Perception and Scientific Observation: a Challenge to the Assumption of Objectivity

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Perception and Scientific Observation: a Challenge to the Assumption of Objectivity University of New Hampshire University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository Doctoral Dissertations Student Scholarship Winter 1971 PERCEPTION AND SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATION: A CHALLENGE TO THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY RAYMOND E. RAINVILLE Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation Recommended Citation RAINVILLE, RAYMOND E., "PERCEPTION AND SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATION: A CHALLENGE TO THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY" (1971). Doctoral Dissertations. 939. https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation/939 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RAINVILLE, Raymond E., 1940- PERCEPTION AND SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATION: A CHALLENGE TO THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY. University of New Hampshire, Ph.D., 1971 Psychology, general University Microfilms, AXEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan I ___________ _ r_______ ___________________ J THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED PERCEPTION AND SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATION: A CHALLENGE TO THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY by RAYMOND E. RAINVILLE A THESIS Submitted to the University of New Hampshire In Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate School Department of Psychology December, 1970 This thesis has been examined and approved. Thesis director, Frederick Jervis, Professor of Psychology RaymoA6 Erickson,Professor of Psychology Eugene Mills, Professor of Psychology Cecil Schneer, Professor of Geology ft oM/jcb Robert Watson, Professor of Psychology / J /ia m Duane Whittier, ‘Associate Professor of Philosophy TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES..................................... iv LIST OF FIGURES.................................... v ABSTRACT........................................... vi I. INTRODUCTION. *..................................... 1 II. IDENTIFYING THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY........ 12 III. THE METHOD OF ANOMALIES........................... ^3 IV. MAKING THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY EXPLICIT 65 V. THREE ANOMALIES TO THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY.. 125 VI. THE EFFECTS OF THE ANOMALIES OH THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY........................................ 178 VII. SEEKING AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY........................................ 212 VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.......................... 239 BIBLIOGRAPHY................................... 2^5 iii LIST OF TABLES 1. Alternative Definitions of Elements in Lobachevakii and Euclid's Geometries.............................. 133 iv LIST OF FIGURES 1. Allport1s Non-Illusion Stimulus....... 128 2. Allport's Illusion Stimulus................. 129 3. Klein's Depiction of a Non-Euclidean Space............ 138 *+. The Stereographic Projection of a3 Dimensional Curvilinear Space onto a 2 Dimensional Non-Euclidean Surface................................................. 11f1 5. 2 Dimensional Non-Euclidean Space of Positive Curvature............................................... 1^-2 6. Reversible Figure...................................... 151 7. Alternative Views of a Swinging Body.................. 153 8. Ames' Rotating Trapezoidal Window..................... 157 v ABSTRACT PERCEPTION AND SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATION: A CHALLENGE TO THE ASSUMPTION OF OBJECTIVITY by RAYMOND RAINVILLE This inquiry attempts to determine whether the assump­ tion of objectivity usually made about scientific observation is justified. This is considered to be an important question because it is usually assumed that scientific knowledge differs from the rest of human knowledge precisely because it is ob­ jective. The belief in the objectivity of science is traced back historically to the beginnings of science in Western civilization. In a brief historical analysis, it is revealed that despite many important historical changes in our account of scientific knowledge, there are two aspects of scientific epistemology which remain constant. These two aspects are first, that scientific knowledge differs from the rest of knowledge in that it is factual and second, that the scien­ tific method is the only appropriate way to distinguish fact from illusion. This long standing tradition in the Western way of knowing presents a unique difficulty to anyone wishing to conduct an inquiry into the value of objectivity. The diffi­ culty arises from the fact that most available methods of inquiry have the assumption of objectivity embedded in them. vi There is, for example, a tendency for methods to be either analytical or experimental. This division is believed to re­ flect an underlying separation into subjective and objective. A method was sought which was not prejudiced by having the assumption of objectivity embedded in it. The method settled upon is called the method of anomalies, which is modeled after the thought experiment. Thought experiments were constructed to produce information anomalous to the assumption of objec­ tivity. Three such anomalies to the assumption of objectivity were produced by this inquiry. The first anomaly demonstrates the inseparability of logical and empirical elements in per­ ception. Specifically, it demonstrates that the real and the illusory can only be separated after certain logical assump­ tions are made. This indicates that the logical assumptions are as fundamental to the definition of the real as are the sensory elements. The second anomaly demonstrates the in­ fluence of the whole on the experience of the parts in both scientific measurement and in normal perception. Specifi­ cally, it shows that concepts or constructs define and select the appropriate measurements to be taken, as well as those to be ignored. The third anomaly demonstrates that the qual­ itative experience in observation and perception is, in part, determined by the purpose of the observation or perception. This means that the act of measurement or perception in part determines the result of the perception or measurement. vii On the basis of the anomalies generated by the inquiry, some important conclusions about the meaning of factual!ty are derived. A chapter is devoted to unearthing the various def­ initions and meanings of the word "fact" within existing theories of knowledge. When each of these definitions of fact is reviewed in light of the anomalies to objectivity, it is concluded that none of the available definitions of fact are able to deal with all three of the anomalies generated by the inquiry. On this basis, it is concluded that the notion of factuality is misleading. It follows that an alternative epistemological unit is required to replace the notion of fact in our understanding of scientific knowledge. Such an alternative building block is described. In addition, a theory of scientific knowledge which is not based on the assumption of objectivity is out­ lined. In such a theory, other units of knowledge than logical and empirical elements would play an important role. Some psychological elements of the alternative theory of scientific knowledge, such as assumptions, whole and goals are discussed. viii 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In 196*+, C.P. Snow published "two cultures", in which he distinguished between the literary man and the scientifi­ cally oriented scholar. His central theme was that these men represented the way in which scientific knowledge and literary knowledge were growing steadily apart. Each of the two cul­ tures was evolving with separate values, methods and pictures of the world. At that time, the scientific culture appeared to be the more viable in terras of affording us solutions to our problems. Or, as Snow put it, it gave us "hope". No lit­ erary man who read Snow's "two cultures" could have escaped feelings of inferiority for not knowing the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Since that time there has been an increasing recognition that our social and ecological fabric required sensibilities which apparently are not available within the scientific culture. The promise that appeared to rest in science and technology in 1956 appears far less promising in 1970. The industrial might resulting from the application of science and technology is a threat to both man's social and biological continuation. But whether we see science as a positive or negative development in human culture, we cannot deny that putting science in its proper place intellectually and assimilating it into the general culture is a serious problem. It is a problem in both general sociology and in the sociology of science. Underlying this significant prob­ lem is a problem in the psychology of knowledge. These sociological and academic effects behoove us to examine carefully the rationale for making a sharp distinction between science and non-science, as well as for elevating scientific knowledge to the pinnacle of human credibility. One of the fundamental reasons for believing in science, as well as for distinguishing it from other types of knowledge, is our belief that science is objective or factual. We know scientific knowledge to be based on facts; facts in turn, are based on observations. Other aspects of human knowledge, such as cultural tradition and folklore, though they are based on experience, may call upon us for allegiance but not for the same kind of credibility that we give science. It appears that we evaluate our knowledge according to our assessment of its
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