Theories, Models, and Science in Community Psychology Jacob Kraemer Tebes Yale University Keywords: Theory, Science, Community Psychology, Framework Author Biography: Jacob Kraemer Tebes is a community/clinical psychologist and Professor of Psychiatry (Psychology), in the Child Study Center, and in Public Health at Yale University; Director of the Division of Prevention and Community Research; and Director of The Consultation Center. He also serves as Chief Psychologist at the Connecticut Mental Health Center and is Editor-in-Chief of the American Journal of Community Psychology. His professional activities include research, practice, teaching, and administration, mostly related to issues of equity and social justice. His scholarship focuses on resilience promotion, the prevention of adolescent substance use, integrating cultural perspectives into practice and research, and the implications of philosophy of science for community research and community psychology. Dr. Tebes also trains and consults to public agencies and community-based organizations on program implementation and systems reform, and on building and sustaining evaluation capacity. Finally, he teaches postdoctoral and doctoral fellows in community research and practice, and is the Program Director of a NIDA T32 postdoctoral research training program in substance abuse prevention. Recommended Citation: Tebes, J.K. (2016). Theories, Models, and Science in Community Psychology. Global Journal oF Community Psychology Practice, 7(2), pages 1-11. Retrieved Day/Month/Year, From (http://www.gjcpp.org/). Correspondence should be sent to Jacob K. Tebes, Ph.D., Division oF Prevention & Community Research and The Consultation Center, Yale University School oF Medicine, 389 Whitney Avenue, New Haven, CT 06511-2369. Email: [email protected]. Global Journal oF Community Psychology Practice Volume 7, Issue 2S February 2016 Theories, Models, and Science in Community Psychology I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the paper by Jason, Stevens, Ram, Miller, Beasley, and Gleason (2016) entitled, “Theories in the Field of Community Psychology.” The authors tackle an important, but often neglected issue – the use of theories in science – and consider how well theories in community psychology advance scientific inquiry. Jason et al. (2016) provide a valuable service to our field in their examination of theories in community psychology, and specifically, theories in three major areas: ecological theory, sense of community, and empowerment. Their brief review of theory in each area provides a useful summary and a call to action for further specification of theory. They have started a conversation vital to our field’s future. Despite my enthusiasm for several parts assumed that observations were of their paper, I have a number of independent of theory, when in fact, they concerns. These include the authors’: 1) were constrained by the very theories assumptions about contemporary science, they purported to test (Popper, 2) assessment of theories in community 1935/1959). Kuhn (1962/1970) and psychology relative to those in other other philosophers of science showed fields in psychology, 3) overemphasis on that theories, and the paradigms in which theory as opposed to models in science, they were embedded, were shaped by and 4) lack of attention to other extra-scientific factors – social, historical, epistemologies in community psychology cultural, and psychological forces – that that hold scientific promise for our field. I influenced the norms and acceptability of discuss each of these briefly below. a given theory among scientists. As a Assumptions about contemporary result, the implicit assumptions science underlying the standard view of science based on logical empiricism were The authors’ implicit view of science is inherently flawed (Longino, 2013). As based on a philosophy of science known Gergen (1988) has noted, one cannot as logical empiricism, which is a twentieth separate out “observational language century adaptation and extension of from theoretical presuppositions” (p. 2) nineteenth century logical positivism because theories determine “what counts (Tebes, 2012). Logical empiricism as evidence, confirmation and replaced positivism because it offered a discomfirmation” (p. 3). Further, because practical way – the (hypothetico- words acquire meaning within specific deductive) scientific method – to conduct contexts and theories are posited in science; in which a researcher begins with language that is context-free, “there is no an a priori hypothesis derived from viable account of how it is that theories theory that is then tested inductively by actually predict phenomena in nature observations made under specific (Gergen, 1988, p. 3). Thus, if observations conditions (McGuire, 1986). Until about and the language used to describe them the 1960s, this was the standard way to are flawed representations of reality do science, and was defensible in the subject to extra-scientific factors, theories philosophy of science. However, as in science are an imperfect “house of philosophers noted at the time, this view cards” upon which conceptions of reality Global Journal oF Community Psychology Practice, http://www.gjcpp.org/ Page 2 Global Journal oF Community Psychology Practice Volume 7, Issue 2S February 2016 are based. and critics of the DJ distinction The above critiques are well known and (Hoyningen-Huene, 2006). The authors have been made by philosophers of note that such a rapprochement seeKs to science (e.g., Bhaskar, 1975; Giere, 2006; establish a “normative perspective” Longino, 2013; Morgan & Morrison, among scholars for “the evaluation of 1999), scholars in the social sciences (e.g., scientific claims” (Hoyningen-Huene, Manicas & Second, 1983; Manicas, 2006; 2006, p. 130). However, after McGuire, 1986, 1989), and community summarizing the adequacy of theories in psychologists (Tebes, 2005, 2012; Tebes, community psychology, they return to Thai, & Matlin, 2014; Trickett & Espino, characterizing the DJ distinction as one 1994). I am sure the authors Know them between conducting “exploratory” well. However, the authors’ extended research vs. research that seeks to discussion of Reichenbach’s (1938) “develop a good theory” and that utilizes “context of discovery” vs. “context of “rigorous methods” (Jason et al., 2016, p. justification,” and its central place in their 18). Consistent with Kuhn and with other argument, suggests that there is a critics of the DJ distinction, I would argue disconnect between their Knowledge of that both types of DJ research – discovery this history and its implications for the and justification – are effectively importance of theories in science, and in exploratory and both use rigorous community psychology. methods, depending on the context of inquiry and questions examined. The authors repeatedly return to the distinction made by Reichenbach (1938) Status of theory in community – that is, the context of discovery vs. the psychology relative to theory in other context of justification, which fields in psychology philosophers refer to as the DJ distinction Another concern I have is that, when it (Hoyningen-Huene, 2006) – as central to comes to theory development, Jason et al. why theories in community psychology (2016) hold community psychology to a do not quite measure up as scientific. higher standard than other fields in However, as philosophers since Kuhn psychology. More specifically, if have maintained, this distinction is less community psychology has yet to produce relevant for theory and science if one adequate theories for scientific inquiry, accepts Kuhn’s central thesis: that the one must asK: Compared to what? I give practice of science is inextricably two examples to illustrate the complexity embedded in social, historical, cultural, of answering this question generally for and psychological factors (Hoyningen- psychology, and specifically for Huene, 2006). For Kuhn (1962/1970), the community psychology. DJ distinction is mostly a false dichotomy A well-developed theory in social since the context of justification is just as psychology is the Theory of Planned embedded in extra-scientific factors as Behavior (TPB, Ajzen, 1985), which is an those that shape the context of discovery extension of the Theory of Reasoned (Hoyningen-Huene, 2006; Nickles, 1980). Action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). TPB The authors are mindful of this issue, and stipulates that intention immediately cite work that has sought a precedes a given behavior and itself has rapprochement between the proponents Global Journal oF Community Psychology Practice, http://www.gjcpp.org/ Page 3 Global Journal oF Community Psychology Practice Volume 7, Issue 2S February 2016 three intersecting influences: one’s theory on ablation studies of rats, and we attitude toward the behavior, subjective now know that his observations were the norms about the behavior, and perceived result of how he measured performance; behavioral control (Azjen, 2015). Each of he used an approach that was standard at these influences is further affected, the time and produced results which respectively, by one’s beliefs about the challenged the prevailing models of the likely consequences of the behavior, brain which emphasized localization of normative expectations for others function (Elliott & Carson, 2000). important to the person faced with the Nevertheless, Lashley’s theory about behavioral choice, and various factors equipotentiality and mass action in the that control effective behavioral