Introduction Chapter 1: the Origins of War
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Notes INTRODUCTION 1. For a discussion of Japanese interpretations of the war, Uno 1970, pp. 24-9;Jansen eta!. 1979; and Nakamura 1991, pp. 165-6. 2. Trade percentages from Sugiyama 1984, p. 17; on Japanese businesses in Korea before the war, and the trade relationship between Japan's major ports and Korea, see Yamada 1979. 3. Dower 1986, p. 9. 4. After these lines were written, a useful article appeared which assesses Japan's image in the West, David Morley/Kevin Robins, 'Techno Orientalism: Futures, Foreigners and Phobias', New Formations, 16, 1992, especially pp. 154-5, where they assert, 'Within the political and cul tural unconscious of the West, Japan has come to exist as the figure of empty dehumanized technological power. It represents as an "ideal type" the alienated and dystopian image of capitalist progress.' 5. Eastlake/Yamada 1897, p. iii. 6. White 1895, p. 458. 7. See for example Michael Adams, The C,reat C1Usade: Masculine Desire and the Coming of the Great War, Bloomington 1990; also Roland Stromberg, Redemption l!y War: The Intellectuals and 1914, Lawrence 1982. CHAPTER 1: THE ORIGINS OF WAR I. For the Japanese army's assessment of Chinese forces in the early 1880s, see General Yamagata's memorandum in Oyama 1966, pp. 91-9. 2. Ohama 1990, p. 25; Tokyo Hyakunenshi Henshu Iinkai 1979, p. 232; Hirosaki Shishi Hensan Iinkai 1964, p. 258. 3. The development of the system is explained in Ogawa 1921. 4. Ohama 1990, p. 30. The army general staff view is in Kuwada/Yamaoka 1976, p. 37. 5. MacKenzie 1992, p. 2. 6. Quoted in Muneta 1974, pp. 58-9. 7. Kokumin Shimbun, I April 1894, in SSMHS, vol. 9, p. 49. 8. Harada 1991, pp. 44-5. 9. On Yamagata's views of February-March 1891, Oyama 1966, pp. 196-201, 204-7. 10. See the proposal by Inoue Kowashi to Prime Minister Ito, August 1892, excerpted in Nakamura 1991, p. 173. 11. Groups of two to four men, including Oi Kentaro, Motoda Hajime, Inukai Tsuyoshi, Ozaki Yukio, and Tokutomi Soho, were mobilised for private discussions with government and political authorities including 188 Notes 189 General Yamagata, Matsukata Masayoshi, Shinagawa Yajiro, Kabayama Sukenori and others. Details in GNN, 28 June 1894. 12. Mutsu to Aoki Shuzo, 27 March 1894, quoted in Shinobu 1974, vol. 1, p. 166. 13. Kawakami's tour is recorded in detail in Tokutomi 1942, pp. 112-23; Fukushima's mission is summarised in Ian Nish, 'Japanese Intelligence and the Approach of the Russo:Japanese War', Christopher Andrew/ David Dilks, eds, The Missing Dimension, London 1984. Yamagata's opin ions are summarised in Oka 1958, p. 56. 14. Uno 1970, p. 27. 15. Chinese minister to Tokyo, 7 June 1894, translated in Eastlake/Yamada 1897, p. 3. 16. Uno 1970, p. 38. 17. Tokutomi 1942, p. 127, quotes a conversation between Ito and Kawakami after the cabinet decided to send troops to Korea. In this, Ito asked Kawakami how many troops were to be sent; Kawakami replied, 'one brigade'. Ito insisted the numbers be kept as low as possible, to which Kawakami replied that the cabinet having decided to dispatch forces should leave the military question of troop numbers to the chief of staff. Kawakami is also credited with manipulating Yamagata who before the war remained anxious about China's military strength and wanted to have China open hostilities, see Matsushita 1969, pp. 241-2, and the quotation from Tokutomi in Maebara Shozo, Meiji no Genkun-tachi, Tokyo 1967, p. 52. 18. Mutsu (Berger) 1982, pp. 21-6. 19. Cleveland instructed Secretary of State Walter Gresham on 7 July to inform the Japanese government 'that the President will be painfully disappointed should Japan visit upon her feeble and defenseless neigh bour [Korea] the horror of an unjust war', quoted in Dorwart 1975, p. 24, also Lee 1976, p. 86. 20. 'Heiwa to Gunjin', editorial in GNN, 11 July 1894. See also the warning of a popular backlash given to Ito on 12July by former prime minister Matsukata Masayoshi, Kunaicho 1973, pp. 455-6. 21. GNN, 21 July 1894. 22. British Foreign Office, FO 881/6594, British Army Directorate of Milit ary Intelligence to Foreign Office, 16 July 1894. 23. Iguchi 1985, p. 87. 24. Kunikida 1965, vol. 7, p. 210, entry for 13 September 1894, records the view of leading journalist Tokutomi Soho that the war influenced the whole of world history; Kuwada/Yamaoka 1976, pp. 62-5, presents the Japanese army's analysis of Chinese forces during the war. 25. Ito 1943, p. 143. CHAPTER 2: WARTIME STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY 1. Kunaicho 1973, pp. 495-6; Watanabe 1936, pp. 241-4; Kaneko 1940, vol. 3, pp. 85-6. 190 japan's First Modern War 2. Document in Kunaicho 1973, pp. 476-7; also Inoue 1987, pp. 714-15. Comparison with Germany, Tanaka 1954, p. 206. 3. The hasty reformulation of the 3rd Division is noted in Kuwada/Yamaoka 1966, p. 125. 4. Kunaicho 1973, pp. 498-9. 5. Details of the Songhwan battle in Kuwada/Yamaoka 1966, pp. 100-9. 6. Araki 1976, vol. 2, p. 36-7, Kokurnin Shirnbun, 7 August 1894, describes the Toyoshima engagement. The Kowshing had been brought to a halt by the Japanese fleet but the report explains that Chinese troops then attempted to wrest control from the British captain and reopen hostil ities. Details also in Kuwada/Yamaoka 1966, pp. 110-15. 7. Kuwada/Yamaoka 1966, p. 120. 8. See also Kuwada/Yamaoka 1966, pp. 133-50. 9. Varying totals for Japanese dead and wounded are taken from Hata 1943, p. 69, which reproduces Nozu's telegram of 16 September; GNN, 29 September 1894, for the early official version; Kuwada/Yamaoka 1966, p. 149, for the later army version; also Kunaicho 1973, p. 516. 10. Kuwada/Yamaoka 1966, pp. 150-61. 11. Details from the official report of General Nozu to the Imperial Head quarters, 26 October 1894, as printed in GNN, 31 October 1894; also Kuwada/Yamaoka 1966, pp. 17 4-83. 12. Gaimusho 1953, vol. 1, pp. 58-61. 13. Hata 1943, p. 154. Hatori 1974 (Nozawa diary), p. 12, entry for 22 November 1894, notes that the commander of the 11th infantry regiment, in whose camp the second fire occurred, marched his troops several miles away from the blaze to a place called Enami and that, subsequently, the local people referred jokingly to this as 'the occupa tion of Enami'. 14. Fujimura 1973, p. 130; Matsushita, 1969, pp. 128-30. 15. Tokutomi 1933, vol. 3, p. 176. 16. Mutsu (Berger) 1982, p. 131. 17. For Ito's memorandum of 4 December, see Kaneko 1940, vol. 3, pp. 134-8; Fujimura 1973, pp. 144-5; Chen 1977, pp. 66-7. Imperial order recalling Yamagata, Kunaicho 1973, p. 601. Date of Yamagata's report on Haich'eng reaching the imperial headquarters, Tokutomi 1933, vol. 3, p. 179. Details also in Kuwada and Yamaoka 1966, pp. 234-43. 18. British Foreign Office, FO 881/6605, Trench to Foreign Secretary Kimberley, 7 September 1894, reporting on an interview with Okuma published in the Kokurnin Shirnbun. Trench went on to comment, 'All such utterances, especially when coming from a great statesman, tend to show that this war is more the outcome of national vanity and of the insatiable craving of the Japanese to pose conspicuously, and assert themselves in the face of the whole world. By belief in the invincibility of.Japan's arms the people are raised to such a pitch of expectation that they are not prepared to meet reverses with equanimity, nor disaster with fortitude.' 19. British Foreign Office, FO 262/697, Mr French (Tokyo) to Foreign Secretary Kimberley, 16 November 1894. 20. Yamagata's shipboard memorandum is quoted in Hata 1943, p. 188; for Notes 191 his assurances to the imperial headquarters on his ability to stay in command, Kunaicho 1973, pp. 601-2. 21. The resolution of the Progressive Party convention at Tokyo in mid December 1894 was that Japanese forces must at all accounts proceed to Beijing, that if a ceasefire was accepted by Japan a precondition must be that Japanese troops move up to Beijing, and that any outside intervention bringing about a conclusion of hostilities must be ada mantly rejected. Party resolution printed in GNN, 19 December 1894. 22. Mutsu (Berger) 1982, p. 111. 23. Inoue 1968, p. 17. 24. Ian Nish, 'British Foreign Secretaries and Japan, 1892-1905', B.]. C. McKercher /D.]. Moss, eds, Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939, Edmonton 1984, p. 59. 25. Geibi NN, 16 November 1894. 26. Kunaicho 1973, pp. 463-4 for the British memorandum of21July 1894 and the surrounding Anglo-Japanese correspondence; also Mutsu 1982, pp. 46-51. Kajima 1976, p. 82 for Kimberley's note of21July. Details on the Shanghai matter are to be found in the collection of British foreign office documents under the general date 29 October 1894, FO 881/ 6527, see especially Kimberley to Mr Paget (Tokyo), 22July 1894, for the original British demand; Le Poer Trench (Tokyo) to Kimberley, 21 August 1894, for the Japanese complaint that Shanghai was being utilised by China for its war effort; and Kimberley to Trench, 18 Sep tember 1894, rejecting the Japanese complaint with the instruction, 'Warn the Japanese Government that until we release them from their unconditional engagement to us we hold them to it.' Summary of agreement also in Kunaicho 1973, p. 465. 27. FO 881/6527, Kimberley to Trench (Tokyo), 2 October 1894. 28. Mutsu (Berger) 1982, p. 53. 29. FO 881/6605, Le PoerTrench (Tokyo) to Foreign Secretary Kimberley, 13 September 1894.