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Replies to Critics SYMPOSIUM LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL JUSTICE REPLIES TO CRITICS BY SAMUEL FREEMAN © 2020 – Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series), Vol. 10, No. 1 (2020): 175-347 Luiss University Press E-ISSN 2240-7987 | P-ISSN 1591-0660 [THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL JUSTICE Replies to Critics Samuel Freeman 1 Reply to Edmundson ill Edmundson primarily focuses on my arguments in chapter 4 of Liberalism and Distributive Justice on property-owning democracy and its connection with B the difference principle. Basically, he sees Rawls’s argument against welfare state capitalism as resting almost exclusively on the fair value of the political liberties, and contends that only socialism of some form can satisfy Rawls’s stated aim to guarantee democratic citizens’ equality of opportunity for political influence. Property-owning democracy he contends cannot meet the requirements of the fair value of the political liberties. This is the primary thesis of Edmundson’s important recent book, John Rawls: Reluctant Socialist. I contend in my book that the difference principle plays a crucial role in Rawls’s argument for social equality and against any form of capitalism, and that the difference principle together with fair political value and fair equal opportunity supports a property-owning democracy as well as liberal socialism. Instead of restricted utility, which I contend © 2020 – Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series), Vol. 10, No. 1 (2020): 175-347 Luiss University Press E-ISSN 2240-7987 | P-ISSN 1591-0660 Philosophy and Public Issues – Liberalism and Social Justice underlies Rawls’s conception of the capitalist welfare state, Edmundson somewhat surprisingly contends that a better way to understand welfare state capitalism is in terms of Rawls’s principles of justice themselves, absent the guarantee of the fair value of political liberties, a position he calls ”justice-without-fair-value.” Justice-without-fair-value is exactly like justice-as-fairness, he says, but without the first-principle guarantee of the fair value of the political liberties. On this interpretation, the second principle of justice is perfectly compatible with the vast inequalities typical of welfare state capitalist economies, so long as they benefit the least advantaged members of society.1 This is a familiar reading of Rawls’s justice as fairness, especially by many on the critical left; it has long been assumed that his aim in A Theory of Justice (TJ) was to justify the capitalist welfare state that evolved in liberal democracies between the Great Depression up until the 1980’s. Rawls sought to combat this (mis)interpretation, in the Preface to the 1999 revised edition of A Theory of Justice (TJ) – which was originally the Preface to the 1987 French edition – and he argued at greater length in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001) that the principles of justice do not justify welfare state capitalism.2 Justice 1 Edmundson says in his book, “what could be termed Neoliberalism…is just like the two principles, but without a guarantee of the fair value of equal political liberties” (Edmundson 2017, 76, n.3). I argue below that neoliberalism or “justice without-fair-value” cannot be squared either with the 2nd principle’s requirement to mitigate inequalities implicit in fair equality of opportunity, or with the “deep reciprocity” of the difference principle. 2 Here referred to as ‘JF’ or the ‘Restatement.’ As the editor, Erin Kelly, says (JF, xii), the Restatement consists of Rawls’ lecture notes for his class in the history of political philosophy in the 1980’s, and were substantially completed by 1989 with some revisions in the early 1990’s as he completed Political Liberalism (here PL). The remaining lecture notes for this class were on Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, 176 Samuel Freeman – Replies to Critics as fairness instead justifies either a property owning democracy or market socialism – as Rawls initially claimed to little fanfare or notice in the first edition of Theory.3 Edmundson and I disagree primarily about his contention that Rawls’s argument against the welfare state and for property- owning democracy or liberal socialism rests solely on the conditions necessary to guarantee political fair value. I contend on the other hand that the difference principle together with fair value and FEO are all three crucial components of Rawls’s argument against welfare state capitalism (WSC). A second major disagreement lies within Edmundson’s rejection of both Rawls’s and my separate arguments for property owning democracy. Edmundson suggests here the striking thesis – developed at length in his book John Rawls: Reluctant Socialist – that no private property system, not even POD, is capable of guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties with equal political influence; hence some form of socialism is required by Rawls’s principles of justice. He argues there, not for liberal socialism of the kind Rawls endorses, but for a kind of democratic socialism, at least at the level of “the commanding heights of the economy,” (Keynes’s term) that resembles in many respects British socialism of the post-WWII years, where the state owned and controlled major industries. Here, I will focus first (in § I) on the difference principle and how my understanding of it differs from Edmundson’s. Then I will discuss why I think the difference principle and fair equality of opportunity are crucial components of Rawls’s argument for both Hume, Mill, and Marx, and were published as Lectures in the History of Political Philosophy (Rawls 2008). 3 See, TJ orig. 258, 271, 272-274, 279; cf. TJ rev., 228, 240-242, 247. See also “Fairness to Goodness,” (1975) in Rawls 1999, 277, where Rawls says that both “associational socialism or property-owning democracy” may be realized by the principles of justice. 177 Philosophy and Public Issues – Liberalism and Social Justice property- owning democracy and liberal socialism. The fair value of political liberties itself is not enough. First, in §§ II-III, I discuss and contest some of Edmundson’s main reasons for contending that property owning democracy does not meet the requirements of Rawls’s principles of justice. Then in § IV, I discuss reasons why Rawls’s second principle requires the fair distribution of economic powers and prerogatives to all citizens, including in their place of work. I address in § V Edmundson’s and others’ argument that my position is basically a defense of syndicalism – or exclusively worker-owned and managed firms. In arguing that workers should have fair opportunities to exercise powers and prerogatives in their work, it was not my intention to defend syndicalism – or exclusively worker ownership and control of firms – but rather a wide variety of arrangements in which workers can exercise a guaranteed minimum of powers and prerogatives in their employment. Finally, in § VI I respond to Edmundson’s and others’ contention that my position violates freedom of association and occupation. I argue that, while the first principle protects freedom to choose one’s occupation and workplace, it does not protect either the freedom to engage in impermissible occupations or the freedom to contract into or join forms of economic association that conflict with the second principle of justice. Before beginning, I should say that Edmundson’s book is an important contribution, in large part because it stands as a much- needed correction to the longstanding criticism from the Marxist and critical left, that Rawls’s justice as fairness is but one more liberal attempt to justify the inequalities inherent in capitalism. I respond in chapter 3 of my book to G.A. Cohen’s version of this criticism, which I contend rests on misunderstanding the difference principle. Edmundson argues differently, that the criticism rests instead on misunderstanding the crucial role of the fair value of political liberties in mitigating economic inequalities and dissolving the concentration of private wealth that attends 178 Samuel Freeman – Replies to Critics private ownership of means of production. So, we agree on the outcome – that far from being incompatible with (liberal) socialism, justice as fairness is a reasonable – perhaps the most reasonable – justification of it. I go one step further, and agree, with Rawls, that property-owning democracy is (also) justified by Rawls’s conception of justice. Here I’ll also note that Edmundson’s primary thesis in his book exactly controverts Alan Thomas’ argument in his book – which is that only property-owning democracy, not liberal or democratic socialism, can satisfy Rawls’s principles of justice. I respond to Thomas’ argument in my reply to his comments. I Democratic Equality and the Difference Principle I.1. My case for property owning democracy rests in large part on Rawls’s difference principle, as I believe Rawls’s does as well. I agree with Edmundson that the conditions for guaranteeing the fair value of political liberties (and fair equality of opportunity as well) are an important part of Rawls’s argument against welfare state capitalism. But I disagree with his contention (developed at length in his book) that the fair value requirement is sufficient to eliminate property owning democracy from consideration as well. One reason I focus most of my attention on the role of the difference principle in Rawls’s argument for POD and liberal socialism is that, unlike the difference principle, Rawls had little to say about the economic arrangements required to guarantee the fair value of political liberties. Clearly, he thought fair equality of opportunity for political influence (like the 2nd principle’s fair equality of opportunity principle itself) required mitigating economic inequalities and diminishing as far as possible the influence of wealth on the electoral and political process; also, that 179 Philosophy and Public Issues – Liberalism and Social Justice fair value could not be realized in a capitalist economy, even combined with the welfare state, because of capitalism’s unregulated inequalities and inevitable concentration of wealth.
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