DOCSLIB.ORG

Regional Report for Central Asia

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Regional Report for Central Asia COUNCIL OF Brussels, 18 June 2008 THE EUROPEAN UNION 10843/08 CORDROGUE 44 ASIE 66 NOTE from : Italian regional chair for Central Asia to : Dublin Group Subject : Regional report for Central Asia Delegations will find enclosed in annex the Dublin Group report for Central Asia. ____________________________ 10843/08 ZH/tas 1 DG H 3A EN ANNEX CENTRAL DUBLIN GROUP MEETING - BRUSSELS, 27 JUNE 2008 DUBLIN GROUP REPORT FOR CENTRAL ASIA June 2008 PREPARED BY THE ITALIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1. Progress of work in the Mini Dublin Groups The following report, prepared by Italy as regional Chair for the Central Asian Countries, is based on information provided by the Mini Dublin Groups established in the region as well as UNODC sources. Partners are thanked for their valuable contribution to the work of the local Mini Dublin Groups. Overview of the regional situation The main trends in the region continue to indicate a high level of narcotics trafficking. According to the most current UNODC estimates (2008), about 21% of all Afghan heroin/morphine transited Central Asia (as well as 15% of the overall Afghan opiates production). This high level of trafficking contributes to the crime situation in the region and leads to an increase in drug addiction locally (it is generally estimated that 25% of the total amount of opium and heroin stays in the transit Countries for domestic consumption, while the remaining 75% is smuggled onward to Russia and Europe). Intravenous drug use associated with opiate addiction appears also to have contributed to the increase in the number in HIV/AIDS cases in the region. The so called “Northern route” for drug smuggling appears thus of persistent importance and Central Asia remains a key transit area, along with the other routes through Iran and Pakistan. According to UNODC statistics, which are in turn based on official Central Asian government figures, the total amount of opiates seized in the region in 2007 rose slightly to 9,473 kg from 9,392 kg in 2006. 10843/08 ZH/tas 2 ANNEX DG H 3A EN The slight increase in recorded total drug seizures in 2007 appears to indicate an ongoing trend in trafficking. Tajikistan continues to show the highest level of combined heroin/opium seizures, although the overall numbers are lower than in the period 2001-2004, a phenomenon which some observers continue to attribute in part to the withdrawal of Russian Border troops from the Afghani-Tajik border in 2005. Heroin Seizures 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 KAZAKHSTAN 136,79 167,69 707,01 457,69 625,65 554,6 522 KYRGYZSTAN 170,90 271,25 104,06 207,60 202,57 260,75 431 TAJIKISTAN 4,239 3,958 5,600 4,794 2,344 2,097 1,549 UZBEKISTAN 446,60 256,30 336,40 591,80 466,80 537,24 480 TURKMENISTAN 131 400 80,5 266 180 201 325 Total (all figures in kg) 5,124 5,553 6,828 6,317 3,819 3,651 3,307 Opium Seizures 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 KAZAKHSTAN 36,23 13,57 192,52 352,81 668,85 636,8 335 KYRGYZSTAN 469,22 109,29 45,68 317,46 116,46 302,29 270 TAJIKISTAN 3,664 1,624 2,371 2,310 1,104 1,386 2,546 UZBEKISTAN 241,70 76,00 151,20 384,70 107,66 759,3 731 TURKMENISTAN 267 1,200 138 665,5 748 2,655 2,284 Total (all figures in kg) 4,678 3,022 2,898 4,031 2,745 5,740 6,166 Total figures for the region show a small decrease in heroin seizures (from 3651 kg in 2006 to 3307 in 2007), thus confirming a declining trend since 2004. The overall decrease was mainly due to data from Tajikistan ( –26,1%, from 2097 kg to 1549 kg), while relatively large increases took place in Kyrgyzstan (+65,7%, from 260 kg to 431 kg) and Turkmenistan (+61,7%, from 201 kg to 325 kg). On the other side, opium seizures slightly increased (from 5740 kg in 2006 to 6166 in 2007). The most notable growth was in Tajikistan (from 1386 kg to kg 2546), while all the other countries registered some decline, with Kazakhstan showing the most decrease (-47,3%, from 636 kg to 335 kg). 10843/08 ZH/tas 3 ANNEX DG H 3A EN Despite the slight total decrease in heroin seizures (whose reasons are not clear, mainly because of poor investigation techniques in the area) figures continue to confirm the trend of widespread ongoing illegal laboratory production in Afghanistan. According to the UNODC Afghanistan 2008 Report, 58% of the opium grown in Afghanistan is converted to heroin or morphine locally before being exported (an equivalent of 666 metric tons in 2007). UNODC reports that all the heroin trafficked along the northern route is believed to have been processed in northern Afghanistan. One of the provinces where a substantial number of illegal laboratories in Afghanistan are located is Badakshan (14 labs, according to the Report) in the Northern border region with Tajikistan. These developments suggest that countering the smuggling of precursors is an important area for Governments in the region and donors to focus aggressively on. This continues to be one of the greatest challenges cited by the Mini Dublin Groups in the area. It is worth noting that, with the exception of the recent seizure of 1.6 tons of acetic acid in Uzbekistan under operation Tarcet, the last recorded seizures of precursors in Central Asia occurred in 2000 (in Turkmenistan). Since Uzbekistan is the only producer in the region of acetic anhydride (the main precursor for heroin), it seems reasonable to suppose that illicit shipments transiting from Central Asia to Afghanistan come from other areas. This appears to be confirmed by the November 2007 seizure of 10 tons of acetic anhydride in the Russian region of Nijniy Novgorod that were in route to Afghanistan through Tajikistan (the dismantled organisation was planning to send an additional 300 tons of acetic anhydride). Some sources point also to the borders of China to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as the most vulnerable, thus deserving a specific attention. Others cite Turkmenistan as a significant transit area for precursors destined for Afghanistan, although (as anticipated) there were no reports of precursor seizures there in 2007. 10843/08 ZH/tas 4 ANNEX DG H 3A EN On the other hand, during the Paris Pact expert level Round Table on precursors used in the manufacturing of heroin (Vienna, 29-30 May 2007) it was observed that most of acetic anhydride reaching Afghanistan probably enters the Country through the Pakistani border. The subsequent seizure early in 2008 under Operation Tarcet of 14 tons of acetic anhydride in Karachi, Pakistan, supports this assessment. At a regional level, porous borders (three of the Central Asian Countries share a common border with Afghanistan for 2,300 kilometres and the large number of road and railway links make anti- trafficking measures difficult) continue to require focussed attention. Inadequate training and scarcity of modern equipment for law enforcement agencies, high levels of corruption, insufficient regional and national co-ordination in anti-drug activities should also be addressed. Governments of the region and donors have dedicated significant resources to these problems on both the regional and national level. While some progress has been achieved in most of the above-mentioned areas, further efforts are still needed, particularly in view of the continuing challenge posed by Afghan opium and heroin production. Persistent economic difficulties combined with political tensions contribute to complicate an already daunting problem. As noted in previous reports, the greater availability of drugs (especially opium and heroin of Afghan origin, but also cannabis) remains a key contributor to the increase in the abuse of narcotics in the region. There is a prevalence of drug injection among abusers, which in turn, has contributed to an alarming growth of HIV/AIDS cases. According to most observers, the following statistics pertaining only to registered cases significantly underestimate the magnitude of the problem. Some sources suggest that, depending on the country under consideration, the real number of drug addicts might be 3 to 10 times greater. The official figures, nevertheless, show a clearly growing trend, especially of HIV cases, with an increase of more than 3000 cases only in Uzbekistan from 2006 to 2007. 10843/08 ZH/tas 5 ANNEX DG H 3A EN Total number of registered drug addicts 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 KAZAKHSTAN 45505 47241 47924 47903 54397 54411 55286 KYRGYZSTAN 5043 5591 6350 7074 7290 7842 8464 TAJIKISTAN 6243 6840 6799 7275 7576 7810 8607 UZBEKISTAN 18087 18956 19088 19551 19574 19654 21465 TURKMENISTAN 31161 37115 39815 34231 34906 33697 33361 (first six months) Drug addicts per 100.000 inhabitants 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 KAZAKHSTAN 305 316 319 317 352 355 358 KYRGYZSTAN 100 110 123 136 138 149 159 TAJIKISTAN 100 109 107 113 116 118 128 UZBEKISTAN 72 74 74 75 74 74 78 Injecting drug users (% of overall drug addicts) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 KAZAKHSTAN 77% 81% n/a KYRGYZSTAN 69% 62% 69% 75% 73% 69,5% 63,6% TAJIKISTAN 36% 49% 70,5% 60,1% 61,8% UZBEKISTAN 44% 45% 40% 39% 47,9% 46,4% 42,6% TURKMENISTAN 24,5% 25,4% 29,2% 24,5% 25,3% 25,5% 25,7% (first six months) Drug Addict women (% of overall drug addicts) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 KAZAKHSTAN 9,7% 9,9% 9,8% 10% 10% 8,8% 8.6% KYRGYZSTAN 6,6% 6,8% 6,9% 6,7% 6,6% 6,7% 6,7% TAJIKISTAN 5,3% 4,7% 4,1% 4,5% 6,4% 4,5% 4,9% UZBEKISTAN 6,3% 5,9% 5,9% 5,6% 5,4% 5,2% 5,2% TURKMENISTAN 4,3% 3,9% 4,0% 3,9% 4,3% 4,4% 4,5% HIV cases 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 KAZAKHSTAN 2522 3257 4003 4702 5440 7402 9378 KYRGYZSTAN 202 362 494 655 826 970 1479 TAJIKISTAN 45 77 119 317 506 710 1049 UZBEKISTAN 779 1760 3596 5612 7810 10015 13184 10843/08 ZH/tas 6 ANNEX DG H 3A EN While actual production remains limited, a potential for wider production of drugs in the region exists: cannabis grows wild in several Central Asian countries and small-scale cultivation of opium takes place in some confined areas.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Afghanistan State Structure and Security Forces
    European Asylum Support Office Afghanistan State Structure and Security Forces Country of Origin Information Report August 2020 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office Afghanistan State Structure and Security Forces Country of Origin Information Report August 2020 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9485-650-0 doi: 10.2847/115002 BZ-02-20-565-EN-N © European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2020 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: © Al Jazeera English, Helmand, Afghanistan 3 November 2012, url CC BY-SA 2.0 Taliban On the Doorstep: Afghan soldiers from 215 Corps take aim at Taliban insurgents. 4 — AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY FORCES - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT Acknowledgements This report was drafted by the European Asylum Support Office COI Sector. The following national asylum and migration department contributed by reviewing this report: The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry of Justice It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, it but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO. AFGHANISTAN: STATE STRUCTURE AND SECURITY
    [Show full text]
  • Failed State Wars
    Afghanistan: A War in Crisis! Anthony H. Cordesman September 10, 2019 Working draft, Please send comments and suggested additions to [email protected] Picture: SHAH MARAI/AFP/Getty Images Introduction The war in Afghanistan is at a critical stage. There is no clear end in sight that will result in a U.S. military victory or in the creation of a stable Afghan state. A peace settlement may be possible, but so far, this only seems possible on terms sufficiently favorable to the Taliban so that such peace may become an extension of war by other means and allow the Taliban to exploit such a settlement to the point where it comes to control large parts of the country. The ongoing U.S. peace effort is a highly uncertain option. There are no official descriptions of the terms of the peace that the Administration is now seeking to negotiate, but media reports indicate that it may be considering significant near-term U.S. force cuts, and a full withdrawal within one to two years of any settlement. Media reports indicate that the Administration is considering a roughly 50% cut in the total number of U.S. military personnel now deployed in Afghanistan — even if a peace is not negotiated. No plans have been advanced to guarantee a peace settlement, disarm part or all of the force on either side, provide any form of peace keeping forces, or provide levels of civil and security aid that would give all sides an incentive to cooperate and help stabilize the country. The Taliban has continued to reject formal peace negotiations with the Afghan government, and has steadily stepped up its military activity and acts of violence while it negotiates with the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • The Civil Challenges to Peace in Afghanistan
    The Civil Challenges to Peace in Afghanistan September 10, 2019 Anthony H. Cordesman With the assistance of Max Molot Working draft, Please send comments and suggested additions to [email protected] Picture: WAKIL KOHSAR/AFP/Getty Images The Failed Civil Side of the War Far too much of the current discussion of the peace process in Afghanistan focuses on whether a peace agreement can be negotiated, and not on whether a peace can be successfully enforced and a stable state emerge out of the peace process. Previous reporting by the Burke Chair has raised serious questions about the ability of the Afghan security forces to secure a peace without continued support from U.S. combat forces. This report addresses a different set of issues. It addresses a critical aspect of the current peace process: its apparent failure to focus on creating a stable post conflict state. It shows that the Afghan government faces a a set of civil challenges which are as serious as the challenges of creating a functioning peace with the Taliban. It does not focus, however, on the current political challenge and divisions within the Afghan Government that are shaping the coming election. It instead examines Afghan popular perceptions of the current level of governance, the deep structural challenges that the Afghan government will have to confront in order to govern effectively in the face of challenges from the Taliban and other opposition groups, and the government’s dependence on continued levels of massive outside aid. It examines the current levels of poverty and economic stress that the government will face even if the fighting ends, and the kind of pressure that a rapidly growing civil population will put on the government for new jobs and higher living standards once the fighting ceases.
    [Show full text]
  • English Language and Upgrade Your Colleague and I Were the First from the Royal Thai Police/ Knowledge on Cultural Dynamics
    The OSCE Asian Partnership for Co-operation Reflections and Perspectives ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Booklet design and printing courtesy of the generous contribution from the Permanent Mission of Slovakia to the OSCE, Chairmanship of the OSCE Asian Partners for Co-operation Group in 2020. The booklet was prepared by Ms. Marietta S. König, Senior External Co-operation Officer, with the support of Ms. Liliya Buhela, Office of the Secretary General, External Co-operation Section. The editors thank the Asian Partners for Co-operation, as well as colleagues in the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, at the Conflict Prevention Centre, and the OSCE field operations in Central Asia for their valuable contributions to this publication. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, EXTERNAL CO-OPERATION SECTION WALLNERSTRASSE 6, 1010 VIENNA TEL: +43 1 514 360 | FAX: +43 1 514 36 6190 EMAIL: [email protected] THIS BROCHURE IS ALSO AVAILABLE IN PDF FORMAT ON THE OSCE WEBSITE: osce.org Design: red hot ´n´ cool, Vienna Photo credit front cover: dollarphotoclub Photo credit back cover: OSCE The OSCE Asian Partnership for Co-operation Afghanistan Australia Japan Republic of Korea Thailand The OSCE Asian Partnership for Co-operation 4 Joint Foreword 7 Introductory note by 2020 APCG Chair Slovakia 10 Introductory statements by the Ambassadors of the five Asian Partner Countries 12 I The 25th anniversary of the OSCE Asian Partnership for Co-operation 24 II Founding Documents 28 III A selection of projects implemented under the OSCE Asian Partnership for Co-operation 52 IV Afghanistan: engagement and strategic co-operation 62 V Prospects for increased co-operation with regional organizations in Asia 70 The OSCE Asian Partnership for Co-operation 6 7 Joint Foreword The OSCE enjoys an excellent level of co- inviting the Republic of Korea to attend the operation with the Asian Partners, who display Budapest Summit.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan: Community Engagement on Civilian Protection Recognize
    AFGHANISTAN: COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT ON CIVILIAN PROTECTION RECOGNIZE. PREVENT. PROTECT. AMEND. PROTECT. PREVENT. RECOGNIZE. MAY 2019 COVER T +1 202 558 6958 Community Civilian Protection Council (CCPC) group E [email protected] work session, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. civiliansinconfict.org CIVIC Photo ii Center for Civilians in Confict (CIVIC) is an international organization dedicated to promoting the protection of civilians caught in conflict. CIVIC’s mission is to work with armed actors and civilians in conflict to develop and implement solutions to prevent, mitigate, and respond to civilian harm. Our vision is a world where parties to armed conflict recognize the dignity and rights of civilians, prevent civilian harm, protect civilians caught in conflict, and amend harm. CIVIC was established in 2003 by Marla Ruzicka, a young American activist and humanitarian who advocated on behalf of civilian war victims and their families in Iraq and Afghanistan. Building on her extraordinary legacy, CIVIC now operates in conflict zones throughout the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and South Asia to advance a higher standard of protection for civilians. At CIVIC, we believe that parties to armed conflict have a responsibility to prevent and address civilian harm. To accomplish this, we assess the causes of civilian harm in particular conflicts, craft practical solutions to address that harm, and advocate the adoption of new policies and practices that lead to the improved wellbeing of civilians caught in conflict. Recognizing the power of collaboration, we engage with civilians, governments, militaries, and international and regional institutions to identify and institutionalize strengthened protections for civilians in conflict. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This briefing paper was written by Mohammad Emal Aslami, Program Manager, Afghanistan and edited by Sahr Muhammedally, Director, MENA & South Asia.
    [Show full text]
  • Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)
    Special Inspector General for OCT 30 SIGAR Afghanistan Reconstruction 2018 QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110- 181) established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). SIGAR’s oversight mission, as dened by the legislation, is to provide for the independent and objective • conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. • leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote economy, efciency, and effectiveness in the administration of the programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in such programs and operations. • means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deciencies relating to the administration of such programs and operation and the necessity for and progress on corrective action. Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018 (Pub. L. No. 115-91), this quarterly report has been prepared in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efciency. Source: Pub.L. No. 110-181, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008,” 1/28/2008, Pub. L. No.
    [Show full text]
  • Commission Des Communautés Européennes
    COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES SEC( 2004 ) 467 FINAL BRUXELLES, LE 23.04.2004 BUDGET GÉNÉRAL - EXERCICE 2004 SECTION III - COMMISSION TITRES 19, 31 VIREMENT DE CRÉDITS N° DEC11/2004 DÉPENSES NON OBLIGATOIRES EN EUROS ORIGINE DES CRÉDITS DU CHAPITRE - 31 02 RÉSERVES POUR LES INTERVENTIONS FINANCIÈRES ARTICLE 31 02 41 - 19 10 06 Aide à la réhabilitation et à la reconstruction de l'Afghanistan CC - 15 000 000 CP - 15 000 000 DESTINATION DES CRÉDITS AU CHAPITRE - 19 10 RELATIONS AVEC L'ASIE ARTICLE - 19 10 06 Aide à la réhabilitation et à la reconstruction de l'Afghanistan CC 15 000 000 CP 15 000 000 EXPOSÉ DES MOTIFS La Commission propose un virement de €15 million en crédits d'engagements et de paiements à partir de la réserve (chapitre 31 02) à la ligne 19 10 06 (Reconstruction de l'Afghanistan). Ce montant avait été entré dans la réserve, en attendant la présentation par la Commission d'un programme intégré destiné à combattre la drogue en Afghanistan (comprenant l'appui au développement alternatif, afin de fournir aux agriculteurs de nouvelles possibilités et de limiter l'exportation de la drogue). Ce programme a été préparé par la Commission et est joint en annexe à la proposition de virement (voir annexe technique). 2 I. RENFORCEMENT a) Intitulé de la ligne 19 10 06 – Aide à la réhabilitation et à la reconstruction de l'Afghanistan b) Données chiffrées à la date du 25.03.2004 CE CP 1A. Crédits de l'exercice (budget initial + BR) 168 000 000 113 500 000 1B.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan-Background Note-V1.0(December 2020)
    Country Background Note: Afghanistan Version 1.0 December 2020 Preface Purpose This note provides a summary of and links to country of origin information (COI) for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims. It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into two main sections: (1) general background to the country concerned, including demography and geography; and (2) issues which may be relevant to protection claims. Unlike country policy and information notes, it does not contain an assessment of risk, availability of protection or reasonableness of internal relocation. Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts. Country of origin information The country information in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2013. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability. The structure and content of the country information section follows a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to this note. All information included in the note was published or made publicly available on or before the ‘cut-off’ date in the country information section. Any event taking place or report/article published after this date is not included.
    [Show full text]
  • TERMINAL EVALUATION – Report of the Independent Evaluation Team TABLE of CONTENTS
    TERMINAL EVALUA TION REPORT Project Number : AFG/H16 Strengthening Afghan – Iran Drug Border Control and Cross Border Cooperation (SAID) Report of the independent evaluation team Report of the Evaluator Everett Erlandson Reviewed and Edited by Stuart A. Steinberg, J.D., L.L.M. Enhanced International Law Enforcement Consultant UN Office on Drugs and Crime Kabul, Afghanistan Thematic area: Counter-Narcotics Enforcement Country: Afghanistan UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME Vienna – May 2009 1 Pr oje ct AFG/ H1 6 – Streng thenin g Afgha n – Iran Drug Borde r Con trol an d Cross Borde r Coope ratio n TERMINAL EVALUATION – Report of the Independent Evaluation Team TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………………2 LIST OF ACRONYMS…………………………………………………………………………4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY…………………………………………………………………….. 5 1. Summary Table of Findings, Supporting Evidence and Recommendations.............. 5 2. Summary Description of the Project Including Project Objectives.............................. 6 3. Major Finding of the Evaluation................................................................................. 7 4. Lessons Learned and Best Practices........................................................................ 7 5. Recommendations, Conclusions and Implications for UNODC.................................. 7 I. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………. 8 1.1 Background and Context…………………………………………………………8 1.2 Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation…………………………………….. 11 1.3 Executing Modality/Management Arrangements…………………………….12
    [Show full text]
  • Ceasefire Violations in Jammu and Kashmir a Line on Fire
    [PEACEW RKS [ CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR A LINE ON FIRE Happymon Jacob ABOUT THE REPORT Ceasefire violations along the Line of Control and international border between India and Pakistan have over the last decade been the primary trigger of tensions and conflict between New Delhi and Islamabad in the long-disputed Kashmir region. This report, supported by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and based on extensive field visits to the border areas, in-depth interviews with Indian and Pakistani military officials, and several primary datasets explains the factors behind the violations and suggests ways to control them within the context of the broader bilateral political dispute. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Happymon Jacob is associate professor of diplomacy and disarmament studies at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has previously worked with the Observer Research Foundation (New Delhi), University of Jammu (J&K), Central European University (Budapest), and the Jamia Millia Islamia University (New Delhi), has participated in or organized some of the influential India-Pakistan Track II dialogues, and has written extensively on India’s foreign policy, the Kashmir conflict, India-Pakistan relations, and security issues in South Asia. Cover photo: Hindustan Times/Getty Images The views expressed in this report are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Peaceworks No.
    [Show full text]
  • Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan
    Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan June 2018 Report to Congress In Accordance With Section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended. The estimated cost of this report for the Department of Defense is approximately $177,000 for the Fiscal Years 2018. This includes $12,000 in expenses and $165,000 in DoD labor. Generated on Jun 1, 2018 RefID: D-F54BED1 This report is submitted in accordance with Sections 1225 and 1532 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended by Sections 1213 and 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92), Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2017 (P.L. 114-328), and Sections 1215 and 1521 of the NDAA for FY 2018 (P.L. 115-91). It includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, and a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State and is the seventh in a series of reports required semi-annually through calendar year 2020. This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan.
    [Show full text]
  • July 30, 2020 Quarterly Report to Congress
    Special Inspector General for JUL 30 SIGAR Afghanistan Reconstruction 2020 QUARTERLY REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110- 181) established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). SIGAR’s oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the independent and objective • conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. • leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in such programs and operations. • means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operation and the necessity for and progress on corrective action. Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. As required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018 (Pub. L. No. 115-91), this quarterly report has been prepared in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Source: Pub. L. No. 110-181, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008,” 1/28/2008, Pub. L. No.
    [Show full text]