International Political Economy

PL SC 563: International Political Economy

Course Syllabus: Spring 2015

Instructor: Boliang Zhu Office: 317 Pond Lab Tel: 814-865-6901 Email: [email protected] Office Hours: TUE 2-4PM or by appointment Class Time: THU, 1:00-4:00PM, 236 Pond Lab

Course Description: This graduate seminar surveys the classic and contemporary literature in international political economy (IPE). We will focus on the key issues in this field, including trade, foreign investment, foreign aid, international migration, development, and conflict. The goals of this course are threefold: 1) to introduce you to the substantive literatures in the field; 2) to prepare doctoral students for the IPE component of the comprehensive exams in International Relations; 3) to complete an original paper that is potentially publishable or could lead to a large project.

Requirements: • Class Participation & Discussion Leaders (20%) This course will be run as a discussion group. You’re expected to READ THOROUGHLY the works assigned for each week and actively participate in class discussion. All readings will be posted on Angel. For each week’s readings, everyone should come up with 2-3 questions for discussion. These questions should be posted on Angel by 5PM on Tuesday. We will have one official “discussion leader” for each week. The discussion leader will not be those who are writing review essays for that week. The responsibility of the discussion leader is to comment on the review essays, and collect and synthesize the questions raised by other students to initiate the discussion.

• Review Essays (20%) Each student will write two short review essays (3-5 pages, double spaced) on topics choosing from the syllabus. The review essay should not only summarize but also compare and criticize the readings. The review essay should be sent to all seminar members by 5PM on Tuesday and a hard copy is due in class. Other students are expected to read the review essays before class. Your review essay should focus on discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the readings, how they speak to each other, and most importantly, what theoretical issues and empirical questions are raised. When criticizing the works, you could ask: Do the assumptions make sense? Is there any logical flaw in the theory? What are the possible alternative explanations? Are the findings convincing and generalizable? How could the research design be improved?

• Research Paper (40%) Each student will write a research paper (about 30 pages, double spaced) that addresses an original research question or puzzle in the field of international political economy. The goal is to develop a potentially publishable paper. You will complete the paper in three steps:

1. Research Proposal Presentation You will present your research proposal to the class on 2/19. The proposal (about 10 pages, double spaced) should be sent to all seminar members no later than 5PM on Friday (2/13). Everyone is required to provide written comments (no more than one page, single spaced) for other students. Your comments should be posted on Angel by 5PM on Wednesday (2/18). To write a research proposal, you’ll first need to come up with some original research question. This is the most difficult part. A research question often comes from reading and criticizing the existing literature. When you are doing the readings, think about what has been done on the topic; what else can explain the same phenomena; how you could improve the empirical test. The next step is to develop a theoretical argument for your paper. Not every paper needs a theory. I encourage you to write a paper with some original theoretical argument. Based on your theory, you should develop a set of testable hypotheses. In addition, you need to discuss the research design in the proposal: How will you test these hypotheses (qualitatively or quantitatively)? How will the dependent or independent variable variables be measured? What data is needed? How will empirical analysis be conducted?

2. A Twenty-Page Draft Due 3/26 You will need to submit your first draft of the paper in class on 3/26. It doesn’t need to be a complete paper, but should include a literature review, theoretical argument, and preliminary empirical results. I will read your draft and provide feedback for further revisions.

3. Mini-Conference Presentation (4/30) We will have a mini conference for you to present the final paper to the class. The conference will mimic the format of APSA annual conferences to prepare you for real professional presentations. You will need to distribute your paper to all seminar members by 5PM on 4/24 (Friday). In addition, you should prepare slides and a 12 minutes presentation. There will be discussants for each paper. To make most use of the conference, all discussants should provide written comments and post them on Angel by 5PM on 4/29 (Wednesday). A revised paper, which should incorporate the comments received, is due a week later, by 5PM on 5/08.

Course Schedule & Readings (Note: All dates and readings are subject to change.)

Week 1 (1/15): Introduction

The Evolution of IPE • Katzenstein, Peter J., Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner. 1998. “International Organization and the Study of World Politics.” International Organization 52 (4): 645- 685. • Frieden, Jeffry, and Lisa L. Martin. 2002. “International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions.” In Political Science: The State of the Discipline, eds. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. 118-146. • Lake, David A. 2006. "International Political Economy: A Maturing Interdiscipline." In The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, eds. Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 757-777.

• Lake, David A. 2009. “Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review.” The Review of International Organizations 4 (3): 219-244. • Oatley, Thomas. 2011. “The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy.” International Organization 65 (02): 311-341.

Research Design • Fearon, James D. 1991. “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science.” World Politics 43 (02): 169-195. • Geddes, Barbara. 1990. “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics.” Political Analysis 2 (1): 131-150. • McDermott, Rose. 2002. “Experimental Methodology in Political Science.” Political Analysis 10 (4): 325-342. • Odell, John S. 2001. “Case Study Methods in International Political Economy.” International Studies Perspectives 2 (2): 161-176.

Part I: Trade Politics

Week 2 (1/22): Domestic Actors & Preferences • Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade.” American Political Science Review 81 (4): 1121-1137. • Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. “Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation.” American Political Science Review 96 (3): 593-608. • Magee, Stephen P. 1994. “Three Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem.” In The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem: A Golden Jubilee, eds. Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern. An Arbor, M.I.: The University of Michigan Press. 185-202. • Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. “What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?” Journal of International Economics 54 (2): 267-292. • Myada, Anna M., and Dani Rodrik. 2005. “Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?” European Economic Review 49 (6): 1393-1430. • Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2006. “Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes toward International Trade.” International Organization 60 (2): 469-498. • Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. “Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety.” International Organization 63 (3): 425- 457.

Recommended: • O'Rourke, Kevin H., and Richard Sinnott. 2001. “The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence.” Brookings Trade Forum: 157-206. • Baker, Any. 2005. “Who Wants Globalization? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (4): 924-938. • Naoi, Megumi, and Ikuo Kume. 2011. “Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment during the Global Recession.” International Organization 65(4): 771-795.

• Guisinger, Alexandra. 2009. “Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?” International Organization 63 (03): 533-557. • Lü, Xiaobo, Kenneth Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2012. “Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection.” American Journal of Political Science 56 (3): 638-654. • Fordham, Benjamin O., and Katja B. Kleinberg. 2012. “How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade?” International Organization 66 (02): 311-328.

Week 3 (1/29): Domestic Institutions & Trade Policy • Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. 2005. “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries.” International Organization 59 (1): 107- 143. • Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. “Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Preferences.” American Political Science Review 100 (3): 369-384. • Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade.” American Political Science Review 94 (2): 305-321. • Dutt, Pushan, and Devashish Mitra. 2002. “Endogenous Trade Policy through Majority Voting: An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of International Economics 58 (1): 107-133. • McGillivray, Fiona. 1997. “Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (2): 584-607. • Park, Jong Hee, and Nathan Jensen. 2007. “Electoral Competition and Agricultural Support in OECD Countries.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (2): 314-329.

Recommended: • Milner, Helen V., and Bumba Mukherjee. 2009. “Democratization and Economic Globalization.” Annual Review of Political Science 12: 163-181. • Milner, Helen V. 1999. “The Political Economy of International Trade.” Annual Review of Political Science 2: 91-114. • Henisz, Witold J., and Edward D. Mansfield. 2006. “Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness.” International Studies Quarterly 50 (1): 189-212. • Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. “The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade.” World Politics 49 (3): 309-338. • Goldstein, Judith, and Robert Gulotty. 2014. “America and Trade Liberalization: The Limits of Institutional Reform.” International Organization 68 (02): 263-295. • Hiscox, Michael J. 1999. “The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization.” International Organization 53 (04): 669-698. • Lohmann, Susanne, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 1994. “Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence.” International Organization 48 (4): 595-632. • Gawande, Kishore, Pravin Krishna, and Marcelo Olarreaga. 2009. “What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade.” International Organization 63 (03): 491- 532. • Ehrlich, Sean D. 2007. “Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies.” International Organization 61 (03): 571-605.

Week 4 (2/5): International Institutions & Trade Policy • Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 1999. “An Economic Theory of GATT.” The American Economic Review 89 (1): 215-248. • Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. “Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements.” International Organization 56 (3): 477-513. • Rose, Andrew K. 2004. “Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?” American Economic Review 94 (1): 98-114. • Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. “Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade.” International Organization 61 (01): 37-67. • Carnegie, Allison. 2014. “States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions.” American Political Science Review 108 (01): 54-70. • Davis, Christina L. 2004. “International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization.” American Political Science Review 98 (1): 153- 169.

Recommended: • Martin, Lisa L., and Beth A. Simmons. 1998. “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions.” International Organization 52 (04): 729-757. • Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions.” International Organization 38 (1): 226-254. • Maggi, Giovanni. 1999. “The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation.” The American Economic Review 89 (1): 190-214. • Rose, Andrew K. 2004. “Do WTO Members Have More Liberal Trade Policy?” Journal of International Economics 63 (2): 209-235. • Subramanian, Arvind, and Shang-Jin Wei. 2007. “The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly But Unevenly.” Journal of International Economics 72 (1): 151-175. • Gowa, Joanne, and Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. “An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950–94.” World Politics 57 (04): 453-478.

Part II: Multinational Corporations and Foreign Direct Investment

Week 5 (2/12): The Politics of MNCs • Moran, Theodore H. 1978. “Multinational Corporations and Dependency: A Dialogue for Dependentistas and Non-Dependentistas.” International Organization 32 (01): 79-100. • Jensen, Nathan M. 2003. “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment.” International Organization 57 (03): 587-616. • Li, Quan, and Adam Resnick. 2003. “Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries.” International Organization 57 (01): 175-211. • Büthe, Tim, and Helen V. Milner. 2008. “The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?” American Journal of Political Science 52 (4): 741-762.

• Li, Quan. 2009. “Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment.” Comparative Political Studies 42 (8): 1098-1127. • Henisz, Witold J. 2000. “The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment.” The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 16 (2): 334-364. • Pinto, Pablo M., and Santiago M. Pinto. 2008. “The Politics of Investment Partisanship: And the Sectoral Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment.” Economics & Politics 20 (2): 216-254.

Recommended: • Caves, Richard E. 2007. Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis. 3rd ed. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press: Chapters 1 & 2. • Büthe, Tim, and Helen V. Milner. 2014. “Foreign Direct Investment and Institutional Diversity in Trade Agreements: Credibility, Commitment, and Economic Flows in the Developing World, 1971–2007.” World Politics 66 (01): 88-122. • Li, Quan. 2006. “Democracy, Autocracy, and Tax Incentives to Foreign Direct Investors: A Cross-National Analysis.” Journal of Politics 68 (1): 62-74. • Jensen, Nathan M. 2008. “Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment.” The Journal of Politics 70 (04): 1040-1052. • Scheve, Kenneth, and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2004. “Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production.” American Journal of Political Science 48 (4): 662-674. • Pandya, Sonal S. 2010. “Labor Markets and the Demand for Foreign Direct Investment.” International Organization 64 (03): 389-409.

Week 6 (2/19): Proposal Presentation

Week 7 (2/26): MNCs & Domestic Governance • Sandholtz, Wayne, and Mark M. Gray. 2003. “International Integration and National Corruption.” International Organization 57 (04): 761-800. • Pinto, Pablo M., and Boliang Zhu. 2009. “Fortune or Evil? The Effect of Inward Foreign Direct Investment on Corruption.” Saltzman Working Paper No. 10. • Malesky, Edmund J., Dimitar D. Gueorguiev, and Nathan M. Jensen. 2014. “Monopoly Money: Foreign Investment and Bribery in Vietnam, a Survey Experiment.” American Journal of Political Science: n/a-n/a. • Desbordes, Rodolphe, and Julien Vauday. 2007. “The Political Influence of Foreign Firms in Developing Countries.” Economics & Politics 19 (3): 421-451. • Malesky, Edmund J. 2008. “Straight Ahead on Red: How Foreign Direct Investment Empowers Subnational Leaders.” The Journal of Politics 70 (01): 97-119. • Mosley, Layna, and Saika Uno. 2007. “Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Economic Globalization and Collective Labor Rights.” Comparative Political Studies 40 (8): 923-48.

Recommended: • Egger, Peter, and Hannes Winner. 2005. “Evidence on Corruption as an Incentive for Foreign Direct Investment.” European Journal of Political Economy 21 (4): 932-952.

• Jensen, Nathan M., Quan Li, and Aminur Rahman. 2010. “Understanding Corruption and Firm Responses in Cross-National Firm-Level Surveys.” Journal of Internal Business Studies 41 (9): 1481-1504. • Wei, Shang-Jin. 2000. “How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?” Review of Economics and Statistics 82 (1): 1-11. • Braguinsky, Serguey, and Sergey Mityakov. 2013. “Foreign Corporations and the Culture of Transparency: Evidence from Russian Administrative Data.” Journal of Financial Economics. • Li, Quan, and Rafael Reuveny. 2003. “Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis.” British Journal of Political Science 33 (01): 29-54.

Part III: Globalization & Domestic Politics

Week 8 (3/5): Globalization & Domestic Politics • Garrett, Geoffrey. 1995. “Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy.” International Organization 49 (04): 657-687. • Adserà, Alícia, and Carles Boix. 2002. “Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness.” International Organization 56 (02): 229-262. • Kaufman, Robert R., and Alex Segura-Ubiergo. 2001. “Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Social Spending in Latin America: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis, 1973–97.” World Politics 53 (04): 553-587. • Rudra, Nita. 2002. “Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less- Developed Countries.” International Organization 56 (02): 411-445. • Iversen, Torben, and Thomas R. Cusack. 2000. “The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?” World Politics 52 (03): 313-349. • Mosley, Layna. 2000. “Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States.” International Organization 54 (04): 737-773.

Recommended: • Dani Rodrik. 1998. “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” Journal of Political Economy 106 (5): 997-1032. • Hays, Jude C., Sean D. Ehrlich, and Clint Peinhardt. 2005. “Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis.” International Organization 59 (02): 473-494. • Garrett, Geoffrey, and Deborah Mitchell. 2001. “Globalization, Government Spending and Taxation in the OECD.” European Journal of Political Research 39 (2): 145-177. • Swank, Duane, and Sven Steinmo. 2002. “The New Political Economy of Taxation in Advanced Capitalist Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (3): 642- 655. • Wibbels, Erik, and Moisés Arce. 2003. “Globalization, Taxation, and Burden-Shifting in Latin America.” International Organization 57 (01): 111-136. • Nooruddin, Irfan, and Nita Rudra. 2014. “Are Developing Countries Really Defying the Embedded Liberalism Compact?” World Politics 66 (04): 603-640.

• Rickard, Stephanie J. 2012. “Welfare versus Subsidies: Governmental Spending Decisions in an Era of Globalization.” The Journal of Politics 74 (04): 1171-1183. • Walter, Stefanie. 2014. “Globalization and the Demand-Side of Politics: How Globalization Shapes Labor Market Risk Perceptions and Policy Preferences.” Paper Conditionally Accepted at Political Science Research & Methods.

Week 9 (3/12): No Class (Spring Break)

Part IV: International Migration

Week 10 (3/19): International Migration & Immigration Policy • Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. “Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy.” Review of Economics and Statistics 83 (1): 133-145. • Hanson, Gordon H., Kenneth Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2007. “Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies.” Economics & Politics 19 (1): 1-33. • Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2010. “Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment.” American Political Science Review 104 (01): 61-84. • Malhotra, Neil, Yotam Margalit, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. 2013. “Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact.” American Journal of Political Science 57 (2): 391-410. • Dancygier, Rafaela M., and Michael J. Donnelly. 2013. “Sectoral Economies, Economic Contexts, and Attitudes toward Immigration.” The Journal of Politics 75 (01): 17-35. • Peters, Margaret E. 2014. “Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Immigration Policy Making in the United States.” International Organization 68 (04): 811-844.

Recommended: • Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2014. “Public Attitudes toward Immigration.” Annual Review of Political Science 17 (1): 225-249. • Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2007. “Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes toward Immigration in Europe.” International Organization 61 (02): 399-442. • Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2014. “The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes toward Immigrants.” American Journal of Political Science: n/a-n/a. • Fitzgerald, Jennifer, David Leblang, and Jessica C. Teets. 2014. “Defying the Law of Gravity: The Political Economy of International Migration.” World Politics 66 (03): 406- 445. • Mayda, Anna Maria. 2006. “Who Is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants.” Review of Economics and Statistics 88 (3): 510-530.

Part V: Foreign Aid

Week 11 (3/26): Foreign Aid • Alesina, Alberto, and David Dollar. 2000. “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic Growth 5 (1): 33-63. • Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. 2000. “Aid, Policies, and Growth.” The American Economic Review 90 (4): 847-868. • Easterly, William. 2003. “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (3): 23-48. • Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2009. “A Political Economy of Aid.” International Organization 63 (02): 309-340. • Svensson, Jakob. 2000. “Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking.” Journal of International Economics 51 (2): 437-461. • Ahmed, Faisal Z. 2012. “The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and Government Survival.” American Political Science Review 106 (01): 146-165. • Wright, Joseph. 2009. “How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (3): 552-571.

Recommended: • Wright, Joseph, and Matthew Winters. 2010. “The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid.” Annual Review of Political Science 13 (1): 61-80. • Dietrich, Simone, and Joseph Wright. Forthcoming. “Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics and Democratic Change in Africa.” Journal of Politics. • Aronow, Peter M., Allison Carnegie, and Nikolay Marinov. 2012. “The Effects of Aid on Rights and Governance: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” Working Paper. • Milner, Helen V., and Dustin H. Tingley. 2010. “The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid.” Economics & Politics 22 (2): 200-232. • Kono, Daniel Y., and Gabriella R. Montinola. 2009. “Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both?” The Journal of Politics 71 (02): 704-718.

Part VI: Political Economy of Development

Week 12 (4/2): Economic Growth: Institutions, Geography, and Resources • North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” The Journal of Economic History 49 (04): 803-832. • Daron, Acemoglu, Johnson Simon, and James A. Robinson. 2001. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” The American Economic Review 91 (5): 1369-1401. • Sokoloff, Kenneth L., and Stanley L. Engerman. 2000. “History Lessons: Institutions, Factors Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (3): 217-232.

• Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development.” Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2): 131-165. • Ross, Michael L. 1999. “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse.” World Politics 51 (02): 297-322. • Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner. 2001. “The Curse of Natural Resources.” European Economic Review 45 (4–6): 827-838.

Recommended: • Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2003. “Institutions Don’t Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 9490. • Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (4): 1231-1294. • Glaeser, EdwardL, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2004. “Do Institutions Cause Growth?” Journal of Economic Growth 9 (3): 271-303. • Dunning, Thad. 2005. “Resource Dependence, Economic Performance, and Political Stability.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (4): 451-482.

Part VI: Globalization and Civil Conflict

Week 13 (4/9): International Political Economy of Civil Conflict • Barbieri, Katherine, and Rafael Reuveny. 2005. “Economic Globalization and Civil War.” Journal of Politics 67 (4): 1228-1247. • Bussmann, Margit, and Gerald Schneider. 2007. “When Globalization Discontent Turns Violent: Foreign Economic Liberalization and Internal War.” International Studies Quarterly 51 (1): 79-97. • Hartzell, Caroline A., Matthew Hoddie, and Molly Bauer. 2010. “Economic Liberalization via IMF Structural Adjustment: Sowing the Seeds of Civil War?” International Organization 64 (02): 339-356. • Olzak, Susan. 2011. “Does Globalization Breed Ethnic Discontent?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55 (1): 3-32. • Savun, Burcu, and Daniel C. Tirone. 2012. “Exogenous Shocks, Foreign Aid, and Civil War.” International Organization 66 (03): 363-393. • Nielsen, Richard A., Michael G. Findley, Zachary S. Davis, Tara Candland, and Daniel L. Nielson. 2011. “Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict.” American Journal of Political Science 55 (2): 219-232.

Recommended: • Savun, Burcu, and Daniel C. Tirone. 2011. “Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” American Journal of Political Science 55 (2): 233-246. • Ross, Michael L. 2004. “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases.” International Organization 58 (01): 35-67.

• Brückner, Markus, and Antonio Ciccone. 2010. “International Commodity Prices, Growth and the Outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa.” The Economic Journal 120 (544): 519-534. • Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. 2004. “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 112 (4): 725-753.

Week 14 (4/16): (No Class, MPSA)

Part VIII: Recent Developments in IPE

Week 15 (4/23): TBD

Week 16 (4/30): Mini Conference—Research Paper Presentation