“GITTIN STUFF” Towards Total War and Confederate Mobilization (1863 – 1864) BY FRED SETH, CPPM CF, HARBOUR LIGHTS CHAPTER PREFACE PART TWO he first article in this series, “Equip- INTRODUCTION ping Confederate Forces at the T ike the first article, this article’s title Onset of the Civil War,” was read and also contains “Gittin Stuff,” a term discussed by many NPMA property pro- L attributed to controversial Confederate fessionals. I thank you all for your Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest encouragement, critical comments and to describe logistics and supply support. suggestions. My wife, Barbara; Marsha After the initial buildup for war, both Campbell; Jim Dieter and Tom Williams the Confederate and United States gov- have been particularly helpful on this ernments focused on changes in strategy. article, reviewing drafts, editing text, Recognizing that the Union was in the and making valuable recommendations. war for the long haul, Confederate Presi- The information contained in these dent Jefferson Davis realized that all articles is from a historical perspective, Southern resources; manpower, produc- which is quite different from typical tion, and financial assets, must be mobi- offerings in The Property Professional. lized to fend off the Northern invasion. Although we may think present-day United States President Abraham Lincoln challenges are new, they are not. understood that to defeat the South and The second article covers the two restore the Union, armies of the North most significant years in the Civil War, must destroy the South’s capability to 1863 and 1864. Early Confederate victo- wage war. ries were followed by invasion and These clashing philosophies resulted defeat, leading to restructuring of the in a significant buildup of Confederate management of equipment and materials industry offset by its nearly total by the South. Such concerns as finance, destruction by Union invading forces. acquisition sources, government con- How logistics aspects influenced key tracting, movement and distribution, battles in the East and West, Gettysburg and centralized vs. decentralized equip- and Vicksburg, are addressed. This arti- ment and material management were as cle concludes with perhaps the Civil critical then as they are today. In addi- War’s most significant event, the re-elec- tion, the impact of logistics support deci- tion of President Lincoln in November sions and capabilities on significant Civil 1864, and its consequences for the Con- War events is discussed. federate cause. 22 PROPERTY PROFESSIONAL Volume 17 Issue 3 example, thirty carloads of uniform cloth Efficient and competent public servants TRANSITION FROM sat on sidings in Charlotte, North Carolina, could only be developed through time and ARTICLE ONE and trains took two weeks to move thirteen training. The Confederate government did boxes of clothing and shoes from Florida to not have enough of either. fter Lee’s withdrawal from Antietam, Dalton, GA (Richmond Enquirer, Novem- The Quartermaster Bureau was never Athe winter of 1862-1863 put a severe ber 28, 1862) To make matters worse, both able to supply enough wagons, tents, blan- strain on the Confederate supply system. Union troops and local citizens, who were kets or clothing and the Commissary Lee’s letters to President Jefferson Davis suffering on the home front, looted Bureau was unable to feed the massive referred to barefoot and destitute troops. unguarded trains. armies consistently. Only the Ordnance Davis forwarded Lee’s reports to Quarter- The Quartermaster and Commissary Bureau can be considered successful, pro- master General Myers for action. Using a bureaus received increased criticism from viding sufficient arms and ammunition standard bureaucratic approach, Myers the press and the public. Many supply per- throughout the entire war. A normally ordered Lee’s quartermaster to submit new sonnel were capable, but others were ineffi- modest man, Ordnance Chief General Josi- requisitions for supplies that were not on cient or even corrupt, disregarding regula- ah Gorgas wrote in his diary on April 8, hand or purchased. In March 1863 Myers tions and wasting what little was available. 1864, "I have succeeded beyond my utmost lectured Lee on using forage throughout the By the spring of 1864 over nine hundred expectations. From being the worse sup- countryside even though his army was quartermasters, some handling over $1 mil- plied of the Bureaus of the War Depart- 2 already on short rations. lion quarterly, had not yet turned in their ment it (Ordnance Bureau) is the best." 1 Supply chain delays were terrible. For accounts for the first two quarters of 1862. Peachtree Street, Atlanta, GA 1864 after Union forces captured the City Courtesy The National Archives Volume 17 Issue 3 PROPERTY PROFESSIONAL 23 GITTIN STUFF tributing more to the success of the Confed- cerned due to anticipated receipt of imports ORGANIZATION eracy than anyone except Robert E. Lee.5 in the fall. The Union Navy then dealt the AND MANPOWER South a severe blow. In September and THE QUARTERMASTER October two ships, the Hebe and the rganizational changes were indicated Venus, loaded with shoes and winter Oand manpower needs adjusted as the BUREAU clothes, were sunk off the North Carolina war grew in size and scope. Each of the By 1863 Quartermaster General Mey- coast.8 To make matters worse, when Gen- logistics bureaus attempted to respond to ers had assumed increased purchasing and eral Lawton finally formally assumed the growing requirements from the armies and manufacturing responsibilities and had position of Quartermaster General, the pressures caused by the Union occupation identified a need for centralized manage- Government could not account for nearly and blockade. ment. The Quartermaster bureau, housed seventy million dollars. Additionally, on Capitol Square in Richmond, swelled to unpaid bills to Southern manufacturers LOGISTICS BUREAUS a staff of eighty-eight clerks and one mes- amounted to $47.6 million and were AND STAFFS senger, shuffling paperwork and attempting increasing rapidly.9 If confronted with a to keep up with the demands of the armies financial audit, the Quartermaster Bureau Confederate ordnance, commissary, in the field.6 would have failed miserably. and quartermaster officers were not held in For months the Bureau had been trou- Richmond’s centralized supply system high esteem by the government. In Novem- bled by conflicts between staff officers, who now relied on signed requisitions submitted ber 1863, General Braxton Bragg, the reported to Meyers, and field commanders to the depot nearest the ultimate recipient. Commanding General of the Army of Ten- and their quartermasters, who reported to The release of stock from those depots was nessee, recommended to President Davis army commanders. Meyers divided the often slow and inconsistent. The Charleston that these officers be given greater rank and Confederacy into eleven purchasing dis- Mercury, August 26, 1863, wrote that for compensation. He wrote, “the chiefs of tricts to improve support, one for each state troops to be supplied, they needed “a requi- these departments are second only in except for the Tenth District (Arkansas and sition, drawn up and signed by the proper importance to the commander-in-chief, and Missouri), and the Eleventh (Tennessee and officer according to the conditions of some yet they are allowed only by sufferance, not Kentucky). A “principal purchasing officer,” unbending and inflexible law.” recognized by law, and with the paltry rank responsible for contracting and purchasing, Gorgas and Northrop also implemented and pay of majors.”3 headed each district. These purchasing offi- centralization of their Bureaus’ activities One such quartermaster assigned to the cers were not responsible to army com- during 1863. These policies would remain 18th Louisiana Infantry, Major Silas T. manders and administered their depots in effect with some modifications until the Grismore, wrote in his reminiscences, “No under the “exclusive control” of the Quar- end of the war. The Government had suc- persons connected with the Confederate armies received so much abuse as the quar- termaster General’s Office. They were ceeded in removing authority for the distri- termasters, whilst but few, if any, officers required to submit monthly reports of bution of supplies and equipment from performed more arduous and constant materials purchased, manufactured, issued field commands to conserve war materials. duties than did those of the Q. M. Depart- and on hand to Myers.7 Chief Quartermas- However, shortages in manpower, supplies ment….Let forage be plenty or scarce, let ters of each army had to cease all purchas- and transportation continued to plague the the roads be good or bad, let the sun shine ing except for forage and fuel, unless in Confederacy, and its mushrooming bureau- or the rain fall, subsistence had to be pro- enemy territory. This centralized approach cracy in Richmond led to increased ineffi- cured, provisions transported, and the army helped the Bureau to manage its limited ciency and corruption.10 4 material moved.” Property managers and resources and, by mid-1863, Meyers had logisticians today often deal with a similar built up a sizable organization. lack of respect and understanding of their PERSONNEL AT However, supply shortages and com- value. plaints from the field continued. After Get- PRODUCTION FACILITIES The most senior logistics officers were tysburg, Lee convinced President Davis to Personnel shortages