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Conflict Or Peace? Ethnic Unrest Intensifies in Burma

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Conflict Or Peace? Ethnic Unrest Intensifies in Burma Burma Policy Briefing Nr 7 June 2011 Conflict or Peace? Ethnic Unrest Intensifies in Burma The breakdown in the ceasefire of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) with the Conclusions and Recommendations central government represents a major failure It is imperative that ceasefire talks resume in national politics and threatens a serious and that all armed actors, both government humanitarian crisis if not immediately ad- and KIO, pursue peaceful processes that will dressed. Over 11,000 refugees have been dis- placed and dozens of casualties reported during bring lasting inclusion and stability. Priority two weeks of fighting between government must be given to the humanitarian needs of forces and the KIO. Thousands of troops have peoples in the conflict-zones. been mobilized, bridges destroyed and commu- The new government must seek to peace- nications disrupted, bringing hardship to com- fully address ethnic conflicts in the country. munities across northeast Burma/Myanmar.1 The occasion of a new government provides There is now a real potential for ethnic conflict to an opportunity to resolve Burma’s long- further spread. In recent months, ceasefires standing political and ethnic crises. Failure in have broken down with Karen and Shan 2011 will only perpetuate conflict and state opposition forces, and the ceasefire of the New under-achievement for another generation. Mon State Party (NMSP) in south Burma is under threat. Tensions between the government It is vital that the new government pursues and United Wa State Army (UWSA) also policies that support dialogue and participa- continue. tion for all peoples in the new political and economic system. Many communities and It is essential that peace talks are initiated and parties remain marginalised outside the new grievances addressed so that ethnic conflict in structures of administration. Policies that Burma does not spiral into a new generation of continue to favour the armed forces and militarised violence and human rights abuse. military solutions will perpetuate resentment and division. To date, no transparent or inclusive process of peace talks has been established. Burma With the advent of a new government, remains a land in political transition, and the opposition groups should seek to find ways to Kachin crisis signifies the first major challenge support progressive political reform through to the new government, under President ex- democratic processes. National unity and Gen. Thein Sein, that assumed power in March participation are essential to achieve 2011. But no clear or coherent policy has democratic and ethnic reforms. emerged among government authorities to address the causes behind the KIO and other The international community must pro- ethnic struggles. Different ministers, military mote conflict resolution, political rights and officers and representatives in the new system equitable opportunity for all ethnic groups in of legislatures are competing to set policy. every sector of national life, including the For its part, the KIO accuses generals of the economy, health and education. Burma is at a national armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, critical stage in political transformation. of continuing a long-term strategy to marginal- Policies that truly support national inclusion ize and repress ethnic minority groups. and stability are essential. Burma Policy Briefing | 1 List of abbreviations used Such a collaborative path is now under threat, raising questions about ethnic peace and stabi- BGF Border Guard Force lity throughout the country. The way that the Thein Sein government seeks to address the CPB Communist Party of Burma crisis could well determine the pattern of KNU Karen National Union national politics for a generation to come. The international community is watching closely. KIO Kachin Independence Will conflict or peace prevail? The warnings Organisation from Burma’s troubled history are clear. KSPP Kachin State Progressive Party BACKGROUND NDA-K New Democratic Army-Kachin Ethnic conflict in Burma has continued through NDF National Democratic Front every political era since independence in 1948. NLD National League for Democracy In the process, countless lives have been lost, millions of citizens displaced and the country NMSP New Mon State Party declined to become one of Asia’s poorest. SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Meanwhile many borderlands have remained Council under the control of different ethnic nationality forces that have contested the authority of cen- SPDC State Peace and Development tral governments, mostly military, in the Council Burman-majority heartlands. Ethnic minorities SSA-N Shan State Army-North are today estimated to make up a third of Bur- ma’s 56 million population. UNFC United Nationalities Federal Council Ethnic volatility has always accompanied peri- USDP Union Solidarity and ods of political change. Perceptions of discrimi- Development Party nation and marginalization have consistently fuelled conflict. The first upsurge occurred in UWSA United Wa State Army 1948 when the Karen National Union (KNU) and other ethnic parties challenged Burma’s Burma has remained under military-dominated new parliamentary system; in 1962 when the governments since 1962. In response, the KIO Tatmadaw seized power and tried to impose has allied with Chin, Karen, Karenni, Mon and Gen. Ne Win’s monolithic “Burmese Way to Shan armed forces in seeking joint negotiations Socialism” on the country; and in 1988 when with the new government to redraw the political the SPDC (initially State Law and Order Resto- landscape. Four months into the life of a new ration Council - SLORC) suppressed pro- political system, ethnic tensions are deepening democracy protests, re-imposing military not reducing in the country. control. Over six decades later, the KNU remains in The implications could not be more serious. armed struggle and over twenty ethnic Ethnic ceasefires were a flagship policy of the opposition organisations, with over 40,000 military State Peace and Development Council troops under arms, continue to administer their (SPDC) that preceded the Thein Sein govern- own territories in the borderlands. At the same ment. At its 1994 inception, the KIO ceasefire time, there are 16 newly-formed ethnic was promoted as a model for Burma. Develop- nationality parties that won seats in the 2010 ment projects started and international aid general election, and a similar number of organisations returned to a conflict-zone that electoral groups outside the government’s had been off-limits to outside visitors for deca- political process. These include political parties des. More recently, foreign investment – pri- which, like the National League for Democracy marily Chinese – has accelerated. Economic and (NLD), won seats in the 1990 general election. humanitarian challenges have remained acute. During a time of change, the future of all these But protagonists on the different sides parties is presently unclear.2 maintained a public commitment to dialogue and the goal of resolving political problems by Against this backdrop, the need has always con- political means. tinued for an inclusive peace process in which 2 | Burma Policy Briefing political and ethnic challenges are addressed. THE KIO CEASEFIRE But in 2011, just four months after the new After protracted talks, the KIO ceasefire was government was introduced, there are already eventually agreed in February 1994. The KIO warnings that Burma’s tragic cycles of ethnic became one of four NDF forces, including the grievance and insurgency could be repeated. Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) and NMSP, that changed their strategy from armed struggle THE KACHIN INDEPENDENCE in border-based alliances such as the National ORGANISATION Council Union of Burma to dialogue in political and economic processes established by the Formed in 1961, the KIO has long been among SLORC-SPDC. Under the ceasefire terms, the the most political of Burma’s different ethnic KIO was allowed to maintain its arms and terri- forces. Initially established in response to eco- tory until a new constitution was introduced. In nomic and religious discrimination (most the meantime a policy of “peace through deve- Kachins are Christians), the KIO rapidly ex- lopment” was initiated to support reconciliation panded its territories during the 1960s follow- and the rehabilitation of communities long- ing Gen. Ne Win’s military coup. With popular devastated by war. support and control of the lucrative jade trade, the KIO was able to establish extensive “libera- The impact was immediate. With support from ted zones” in the Kachin state and northern the Kachin Baptist Convention, Catholic Church Shan state. It also became a key member of the and other community-based groups, aid pro- National Democratic Front (NDF - established jects spread across northeast Burma in both 1976) with the KNU and other federal-seeking KIO and government-controlled areas, and ethnic forces. international visitors were officially allowed to return for the first time in over three decades.5 Following the SLORC-SPDC’s assumption of Social and economic progress, however, was power in 1988, the KIO was initially a principal contentious and slow. Particular humanitarian actor in the changing politics in the border- challenges developed in Kachin communities, lands, providing sanctuary to students and including rising heroin use and HIV, that had democracy activists who had fled from urban not been anticipated. At the same time, Tatma- areas. But under
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