A Study in the Transcendental Dialectic of Immanuel Kant by Whi. H. Hollis a Thesis Submitted To
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The ontological argument; a study in the transcendental dialectic of Immanuel Kant Item Type text; Thesis-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Hollis, William Heym, 1914- Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 04/10/2021 04:44:19 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/553502 The OntolOjErlcal Argument? a Study In the Transcendental Dialectic of Immanuel Kant by Whi. H. H o llis A Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Department of Philosophy end Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Graduate College University of Arizona 1940 Approved: x7-). /? . & ,9 y / . / $ <*4 n liejor Professor <7 ^ 9 7 9 / f 9 < /o Certe Id quo mejus coHtarl neqult, non potest esse in intellect* solo. Si enim vel in solo intellect* "9t, potest coritari esse et in re: quod majus est. Si ergo id quo majus coritari non potest, est in solo intellect*; id ipsum cuo majue cogitari non . potest, est quo raajus cogitari potest. Sed ^ certe hoc esse non potest. - Anselm of Canterbury 130753 Contents Introduction 1 . The Contemporary Scene and Metaphysics 1 E. The Problem 6 I. !Rie Meaning of Ontology and the Ontological Argument 9 1* Etymology and Itefiniticms 9 2. Brief History of Ontology 15 3. The Meaning of the Ontological Argument 27 4. The History of the Ontological Argument 34 II. Immanuel Kent and the Ontological Argument 57 1. The General Philosophy of Kant 57 2. The Transeendental D ia le c tic 66 3. The Impossibility of an Ontological Proof 77 III. Criticisms and Conclusions 97 1. Kant1 s General Conception of the Argument 97 2. Post-Kantian Criticism 105 3. Virtues of Kant1 s Analysis 116 4. The Fundamental Issue 126 ' •- •' ,• - “> Appendix I. Aristotle and Meta^iysies 148 Appendix II. Wolff and Ontology 149 Appendix III. Augustine mi the Immortality of the Soul 150 Appendix IV. Anselm and the Ontological Argument 151 Appendix V. Kant and Kantianism 153 Bibliography 165 nfioroofies Thm Gontem?o?ar:r Seen© end Metaphysics The Enihjeet of this thesis, the ontological argument. Is a subject definitely metaphysical in nature. But it is hoped that the investigation of the argument is more exposi- ticmal end critical than metaphysical. With this hope and this purpose in mind, Kant has been selected as the philoso pher most capable as a guide in conducting the investigation. It is most difficult to approach a metaphysical subject with ■ ■ - - ■ . ■ ' - the simple, open-eyed realism of the ancient Greek thinkers, and still more difficult to avoid metaphysical speculation in any treatment of an argument ■which has proved to be a primary philosophical question par excellence since humans first at tempted to sound the depths of existence. It is hoped that the analysis and presentation of the argument in the follow ing pages has suffered from no great prejudice or bias. We moderns, with our distrust and skepticism, our hustle and bustle, find little time or Interest in a question frankly metaphysical and speculative. The philosophic attempt to me things steadily and as a whole, the quest for a synoptic vi sion of tru th , beauty, and goodness h a s become h ig h ly d i f f i cult in what Sorokin calls this "overripe Sonsate culture*! 1 1 Sorokin. Social and Cultural Bynamics. II, 206-207. of ours.2 Perhaps nhe who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time end all existence”,® the true phi losopher, has become rather a myth of the past. Then again, the human spirit, with its profound faith and abysmal ignorance, has often succeeded In shamefacedly de ceiving itself. The extravagant systems of the past are sur veyed with a skeptical eye. System upon system was erected with adolescent enthusiasm. The zealous metaphysician seized' his building-blocks of the universe and carefully put them in architectural order only to find that the house of dreams had fallen into complete ruin overnight. This, say many astute critics, has been the entire history of aetaphysleal theory. The cobwebs of the brain are swept ceaselessly by more rigor ous and less romantic housekeepers of ideas. The business of living begins where nightmares pass from the scene. What is i t th a t the poet S c h ille r says somewhere a f te r the p u b licatio n of that Copernlcan revolution in pure ideas, the Critique of Pur® Reason?: Pa die Ifetaphyeik vor kurzem unbeerbt abging Worden die Binge an si eh morgen sub hasta verkauft. , It is interesting to note the recent remarks of the - ' . * celebrated mathematician end writer, Bertrand . Bussell, concern ing hie attitude toward metaphysical theory. He writes: 23 2 Plato; Republic. Book Six highly apropos here. 3 Plato. Bepuolle. 486A. - 3 - Academic philosophers, ever since the time of Parmenides, have 'believed that the world is a unity. This view has been taken over from them by clergymen and journalists, and its acceptance has been considered the touchstone of wisdom. The most fundamental of my intelloetual beliefs is that this is*rubbish, I think the universe is all spots and jumps, without unity, without continuity, without coherence or orderliness or any of the other properties that governesses love. Indeed, there is little but prejudice and habit to.be said for the view that there is a world at all,* We have here a modern representative of Sextus Bmplrleus without a trace of his urbanity and nothing of his malicious wit and refreshing humor. But Bus soil 1 s caustic criticism is hardly more pointed than the following words of Professor ■ ■ . * - ' ■ . Schlick, sworn enemy of a l l m etaphysical th eo ry . The metaphysician will not know things, he will experience them .. All our knowledge of Being is principally acquired throu^i the methods of the particular sciences; every other "ontology" is idle babbling ... "Metaphysics is impossible because contradictory. If the metaphysician seeks only experience, his demands may be fulfilled, through, poetry and art and life itself, But if he wishes thoroughly to experience the tram- eeendent be mistakes experience for knowledge and, befogged by double ocmiradict 1 on, seeks empty shad ows Metaphysical systems c<mtain much science, - and much poetry, but they never contain metaphysics. But these gentlemen, and many others, find that the < ' " dreaded metaphysio, decently entombed and burled, raises its ‘ . • • ' Mostly appariti<m in another philosophic garret, and another wide-eyed mortal stumbles across the forbidden threshold with the fruits of his laborious metaphysical reflections. And 45 4 Russell. The Scientific Outlook. 94-95. 5 Sehliek. ^Erleben, lirkennen, Metaphysik.' Kant Studlen, Band UU. 156-159. more often than not he "brings with him a new version of an incredibly old argument, the ontological argument. For ell these eon sclentIons objeetors to metaphysical theory Professor 7 . H. Bradley has proposed a singular and not unsatisfactory justiflostion of its pursuit. He writes: All of us, I presume, more or less, are led beyond the region-of ordinary facts. Some in on® way and s€m© in o th ers, we seem to touch and have communion with what is beyond the visible world. In various manners we find something higher, which both supporte and humbles, both chastens and transports us. And, with certain persons, the intellectual effort to understand the universe is a principal way of thus experiencing the Deity. Ho one, probably, who has not felt thi s, however differently he might &e scribe it, has ever cared much for metaphysics. And, where- ever it has been felt strongly, it has been its own justification . 6 . On the o th er hand, when we consider the enormems range and astounding number of metaphysical systems proposed in the history of philosophy, we feel that much may be said In favor of the positivist, overcome with the subtleties of cerebral creation, attempting to grope toward a kind of clas sical simplicity with Ockham's laser or the principle of par simony or some similar methodological instrument. And our 4 " ' ' positivist may find, if he tread carefully on the analytic road, one of .the most subtle yet perfectly simple arguments, capable of endless discussion and infinite confusion, near his destination. Ho will have discovered the ontological argument. It may not be found in its time-honored form as 6 6 Bradley. Appearance and Reality. 5-6. - 5 - an attempt to prove the exlatenee of Goa, perhaps: it is an argument of many curious extensions and has appeared In many forms. From the time of Plato to the contemporary thought of Giovanni Gentile it has "been invested with philo soph teal sig nificance and metaphysical or psychological attributes. And long before philosophers concerned themselves with the pecu liar aspects of the relationship between essence and existence, when simple men on a simple e a rth re fle c te d upon, th e ir thoughts, their words, end their experiences, we find this fundamental argument, lacking the sophistication of dialectic, perhaps, but inevitable end. inexorable in its power to convince* Hot in that time, nor in this, does its power convince all nenf but its appearances have been somewhat regular and its mani festations rather constant* The psychologist, William James, the defender of Pragmatism and foe of impractical dreamers asleep in the un conditioned bosom of the Absolute, divided all men into •tou^i- minded" and "tender^ainded* individuals on the basis of their particular faiths end beliefs.