Theories, Models, and Science in Community

Jacob Kraemer Tebes Yale University

Keywords: Theory, Science, , Framework Author Biography: Jacob Kraemer Tebes is a community/clinical psychologist and Professor of Psychiatry (Psychology), in the Child Study Center, and in Public Health at Yale University; Director of the Division of Prevention and Community ; and Director of The Consultation Center. He also serves as Chief Psychologist at the Connecticut Mental Health Center and is Editor-in-Chief of the American Journal of Community Psychology. His professional activities include research, practice, teaching, and administration, mostly related to issues of equity and social justice. His scholarship focuses on resilience promotion, the prevention of adolescent substance use, integrating cultural perspectives into practice and research, and the implications of of science for community research and community psychology. Dr. Tebes also trains and consults to public agencies and community-based organizations on program implementation and systems reform, and on building and sustaining evaluation capacity. Finally, he teaches postdoctoral and doctoral fellows in community research and practice, and is the Program Director of a NIDA T32 postdoctoral research training program in substance abuse prevention. Recommended Citation: Tebes, J.K. (2016). Theories, Models, and Science in Community Psychology. Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice, 7(2), pages 1-11. Retrieved Day/Month/Year, from (http://www.gjcpp.org/). Correspondence should be sent to Jacob K. Tebes, Ph.D., Division of Prevention & Community Research and The Consultation Center, Yale University School of Medicine, 389 Whitney Avenue, New Haven, CT 06511-2369. Email: [email protected].

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Theories, Models, and Science in Community Psychology I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the paper by Jason, Stevens, Ram, Miller, Beasley, and Gleason (2016) entitled, “Theories in the Field of Community Psychology.” The authors tackle an important, but often neglected issue – the use of theories in science – and consider how well theories in community psychology advance scientific inquiry. Jason et al. (2016) provide a valuable service to our field in their examination of theories in community psychology, and specifically, theories in three major areas: ecological theory, sense of community, and empowerment. Their brief review of theory in each area provides a useful summary and a call to action for further specification of theory. They have started a conversation vital to our field’s future. Despite my enthusiasm for several parts assumed that observations were of their paper, I have a number of independent of theory, when in fact, they concerns. These include the authors’: 1) were constrained by the very theories assumptions about contemporary science, they purported to test (Popper, 2) assessment of theories in community 1935/1959). Kuhn (1962/1970) and psychology relative to those in other other philosophers of science showed fields in psychology, 3) overemphasis on that theories, and the paradigms in which theory as opposed to models in science, they were embedded, were shaped by and 4) lack of attention to other extra-scientific factors – social, historical, epistemologies in community psychology cultural, and psychological forces – that that hold scientific promise for our field. I influenced the norms and acceptability of discuss each of these briefly below. a given theory among scientists. As a Assumptions about contemporary result, the implicit assumptions science underlying the standard view of science based on logical were The authors’ implicit view of science is inherently flawed (Longino, 2013). As based on a known Gergen (1988) has noted, one cannot as logical empiricism, which is a twentieth separate out “observational language century adaptation and extension of from theoretical presuppositions” (p. 2) nineteenth century logical because theories determine “what counts (Tebes, 2012). Logical empiricism as evidence, confirmation and replaced positivism because it offered a discomfirmation” (p. 3). Further, because practical way – the (hypothetico- words acquire meaning within specific deductive) – to conduct contexts and theories are posited in science; in which a researcher begins with language that is context-free, “there is no an a priori hypothesis derived from viable account of how it is that theories theory that is then tested inductively by actually predict phenomena in nature observations made under specific (Gergen, 1988, p. 3). Thus, if observations conditions (McGuire, 1986). Until about and the language used to describe them the 1960s, this was the standard way to are flawed representations of reality do science, and was defensible in the subject to extra-scientific factors, theories philosophy of science. However, as in science are an imperfect “house of philosophers noted at the time, this view cards” upon which conceptions of reality

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Volume 7, Issue 2S February 2016 are based. and critics of the DJ distinction The above critiques are well known and (Hoyningen-Huene, 2006). The authors have been made by philosophers of note that such a rapprochement seeks to science (e.g., Bhaskar, 1975; Giere, 2006; establish a “normative perspective” Longino, 2013; Morgan & Morrison, among scholars for “the evaluation of 1999), scholars in the social sciences (e.g., scientific claims” (Hoyningen-Huene, Manicas & Second, 1983; Manicas, 2006; 2006, p. 130). However, after McGuire, 1986, 1989), and community summarizing the adequacy of theories in psychologists (Tebes, 2005, 2012; Tebes, community psychology, they return to Thai, & Matlin, 2014; Trickett & Espino, characterizing the DJ distinction as one 1994). I am sure the authors know them between conducting “exploratory” well. However, the authors’ extended research vs. research that seeks to discussion of Reichenbach’s (1938) “develop a good theory” and that utilizes “context of discovery” vs. “context of “rigorous methods” (Jason et al., 2016, p. justification,” and its central place in their 18). Consistent with Kuhn and with other argument, suggests that there is a critics of the DJ distinction, I would argue disconnect between their knowledge of that both types of DJ research – discovery this and its implications for the and justification – are effectively importance of theories in science, and in exploratory and both use rigorous community psychology. methods, depending on the context of inquiry and questions examined. The authors repeatedly return to the distinction made by Reichenbach (1938) Status of theory in community – that is, the context of discovery vs. the psychology relative to theory in other context of justification, which fields in psychology philosophers refer to as the DJ distinction Another concern I have is that, when it (Hoyningen-Huene, 2006) – as central to comes to theory development, Jason et al. why theories in community psychology (2016) hold community psychology to a do not quite measure up as scientific. higher standard than other fields in However, as philosophers since Kuhn psychology. More specifically, if have maintained, this distinction is less community psychology has yet to produce relevant for theory and science if one adequate theories for scientific inquiry, accepts Kuhn’s central thesis: that the one must ask: Compared to what? I give practice of science is inextricably two examples to illustrate the complexity embedded in social, historical, cultural, of answering this question generally for and psychological factors (Hoyningen- psychology, and specifically for Huene, 2006). For Kuhn (1962/1970), the community psychology. DJ distinction is mostly a false dichotomy A well-developed theory in social since the context of justification is just as psychology is the Theory of Planned embedded in extra-scientific factors as Behavior (TPB, Ajzen, 1985), which is an those that shape the context of discovery extension of the Theory of Reasoned (Hoyningen-Huene, 2006; Nickles, 1980). Action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). TPB The authors are mindful of this issue, and stipulates that intention immediately cite work that has sought a precedes a given behavior and itself has rapprochement between the proponents

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Volume 7, Issue 2S February 2016 three intersecting influences: one’s theory on ablation studies of rats, and we attitude toward the behavior, subjective now know that his observations were the norms about the behavior, and perceived result of how he measured performance; behavioral control (Azjen, 2015). Each of he used an approach that was standard at these influences is further affected, the time and produced results which respectively, by one’s beliefs about the challenged the prevailing models of the likely consequences of the behavior, brain which emphasized localization of normative expectations for others function (Elliott & Carson, 2000). important to the person faced with the Nevertheless, Lashley’s theory about behavioral choice, and various factors equipotentiality and mass action in the that control effective behavioral first half of the 20th century was performance. TPB has been widely enormously influential theoretically in studied in a variety of health contexts explaining how laboratory animals and related to health behavior change and some humans could recover specific public health. Its specificity has enabled functions, such as speech and language, the theory to be examined carefully in despite having lesions in regions of the both cross-sectional and longitudinal brain usually associated with those observational studies as well as in functions. However, as scientists were randomized controlled trials (Azjen, able to map brain functions with greater 2015; Sniehotta, Presseau, & Arauja- precision, the original principles were Soares, 2014). The utility of the theory shown to have less utility because of has had mixed assessments as a theory of previously unrecognized behavior change, but it has been useful as interconnections within the brain that a theory to specify conditions under accounted for the observed effects (Elliott which behavioral intentions result in & Carson, 2000). Despite these specific behaviors (Azjen, 2015; Sniehotta limitations, the influence of Lashley’s et al., 2014). My guess is that Jason et al. theoretical principles were considerable (2016) would regard TPB a theory to as scientists conceptualized the brain as which community psychologists should an integrated neural network (Hebb, aspire, and I would agree. 1949), and identified pervasive and In another example, in the fields of distributed brain functions, including , physiological those for cognition, language, and action psychology, and cognitive science there (Hagoort, 2005; Sporns, 2011; Willems & has been considerable research Hagoort, 2007). conducted on the proposed theoretical Clearly, Lashley did not have a fully principles of equipotentiality and mass developed theory of the brain in action (Lashley, 1929, 1950). Mass action articulating his principles of (Lashley [1929] originally called it mass equipotentiality and mass action, and function) refers to the notion that the once they were assessed using more brain functions as an integrated system varied measurement approaches, they did (mass action) in which specific neurons, not survive what Jason et al. (2016) when necessary, can take on functions would consider the context of ordinarily carried out by other neurons justification. However, their influence as a (equipotentiality). Lashley based his model of brain function was quite

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Volume 7, Issue 2S February 2016 significant, and arguably, quite relevant to However, in recent years, a number of contemporary theories of the brain. Their philosophers of science (Frigg & abiding influence represents the value of Hartmann, 2012; Giere, 2006, 2010; the context of discovery in science and Morgan & Morrison, 1999; Nersessian, how models of behavior can have 2006) have emphasized the centrality of enormous scientific influence, even in the models, even more so than theories, to absence of a well-articulated theory. advance science. Although the authors In my view, Jason et al.’s (2016) analysis make a case for the value of theory, I of ecological theory is similar in many think much of what takes actually place in ways to Lashley’s principles of science – especially when doing research equipotentiality and mass action. Jason et in what the authors would refer to as the al. (2016) summarize ecological theory as context of discovery – involves described by Kelly (1968; 2006) as well conceptualizing and testing models. as Bronfenbrenner (1979), noting that Models represent some middle ground Kelly’s emphasis on interdependence, between theory and observation, are cycling of resources, adaptation, and intended as representations of the world, succession provides somewhat greater and are usually tied to the contexts in specificity than Bronfenbrenner’s which observations take place (Frigg & embedded socio-ecological contexts for Hartmann, 2012; Giere, 2006; Nersessian, human development. However, for both 2006). This view is consistent with Jason aspects of ecological theory as used in et al. (2016), although to be fair, they did community psychology, Jason et al. not go into any depth describing models. (2016) correctly point out that this One value of models is that they are non- “theory” operates mostly as a linguistic; that is, they are less “framework” because it provides a basis constrained by language as a for specifying various models and representation of the world (Giere, 1988; hypotheses, but not specific predictions Morrison & Morgan, 1999). This allows based on the theory. This is very similar models to transcend some of the to what Lashley introduced to limitations of language endemic to theory. neuropsychology when he proposed a As a result, models function as physical, theoretical framework for the brain that graphical, mathematical, or described the two principles of computational depictions of the world equipotentiality and mass action. (Frigg & Hartmann, 2012; Haig, 2013; Lashley’s framework was not a fully Nersessian, 2006) that serve as developed theory of the brain, but it autonomous agents between theories and stimulated subsequent productive science observations to mediate their on the brain; ecological theory has had a relationship (Morrison & Morgan, 1999). similar impact on science in community This affords scientists freedom to psychology. characterize the world apart from the language of theory (Giere, 2010), thus Overemphasis on theory as opposed to producing more useful, accurate, and models in science locally-grounded observations (Dunbar, The authors focus their paper on theories 1999; Giere, 2010). Examples of this are in the field of community psychology. found in studies of how scientists think;

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Volume 7, Issue 2S February 2016 their use of model building through Harre, 2009; Manicas & Secord, 1983). analogous reasoning and distributed This view holds that there is a reality “out cognition in teams illustrates how science there” independent of one’s construction advances in the context of discovery of it (i.e., realism) and that the natural (Dunbar, 1999, 2000; Nersessian, 2006). world, including human beings, can be Since community psychology is centrally known (albeit imperfectly) through direct focused on action and inquiry that is engagement and observation (i.e., culturally situated and local, and often naturalism) (Tebes, 2005, 2016). For involves participatory approaches with scientists, the shift from logical various stakeholders, a focus on model- empiricism has had little practical building over theory-building is likely to consequence; they retained the scientific have significant benefits for advancing method but accepted its philosophical science. There are numerous successful limitations by adopting a pragmatic examples of how such collaborative, solution; that is, a stance that allows for culturally grounded research has theoretical and methodological pluralism advanced action as well as science in the in which no method or theory is field (Allen & Mohatt, 2014; Andrews et considered, a priori, to be better than al., 2012; Brodsky, 2009; Jason, 2013; another (Tebes, 2005, 2012). Certainly Tebes et al., 2014). scientists have their biases about which theories and methods they find most Lack of attention to other useful, but norms are generally epistemologies in community established within each field for what psychology that hold scientific promise constitutes scientific inquiry. Within The authors’ scope was ambitious – methodology, this pragmatic solution has Theories in the Field of Community come to be known as “critical multiplism” Psychology – and so it is natural that they (Cook, 1985; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, were unable to incorporate most of the 2002). relevant work related to their topic. One Realist of science depart area that needs further consideration is from the approach adopted by the other major epistemologies in community authors because they do not regard psychology and their implications for explanation and prediction as the sine qua scientific inquiry. The term epistemology non of science, but rather, one component refers to how one comes to know the of a broader science that seeks to world and to make knowledge claims describe how phenomena interact in the about it (Tebes, 2005). I conclude this world (Manicas, 2006). Theory directs the commentary with a brief discussion of scientist “to provide an understanding of this issue and its implications. the processes which jointly produce the As noted at the outset of this essay, the contingent outcomes of experience” authors adopted a framework for science (Manicas, 2006, p. 1). In this view, grounded in logical empiricism, a view no understanding the interactions of various longer accepted by philosophers of aspects of the world is what science is all science. What replaced logical empiricism about, and theories – in the natural and in philosophy was various forms of social sciences – determine where realism (Bhaskar, 1975; Giere, 2006; scientists should look.

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Giere (2006)’s scientific perspectivism is practice and research or social action and another realist philosophy of science that science is consistent with Dewey’s further emphasizes how observations of emphasis on action as the source of the world are a distinctively human knowledge. Feminism and critical theory activity; they constitute a perspectival have contributed essential frameworks, reality from the point of view of the theories, and models to advance scientific observer, something I have written about understanding in community psychology, elsewhere in describing perspectivism, often in direct resistance to the standard which I have argued is a foundational, view of science embodied by logical constructivist philosophy of science for empiricism (Campbell & Wasco, 2000; our field (Tebes, 2012, 2016; Tebes et al., Nelson & Prilleltensky, 2010; Tebes, 2014). Although the authors briefly 2016). As a central foundation for summarize perspectivism in their paper, I community psychology, feminism’s believe they do not fully appreciate the contribution to our field’s scientific implications of perspectivism for their inquiry has emphasized situated knowing, thesis: that while science may include a participatory approaches, diverse focus on explanation and prediction, methods, and action (Bond, Hill, Mulvey, those are not its only or even primary & Terenzio, 2000; Campbell & Wasco, purposes. The scientist seeks to construct 2000; Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1986; a contextualized understanding of the Lather, 1991; Longino, 1990, 2013; Riger, natural world for various purposes, such 1992). Critical theory, as another as understanding and action as well as philosophical foundation for community explanation and prediction. Thus, the task psychology, has focused on human for contemporary science is broader than experiences of power and oppression as it was for logical empiricism, and requires well as resistance, emancipation, and more pluralistic theories, models, liberation through individual and methods, and voices. collective action (Fox, Prilleltensky, & Community psychology embraces a Austin, 2009; Horkheimer, 1931/1993; number of epistemological traditions Martı´n-Baro, 1994; Mertens, 2007; relevant to this task that the authors do Nelson & Prilleltensky, 2010; Teo, 2015). not address. Along with perspectivism, Each of these approaches has moved our our field also has strong philosophical field away from a logical empiricist roots in pragmatism, feminism, and approach to science to one that embraces critical theory, which elsewhere I have catalytic or transformative change argued serve as foundations for a (Lather, 1991; Mertens, 2007). philosophy of science of community These four philosophical foundations for psychology (Tebes, 2016). our field – perspectivism, pragmatism, Pragmatism (Biesta, 2010; Dewey, 1905; feminism, and critical theory – have Mertens, 2007; Vanderstraeten, 2002) overlapping constructivist epistemologies provides a basis for understanding with implications for science in meaning and action, including action community psychology (Tebes, 2016). In research, mixed methods, and program future work, the authors may wish to evaluation (Biesta, 2010; Tebes, 2016). incorporate these into their analysis, and The interdependence in our field between discuss how each offers opportunities for

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Volume 7, Issue 2S February 2016 - and model-building for Bond, M., Hill, J., Mulvey, A., & Terenzio, M. community psychology. (2000). Weaving feminism and community psychology: An introduction to a special issue. References American Journal of Community Ajzen, I. (1985). From intentions to Psychology, 28, 585-597. actions: A theory of planned behavior. Brodsky, A.E. (2009). Multiple In J. Kuhl & J. Beckman (Eds.). Action- psychological senses of community in control: From cognition to behavior. Afghan context: Exploring (pp. 11-39). Heidelberg: Springer. commitment and sacrifice in an Ajzen, I. (2015). The theory of planned underground resistance community. behaviour is alive and well, and not American Journal of Community ready to retire: a commentary on Psychology, 44, 176-187. Sniehotta, Presseau, and Araújo- Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979). The ecology of Soares. Review, human development: Experiments by 9(2), 131-137. nature and design. Cambridge, MA: Allen, J., & Mohatt, G.V. (2014). Harvard University Press. Introduction to ecological description Campbell, R., & Wasco, S.M. (2000). of a community intervention: Building Feminist approaches to social science: prevention through collaborative Epistemological and methodological field-based research. American Journal tenets. American Journal of Community of Community Psychology, 54, 83-90. Psychology, 28, 773-791. Andrews, J.O., Tingen, M.S., Jarriel, S.C., Cook, T.D. (1985). Postpositivist critical Caleb, M., Simmons, A., Brunson, J., multiplism. In L. Shotland & M.M. Mueller, M.,.Ahluwalia, J.S., Newman, Mark (Eds.), Social science and social S.D., Cox, M.D., Magwood, G., & policy, (pp. 21-62). Beverly Hills, CA: Hurman, C. (2012). Application of a Sage. CBPR framework to inform a multi- Dewey, J. (1905). The postulate of level tobacco cessation intervention in immediate empiricism. In: J.A. public housing neighborhoods. Boydston & L. Hickman (Eds.), The American Journal of Community collected works of John Dewey, 1882- Psychology, 50(1-2), 129-140. 1953. Electronic Edition. Bhaskar, R. (1975). A realist theory of Charlottesville, VA: InteLex science. London: Verso. Corporation, 2003. Biesta, G. (2010). Pragmatism and the Dunbar, K. (1999). How scientists build philosophical foundations of mixed models: InVivo science as a window methods research. In C. Teddlie & A. on the scientific model. In L. Magnani, Tashakkori (Eds). SAGE handbook of N.I. Nersessian, & P. Thagard (Eds.). mixed methods in social & behavioral Model-based reasoning in scientific research. Second Edition. (pp. 95-117). discovery. (pp. 85-99). New York: Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.

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