Deficits of democratic quality in Catalonia

Report from the SCC regarding the separatist challenge

Barcelona, 10 September 2015

1.- Introduction ...... 3 2. The ‘Generalitat’ Government of Catalonia, an administration acting outside the law ... 4 2.1. The Advisory Council for National Transition (Consejo Asesor para la Transición Nacional) ...... 5 2.2. Creation of State structures ...... 8 2.2.1. Explicit creation of State structures ...... 10 2.2.2. Creation of State structures without publicity ...... 13 2.3. Government of Catalonia and “alternative paths” for the consultation ...... 14 2.3.1. 9-N: From fraud to disobedience ...... 14 2.3.2. 27-S: Autonomic elections to unilaterally declare independence ...... 18 2.4. Instrumentalisation of the international relations ...... 22 2.4.1. Assumption of state competencies and action against the general interest ...... 24 2.4.2. Unilateral declaration of independence, legal security and citizenship ...... 28 2.4.2.1. Without legal security ...... 28 2.4.2.2. Loss of rights ...... 30 3. The Local Administration at the service of separatism ...... 32 3.1. The Association of Municipalities for Independence ...... 32 3.1.1. Illegitimate ascription of local entities ...... 34 3.1.2. Drive for manifestly unconstitutional taking office of mayors ...... 35 3.2. Symbolic invasion of official buildings and public spaces ...... 38 3.2.1. Esteladas even during the electoral period ...... 38 3.2.2. Removal of Spanish flags ...... 41 4.- Policies of communication for national construction ...... 43 4.1.- Governmental control and discredit of the public media ...... 45 4.2.- Pro-independentist leaning of the Audio-visual Board of Catalonia ...... 49 4.3.- Subsidies to similar media and propagandistic use of institutional publicity ...... 55 5. Lack of political neutrality and linguistic discrimination in schools ...... 61 5.1. Nationalistic indoctrination ...... 61 5.2. Institutions against bilingualism ...... 65 6.- The demonization of dissidents in Catalonia. The case of SCC...... 72 7. Conclusions ...... 82

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1.- Introduction Democratic quality is undoubtedly a very multisided question. From the five dimensions established by Morlino (freedom, equality, legality, responsibility and legitimacy) many indicators have been created and can be created for the analysis of specific realities. However, the aim of this report is not to enter into a theoretical disquisition concerning democratic quality, but rather to reveal some irrefutable signs that in Catalonia certain very important democratic deficits are occurring at a particularly sensitive political and social time. The separatist challenge is not only tensing society, but is also eclipsing much more important social problems which are being left absolutely unattended.

As an association which brings in citizens of different sensitivities, but all firmly committed to Catalonia and to Spain as a whole, Sociedad Civil Catalana (SCC – Catalan Civil Society) aims to contribute with this document to raising the collective awareness as to the implications of the nationalist drift on our model of coexistence.

Democratic quality has been the concern of SCC since it was created on 23 April 2014, but which was clearly consolidated a year later with the publication of the manifesto “Por una auténtica democracia en Catalunya” (For true democracy in Catalonia)1, the first initiative of the Observatory of Democratic Quality of the SCC, the movement behind this report.

Although there is much other evidence of democratic shortcomings in Catalonia which are very well known for the echo they have had in the media, above all the cases of political corruption, in this first report of the mentioned Observatory, it has been chosen to deal with the questions that the SCC has had to constantly face in its first 14 months of existence. Specifically the absolutely disloyal actions of the ‘Generalitat’ Government of Catalonia and the local entities which, in open breach of legality, harm the juridical security and limit the rights of people; the instrumentalisation of the policies of communication at the service of the so-called national construction, which implies the intoxication of the public debate, and the obsessive demonization of those who fail to pull the line, which shows the great contradiction of Catalan nationalism, which is that it is incapable of respecting the diversity in its own territory.

1 http://www.cronicaglobal.com/es/downloads2/scc90.pdf

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2. The ‘Generalitat’ Government of Catalonia, an administration acting outside the law The ‘Generalitat’, according to article 2 of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, is the institutional system into which this community politically organises its self-government. It is formed by the Parliament, the Presidency of the Government of Catalonia, the Government and other institutions established by Chapter V of Title II of the Statute. As the institutional organisation of an Autonomous Community, it forms part of Spanish legal ordinance and exercises the functions attributed to it by said ordinance and particularly by the Spanish Constitution and the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. Being subject to the whole of the ordinance, the ‘Generalitat’ cannot exercise the public power that has been conferred on it outside the legal provisions, and even less so against them.

However, the ‘Generalitat’ and other Catalan institutions and public authorities have long chosen to ignore their condition as Spanish authorities and institutions and act as if the powers they exercise came from them and were not dependent on the other instances. This action supposes a deep lack of institutional loyalty and the use of public resources and authority not only for purposes not accounted for in the legal ordinance, but also intended for the destruction of the institutional framework from which their very condition as a public power is derived. This disloyalty does not only have institutional consequences, but, as we will see, means placing the citizens and particularly public officials in an inadmissible situation, permanently confronted with the need to obey orders or recommendations contrary to the legal ordinance. The result is a democratic anomaly unequalled in the countries of our surroundings.

It is more than obvious that the Government of Catalonia acts outside Spanish legality and is also aimed at breaking it down. Unfortunately we have very clear examples of this attitude. In the report that follows, we will deal with the use of the ‘Generalitat’ for the creation of a Catalan State, something which has already been started: by starting up the Consejo Asesor para la Transición Nacional (CATN - Advisory Council for the National Transition) and the so-called “State structures”; through the express will to breach the Constitution with the holding of the so-called “citizens’ participation process” on 9 November 2014, and its continuation with the so-called “plebiscitary” elections of the coming 27 September; through the usurpation of international state competencies in order to establish diplomatic contacts against the general interests of Spain, and; through

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repeated declarations by public leaders of the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence.

2.1. The Advisory Council for National Transition (Consejo Asesor para la Transición Nacional) As has been said, the ‘Generalitat’ is a Spanish institution with competencies in a wide range of areas, which has to act in coordination with other Spanish administrations in order to satisfy the interests of the citizens, and always within the framework of these competencies. These obviously do not include that of preparing the creation of a new state in the territory of Catalonia in order to extract the Catalan territory and citizens from Spanish sovereignty. However, in a manifestation of disloyalty that is difficult to measure, the ‘Generalitat’ for years has devoted public resources to the creation of the conditions that would enable the creation of this new state.

In 2013, it created the CATN by Decree 113/2013 of 12 February2. This decree indicates that the Council will depend on the Presidency Department and that its functions include advising on the creation of State structures, the exercise of the right to decide and the performance and dissemination of the process of national transition3.

The CATN is a body which expressly aims to advise on the way in which a new State could be created in the territory of Catalonia. Obviously this is objective; the creation of a new State over a part of Spanish national territory is not a function which could be understood to be attributed to an Autonomous Community and not even the most benevolent of interpretations could accommodate either said purpose or a body integrated in the administration to advise on this area in our legal ordinance.

It is not a question of seeking ways to reform the Spanish Constitution and through said reform to introduce a previously non-existent right to secession which would allow a future separation from the Spanish State, creating a Catalan State in turn, but rather a question of

2 Official Gazette of the ‘Generalitat’ de Catalunya (DOGC), 14 February 2015.

3 Regarding the adscription of the CATN, cf. article 4 of Decree 113/2013. regarding its functions, article 2 and the preamble: “Given the purpose agreed by the President of the Government of Catalonia to carry out the process of national transition and the exercise of the right to decide in the investiture debate, and also the need to fulfil the principles of dialogue and legality in developing this process, the Government believes it should receive the best possible legal and political advice in this area”.

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exploring all possible mechanisms both in accordance with Spanish reality and outside said legality, in order to achieve the de facto creation of said State. In other words, the CATN is a body intended to plan the breakaway from the Spanish State and the creation of a new state entity which would exercise the functions of a sovereign state over the territory and population of Catalonia.

The content of the CATN confirms this approach. As has been said, it is not a question of exploring the possibilities offered by Spanish law for its modification, but rather that for the CATN, Spanish legality is a further element to be considered within a whole range of elements which are used in accumulation to examine the possibilities of subverting the constitutional order. The prospective of the Spanish State being an opponent which might have to be forced to admit the creation of a new state in Catalonia is present in all of the reports drawn up by the CATN and brought together in the Llibre Blanc sobre la Transicio- Nacional de Catalunya (White Book on National Transition of Catalonia)4.

Therefore, in its first report on a consultation on the political future of Catalonia, it is said that, “While expecting that the State will oppose the holding of a consultation using the forms of internal law, it is analysed whether international and European law establish any specific legal procedure for calling the consultation, or incorporate any right or principle which might be alleged before a court of justice or which might establish some kind of active legal situation in favour of the Government of Catalonia or, finally, whether they incorporate any law or principle which allow it to be concluded that the holding of the consultation by alternative paths and the implementation of its results, including the constitution of an independent state does not constitute an international offence with the consequences that might be derived from it”5.

The report is explicit. Not only are the paths provided by Spanish ordinance for holding the mentioned consultation consulted, but also “alternative paths” are analysed and the “implementation of their results, including the constitution of an independent state” to make sure that “it is not an international illicit”. In other words, it is said that the CATN

4 http://web.gencat.cat/es/actualitat/detall/20140930_Llibre-blanc-sobre-la-Transicio-Nacional-de- Catalunya

5 Cf. pp. 10 and 11 of the referred first report of the CATN: http://presidencia.gencat.cat/web/.content/ambits_actuacio/consells_assessors/catn/informes_publicats/in f_1_castella.pdf

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does not advise within the framework of Spanish legality, but that its purpose goes further to study the consequences of the confrontation between the action of the Government of Catalonia (already outside the competencies afforded by Spanish ordinance) and the Spanish State from the perspective of international law.

In order not to insist on this point, it is sufficient to reproduce the start of caption 5.1 of the mentioned report (pp. 59-60): “In the debate on the consultation, the question is often posed of whether, if Spain prevents the use of the legal paths existing in the internal legal ordinance, in the law of the European Union and/or international law, there might be legal procedures for calling a consultation such as that majoritarily called for in Catalonia. It is also questioned whether there might be laws and principles applicable to the case and what effects they might have on the holding of the legal consultation and the implementation of its results, as well as the “alternative paths” that the Government of Catalonia could use in the case of the Spanish State blocking the legal paths. These are the two questions we will briefly analyse in this section…”.

And the final part of caption 5, which establishes the following (p. 71): “In any case, given that Catalonia has its territory, its population and its public powers, and in so far as said powers are effective and the process of separation has been performed in full respect of the internationally demanded requirements (peaceful, democratic nature, etc.) there might be good legal arguments to say that the alternative paths and their results could not be declared to be internationally illicit and that the international community might recognise said results, including independence”.

This last paragraph is particularly relevant. As we all know, for a new state to be created there must be public powers to control the territory and the population of what is intended to be the new state. The CATN assumes that the ‘Generalitat’ would be this public power, which would act in a sovereign manner and whose effective control of the territory and the population would lead to independence. It is obvious that we are therefore faced with a plan in which the ‘Generalitat’, a constitutional institution that has to act within the limits of the competencies granted by current ordinances, aims to become the sovereign authority in the territory of the new state that is to be created.

It would be amazing that Spanish public powers should openly organise the detailed plan which would lead to the illegal secession of part of the national territory and the transformation of Spanish institutions and administrations into institutions and administrations of a new state. And all of this necessarily via

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“alternative paths”, in other words outside Spanish legality. We are no longer faced with mere disloyalty, but rather the explicit aim to use the resources granted by the Spanish State to stand up to it and overcome its resistance to the secession of part of the Spanish territory and population.

This is the key in which the White Book on National Transition of Catalonia should be viewed, which, as we have said, includes the reports drawn up by the CATN. All of these draw out the form in which the Catalan institutions and administrations can become the administrations, institutions and authorities of a new state created over the territory of our Autonomous Community. In this line, the State structures are defined which are necessary for carrying out the effective control of the territory and the population (tax administration, for example, in report number 2; judicial power and justice administration in report number 14, authorities regulating competition and other administrative structures in report number 12, etc.) and the way in which the international relationships would be approached (integration of Catalonia in the EU, report number 6; relationships of cooperation with the Spanish State, report number 3, etc.).

The documents of the CATN therefore show a clear will to separate along a path of current legality, by making the Government of Catalonia a participant in the process of sedition. But unfortunately, the ‘Generalitat’ has not simply drawn up plans, but is rather moved forward in breaching the constitutional ordinance by, firstly, implementing the programme to create the State structures necessary for independence and, secondly, the express and arrogant disobedience of the obligations established by Spanish law. We will deal with these two questions in the following.

2.2. Creation of State structures The creation of a new state on part of the territory of an existing state requires the public powers of the former to assume the effective control of the territory and the population. We have just seen how the first report of the CATN already made clear this idea which poses no doubts from the perspective of international law.

It is clear that the secessionists’ plan consists of it being the Government of Catalonia and, if possible, the town halls and other local administrations, the bodies that assume the role of the administrations of the new Catalan State. However, although the competencies of

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the ‘Generalitat’ are broad, it does not have all of the necessary elements to achieve real and effective control of the territory and of the administration even for the typical functions of a sovereign state. The reports of the CATN make it clear that these shortcomings do exist and consider ways to overcome them, ways which suppose, in the last instance, that all the necessary bodies and institutions for a sovereign state and which are currently part of the Spanish State are duplicated in Catalonia so that, dependent on the ‘Generalitat’, they might be added to the administration of the new state. The creation of courts, the tax office and the country’s own security forces are necessary for the appearance of the state and the ‘Generalitat’ government has showed no shame in starting the process to create said structures.

Before going into the actions of the Government of Catalonia in this sense, we must remember that the creation of these State structures is contrary to current ordinance for two reasons. First of all because it implies the assumption by the Government of Catalonia of functions that fail to correspond to those constitutionally and statutorily assigned to it. And secondly, because beyond the limits of these competencies, the creation of said State structures forms part of a plan (“the process”) which aims to displace the Spanish State in Catalonia to constitute a new state, which in itself supposes a breach of constitutional ordinance and a fracture of the state unity expressly guaranteed by the Spanish Constitution.

There are no recent precedents in a democratic state of our legal surroundings of a similar use of the public means and resources for the destruction of the state itself. The fact that we have legally reached this point would indicate that Spanish ordinance lacks sufficient mechanisms to protect itself from misuse of public powers and, in any case, makes it obvious that the ‘Generalitat’ is acting disloyally and contrary to Spain’s general interest. No matter how benevolent and flexible the margin of interpretation of the action of the Government of Catalonia aims to be, in no way can it be considered compatible with this general interest of Spain that the Spanish institutions should be used to break up the state.

The creation of State structures in Catalonia cannot be confused with or limited to those formally presented as such. In some cases the Government of Catalonia and the political forces backing the process of succession have expressed their purpose of creating State

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structures, while there are other signs that these structures are being prepared without publicity. We will deal both with the express creation of State structures and the signs that point to the creation of certain structures of sovereign states without giving publicity to it.

2.2.1. Explicit creation of State structures A few months ago, the Law of Accompaniment of Budgets of the Government of Catalonia was intended to be used to: • create a Catalan tax agency (amendment no. 426 to the Bill of Tax Financial and Administrative Measures6), • entrust the ‘Generalitat’ Government of Catalonia with drawing up an inventory of the assets and liabilities of the Spanish public administrations present in Catalonia for the effects of their attribution in the case of a state secession (amendment 427 to the mentioned Bill), • drive the preparation of the law to protect the critical infrastructures located in Catalonia (amendment 428), • create a Catalan Social Security agency (amendment 429), • create a Catalan competition authority (amendment no. 431), and • prepare a bill on nuclear security (amendment 433).

The Council of Statutory Guarantees of Catalonia, in its decision 3/2015 of 26 February7, pronounced on these amendments and concluded that the creation of a Catalan tax agency, the preparation of an inventory of goods of the administrations present in Catalonia with a view to their division in the event of state succession, the creation of a Catalan authority on competition and the preparation of the nuclear security bill had no place in the Constitution and the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. However, it did admit the possibility of drawing up laws for the protection of the critical infrastructures of Catalonia and for creating a Catalan Social Security agency, though with a more limited content than that posed in the initially suggested amendment.

Despite this decision, the Law of Tax, Financial and Administrative Measures (Law 3/2015 of 11 March)8 includes plans for drawing up a steering plan of the tax administration of

6 Official Gazette of the Parliament of Catalonia (BOPC), 28 January 2015.

7 https://www.cge.cat/contingut.php?id_pagina=18 8 DOGC, 13 March 2015.

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Catalonia to contemplate the assumption of additional tax competencies to those already in place: “Additional Provision Twenty-Two. Steering Plan of the Tax Administration of Catalonia: The Government, within a time of five months counting from the enforcement of this law, must approve a steering plan of the Catalonia Tax Administration to be carried out within a time of twelve months. This plan must constitute the strategic planning instrument of a tax administration prepared for a possible assumption of new tax functions and competencies; it must determine the organisational adaptations, the institutional, functional and staff structure, the economic system, the system of contracting and wealth of this administration; it must bear in mind the technological solutions, the needs of the systems of information and the social collaboration and collaboration with other administrations, and it must include the proposed tax regulation of Catalonia”.

Equally, Law 3/2015 includes the commission of the Government of Catalonia to draw up an inventory of the wealth of the administrations in Catalonia (additional provision twenty- three) and also a catalogue of basic infrastructures (additional provision twenty-four). What’s more, the Catalan Social Protection Agency is created (additional provision twenty- five) and a regulation is planned for energy, telecommunications, information systems and railway transport (additional provision twenty-six).

The construction of these “State structures” also implies the creation of the post of Commissioner for National Transition, made effective by Decree of the Government of Catalonia 16/2015 of 24 February9. This Commission has the mission of “driving, coordinating and implementing the necessary measures to culminate the process of National Transition and to monitor the State structures in accordance with the directives established by the Government and under the superior direction of the head of the department”10 (art 1).

The creation of the Commissioner for National Transition, the provisions of the Law of Tax Financial and Administrative Measures we have just indicated, and other precepts of the same regulation were challenged by the Spanish government before the Constitutional Court, which admitted the appeal to proceedings via providence of 25 June 201511 with

9 DOGC, 26 February 2015.

10 The Commissioner is attached to the Presidency Department.

11 http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/salaPrensa/Documents/NP_2015_049/P%203493-2015.pdf

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respect to the precepts of the Law of Tax, Financial and Administrative Measures, and of 7 July 2015 with respect to the creation of the Commissioner for National Transition12. The admission of the appeal to proceedings implied the suspension of the application of the affected precepts, as established in art. 161.2 of the Spanish Constitution.

Despite all this, the Government of Catalonia insists in its purpose of continuing with the construction of said “State structures”, as declared by the spokesperson of the ‘Generalitat’ in La Vanguardia on 26 June 201513.

In fact, one month after the challenge of the Law of Tax, Financial and Administrative Measures of 26 July 2015 was admitted to proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the Additional Provision Twenty-Two of the mentioned law already having been suspended, the form of the Catalan tax office which independence would require was presented. This occurring when the Constitutional Court had only suspended the application of the regulation that could cover the performance of the study can only be considered a provocation, as it implies clear disobedience of the suspension. The connection between the presented document and the independence of Catalonia is made clear in the declarations of the Minister of the Economy, for whom “after these works, we will be much better prepared for what has to happen”14. The information on this tax model can be accessed from the official website of the Government of Catalonia15.

From what we have seen up to now, it seems that the ‘Generalitat’, despite the suspension decided by the Constitutional Court, is going on with its work to prepare the administrative structures that would be necessary to achieve the creation of a state in the territory of Catalonia. This is a clear attitude of

12 Official State Gazette of 10 July 2015, http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2015/07/10/pdfs/Official State Gazette-A-2015-7734.pdf. The section of article 34 of the Law of Budgets of the Government of Catalonia for 2015 (Law 2/2015 of 11 March) has also been challenged. This precept has also been suspended by the Constitutional Court by Providence of 25 June 2015: http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/salaPrensa/Documents/NP_2015_048/P%203492-2015.pdf

13 http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20150626/54433060027/govern-advierte-seguira-trabajando- estructuras-estado.html

14 http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2015/07/27/catalunya/1437996136_608026.html

15 http://www.govern.cat/pres_gov/AppJava/govern/monografics/287051/model-dadministracio- tributaria-catalunya-cooperacio-confianca.html

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disobedience of current ordinances to which we will return immediately and which shows that the Government of Catalonia, as we said before, refuses to act as a Spanish administration and aims to be configured as a protoadministration of the new state. The creation of what has been called “State structures” supposes an instrumentalisation of the public powers and their diversion towards purposes not only not provided in the ordinances, but contrary to them. The disobedience of the mandates of the Constitutional Court, explicit though it may be, expresses this rupture and, as we will see, places the citizens and the officials in a disjuncture that is inadmissible in Rule of Law.

2.2.2. Creation of State structures without publicity However, it is inconceivable that all of the actions necessary to build the State structures can be made openly, in fact there are signs that public means and resources are being used to build the elements of this state which, at a certain time, would dispute the Spanish State’s control of the Catalan territory and population.

For their nature in themselves, these actions are not public, but some of the preparations for this construction of state institutions has transcended. In December 2013 a document was disclosed concerning the creation of a National Catalan Security Agency16. The news was published by different media17 following a report made in the Parliament of Catalonia by the leader of the political party Ciudadanos, Albert Rivera. It is also well known that the autonomic police are prepared for functions not currently lying within their competencies18.

Special treatment should be given to the action of the Government of Catalonia in international relations. In this case, public actions are mixed with others carried out with more discretion. In any case, given the specific importance of this foreign action due to the nature of the intended purpose (the creation of a state), we will devote a special section of this chapter to this question.

16 http://estatico.vozpopuli.com/upload/Esther_Arroyo/informe-govern-agencia-catalana-espionatge.pdf

17 http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2013/12/05/529fb5c10ab7403f588b4575.html, http://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2013-11-22/mas-destina-306-agentes-y-28-millones-a-su-agencia- nacional-de-seguridad-catalana_57528/, http://vozpopuli.com/actualidad/35496-ciutadans-acusa-a-artur- mas-de-estar-preparando-un-cni-catalan

18 http://www.cronicaglobal.com/es/notices/2015/05/mas-ya-prepara-a-los-mossos-d-esquadra-para-una- hipotetica-secesion-de-cataluna-20533.php

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2.3. Government of Catalonia and “alternative paths” for the consultation

2.3.1. 9-N: From fraud to disobedience The reports of the CATN had advanced that if the Spanish State failed to allow a consultation to be made of the political future of Catalonia, alternative paths could be explored; in other words, paths outside of Spanish legality but which could be internationally recognised. The process which concluded in the 9-N consultation is one of these alternative paths. As the possibility of a legal consultation had been truncated by the suspension ordered by the Constitutional Court, the ‘Generalitat’ replaced this consultation with a “process of citizen participation”; when this process was also suspended, they went ahead with it, but without legal coverage. This is a consultation that would correspond to that provided in point 8.1 of the first CATN report and which would be organised by the Government of Catalonia, but without legal coverage. It must be stressed that the CATN itself forecast that the consultation would be a “head-on confrontation with the State” and advised against it, but it is now known that despite this, it was the path finally used by the Government of Catalonia.

It must be remembered, though briefly, what is the origin of the 9-N consultation. The President of the Government of Catalonia and several political forces (CiU, ERC, ICV- EUiA and CUP) had reached an agreement on holding a consultation regarding Catalonia’s self-determination19. In other words, a consultation in which the citizens would be asked whether they wanted Catalonia to become an independent state. It is true that a consultation with this content could be understood as contrary to the Spanish Constitution in its current version, but beyond this it became necessary to express the procedure for its performance. There were therefore different alternatives (set out in report number 1 of the CATN), but none satisfied the promoters of the consultation because it implied having the authorisation of the Spanish government or the Congress of Deputies. Therefore, not even the Catalan law on popular consultations by referendum (Law 4/2010) would be useful as a referendum required State authorisation (articles 13 and 43.1). So in order to be able to make the consultation without said authorisation, a non referendary law of consultations (Law 10/201420) was drawn up to give it legal coverage.

19 http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/politica/acuerdo-pregunta-fecha-consulta-catalunya-2919229 As can be seen in the video, the announcement of the agreement for the consultation was made at the headquarters of the Government of Catalonia and using a lectern with its symbol.

20 DOGC, 27 September 2014.

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Law 10/2014 regulates consultations which are not referendums, consultations which, as established in the regulation itself, did not require the authorisation of the Spanish government to be called. In this way the President of the Government of Catalonia could convene the consultation without the authorisation of the Spanish government. The problem the mentioned law faces is that what is called a non referendary consultation, is in fact a referendum, as it has been interpreted by the Constitutional Court. In short, the intention of Law 10/2014 is that for a consultation not to be a referendum, it is sufficient not to call it so, whereas the constitutional doctrine understands that a referendum, regardless of its aim, is any consultation directed at the whole of the electoral census for them to exercise the public right to participate in public matters in relation to a political question21. Starting with this interpretation, few doubts can remain that a consultation on the independence of Catalonia aimed at all Catalan citizens has to be qualified as a referendum and that the consultations provided in Law 10/2014 would fall into this category, which would mean that the law itself was unconstitutional. For all of this, it was foreseeable that the Constitutional Court would not back the precepts of Law 10/2014 which gave cover to a consultation like that intended by certain sovereigntist forces. The declaration of unconstitutionality was made in Constitutional Court Sentence 31/2015 of 25 February22. Equally foreseeable was that the convention of a consultation on the secession of Catalonia made on the basis of the mentioned regulation would also be declared unconstitutional, as was in fact the case (Constitutional Court Sentence 32/2015 of 25 February)23.

Any impartial observer could foresee that things would happen as they did because the unconstitutionality of Law 10/2014 and of the consultation was very obvious. It is only necessary to read the particular votes of the Decision of the Council of Statutory Guarantees of Catalonia24 to see the solidity of the arguments against the compatibility with the Constitution of the Law of non referendary consultations and the consultation itself.

21 Cf. Legal Base 2 of the Constitutional Court Sentence (Plenum) 103/2008 of 11 September: http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/fr/jurisprudencia/Pages/Sentencia.aspx?cod=15782

22 http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/HJ/es/Resolucion/Show/24331

23 http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/HJ/es/Resolucion/Show/24332

24 Decision 19/2014 of 19 August: https://www.cge.cat/admin/uploads/docs/20140926140031-1.pdf

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The preparation of this law of consultations and of the intention, under the said law, of making a consultation on the secession of Catalonia suppose a fraud and institutional disloyalty which can hardly be qualified, as the actors were playing with a clearly unconstitutional action by taking advantage of the times required for the Constitutional Court to resolve. The plan was therefore disloyal and no effort was made to conceal it, for in an extraordinary action, the President of the ‘Generalitat’ himself admitted that the true adversary was the Spanish State25 and that it had to be deceived26.

The fraud, however, failed to avoid the Spanish government challenging both Law 10/2014 and the decree to call the consultation, and the fact that the Constitutional Court proceeded to suspend it by providence on 29 September 201427.

Despite this suspension, the Government of Catalonia maintained the institutional information on the consultation for several days more, flagrantly failing to observe the suspension of the Constitutional Court. Instead of loyally obeying the suspension and putting an end to the consultation process, the ‘Generalitat’ maintained it with the argument that “the suspension could be lifted”. When it was finally necessary to admit that the lifting would not happen, the tactic consisted of replacing the consultation with a process of citizens’ participation on the same date and with the same formula as the consultation.

Obviously the merely formal substitution of a consultation with a process of citizens’ participation did not vary the intended substance, so this mere name change was further disloyalty towards the normal operation of our democratic system, as it disobeyed what had been ordered by the Constitutional Court and caused a new institutional confrontation with the State.

25http://www.lasexta.com/noticias/nacional/artur-mas-adversario-real-estado-espanol- olvidemos_2014101400096.html

26 http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/politica/mas-tenemos-enganar-estado-3633906

27 http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/salaPrensa/Documents/NP_2014_074/P%205829-2014.pdf and http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/salaPrensa/Documents/NP_2014_074/P%205830-2014.pdf

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The process of citizens’ participation was also challenged before the Constitutional Court, which suspended it by providence on 4 November 201428.

This suspension should have been final, and a loyal and legal attitude on the part of the Government of Catalonia should have led to the suspension of the consultation, now called the process of citizens’ participation, but this was not the case. The Government of Catalonia continue to organise the consultation, maintained the institutional website and performed the necessary actions for it to be held (polling stations, for which it basically used schools, computer support, press hall, etc.). There are no doubts as to the ‘Generalitat’’s organisation of the consultation or to its responsibilities, as the will to disobey the order of the Constitutional Court was made obvious29.

The public authorities are subject to law and the action of the Administration is controlled by the courts; these are the basic principles of a democratic state and therefore any administration’s action outside the law would be an essential breach of democracy. This is what happened in Catalonia with the celebration of the consultation on 9 November. Once over the phase of institutional disloyalty, specified in the search for a subterfuge to avoid the necessary state authorisation to hold a consultation on the political future of Catalonia, and when said consultation has been suspended by the Constitutional Court, its maintenance or transformation into a process of citizens’ participation are now extremely serious acts of explicit disobedience.

This breach of democracy is not simply formal or institutional in nature either. The fact that the Government of Catalonia should act against what was ordered by the Constitutional Court placed the general citizens and the public officers in particular in a situation which is inadmissible in a democratic state, which is that of choosing between the imperatives derived from different public powers. This situation was difficult for a lot of Catalans in the weeks leading up to the 9-N. This is the case of the schools and head teachers who were asked for their “collaboration” in holding the consultation, as they were asked to give up the keys to the centres under their responsibility. Something else that stands out is the case of the radio stations which refused

28 http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/salaPrensa/Documents/NP_2014_083/P%206540-2014.pdf

29 “If the Public Prosecutor wants to know who is responsible for opening the schools, I am responsible”, declared Artur Mas on 9 November: http://www.antena3.com/noticias/espana/artur-mas-fiscalia-quiere- saber-quien-responsable-abrir-colegios-soy_2014110900029.html.

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to insert the institutional messages of the Government of Catalonia and are still subject to sanctions from the Audio-visual Board of Catalonia, as will be explained in chapter 4.

As it is known, the so-called citizens’ participation process was held without democratic guarantees outside the electoral regulations and substituting the independent control required on all calls to the polls by the custody exercised by volunteers. According to the Government of Catalonia and without it being possible to check the figures provided, 2,305,290 citizens took part in the citizens’ participation process30, which would suppose some 37.032% of those called to vote31. Of these 2,305,290 people, 1,861,753 would have voted in favour of the creation of an independent Catalan State32. In other words, 29.89% of all of those who could take part in the consultation.

The result is obviously insufficient to justify a largely majority will of the Catalans in favour of independence. If the participation had been massive, we do not know what would have happened, but without this majority backing of the process, the President of the Government of Catalonia decided to attempt this alternative consultation by another path in an attempt to maximise the insufficient number of independentists revealed by the 9-N. The result of this attempt to maximise the independentist vote is the call to autonomic elections on 27 September 2015.

2.3.2. 27-S: Autonomic elections to unilaterally declare independence The first report of the CATN, included in the White Book on National Transition, already presented the plebiscitary elections as an “alternative path” for the performance of a consultation of self-determination in Catalonia (p. 135 and following). For the CATN, these elections are a suitable way to find the position of the citizens of Catalonia with regard to independence: “In fact, if it is incontrovertibly seen that it is impossible to perform a referendum or consultation on the independence of Catalonia by the legal means above as a consequence of the reiterated positioning of the state institutions, the alternative path of plebiscitary elections would be most suitable to know the position of the citizens of Catalonia on their collective

30 http://web.gencat.cat/es/actualitat/detall/20141110_participacio-resultats-00002

31 http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/11/09/actualidad/1415542400_466311.html

32 http://web.gencat.cat/es/actualitat/detall/20141110_participacio-resultats-00002

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political future. To this effect, arguments of legality, effectiveness and respect for the democratic order can be invoked”.

So-called plebiscitary elections are called like ordinary elections to the Parliament of Catalonia, but take on a different meaning in the process of secession, as they would be used to try to legitimate a unilateral declaration of independence. Plebiscitary elections therefore have to be seen in relation to a hypothetical unilateral declaration of independence with which we will deal in the next section. Now we will focus on the sense of the plebiscitary elections and the way this concept affects those called for 27 September.

President Mas, immediately after calling the elections to the Parliament of Catalonia, already pointed to the dual perspective of the ballots on the 27th. He said that formally they were autonomic elections, but that they were really based on something else33. He insisted on this idea in his appearance before the Permanent Commission of the Parliament of Catalonia on 2 September34. This “base”, which according to the caller would be different, is that it with which we must be concerned from a legal and democratic perspective.

What Artur Mas is pointing to is the fact that the elections will not only be considered from the Spanish legal perspective, but also from the point of view of building a Catalan State. We have shown how, up to now, the Government of Catalonia and other Catalan administrations had for years acted as if they were not Spanish administrations, but rather the protoadministration of a new State. Their constantly exceeding the scope of their competencies, their direct disobedience of the Spanish laws and the mandate of its courts and the repeated declarations of their will to continue to disobey implies that they are trying to operate as institutions of the new state they intend to create in Catalonia. Within the framework of this secessionist purpose, the autonomic elections of 27 September are presented as a plebiscite on independence and consequences are even assigned to their results which have nothing to do with Spanish legality. It is in this key that the declarations that a majority of independentist deputies would mean the victory of the yes to independence has to be understood35.

33 http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2015/08/03/55bfa6f722601d79268b45a1.html

34http://www.parlament.cat/web/actualitat/canal- parlament/sequencia/videos?p_cp1=7583259&p_cp3=7583380

35 http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2015/08/04/catalunya/1438683546_309224.html

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Obviously, from Spanish legality, the elections have nothing to do with the independence of Catalonia and no result would enable them to start the secession or proclaim independence. These effects of the autonomic elections are in no way derived from Spanish legality, but are done so from the intentions of those who seek secession and who, as we said, for years have been trying to make the Catalan administration’s work not as Spanish institutions, but rather as the public powers of a new State in stato nascendi. It is therefore coherent with their general action, but at the same time extraordinarily concerning that the maximum authority of the State in Catalonia should present the elections of 27 September not as what they are from the perspective of Spanish ordinance, but what they are intended to be by those who seek the destruction of our model of coexistence.

It is inadmissible that a public authority, and also one calling the elections of 27 September should reveal that his position with respect to the said election is not that which corresponds to Spanish legality, but that which adjusts to the secessionist plans which, prefigured by the documents drawn up by the CATN, suppose that a consultation with the result that might be considered sufficient by the secessionists, it being the secessionists themselves who determine what has to be understood by a sufficient result36, would lead to the declaration of independence of Catalonia. This is once more a very serious sign of institutional disloyalty.

Given that the secessionist plans, at least in their general lines, are public as they appear in the “roadmap” signed by Convergencia Democrática de Catalunya (CDC), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)-Reagrupament, Asamblea Nacional de Catalunya (ANC), Òmnium Cultural and the Asociación de Municipios por la Independencia (AMI)37, we can see the role the autonomic elections called for 27 September play in them. According to this document, the elections would have a plebiscitary nature on the independence of

36 As is known, in secessionism not everyone has the same idea for identifying what would be a sufficient result to achieve its purposes. For some, the independentist lists (and it would remain to be known what is understood by independentist lists) must achieve an absolute majority of deputies in the Parliament, as seen in the declarations of Artur Mas which have just been cited. Others sustain that it is necessary to gain more than 50% of the vote in favour of the independentist lists (http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20150804/54434739879/cup-imparable-independencia-mas-55- votos-27s.html). In any case these figures are “self-referential” or figures which the secessionists conceive of their own will and not derived from any regulation. This self-referential nature is coherent with the aim of considering unilateral secession (unilateral declaration of independence), as will be seen later.

37 http://www.ara.cat/politica/FULL-RUTA-ERC-CDC-OMNIUM-ANC-AMI_0_1330067191.html

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Catalonia. The elections would be followed by the preparation of a constitutional text within a time of 10 months. The necessary structures would be started up for the new state and the necessary acts of sovereignty would be carried out for the construction of the new country (“Exercise of the acts of sovereignty to build the new country”). The elections would be followed by an initial sovereigntist declaration and the start of a process to proclaim a new state.

It is explicit that the aim is to create a new state by taking the territory and population of Catalonia away from Spanish sovereignty. It is assumed that acts of sovereignty must be made and that it is a process which is not conditioned by the authorisation of the Spanish State (“The process of democratic transition will in no case be subject to the legal currency or eventual challenges of this declaration”). We are faced by a typical case in international law in which certain people or groups intend to create a public power to gain control of a certain territory in order to create a new state in it. It is not our aim here to go further into the analysis of the criminal consequences which, according to our Law, the performance or even the preparation of this plan might have. It is our intention, however, to insist on the democratic fraud which supposes that the President of the Government of Catalonia, his government and other Catalan administrations boast their participation in such a plan. The citizens do not have to be subject to a public power which expressly waives its constitutional functions to become involved in a Coup that aims to create a new order not subject to Law and which deprives the population under its administration of full custody of the current legal ordinance. It is, as we have said, a situation that is not compatible with the minimal conditions required by the Rule of Law. Artur Mas’s reiterated statements in the sense of giving the 27-S a plebiscitary nature confirmed that he is no longer acting as a Spanish authority, but rather in a clearly challenging way within the framework that the Catalan State that the secessionists intend to create would give him.

The abnormality of the convention of the 27-S from the perspective of Spanish legality and its plebiscitary nature according to the separatist plan are also present in the announcement of the elections and the paraphernalia that surrounded the announcement itself.

The elections were called on 4 August 2015 by publication of the corresponding decree in the Official Gazette of the Government of Catalonia, signed by the President of the

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‘Generalitat’, Artur Mas, on the day before in an institutional act to which historical importance was to be given and which was transmitted live by the autonomic public television (TV3). These elections were brought forward, as the final date for the 10th legislature is 25 December 2016.

Surprisingly, the announcement of the call to elections was made by the President of the Government of Catalonia himself on 14 January 2015 in a press conference after a meeting at the Palau de la Generalitat with Oriol Junqueras, the leader of ERC; Carme Forcadell, then president of the ANC; Josep Maria Vila d'Abadal, then president of the AMI; and Muriel Casals, who at the time was at the forefront of Òmnium Cultural. The participants at the meeting, as members of these political groups and associations, are now running for the elections with the candidature Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes).

The announcement of the candidature was made in another official building, the Catalonia National History Museum, on 20 July 2015. The document of the candidature defends the plebiscitary nature of these elections called to start a process towards independence of Catalonia38. This institutional and partidist mixture is improper of the Rule of Law. It is not admissible that the President of the Government of Catalonia, as such, should call elections with the members of one of the lists which would go in for them. This is party use of the institutions that represent us all and would be an offence not only from an institutional perspective, but also for the citizens who legitimately disagree with the takeover approach of Junts pel Sí.

This continuous use of the public institutions in favour of the independence of Catalonia has led Sociedad Civil Catalana to present a new request to the Central Electoral Board and the Autonomic Electoral Board, asking them to ensure the neutrality of the institutions and to have withdrawn once more all independentist flags, symbols and banners from the official buildings and public spaces. We will say more about this in the chapter that follows.

2.4. Instrumentalisation of the international relations The secession only makes sense from the perspective of International Law. What the secessionists intend is to create a new state, a new sovereign subject, separating from the Spanish State and with capacity to act in International Society. This is why the international

38 https://juntspelsi.cat/qui_som?locale=ca

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perspective is key throughout the process. For a state to appear, the conditions have to be met that are established by international law, which are the effective control of the territory and the population by the public authority proclaiming the session. As we have seen, the first report of the CATN already made this consideration clear, and in relation to it the creation of the state structures makes full sense.

International law is also relevant for the process from another perspective: from the outset the secessionists have sought to make the international community pressurise Spain to admit the holding of a referendum on secession. Since 2012 there have been initiatives aimed at achieving what was called the “internationalisation of the conflict”, which was also covered in report number 4 of the CATN.

In this report, amongst other things it is advised “to involve the European Union in the Catalan process once it is definitively started up” (p. 36). It is also suggested that the Government of Catalonia should deploy “an executive plan to explain the process of Catalonia, to overcome negative positions and, if feasible, to create friends or allies” (p. 38). For the CATN this would imply “institutionally strengthening the strategy of internationalisation, given that the foreign action in this phase of the process will become a priority area of the governmental action” and “developing standard diplomacy between the Government of Catalonia and the representatives of other states and international organisations” (p. 38).

Finally, we must bear in mind that the separatists consider that the independence of Catalonia should not suppose either that the Catalan territory should stop being a territory of the European Union or that the Catalan citizens should lose their condition as citizens of the EU. As it is known, the community authorities have made it clear that the hypothetical independence of Catalonia would imply that the new state would not be a member state of the EU and would have to apply to join39. This has not prevented secessionist propaganda from continuing to argue over said continuity in the EU and contacts being maintained with authorities of the Union by politicians from secessionist parties and members of the Government of Catalonia. In any case, we are not going to go further into this.

39 Cf. The Declaration of the President of the Council of 12 December 2013: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140072.pdf

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We will now and first of all deal with the way that the Government of Catalonia has aimed to act in the international arena, exceeding the competencies attributed by the Constitution and the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. And secondly, we will examine the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence from the perspective of international law, and the way this will affect the Catalan citizens. All of this is intended to show how the simple threat of a unilateral declaration of independence supposes a breach of the rights of the Catalan citizens and all Spanish citizens.

2.4.1. Assumption of state competencies and action against the general interest As has been indicated, the CATN already said in its fourth report that it was convenient that the Government of Catalonia should develop a foreign action to try to convince the international players of their own approach on the secessionist process and seek possible allies for its purpose. Given that the purpose of the secessionists, as said in other sections, is confrontation with the Spanish State, what are sought abroad are allies that might be useful in the job of forcing the Spanish State to authorise the holding of a referendum on self-determination and, eventually, the independence of Catalonia.

This intention comes up against two obstacles: on the one hand, the Government of Catalonia lacks competence in international relations, as this corresponds entirely to the State (article 149.1.3ª of the Spanish Constitution). Certainly the autonomous communities have competence with regard to foreign action, but it is clear that this does not include negotiation on borders, but depends on the competencies assumed by each community and is intended to enhance their operation. On the other hand, now independently of the question of competencies, it is clear that an autonomous community cannot act to harm the general interests of the State, and the achievement of the secession of a part of the national territory cannot be considered even in the most flexible of interpretations, as compatible with this general interest.

Neither of the obstacles has been an impediment on the Government of Catalonia using the means available to it to try to be admitted as an international player and to achieve allies abroad for its secessionist aim; several lines of action have been developed in this sense.

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Firstly, the offices of the Government of Catalonia abroad have been used to disseminate the secessionist approach and the need to support the so-called “right to decide”40. Furthermore, collaboration has also been received from DIPLOCAT, a consortium of several administrations (including the Government of Catalonia) and private entities aiming to justify the legitimacy of the “right to decide” before international public opinion. The DIPLOCAT website (http://www.diplocat.cat/es/es)41, and the activities it organises have this aim in mind, an aim which fails to correspond to the competencies attributed to the Government of Catalonia or any of the Spanish administrations, and which therefore implies the use of public resources for an inadequate aim and which moreover, in this specific case, supposes the will to breach the constitutional ordinance42. This supposes party use of the public institutions, but is less serious than the attempt by the Government of Catalonia to become a spokesperson in the international arena. It is clear that achieving this condition would be a step forward in the recognition of the creation of a new sovereign subject in the territory of Catalonia, and it is not surprising that it is a priority objective for the separatists, who have worked on it through the preparation of legal and factual regulations. We will deal with both dimensions below.

40 To give an example, the Government of Catalonia has declared that the Office of the Government of Catalonia in Rome is intended to open “a channel of direct communication without intermediaries in relation to the Catalan political process before the Italian government”: http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2015/06/16/558068cfe2704e67288b458b.html

41 In the weeks leading up to the 9-N, and even after the suspension of the consultation by the constitutional Court, the “Catalonia Votes” website owned by DIPLOCAT (http://www.diplocat.cat/en/activities/725- cataloniavotes-web-receives-150-000-visits-in-1st-year) maintained a counter which counted down the seconds remaining for the consultation:

42 The interview given by Albert Royo, the Secretary-General of DIPLOCAT to the French medium L’Indépendant (http://www.lindependant.fr/2015/08/21/catalogne-une-situation-tres-differente-entre-nord- et-sud,2074077.php) is significant, in which he recognises that although his mission is not “formally” that of a diplomat, his work is in favour of the Catalan citizens’ right to self-determination.

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With respect to the legal instruments drawn up to cover this international action of the Government of Catalonia, the Law of foreign action (Law 16/2014 of 4 December on foreign action and relations with the European Union)43 must be highlighted. This law, despite having a preamble that invokes constitutional doctrine that distinguishes between foreign relations (the exclusive competence of the state) and the foreign action which may be performed by the autonomous communities within the framework of their competencies, defines Catalonia as an “international player” (art. 1.1.b) and identifies the areas in which the “Catalan diplomacy” operates, while planning relationships between the ‘Generalitat’ and governments of other territories (art. 26) and international organisations (art. 27).

Several articles of this law were challenged before the Constitutional Court, which admitted the appeal and proceeded to suspend by providence of 14 April 201544. It later lifted the suspension in relation to some of the challenged articles (Ruling of 7 July 2015)45 although it maintained it with regard to the precepts defining the different dimensions of Catalan diplomacy or the qualification of Catalonia as an active international player.

This suspension has not prevented the Strategic plan of foreign action and relations with the European Union for 2015-201846 from being drawn up and published. This strategic plan (p. 20) poses the objective of the independence and continuity of Catalonia as a new state in the EU (“Our national transition towards our own state necessarily involves continuing to be part of Europe, and the first step in achieving this is to fulfil, as a country, all of the obligations which the European Union establishes for its member states”), taking for granted the sovereign nature of Catalonia (“We want to contribute to strengthening Europe and we are prepared to give up part of our sovereignty for the construction of a politically and economically stronger Europe, a Europe that is transformed into a true federal area”). The plan also takes for granted that Catalonia is a subject with capacity to develop international relations (“Catalonia must have sectorial and geographic strategic varieties in which to develop its international relations”).

43 DOGC, of 11 December 2014.

44 http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/salaPrensa/Documents/NP_2015_029/P%201442-2015.pdf

45 Boletín Oficial del State (Official State Gazette) of 16 July 2015.

46 http://www.cronicaglobal.com/es/downloads2/pla-estrategic-accio-exterior-2015.pdf

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In short, we are faced with a strategic plan which exceeds the limits of the competence of the autonomous communities and which is more typical of a sovereign state than of a sub state entity. It is therefore coherent with the pretension of the Government of Catalonia to act not as a Spanish administration, but rather as a sovereign entity disconnected from Spanish Ordinance. In other words, it brings forward what the situation would be after an effective secession of Catalonia. The fact that the plans are made public and disseminated is also in the line of other actions that we have considered (the preparation of the form of Catalan tax office, for example) and which are framed within the construction of the State structures that would lead to independence. Once more we are faced with the action of a public administration that diverts the means available to it as a consequence of its integration in the Spanish State for purposes beyond its competencies and which seek confrontation with the same state from which its powers are derived. In short, a perversion of public power that limits the rights of the citizens and creates legal insecurity.

If the above is worrying, it is yet more worrying that in fact and without any legal coverage, acting once more beyond the framework of its competencies, the Government of Catalonia has been in contact with foreign governments in order to achieve their support for the secession. Obviously, it is to be supposed that these contacts have been discreet in most cases, but one has transcended which is particularly serious. In December 2013, Artur Mas sent a letter to several European leaders to ask them for support in achieving an agreement with the State government to hold a referendum on self-determination47. The letter concluded by saying: “I am confident that I can rely on you to encourage the peaceful, democratic, transparent, and European process to which I and a vast majority of the Catalan people are fully committed”.

It is clear that this letter, which was sent with the stamp of the Presidency of the Government of Catalonia, is not only beyond the framework of competencies of the ‘Generalitat’, but is also intended to make the heads of foreign governments pressurise the Spanish State on Spanish internal matters. It would be hard to find an example of a more disloyal attitude from an institutional perspective. The use of the means provided to the Government of Catalonia to work against the interest of the State by involving foreign states is an action that cannot be qualified, but at the same

47 http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20140102/54398729947/mas-carta-27-lideres-europeos.html. The text of the letter can be consulted here: http://file02.lavanguardia.com/2014/01/02/54398730227-url.pdf

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time is coherent with Artur Mas’s approach. In the letter he no longer presents himself as the president of an autonomous community as part of Spanish ordinance, but rather as the leader of a people aspiring to become a sovereign subject. Once more we are faced with the appropriation of constitutional institutions to use them at the service of the separatist plan, in this case in such a particularly delicate area as the international arena.

The intromission in Spain’s international relations, also calling on foreign powers to support the secessionist process started in Catalonia is a reflection of having completely lost the awareness of the role that the autonomous communities play in our institutional organisation. This permanent confusion between the authority which has been conferred on the president of the Catalan government and the role he assumes is an institutional distortion of significant consequences projected on the lives of the Catalan citizens, who instead of having an administration that develops the competencies attributed to it, diverts resources and efforts towards a seditious purpose that seeks the separation of Catalonia from the rest of Spain. It is an illegal, illegitimate and profoundly disloyal action.

In short, we face a situation in which the government of the autonomous community, forgetting its constitutional function, aims to become an international actor by building a true diplomacy, claiming its condition as an international spokesperson48 and also trying to make other states support the secessionist project to which it devotes the means and authority that have been conferred on it by the Spanish Constitution Ordinance. It is a profoundly disloyal action that deprives the citizens of one of the administrations that should be at their service and replaces it with a protoadministration of a state that hopes to be born outside the internal law and only by fact.

2.4.2. Unilateral declaration of independence, legal security and citizenship

2.4.2.1. Without legal security For years there has been a constant threat of a unilateral declaration of independence. If we go through the newspaper and publications libraries, it will not be difficult to find references to the many times when the leaders of the separatist parties or the Government

48 In this sense, it cannot be ignored that the pretension of the offices of the Government of Catalonia abroad is that they should be viewed as true diplomatic representations, using the terms and expressions typical of state representations. Cf. https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CLKhcX6WgAAb2b0.jpg:large

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of Catalonia itself have mentioned the possibility of proclaiming the independence of Catalonia.

Too often it is assumed that the mere declaration of independence would imply the effective independence of the territory which now constitutes the autonomous community of Catalonia. This is not true. As has already been said, the unilateral declaration of independence implies that a person or group of people express their will to be constituted in authority to control a certain territory and population, and thereby claimed their condition as a sovereign subject and therefore of an independent state.

In the case of Catalonia and as we have seen up to now, the intention is that the ‘Generalitat’ and all of its organisation and structures, should stop being a Spanish administration to become this public authority which would sovereignly control the territory of the population of Catalonia, thereby displacing the presence of the State administration wherever necessary.

It is clear that the unilateral declaration of independence by definition does not adjust to the provisions of the Rule of Law with respect to which the secession occurs, nor is this intended, because the unilateral declaration of independence supposes a break with previous legality. This idea is very clearly present in the secessionist roadmap which we have dealt with and which reminds us that the process of the creation of a Catalan State is not subject to its challenge from a legal perspective, in other words, from the perspective of Spanish ordinance.

The unilateral declaration of independence therefore supposes a definitive breakdown of the current law by those who proclaim it, as from this time on they will only work through fact, outside legality. In this sense it is good to remember that although a declaration of unilateral declaration of independence is not contrary to international law, the state does not emerge until the territory and population are effectively controlled, and this control, when it is not consented by the state from which the separation is intended, is not a right which is derived from the unilateral declaration of independence. In other words, after the unilateral declaration of independence, it is legal and legitimate that the state which sees its territorial integrity threatened

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should take all necessary measures to preserve it, whereas those intending the secession would take all measures they deem suitable to achieve the intended control. Only if they achieve this control would the new state be created.

The unilateral declaration of independence therefore opens up a scenario in which both the rebel authorities and the Spanish would battle for the control of the territory and the loyalty of the population. Within the framework of the 9-N, as we already explained, we were witness to an advance of this situation when the public officers and private radio stations had to choose between complying with the suspension of the consultation ordered by the Constitutional Court or observing the instructions they received from the Government of Catalonia. A unilateral declaration of independence would produce this situation of conflict for the citizens and authorities.

It is therefore clear that the mere threat of a unilateral declaration of independence supposes the creation of a situation of tension which restricts the freedom of individuals and deprives them of one of the values that has to be given by the Rule of Law, which is legal security, which disappears when one public power threatens to openly confront current legality.

2.4.2.2. Loss of rights As has just been explained, the possibility that the Government of Catalonia or the Parliament of Catalonia should unilaterally declare independence supposes, on the one side, that the ‘Generalitat’ would have definitively stopped acting as an administration subject to law, and, on the other, a confrontation would be produced over the territory of Catalonia and in relation to the Catalan systems, between two counterpoised legalities. Therefore the constant consideration of said possibility in itself supposes a limitation on the freedoms of the citizens, who can see their present action conditioned by the consequences which their activity or opinions might have in a hypothetical independent Catalonia.

In this respect, is necessary to remember that the public figures ascribed to independentism, including some with responsibilities attributed by the public powers, have expressed their opinion that in a future independent Catalonia, those

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who have not supported the process of secession would be considered traitors, or ask for the attitude of individuals during the process to be taken into account49. The fact that the public authorities ascribe to a planned coup which would inevitably have consequences with respect to the citizens is inadmissible from a democratic perspective.

If the process should achieve the secession of Catalonia, the Catalan citizens would see their legal status changed and their rights and freedoms reduced. They would therefore lose their condition as Spanish citizens and, if they could maintain said nationality, would be foreigners in their place of residence, as the possibility of holding onto Spanish nationality while having Catalan nationality corresponds neither to the logic of the right to nationality nor is coherent with the experience in secession processes that have existed up to now50.

The loss of Spanish nationality would also suppose the loss of European citizenship, which is dependent on the nationality of one of the member states of the EU. This would logically imply the loss of rights of circulation, settlement and the other advantages linked to the fact of being a citizen of the EU, such as the exemption from the need to have a visa to travel to a large number of countries. In this sense, it must be remembered that as Catalonia would not be a member state of the EU, the secession would mean that the borders of the new state with Spain and France would be exterior borders of the EU and therefore the system for crossing the border would be that of any border with another country, as established in the Schengen Border Code51. Catalonia and the Catalans would also be applied the remaining regulations on the right of entry and residence in the EU of nationals from other states52.

49 Joel Joan, the actor and president of the Catalan Cinema Academy maintained that when the omelette was turned, those who were not independentist would be traitors (http://www.eldiario.es/politica/PSC-denuncia- declaraciones-alientan-Cataluna_0_57044764.html) and Toni Soler, journalist and television and radio producer, in addition to novelist and commission of the holding of the Tercentenary of 1714, maintained in a newspaper that at the end of the process, the opportunists would be treated as they deserve (http://www.ara.cat/premium/tema_del_dia/foto_0_1186681389.html).

50 Cf. With respect to the article by Javier Soria “Secession, Catalan nationality and double nationality, another myth?”, in the blog Puerta de Brandemburgo: http://www.puertadebrandemburgo.com/search/label/doble%20nacionalidad

51 Regulation (CE) 562/2006 of the European Parliament and Council of 15 March 2006, establishing a community code of rules for people crossing borders.

52http://eur-lex.europa.eu/search.html?CC_1_CODED=19&name=browse-by:consleg-in- force&CC_2_CODED=1910&displayProfile=lastConsDocProfile&qid=1440146711885&CC_3_CODED= 191040&type=named

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It is clear that the secessionist movement supposes a restriction of the rights of the Catalan citizens which, as we have seen, lacks a legal base and is based only on the will of certain political players who have placed the institutions, which belong to everyone, at the service of the project, and which furthermore act without the party driving the project, the present CDC, explaining its separatist will in the programme with which it ran for the last autonomic elections.

3. The Local Administration at the service of separatism The systematic breach of the law also hangs over the actions of the Catalan local administrations in which, just as we have seen in the autonomic government, we are surprised by their alarming lack of neutrality and their constant search to go beyond the scope of their competencies.

This explains that the actions of many municipal councils are seriously affecting the rights and freedoms of the citizens, for example, by promoting or tolerating the cornering of those not agreeing through an inadmissible symbolic invasion of the public spaces by the separatists.

To justify the title of this section, we will now analyse the worrying role being played by the Association of Municipalities for Independence (Asociación de Municipios por la Independencia - AMI) and the policy of flags that is being deployed in no few town halls, which consists of replacing the Spanish flag with the so-called “estelada” Catalan flag of independence, which represents the feeling of only part of the citizens and, above all, cannot be linked to any known legal order.

3.1. The Association of Municipalities for Independence The AMI is a private association created on 14 December 2012, whose basic founding purpose proclaimed in the display of reasons in its bylaws (and corroborated, as we will see, by the actions undertaken since its constitution), is that of promoting and participating in “everything which might be useful in taking the people of Catalonia to independence”53.

53 http://www.municipisindependencia.cat/que-es-ami/estatuts/

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It is a private association, but necessarily made up of public administrations, essentially municipalities, but also local regional and provincial councils. Its very existence supposes a democratic anomaly, as it implies that the local bodies adhered to it ascribe to a certain ideological position which, furthermore, is contrary to the basic constitutional principles. The association does not pursue a modification of the Fundamental Law that allows the secession of Catalonia, but makes it clear that although it will act within the law whenever possible, this respect for legality is not an essential absolute54. Just like the ‘Generalitat’, the AMI does not behave as a Spanish administration, but rather as the public power of a new state. It promotes the ascription of Catalan town halls (and other local entities) to the authority which would hypothetically control the territory and the population in the case of an independent Catalan State. Their role is therefore central to this secessionist purpose.

All of this supposes a breach of the rights of the citizens, as it implies that the public power can stop acting subject to the law and act within the framework of future unspecified legality. A true aberration in democratic terms.

Furthermore, this association manipulates social reality to defend the nationalist supremacy; from the first page of its bylaws, it compares Spain with Castile, identifies those called Castilians and Castilian speakers with the repression of Catalonia, declares that Spain has an “aggressive, excluding and inquisitorial spirit”, and maliciously reduces its history to Francoism and other dark ages.

The sectarian tone of the declaration of reasons of the bylaws of the AMI is irrefutable proof of the lack of respect for Catalonia’s internal diversity and for freedom of thought in general.

There follow two actions of this association which, beyond the initial approaches of its programs, are particularly concerning in terms of democratic quality: the plan of ascription to the AMI of local entities, which is legally questionable and uses ethically reproachable

54 In the Declaration of Reasons of the Bylaws of the AMI it is said that, “And therefore, we have to be founded on legal bases wherever possible, but bearing in mind that justice is above the laws, which evolve constantly”.

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strategies, and the promotion of a formula for taking possession of the councillors elected in the last municipal elections, which implies absolute depreciation of the very constitutional order which, as we have already explained, justifies the existence of the Government of Catalonia itself.

3.1.1. Illegitimate ascription of local entities The ascription of town halls and other local administrations to the AMI implies their inclusion as said public administrations in the secessionist process. The adhered town halls act as a spokesperson, instrument or form of expression of the claims of a group singularised by certain approaches, completely ignoring those who do not agree and undermining the general interest and confusing these ideas with the purposes and missions of the local entity.

The AMI is maintained by the public coffers. The local corporations that make it up devote part of their budgets to paying the fees to this association. This highly controversial fact has produced court resolutions which have considered contributing to an association whose objective is to achieve the independence of Catalonia, contrary to the municipal purposes55. The local corporations adhere to it by agreement of the plenary to an absolute majority of the councillors. At this time, as the association recognises on its website, the AMI gathers around 700 town halls of Catalonia and a further 40 miscellaneous local entities56.

The incorporation of municipalities whose sociological base is not separatist in the AMI as a consequence of electoral pacts between very different parties in order to facilitate the governability of the municipality is something that is being very conflictive. If it is already inadmissible from a democratic viewpoint that the plenary session of the town hall can take a decision of this importance without legal coverage, it is

55 The Spanish Governmental Delegation in Catalonia has launched contentious administrative appeals against the payment of the referred fees by town halls and other local corporations. These payments have been annulled by the judicial bodies. Example of this are the sentences of the contentious administrative courts number 13 of Barcelona and number 1 of Tarragona: http://www.municipisindependencia.cat/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/141110-SENTENCIA-quotes- begues.pdf http://www.municipisindependencia.cat/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/150511-ADMISSIO-quotes-consell- comarcal-ribera-d_ebre.pdf

56 http://www.municipisindependencia.cat/municipis-adherits/

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striking that, given its significance, qualified majorities are not sought to adopt it. And of course it is profoundly antidemocratic that councillors of parties who have declared themselves openly contrary to independence (such as the case of the PSC) should vote in favour of the ascription of their municipality to the AMI due to sporadic local interests. A good sign of all of this is the multitudinous demonstration in favour of coexistence promoted by Sociedad Civil Catalana (SCC) in Castelldefels on the past 9 July57.

The role of the AMI has in turn been determining for the configuration of the candidature of Junts pel Sí, as is proven by the inclusion of its former president, Josep Maria Vila d’Abadal, in the list for Barcelona, and its current president, Carles Puigdemont, in that for Gerona. Therefore, indirectly the local corporations are supporting specific political options that will be running for the autonomic elections of 27 September. This is obviously incompatible with basic principles of the Rule of Law and supposes an essential breach of the political game rules in a democratic order.

In short, adhesion to the AMI clashes face on with freedom of thought or awareness, as it implies that its ideology becomes official by being assumed by the government which represents one and all. It must be, surprisingly, remembered that the competencies which constitutionally and legally are assigned to local entities are intended to serve the general interests of the residents of the municipal area.

3.1.2. Drive for manifestly unconstitutional taking office of mayors The pretension that the town halls and other local administrations should stop working within the framework of Spanish legality has become obvious in the office taking of mayors who were elected after the municipal elections of 24 May 2015.

The AMI pushed forward a campaign intended to ensure that elected councillors would include the following pronouncement in their oath or promise to obey the Constitution, which is necessary for taking office: “By democratic expression of the citizens’ will, I announce that I am available to the new Parliament, to the President and to the Government of Catalonia arising from the elections of 27 September 2015, to exercise

57 A video made by the SCC shows several testaments by voters of different non-independentist parties, which bear witness to what we say: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h2hI1Db74fU

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the self-determination of our people and, along with all of the institutions, to proclaim the FREE AND SOVEREIGN CATALAN STATE”58.

Doubting the legality of an oath or promise to obey, to which the indicated pronouncement is added, the secretary of the Town Hall of Falset (province of Tarragona) sent a query to the Central Electoral Board (JEC). This body determined that the formula proposed by the AMI breached the provisions of article 108.8 of the Organic Law of the General Electoral System (LOREG) “because the expressions used detract from the fulfilment of the requirement imposed by the said article in so far as they empty the unequivocal commitment to respect the Constitution of content”59.

Despite the agreement of the Central Electoral Board, the AMI maintained the campaign justifying it in a report made by the sectorial of the Asamblea Nacional de Catalunya “SIT X CAT” (Secretaries, Treasurers and Officers of the Local Administration for Independence) in which it is sustained that the agreement of the Central Electoral Board has “scarce legal transcendence”60.

However, it is obvious, as indicated in the referred agreement of the Central Electoral Board, that the oath or promise by the AMI supposes the obvious undermining of the requirements of the LOREG. In no way can a declaration intended to promote the secession of part of the national territory be considered observance of the Constitution. The basic precepts of our ordinance are being breached, which are articles 1 and 2 of the Spanish Constitution itself, in which it is established that the sovereignty corresponds to the Spanish people (as a whole, not part of it) and is also inseparable from the Spanish nation.

58http://www.municipisindependencia.cat/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/150603-regidor_a-per-la- independencia.pdf

59 Agreement of the Central Electoral board on 24 May 2015, Dossier 354/229, accessible from the AMI website: http://www.municipisindependencia.cat/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/150526-Resposta- Junta-Electoral-Central-a-Falset.pdf

60 http://www.municipisindependencia.cat/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/150601-informe-SITxCAT- jurament-o-promesa-presa-possessio-carrec.pdf

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This formula of the AMI is, however, perfectly coherent with the approach of the “secessionist roadmap” we referred to in the previous chapter and which this association has also signed. From the separatist perspective, the elections of 27 September would suppose the creation of bodies not subject to constitutional legality. The observance by councillors of said bodies, suggested in the ceremonies of taking office on 13 June, is intended to prefigure the rupturist scenario established by the secessionist forces.

In this context, on 5 June 2015 SCC sent a letter to the Spanish Governmental Delegation in Catalonia asking for the proposal of the AMI or any which should undermine the provisions of the Spanish legal framework to be considered a valid formula for oath61. SCC warned of the consequences that would be derived for public officials and authorities from the admission of formulae in said oaths which failed to imply true observance of the Constitution. Likewise, our association asked that if any councillor should have become so by using an oath or promise which failed to suppose true observance of the Constitution, the mechanisms provided in art. 67 of the Law of Bases of Local System should be used62, and any other which might be convenient, in order to restore the legality and full respect for the Rule of Law.

The reason for this request lies in the fact that it would be difficult to find a case of agreement which more directly contradicted the general interest of Spain than the recognition of the condition of public authority to councillors who, instead of obeying the Constitution, declared their express will to breach it. The admission of the oath or promise proposed by the AMI would imply tolerance of the public powers of the local corporations being exercised outside of the provisions of the Constitution with the declared purpose of using the local councils to achieve the secession of the Catalan territory and the creation of a new state in it. Despite the warnings, many councillors used the formula. The government delegation has asked the municipal secretaries to send the minutes to bring all opportune action63, although for the moment no resolution has been known to have been made.

61 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/scc-pide-a-la-delegacion-del-gobierno-que-actue-para-que-los- concejales-acaten-la-ley-en-su-toma-de-posesion-gcm9

62 “If a local entity should adopt acts or agreements which seriously attempt against the general interest of Spain, the Government Delegate, being required to annul the President of the Corporation effected in the ten days following the reception thereof, may suspend them and take all pertinent measures to protect said interest”.

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The use of this formula not only suggests the appropriation of the public institutions by the separatist movement, but affects the rights of the citizens as the offices may be annulled for not meeting the demands of the LOREG, as was forwarded by the JEC. This obviously creates a situation of legal insecurity for those affected. The separatists, however, put their interest in making it clear that the public administrations and posts already act outside the framework drawn out by Spanish legality before the interest of the citizens.

3.2. Symbolic invasion of official buildings and public spaces In Catalonia there is often talk of the spiral of silence, of the fear of non-nationalist citizens to declare their disagreement. In SCC we constantly receive accounts in this sense. Certainly the effort of the separatist movement to have it understood that their approaches and symbols are “those of Catalonia” has had an effect on too many people.

The role of the schools and the media has been central in this strategy, but also the promotion of the symbols and the demonization of those who represent coexistence in Spain. We will deal with how the media and educational institutions contribute to unifying the discourse in chapters 4 and 5. Now we will focus on the tremendous effort of the municipalities to generalise the use of the estelada flag on official buildings and in public spaces, while disdaining the Spanish flag. There is no need to underline the importance of symbols when appealing to nationalist sentiment.

3.2.1. Esteladas even during the electoral period The estelada flag is an unofficial symbol used by the citizens and political parties who aim to achieve the creation of an independent state within the territory of Catalonia. There are different kinds of esteladas. The most frequent are those known as the estelada blava (white star on a blue triangle) which are those generally used by Catalan independentism, and the estelada vermella (red star on a yellow background), which is promoted by political groups defending a socialist independent state.

63 http://www.elconfidencialdigital.com/politica/Gobierno-posesion-concejales-catalanes- independencia_0_2507749203.html

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Their use in public acts of different signs, political campaigns and specifically electoral campaigns, has established a close connection between certain political parties and coalitions with the estelada flag. CDC and ERC generally use the estelada blava and the CUP profusely uses the estelada vermella. These flags have become part of their party symbols, so they are very often seen at their events. Aside from these parties, many others also use them as a symbol of their independentist ideology.

Therefore the party nature of the estelada conditions its use by the public administrations. In fact the very autonomic administration, through the Directorate General for the Prevention, Extinguishing of Fires and Rescues of the Department of the Interior, at the time of the autonomic elections in 2012, issued an internal memo 64 to the chiefs of the fire stations asking for all banners, flags and different symbols to be removed because they might “attempt against the principles of objectiveness and transparency of the electoral process and equality between political formations”. However, in the elections held later, the independentist flags have been allowed.

In any case, article 103 of the Spanish Constitution is very firm in stating that “the Public administration objectively serves the general interests”. In this it is clearly concluded that the public spaces cannot be permanently occupied by symbols representing the feeling of only one part of the citizens, and even less so if these symbols are intended to destroy the model of coexistence that we have given all Spaniards, with the broad acceptance of Catalan society.

Within this framework, the agreements to fly esteladas are normally supported by the will of the majority of the councillors of the municipal board, given of course that illegal agreements can be reached, thus overwhelming the citizens who oppose such a breach of legality.

The result is a generalised and orchestrated presence of the estelada flag on the official publicly-held buildings and areas of Catalonia, carried out with the agreement of the Catalan institutions and the separatist associations and parties.

64 https://insignis.aranzadidigital.es/maf/app/document?redirect=true&srguid=i0ad818150000014fa39fad015b 5b6a68&marginal=MIX\2012\923689&docguid=I5158e48019a311e28f92010000000000&ds=ARZ_IN_LE GIS_CS&infotype=arz_noticias;&spos=1&epos=1&td=1&predefinedRelationshipsType=documentRetrieva l&fromTemplate=&suggestScreen=&&selectedNodeName=&selec_mod=false&displayName=

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This presence is a breach of the neutrality of the administrations which is inadmissible from a democratic perspective.

The obligation of the neutrality of the administration, which is general, clearly deduced from the referred article 103 of the Constitution, must especially be observed in electoral periods, in which the Electoral Administration has to ensure that the public powers are not placed at the service of some of the participants in the electoral battles (articles 8 and 50 of the LOREG).

Therefore, following the call of the municipal elections for 24 May 2015, SCC started to prepare a report with which it intended to denounce the presence of esteladas flags on the official buildings and in public spaces. The report, which logically could not be exhaustive and was prepared thanks to the participation of citizens who sent us images of the independentist flags, identified 429 esteladas in public spaces, 93 of which were on official dependencies65.

This document, which is structured according to the electoral zones and includes photographs of the esteladas with the precise indication of their location, was presented before the Central Electoral Board (JEC), the Provincial Electoral Boards and the Zone Electoral Boards on 5 May 2015.66. By resolution of the JEC on 13 May, it was agreed to remove the esteladas from the official buildings and electoral premises placed before and during the campaign for the municipal elections67, a resolution which was sent to the town halls and administrations of Catalonia. The JEC rejected the appeal made against a resolution by the Convergencia i Unió coalition68.

However, despite the clearness of the order, many local corporations were contrary to carrying out the agreement, which meant that the Zone Electoral Boards had to take

65 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/assets/documents/Por-un-Ayuntamiento-de-todos.pdf

66 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/scc-insta-a-la-junta-electoral-a-retirar-las-estaladas-8fgh

67 http://www.cronicaglobal.com/es/notices/2015/05/la-junta-electoral-ordena-retirar-las-esteladas-en- edificios-publicos-durante-la-campana-electoral-19806.php

68 http://www.cronicaglobal.com/es/notices/2015/05/varapalo-a-ciu-la-junta-electoral-central-rechaza-su- recurso-contra-la-retirada-de-esteladas-de-l-20047.php

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resolutions to force the withdrawal of the esteladas69. The public forces of order were even needed to remove partidist flags from some towns70.

It must finally be stressed that the respect for the rules of the democratic game must not be limited to the electoral campaign, but that the public powers must be neutral, and permanently attend the general interest. Flying a flag backed by no legal order on the balcony of the town hall is unheard of from a democratic viewpoint. However, the official buildings and Catalan public spaces, from the date after the end of the campaign, were filled with separatist flags. It is a question of pressing as far as possible to ensure that the secessionist project is perceived as the only one possible.

The presence of these flags and other independentist signals, such as signs at the entrance to towns and villages announcing that the municipalities came down in favour of the independence of Catalonia or that they are members of the AMI, are more and more frequently installed by the town halls on official buildings and public lands. SCC, for the holding of the autonomic elections called for 27 September 2015, has therefore once more presented the Provincial Electoral Boards and Zone Electoral Boards with a request to have these partidist symbols removed, a decision whose resolution was not yet known at the time of completing this report.

We are therefore faced by a new challenge to the Rule of Law that is so recurrent in the secessionist strategy. The laws and judicial sentences are not respected. The legal security of the citizens is of no importance.

3.2.2. Removal of Spanish flags A highly significant aspect of the action planned by the Catalan public powers to make any symbolic presence of the Spanish State disappear from its territory, which in independentist language is defined as “the disconnection”, appears in the fact that the absence of the Spanish flag is deliberately sought by those politically

69 http://www.cronicaglobal.com/es/notices/2015/05/espadaler-envia-mossos-de-paisano-a-retirar- esteladas-para-evitar-una-imagen-perjudicial-para-ciu-20197.php

70 http://www.cronicaglobal.com/es/notices/2015/05/la-junta-electoral-ordena-a-los-mossos-retirar-las- esteladas-de-seis-ayuntamientos-20160.php

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responsible for the local corporations and on buildings of the autonomic Administration.

This is a measure which is contrary to current legality which obliges both the Spanish flag and the flag of Catalonia to be raised on official buildings. Therefore, Law 39/1981 of 28 October, which regulates the use of the Spanish flag and that of other flags and signs, sets up the content, scope and meaning of the flag of Spain. In this sense, article 1 declares that this "symbolises the nation, is a sign of sovereignty, independence, unity and integrity of the patria and represents the superior values expressed in the Constitution". As a consequence of the above, article 3.1 specifies that "the Spanish flag must fly outside and occupy the preferential place inside all buildings and establishments of the central, institutional, autonomic, provincial or insular and municipal State administration". In turn, article 4 of the same law establishes that “in the autonomous communities whose statutes recognise their own flag, it will be used alongside the Spanish flag on all civil public buildings” of its territorial area. Article 8.2 of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia says that the Catalan flag must be present on all public buildings and at all official acts taking place in Catalonia.

The reticence of some authorities to permanently and preferentially display the Spanish flag on the public buildings is nothing new and has given rise to pronouncements from the Spanish Supreme Court (Third Section of the Sixth Chamber). It is sufficient to remember the sentence of 3 February 201071, which in turn mentions the sentences of 24 July 2007, 25 November 2008, 12 May 2009 and 4 November 2009, in which it is declared that “the expression ‘must fly’, used by the legislator, formulated in categorical imperative, shows the legal requirement that the Spanish flag should fly on the days and in the places expressed, as a symbol that the buildings or establishments of the State Public Administrations are places in which sovereignty is exercised directly or in delegation and the public function is developed in all of its breadth and integrity, of any order, according to the constitutional values, principles, rights and duties that the flag represents, along with the unity, independence and sovereignty and integrity of the Spanish State”. According to the Supreme Court, “The use of the Spanish

71 https://insignis.aranzadidigital.es/maf/app/document?srguid=i0ad818160000014fa3b8bd9ddadadba7&marg inal=RJ\2010\1377&docguid=Id0040b6030a411dfa134010000000000&ds=ARZ_IN_LEGIS_CS&infotype =arz_juris;&spos=2&epos=2&td=125&predefinedRelationshipsType=documentRetrieval&fromTemplate= &suggestScreen=&&selectedNodeName=&selec_mod=false&displayName=

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flag on said establishments or buildings must be daily as a sign to the citizens of the content it symbolises and represents”. This same court order concludes that “the Law distinguishes and regulates the different situations in which the Spanish flag must fly”, and clarifies, “The first, outside the buildings and establishments of the Public Administrations, on which the flag must fly permanently each day and not temporarily, not exceptionally but rather generally, at all times and preferentially, inside”. However, despite the clarity of the regulation and interpretation given thereof by the highest Spanish judicial body, at many plenary meetings of town councils, provincial councils or regional councils, agreements are reached in which abundant extrajudicial arguments are made which assume the de facto illegality of its resolutions, or simply the Spanish flag disappears from the official buildings.

The single presence of the autonomic flag on public buildings or the absence of both has given rise to contentious administrative appeals by residents or by the Spanish Governmental Delegation in Catalonia, to achieve the annulment of the agreements contrary to Law. The AMI itself has counted 102 contentious administrative appeals presented to date by the Governmental Delegation against infringing town halls and regional councils. It has also qualified the lodging of these court actions as a "war of flags", assuring that the Spanish government’s attitude jeopardises social peace and stability.

The freedom with which these local entities work is seen in behaviour such as that of the Mayor of Balaguer, who justified not raising the Spanish flag because they could not pay for the pole or that of the Council of Sant Sadurni d’Anoia, which has placed a plate on which it justifies the raising of the flag “by legal imperative”.

4.- Policies of communication for national construction It is commonplace to hear in the dominant academic and political discourses in Catalonia that communication policies have to be a tool aimed at expressing a Catalan space of communication, which on another few occasions is presented as covering all of the territories where Catalan is spoken72. The existence of this space, in the end a

72 Cf. Gifreu, J. (director) and Corominas, M. (coordinator) (1991): Construir l’espai català de comunicació. Barcelona: Government of Catalonia. Communication Research Centre.

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powerful media system differentiated from the Spanish and from that of other autonomous communities, is understood as an essential step for moving forward in the so-called “national construction of Catalonia”.

In other words, there is open defence of the instrumentalisation of the policies that affect the media at the service of nationalism. An especially significant document in this sense, which then circulated around the Department of the Government of Catalonia, was published on 28 October 1990 in El Periódico de Catalunya with the title “The strategy of recatalanisation”. It is an absurd catalogue of intentions the final purpose of which is to strengthen the “national awareness”. Therefore, in the important section on the media, one of their fundamental activities is given as “inserting nationalist people of high professionalism and great technical qualification in all key places of the media”. Along this line, there is also talk of “encouraging the initial and permanent training of all journalists and communication technicians to guarantee training with Catalan national awareness”; and amongst the objectives, to mention but a few to support what we discuss further on: “ensuring that the public media dependent on the government of Catalonia continue to be effective transmitters of the Catalan national model”; “inducing advertising companies to create a positive and well-made publicity message that transmits the Catalan social and cultural model”, and; “giving the Avui newspaper a great national scope”.

In another section of the same document, called “Thought”, time is given to the role of the media as the disseminator of a series of “lines of awareness raising”, such as “configuration of the Catalan personality… (being more educated, more modern, more civic, more supportive, more European…)” or “memorial of aggressions (Catalonia is a discriminated nation that is unable to freely develop its cultural and economic potential. Discovery, awareness, weighting and dissemination of the discriminatory facts, shortcomings, etc., clearly, firmly and systematically”.

We now give some recent examples of actions in the area of communication policies of the Government of Catalonia, which might clearly be reproached in the context of an advanced democracy and show that the referred “strategy of recatalanisation” was neither innocent or exaggerated. The examples could be infinite, but we have chosen to refer to

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three areas in which the SCC has made a public statement in 2015: the autonomic public media, the supposedly independent audio-visual regulator, and institutional publicity.

4.1.- Governmental control and discredit of the public media The state and autonomic public media in Spain suffer from an obvious discredit which is explained by the frequent political meddling in the maximum organs of management (president/director general and boards of administration/government boards). In this sense, the case of the Catalan Corporation of Audio-visual Media (Corporación Catalana de Medios Audiovisuales - CCMA) is particularly paradigmatic, and much more so in the present political context.

In 2007 (with ERC at the forefront of the audio-visual policies) in Catalonia a reformation was undertaken of the model of government of the autonomic public media, the implementation of which was a palpable example of a lack of democratic maturity. An academic work which analyses this reformation concludes that “it is inadmissible and that an independent audio-visual authority should be sent a list with a number of candidates identical to that of the eligible posts, that the person responsible for audio-visual policy of the government should be appointed president of the board of government of public radio and television (in a context which wagers on the degovernmentalisation), that a legal reformation should be threatened because there is no agreement on appointing a director-general (in a process which must be one of public tender) and much more that the reformation should be by decree-law and against the opinion of the Council of Statutory Guarantees, the majority required to appoint a public post, and the president of the board of government of the CCMA, which also had previously been occupied by a post in the Executive”73. With the return of CiU to the Government of Catalonia, the regulation controlling the organisation and operation of the CCMA was changed once more. Therefore, since 2012, its board of government has had 6 members, one of them the president74, elected by a two-

73 To go further into this question, cf. Fernández Alonso, Isabel; Sarabia Andúgar, Isabel; Sánchez Martínez, Josefina and Bas Portero, Juan José (2011): “Models of government in autonomic public radio televisions in Spain: the case of the Catalan Corporation of Audio-visual Media”, in Ámbitos. Revista Internacional de Comunicación, Seville, no. 20, pp. 255-270.

74 By Law 2/2012 modifying different laws in the area of audio-visuals, and using the argument of the crisis, the number of members was halved and the figure of the director-general was suppressed. From 2007 to 2012, there were two heads at the forefront of the CCMA: a president, with essentially political functions, and the director-general performing executive tasks. With the reformation we comment, the figure of the president is strengthened by assuming competencies previously held by the director general.

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thirds majority of the Parliament in the first vote, and if this should not be achieved, by absolute majority in the second. This same flexibilisation of a qualified majority required up to then is also established for the taking of important internal agreements in the heart of the board of government of the CCMA, such as the appointment of management posts.

With this regulatory framework, a board of government was set up with three members (Núria Llorach, Antoni Pemán and the president, Brauli Duart) proposed by CiU, two by PSC (Xavier Guitart and Josep Vilar) and one by the PP (Armand Querol). Guitart resigned in September 2013 and the board worked until July 2015 with just five members (including the president), due to ERC’s refusal to enter (they said) the game of party quotas, as their wager was the true degovernmentalisation of the CCMA.

However, the rupture of the CiU nationalist coalition in June past implied that CDC could lose control of the board of government of the Catalan public media be given the Demo Christian (UDC) profile of Antoni Pemán. In this context, the two parties driving the Junts pel Sí candidature hurried to appoint a new councillor on the proposal of ERC, Rita Marzoa, on 22 July, when the period of sessions of the legislature was about to close. Marzoa, who was appointed in a second vote, only by absolute majority of the chamber and with only the votes of the CiU and ERC Parliamentary groups, had just left the national board of Òmnium Cultural at the same time as Muriel Casals, who was to come in as number 3 in the candidature of Junts pel Sí.

Immediately after Marzoa’s appointment on 28 July, the UDC militant Félix Riera was dismissed from the direction of Catalunya Ràdio, also in a second vote and, with the essential vote of the new member and the quality vote of the president of the CCMA. The members proposed by PP, PSC and UDC voted against.

Logically the corporation’s communiqué justifying the dismissal for reasons related to a strategy of business reorganisation convinced no one and caused a flood of criticisms on the instrumentalisation of the public media at the service of the independentist movement. SCC on 29 July sent a letter to the president of the CCMA in which it reproached what it considered a dismissal for political reasons and reminded that the

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audio-visual policies and public media “in no way can be at the service of the so-called national construction, as this implies an unacceptable instrumentalisation of the institutions at the service of what only one part of the citizenship thinks”. The letter also said that this entity “believes that the taking of agreements by qualified majority, and especially on more sensitive matters, is a clear symptom of democratic maturity, whereas the systematic resorting to quality votes constitutes a policy which shows little respect for discrepancy”75.

Signs that the instrumentalisation of the Catalan public media is a reality are the ever more frequent reports from PP, C’s, PSC and ICV-EUiA in the discussions of the Control Commission of the Action of the CCMA in the Parliament of Catalonia, which can be consulted in the corresponding minutes.

Similarly, there are significant different pronouncements from professional entities such as the Union of Journalists of Catalonia or the Guild of Journalists of Catalonia. By way of illustration, the Televisió de Catalunya (TVC) section of the first of these entities indicated in a communiqué with the title “Let’s save our professionalism”, made public on 5 September 2014 and which was particularly echoed, that “the reiteration of ‘service’ reports on the national day explaining the way to get there, indicating the sections still having to be filled, interviewing the organisers of the event for the umpteenth time, constitute barefaced calls to participation”76.

For its part, the Guild of Journalist of Catalonia issued a very firm communiqué (“Strong condemnation of the manipulation of the public media”) on 14 August 2015, following the coverage of the signing of the decree to call the autonomic elections on 27 September and the subsequent interview on TVC with the “supposed” head of the opposition, Oriol Junqueras, who, however, was facing these elections in the same list as the current president of the ‘Generalitat’. We highlight one of the paragraphs of this communiqué: “The Guild of Journalists gives full support to the criticism made by the Professional Board of TV3 following the signing of the decree to call elections and the interview with the head of the opposition. Informative coverage must never be confused with an institutional signal. Decisions must be avoided which can compromise the independence of the media. The Guild of

75 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/scc-reprueba-el-cese-de-felix-riera-como-director-de-catalunya- radio-rx5s

76 http://redacciotvc.blogspot.com.es/2014_09_01_archive.html

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Journalists also reports the lack of transparency in media coverage of such an important event and that the remaining media had no access to it”77.

Even the Audio-visual Board of Catalonia (Consejo Audiovisual de Catalunya - CAC), which has traditionally solidly protected the actions of the Catalan public television in the area of pluralism, was obliged in an agreement on the past 15 July, to condemn the tight focus of the debate organised in the programme .Cat under the title of “Next appointment: 27-S”, aired on 28 May after the Catalan municipal elections. In the debate, no voice could be heard to question the separatist positions. The guests were three well- known leaders of the three markedly independentist parties of the Catalan parliamentary spectrum (CDC, ERC and CUP) as well as the presidents of ANC and Òmnium Cultural78.

Further very recent evidence of the instrumentalisation of the Catalan media by the Government of Catalonia is the incredible coincidence between the logo of the summer promotional campaign of Televisió de Catalunya and Catalunya Radio (image on the left) and the logo of the Junts pel Sí candidature (image on the right). The Provincial Electoral Board of Barcelona understood this and on 17 August required the CCMA to withdraw the referred campaign, curiously previous to the presentation of the independentist candidature79:

77 http://www.periodistes.org/ca/noticia/energica-condemna-per-la-manipulacio-dels-mitjans-de- comunicacio-publics-1609.html

78 http://www.cac.cat/detall.jsp?Njg%3D&MQ%3D%3D&L2RldGFsbENvbnRlbnQ%3D&NjUw

79 http://www.cronicaglobal.com/es/notices/2015/08/la-junta-electoral-ordena-retirar-el-logo-de-verano- de-tv3-identico-al-de-junts-pel-si-23769.php

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In the described context, the financing of the Catalan autonomic public media, which in 2014 received €235 million from the coffers of the ‘Generalitat’ Government, according to data of the Informe de la comunicació a Catalunya 2013-2014 (page 25) is no petty question. The income from publicity (the second source of financing) was around 60 million euros, according to the same source. The figure of public subsidy contrasts enormously with that of the public media in Aragon (the television of this community is that with the second largest audience very shortly behind TV3), to which the community budgets in 2014 assigned 43 million euros80, almost 5.5 times less.

In the following caption and in chapter 6 we will see signs, respectively, of how some practices of Catalan public television absolutely disrespectful of pluralism have been protected by the Audiovisual Board of Catalonia (CAC), and how their discussions have at times been particularly injurious to SCC.

When we closed this report, El Confidencial filtered a series of documents proving the connivance between TVC and the ANC for broadcasting the demonstration on 11 September, which do nothing but further confirm the thesis that we have been sustaining81.

4.2.- Pro-independentist leaning of the Audio-visual Board of Catalonia The CAC, along with the CCMA, is one of the central players of the so-called Catalan space of communication. The Catalan regulator, with significant competencies since 2000, has traditionally been presented as a model to be followed by other autonomous communities (there is only one similar regulator in Andalusia) and also throughout the State, where the National Commission of Markets and Competition (Comisió Nacional de los Mercados y de la Competencia - CNMC), a macro regulator with limited competencies in the area of audio-visual (and logically relative to the operators covering the whole of Spain) was not created until 2013.

80 http://www.abc.es/local-aragon/20141027/abci-radiotelevision-aragon-costara-millones- 201410270836.html

81 http://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/cataluna/2015-09-07/un-dossier-destapa-el-plan-conjunto-de-la- anc-y-tv3-para-teledirigir-la-emision-de-la-diada_1001444/

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Normally an independent audio-visual regulator (of the government)82 is a symptom of democratic quality as it assumes such important tasks as assuring the fulfilment of the public service missions of the media or the adjudication of broadcasting licences. But the CAC is very far from being this. In fact it was created already corrupt, as its first president, Lluís de Carreras, recognises when he says that “the reason for its creation was to protect it from the possibility of the intervention of the State authorities on the media in the Catalan autonomic area... it was feared that... a state body might be constituted with competencies over all media (state and autonomic) that might lead to state control of the Catalan public media”83. In short, the “national construction” always above the desirable objective of contributing to the expression of a diverse and plural public opinion.

The SCC Observatory of Democratic Quality since early 2015 has been making a detailed follow-up on the actions of the CAC and has been able to see its arbitrariness, particularly in relation to the complaints this entity has made

• for the broadcasting and joint production by TV3 of the L’endemà pro independentist documentary (directed by Isona Passola, now a member of the list of Junts pel Sí), in which only opinions favourable to the secession of Catalonia were collected;

• and for the systematic breach of legality by the El Punt Avui TV local TDT channel, also clearly separatist, which broadcasts exactly the same contents in several demarcations, completely ignoring its obligations to give proximity programming for each one. a.- With respect to the case of L’endemà, SCC asked the CAC on the past 5 January84 to see whether since 2012 (the first large independentist demonstration) any documentary had

82 The 6 members are chosen by the Parliament, in a procedure very similar to that described for the CCMA: http://www.cac.cat/web/informacio/composicio/llistat.jsp?NA%3D%3D&MQ%3D%3D&L3dlYi9pbmZv cm1hY2lvL2NvbXBvc2ljaW8vbGxpc3RhdENvbnRlbnQ%3D

83 Carreras, Lluís (2013): “The Audiovisual Board of Catalonia (CAC)”. In Gavara de Cara, J. C. (ed.): Las autoridades independientes de control de los medios de comunicación audiovisual, Barcelona, Bosch, p.115.

84 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/queja-ante-el-cac-por-falta-de-pluralidad-en-tv3

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been broadcast on Catalan public television defending only cases in favour of a Catalonia coexisting as part of Spain (those contrary to the opinion is given in L’endemà), and if not, to encourage TVC to joint produce and broadcast it and to thereby fulfil its obligations with respect to the pluralism of society and more at such a sensitive time and delicate subject.

Surprisingly the CAC has simply sent a letter dated 11 March to our president, Josep Ramon Bosch, in which the regulator does nothing but assume the version that TVC sent him in answer to our complaint. In addition to being a grotesque answer, a list of four broadcasts is given as a sign that in two years some people contrary to succession have been allowed to speak; it is extraordinary that an appeal authority might answer a plaintiff assuming the analysis of content of the defendant company.

Our later request for a formal agreement to be reached by the Board of the CAC with respect to our complaint was not attended. This is an attitude which is truly incomprehensible, and more still when the same regulator did reach a formal agreement on the same dates (61/2015, 22 April) relative to the report “Querella contra Mas” (Plaint against Mas), broadcast on the TVE national broadcaster’s Informe Semanal program, in which the CNMC is called “to warn the CRTVE public service provider (La 1 television channel) on the need to take care in the treatment of informative programs and especially with respect to broadcasting content such as that which analyses this agreement”. SCC publicly showed its amazement at the fact that the CAC should reach a formal agreement on the broadcasts of the state television operator (which is the competence of the CNMC) but should fail to do so with respect to the broadcasts of the Catalan autonomic public television station, of which it is the main vigilant85.

And finally, when we closed this report, the press was reporting a new agreement of the CAC, dated 1 September 2015, by which the report on pluralism of the campaign of 27 September was to include the analysis of its coverage by the TVE, Antena 3 and Telecinco stations. This agreement, reached with the votes of two members proposed by CDC and ERC and the quality vote of the President, also proposed by CDC, is accompanied by a particular vote signed by the other three members, proposed by PSC, PP and UDC. This joint particular vote refers to the CAC using abundant public resources to make an analysis

85 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/scc-traslada-su-queja-sobre-lendema-a-la-cnmc-rjz3

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which goes beyond its competencies, assuming the risk “of going into a political comparison” which the regulator “must not enter or nurture”86. b.- With respect to the case of El Punt Avui TV, the CAC notified SCC on the past 3 March that it had reached agreement 22/2015 of 18 February, calling for sanctions on the management company of this operator (Xarxa de Serveis i Comunicacions 2014 S.L.) as it saw that, as our association had reported in a complaint on 27 January 201587, there were clear signs of a series breach for broadcasting contents (the same contents in different local demarcations) in excess of those legally permitted by Law 22/2005 of the audio-visual communication of Catalonia.

When SCC asked the CAC for the specific content of this agreement, the answer from the secretary general (mail of 16 March) was that the regulator was only obliged to announce these kinds of decisions when there were particular votes, and as that there were none in this case, it opted for the possibility of restrictively interpreting the meaning of discretional powers.

As Josep Ramon Bosch considered this answer unacceptable, on 18 March he wrote a new letter to the President and to all other members of the CAC in which the president of SCC expressed the amazement of our association at the fact that the CAC, given the chance to air an agreement, should choose not to do so and particularly when there were precedents of agreements of initiation of sanctioning cases without particular votes which had been made public (case of 13/2010). Bosch asked the CAC what reasons should justify the failure to publish agreement 22/2015, which clearly collides with the new regulations on transparency, and asked for a rectification of the decision. The insistence had an effect and finally the agreement in question was published.

However the case of El Punt Avui TV has other sides which make it much more serious in terms of democratic quality. SCC warned that the CAC had published agreement 40/2015 of 25 March, which waived the referred sanctioning case despite recognising 100% chain

86 http://comunicacio21.cat/noticies-comunicacio21/112462-el-cac-tambe-analitzara-el-pluralisme-de-les-tv- espanyoles-en-la-campanya-del-27s

87 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/presentada-una-queja-ante-el-cac-para-que-el-punt-avui-respete- la-legalidad-8rnb

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broadcasting in the cases analysed. This agreement was of no public transcendence, maybe because instead of appearing in the section that might be expected (Actions/Communications service providers) it does so in the most marginal place of all those possible (Actions/Contents/Others) and also without the habitual press note and highlight in the homepage.

The new decision is justified on the basis of a blurred reformation of the concept of own production which has been introduced, with the vote of the CiU and ERC parliamentary groups, in letter c of article 1 of the audio-visual communication law of Catalonia via Law 3/2015 on tax, financial and administrative measures. This measure has clearly been put forward to protect the interests of El Punt Avui TV as was already reported in January by SCC in a letter to all of the parliamentary groups88 when discussion was under way on the reformation in question. In this way, the absurd decision was reached of considering that the fact that El Punt Avui TV broadcasts the same content in all of the demarcations in which it has a licence (lease) to broadcast (reaching 80% of the population of Catalonia) is compatible with the idea of a local television.

The agreement to waive the sanctioning case was reached thanks to the quality vote of the president of the CAC, Roger Loppacher, who has a long political career with CiU. The members Carme Figueras, Eva Parera and Daniel Sirera (half of the board) issued a joint particular vote in which, amongst other things, they indicate that the filing of the sanctioning case “should be accompanied by a simultaneous agreement to open an informative case (of the sanctioner) for possible breach of the concessional commitments in relation to proximity programming”.

It seems obvious that if the adjudication of the local TDT licences involves the assumption of commitments to broadcast local contents, these would have to be met, so the legal reform would not be sufficient to regularise the El Punt Avui TV broadcasts. It must be made clear that when authorisation was given for leasing the licences which previously belonged to the management company of Canal Català to that of El Punt Avui TV (agreement 52/2014 of 11 April), half of the board members of the CAC (at that time Elisenda Malaret, Carme Figueras and Daniel Sirera) warned about the obvious existence of

88 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/presentada-una-queja-ante-el-cac-para-que-el-punt-avui-respete- la-legalidad-8rnb

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chain broadcasts, separating themselves from the decision of the meeting, which was equally adopted with the quality vote of the President.

On 2 in June 2015, SCC sent a new complaint to the CAC on the line of the particular votes mentioned above89. The regulator is called upon to clarify which obligations the management company of El Punt Avui TV assumed when it leased the local TDT licences it now operates, to verify whether it is fulfilling them and to explain whether the mentioned reformation of the concept of own production would or would not imply the necessary disappearance of the obligations relative to the broadcasting of proximity contents. SCC specifies in the complaint that according to article 59.1 of the referred Law 22/2005, “the necessary disappearance of the conditions that justified the granting of the licence to give audio-visual communication services determines their expiry”.

At the time when this report is made, SCC has received no formal answer to any of the three complaints, the last one included, which it has made to the CAC in 2015.

Other previous and particularly striking proof of the political control of this regulator was the attempt to silence, on the initiative of the president of the CAC and with the support of the other members with political careers clearly linked to CiU, the particular vote of the divergent members (Elisenda Malaret, Carme Figueras and Daniel Sirera), often focused on questions related to the pro independentist leaning of the media or subjects such as the referred case of El Punt Avui TV. This is a very unfortunate decision which explains that in the regulator’s website, the particular votes relative to the agreements taken between 7 November 2012 and 22 January 2014 and which was finally frustrated because the members proposed by the constitutionalist parties insistently reported this unacceptable democratic anomaly90 do not appear.

More recently the CAC, by agreement 104/2014 of 3 September, adjudicated 22 FM licenses corresponding to the National Technical Plan approved by Royal Decree

89 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/scc-reclama-al-cac-que-investigui-novament-a-el-punt-avui-tv- 5is6

90 Cf. Fernández Alonso, Isabel and Espín, Marc (2015): “The policies of communication”. In Civil i Serra, Marta; Corbella Cordomí, Joan; Ferré Pavia, Carme and Sabaté, Joan (eds.): Report on communication in Catalonia 2013-2014, Barcelona, Generalitat de Catalunya, p. 28. Available at: http://incom.uab.cat/informe/download/2013/informe13_1.pdf

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964/2006 (and which at the time were assigned to the former COMRàdio). The autonomous communities have exclusive competence to grant autonomic or less far reaching radio and television licences, so that in all of these cases (autonomic and local TDT and radio in FM) in Catalonia, linguistic criteria were generally established in the tenders, which clearly undermine the options of non-Catalan companies. In the case we are commenting, the entrepreneurs most benefited by the tender were Godó (the owner of the clearly independentist RAC1 broadcaster), which obtained 9 licences, and Miquel Calçada (Commissioner of the events of the tercentenary and currently a member of the Junts pel Sí candidature), who got 6.

An extraordinarily serious matter which has not yet been resolved by the CAC is the extraordinary request of the Catalan government for the proprietor companies of the three large Spanish radio chains (Ser, Cope and Onda Cero) to be sanctioned for having refused to disseminate the mentioned campaign of the 9N, prohibited by the Constitutional Court. According to the Convergent executive, by failing to do so, the companies in question breached article 82.1 of Law 22/2005 of audio-visual communication of Catalonia, according to which “the audio-visual communications service providers are obliged to disseminate free and indicate the origin of all communiques and declarations that the State Government and the Government of Catalonia should see fit for reasons of public interest”91.

Too many examples of the fixation of the CAC, in this last case the instigating role of the Catalan government is diaphanous, with the Spanish media, which are really the competence of the CNMC, while it fails to answer complaints made at least by SCC on matters which are of its strict competence.

4.3.- Subsidies to similar media and propagandistic use of institutional publicity In addition to considering the role of the CCMA and of the CAC to understand the strategies in communication policies at the service of “national construction”, it is necessary to analyse the subsidies to private media already installed in the early 80s and aimed fundamentally at two large lines: the so-called structural aid (depending on the

91 Cf. press note on the subject of 23 December 2014: http://www.cac.cat/web/actualitat/notespremsa/llistat.jsp?MTU%3D&MQ%3D%3D&L3dlYi9hY3R1YW xpdGF0L25vdGVzcHJlbXNhL2xsaXN0YXRDb250ZW50#

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results of the dissemination/audience of the previous year) and aid to projects, in which the different governments enjoyed a larger margin of discretion to reward some of the others. The requirements in both cases always clearly favoured the media choosing the Catalan language and the projects aimed at fostering the Catalan space of communication. Once more the “national construction” as a priority of public policies.

This is seen in the basis of all of the tenders and is also understood from a rigorous investigation report published by the journalist Marthe Rubio in El Mundo on 8 September 2014, which concludes that, since 2008, “the Catalan government has injected a total of 181 million euros into the media”. And she specifies that, of this figure, “82 million come from subsidies and a further 99 million from institutional publicity spread non-transparently”. Rubio says that “throughout the detailed reading of the Official Gazette of the Government of Catalonia (DOGC), only 22 institutional publicity contracts appear that specify the beneficiary media, for a total value of 13 million euros”92.

These figures, much higher than those seen in other autonomous communities, as is shown in the referred report, reveal an important dependence of the Catalan media with respect to the public power and are difficult to disconnect from events such as the joint publication in 12 newspapers on 26 November 2009, of the editorial “The dignity of Catalonia”, with which the Constitutional Court was to be pressurised in relation to the sentence relative to the adaptation of the Statute of Autonomy of 2006 to the provisions of our Magna Carta93.

Amongst the aid granted in recent years, those received by the publishing companies of the independentist Ara (launched in 2010) and El Punt Avui (the result of the integration of two headers, Avui and El Punt, launched in 1976 and 1979, respectively, the merger of which is consummated in 2011) are worthy of special mention. Marthe Rubio herself notes that the Government of Catalonia granted the publishers of Ara (Edició de Premsa Periòdica Ara, S.L.) more than 2.5 million euros in the newspaper’s first three years of life. In turn, this journalist shows that the newspapers that have received most subsidies in

92 http://www.elmundo.es/grafico/espana/2014/09/08/53db717bca4741781c8b4577.html

93 Martín Alonso, in his book El catalanismo, del éxito al éxtasis (Barcelona: El Viejo Topo, 2015), says that this publisher’s “perform the framing work by placing a subject at the centre, Catalonia, and the condition which is perceived impregnated with victimism, that of a mistreated dignity”. “It was,” he adds, “The founding act of a discursive community”. “Artur Mas,” continues Martín Alonso, “Will incorporate it in the institutional discourse on the eve of the national day of 2012” (p. 142).

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comparison with their circulations are El Punt and Avui, for although both separately and after the merger, they failed to surpass 40,000 copies in the years of the crisis, “This did not prevent them from receiving 10 million euros from the public coffers since 2008”. A particularly surprising case is that of El Esportiu, the only newspaper written completely in Catalan and which is published in Catalonia and has a circulation (not subject to control) which does not seem to exceed 2,000 copies. Always according to data from the report we are citing, between 2008 and 2013, the publishers of El Esportiu (Comercialitzadora i Editora de la Coordinadora de Mitjans, S.L.) “received 2.5 million euros in subsidies, for example, ‘to spread the notoriety of the brand’ or for ‘promotional actions’”. It must be highlighted that the Comercialitzadora i Editora de la Coordinadora de Mitjans, S.L. is also the publisher’s behind El Punt Avui, the same company responsible for the television station of the same name which broadcasts the same content highly irregularly in different local demarcations, as we have explained.

Another very significant point in terms of democratic quality is the historical existence in Catalonia of aid to the media not subject to public tender94, a situation which was to be corrected with the arrival of the tripartite government95, but which, as revealed by the Informe de la comunicació a Catalunya 2013-2014 (page 30-31) has not been resolved at all.

However, the case of institutional publicity is yet more concerning than that of the subsidies, for two reasons: due to its lack of transparency (the ‘Generalitat’ has never offered detailed figures on how they have reverted the institutional publicity campaigns in the accounts of the media companies) and due to the easy instrumentalisation of the message by the institutions which means that what should be a content related to the provision of a public service is often confused with political propaganda.

A clear example of the two democratic shortcomings we are discussing, the lack of transparency with respect to the figures and the instrumentalisation of the messages, is the case of the Preparats campaign launched by the Government of Catalonia in May 2015

94 Cf. Fernández Alonso, Isabel y Blasco Gil (2005): “Help to the press in Catalonia (2000-2003)”, en Sphera Publica, Murcia, nº 5, pp. 181-199.

95 Cf. Fernández Alonso, Isabel y Blasco Gil, José Joaquín (2014): “Press Subsidy Policies in Spain in the Context of Financial Crisis (2008-12). An Analysis of the Catalan Case”, in European Journal of Communication, London, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 171-187.

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(image on the left), which is very surprisingly similar to a campaign driven a few months before by the ANC (image in the centre) and also, though less so (the idea of “Fem- ho”=let’s do it), with the CiU campaign for the autonomic elections of 2012 (image on the right):

SCC sent a letter on the past 27 May to the Secretary for Communication of the Government of Catalonia, Josep Martí, in which it asked for the immediate withdrawal of this campaign backed with a budget of 1,360,000 euros, as it understood that it was clearly in line with the pro secessionist propaganda which dominates the Catalan public space. Our association reminded in the letter that the law of audio-visual communication of Catalonia in its article 100 9.2 establishes that institutional publicity “can only be aimed at information on public services”, something which is not at all the case here. Similarly, SCC drew the Secretary for Communication’s attention to “the inexcusable obligation of the institutions to be neutral, to be at the service of all citizens thus avoiding any form of discrimination, naturally including ideological”96.

Martí answered the referred letter saying that in no way would he withdraw a campaign backed by the Advisory Commission of Institutional Publicity (CAPI) in meeting on 21 May 2015. SCC answered saying that in addition to having received no clarification on the

96 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/scc-reclama-la-retirada-de-la-campana-preparats-per-fer-una- catalunya-millor-y5f2

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public service to which the Preparats refers, it seems obvious that the margin for movement of the CAPI was non-existent because on the date on which it met, the campaign had obviously already been completely drawn up. In this situation, our association asked to be provided with written information on the agreement of the CAPI relative to this campaign and for the data regarding the distribution of its costs and how this affected the accounts of different communication companies to be made public. All of this appealing to article 11.1.f of Law 19/2014 concerning transparency, access to public information and good government, according to which “information relative to the economic and budgetary management which the Administration must make public in application of the principle of transparency must include… the cost of institutional publicity campaigns, breaking down the different items of the campaign and the amount contracted out to each medium”97.

In a new letter on 12 in June 2015, Martí refers to agreement CAC 76/2015 which backs the campaign, only with the votes of the members proposed by the parties forming the candidature Junts pel Sí98, and therefore without clarifying the public service to which, according to law, “Preparats” has to refer. In turn, it agrees to make the information requested by SCC public.

On seeing that this was not the case, SCC sent a third letter on 27 in July to the same Secretary for Communication, asking for it once more. At the time when this report is closed, our association has not received any reply and the required information has not been made public.

The reader can view the videos of the campaign we have been discussing and form their own opinion on whether we are talking about a case of institutional publicity or political propaganda. This is the script (translated) of the main video which still appears on the ‘Generalitat’ website:

“A new reality approaches loaded with hope and renewed with excitement. And we are prepared! Prepared to make a society with more resources and better services! To make a modern country of quality! Prepared to achieve the challenges we have proposed! We have overcome many obstacles. We have

97 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/scc-solicita-datos-concretos-sobre-la-campana-preparats-ases

98 The agreement had two particular votes in argumentary line with the claims of SCC: http://www.cac.cat/web/actuacions/index.jsp?ODA%3D&MQ%3D%3D&L3dlYi9hY3R1YWNpb25zL2xs aXN0YXRDb250ZW50&MTQ%3D&MjA%3D

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worked with rigour, tenacity and commitment. And we are prepared to make a better Catalonia! Let’s do it! Let’s do it! Let’s do it! Generalitat de Catalunya. Prepared!”99.

The confusion between what has to be a rigorous institutional message attending the interests of all of the citizens of Catalonia of whatever sentiment, or non-sentiment, of identity, and the propaganda in favour of what only one part thinks is a serious democratic shortcoming of which there are other equally striking signs such as the exact coincidence between the contents of the tweets of the Government of Catalonia (image on the left from 13 August 2015) and those of CDC (image on the right from 14 August). As usual, both seek confrontation in the rest of Spain:

In short, several examples have been given that prove the orientation we indicated at the beginning of this chapter of the policies of communication at the service of national construction. It cannot be doubted that the separatist project, to give an example that is difficult to contest, would not have managed to achieve so much support without the backing of media which, in a clearly orchestrated manner, identify nation and country, if not principality100, time and time again with Catalonia, as opposed to the Spanish State, which they fail to call country for reasons of style, the Valencia Community with Valencia Country and the territories where Catalan is spoken with the Catalan Countries101.

99 http://web.gencat.cat/ca/actualitat/reportatges/campanyes/preparats/ 100 Traditional designation of the block of Catalan counties which during the Middle Ages occupied the territory of the present Autonomous Community of Catalonia.

101 Proof that this is so in the media is the publisher’s guide of the Libro de estilo de la CCMA. Specifically, section 1.1.2.1.5. “Denominations”: http://www.ccma.cat/llibredestil/guia-editorial/denominacions

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However, if the role of the media has been important in expressing and disseminating the nationalistic approaches, the schools, as we will see below, have played an absolutely central role.

5. Lack of political neutrality and linguistic discrimination in schools

5.1. Nationalistic indoctrination The Catalan educational authorities have rejected de facto the duty of political and ideological neutrality of state schools and do not work to spread this duty to the public employees themselves, and particularly when they have minors in their custody.

Throughout this report, we have reiterated the breach of the principle of objectiveness which must preside the actions of the Public Administrations. The objectiveness, as we have said, is an elementary and fundamental criterion of administrative activity. This principle is clearly expressed in the already mentioned article 103.1 of the Spanish Constitution: “The Public Administration objectively serves the general interests and acts in accordance with the principles of efficacy, hierarchy, decentralisation, concentration and coordination, fully subject to the Law”. Similarly, objectiveness must be the quality that is characteristic of the action of the public officers as a personal element of the Administration, as is set out in article 103.3 of the same Magna Carta: “The Law will regulate the status of the public officers, the access to public office in accordance with the principles of merit and capacity, the special features of the exercise of their right to union participation, the system of incompatibilities and the guarantees for impartiality in the exercise of their functions”.

Therefore, the guarantee of political neutrality based on the separation between politics and Administration is a fundamental requirement in any democratic order. The action of a public employee intending to favour their own interests or those of certain social or political groups to the detriment of the general interests would not be objective.

However, this is something that has been done in Catalonia far too often, even to attempt to delegitimise the actions of parents who defend the interests of their children and who also have the backing of the court bodies for their claims, before

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public opinion. In other words, the intention is that the ideological positions of certain organisations should have the “backing” of the bodies of the Administration. But the worst thing of all is that these positions are very often encouraged and fostered by the Catalan educational administration itself, contravening its duty to neutrality. This is also done by using human means and public materials to create situations of coercion on the ideological plain towards part of the members of the schools’ governmental bodies, subject to the pressure of having to pronounce on a question which is not of their competence in the heart of an administrative body, when their obligation to political and ideological neutrality is precisely intended to avoid such an improper situation of a modern and democratic Rule of Law. This was the already discussed case of the head teachers of schools during the consultation of 9 November 2014.

It must be remembered that the right to freedom of expression in any case corresponds to the citizens as such, and also in the exercise of the political activity, if any. But what should not happen is that the public employee in the exercise of their functions appeals to said right to elude their duty to political and ideological neutrality, as a fraud of law, and much less before minors in their custody, with the aim of indoctrinating them in their ideas.

The institutions’ duty to neutrality has been reminded by the Supreme Court102 in a sentence of 11 February 2009, in which it expressly rejects indoctrination in schools.

It must therefore be understood that out of respect for pluralism, consecrated as a superior value of Spanish juridical ordinance, and the duty of ideological neutrality of the public institutions, these are forbidden from incurring any kind of proselytism. In a democratic society it should not be the educational administration, nor the teaching centres or the teachers, which stand as the arbiter of controversial questions. These belong to the free

102 http://servidormanes.uned.es/mciud/documentos/debate_ciudadania/Sentencia_TS[1].pdf The sentence of 11 February 2009 deals with the neutrality in the following terms: “In fact the State, in the area corresponding to the principles and common moral underlying the fundamental rights, has the power and the duty to give them, and can do so, as has been said, even in terms of their promotion. However, within the space of our ideological, religious and individual moral approaches, in which there are differences and social discussion, education must be limited to presenting them and informing on them neutrally without any indoctrination, in order to respect the space of consubstantial freedom to constitutional coexistence”. Along these lines, the same sentence warns that neither the educational administration nor the teaching centres or teachers themselves can impose or inculcate, albeit indirectly, certain points of view on questions that are controversial in Spanish society.

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area of discussion in civil society, where the vertical teacher-student relationship is not given, nor naturally that of individual awareness.

Formally, the governing principles of Law 12/2009 of 10 July, concerning Education in Catalonia (LEC)103, are accommodated in the above doctrine insofar as the Catalan educational system is erected through the framework of values defined by the Constitution and the Statute of Autonomy. Specifically, it must respect the very values of a democratic society, such as the pupils’ freedom of awareness, pluralism and the exclusion of any form of proselytism or indoctrination (article 2.1).

However, the reality is quite different and can be seen in not few extraordinary surprising documents which the media have echoed. This would be the case of very striking figures such as that of the Instituto La Llauna in Badalona which opened its doors, just as other teaching centres, on 12 October 2012, the Day of the Spanish Race, as it understood that there was nothing to celebrate. Let us allow the readers to consider whether the alternative activities which were organised are suitable for the educational area104… Another video is really unacceptable in which sixth-grade primary students from a Catalan subsidise school fly esteladas and sing an independentist hymn. The document was hung by the parents on the social networks105. A third resounding example was the report of another group of parents, this time from a school in Manlleu, which in December 2014 posted the verses that fifth-grade primary students had to sing at a Christmas entertainment event106. The same parents sent SCC a copy of these verses which we reproduce below. At the top of the image the name of the school is seen and in the second verse on the right it can clearly be read: We are tired of paying taxes / to give them to Madrid. / We want independence now / we are losing our patients / Fuck Rajoy / we want to be independent…

103 DOGC, of 16 July 2009.

104 http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20121012/54352977262/12-o-mas-una-docena-colegios-catalanes- abren-viernes.html

105 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8S0ZiDVp8AI

106 http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/educacion/polemica-cole-manlleu-pastorets-soberanistas-3753206

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The recently constituted SCC Teaching Group has started to collect examples of indoctrination in schools107 which it is studying and classifying. Of the material received, there are a large number of photographs of schools with esteladas or banners of the Som Escola108 entity, from whose motto “For our country for everyone, schooling in Catalan” an idea of social cohesion is understood that is truly alarming from a democratic viewpoint. By way of example, we reproduce what unfortunately is a habitual image in Catalan schools. Here it is the Instituto El Castell, in Esparraguera:

107 http://www.cronicaglobal.com/es/notices/2015/06/campana-de-scc-para-denunciar-el-adoctrinamiento- nacionalista-en-las-escuelas-20676.php

108 http://www.somescola.cat/

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All of these aberrant practices, much more frequent in primary and secondary schools than university, have undoubtedly been favoured by the policies of linguistic immersion to which we refer in the following section.

5.2. Institutions against bilingualism In the last thirty years, the Catalans have suffered an attempt on the part of successive ‘Generalitat’ governments to impose a monolingual educational system in Catalan which, in practice, excludes Spanish as a vehicular language of teaching and denies parents the right to decide on the form of education they want for their children with respect to the language used in teaching.

During this long period of time, many families have had to turn to the courts to be recognised their constitutional right to also be taught in Spanish in the Catalan educational model. The fight against the Catalan autonomic administration has been very unequal. The successive ‘Generalitat’ governments have progressively and inflexibly imposed a compulsory model of linguistic immersion in Catalan which ignores the pedagogical needs and the linguistic reality of the pupils, breaches the rights of the parents or guardians to express their linguistic preferences (through organised mechanism such as pre-enrolment or enrolment forms), and twists students’ common sense and dignity by applying the

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dissuasory method of individualised attention in Spanish for those who have been recognised the right to be taught in this official language.

Sentence 31/2010 of 28 June109 of the Constitutional Court on the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, and before that the one of 23 December 1994, was a point of inflection in this whole process with regard to the scope of the officialdom of the languages in the Catalan educational model. The High Court develops the concept of vehicular language in teaching in relation to its officialdom, and eliminates the consideration of Catalan as the preferential language of the Catalan educational system from the text of the Statute of Autonomy 2006.

This sentence guides the jurisprudential line of later sentences of the Supreme Court and the doctrine of the Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia, which have concluded that the interpretation of the LEC can only be constitutional if it is applied using the parameters of the linguistic conjunction model. This model is based on a balance (reasonable proportion) between the two joint official languages, apart from in the first teaching in which the right of families to have their children taught in their usual language is given priority. Being aware of the resistance and reticence of the Department of Education to apply the court rules and resolutions, the courts have even ordered the Catalan educational administration to take all necessary measures for Spanish also to be considered a vehicular language in the compulsory educational system of Catalonia, alongside Catalan. What’s more, they have even specified what has to be understood as a “reasonable proportion”, setting 25% as the minimum percentage of subjects in Spanish in the class groups110. These resolutions have been publicly widely-known and the Department of Education of the Government of Catalonia has used freebooting practices to make parents’ right to bilingual teaching in Catalonia requested in recent years ineffective.

Organic Law 8/2013 of 9 November for better educational quality (LOMCE)111, incorporates Additional Provision 38 to Organic Law 2/2006 of 3 May, on

109 http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/Paginas/Sentencia.aspx?cod=16273

110 http://www.cronicaglobal.com/es/notices/2015/05/el-tribunal-supremo-confirma-que-el-castellano- debe-ser-la-lengua-vehicular-de-al-menos-el-25-del-19514.php

111 Official State Gazette of 10 December 2013.

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Education (LOE)112, including the obligation of the autonomic educational administration is to guarantee students right to receive teaching in Spanish, the official language of the state, and in the other joint official languages, depending on the territory, for the first time in a law. A direct consequence of this obligation is the duty of said administrations to program education to make the satisfaction of this right possible.

Unlike what might be expected in Rule of Law, the answer of the Department of Education of the Government of Catalonia throughout this process has been a solid strategy of obstruction, threats and coercion. Obstruction by resorting to all judicial paths to prevent the application of the law. Threats by making constant allusions, more or less overseen by those responsible for Catalan autonomy, to the possibility of insubmission before a legal framework that they do not recognise as legitimate. Coercion by placing the parents who want to exercise their right before the educational community as marginal individuals contrary to the rules of coexistence.

Finally, the Department of Education has now shamelessly moved into the phase of refusal. It has done so with resolutions and forms relative to pre-enrolment for the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 academic years113, which have not included procedures that allow schools to know the linguistic preferences of the parents, thus infringing the reiterated sentences of the Supreme Court in this respect. And it does so now by approving the resolutions by which the instructions are given for the organisation and management of schools for the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 academic years. Something which is especially significant is the chapter these resolutions devote to the treatment and use of the languages in the educational system. The design of the linguistic project of the schools reproduces and confirms the model applied throughout all of these years, deliberately ignoring Additional Provision 38 of the LOE, the sentences of the Constitutional Court and the judicial resolutions of the Supreme Court and the Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia. The Department of Education intentionally:

112 Official State Gazette of 4 May 2006.

113 http://dogc.gencat.cat/es/pdogc_canals_interns/pdogc_resultats_fitxa/index.html?action=fitxa&mode=sin gle&documentId=685623&language=ca_ES&newLang=es_ES

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• fails to take the necessary measures to make effective the model of linguistic conjunction and confirms the role of the Catalan and Aranese (in the Vall d’Aran) languages as the backbones of the educational project and given their condition as the languages of Catalonia and the Arán Valley, respectively; • and gives Spanish residual role, playing down its condition as a vehicular language of teaching. No program is contemplated in favour of linguistic conjunction, but quite the contrary: a) Once more, the role and weight of the Spanish language is ignored beyond the general affirmation that the pupils will have learnt it by the end of compulsory education. b) It is provided that in centres where Catalan is not the language of the majority of students, strategies must be used for linguistic immersion in Catalan, without providing a parallel obligation in centres where Spanish is not the language of the majority of the students. c) The concept of “reasonable proportion” is not developed with regard to teaching the vehicular languages, nor is any legal mechanism contemplated to guarantee the exercise of the right to be taught in one’s habitual language in the early years of learning. d) The right to education in Spanish is contemplated as a problem and not as an enriching sign of the plurality of Catalan society. e) The appeal for education in Spanish is reduced to the confirmation of the practice of individualised attention in early education for the requests of the families, omitting the fact that this “pedagogical” resource is only intended to skip the obligations of the educational administration of Catalonia, and which the courts have defined as inadequate, insufficient and discriminatory. g) The LEC is recognised as the only reference legal framework, ignoring (after the modifications made to both by the LOMCE) what is established in the referred Organic Law of Education and in Organic Law 8/1985 of 3 July, regulating the Right to Education (LODE).

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h) Article 118 of the Constitution is breached, which obliges everyone, including the Catalan educational administration, to obey the firm sentences and resolutions of judges and courts and to give the collaboration they need for the performance of what they have resolved.

The nature of the Department of Education as a “rebellious” body is ratified when it is seen that the Minister herself openly supports manifestations that are intended to declare the disobedience of Catalan schools of other laws and of the courts and in which the referred slogan of Som Escola “Per una escola de tots, l’escola en català” is praised, although it is absolutely improper of a model of neutral education respectful of the Catalan linguistic plurality114.

It is therefore shown that the Government of Catalonia, with a profoundly disloyal attitude, breaches the obligations imposed upon it by the Constitution, the Statute of Autonomy and current laws with respect to the effective exercise of the right to also be taught in Spanish in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia. This brings obvious harm to the Catalan students, who cannot be taught in accordance with the model of linguistic conjunction, the legal model in Catalonia, or in their habitual language if this is Spanish, in their early education.

The reactions of the Catalan government and some Catalan political parties to the rulings of the Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia, backed by the Supreme Court, in which the obligations imposed of teaching at least 25% of the core subjects in Spanish, are particularly serious in so far as they justify the policy of harassment being suffered by families who have asked for protection from the Court of Justice and to see their legitimate rights questioned by people who are largely alien to the educational community. The harassment is intended to make parents waive the rights recognised by the courts. The procedure is always the same:

114 http://www.elperiodico.cat/ca/noticias/educacio/manifestacio-somescola-defensa-escola-catalan- barcelona-3302891 In the same line of express will of disobedience of the courts, cf: http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20150508/54430518464/rigau-decision-supremo-casos- particulares.html

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1.- Request from the parents to the school for bilingual education. 2.- Rejection of the request by the Department of Education. 3.- Lodging of a contentious administrative appeal before the Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia. 4.- Adoption of precautionary measures by the court, which concedes the teaching in Spanish of a least 25% of the teaching subjects. 5.- Delay in the fulfilment of the measures by the Educational Administration. 6.- Assembly of the head teacher of the centre with the parents of the pupils of the class of the child who has also achieved education in Spanish. 7.- Protests from the school’s parent-teachers association. 8.- Report from the nationalist parties of the place accusing the courts, the parents and the government of Spain of “politicising language”. 9.- Demonstrations in protest for the “persecution of Catalan” and call for rebellion. 10.- Report from the Council and declarations from the Department of Education qualifying the model of linguistic immersion as a successful model and putting in check the pedagogical purpose of the intentions of the parents. 11.- Pressure on the parents to give up their request. 12.- Campaign in the social networks against the parents. 13.- Change of school or abandonment of the request115.

The most absurd thing about this whole process is that the families who ask for bilingual education, to which they are entitled by application of the linguistic conjunction model in Catalonia, are cynically accused of “politicising education” by groups such as Som Escola and Escola en català which call demonstrations in defence of a model in which Catalan is the only teaching language and in which those attending cry out the “independence” model and wave flags representing these objectives. This has happened to many parents and in many municipalities: Vilanova i la Geltrú116, Tona117, Sabadell118, Sant Cugat del Vallès119, Mataró120, Tarragona121, Sant Fost de Campsentelles122, Balaguer123...).

115 The description of this process was provided by Ana Losada, President of the Assembly for Bilingual Schooling, from the many experiences accumulated. 116 http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2014/09/12/catalunya/1410543000_253446.html

117 http://www.cronicaglobal.com/es/notices/2014/02/el-director-del-un-colegio-de-tona-senala- publicamente-a-un-padre-que-pidio-educacion-bilingue-para-5139.php

118 http://cac.drac.com/?p=1353

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The most unfortunate thing about these orchestrated campaigns, which include pressure from the head teachers of schools and demonstrations in front of the schools to shamelessly encourage disobedience of the law124, is that their objective is to frighten125 the parents and make them go to another school or give up their right. Sometimes they achieve it.

In short, although the model of linguistic conjunction is enforced in Catalonia, the educational administration of the community, systematically ignoring the court sentences, gives instructions to make Catalan the only teaching language. The parents are not even able to declare their linguistic option. When they ask for bilingual education, they are denied it, so all that remains is for them to go to court. When the courts err on their side, the educational administration and head teachers of the schools call protests which systematically imply an intolerable signalling and demonization of parents and pupils for having “dared” claimed their rights. All of this without forgetting that in western democracies, no case is known in which an official or joint official language, such as the case of Spanish in Catalonia, is not the vehicular language of education.

119 http://www.totsantcugat.cat/actualitat/poble/el-tsjc-imposa-mes-castella-a-l-escola-santa-isabel- 26436102.html

120 http://www.cronicaglobal.com/es/notices/2015/05/acoso-de-ciu-erc-icv-euia-y-la-cup-a-una-familia-de- mataro-por-pedir-educacion-bilingue-19763.php

121 http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2014/09/10/catalunya/1410344441_681989.html

122 http://www.larazon.es/espana/mi-hijo-recibe-amenazas-por-querer-estudiar-en-castellano- LY5364148#.Ttt1FvSrBeuyUb5

123 http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2015/09/05/catalunya/1441477588_021382.html

124http://www.larazon.es/historico/3517-argumentario-en-los-colegios-para-desobedecer-al-supremo- OLLA_RAZON_412625#.Ttt1qeBk5I2MWXZ

125 http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2014/02/08/52f57f9bca4741af158b4571.html

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6.- The demonization of dissidents in Catalonia. The case of SCC. One of the recurrent axes of the Catalan nationalist discourse is its tiresome reference to the “cultural oppression” of a “Spanish State” which is insistently identified with Francoism as if the rest of the Spanish had not been victims of the dictatorship or as if there had been no connivance of certain Catalan elites with it.

This accusation of “cultural oppression”, a malicious lie in the democratic context, contrasts strikingly with the tremendous lack of respect shown by the Catalan institutions and a lot of autonomic media for internal diversity. From nationalism, there is a call for respect for the diversity of Spain when the only diversity that is really in danger is the Catalan.

To try to eclipse this contraction, it is essential to demonise the dissident, to deauthorise it once and again until it is silenced. This is a prime democratic shortcoming which, with the separatist movement, is becoming more and more obvious. It is a question of an obsessive attempt to present Catalonia as a monolith confronting Spain.

Just as occurs with other subjects that are dealt with in this report, there are an infinite number of examples of demonization of the dissident that could be pointed out. We have had the chance to examine a few especially scandalous cases in previous chapters, such as those related to the persecution suffered by parents who ask for bilingual education in Catalan schools. In this last chapter, we thought it would be good to exemplify the persecution of the dissident with our own experience, being aware that how the SCC has been treated by the institutions and media is not exceptional, but has rather, unfortunately, been suffered by the people and social entities who have raised their voice, in broader terms, against nationalism.

During the Democratic period, several entities have stood up for their opposition to excluding nationalism. All of those who have promoted manifestoes or constituted associations or foundations intended to favour the coexistence of the Catalans with the rest of the Spanish or the defence of bilingualism have been qualified as anti- Catalan or fascist. These “sins” have been attributed to those signing the

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Manifiesto de los 2300, to the Asociación Miguel de Cervantes, to the Coordinadora de Afectados por la Defensa del Castellano (CADECA), to the Asociación por la Tolerancia, to the Asociación de Profesores por el Bilingüismo, to the Foro Babel, to Convivencia Cívica Catalana, to Impulso Ciudadano, to Federalistes d’Esquerra, to D’Espanya i Catalans, to Somatemps, to the Asamblea por la Escuela Bilingüe de Catalunya and so many other associations. These qualifications have also been aimed at parties and political leaders who aim to maintain the structure of the Spanish territory, so, in this context, Sociedad Civil Catalana was going to be no exception.

We believe that the case of our association is paradigmatic because it has managed to bring together non-nationalists of very different political sensitivities and also have a very important public presence since its creation on 23 April 2014 at the Teatro Victoria in Barcelona. Something essential to break with the already mentioned spiral of silence suffered by the citizens of Catalonia.

Since that very day, the attempts to identify our entity with the extreme right wing have been constant and became especially acute when SCC was awarded the European Citizens Prize 2014 given each year by the European Parliament to “citizens, groups, associations organisations who have shown exceptional commitment in promoting better mutual understanding and greater integration between citizens of the member states or promoting cross-border or transnational corporation within the European Union”126. This recognition is obviously a very important obstacle for the strategy of demonization that Catalan nationalism has so meticulously woven against the dissidents.

The attacks on SCC have been basically driven from the digital media, the so-called ‘catosphere’, all financed by the Government of Catalonia. The logo can be identified in its websites. For the purpose of illustration, in the following we give several examples of the obsession of Catalan nationalism to, always grotesquely, taint an entity that

126 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/es/20150201PVL00043/Premios

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has simply decided to raise its voice to show that the official Catalonia does not convince us all, as fascist, Francoist, extreme right wing or Nazi127.

127 These are the links to the screenshots appearing on the following pages: http://www.naciodigital.cat/noticia/83072/parlament/europeu/premia/avui/franquista/admirador/blas/pi nar http://www.vilaweb.cat/noticia/4210629/20140914/video-societat-civil-catalana-pactant-grups-nazis- tarragona.html http://www.directe.cat/noticia/393101/el-feixisme-de-societat-civil-catalana-te-mal-perdre http://www.elsingular.cat/cat/notices/2015/05/l_ultra_empresonat_per_gihadisme_va_manifestar- se_amb_scc_108651.php http://www.racocatala.cat/forums/fil/185323/proves-unionisme-es-feixisme http://www.elcritic.cat/investigacio/els-vincles-ocults-de-lextrema-dreta-amb-societat-civil-catalana-2365

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However, although it is serious to write such things under an apparent form of journalistic texts, it is even more alarming that the disqualifications of SCC should proffer and be supported by the public media. One sign of this was a really ominous discussion on the TV3 Els matins programme on 1 July 2014, following Artur Mas receiving SCC to talk about the call to the 9N consultation. The discussion lacked one of the basic principles of the journalistic profession, which is the presence of different voices, but not only this, but the whole general tone of the debate was one of aggressiveness and contempt of our entity, which can only be appreciated by listening to it. It was said that SCC caused an “immense mercy”, which only sought to “intoxicate”, and even that it made a “fifth column”. Nothing more and nothing less than a foreign enemy128. The CAC, in reply to a complaint made by our association, only gave the public television station a slight reprimand129.

More recently, on the past 8 June in another debate, this time on the “23/24” programme of the 3/24 informative channel (minutes 18 to 25.40), equally injurious comments are made about SCC. One of the people at the table, Gabriel Rufián, said, “They are the largest nationalist power of the State. There is no more excluding nationalism than the Spanish … The State never fails and creates these kinds of monsters … And we have to be a little on the defensive because they are. That they set up these kinds of acts130 has to alert us …”. Other speaker, Gemma Aguilera, said that SCC “from the beginning has turned into an anti-Catalan platform, against the right to decide and against everything that is not radical Spanish nationalism …”. She also said that we make no proposal and simply “come out on 12 October with Spanish flags and not precisely constitutional flags”. No dissident voices were heard in the debate. SCC complained to the public television station for the treatment it had received, but has not yet received any answer at the time of writing this report131.

128 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oYrn8INux6E 129 Agreement 133/2014 of 29 October: http://www.cac.cat/web/actuacions/index.jsp?NzI%3D&MQ%3D%3D&L3dlYi9hY3R1YWNpb25zL2xsa XN0YXRDb250ZW50&OA%3D%3D&MjA%3D

130 Referring to the act “For Health, Together and Better”, held on 8 June 2015 in Barcelona and which was attended amongst other people by the present Minister for Health, Social Services and Equality Alfonso Alonso, and the former socialist minister Trinidad Jiménez.

131 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/scc-denuncia-el-trato-recibido-en-el-programa-2324-de-tvc- 8p8m

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However, as if this were not enough, the aggressions on SCC have also been proffered from the very Catalan institutions themselves. And so, the secretary general of the Board of Public Diplomacy of Catalonia (DIPLOCAT), Albert Royo, on twitter on 2 March 2015, described SCC as an entity that defends an “expansive and fascistic Spanish nationalism”, and later refused to take back the statement, which is particularly inadmissible in someone holding a supposedly “diplomatic” post132.

Another similar aggression on SCC came from Artur Mas’s press chief, Joan Maria Piqué Fernández, who said, also on twitter, on the past 21 March, when the Mayor of Lérida, Àngel Ros, had received SCC, “I do not recognise Àngel Ros, or Bellera, the opticians from which I bought my first white glasses. Shameful”133.

However, the most symptomatic example of how far the nationalism in Catalonia is capable of going with those of us who dissent is seen in the shameful resolution passed on 15 July 2015 by the Commission of Institutional Affairs of our autonomic parliament asking for SCC to be stripped of the mentioned European Citizens Prize, with the argument that this entity has “obvious connections with the extreme right wing”. The nationalists parties, which hold a majority in the chamber, on the proposal of the parliamentary group Iniciativa por Catalunya Verdes - Izquierda Unida y Alternativa (ICV-EUiA), assume the accusations that the referred digital media have

132 SCC called for Royo’s resignation over these occurrences: https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/ca/news/scc- pide-la-dimision-de-albert-royo-pddu.

133 http://www.cronicaglobal.com/es/notices/2015/03/el-jefe-de-prensa-de-mas-considera-una-verguenza- que-ros-reciba-a-scc...-dos-dias-despues-de-ser-r-17688.php

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painstakingly repeated and which are based only on the presence of certain people related to the extreme right being present at public events organised by SCC, something impossible to avoid when defending Spanish unity, and in the family connections of our president, as if they did not know the idea of the individual responsibility of the acts.

It must be stressed that one of the arguments made by the deputy who defended the resolution, Jaume Bosch, consisted of referring to a conversation of the secretary of SCC, José Domingo, with a group of “fascists” to which he supposedly said “hide yourselves, don’t let the journalists’ cameras focus on you”134. This incident, which is set out in the screenshot of Vilaweb that we reproduced a few pages back, was absolutely turned round by the nationalist press: “Video of SCC pacting with Nazi groups in Tarragona”, was the title given by Vilaweb, insofar as what José Domingo was logically trying was that a group of people attending, whose ideology was unknown to him and who changed in formation, should enter the meeting discretely and respecting the spirit of the meeting. This was what was recognised by the Court of First Instance number 43 of Barcelona which, in sentence of 24 July 2015, obliged Vilaweb to change this information135.

Never has a single action been documented that might relate SCC with any group that defends non-democratic positions. Not only this, but in the calls to the most significant public acts that it has organised, SCC has been firm. Therefore, for instance, in a note made public on 22 August 2014, precisely on the eve of Tarragona’s festivity in 2014, it was textually indicated: “we welcome all people and democratic organisations that join our Manifesto and respect the civic spirit of the call”. It was also similarly said that, “We reject the presence at our events of any person or organisation of dubious democratic reputation or xenophobic ideology”136. Another sign: in an interview on 8TV on 11 October 2013, on the eve of the day of the Spanish race in Barcelona, José Domingo explicitly says to the fascists “I don’t even want to see you” at the important event he was organising. In the video of the interview (from minute 2.20) it is also seen how the

134 The transcription of the debate that produced the approval of this resolution is available on the website of the Parliament of Catalonia: http://www.parlament.cat/document/trancripcio/150492.pdf. The proposed resolution is also presented in the Official Bulletin of the Parliament of Catalonia of 23 March 2015, p. 71: http://www.parlament.cat/document/bopc/52591.pdf

135 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/la-justicia-ordena-a-vilaweb-a-rectificar-una-noticia-falsa-sobre- scc-bwco

136 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/aclaracion-sobre-la-diada-en-tarragonaç

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journalist Josep Cuní recognises that the position of the secretary of SCC on this matter has always been firm137. Further proof of the position of our entity is its condemnation of the aggression on several members of the ANC on 30 August 2014 in Granollers138.

To close this section, we want to mention the forthcoming appearance of the book by Jordi Borràs, the author of several supposedly journalistic texts that unceasingly repeat the same attacks we have commented (Desmuntant Societat Civil Catalana. Qui són, què oculten i què fan per impedir la independencia de Catalunya [Unveiling Sociedad Civil Catalana. Who they are, what they hide and what they do to prevent the independence of Catalonia], which will be published by Saldonar. On the website where the publication is announced139 an official logo can be seen that prays “With the support of the Government of Catalonia. Department of Culture”. We therefore have a magnificent sign of how the institutions reward journalists and writers who support the nationalist cause. Could anyone in Catalonia imagine a similar title referring to Òmnium Cultural, the ANC or the AMI and published with public funding?

137 http://www.8tv.cat/8aldia/videos/jose-domingo-no-desitgem-que-sigui-la-festa-dun-partit-sino-la-festa- de-tots/

138 https://societatcivilcatalana.cat/es/news/denunciem-lagressio-a-membres-de-lanc

139 http://llegirencatala.cat/llibres/desmuntant-societat-civil-catalana/

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7. Conclusions In the El País newspaper of 6 September 2015, a letter was published “To the Spanish” which is first signed by the President of the Government of Catalonia, Artur Mas140. The letter starts by saying that, “You have to be bold to give lessons on democracy to the Catalans”. It is not our intention with this report to give lessons to anyone, and even less so “to the Catalans”, as if they were a monolith, but it is our intention to pose serious objections on the idea of democracy that underlies the propaganda and the praxis of Catalan separatism.

In this sense, we now sum up the central ideas set out in this report:

1) The Government of Catalonia and other Catalan public authorities and institutions have stopped working as Spanish authorities and institutions and now do so as the protoadministration of a Catalan State disconnected from Spanish ordinance. This disconnection means placing the Catalan citizens in a situation of subjects administered by public powers that boast their lack of submission to the law, harming their legal security and forcing public officials and citizens to act outside what is established in the legal ordinance, as was shown in the consultation called for the past 9 November.

At the same time, the renunciation of the ‘Generalitat’ and certain local entities to continue acting as Spanish administrations supposes an instrumentalisation of the institutions that not only means placing the public resources at the service of a certain partidist option, but also the discrimination of the citizens and groups that do not share the separatist approaches. The occupation of public space by partidist symbols (estelada flags) makes this discrimination visible.

2) The disconnection of the ‘Generalitat’ from Spanish ordinance starts with the creation of the Advisory Council for National Transition (CATN), continues with the promotion of the so-called state structures, including the attempt of the Government of Catalonia to become an international player, and is made clear with the conscious disobedience of the suspension of the consultation ordered by the Constitutional Court on 9 November 2014.

140 http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/09/05/opinion/1441473386_212454.html

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The calling of the autonomic elections on 27 September 2015 with a plebiscitary nature confirms this disconnection of the autonomic administration from Spanish legality.

3) The CATN is a body dependent on the Presidency Department of the ‘Generalitat’ Government of Catalonia which is expressly intended to advise on the way a new state could be created over the territory of Catalonia. The creation of a new state over part of the territory of Spain is not a function that might be understood to be attributed to an Autonomous Community. Not the most benevolent of interpretations could accommodate such a purpose or such an advisory body for the administration in our legal ordinance. The creation of this Council is an institutional disloyalty contrary to the Constitution and to the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia.

4) The plan designed by the CATN implies that the ‘Generalitat’, an institution whose powers emanate from the Constitution and which must logically act within the limits of the competencies granted to it by current ordinances, would become a sovereign authority in the territory of the new state it aims to promote. Therefore the Government of Catalonia has to create state structures to complete the functions it already exercises. This creation has started and continues despite the suspension ordered by the Constitutional Court. It is a conscious action of disobedience and disloyalty towards the current ordinances, which reveals that the Government of Catalonia refuses to act as a Spanish administration and aims to be configured as the public power of a new state.

5) The preparation of the Law of consultations and the aim, pursuant to this law, of making a consultation on the secession of Catalonia are an institutional fraud. The disobedience of the suspension of the consultation by the Constitutional Court placed the citizens in general and the public officers in particular in a situation that is inadmissible in a democratic state: that of choosing between the imperatives of two different public powers.

6) It is reproachable that a public authority, and especially one calling the elections on 27 September should declare that its position with respect to the (autonomic) ballot is not that which corresponds to Spanish legality, but which rather adjusts to the secessionist plans and would lead to the unilateral declaration of independence of Catalonia. This declaration is also made from an absolute majority of deputies, established arbitrarily by those calling (Convergencia Democrática de Catalunya, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and the

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entities Asamblea Nacional de Catalunya and Òmnium Cultural), which have not hesitated to use the Palau de la Generalitat institutional building and other emblematic public buildings to express and make public the Junts pel Sí candidature.

7) The aim of the secessionists is confrontation with the Spanish State and they have not hesitated to look for foreign allies that might be useful in the work of forcing it to authorise a referendum on self-determination and the possible independence of Catalonia. It is obvious that an Autonomous Community cannot act to harm the general interests of the State, and the achievement of the secession of part of the national territory cannot be considered, even in the most flexible of interpretations, compatible with these general interests.

8) If the secession of Catalonia were to occur, the Catalan citizens would have a different legal status and their rights and freedoms would be reduced as they would no longer be Spanish and European citizens or would alternatively become foreigners in their own land. This is why the mere threat, above all from public authorities, is an inadmissible limitation of legal security, which is an irrenounceable principle in a democratic order.

9) In the local area, the breach by a large number of administrations of the principle of institutional neutrality is particularly striking. In the case of the Asociación de Municipios por la Independencia (AMI) (whose funding with the resources of the councils has been declared illegal in several sentences), this is blood-drawing. This association, whose by-laws depend on a more than worrying sectarism, has the fundamental purpose of working for independence and it aims to control the municipal ordinances to place them at the service of this purpose, something simply inadmissible in Rule of Law.

The ascription of the municipalities to the AMI is made by the absolute majority of councillors, sometimes with the vote of parties that have never declared themselves in favour of independence or quite the contrary. This is not a problem for the separatists. In the end the governing party, Convergencia Democrática de Catalunya, has never revealed its independentist vocation up to now in any electoral programme and this has not prevented it from literally sequestering the autonomic institutions at the service of the so- called “process”, as has been shown in this report.

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10) The adhesion of Catalan municipalities to the AMI clashes directly with the freedom of thought or consciousness as it implies that their ideology becomes official by being assumed by the government representing one and all. The president and former president of this entity form part of the Junts pel Sí candidature.

11) On the proposal of the AMI, after the last municipal elections the separatist representatives adopted the following formula in swearing in in their posts: “By democratic expression of the citizens’ will, I announce that I am available to the new Parliament, to the President and to the Government of Catalonia arising from the elections of 27 September 2015, to exercise the self-determination of our people and, along with all of the institutions, to proclaim the FREE AND SOVEREIGN CATALAN STATE”.

The use of this formula not only means the appropriation of the public institutions by the separatist movement, but also affects the rights of the citizens as the takings of possession can be annulled as they fail to adjust to the requirements of the Organic Law on the General Electoral System, as has been brought forward by the Central Electoral Board. This clearly creates a situation of legal insecurity that is harmful for those affected. The separatists, however, bring in front of this interest of the citizens their purpose of making it obvious that the administrations and public posts are acting outside the framework of Spanish legality.

12) The overwhelming presence of esteladas flags on official buildings and in public spaces, combined with the removal and most absolute contempt of the Spanish flag exercise a symbolic pressure over the citizens, not to say the children in the schools, which contributes to explaining the spiral of silence in Catalonia.

That these measures should be orchestrated by the public authorities, which even in an electoral period and with clear resolutions of the Central Electoral Board refuse to remove the separatist flags, implies an absolute lack of respect to dissidents, which is inadmissible in a democratic context and an intolerable alignment against the rules of political pluralism.

13) The media in Catalonia also contribute to silencing the dissident, and therefore annulling true democratic debate. The vocation of the media as an instrument at the service of the “national construction” is explicit and the results are obvious.

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In the case of the public media, an extraordinary strengthening of governmental control is seen, as is noted with the dismissal of the director of Catalunya Radio, a militant of Unió Democrática de Catalunya, coinciding with this party’s separation from the historical coalition governing Catalonia (Convergencia y Unió). Growing reports have been described of the pro independentist leaning of the autonomic public media (very considerable in the case of professional entities), without forgetting the historical manipulation of the language. For example, the Style Book of the Catalan Audiovisual Media Corporation exclusively reserves the use of the concepts of “country” and “nation” to refer to Catalonia. This is a systematic praxis of the separatists which they naturally transfer to the educational process.

14) Ion turn, the supposed independent regulator, the Audiovisual Board of Catalonia (Consejo Audiovisual de Catalunya - CAC), has shown more than obvious signs of lack of democratic quality. An alarming example is that, thanks to the vote of the councillors proposed by the separatist parties, and the quality vote of the president, the particular votes of the councillors proposed by the constitutionalist parties have been silenced. What’s more, the CAC has not formally answered the three complaints that Sociedad Civil Catalana presented to it in 2015 (one for the broadcasting of the pro-secessionist documentary L’endemà, with a directress who is a member of the Junts pel Sí candidature), while it pronounces on the contents of the state media, which fall outside the realm of its competencies. It has also adjudicated many licences to radio stations with a clearly independentist editorial profile. This is the case of the company of Miquel Calçada, who recently joined the Junts pel Sí list.

15) The strengthening of the nationalist feeling is undoubtedly added to by the important injections of money made by the public administrations in the Catalan private media (unequalled in the rest of the State), either via subsidies or institutional publicity. The fact that the Spanish written media are directly excluded and the subsidies are often given without public tender is a clear democratic deficit. Also the complete lack of transparency in the processes of placing the institutional publicity campaigns in the media, and the propagandistic tone of messages that should be intended only to inform on a public service, as is the case of the polemical Preparats campaign.

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16) The democratic shortcomings in Catalonia are particularly obvious when the dissident decides not to be silent. The traditional pressures on parents who call for education in Spanish for their children (recognised in multiple court sentences) was recently seen once more in Mataró and Balaguer. Those who once (rightfully) supported the convenience of education in the mother tongue now accuse Spanish speaking parents claiming exactly the same thing of “imposition” in what could be the only place in the world where a joint official language (Spanish) is not vehicular in education.

The recurrent identifications of Sociedad Civil Catalana with extreme right wing political approaches, described in the last chapter of this report, are another obvious sign of how cynical the victimist approaches of nationalism are, which are so clearly reflected in the referred letter “To the Spanish” from the President of the Government of Catalonia (and other members of Junts pel Sí) when it concludes that “it is impossible to live together suffering insults, maltreatment and threats when we ask for democracy and respect for our dignity”.

Well, with this document, Sociedad Civil Catalana wishes to raise its voice on behalf of the citizens to which the President of the Government of Catalonia has decided not to represent: those who do not share such unfortunate statements that only rekindle the conflict. Sociedad Civil Catalana wishes to raise its voice to show that there are great democratic deficits in this community, clearly aggravated by the separatist line for which Artur Mas is obviously responsible. And it also wishes to stress that of these deficits, we are particularly concerned by the lack of respect for the internal diversity of Catalonia, which is an unsustainable contraction of nationalism. In short … We have tried to expose and orderly document some reasons why we believe Catalonia is currently suffering from a considerable democratic deficit. Obviously the report is not exhaustive and focuses, as we said at the beginning, on the questions we know best, having experienced them first hand since we started on 23 April 2014. We will have to go further into what is happening today and its historical roots. Meanwhile, we would ask those who read this document to pass it around and we declare our firm will to defend our approaches in as many forums as invite us to do so to the extent of our possibilities.

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