In this case Hermeias’ anger and depiction aligns with Teuta and Dorimachus, and Epigenes appears justified in his anger, filling the same role as Coruncanius and Skyron. However, this passage occurs within a state, not between states, and it does not begin a war. Therefore, this is not the place for a full discussion and comparison of it. 923 Polyb., IV.31.2. ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ πολὺ παραπαίοντες τοῦ δέοντος κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν γνώμην. See IV.31-33. 924 Polyb., IV.36.7-9. 925 Conversely, Skyron’s activism against Dorimachus sets him in the Romans’ company, in contrast to typical Messenian lethargy. 206 In both cases, the negotiations break down when anger provokes more anger, resulting in a complete dissolution of diplomacy and leading to war. Anger indeed is a powerful cause of war, whether unjustified or justified. However, in both passages, Polybius and his characters focus on anger, not strategic prudence even if anger led to strategic action.

The treaties between Rome and Carthage, which receive much scholarly attention, focus on and emphasize prudent expediency and tend to exclude considerations of morality and emotion. This has significant ramifications for a discussion of responsibility for the Punic Wars.

Polybius discusses the First Punic War’s causes, its justification, and relevant treaties as a comparison to the identification of the cause and responsibility of the Second Punic War. In this discussion, Polybius emphasizes the need to investigate and understand treaties and their terms, but also that a breach of a treaty most often does not mark the cause of war as much as the beginning. Moreover, Polybius demonstrates that treaties and their legalistic reckoning of guilt do not necessarily correspond with or represent morality and moral responsibility for the war. A legalistic framework, in fact, does not provide the only or the best means for understanding morality. Concerning the First Punic War, Polybius states:

“if one considers the Romans’ crossing to Sicily, that they took the Mamertines generally into their friendship and after this aided them in their moment of need, people who had betrayed not only the Messenians’ city but also that of the Rhegians, he would reasonably grow indignant; but if someone considers that the Romans made the crossing against their own oaths and treaty, clearly he is ignorant.”926

Polybius not only corrects unnamed others about the lack of a treaty forbidding the Romans access to Sicily but also emphasizes moral considerations, which arouse a moral emotion,

926 Polyb., III.26.6-7. εἰ [κατὰ τοῦτό] τις ἐπιλαμβάνεται Ῥωμαίων περὶ τῆς εἰς Σικελίαν διαβάσεως, ὅτι καθόλου Μαμερτίνους προσέλαβον εἰς τὴν φιλίαν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα δεομένοις ἐβοήθησαν, οἵτινες οὐ μόνον τὴν Μεσσηνίων πόλιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Ῥηγίνων παρεσπόνδησαν, εἰκότως ἂν δόξειε δυσαρεστεῖν. εἰ δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας ὑπολαμβάνει τις αὐτοὺς πεποιήσθαι τὴν διάβασιν, ἀγνοεῖ προφανῶς. 207 indignation.927 The Romans allied with treaty-breakers and wrongdoers (παρασπόνδησαν) when accepting the Mamertines into their friendship. Indignation is the correct response to this

(εἰκότως ἂν δόξειε δυσαρεστεῖν). Polybius expresses moral condemnation of the Romans’ decision solely through the emotion of indignation in an indefinite observer (τις).928 This judgment of the Romans extends implicitly to the beginning of the First Punic War.929 Polybius takes great effort to argue against the existence of a treaty mentioned by Philinus, and he meticulously details how the Romans (or Carthaginians) did not breach a treaty.930 He is clearly concerned with discerning responsibility. Despite the Romans’ correctness according to the treaties, one should grow indignant at their alliance with the Mamertines. Thus, moral behavior extends beyond the constraints of treaties or, put another way, treaties and other legal rules do not guarantee moral or just behavior.931 The Romans, therefore, can be considered at fault morally if not legally.

This example differs in major ways from the anger cited as a reason for the Second

Punic War. The indignation at the Romans’ alliance with the Mamertines is not a stated cause,

αἰτία, of the First Punic War. Instead it is based on a value judgment of the reader on who had right or wrong on their side at the beginning of the war.932 It exemplifies what Hannibal failed

927 Hoyos 1998, 42, notes the morality involved in this passage. He does not, however, note that that very morality is conveyed through emotion alone. The observation of Hoyos 2011, 136-140, that more time elapsed between the various actions of the Mamertines (in crossing to Sicily, calling in the Romans, and so forth) than it seems in Polybius’ narration actually furthers my point that Polybius saw emotion as bridging a wider time gap in causation, just as he saw emotion carry over from the First Punic War to the beginning of the Second Punic War. 928 The Mamertines were judged through the term παρασπονδεῖν, but this does not apply directly to the Romans. See Chapter 5 on the indefinite observer. See Polyb., I.7-I.11, and I.20 for Polybius’ narrative involving the Mamertines. 929 It does not necessarily follow that the Carthaginians were right, however. 930 See especially Eckstein 2010. 931 See Waldron 2015 on the important distinction between conventions and moral norms in war. While, for example, ideally a treaty or other convention in warfare would encompass and prohibit immoral behavior, such as allying with the unjust, this result would be impossible or difficult to administer. Buchanan 2015, 7ff., likewise distinguishes the roles of morality and law. 932 The person making the value judgment is a generalized person (a proverbial ‘man on the street’). This includes the external audience in this judgment: we, the readers, consider the situation before us, that the Romans allied with 208 to inspire through his particular “falsified” pretexts: he failed to stir up indignation or a similar moral response against the Romans in the audience of everyone else viewing the war.933 The true reasons would have succeeded. This example also demonstrates whose judgment is most important in discerning the morality of causes: the external audience.

Legal arguments, it seems, do not to take a broad perspective or give moral considerations their full due. They necessarily involve immediate and local events: the crossing of a boundary at a particular place and time. Detailed calculations of boundaries and allies do matter to Polybius, as seen in his meticulous discussion of all the past Romano-Carthaginian treaties he could find and attention to boundaries and allies throughout the Histories. However, like bad pretexts, legalistic thinking ignores the underlying causes and reasons behind a nation’s crossings or alliances. By the time a character crosses a boundary the decision has already been made. For Polybius, these psychological and rational underpinnings matter more than the immediate action, which leads to the failure of legalistic reckoning to account fully for the responsibility of war.

Theoretically, the treaties and legalistic rules are meant to uphold moral standards and expectations: breaking the treaty should mean breaching a moral standard and therefore being morally responsible.934 Polybius’ discussion and conclusion show that this does not always hold true. States can respect treaties and claim that they come to defend their allies, as the Romans did in crossing to Sicily, but they can also be at fault morally, such as Polybius finds the Romans to be in their alliance with treaty-breakers, the Mamertines. Likewise, with the Second Punic

War, one can still do injustice while upholding treaties, such as the Romans’ actions in Sardinia,

those who broke treaties, and we are to grow indignant, if we are normal individuals, that is. The implication is that we are, otherwise we would be ignorant. This type of analysis of the readers’ emotional responses is addressed briefly in Chapter 5. 933 See below for how this is important for Polybius’ theory of history. 934 See Waldron 2015 on this theory and its disjuncture. 209 and one can break a treaty with moral justification, such as when Hannibal does cross the

Ebro.935 Those, such as the Romans, who mark the fall of Saguntum as the cause of the war in retrospect rely on legalistic arguments: Hannibal broke treaties, therefore he was wrong.936 Like most pretexts, legalistic rationale falls short of discerning and representing what is most significant to Polybius, that is, morality and true causes. Morality, and the emotion which conveys this, sometimes is juxtaposed with practical, strategic, and legalistic rationales, as in the cases of the treaties and beginnings of the First and Second Punic Wars. In Polybius’ view, the moral course of action often comes away as more honorable and preferable than either expediency or legal reasoning.

Emotion works in combination with strategic prudence, as we saw with Hamilcar,

Prusias I, and even Philip II and Philip V when they all delayed beginning or joining war until they and their successors built up more military strength. Emotion also contrasts with strategic rationale when characters prioritize anger as the reason to make war and allege little or no strategic considerations, such as the mercenaries, Romans, or Aetolians. Moreover, emotional and moral logic may take precedence over legalistic thinking in determining responsibility. In all of these aspects, however, emotion serves as a link between past events and the present conflict and exemplifies the benefit of (universal) history.

Emotion as a Link

At III.32 Polybius distinguishes how his subgenre of history, universal history

(καθόλου), best illustrates causes, especially in comparison to monographic history (κατὰ

935 Polyb., III.30. 936 The morality of the actual fate of Saguntum, at least in Polybius’ portrayal of the Roman argument, does not play a large role. The Roman argument, in other words, does not dwell upon or highlight how unjustly the innocent people of the city suffered, or how Hannibal attacked them unprovoked. (Both arguments could have been made, even if they were not true to the facts.) It focuses entirely on the treaties and Hannibal’s transgression of these rather than any humanitarian consideration, even though breaking treaties is morally wrong in the breach of trust. Hannibal too, in his ‘misguided’ pretexts (according to Polybius), relied upon legalistic arguments in that the Romans broke a treaty by interfering in Saguntum previously. This focus contrasts the concerns of modern just war theory in general, which emphasizes human rights. See especially Orend 2013, 22-32. 210 μέρος). Polybius does not claim that all monographs neglect treating causes: any such work that he might have argued against does not survive, at any rate.937 Rather, Polybius compares the universal histories to monographic histories to show why his choice of universal history is better.

In particular, he makes his argument to those who already had criticized him for his lengthy work and preferred the (seemingly) shorter, monographic works which covered the same events.938 Thus, Polybius’ points relate more to his contemporary context, rather than serve as criticisms of the few earlier Greek historians whose texts we have today. Others’ monographs, he says, are even longer but cover a narrower scope, and they both focus only on the events – without comparisons between contemporary affairs – and relate the same content in different manners.939 Most importantly, they do not adequately emphasize the most crucial part of history itself as much as universal history does: what accompanies war, what follows war, and especially what concerns its causes.940 Polybius then provides an example of the importance and longevity of causation. The Romans’ war with Antiochus III took its origins from their war with Philip V, and that from their Hannibalic War, and that took its origins from the First Punic War.941 Only a general, or universal, history can provide such knowledge and understanding for the reader, unlike a history of only the Second Punic War or the Second Macedonian War.942 Polybius drives his point home with two analogies. He says that claiming that one can understand history without causes is like claiming one understands a whole war’s management and status from

937 It is fairly certain that Polybius read and shared characteristics with the Greek historians whose texts we have. However, his argument does not pertain to their texts, for these historians show clear interest in causation. See Longley 2012 and Rood 2012 on Thucydides and Polybius, see McGing 2012 on Herodotus and Polybius, and see Gibson 2013 on Xenophon and Polybius. 938 See Walbank 1972, 97-129 on Polybius’ publication. 939 Polyb., III.32.4-5. 940 Polyb., III.32.5-6. τῶν δὲ κυριωτάτων μηδὲ ψαύειν αὐτοὺς δύνασθαι τὸ παράπαν. ἀκμὴν γάρ φαμεν ἀναγκαιότατα μέρη τῆς ἱστωρίας εἶναι τά τ’ ἐπιγινόμενα τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα καὶ μάλιστα τὸ περὶ τὰς αἰτίας. 941 Polyb., III.32.7-8. 942 While Polybius’ narration of the causes and beginning of the Second Macedonian War do not survive, Livy, 31.1, attributes Roman anger at Philip V for his treachery in the peace with the Aetolians and other allies and his aid to Hannibal during the Second Punic War as a motive to declare war. 211 descriptions of individual battles.943 Likewise, the difference between what one understands from universal history versus what one understands from a monographic history differs as much as active learning differs from hearing.

Through III.32 Polybius elucidates the benefits and superiority of universal history. He takes a broad, long term perspective of history in his emphasis on understanding causes and how they relate past events to his present subject matter. For Polybius, universal history best provides this most crucial part of history, causation, and universal history best provides the lessons and benefits of history as described in III.31, since universal history privileges causation, comparison, and what accompanies the events themselves. Polybius sees causation as the link between various world events, a link which explains the origins of each separate event.944

Although this argument, however, about the superiority of universal history seems forced, especially in comparison to Thucydides’ and other ancient historians’ critical attention to causation, it is significant in showing Polybius’ self-conscious effort to privilege long-term causation, including emotions.945

Emotions come into play in this scheme as one phenomenon of a causal link. Emotions tie together the separate events. As we shall see, for the Second Punic War anger and θυμός reach back to the First Punic War and its aftermath with Sardinia. These emotions explain how the Hannibalic War drew its origins from the “war over Sicily.” Likewise, the Aetolians’ anger at the Romans from the end of their joint war against Philip V provides the origins for the war between Antiochus III and the Romans.946 Polybius prioritizes emotions and psychological

943 Polyb., III.32.9. 944 Walbank 1994 lays out how Polybius sometimes forces material into his historiographical scheme. 945 See especially Derow 1994 and Walbank 1994 on contextualizing Polybius’ account of causation with other ancient historians. See too Marincola 2011, 171-179, on characteristics of universal history. 946 The causal link between the Second Punic War and the Second Macedonian War does not explicitly include emotion as a central feature, but the narrative sections detailing such interconnection do not survive, so we cannot examine how Polybius’ emotional connections from his summary play out in the actual narrative. 212 factors as causal links. Emotions often contribute as causes which distinguish and elevate

Polybius’ genre of history, general or universal (καθόλου), from that of monographs (κατὰ

μέρος).

The first cause of the Second Punic War, Hamilcar’s θυμός and drive for retaliation, draws causation back to 241 from 220 BC, over twenty years, linking the Second Punic War back to the First Punic War. Walbank criticizes the length of this gap, backing up his criticism with Hamilcar’s lack of hostile action against Rome. He concludes, “in short, the ‘wrath of

Hamilcar’ was a later invention, designed to establish a long-cherished Barcine plan of revenge.”947 Whether or not Polybius invented “Barcine wrath”, it is significant that emotion provides the link between two wars separated by twenty years and different actors.948 Polybius identifies θυμός as a true cause of the Second Punic War, and this identification attests that causation for Polybius traced back much further than Walbank and many other scholars believe plausible.949 Polybius thought emotion carried over and provided the first initiative for the

Second Punic War to come about.950 Polybius’ theory of universal history, however, requires and privileges such long-term accounts of causation. Other reasons, such as the immediate events and context, pale in comparison to the emotion, Hamilcar’s θυμός, which continued from the end of the First Punic War, in Polybius’ view.

However, Hamilcar’s θυμός raises an issue with the nature of emotions. By the outbreak of the Second Punic War, Hamilcar had been dead for nine years, which scholars have

947 Walbank, HCP I.313. See too, Walbank 1983, 62-63. 948 See Rich 1996, 14-15, for discussion and sources involved in ‘Barcid wrath’. Polybius is our first extant source of this theme, but he could have received it from an author whose text does not survive. 949 See Walbank 1972, 310-313, and especially Hoyos 1998, with discussion and bibliography of scholarship. Rich 1996, 6, praises Polybius’ longevity of his causes: “It is to Polybius’ credit that he insisted on the need to search for the remote causes of wars, and, in the case of this war, drew attention to its causal connection with the First Punic War and to the significance of the new Carthaginian empire in Spain.” 950 Eckstein 1995, 175, notes that passion drives the Carthaginians from the First Punic War to the Second Punic War but does not fit this within what he identifies on p. 57 as an important trend, wars begun for the sake of honor and which receive Polybius’ approbation. 213 noted and criticized.951 While most scholars consider how a dead man can start a war, I am concerned with the implications for emotions. How does emotion transfer from one man to others in such a way as to continue after his death and start a war in the process? Surely

Hamilcar’s θυμός died with him.952

We have one clear example which details how Polybius envisioned the transference of emotion went from one person to another. Hamilcar transferred his hatred of Rome to

Hannibal in the famous oath scene, when Hannibal recalls later for Antiochus III that he swore to hate the Romans forever at a sacrifice with his father, Hamilcar.953 This clearly constitutes an important moment in the Histories for elucidating Hannibal’s motives and character throughout his war against Rome. This scene of emotional transference holds special significance in the text as a powerful and enduring moment which profoundly shaped Hannibal’s character.

This scene also illustrates how Polybius envisioned emotion could transfer from one person and generation to the next. Polybius introduces this scene precisely as an explanation of how a dead man could cause a war.954 Hamilcar inculcates hatred in Hannibal by exploiting his senses: Hannibal was experiencing something new, exciting, and special as a religious rite.

Hamilcar takes advantage of Hannibal’s susceptibility as a young child. Hannibal continued to live in a community which hated Rome, and he clearly subscribed rationally to this emotion, for he brought up this experience as indicative of his own feelings even at a much later date.955

951 Rich 1996, 14-16; However, Champion 2004a, 120, notes the innovation of Polybius in this transference. 952 Ancient Greek conceptions of thumos do not carry over into the afterlife generally; this is more the psuche or phrenes. It is also difficult to envision how even there it would be able to cause war actively, outside of the direct involvement of the gods, as seen in poetry. 953 Polyb., III.10.7-III.12. 954 Polyb., III.10.7. 955 Unfortunately, these factors of inculcation and environment are also how racism, sexism, and other strong prejudices tend to survive across generations: from strong inculcation from elders, living in an environment in which it was accepted, and eventually feeling strong feelings of aversion or disgust when confronted in this kind of hatred. See, with particular emphasis on emotions during wartime, Halperin 2014. 214 Another way in which Hamilcar transferred his feelings of animosity towards the

Romans to the Carthaginians is through shared emotions. The Carthaginians may not have received Hamilcar’s actual (personal) θυμός, but they clearly shared his sentiments, for they were all angered (ὀργή) by the loss of Sardinia.956 Hamilcar’s strong feelings over the end of the

First Punic War, combined with the similar sentiments that the Carthaginians held over the loss of Sardinia, would have persuaded the Carthaginians to work towards a future war.

Despite these methods of inculcating or sharing actual emotions, Hamilcar did not necessarily need to pass on his θυμός or emotion as such. For his θυμός to count as a cause of the Second Punic War, it need merely have been his original impetus to persuade others to decide upon and work towards war, much as the Aetolians’ anger motivated them to persuade

Antiochus III to invade Greece and wage war, even though they did not transfer or share their emotion of anger with him. Hamilcar, motivated by his own θυμός, persuaded the

Carthaginians to support his projects of going to Spain and increasing Carthaginian power there in order best to wage war against Rome in the future.

Along with Hamilcar’s θυμός, the ὀργή of the citizens causally links the earlier seizure of Sardinia and the outbreak of the Second Punic War. Without the emotion and its psychological framework, Polybius’ assertion that the Mercenary War contributed directly to the

Second Punic War – through the loss of Sardinia – lacks force.957 However, here Polybius provides a key insight into his envisioned importance for history: emotion carries over from one war to the next. Hamilcar’s θυμός carries over from the First Punic War, and the Carthaginians’ anger from the seizure of Sardinia motivates them to take steps leading to the Second Punic

956 This provides evidence against any subscription by Polybius to thumos as the middle part of Plato’s tripartite soul. 957 Many scholars in fact have noticed the weakness of Polybius’ claim. Most recently, McGing 2010, 45; Gibson 2013. 215 War. Without the emotions at the center of the causes, Polybius’ claims of true causation and their importance falter.

Polybius’ perspective, from the Carthaginian side, affects his long-term attribution of causation as well. While he relates the Carthaginians’ reasons, no Carthaginian character alleges or attests to these causes: Hannibal cites immediate pretexts from the situation in Spain to the

Romans at New Carthage, and the Carthaginian Senate argues about the inapplicability of treaties’ terms. What the actual agents may have thought or adduced as their reasons for war matter far less than what Polybius, the historian with retrospect and a holistic view of the course of events, discerns as the causes. Moreover, Polybius’ sequence of causation differs from what modern (and other ancient) historians trace as the sequence of events.958 Polybius tries to stretch the causation of the Second Punic War back much further than a pragmatic, modern historian would – despite the similar emotional connection between the First and Second World Wars in modern history.959

Hannibal, as noted above, alleged immediate events and reasons as his pretexts, instead of the causes Polybius identified. However, Hannibal must have intended war against Rome, not

Saguntum, if Polybius’ chain of causation from the First Punic War and Mercenary War are to hold true. In arguing for the greater value of universal history over monographs, Polybius stresses that world events and different wars affected other wars.960 The Second Punic War provides Polybius’ prime example of how he thought universal history were superior to monographs: its causes lay in previous wars included within the same text. Without the knowledge of these one could not understand the Second Punic War itself.961 Therefore, it is

958 Walbank 1972, 160: “in reality many wars are the result of a gradual buildup of hostile feeling and will to war on both sides.” See Rich 1996, 3-14, for a discussion of other ancient sources. 959 See, for example, Walbank, HCP 1.319-324. 960 Polyb., III.32.6-9. 961 Polybius stresses the importance of having read Book One on the First Punic War and the Mercenary War throughout his discussion: III.10.1-2, III.28.5. 216 important for Polybius’ universal history and theory of interconnected causation that Hannibal intend to wage a Roman war as his ultimate goal.962

It is important, therefore, for Polybius’ project in universal history that the real causes be interconnected and acknowledged. Polybius saw Hannibal as commencing the Second Punic

War, and he thought Hannibal at that moment would have presented a better case for the justice of the Carthaginian cause by stating the true reasons for war with the Romans: their unjust loss of Sardinia at the hands of the Romans. For Polybius, true causes hold greater weight than immediate circumstances.963 He criticizes Hannibal so heavily for his pretexts not because they were bad in and of themselves, but because the true causes were just and right, and therefore they would better convince his audience of the justness of his cause as a pretext should.964

Hannibal’s audience did not consist merely of the Roman embassy or the Romans in general; it was highly unlikely that the Romans would have conceded that they unjustly seized Sardinia. In discussing the Romans’ search for pretexts to begin the Third Punic War, Polybius stresses the importance of pretexts for an external audience (πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός) (περὶ τῆς τῶν ἐκτὸς

διαληψέως).965 Hannibal’s audience included the rest of the world, that is, anyone who cared

962 Hannibal still could have intended war against Rome but did not foresee that Rome would react in such a way to his attack on Saguntum. Rich 1996, 6, with whom I concur, finds intentionality Polybius’ greatest weakness in his theory of causation. 963 Walbank 1983, 63, notes the temporal differences between the stated aitiai of III.9-10 from Hannibal’s claims at III.15. 964 Eckstein 1989, entirely ignores the content of Polybius’ criticism of Hannibal’s pretexts. He focuses on Polybius’ characterization of Hannibal as young, emotional, impulsive, and chiefly, irrational. He concludes that Hannibal’s “depiction inevitably implies a negative Polybian judgment on Carthaginian policy leading to the Second Punic War: a policy based on emotion invited disaster, and disaster was the final result.” Polybius clearly criticizes Hannibal for his youthful rashness and irrationality and for his failure to use the correct – also emotionally based – reasons for war, a failure which stemmed from and exemplified his youthful impulsiveness. However, Eckstein ignores Polybius’ determination that the true causes (from III.9-10) would have given Hannibal the appearance of justice. Eckstein’s statement and analysis also relies on the assumption that a bad cause for a war entails a bad result. This is neither true in Polybius’ Histories or in history (unfortunately). Causes were important, but in war anything can happen – regardless of the justice of one’s cause, and Polybius seems to have subscribed to this view as well. The Carthaginians lost the war not because they began it on unjust principles but because of the way they, and the Romans, managed it near the end. For the (moral) importance of the distinction between the reasons for a war and the conduct of a war, see Walzer 2015, and see Potter 2016 on ancient wars. 965 Polyb., XXXVI.1-4. 217 about this war and its outcome, including later generations.966 Pretexts are important for presenting oneself as just, which is the substance behind Polybius’ criticism: Hannibal should have portrayed himself better and should have justified war against Rome instead of Saguntum.

The emotion of anger, feeling of confidence, and passionate spirit, θυμός, all contribute to the reasons for war. Hannibal’s pretexts do not feature any emotions but a claim of injured allies, and these pretexts concern only recent and local events, compared to Polybius’ list of three causes.967 Emotions help to connect past events to the current circumstances and allow

Polybius to emphasize the interwoven nature of history: events seemingly remote in place or time still have an effect on later events, and the causation for the Second Punic War provides the cornerstone example of this. These emotional causes exemplify Polybius’ own precepts and aims for how his history is the best: causes are linked to past events through emotion.968

Conclusion

Against scholarly opinion that “war undertaken without rational calculation, but emerging from sheer, unrestrained emotion” was the only way emotions led to war, I have argued that Polybius saw anger often as justifiable as a motive for war.969 If justified, anger provided a suitable and moral reason to initiate hostilities, particularly when combined with strategic prudence. As such, anger could be cited as a pretext – as Hannibal could and should have done at New Carthage – and thus fulfill the important role of a pretext as outward justification for one’s actions. Anger is most important in its role as a link back to past affairs,

966 This can include the readers of Polybius’ text; see Chapter 5. 967 Most pretexts examined thus far usually involve immediate circumstances, but recall that both the Gauls and Dorimachus used the emotion of anger as their pretexts. 968 This is seen also in Polybius’ criticism at III.8.9 of Fabius Pictor, whose attribution of emotion, indignation, does not accord with his narration of the characters’ actions. Fabius’ attribution of indignation to the Carthaginian Senate does not cohere with his narration of events (that they did not hand over Hannibal, the object of their indignation, when they had a perfect opportunity) but rather strikes a discordant note for any trying to follow the logic of his account. 969 Eckstein 1995, 57. 218 connecting separate events into a cohesive and intertwined history. Emotion and its place in causation thus play a significant role in Polybius’ project and theory of history.

In III.31, Polybius affirms the importance of causes. He justifies his decision to go through such a detailed and lengthy account of the causes of the Second Punic War and argues that knowledge of causes is useful for individuals in their future actions, both public and private.

First, he relies on the common historiographical motif that no one can assume continued prosperity for his whole life. Because of this common understanding, each person must actively maintain their well-being.970 Polybius relies on psychological description to make his argument.

To maintain one’s well-being, one must be able to persuade others to take his side and contribute to his projects. Studying another’s past actions will allow one to find someone to empathize with oneself and thus to share in his actions: “From [the study of past events] one can discover the one who will pity, the one who will grow angry together with one, and in addition the one who will vindicate him” (ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἐλεήσοντα καὶ τὸν

συνοργιούμενον, ἔτι δὲ τὸν δικαιώσοντα).971 Thus, studying past events, especially why people do what they do, will lead one to be able to persuade others so as to make them empathize, or share emotions, with oneself, which is the greatest aid for life (ἅπερ ἔχει

μεγίστας ἐπικουρίας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ’ἰδίαν πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον).972 This distinguishes history: it is useful to the reader.973

Polybius’ goal for history is grounded in emotion – something remarkable given his reputation as a pragmatic historian with little tolerance for “tragic” history. This emotional goal

970 Polyb., III.31.2-4. 971 Polyb., III.31.5-9. ΙΙΙ.31.8-9: τὰ δὲ παρεληλυθότα τῶν ἔργων, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων λαμβάνοντα τὴν δοκιμασίαν, ἀληθινῶς ἐμφαίνει τὰς ἑκάστων αἱρέσεις καὶ διαλήψεις, καὶ δηλοῖ παρ’ οἷς μὲν χάριν, εὐεργεσίαν, βοήθειαν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, παρ’ οἷς δὲ τἀναντία τούτων. ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἐλεήσοντα καὶ τὸν συνοργιούμενον, ἔτι δὲ τὸν δικαιώσοντα, πολλάκις κἀπὶ πολλῶν εὑρεῖν ἐστιν. 972 Polyb., III.31.10. 973 Polyb., III.31.11-12. 219 of knowing how to make others share emotion with oneself is distinct from the emotion that serves as a cause, but they both foreground a basic but important element of Polybius’ thought that has not received adequate emphasis: emotion is a crucial factor for history. Not only does emotion serve a vital role in causation, tying temporally distinct events together in the ‘woven’ project of history, but it is a vital tool for the statesman to recognize and use and for the historian to recognize and explain.974 Causation provides the key shared element between these two functions of emotion. Emotion serves as a cause, as I have analyzed throughout this chapter, and causation teaches the statesman how to persuade others to see and feel his side.

Therefore, emotion is important to the project of history – important to recognize in causes and important as a goal or tool to take away from the study of history.

974 See Walbank, esp. 1975, on Polybius’ metaphors of weaving history. 220 Chapter 5

Conclusion

Emotions reflect Polybius’ moral values. Sometimes they arise because the morals and standards of reasonable agents have been thwarted and trampled. At other times, emotions highlight a character’s incongruence with Polybius’ own moral values and provide the basis for criticism of the character. Polybius provides insight into human emotion by describing how emotions connect historical events and motivate action. As a historian, Polybius sets out to narrate what happened, what was likely to happen, and only what was important to the events.

Emotions were important enough to include in his historical narrative.

Polybius’ roster of emotional terminology differs from the lists of emotions in Aristotle’s

Rhetoric and Konstan’s analysis of Classical Greek literature, and this variance complicates our understanding of ancient emotions. His text provides a source for emotions separate from philosophy and standard Classical Greek usages by about two hundred years. Polybius’ historical text gives insight into collective emotion, for example, beyond the discussion of individual, interpersonal emotion which Aristotle discusses. In the Histories, the people as a collective community react together with anger, hatred, resentment, and indignation to cause social change within the state, even when they technically have no political status, such as under the monarchy in Alexandria, for example. Polybius’ historical text includes also the emotions of a state as a unity, such as the Aetolians’ or Carthaginians’ anger against Rome. While the anger of these states follows the same basic processes as that of the anger of individuals, that is, in response to a transgression or slight, Aristotle’s focus on social hierarchy does not apply in the international arena, where those defeated, such as Carthage after the First Punic War, still grow angry and eventually begin war. The differences between Polybius’ and Aristotle’s terminology also complicates our understanding of ancient emotion. Polybius used the emotional terms τὸ

221 ἀγανακτεῖν, δυσαρέστησις, and προσκοπή to express (moral) disapproval in his narrative, yet these terms are absent in Aristotle’s list of emotions and Konstan’s analysis.975 The absence of these terms of indignation in Konstan’s analysis and Aristotle calls into question how comprehensive our understanding and views on ancient Greek emotion are, particularly when such terms clearly affected the flow of Polybius’ historical narrative.

Likewise, Polybius provides a unique data set for identifying and analyzing emotions – historical reality. As opposed to the ancient philosophies, especially the contemporary

Hellenistic philosophies of Stoicism and Epicureanism, Polybius’ historical text provides examples of emotion at work affecting events, influencing decisions, and causing historical change. The Hellenistic philosophies, on the other hand, examine and theorize emotions specifically to fit in their larger philosophical framework. The Stoics, in idealizing a sage who can choose to remain undisturbed by the world, describe emotions as judgments to which one must rationally assent. Thus their sage can choose not to assent to feelings which might disturb him, which would then become emotions. The Epicureans likewise theorize emotions in how they pertain to their sage’s goal of pleasurable ataraxia. Emotions can vary the sage’s pleasure, but they are unnecessary desires, unessential to the Epicurean lifestyle. Polybius does not constrain his portrayal of emotions in such ways: he describes emotions as they regularly happened in the world.

His portrayal of emotions shares similarities instead with the analysis of emotions in modern philosophy and psychology. These modern studies found their analyses on observations of emotions either in experimental settings or in generalized human behavior. Polybius too observes and focuses on generalized human behavior in history. Moreover, Polybius in some ways anticipates the modern social sciences in his portrayal of emotions. For example, he

975 Konstan makes clear that he does not intend to cover terms outside of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and I am not faulting him for this. 222 portrays emotions as rationally based, something the social sciences began to emphasize in the

1990s and 2000s.976 He describes collective emotion, which recently has seen increased attention, particularly in the role of collective emotion for causing social change.977 The good generals of Polybius’ narrative, specifically Hannibal and Scipio Africanus, demonstrate excellent emotional awareness, a component of emotional intelligence, identified as a major factor in good leadership by modern psychological studies.978 Lastly, Polybius narrates emotions within social contexts and as socially-embedded: emotions facilitate interaction (whether positive or harmful) between different individuals and groups. The social foundation for emotions has recently seen increased attention, especially in contrast to the traditional view that emotions are an internal, personal phenomenon.979 Polybius’ portrayal of emotions at work in his historical narrative anticipate and corroborate these modern views from the social sciences.

Characters feel emotion in the Histories for a reason. Philip V cited the Aetolian destruction at Dodona by Dorimachus and at Dium by Scopas as his reason and justification for destroying parts of the Aetolian capital at Thermum. The people of Alexandria vented their anger on Agathocles’ family and followers because they felt that Agathocles and his regime had abused their power and committed outrages against members of the community. The

Carthaginians held onto their anger and began the Second Punic War because they considered the Roman seizure of Sardinia unjust. Scipio Africanus quelled a mutiny by arguing that the mutineers’ indignation had no rational basis and therefore was unjustified indignation. Reasons underlie the emotions here. Similar to the modern theory of moral emotions of Bennett Helm, in Polybius’ text characters feel emotions because they care about something, and something happened either to benefit or promote what they care about, thus arousing positive emotions, or

976 See for example, Damasio 1994, Goldie 2000. 977 See von Scheve and Salmela, eds., 2014 and Flam and Goodwin, eds., 2005. 978 See Goleman 1995 and Bradbury and Graves, 2005. 979 See von Scheve 2013 and Ahmed 2004. 223 more often something happens which harms what they value. In this way emotions can be rational and moral in Polybius’ Histories.

Not all emotions are rational and moral, however. Polybius judges emotions based on how appropriately characters are motivated and how they act on their emotion. Teuta, the

Queen of Illyria, felt inappropriate and unjustifiable anger at the Roman envoy Coruncanius’ outspokenness and reacted disproportionately by assassinating him. The people of Alexandria felt appropriate and rational negative emotions against Agathocles and his regime but reacted disproportionately: Agathocles himself did not receive a punishment severe enough for his crimes, although his associates experienced savage violence. Philip V at Thermum felt appropriate anger against the Aetolians but misdirected his anger against the property of the gods, thus causing disproportionate destruction. In wars, the moral appropriateness of an emotion is shown in its suitability for use as a pretext and acceptability as a cause. Polybius criticizes Hannibal for using a pretext less justifiable than the cause – Carthaginian anger at the

Roman injustice in seizing Sardinia. Emotions thus are not inherently negative or irrational.

Their motivation and result determine how to evaluate an emotion.

Moreover, as emotions are not categorically irrational, so too they did not characterize only those of whom Polybius disapproved – barbarians, women, the masses, mercenaries, and the youth. The people under tyranny or oligarchy in the anacyclosis felt rational emotions based on their sense of social morality and created the positive changes to aristocracy and democracy, respectively. On the other hand, the people in the mixed constitution felt anger based on ambition and greed, forsaking any thought for the good of others, and thus they accelerated their decline into ochlocracy. All characters, including those who stereotypically show reason, the Achaeans and the Romans, felt emotions as much as the paradigms of barbarity, that is, the

Aetolians, Illyrians, and Gauls. To Polybius, emotions were universal, and therefore anyone

224 could feel them and react. Only in why they feel emotion and how they react does Polybius evaluate emotion. The justifiability of wars demonstrates this point: Romans, Carthaginians,

Gauls, Libyan mercenaries, a Bithynian monarch, an Illyrian woman, an Aetolian, and a

Messenian all felt anger which led to war. Only those whose anger did not refer back to a moral and acceptable cause are portrayed negatively by Polybius.

Emotions bring moral principle into action. For example, only after the people of the anacyclosis or of Alexandria feel emotion do they create change for the better in the state. The transgression of their moral values elicits anger, hatred, and indignation, which propel the people and their leaders to action. Through this same process, emotion links wars separated in time:

Hamilcar and the Carthaginians felt anger at the unsatisfactory, dishonorable, and unjust endings of their previous conflicts with Rome, and thus Polybius cites their anger in the causation of the

Second Punic War. Even in speeches, Hannibal and Scipio Africanus cite emotion based on what is (not) honorable as a motivation for action. Hannibal motivates his soldiers to pursue action and death in battle rather than to survive in dishonor and become pitiable. Scipio

Africanus challenges the rational basis for his soldiers’ indignation, arguing away any rational or moral foundation for such emotion and thus depriving them of a reason to continue their actions as mutineers.

Emotion plays an integral role in Polybius’ attribution of historical causation. Polybius thought that emotion, particularly anger, was both acceptable and justifiable as a cause of war.

Emotion was so important that Polybius cites it in his prominent discussion of the causes of the

Second Punic War. The “wrath of the Barcids” has featured in scholarship on the causation of the Second Punic War as an embarrassment and an unfortunate fault in Polybius’ judgment.980

Yet Polybius deliberately attributes anger as a cause and argues against views which attribute the

980 See Rich 1996, 14 nt. 55 for detailed list of bibliography. 225 immediate circumstance of the siege of Saguntum as a cause. Anger explains why Hamilcar expanded Carthaginian strength in Iberia and why the Carthaginians supported both him and his son Hannibal. Anger unites the state of Carthage. Anger links the Second Punic War back to the First Punic War and the Mercenary War. Anger explains and justifies their human behavior, providing the psychological underpinnings of Hamilcar’s and the Carthaginians’ decisions and thus fulfilling the role of a cause (αἰτία) in Polybius’ theory of causation. Moreover, to understand history, readers should pay closest attention to causes, which affect agents’ decisions, so that they too can persuade others to join in their own feelings and endeavors. Emotions as causal mechanisms in human decision-making not only justify individuals’ actions, explain why states change from worse to better, and link the beginning of wars to past events. They also provide the basis for persuading one to sympathize with and join in one’s own actions.

In the rest of this chapter, I touch upon Polybius’ own emotional persuasion by means of his Histories. Polybius attributes emotions to internal observers within the text. Some of these internal observers are present at the scene of historical action, but many internal observers, though mentioned in the text, are not present at the actual events. For Polybius, these observers represent public opinion as they view and judge the historical action. I suggest that these observers, separate from the historical action, also include Polybius’ external audience, his readers. Polybius’ readers also observe the historical events from a distance and can react and make judgments about the historical characters and action. I argue that Polybius assimilates his observers with his readers in order to condition his readers to respond with the correct emotions. That is, Polybius describes the responses of observers in the text to the actions in the historical narrative to teach his readers which emotions are appropriate to feel in certain

226 situations. In this way, Polybius uses the observers within the text to guide his readers’ own reactions.

James Davidson, in his article “The Gaze in Polybius’ Histories,” carefully brings out the layers of viewers in and of the events of the Histories, particularly in the context of war.981 He draws attention to the differing perspectives between the generals, their troops, other third parties such as a king from an uninvolved country, and the audience. He concludes that

Polybius invested more meaning into the perspective of viewer and interpreters than the military

“facts” of battle and war.982 His conclusions hold great significance for studying emotions in

Polybius’ text. I extend Davidson’s emphasis on perspectives to examine how Polybius makes external observers feel – and are supposed to feel – emotions. Davidson claims that “Polybius provides us with an audience for the readers to model themselves on, together with a paradigmatic gaze and exemplary responses.”983 Polybius attributes emotions to observers, who view the action in the historical narrative and react with emotion but who do not take part in the action. These observers’ emotions provide a model for the readers of which emotions are appropriate as responses to the situation. I will now briefly argue that Polybius’ portrayal of observers actually extends to the audience, and thus that his attributions of emotion to observers also (should) apply to his readers.

We have already encountered observers’ emotions within the narrative, most prominently in the anacyclosis. Observers (τοὺς συνόντας καὶ συνιδόντας) see how children and other citizens maltreat their benefactors, and these observers then grow indignant and eventually take action to censure such behavior.984 While these observers begin as bystanders

981 Davidson 1991. 982 Davidson 1991, esp. 23-24. 983 Davidson 1991, 14. 984 Polyb., VI.6.3. 227 outside of the immediate situation, they clearly are present within this prototype community, and they can affect the actual events occurring in the narrative.

By contrast, most observers whose emotions Polybius narrates are not present at the actual scene of historical action. For example, the observers of Achaeus’ downfall were not physically present at Sardis when they felt pity for Achaeus and hated the perpetrators of his demise, in the passage with which we began Chapter 1. Achaeus, a rival against Antiochus III for the throne of the Seleucid empire, had endured Antiochus’ siege of Sardis. However, he decided to make a break for it, trusting two Cretans, who were actually working for Antiochus.

They led him down from Sardis under the pretense of escape and betrayed him once outside the citadel to Antiochus, who ordered him to be decapitated. Polybius qualifies the emotional responses: “Among those outside what happened generated pity and pardon for him suffering, and it created reproach and hatred for the perpetrators.”985 Polybius specifies that these feelings arose in unnamed “outsiders” (παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτός). Polybius uses the phrase “οἱ ἐκτός”, “those outside”, to refer to anyone beyond the confines of the scene. He often uses this phrase geographically to speak of all who are not in one particular place.986 This phrase “οἱ ἐκτός” excludes those within the place, or scene of action, and Polybius does not place a limit on how far ‘outside’ this phrase applies.987 Moreover, Polybius often uses those outside (οἱ ἐκτός) to reflect on and judge the characters who are within the situation he describes.988

Clearly, these outside observers of Achaeus’ downfall differ from those of the anacyclosis; they cannot step directly into Achaeus’ situation and therefore do not make a

985 Polyb., VIII.36.9. τό γε μὴν συμβὰν ἔλεον μὲν τῷ παθόντι καὶ συγγνώμην ἀπειργάσατο παρὰ τοῖς ἐκτός, διαβολὴν δὲ καὶ μῖσος τοῖς πράξασιν. 986 Polyb., I.5.3, XV.6.4, XXX.10.3, XXXVIII.6.1. 987 This applies to both people, places (see previous note), and resources: people outside: VI.13.1, XVIII.25.1, XXXVIII.2.8; resources or things: I.12.7, II.1.1, III.46.2, VI.18.5, VIII.4.7, VIII.7.11, IX.20.8, XXIII.17.4. 988 Clear examples of people who judge the characters in the historical action: V.37.2, VIII.12.3, VIII.36.6, VIII.36.9, IX.23.4, XVI.8.7, XXX.19.4, XXXVI.2.2, XXXVI.2.4, XXXVIII.3.2. External observers in general: II.47.10, III.82.8, IV.84.8, VI.53.3, IX.13.2, XII.25e.4, XV.37.2, XVI.22.2, XXVIII.21.4. 228 judgment that is even indirectly personal. This description of external observers’ emotions ends

Polybius’ discussion of how to judge characters’ demises. For Achaeus, he says, exemplifies someone who did all in his power to secure his safe escape, but since no one can entirely avoid having to trust others at all, he did so and entrusted his life to the wrong people. Therefore, he deserves pity from “those outside”, that is, from any who observed his fate, whether through hearsay at the time or by reading this account in Polybius’ text. The emotions of “those outside” can be interpreted as a proxy for ‘general opinion’, and therefore suggest that they are an appropriate guide for Polybius’ own audience for interpreting Achaeus’ story.

Likewise, in his digression on victors’ appropriation of property after the fall of Syracuse to the Romans, discussed in Chapter 2, Polybius mentions observers who generally feel pity for others in misfortune, then feel pity for themselves upon reflection.989 These could be contemporary observers, just as “those outside” presumably were contemporary observers of

Achaeus’ downfall. However, the self-pity which then incites anger and hatred implies that these observers have suffered similarly and are not in the position of power, as the Roman viewers of the triumphal spoils were. Polybius’ appeal to observers’ emotions reaches a wider audience – including the most external audience, his readership.

A remark by Polybius clarifies the distance of observers from the situation. Polybius chastises Philip V of Macedon for not measuring his ladders before attempting to take a city by storm. Of generals who act this carelessly, Polybius says, “they clearly generate distrust and hatred for themselves in the future, and on top of this they proclaim to all to be on guard: for not only do they give this announcement to watch out for them and be on guard to those

989 Polyb., IX.10.7-12. 229 suffering but also to those learning what happened in some way.”990 Polybius specifically notes that those not present but still hearing of this event (τοῖς συνεῖσι τὸ γεγονὸς τρόπον τινὰ) can or will learn from what happened and will distrust and hate such generals. Polybius ostensibly advises generals what not to do, but he also provides information for their potential victims or even allies. He conveys this information in the external observers’ reactions. First, they hate the generals, but they also now know both to prepare against sudden attack by this particular kind of general and not to trust such a general as a leader or ally. For an astute reader of Polybius, this reaction by the observers gives them a guide for action. Polybius’ own text provides the means (τρόπον τινὰ) for those learning what happened (τοῖς συνεῖσι τὸ

γεγονὸς). We the readers learn about and “observe” this situation by reading Polybius’ text, much as the internal observers learn about the situation “in some way”. Polybius’ text is one such way to learn about the situation and about the correct emotional response.

In all three examples, the observers see the historical situation and react with emotion.

These observers are within Polybius’ text but are separated from or external to the historical action narrated. Polybius describes the next category of observers with his use of the impersonal pronoun “τις”, “someone”. In these cases, someone (τις) observes a generalized situation and reacts with emotion. We have already investigated one such occurrence of this category of observer. “Someone” judges the crossing of the Romans to Sicily at the beginning of the First

Punic War and “would rightly grow indignant” (εἰκότως ἂν δόξειε δυσαρεστεῖν) when considering that the Romans allied with treaty-breakers.991 The “someone” (τις) observes and feels indignant. This generalization takes one step away from an embedded observer, such as

990 Polyb., V.98.7-8. πρός γε μὴν τὸ μέλλον ὁμολογουμένως ἀπιστίας καὶ μῖσος ἐξεργάζονται καθ΄ αὑτῶν, ἔτι δὲ φυλακὴν παραγγέλλουσι πάσιν · οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοῖς παθουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς συνεῖσι τὸ γεγονὸς τρόπον τινὰ παράγγελμα δίδοται προσέχειν αὑτοῖς καὶ φυλάττεσθαι. 991 Polyb., III.26.6. 230 those in the anacyclosis or the third parties analyzed by Davidson. The unnamed observer’s moral sensibilities – that treaty-breakers, the Mamertines, should not receive aid for being called to account for their transgressions – are expressed wholly in the emotion of indignation. The indefinite pronoun “τις” feels what any “normal” person would rightly feel and represents the proverbial “man-on-the-street.” In representing a regular person, the “τις” stands in for

Polybius’ potential readers as well.

Polybius discusses the issue of bias in Philinus’ account of the First Punic War in a generalized statement about when to love and hate. He draws attention to Philinus’ pro-

Carthaginian partiality in his history and Fabius Pictor’s pro-Roman favoritism.992 Polybius informs us that:

“In the rest of life one might not perhaps reject such favoritism: for it is necessary that the good man (τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα) love his friends and country and that he both hate together with his friends their enemies and love their friends. But when someone (τις) assumes the role of a historian, it is necessary to be freed from all such things, and often it is necessary to speak well of and bestow the greatest praises on one’s enemies when their deeds require this, and conversely often it is necessary to criticize and blame reproachfully those closest to one whenever the errors of their affairs show this.”993

Again, someone (τις) represents an external observer, viewing and judging the situation, in two different cases: that of favoritism in ordinary life, and that of favoritism in the case of a historian. Someone (τις) who aspires to be a historian, must be free from all favoritism.

However, Polybius also inserts the good man (τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα) as a normative concept for how to feel emotions correctly. A generalized observer would think emotions of favoritism

992 Polyb., I.14.1-3. 993 Polyb., I.14.4-5. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ λοιπῷ βίῳ τὴν τοιαυτὴν ἐπιείκειαν ἴσως οὐκ ἄν τις ἐκβάλλοι · καὶ γὰρ φιλόφιλον εἶναι δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ φιλόπατριν καὶ συμμισεῖν τοῖς φίλοις τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ συναγαπᾶν τοὺς φίλους · ὅταν δὲ τὸ τῆς ἱστωρίας ἦθος ἀναλαμβάνῃ τις, ἐπιλάθεσθαι χρὴ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ πολλάκις μὲν εὐλογεῖν καὶ κοσμεῖν τοῖς μεγίστοις ἐπαίνοις τοὺς ἐχθρούς, ὅταν αἱ πράξεις ἀπαιτῶσι τοῦτο, πολλάκις δὲ ἐλέγχειν καὶ ψέγειν ἐπονειδιότως τοὺς ἀναγκαιοτάτους, ὅταν αἱ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἁμαρτίαι τοῦθ’ ὑποδεικνύωσιν. 231 appropriate in everyday life because the moral paradigm, the good man, should love and hate together with his friends. This kind of moral reference, the good man, colors the generalized viewer’s perspective on what emotions are appropriate.

Similarly, Polybius argues for the necessity of pity in particular circumstances. In explaining how to judge the Epirotes’ recent suffering, Polybius generalizes that:

“It is agreed that when humans, being what they are, fall unreasonably into some kind of troubles, blame falls on Fortune and the perpetrators, not on those who suffer. It is agreed conversely that when people recklessly and manifestly throw themselves into the greatest misfortunes it is the fault of those suffering. For this reason, from those who think sensibly pity and aid as well as pardon accompany those who fall from Fortune, but reproach and blame follow those who suffer because of their own folly.”994

Polybius calls those observing and judging “παρὰ τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν.” By characterizing those judging as reasonable people, Polybius implies that we, the external audience, should also judge and feel pity in this way. If we do not, then we must not be sensible people. Polybius presses his audience to accept his version of correct judgment and pity by challenging their own reasonableness. Polybius stresses the undeservedness of the suffering of the objects of pity: those who bring destruction on themselves deserve nothing but reproach and blame, but those who fall in misfortune through no action of their own deserve pity. Moreover, Polybius shows us the rational basis for pity here: those who think rationally see the appropriate situation for pity.

Polybius continues to coopt his audience to his own views and judgments about the correct situation for pity. He explains that, generally, “when one seems to be overcome by feeling because of the greatness of his misfortunes, he elicits pity from those who see and hear

994 Polyb., II.7.1-3. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ὄντας παραλόγως περιπεσεῖν τινι τῶν δεινῶν, οὐ τῶν παθόντων, τῆς τύχης δὲ καὶ τῶν πραξάντων ἐστὶν ἔγκλημα, τὸ δ’ ἀκρίτως καὶ προφανῶς περιβαλεῖν αὑτοὺς ταῖς μεγίσταις συμφοραῖς ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι τῶν πασχόντων ἁμάρτημα. διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τύχης πταίουσιν ἔλεος ἕπεται μετὰ συγγνώμης κἀπικουρία, τοῖς δὲ διὰ τὴν αὑτῶν ἀβουλίαν ὄνειδος κἀπιτίμησις συνεξακολουθεῖ παρὰ τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν. 232 him, and the strangeness moves each of us in some way.”995 Polybius uses a first-person form,

ἡμῶν, to coopt his audience in his explanation. Moreover, he elides the (potential) difference between those who observe and “us”: some observe (παρὰ τοῖς ὁρῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσι) the situation and feel pity; each of us (ἕκαστον ἡμῶν) are moved by the situation. This statement only makes sense if we also observe, for the strangeness moves us, presumably through our observation, to feel pity for the extremely unfortunate. By extension we observe, seeing and hearing the passionate outburst of others through the text, and thus we are moved to pity by the strangeness of that (implicit) observation. In this way, Polybius guides his audience member to feel appropriate pity. He coopts the reader into his first person “each of us” (ἕκαστον ἡμῶν), the observers and external audience together. Through his phrasing, Polybius teaches his readers that pity is the appropriate response. Polybius in guiding his readers to the appropriate and rational response of pity offers them an education in emotion.

Polybius again relies on “τις” for displaying how a normal person would feel after observing and judging the downfall of Greece in the Romans’ Achaean War in 146 BC. He says,

“for not only would someone (τις), understanding the truth of each matter, pity the Greeks for what they suffered, but still more might think that they fell into disaster for what they did.”996

No one in particular observes, judges, and feels. If someone – anyone generally – were, they would feel pity. The indefinite someone (τις) again fills in a normative judgment of the situation, ostensibly without any bias whatsoever. Polybius strengthens his rhetoric through the phrase πυθόμενος περὶ ἑκάστων τὰς ἀληθείας. By realizing the truth, one sees the genuine

995 Polyb., XV.17.1. τὰ γὰρ ὑπεραίροντα τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν τῶν παρ’ ἐνίοις ἐθισμῶν, ὅταν μὲν αὐτοπαθῶς δόξῃ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν συμπτωμάτων, ἔλεον ἐκκαλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς ὁρῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσι, καὶ συγκινεῖ πως ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ὁ ξενισμός. 996 Polyb., XXXVIII.1.3. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀφ’ ὧν ἔπαθον ἐλεήσαι τις ἂν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐφ΄ οἷς ἔπραξαν ἠτυχηκέναι νομίσειε, πυθόμενος περὶ ἑκάστων τὰς ἀληθείας. 233 suffering involved and presumably can thus deem the Greeks all the more pitiable. The

“somebody” who considers the Greeks both pitiable and responsible thinks correctly, perceiving the truth, which the historian aims to convey. This “τις” who finds the Greeks pitiable thus marks an ideal reader for Polybius.

Polybius explains why the Greeks’ survival of the Achaean War deserves more pity than the eradication of all Carthaginians in their state’s downfall:

“So that by as much as we consider (νομίζομεν) that those who survive in punishment are more pitiable than one of those who lost their lives in the thick of troubles, by so much must it be considered (νομιστέον) that the misfortunes of the Greeks at that time were more pitiable than what happened to the Carthaginians, unless someone makes his or her judgment spurning duty and right (τοῦ καθήκοντος καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ) but looking only towards expediency itself.”997

Here Polybius frames his argument as what “we” consider (νομίζομεν) and later as “what must be thought” (νομιστέον). Polybius subscribes to this view, as it aligns with behavior he condoned throughout the Histories, especially his concern for duty and what is right (τοῦ

καθήκοντος καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ).998

Finally, Polybius qualifies why pity actually matters: “for pity from those outside (Ὁ γὰρ

παρὰ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἔλεος) is not a small aid to those suffering unjustly (αδίκως), if indeed it is often possible to see both Fortune being changed and the conquerors themselves changing their

997 Polyb., XXXVIII.7-8. ὥστε καθ’ ὅσον τοὺς ζώντας μετὰ τιμωρίας ἐλεεινοτέρους νομίζομεν τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς δεινοῖς ἐκλειπόντων τὸν βίον, κατὰ τοσοῦτο καὶ τὰς τότε περιπετείας τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλεεινοτέρας νομιστέον τῶν συμβάντων Καρχηδονίοις, ἐὰν μή τις ἀφροντιστῶν τοῦ καθήκοντος καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, πρὸς αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ συμφέρον ἀποβλέπων ποιῆσαι τὴν ἀπόφασιν. 998 The “τις” here represents an outlier to Polybius’ normative view and may represent some who disagreed with Polybius and against whom he argues for pitying the Greeks. Polybius’ highly moralizing vocabulary and previous use of νομίζομεν warns his audience from thinking like this outlier, who considers only τὸ σύμφερον - here only (amoral) expediency. See Cic., De Off. 2.9-10 and Book 3 on the Stoic distinction (and reconciliation) between these concepts. 234 minds and rectifying the ills of those who fell into misfortune unexpectedly.”999 External observers (παρὰ τῶν ἐκτὸς) again ground the emotion, but here Polybius explicitly acknowledges why they are so important: the judgment and pity of others affects both Fortune, somehow, and the conquerors, causing them to change their behavior and minds. Applied to the Greeks after the Achaean War, Polybius wanted “those outside” to pity the Greeks in their disaster, thus mitigating the Greeks’ suffering and any further punishment from the Romans.

Observers, i.e., his readers, should pity the Greeks more than the Carthaginians: they deserved more pity both because their past actions were shameful and their suffering genuine, and they needed that pity for their future as well.

In his preface to the Achaean War, Polybius uses his historical text to persuade his audience to join in pity. As we noted at the end of Chapter 4, Polybius states that persuading others to join in one’s own emotions is a purpose and benefit of history. With the Achaean

War, Polybius engages in this very persuasion: he attempts to persuade his readers to join in pitying the Greeks. Not only does Polybius present the emotions of his characters, but he also uses history to inculcate a sense of correct, normative emotion in his audience.

Tragic historiography also strove to elicit emotions from its readership. Phylarchus tried to do so through sensational details, such as the exaggerated description of the capture of

Mantinea by the Achaeans, which we addressed in Chapter 3.1000 Polybius criticizes Phylarchus for this in three ways. Phylarchus exaggerates details, draws attention to events, characters, and situations which do not deserve it and away from other pertinent factors, and does this for the sole purpose of eliciting emotions from his audience. Polybius, on the other hand, portrays emotion as a crucial element in causation and in bridging moral principle and action. He

999 Polyb., XXXVIII.3.2. Ὁ γὰρ παρὰ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἔλεος οὐ μικρὸν ἐπίχειρόν ἐστι τοῖς αδίκως ἀκληροῦσιν, εἴ γε πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἔστιν ἅμα ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν ὁρμαῖς καὶ τὴν τύχην μεταβαλλομένην καὶ τοὺς κρατοῦντας αὐτοὺς μεταμελομένους καὶ διορθουμένους τὰς τῶν παραλόγως ἠτυχηκότων περιπετείας. 1000 Polyb., II.56-58. 235 narrates characters’ emotions as appropriate or inappropriate to their motivations and as correctly and proportionately acted upon (or not). Polybius both narrates emotions and uses them through his description of observers and normative vocabulary to guide his audience to the correct emotional responses, which are both moral and rational.

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