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Lessons from Israel's Intelligence Reforms

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Lessons from Israel's Intelligence Reforms The Brookings Institution 1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20036-2103 ANALYSIS PAPER www.brookings.edu Number 14, October 2007 Lessons from Israel’s Intelligence reforms Yosef Kuperwasser ANALYSIS PAPER Number 14, October 2007 LESSONS FROM ISRAE L ’S INTE lli GENCE REFORMS YOSEF KUPERWASSER TAB L E OF CONTENTS A C K NOW L EDGEMENTS ...............................................V P REFACE B Y DAN I E L L. BY MAN ........................................VII E XECUT iv E SUMMAR Y .............................................. XI T HE AUTHOR ................................................. XVII I NTRODUCT I ON ...................................................1 T HE NEED FOR INTE lli GENCE REFORM IN ISRAE L ............................7 I SRAE L ’ S INTE lli GENCE REFORMS ...................................... 13 C R I T I C I SMS OF ISRAE L ’ S INTE lli GENCE REFORMS ............................ 23 P OSS I B L E LESSONS FOR THE AMER I CAN INTE lli GENCE COMMUN I T Y ................ 27 A PPEND I X ..................................................... 31 B I B li OGRAPH Y .................................................. 33 T HE SABAN CEN T ER A T THE BROOKING S IN st I T U T ION III AC K NOW L EDGEMENTS am very grateful to the many wonderful people Intelligence Officer, Brig. Gen. Yuval Halamish, his I whose contributions and assistance made my desire predecessor Brig. Gen. David Tsur, and my successor to write this paper come true. Ariel Kastner of the Brig. Gen. Yossi Baidatz shared with me their experi- Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings ence and ideas about the reform. Dr. Amos Granit, Institution had a major role in writing the paper and the Director of the Institute for Systemic Intelligence taking care of many hurdles. His many talents and Studies in the IDF intelligence branch, read the text wise advice, as well as his insistence on perfection and and gave many invaluable comments. Prof. Zeev relentless curiosity are imprinted all over the paper. Bechler and my sister Nitza helped with some philo- sophical matters. Everybody on the Saban Center team made their own special contribution, in particular, Martin S. Indyk, Di- In the United States, special thanks are due to many rector of the Saban Center. Martin Indyk was the one people. I owe a lot to Professor Roy Godson, to Richie who decided to have me write this paper and through- Horowitz, and to Gary Schmitt for their comments. out my stay at Brookings gave extremely useful advice Former intelligence officers, including Paul Pillar, and comments. It was his feeling that this paper would helped my understanding of what went wrong with fit the mission of the Brookings Institution, namely to 9/11 and with the war in Iraq. provide the American administration with ideas and views that might help it perform better. Regardless of all this support, the full responsibility for the contents of this paper lies solely with me. On the Israeli side, many people who were involved in the reform deserve special thanks, not all of whom Last but not least is the incredible support I received— I can mention by name. The Director of the IDF in- as always—from my wife Tsionit who took care of the telligence branch, Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, his pre- many issues in Israel which enabled me to spend the decessor Maj. Gen. (ret.) Aharon Zeevi, the Chief time necessary in Washington writing this paper. T HE SABAN CEN T ER A T THE BROOKING S IN st I T U T ION V PREFACE Daniel L. Byman, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service he once-cloistered world of U.S. intelligence These challenges lie at the heart of this analysis paper. Tis openly in turmoil. The September 11, 2001 What are the true priorities of intelligence agencies? terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent What is the best way to assure objectivity in intelligence failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq while ensuring that intelligence is tightly integrated into both led to extensive reforms of the U.S. intelligence the policy process? How should analysts and collectors community. The very heart of the intelligence best interact? Given changing missions and technolo- process—collection, analysis, and dissemination—all gies, what are the most effective ways to disseminate changed dramatically as the community underwent information while still protecting sources? reorganization after reorganization. Less publicly, but no less dramatically, the U.S. military has also Yosef Kuperwasser is an ideal person to answer these transformed the mission, scope, and organization of questions. Having served in several senior-level Israe- its intelligence activities. Bureaucracies with primarily li intelligence positions, he is well versed in the new domestic responsibilities, such as the Federal Bureau world facing intelligence professionals. Kuperwasser, of Investigation and the Department of Homeland however, goes well beyond the perspective he gained Security, further complicated the intelligence picture, in his own experience as an intelligence professional, offering new capabilities but also placing new demands integrating the many (and often competing) concerns on the system. Even farther away from the spotlight, of Israeli policymakers and applying the lessons to but perhaps more consequential in the long term, are America’s unique dilemmas. changes in technology, society, and the very nature of warfare, all of which shape the demands on intelligence. U.S. policymakers and intelligence professionals have The U.S. intelligence community has struggled to adapt much to learn from Kuperwasser’s insights into the to these criticisms and challenges, and the jury is still Israeli experience. Israel’s intelligence community, out on the effectiveness of the new approach. particularly its military intelligence, has changed dra- matically in the last decade in order to meet better the While intelligence professionals struggle with these threats facing the Jewish state. As the dangers of ter- changes, they must also confront a perennial yet daunt- rorism and proliferation have come to overshadow the ing problem: policymakers’ limited comprehension of conventional military threat from neighboring Arab the intelligence process. As a result, intelligence offi- states, Israeli military intelligence has gone well beyond cials must not only ensure that the best information is its historic “what is over the next hill?” focus to address collected and properly analyzed, but also that it is read a wider range of operational and strategic issues. Their and understood. analysts have had to learn how to expand the scope of T HE SABAN CEN T ER A T THE BROOKING S IN st I T U T ION VII what they do while retaining the long-standing exper- tise they have gained on adversary military capabili- ties. In addition, Israeli military intelligence has had to expand its dissemination and work with new partners both inside and outside of Israel. Although America and Israel face distinct challenges today, Americans can learn from Israel’s successes and problems as they struggle to remake U.S. intelligence and meet tomorrow’s threats. VIII LE ss ON S FROM IS RAE L ’ S IN T E ll IGEN C E REFORM S EXECUT iv E SUMMAR Y he events of September 11, 2001 led to large-scale Israel’s intelligence leadership felt it necessary to re- Texamination of the American intelligence system, form the concepts, perceptions, and practices of intel- with many questioning whether the failure to prevent ligence since existing methodologies could no longer the terrorist attacks lay on the doorstep of decision fully address the growing complexity of the security makers or intelligence personnel. The questions and environment and the emerging threats. While ideas for concerns stemming from 9/11 led to a commission improving intelligence date back over thirty years in of inquiry and, ultimately, passage of the Intelligence Israel, to the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which was the reforms in the late 1990s grew from the identifica- signed by President Bush in December 2004. Many of tion of a number of geo-strategic changes and some the provisions of the Act advanced specific structural new understandings: and cultural changes, and were coupled with measures to improve the intelligence “product.” Around the • Changes in the Characteristics of Wars and time that the debate surrounding 9/11 was taking Changes in the Military Doctrine of the Enemies. place, however, another intelligence failure unfolded. The changing nature of battle was a major catalyst The contention that Saddam Hussein possessed for Israel’s intelligence reform. In the past, most weapons of mass destruction, a key rationale behind wars in which Israel was involved were well defined the George W. Bush Administration’s drive to war in in place and time, with the enemy having a relative- Iraq, could not be substantiated. Again, the debate ly centralized and well-defined decision-making resurfaced about who—the intelligence community process, and a high-profile military presence. How- or the policymakers—was responsible. The underlying ever, in recent years, the nature of war has changed. premise in this discussion over the American In many instances the battlefield is one in which intelligence system was that structural, professional, entire societies are involved, as the battle is about and cultural changes had to be implemented in order the endurance of these societies. The decision- to improve the way intelligence agencies perform their making process of the enemy is ambiguous and missions, and that within the United States, intelligence involves many elements, and the enemy employs a and policymaking are in fact two separate spheres. strategy of concealment. As a result, indicators of success have changed, with territory no longer the In Israel, there was no major intelligence failure in re- only focus.
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