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Home , Abubakar Gumi, Ashura, Barelvi, Doxa, Ganief Hendricks, Ibrahim Zakzaky

INSTITUT D ’É TUDES POLITIQUES DE

PARIS SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS MASTER IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

DIFFUSION OF ISLAMIC DISCOURSE : SAUDI AND IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN LAGOS AND

TORE REFSLUND HAMMING

Thesis directed by Stéphane Lacroix, Associate Professor at Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA)and Researcher atCentre d’Études de Relations Internationales (CERI)

MARCH 2014

Jury: M. Stéphane Lacroix, Associate Professor M. Andreas Roessner, Academic Advisor Mme Laurence Louër, Chargée de Recherche CERI

The copyright of this Master's thesis remains the property of its author. No part of the content may be reproduced, published, distributed, copied or stored for public or private use without written permission of the author. All authorisation requests should be sent to [email protected]

TABLE OF CONTENT

Abstract i Preface iii Acknowledgements v Glossary vi

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 Research prism and clarification 3 Outline 6 Clarification of terminology 6 Theoretical Framework and Methodology 8 Research design 13

CHAPTER 2 SAUDI – RELATIONS:A SOFT POWER SUPREMACY DILEMMA 16 A political and historical perspective 17 A sectarian perspective 18 Soft power dilemma: Diffusing for regional supremacy 20

CHAPTER 3 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN LAGOS 23 Challenging existing structures:Newcomers to a monopolised field 25 The emergence of Salafi doctrine 29 Saudi inspiration and interference 33 The role of Shiism and the relation to Iran 35 Transformation of the Islamic field:The importance of education 38 Conclusive remarks:The transformative power of the educated youth 40

CHAPTER 4 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN CAPE TOWN 43 Religion turning increasingly public and pluralistic 44 The emergence of Shiism in Cape Town 46 The emergence of Salafism:Literalism in a tolerant community 48 A Sunni-Shia sectarian struggle 53 The transnational character of Shiism and Salafism 55 Conclusive remarks:Field transformation and limitations 57

CHAPTER 5 EXPLAINING RELIGIOUS DIFFUSION: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ISLAMIC COLD WAR PRISM 60 Assessing religious diffusion 61 Limits of the Islamic Cold War prism 64 What does it indicate for the future? 64

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 67

Annex: Maps 70 Lagos 70 Cape Town 71 Bibliography 72

ABSTRACT

From the context of the Islamic Cold War between the Kingdom of and the Islamic of Iran, this thesis examines the diffusion of Salafi and Shia doctrines to Sub- Saharan through case studies of Lagos and Cape Town. It is my hypothesis that the Islamic Cold War and the Saudi-Iranian struggle for regional hegemony – a dynamic I define as a soft power supremacy dilemma – can partly explain the diffusion of religious doctrine and the emergence of Salafism and Shiism south of Sahara. To assess the explanatory prowess of this hypothesis and to understand the development of Islamic doctrine in Sub-Saharan African, I seek to provide answers for three interrelated questions: (1) to what extent are the religious discourses of Saudi Arabia and Iran diffused to Lagos and Cape Town and how can such diffusion be interpreted in the context of an Islamic Cold War and their struggle for regional power?, (2) at what level of interaction and through which types of actors is religious diffusion occurring?, and (3) what is the reciprocal influence of Salafi and Shia doctrines in the local environments of Lagos and Cape Town? To answer these questions, I apply a methodological framework, which takes it inspiration from French sociologist ’s conceptualisation of social fields as an interpretative grid open for analysis. This framework helps identify intra-field contestation for religious authority and thus enables analysis of field dynamics and transformation. The main foundation of empirical data in constituted by first-hand interviews and observations conducted during two months of fieldwork in Lagos and Cape Town, respectively.

Having studied and interacted with and having held several meetings with Salafis and Shias in Lagos and Cape Town, the thesis presents three broad conclusions; first, since the 1960s-70s, both Lagos and Cape Town have experienced increased pluralism within the Islamic field affecting the structures of the field. in Sub-Saharan Africa has traditionally been equated with prominent Sufi brotherhoods and moderate and tolerant religious interpretation, but the emergence of several new doctrines is challenging ’s monopolisation of Islamic discourse. New actors – Salafis in particular – have to a great extent succeeded in transforming both doctrine and discourse by emphasising the importance of religious . Second, the emergence of new doctrines has led to a radicalisation of Islamic discourse with the dual objective of consolidation and condemnation. The debate focuses on issues such as ‘what constitutes religious knowledge’ and ‘what true Islam is’ resulting in reciprocal accusations of heresy and bid’a and leading to what could be defined an Islamic revivalism. Third, the emergence of Salafism and Shiism in Lagos and Cape Town is a result of interaction with Saudi and Iranian actors and institutions. Primarily occurring through educational institutions, this diffusion can be attributed to the Islamic Cold War and

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its inherent . I argue that Saudi and Iranian diffusion has been paramount to the emergence of new doctrines, but that it is inadequate to understand the further development of Salafi and Shia doctrine within the local environments of Lagos and Cape Town.

PREFACE

The initial idea for this thesis came about in my first semester at during a casual talk with my academic tutor on the topic of preparing for a future Ph.D. application. Discussing my interests in the Middle East and Africa, she made a remark on the struggle between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the of Iran for Islamic domination in Sub-Saharan Africa. As I was really interested in applying a transcontinental or transregional research focus, I started to get interested in the topic and conducted some basic

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research to attain more knowledge. However, the absence of information was striking – particularly when researching the transregional religious influence, which was my greatest interest. Academics gaps of knowledge are found in abundance, but my fascination for the study of radical Islamic doctrines like Salafism and Shiism and the evident volatility of religious affiliation in Sub-Saharan communities triggered my curiosity. In the following months, ideas and assumptions were discussed with my supervisor, which helped me only understand the substance but also in guiding me in critical choices regarding research design and methodology.

As it was a clear ambition from the start to provide information and analysis to a topic lacking sufficient academic research, it was paramount to me that the main sources underlying the analysis were attained through first-hand empirical data. This led me two months to first Lagos and then Cape Town, where I got to conduct interviews, observe, and reflect. The results are presented through the following 100 pages. A few months of field work and a master thesis however, is not sufficient to fill the gap of knowledge and thus more studies are necessary to truly understand how Islamic doctrine is developing in Sub-Saharan Africa and how this development to some extent in influenced by external actors including Saudi Arabia and Iran. If nothing more, I consider the findings of this thesis relevant to better understand these dynamics and hope that it will not only add to the scholarly perception of Islam in Sub- Saharan Africa and the dynamics of the Islamic Cold War, but also that my findings will be used in future examinations related to .

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As I regard this thesis an integral part of my master degree at Sciences Po, I would like to thank the Paris School of International Affairs for letting me engage on the thrilling and

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highly challenging task it has been to conduct the research resulting in this master thesis and not least for allowing me to travel to amid high instability. Furthermore, I would like to thank my supervisor Stéphane Lacroix for our talks and his guidance, which not only helped as clarification for also as an incredible source of inspiration.

From my time in the field, much appreciation goes to my research assistant Usman Abdulmalik Aliyu, whose assistance in introducing me to local and in translating interviews was immense. A further thanks needs to be extended to all the persons I interviewed in Lagos and Cape Town. Their general openness and generosity not only made my job feasible, but also provided me with incredibly interesting perspectives on how Muslim communities are developing in the two Sub-Saharan metropolises.

Lastly, I would like to thank the Kuwait Program at Sciences Po for awarding me the mobility grant, which made my fieldwork in Lagos and Cape Town possible. As first-hand interviews have been critical to understand and examine the research topic and to obtain knowledge absent in existing academic literature, their financial assistance has been essential to the quality and final result of the thesis.

GLOSSARY

Ahl al- wal-Jama’a Literally, ‘the people of the tradition and the group’. AhlulBayt or Ahl al-Bayt Literally, ‘the people of the house’ referring to the members of the family of the Prophet . ‘aqida The creed. The dominant conception in the Sunni world is the Ash’arite creed, which gives a limited role to reason in theological speculation. This conception is fiercely challenged by Salafis. Ash’ari A Sunni school of Islam after Abu al-Hasan al- Ash’ari. See above. Celebration that takes place on the tenth day of the Muslim month of to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. It is marked by processions of men dressed in black, who flagellate themselves as a sign of penitence. bid’a Religious innovation. da'wa The preaching of Islam. Designates the action of preaching or proselytising. Law or . Jama’atuIzalat al-Bid’a waIqamat Literally, the Society for the Removal of Innovation and al-Sunna Reinstatement of Tradition. A Nigerian group established in 1978 in the city of , who adheres to a Salafi-inspired

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creed. , pl. madhahib Generic term for school of jurisprudence. Within there are four recognised madahib named after the founding imam. In Sub-Saharan Africa the madhhab is dominant. In theory, Salafis do not follow any madhhab, but in Saudi Arabia it is tradition to follow the madhhab. Literally, ‘one who is garrisoned’. Used in western and northern Africa to designate the religious leader of a Sufi brotherhood. Followers of a brotherhood are referred to as . marja’ al- Literally, ‘source of emulation’. It is the highest religious authority in Shiism to whom Shias should refer in matters of religious doctrine. mawlud Celebration of the birthday of Prophet Muhammad. Normally practiced by Sufis but considered by Salafis. salafi Faithful to the practice of the first generations of Muslims, the ‘pious ancestors’ (al- al-salih). shirk Association of with other entities. sunna The Prophetic tradition. Exegesis of the Qur’an. , pl. turuq Literally, ‘path’. Description for Sufi brotherhoods. taqiyya A Shia term that means concealing or denying one’s religious identity. This is deemed legal if an individual is at risk of serious prosecution. The oneness of God. For Salafis it is the most important theological concept. Vilayat-e faqih or Wilayat al- Guardianship of the jurist. Doctrine developed by Faqih , which argues that during the period in which the twelfth Imam has gone in , the governance of the state is in the hands of religious scholars.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION On February 1 st 1979, as many as five million Iranians took to the streets in Teheran to celebrate the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the ensuing establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The popular protests and Khomeini’s institutionalisation of Vilayat-e faqih (governance of the jurist) in Iran symbolises the commencement of a formalised Islamic Cold War between Iran and its religious archenemy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the initiation of what I refer to as a soft power supremacy dilemma between the two states.In a regional climate characterised by fierce contention for power, both states perceive themselves as entitled to a hegemony status.This struggle became formalised with the 1979 Iranian Revolutionas the emergence of an Islamic Shia republic produced a competition between two formal political entities, despite the rivalry’s foundation well entrenched in religious animosity much older. 1With the revolutionary Shia clergyregime in Iran and the Sunni Al Saud monarchy in Saudi Arabia, religious differences have consistently been at the centre of the two states’ relationship and are central in explaining historical events. As states with strong religious affiliation,2religion has occupied an essential legitimising role for both regimes in

1 Scholars disagree on the source of the animosity between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Anoushiravan Ehteshami argues tensions are of contemporary character, Fred Halliday it is a consequence of the state-building process and the rise of nationalism, while ShabramChubin and Charles Tripp stress more structural factors like geopolitical differences, see Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: soft power rivalry in the Middle East (: I.B. Taurus, 2013), p. 41. My is not that sectarian difference is the main source for the rivalry, but rather that such difference has become a central issue in the relation as a product of the tension. 2 Despite strong religious affiliation, some scholars argue against Iran and Saudi Arabia being religious states as political concerns are their main focus. For such argument on Iran see Sami Zubeida, ‘Is Iran an ?’, in : Essays from Middle East Report , eds. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) and for Saudi Arabia see Madawi Al Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi state: Islamic voices from a new generation (: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

1 INTRODUCTION their claims for political authority. It is in the context of this Islamic Cold War and the legitimising role of religious discourse this thesis positions itself.

With their domestic and regional political authority partially dependent on the legitimacy of their religious doctrine, exportation or diffusion of their respective religious discourse hasbeen integral in the foreign policy toolbox of consecutive Iranian and Saudi leaders. Conducted through varying but often indirect processes, such transnational diffusion of religious discourse caught regional scholars’ interest, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the and almost exclusively with a research focus on regional neighbours in the Gulf. However, in light of Laurence Louër’s description ofa ‘Shia revival’ 3 after the fall of in and Bernard Haykel’s contention that Salafism, the dominant Sunni doctrine in Saudi Arabia, has ‘lately become attractive to many Muslims’ 4, a deeper exploration of Saudi and Iranianefforts to diffuse their religious discourse is indeed pertinent. In contrast to most prior studies on the subject, I apply a transregional perspective focusing on Sub- Saharan Africa instead of the closer neighbours of Iran and Saudi Arabia, in order to expose the lacuna of literature on radical Islam south of Sahara and to illustrate the presence of such radical doctrines ashighlighted by . 5 This transregional focus is mainly due to three factors. First is a critical deficiency of transregional academic studies on Islamic discourses and movementsbetween the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Second, due to Islam’s rapid proliferation inSub-Saharan Africa, 6 and third, because of the challenge these more radical Islamic interpretations pose to the so-called African Islam , traditionally characterised by Sufism, moderation and tolerance. 7In the aftermath of the 2011 al- attacks on New York and Pentagon, the last point has become increasingly important from a security perspective, as the Salafi doctrine has been intimately associated to globalisedjihadism, 8 thus stressing the security-related imperatives of studying the spread of such radical doctrines. Salafis’newfound electoral success in post-Mubarak , increasing visibility in , and prominence in the Syrian Civil Warhave only bolstered this analytical tendency. In response to this rigid understanding and fear of especially Salafism, this paper also seeks to provide nuance to the prevalent popular misinterpretation of the Salafi doctrine as being equal to .

Although my primary objective is to analyse the diffusion of Salafi and revolutionary Shia discourses and assess to what degree the soft power supremacy dilemma characterising Saudi- Iran relations can explain such diffusion, the socialimplications in Lagos and Cape Town of this diffusion are similarly important. This is because an increasing prominence of Salafism and revolutionary Shiism in Sub-Saharan metropolises like Lagos and Cape Town not only will be at the expense of more tolerant Islamic doctrines, but also because the existence of competing religious discourses in a society potentially has a destabilising effect as stated by

3Laurence Louër, Shiism and politics in the Middle East (London: Hurst & Company, 2012), p. 1. 4 Bernard Haykel, ‘On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action’ in Global Salafism: Islam’s , ed. Roel Meijer (London: Hurst, 2009), p. 35. 5 Gilles Kepel, : The Trail of Political Islam (London: Tauris, 2004), pp. 130-132 and pp. 193-194. 6 The development is stated by the vast majority of international scholars in the field, however Marc-Antoine Pé rouse de Montclos claims there is ’ no scientific measurement of the progression of Islam’; de Montclos, Conversion to in Nigeria: A View from the Underworld, Africa Today 54(4) 2008, p. 73. 7 David Westerlund and Eva Evers Rosander eds., African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists (London: Hurst, 1997), p. 1. 8 Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: violence and pan- since 1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

2 CHAPTER 1

Thomas Banchoff. He defines identity movements – a grouping where both Salafis and Shias can be included – as the most ‘powerful global religious forces’. 9 Hence, with this in mind, thethesis will consider the impact of such potential diffusion strategiesinthe context of both the Gulf region and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Whilethis thesis seeks to write itself into the academic tradition of the Islamic Cold War literature, it also aims to expand this perspective by investigating the existence of Salafi and Shia doctrines in Lagos and Cape Town. In this context, I explore and analyse the following research questions in order to reveal their inherent complexities and potential influences:

 To what extent are the religious discourses of Saudi Arabia (Salafism) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (revolutionary Shiism) sought exported or diffused to Lagos and Cape Town, respectively, and how can such diffusion be interpreted in the context of an Islamic Cold War and their struggle for regional power?  At what level of interaction and through which types of actors is religious diffusion occurring?  What is the reciprocal influence of Salafi and Shia doctrines in the local environments of Lagos and Cape Town?

RESEARCH PRISM AND CLARIFICATION Due to the complex nature of the research focus, additional clarification and explanation is necessary to foster proper understanding.This research takes place against a backdrop of the Islamic Cold War between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which serves as a framework for understanding the logic of Salafi and Shia communities in Lagos and Cape Town. 10 By doing this, I am not staunchly arguing that the Islamic Cold War can explain everything regarding the development of local Salafi and Shia communities or even constitutes the logic for all transregional relations, but rather that it works as a prism to forward a hypothesis, whose explanatory validity I intend to test throughout the analyses and finally assess in the final chapter.

It should be mentioned that this is not a historical study, but an attempt to understand and explain the contemporary situation. To accomplish this however, and as I have a strong in the explanatory importance of history, the introduction of historical events and aspects is imperative and will thus be included.As mentioned, the choice of studying the transregional dynamics with a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa is due to the critical absence of academic studies focusing on either Islamic relations between the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa or

9 R. Scott Appleby, Building Sustainable Peace: The Roles of Local and Transnational Religious Actors, in , globalization, and world politics , ed. Thomas F. Banchoff (New York: University Press, 2008), p. 129. 10 See Justin J. Gengler, ’Understanding in the Persian Gulf’, in Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf , ed. Lawrence G. Potter, pp. 31-66 (London: Hurst & Company, 2013) for a recent analysis of the contemporary ‘warm’ character of the Islamic Cold War.

3 INTRODUCTION simply on radical Islamic doctrines south of Sahara. 11 In the specific contexts of Lagos and Cape Town such lack of studies is vivid. Although several scholars of history, religion, andpolitics have studied the role of including radical Islamic interpretations, these studies have exclusively focused on the northern Hausa-dominated part of the country. 12 In the context of Cape Town, hitherto studies have been conducted by Abdulkhader Tayob and Yunus Dumbe butdespite fascinatingly describing Islamist movements and the emergence of Salafi doctrine in a glocalised form 13 it is inadequate to understand the nuances of more radical interpretations of Islam. Besides this research, studies of Salafism or Shiism are close to absent. Hence, based on existing literature one could easily get the impression that Salafis and Shias are close to non-existence not only in Lagos or Cape Townbut in Sub-Saharan Africa in general. To problematise such perceived absence Mara Leichtman, a long-time researcher of Shiism in Senegal and its transregional relations to Shia centres in the Middle East, points out that minimal information on Shia presence does not necessarily imply they do not exist, but more likely indicate an absence of scholarly research. 14 This seems to be the case regarding both Salafism and Shiism particularly in Lagos and to some extent in Cape Town.

Nigeria and ’s distinctive contextual trajectories make both countries useful case studies.With a Muslim population in the range of 90 million, Nigeria is by far the state in Sub- Saharan Africa with the largest Muslim population. Historical events have greatly influenced the lives and development of Nigerian Muslims, as the establishment of the , colonial rule, and the history of Islamic radicalisation are clear examples of. With approximately the same number of Muslims as in Egypt and with Lagos’ Muslim population of approximately 10 million, the sheer numbers emphasise Nigeria’s importance to Islamic centres in the Gulf. This importance is enhanced by Nigeria’s role as a regional powerhouse that attracts people from all over western Africa. Islam’s historical centrality in Nigeria is in stark contrast to the situation in South Africa, where religion’s role – Islam in particular – has been heavily influenced by the context ofApartheid during the 20 th century. Despite its much more recent origin than in Nigeria, South African Islam presents an example of an empowered Muslim population in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has implied great regional prominence of Islamic scholars if the small number of Muslims is taken into consideration. This prominence is exactly why the Muslim communities in Cape Town would be of interest from a Gulf perspective as it has the potential to influence the wider region indirectly. 15 Such contextual settings and structural differences have naturally influenced the role and development of Islamic movements and doctrines in the two countries, thus opening up for comparative considerations.

11 Ousmane Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria: A study of the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition (Boston: Brill, 2003), p. 16. 12 Examples of such studies are Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria ; Roman Loimeier, Islamic reform and political change in northern Nigeria (Evanston, Ill: Press, 1997); John Paden, : Sardauna of Sokoto ( London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986). 13 Glocalisation is an amalgamation of the global and the local and in this context refers to how a global phenomenon like Salafism adapts to local conditions. See Roland Robertson, ‘Globalisation or Glocalisation?’, In Journal of International Communication , No. 1 Vol. 1, 1994, pp. 33-52. 14 Mara Leichtman, The Authentication of a Discursive Islam: Shi’a Alternatives to Sufi Orders, in New perspectives on Islam in Senegal: conversion, migration, wealth, power, and femininity , eds. MamadouDiouf and Mara Leichtman, 1. Ed., (New Work: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 111. 15 Interestingly, when visiting bookshops in Lagos I regularly found sermons by South African clerics, which simply illustrates their regional prominence.

4 CHAPTER 1

Although research on transnational Salafism is limited, 16 the quality of research in the field is high. One of these examples is Laurent Bonnefoy’s study Salafism in : Transnationalism and Religious Identity , in which he helps frame analytical questions relevant for my research.I build on his research in order to analyse the Salafi and Shia movements in Lagos and Cape Town with a specific focus on relations to Saudi Arabia and Iran both as ‘sponsors and as ideological references’. This triggers helpful questionssuch ashow ‘Saudi’ or ‘Iranian’ is Salafism or Shiism in Lagos and Cape Town? How important are informal Saudi and Iranian strategies for proselytization in the development of Salafi and Shia discourses in Lagos and Cape Town both at the level of religious entrepreneurs and laymen? Do these Salafi and Shia actors give primary loyalty to Saudi Arabia and Iran, respectively, at the expense of other religious and political authorities? 17

As domestic structures and institutional setup have an effective constraining influence on transnational actors, my argument will not be a complete Saudisation or Iranisation of the Muslim community in Lagos or Cape Town – are not even coming close – but rather to study to what degree Saudi and Iranian actors have been influential in making the restructuring of the religious field possible. New technology has undoubtedlycontributedto making foreign information more readily available. Other sources of this transregional influence involves relational aspects such as official political, economic and diplomatic relations, experiences of studying in the Gulf, , funding of religious institutions, 18 clerical delegations, distribution of religious material, and Islamic NGOs, 19 all of which will be sought considered throughout the analyses as such interaction has assisted in creating the organisational, institutional, and ideological base so essential for religious newcomers.

Although I do not intend toclosely examine the relation between Islam and other , Salafism’s and Shiism’s effects on other religions should not be ignored. Two factors particularly influence this relation, one being an objective of conversion from one religion to another and the other being a Salafi-specific aim to eradicate any local influences to the practice of what they define‘true Islam’. The latter is due to a Salafi perception that is shirk (innovation) and that culture is not consistent with pure Islam. In this context, Olivier Roy argues that a primary objective of Salafis is a ‘deculturation’ as they seek to eradicate local customs and culture. 20 Thus, the introduction of Salafism and Shiism into the Nigerian and South African religious landscape inevitably causes an increased situation of competition with non-Islamic belief systems as well as within Islam itself.

16 With an exclusive focus on Salafism, the following studies deserve mentioning: Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and religious identity (London: Hurst & Co., 2011);TerjeØstebø, Localising Salafism. Religious Change among Oromo Muslims in Bale, (Leiden: Brill, 2012); AbdulaiIddrisu, Contesting Islam in Africa: homegrown and Muslim identity in northern Ghana, 1920-2010 (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2013). 17 Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen , p. 26. 18 For an explanation of general Saudi funding efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa, see Westerlund and Rosander ed., African Islam and Islam in Africa , p. 10. 19 MaykeKaag, ‘Transnational Islamic NGOs in : Islamic Solidarity in the Age of Neoliberalism’, Africa Today 54(3) 2008, pp. 5-11 provides examples of the transnational influence of Islamic NGOs in Chad and particularly how Saudi NGOs are trying to diffuse the Salafi doctrine. 20 Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the ’, Studies in Conflict & , 29:3 2006, p. 210. However, the practical pursuance of this objective should perhaps not be overstate in this particular context as accommodation to local environments seem to be critical for many Salafis. Nonetheless, Westerlund and Rosander ed., African Islam and Islam in Africa , p. 6 provides a research example of the attempt to decontextualize Islam in . Adding to the complexity, in JoasWagemakers’ study of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi he concludes that different ‘Salafi-cultures’ exist, making the anti-culture stance of Salafism more important in theory than in practice.

5 INTRODUCTION

OUTLINE With the research focus outlined, a brief clarification of the most essential terminology will be provided in order to minimise confusion throughout the thesis. This will be followed by an explanation of methodology including the theoretical framework, the method applied, and reflections on research design. Before proceeding to the actual analyses, chapter two will briefly elaboratethe relation between Iran and Saudi Arabia from a politico-historical and sectarian perspective ending with a characterisation of this relationship as a soft power supremacy dilemma perspective as I consider a specific understanding of this relationship imperative to justify the continuing analytical perspective.

Following is the analytical part, which is divided into two levels of analysis. In chapters three and four, the first analytical level focuses on Lagos and Cape Town from a micro-perspective and is extensively based on my fieldwork in the two cities. Starting in Lagos and proceeding to Cape Town, this part seeks to analyse the Islamic field in the two cities with a focus on the presence of Salafi and revolutionary Shia doctrines and their potential relations to the Gulf- region. Although introducing historical aspects, this analysis is intending to illustrate the contemporary situation and the development within the last decade. Due to the differences in societal structures and Islamic development in the two cities, the analyses will be adjusted to their particularities and will thus differ in structure. This part will be the main analytical body of the thesis.

In chapter five, the second analytical level changes from a micro- to a macro-perspective. Based on the conclusions from the first level of analysis, I seek to reflect upon and analyse these findings in the context of the Islamic Cold War and the logic inherent in thesoft power supremacy dilemma.It is in this part that trans-regional considerations will be particular present and it will take on both a historical and a predictive character. However, as the first analytical part constitutes the foundation for the second level, the former will take up most space and focus. As few have studied radical Islamic doctrines in Lagos and Cape Town, the first part is also where I will be able to contribute with new knowledge to the research field, thus emphasising its importance.

CLARIFICATION OF TERMINOLOGY Due to the centrality of the notions of Salafism and Shiism throughout the thesis and because of the particular delicateness attached to these terms, a more precise elaboration is paramount. One always has to be careful and critical when the terms Salafism and Shiism are used as such articulations and discursive expressions have been used continuously by both friends and foes with differing meaning. While actors have proudly used the terms as self-identification, it has also been labels articulated by enemies as strategies of antagonism and securitization 21 and as a mean to discredit the actors in question.

21 A term coined by the Copenhagen School, securitization is a discursive-oriented conception of security, which deals with how issues are transformed into a matter of security by powerful actors in order to justify the use of extraordinary means to counter the discursively created threat. See Barry Buzan et al., Security: a new framework for analysis (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

6 CHAPTER 1

Starting with Salafism, 22 the term has traditionally been closely connected and confused with Wahhabism and to some degree Ahl al-Sunnawal-Jama'a (the people of the tradition and the group) . Whereas I regard the former asa specific reform movement initiated by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the mid 18 th century in , my understanding of the latter is a broad category simply referring to followers of the Qur’an and sunna. As explained by David Comminsand others, 23 the Wahhabi movement adhered to a Salafi creed, 24 but rather than being equated with Salafism, Wahhabism should simply be understood as one of several forms of Salafism. 25 However, Wahhabism has right from the beginning in the 18 th century – and even more so in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks – been used in a derogatory sense by its adversaries making it a delicate term to use for self-identification. Furthermore, as the movement stems from the , Salafis from other countries have generally not referred to themselves as Wahhabis. Ahl al-Sunnawal-Jama'a, on the other hand, is a term used globally by Muslims to identify themselves as true followers of the Qur'an and sunna as the only legitimate sources to follow. However, how they follow it depends on their creed, meaning the understanding of interpretation and the validity of reason versus a literalist interpretation. Salafis, among others, would identify themselves as Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a, but as many Nigerian Muslims with a more moderate creed 26 likewise identify themselves as Ahl al-Sunnawal-Jama'a, the term becomes confusing in practice. 27 This is not least the case due to the more positive connotation surrounding the term. Hence, this broad application of the term necessitates that one is cautious when analysing, which will be considered carefully throughout the analysis. In the context of Nigeria, the movement Jama’atuIzalat al-Bid’a waIqamat al-Sunna (the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition, henceforth referred to as Izala ) requires a comment too. Like Wahhabism, Izala refers to a specific geographically defined movement in Northern Nigeria, whose members follow a Salafi-inspired doctrine. Hence, despite they follow a similar creed Muslims in Lagos rarely use Izala for self-definition as they regard it strictly as a northern movement.

Of perhaps even greater importance is a terminological clarification of Shiism. Since the start 1980s, the term Shiism has been used to denominate several distinctive groups, with far from all adhering to the Ja ʿfar ī doctrine. In the aftermath of the 1979 revolution in Iran many Nigerian Muslims, particularly the youth, were inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini’s discourse and the alternative type of government, he implemented. Essentially, it was the revolutionary of Shariati and the methods used to carry it out by Khomeini that turned out

22 The complexity of the concept of Salafism and its historical confusion and -development has been described by Henri Lauzière in ‘The Construction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of Conceptual History’, International Journal of Middle East Studies , 42 (2010), pp. 369–389. My understanding of Salafism is not the modernist Salafism related to Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ’Abduh and – although the latter could be placed in a grey zone as he declared at some point that he had gone from to Salafi – but rather an understanding of Salafiyya as related to a strict following of madhhab al-Salaf (doctrine of the forefathers) and theologians such as and ibn Hanbal. 23 Commins, The Wahhabi mission and Saudi Arabia . 24 A theoretical exception is the Wahhabis generally following the Hanbali maddhab, which is in contradiction with Salafi rejection of any taqlid. 25 Al Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi state , p. 58. Furthermore, Bonnefoy too identifies Wahhabism as a specific reform movement adhering to Salafi ‘aqida and characterises the movement by its emphasis on tawhid , adherence to the Hanbali school, and by a desire to purge religious practice from certain bid’a (innovations) , Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen , pp. 40- 41. 26 Sunnis who follow the more moderate 'Ashari in 'aqida and Maliki in fiqh often describe themselves as Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a as is the case with followers of the more strict and literalist 'Athari 'aqida and Hanbali maddhab. 27 Even Shias sometime use the term Ahl al-Sunna as self-identification as was exposed during my interviews.

7 INTRODUCTION to be the major inspiration, while less so the actual religious Shia doctrine. For want of a better word this will be termed revolutionary Shiism . Initially, Nigerian Muslims inspired by Khomeini all became known as Shias within the Nigerian society disregarding their actual doctrine. This opens up for a distinction between religious and political Shiism, where the former is adherence to the religious Shia doctrine and a belief that the ahlulbayt (people of the house) – referring to the infallible descendants of Ali and a specific list of 28 – were destined to rule whereas the latter is an inspiration by the revolution itself and its defeat of the secular Iranian monarchy. Revolutionary Shiism, I will argue, is an amalgamation containing parts of both with strong emphasis on the revolutionary objective. This division stresses the need to be careful when applying the Shia denomination as its meaning is rather ambiguous.

These conceptual considerations will be exemplified and elaborated during the analysis.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY With the research focus outlined, it becomes clear that the thesis positions itself between the domestic and the international. It aspires not only to investigate local changes and dynamics, but also to link the findings to international relations in the Gulf regional setting. To succeed in this pursuance, methodological concerns are central to organise, to focus, and to make sense of the analyses. Thus, in order to understand dynamics and relations both within a society and between states, a theoretical amalgamation of sociological and of international relations (IR) approachesis applied.

The analytical framework for the analysis is based on overlapping ontological fields of research, which are interrelated in theory as well as in practice as will be shown throughout the analysis. In the following paragraphs, it is my intention to elaborate on the methodology applied in order to illustrate such interconnection, while ending with an explanation of the research design and the method used for the collection of data. Adopting a structural perspective, my analytical strategy is based on a field , where structures can be identified and studied. At the same time, I find inspiration in a poststructuralist perspectiveand apply the concepts of field, capital and habitus as epistemological tools to analyse the fields of research thus bridging the emphasis on structural power and individual freedom of action. 29 The latter goes hand-in-hand with the constructivist IR approach put forward by scholars like Michael Barnett. 30

The first level of analysis (chapters three and four) focuses on Lagos and Cape Town and seeks to unveil and analyse the composition and structure of the religious communities in

28 MoojanMomen, An introduction to Shi i Islam: the history and doctrines of Shi ism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 63-64. 29 Bourdieu tried to bridge the theoretical positions of and constructivism and thus defined his work as either ‘constructivist structuralism’ or ‘structuralist constructivism’; see Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Socialt Rum ogSymbolskMagt’, in Pierre Bourdieu – CentraleTeksterinden for SociologiogKulturteori, eds. StafCallewaert et al.: (København: AkademiskForlag, 1994 [1990]), p. 52. This amalgamation stresses the existence of structures, but also that these structures are influenced and transformed by inter-subjective interaction. 30 See Michael Barnett and ShibleyTelhami eds., Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), introduction; and Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab politics: negotiations in regional order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), introduction.

8 CHAPTER 1 these two Sub-Saharan cities. 31 As it is my ambition to show how the Muslim communities have transformed in recent decades, I apply the conceptual framework of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, outlined in a religious context in Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field ,32 as his notions of fields, capital, and habitus provide a useful ontological and epistemological framework to capture the inherent dynamics of such communities. As explained by Stéphane Lacroix, a field according to Bourdieu is ‘a configuration of relations among hierarchically arranged positions ’ forming an arena governed by its own logic. One could argue it is an interpretive grid dividing social into analytically observable fields. 33 Within these hierarchical systems capital , a source of either material or symbolic character, defines the ability of actors to occupy a specific position and exercise power, while habitus , a set of socialized norms and predispositions, guide their behaviour. The dynamics of capital and habitus are set within the structural limitations of the field, and are conceptualised by Bourdieu in the term doxa, which can be translated into the norms and rules governing the field. 34 In the first level of analysis, focus will be on what I define theIslamic field in Lagos and Cape Town, respectively. My definition of the Islamic field is rather narrow and exclusively defined by religious measures thus including Muslims at all levels in the specific societies. By such narrow definition I intentionally exclude some actors, who in some contexts will be attached to the Islamic field but without having any direct religious affiliation to Islam.

Applying this theoretical framework enables me to illustrate how Muslim communities in Lagos and Cape Town have transformed from situations almost characterised by a monopolisation of the Islamic belief up until the 1960s into a state characterised by pluralism beginning in the 1970s (figure 1). Through this examination, I intend to clarify how newcomers have tried to undermine the structure of the Islamic field or restructure the field by breaking the established doxa with the potential result of constituting a new paradigm. 35 Furthermore, by emphasising the introduction of newcomers to the Islamic field, I wish to show how the field has been transformed from within, implying a close relation or even an overlap with particularly the political and educational fields (figure 2).

31 The delineation of Muslim communities to Lagos and Cape Town respectively, is both due to practical concerns and lacking scholarly research. However when it is of relevance, reflections of a more national-level scale will be included. 32 Pierre Bourdieu, ’Genesis and structure of the religious field’, Comparative Social Research , Vol. 13, 1991, pp. 1-44. 33 Stéphane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: the politics of religious dissent in contemporary Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011) pp. 6-7. 34 See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977 [1972]) and Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, in Knowledge Vol. 3, eds. Stehr and Grundmann:, (London: Taylor and Francis, 2005 [1986]). 35 See Abdulkhader Tayob, Islamic resurgence in South Africa: the Muslim youth movement (Cape Town: UCT Press, 1995), chapter one.

9 INTRODUCTION

FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2

dsdsad

Transformation of the Islamic field in the 1960s-1970s How the Islamic field converges with the political field and the educational field

Through this approach, I intend to analyse the dynamic and transformative character of field specific capitals. In the analysis, it becomes clear that newcomers to the Islamic field 36 challenge the constituted situation of power including the hierarchy of capital by introducing new Islamic discourses. 37 Looking into the transformative character of the field, it automatically becomes an issue of power; a power to define, to be a source of knowledge, and to influence, thus making power a very central notion. In a religious context, Abdulkhader Tayob states that ‘ religious knowledge, which is inextricably tied to the notion of power, plays a crucial role in determining, authorising, admitting and excluding individuals or groups depending upon their perspectives and interpretation of Islam’ 38 thus emphasising the central role of religious and sometimes esoteric knowledge. To identify efforts to challenge existing power positions, QuintanWiktorowicz’sstudy of a framing struggle for sacred authority in the context of al-Qaida is helpful as it presents polarising strategies to either credit ingroup actors or discredit outgroup actors. Wiktorowicz outlines four specific strategies (1) vilification ; to demonise competing popular intellectuals, (2) exaltation ; to praise ingroup intellectuals, (3) credentialing ; to emphasise the expertise of ingroup intellectuals, and (4) decredentialing ; to raise questions about the expertise of rivals. Such strategies are particularly relevant in what he defines a ‘ competitive identity environment ’, which both Lagos and Cape Town are examples of.

In the analysis of the Islamic field, its transformation and contemporary status can be described through the interaction between the different types of actors within the field. As ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’ of religion constitute the Islamic field at its most fundamental level, it turns out to be highly relevant to consider the interaction not only between producers and consumers, but also between the different producers of Islamic doctrine (figure 3). 39

36 The religious field has previously been criticised for being dependent on situations with strong hierarchies and great concentration of power in the hands of the priests, see LeneKühle, ‘Bourdieu omdetreligiøse felt’, PraktiskeGrunde , Nr. 1-2 (2009). However, this should not pose any problems for this research as both preconditions are generally fulfilled in a Sub-Saharan context. 37 In this struggle for definition, issues such as the definition of legitimate education in order to claim religious authority and to define correct physical appearance are central. 38 Tayob, Islamic resurgence in South Africa , p. 20. 39 Bourdieu, ’Genesis and structure of the religious field’, p. 17.

10 CHAPTER 1

FIGURE 3

Imam Imam

The religious field

Laypersons

In a very different context, Bourdieu himself described the structure of the religious field with the creation of a dominant class of ‘religious experts’, who monopolise the religious capital and dominate the laity by inducing a religious habitus in them. 40 While Bourdieu considers how the prophet and the sorcerer are challengers to monopolisation of the established class of experts, I intend to analyse how proponents of non-Sufi doctrines (particularly Salafis and Shias) are challenging the dominance of Sufi brotherhoods or orders (sing. tariqa , literally meaning way ). When analysing these challenges, the relation to the laity becomes essential as any attempt to challenge the existing structure needs to correlate with popular demands. Considering the relation between experts (in this case typically or imams) and laity (ordinary Muslims), the issue of symbolic violence becomes pertinent. This would be the case if the rhetorical level of abstraction of the religious experts is too abstract for the Muslim population to actually understand with the latter still choosing to internalise it unaware of the structural power they are subjected to.

In addition to the methodology introduced above, a religious market theory perspective will be utilised to further explain the dynamics of the field transformation by elaborating on the structural relation between producers and consumers of religion. This perspective, which is somehow inherent in the perspective of Bourdieu, 41 views the societal position of Islam as a market and considers the level of ‘competition’ between producers of religious doctrines and the ‘price’ for consumers to follow a specific Islamic doctrine. Isolated, the explanatory ability of these concepts is limited, but they are a useful terminology when describing the dynamics of the field transformation that a Bourdieu-inspired analysis exemplifies. In essence, what I intend to identify is the practice of Muslims in Lagos and Cape Town and the sources defining them. Practice should be seen as the product of the encounter between the habitus and the field. The key to understand the social world and human practice is founded in an analysis of this ‘double relation’, which operates in accordance with an economic logic of supply and demand. 42 Furthermore, as radical Islamic movements tend to use soft power to project their

40 Ibid. 41 Ibid., p. 22. 42 Terry Rey, ’Marketing the Goods of Salvation: Bourdieu on religion’, Religion , 34:4, 2004, p. 336.

11 INTRODUCTION influence, 43 Joseph Nye’s understanding of this concept 44 will be introduced to emphasise channels and methods of influencing external actors, in this case being religious scholars and the populations in Lagos and Cape Town.Nye defines soft power as ‘getting others to want the outcomes that you want’ and as the ‘ability to shape the preferences of others’. 45 While countries in general aspire to accumulate soft power with the intention of increasing their legitimacy, two more specific objectives for such accumulation can be defined and that is either to reduce threats to internal security orto increase its attractiveness to external actors with the intention of enhancing its power position. From the perspective of this thesis, the latter objective will constitute the major premise of the analyses and will thus be elaborated in chapter two.

In the second level of analysis (chapter five), I change from a micro or meso perspective to a macro perspective by focusing on fields of a transnational character. The intention of such a change in perspective is to discuss from the logic governing the regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran how diffusion of religious discourse can be understood. Theoretically, this can be constructed through a definition of a ‘Global Islamic Field’ or an Islamic Power Field and a ‘Gulf Region Political Field’, which are characterised by heavy interrelation.This interrelation is based on the assessment that the religious field in both Saudi Arabia and Iran are rather monopolised by Salafi and revolutionary Shia doctrines respectively, and that the countries’ particular Islamic doctrine is closely related to the domestic political field. 46 From this assumed relation stems my argument that successful diffusion of Salafi or revolutionary Shia doctrines is a tool to influence the religious and political legitimacy of the two Gulf regimes and thus indirectly their authority to act as legitimate representatives of the . This argument will be qualified further throughout the thesis as it in this rather raw form presents an over-simplification of realities. In this second level of analysis, the unit of analysis shifts to a more state-level perspective. Unlike the realist theoretical perspective though, I neither consider states as uniform entities nor focus exclusively on materialistic relations. 47 Instead I stress the existence of internal diversity of identities and the importance of ideas, identity and ideology. My definition of transnationalism is in line with Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, who defined it as ‘ contacts, coalitions, and interaction across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments ’. 48 This move away from a state-centric approach opens up for studying relations across borders both on a state and on an individual level as exemplified in Bonnefoy’s study of Salafism in Yemen.Transnational interaction between religious actors is particularly taking place at a sub-state level signifying a situation that could even be referred to

43 John O. Voll, ‘Trans-state Muslim Movements and Militant Extremists in an Era of Soft Power’, in Religious pluralism, globalization, and world politics , ed. Thomas F. Banchoff (New York: , 2008). 44 As outlined in Joseph S. Nye, Soft power: the means to success in world politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 45 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 46 The assessment for this relation in elaborated in the second chapter ‘Saudi – Iran relations: soft power supremacy dilemma’. 47 Rather than from Realism, the analytical focus on states is inspired by a historical approach as presented by Fred Halliday in The Middle East in international relations: power, politics and ideology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 48 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye eds.,Transnational relations and world politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. xi. Westerlund and Rosander ed., African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis and Islamists , p. 10.

12 CHAPTER 1 as trans-local. Hence, it is actually what Peter Mandaville has coined trans-local spaces that I intend to study. 49

As with any analytical approach, applying an analytical strategy defined by Bourdieu’s field ontology and some of his thinking tools 50 enable you to identify certain aspects while hiding others. The methodology constructed in the preceding paragraphs allows me to identify the structural relations between actors in the fields, their struggle for capital and power, and through the notion of habitus to assess their ability to influence the Muslim populations. With the two ontological fields, I become able to analyse inter-field relations and potential sources of transnational influence, which is the central objective of the thesis. However, a focus on specific fields leaves me unaware of the influence of actors not included in these fields, which potentially could be of importance. This methodological deficit will be sought mitigated best possible through additional reflections based on secondary literature.Taken all this into account, the outlined analytical strategy will be sought applied throughout chapters three to five not with the intention to create a strict and firm theoretical shape but rather organically to foster an explorative character.

RESEARCH DESIGN Whereas the previous section outlines the theoretical framework and analytical strategy, this section will elaborate on the research design and the method applied to collect information while also defining the theoretical and empirical scope of the research. Based on the theoretical and strategic methodology outlined above, this study has been developed and conducted with both a descriptive and explanatory objective asking the questions ‘ What is the current situation?’ and ‘Why are changes occurring?’ .51 Naturally, the descriptive part will precede any attempted explanation as the latter depends fully on the former. This relation between the two parts is theoretically illustrated above in the relation between the two overlapping ontological fields. As this approach focuses particularly on one suggested explanation, that is an external doctrinal inspiration to any changes discovered in the descriptive part, it will never be able to provide an exhaustive explanation of transnational religious influence although more holistic considerations will be included in the analysis.

It is important to stress that the intention is not a rigid application of these theoretical concepts and perspectives, but rather to accommodate their use to the specific research context in order to foster an eclectic approach. As this study finds itself somewhere within the spheres of international relations-, security- and , it is imperative to approach it with an explorative and open approach in order to identify nuances. A few comments need to be added to the scope of the thesis’ primary ontological field. In a context like Lagos and Cape Town, it is clear that there is more than one religious field. Besides an Islamic field, it is possible to identify a Christian field, a traditional religion field etc. However, from the perspective of this research it should be underlined that it will only directly address the Islamic field and thus leave other religious fields and the potential interaction between them aside.

49 Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and religious identity , pp. 15-16. 50 ‘Thinking tools’ is a label by Anne Leander, who outlays an alternative practical use of Bourdieu’s theory focusing on a limited range of his notions. See Anna Leander, ’Thinking Tools - Analyzing Symbolic Power and Violence’, In Klotz and Prakash, Qualitative Methods in International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). 51 David A. De Vaus, Research design in social research (London: , 2001).

13 INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the analytical approach of Bourdieu, the empirical focus will be based on a methodological openness, attempting to include a broad range of material differing in character with the objective of strengthen the validity of the analysis best possible. This strategy allows for an important degree of flexibility regarding the type of empirical data, much depending on the tangible context.

The primary empirical data for the analysis of Muslim communities in Lagos and Cape Town will be based on approximately30 interviews, both formal and informal in character, conducted during two-months of fieldwork. Interviews have been conducted in English, in Hausa, and in Yoruba, the latter two through translator, with a wide range of actors. Regarding their structure, few interviews were of formal character as most took the form of simple conversations regarding the local Muslim community and the role of the actor or group in question. Such conversations were semi-structured by an identification of issues of interest formulated prior to any talk. While the majority of the interviews were with imams from differing Islamic covering the several Sufi brotherhoods, , Ahl al-Sunnawal- Jama'a, Salafis, Shia and several Islamic societies, they also include actors such as Islamic student organisations, Islamic NGOs, and mad āris. Interviewees can be categorised into three groups depending on how they were chosen for the interview. The first group was identified through pre-departure research and thus covers the full range of actors, as this was deemed essential. Actors in the second group were identified directly when being in the neighbourhoods by visiting local and mad āris, while actors from the third group were all recommended me to get in contact to by other interviewees in order to cover all the particularities of the Muslim community in the specific neighbourhood. Through this approach, I believe to have avoided the most severe pitfalls of selection as I have depended on selection criteria characterised both by strategic research and an open and impulsive approach in order to engage with as many and as diverse Islamic actors as possible. However, due to the delicate character of the discussion of Shiism, Salafism, and any external influence, many regarded my field of research and particular questions with suspicion, which in some cases prohibited me from conducting interviews or from obtaining particular information.

The much differing structural setting of the two cities made it necessary with diverse strategies for data collection. Whereas it is the case in Cape Town that Islamic actors are formally organised and more often than not easily identifiable for the public through the Internet, the exact opposite is the case in Lagos. This situation stressed the necessity of local social interaction in identifying relevant actors and to understand the characteristics of the local Muslim communities. Furthermore, due to the immense size of Lagos, it has moreover been a challenge to cover the full spectrum of the city. Hence, particular neighbourhoods have been selected due to their high percentage of Muslim population and/or their ethnic setting. In Lagos I have particularly focused on the neighbourhoods Surulere, Idi Araba, Agege, Mushin, Ebutte-Metta, and to a lesser extent on Apapa and Lagos Island. In Cape Town, the easy access to information on the organisation of religious actors allowed me to cover the city more broadly. Spending most of my time during the fieldwork in these local environments, my own observations will likewise constitute information for the analysis. This is particularly relevant for observations regarding , the general social attitude of the Muslim population, and the available . Due to the important transformative power of

14 CHAPTER 1 literature and recorded sermons, my findings in local bookshops and what is generally being sold on the street will be considered valuable too when assessing the religious input to the population both from a substantial and a geographical perspective. In addition, articles, YouTube-videos, and debates on Islamic Internet forums will be included as will information from informal discussions with domestic and international scholars in the field and with journalists. Such discussions have either taken the form of face-to-face conversations or longer e-mail correspondences. It needs to be mentioned that due to the particular circumstances and complexity of the empirical situation, the analysis will depend more on a theoretical foundation and existing literature when describing the Shia perspective. This does not imply, however, that no findings from the field will be included in the analysis in the description of Shia communities, but simply that these findings on Shias largely come from interviews with Sunnis.

15

CHAPTER 2

SAUDI – IRAN RELATIONS : A SOFT POWER SUPREMACY DILEMMA

As the thesis is based on the premise of an ongoing Islamic cold war between Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is the intention of this chapter to outline the thesis’ contextual setting while providing both a theoretical and an empirical foundation for the analyses. Several authors have already analysed how the 1979 Iranian Revolution influenced regional politics and security in the Gulf and as such a detailed analysis of Saudi-Iranian relations post-1979 will not be the ambition here. Instead the objective is to introduce and focus my perspective on the bilateral relationship as a way to contextualise and justify the analytical perspective of the thesis by briefly outlining the political and sectarian dimensions triggering a regional power struggle before finally explaining what I define as a soft power supremacy dilemma between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

That an Islamic cold war is not just a phenomenon of the past became evident during the . In his book Sectarian Gulf: , Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring that Wasn't , Toby Matthiesen describes how domestic Shia uprisings in 2011 in eastern Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were regarded by the as Iranian initiatives 1 much like the situation in and Al-Ahsa in 1979. Despite much scholarship on the topic, the actual reasons for the animosity between the two states continue to be difficult to identify precisely as scholars fundamentally disagree as exemplified by the following explanations of well-respected scholars. Representing a sectarian explanation, Anoushiravan Ehteshami believes the rivalry is emanating from the

1 Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring that wasn’t (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013).

16 CHAPTER 2 revolution and thus of contemporary character. In contrast, Fred Halliday states it is atavistic belligerence or imperialist interference, arguing that it is a result of state-building processes and the rise of nationalism, while ShahramChubin and Charles Tripp say it is due to structural factors and geopolitical differences. 2 Academic disagreements aside, it is certain that the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is of a complex character, taking several different forms such as geopolitical and military competition. This thesis, however, intends to look at it primarily from a religious perspective or at least by stressing the legitimating role of religion for both states both domestically and externally with the objective of winning the support of the Muslim population.

A POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE According to Saudi scholar Madawi Al Rasheed the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran started in 1979, however to properly understand its emergence one needs to start a decade earlier. In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which left Egypt shattered, Saudi Arabia considered itself as the sole defender of Arab and Muslim causes. This perception was only strengthened after Anwar Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel in 1978. The Saudi self-proclaimed monopoly of pan-Islamism changed radically with the Iranian Revolution as the new Iranian clerical regime likewise claimed to champion Muslim interest and to apply law as the foundation of society. Hence, the revolution initiated a struggle to win hearts and minds of Muslims globally through methods such as promotion of religious literature and the sponsoring of , mosques, and Islamic conferences abroad. Al-Rasheed argues that this process caused a politicisation of sectarian identity in the relationship between the two states and it is this transformed character of sectarianism, which constitutes the overall premise of the thesis. 3 Other issues such as geopolitics, particularly the production and export of oil, and alliance politics have influenced the relationship too as explained by ShahramChubin and Charles Tripp, who nonetheless supports Al-Rasheed by stating that the Islamic Revolution ‘considerable worsened Iran-Saudi relations, not least by expanding their rivalry to ’. 4 Perhaps best put by Olivier Roy, he says that ‘this divide [between Sunni and Shia], which was originally political, took a religious turn as the Salafist and Wahhabi movements [of Saudi Arabia] increasingly denounced the Shi’a as heretics from the mid-1980s on’. 5

Some level of political competiveness did exist prior to the revolution though as both Iran and Saudi Arabia have regarded themselves as natural authorities if not leaders in the region. Ehteshami has explained how ‘the drive toward regional supremacy has long been a feature of Iranian foreign policy. Derived from Iran’s long history and its geography, Iran sees itself as uniquely qualified to determine, at the very least the destiny of the Gulf subregion’ thus clearly stressing Iran’s ambitions of regional leadership. 6 Likewise, the regime in has for long

2Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran , p. 41. 3 Al Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi state, pp. 104-10. 4ShahramChubin and Charles Tripp, Iran-Saudi Arabia relations and regional order , Adelphi Paper No. 304 (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996) p. 53. 5 Olivier Roy, ‘The Impact of the Iranian Revolution on the Middle East’, in The Shi’a Worlds and Iran , ed. Sabrina Mervin, (London: SAQI, 2010) p. 31. 6 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘The Foreign Policy of Iran’, in The foreign policies of Middle East states , eds. Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002) p. 286.

17 SAUDI-IRAN RELATIONS: A SOFT POWER SUPREMACY DILEMMA regarded Saudi Arabia as a natural leader in the region based on the narrative of being the cradle of Islam and the place of the two holy places, Mekka and , which justifies their claim for regional power. 7

With the coming to power of Khomeini and his fellow Shia , the competition between the new Islamic Republic of Iran and the Saudi Sunni kingdom became fiercer, which prompted several new policy initiatives, particularly by the Saudis. A central reason for this policy adaptation was the philosophical aspect of revolution inherent in Shiism, which unfolded in the process leading to the revolution. For Shia ‘ there are three distinctive ways of relating to the state with one of them being political activism against state authority – an approach not entirely different from Henry Thoreau’s philosophy of civil disobedience. Along with the societal role played by the Iranian philosopher , as explained by MoojanMomen, this laid the theoretical foundation for the Iranian Revolution and potentially elsewhere, which certainly constituted a source of fear for the Al Saud. 8 The Saudi fear was only aggravated by the discourse of Khomeini, who castigated monarchical rule with a clear implicit reference to the Saudi royal family. 9 To counter any suspected Iranian attempts of provoking instability for Al Saud, the Saudis led the creation of the (GCC) in 1981 to increase its legitimacy in addition to its efforts in already existing organisational forums like the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), where Saudi Arabia was a leading actor in setting up the former. Politically, the bilateral relationship has not been exclusively strained and distrustful as it has been dependant on events such as wars, alliances, and not least political leadership. Hence, the presidential election of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a pragmatic, followed by the reformists Ali Khatami implied a softened discourse between the two states. However, during the presidency of Ahmadinejad, any attempts of rapprochement were cancelled.

A SECTARIAN PERSPECTIVE As my analytical perspective stresses the sectarian aspect of the competitive nature between Saudi Arabia and Iran, an elaboration of the Salafi and Shia doctrines is central. However, rather than a full and detailed explanation of either doctrine, I intend to more specifically highlight particularities relevant for the understanding of their internal animosity and the analyses.

Salafism, often described as a retrograde religious doctrine, should at its most general level be understood as a return to the foundation of religion and the practices of al-Salaf al-Salih (the pious ancestors; referring to the Sahabah ) as their practices had not been altered by innovations, which Salafis so critically denounce. A central aspect of Salafi identity is their self- perception of being the saved al-firqa al-najiya ,10 thus indicating the superiority of their doctrine to others. In contrast to other Sunni sects, Salafis do not follow any of the schools of

7 F. Gregory Gause, ‘The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia’, in The foreign policies of Middle East states , eds. Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002) p. 193. 8Momen, An introduction to Shi i Islam , p. 193. 9Gause, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia, p. 197. 10 Roel Meijer, ,The Problem of the Political in Islamist Movements’, in What Happened to the Islamists? Salafis, Heavy Metal Muslims and the Lure of Consumerist Islam , eds. AmelBoubekeur and Olivier Roy (London: Hurst and Co., 2012).

18 CHAPTER 2 jurisprudence ( madhahib ) as they reject imitation ( taqlid ), while they stress a literalist interpretation of the sacred texts of Islam being the Qur’an and as they are presented in sunna. With such explicit acceptance of only the Qur’an and sunna as legitimate sources, Salafis abandon both the validity of , referring to consensus between ‘ulama, and , which is the use of reason in religious interpretation, as such methods would be against tawhid , the oneness of God, which is essential to the Salafi doctrine. 11 It is on this theological foundation that Salafis seek to purify Islam from ‘superstitions, celebrations and beliefs that belong to popular Islam, particularly Sufism, which through the cult of appears to be guilty of introducing between God and the believer’. 12

With this understanding of Salafism in mind, several aspects of contemporary Shiism become interesting. 13 As Shias consider Ali ibn Abi Ṭalib the first imam, they do not accept the legitimacy of , Umar ibn Al-Khattab, and ibn Affan, the first three caliphs according to Sunni belief, in addition to several other early companions of the prophet and hence Shias reject the body of transmitted by these people. 14 As these companions of the prophet are held in particular high esteem by Salafis, it is easy to understand how the Shia rejection of their authority is regarded with anger by Salafis. A more recent source of disagreement occurred in the aftermath of the Safavid dynasty in the 18 th century, when the Qajar tribe took power. Besides implying a split between the state and the ‘ulama, the change of dynasty also witnessed the rise of a new philosophical approach to Islam as the reason- based ‘aqida came to dominate the ‘aqida, which rejects . 15 Besides increasing the power of the Shia ‘ulama, the prominence of entailed a philosophical tradition in stark contrast to what Salafis now agitate for.

Despite the attempts to generally define Salafism and Shiism so far, none on them should be considered as heterogeneous in practice. Bonnefoy illustrates this diverse character of Salafism, which scholars traditionally have divided into three distinct groups depending on their manhaj .16 As of now further elaboration is not needed however, as it will be introduced in the analysis. Same heterogeneous character can be applied to Shiism as religious practice varies depending on what marja al-taqlid (source of imitation) one follows. 17 Furthermore, Shiism is divided into several groups or branches with Ja faris (), Zaidis , and Ismailis being the three largest. As Shias in Iran are Ja ʿfaris and as Ja ʿfari Shiism is defined as in the Iranian constitution, this branch will be what I refer to as Shiism throughout the thesis.

What is important to clarify in this section is the mutual animosity between Salafis and Shias. While Salafis do not consider Shias as true Muslims at all, Ja ʿfaris actually do regard Salafis as Muslims, although they believe that Sunnis in general follow the wrong path and that they are

11 Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen , pp. 39-52. 12 Ibid., p. 45. 13 As I do not intend to elaborate much on Shia origin, development, and doctrine, please see Momen, An introduction to Shi i Islam and SeyyedHossein Nasr, Hamid Dabashi and SeyyedVali Reza Nasr (eds.), Shi ism: doctrines, thought, and (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1988) for more information; See Louër, Shiism and politics in the Middle East and Sabrina Mervin, (ed .), The Shi'a worlds and Iran (London: SAQI, 2010) for more on the transnational character of Shiism. 14 Momen, An introduction to Shi i Islam , p. 73. 15 Ibid. 16 Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen , p. 193. 17 Mervin, The Shi'a worlds and Iran.

19 SAUDI-IRAN RELATIONS: A SOFT POWER SUPREMACY DILEMMA therefore not ‘true believers’. 18 This hostility vis-à-vis the other part is increased both from a religious and a political perspective as both Iran and Saudi Arabia – the cradles of Shiism and Salafism respectively – claim natural leadership of the . 19 Hence, whether the foundational source of the Islamic cold war conflict is sectarian or not, sectarianism is certainly used as an integral part. 20

SOFT POWER DILEMMA : DIFFUSING RELIGION FOR REGIONAL SUPREMACY In 2003, regional structures changed, which affected the Saudi-Iran rivalry substantially. The fall of Iraq and Saddam Hussein followed by almost a decade long American presence implied a two-horse race in the Gulf region as the former powerhouse of Iraq was left in a devastated condition. Although it somehow simplified the situation, it also pitted Iran and Saudi Arabia directly against each other and made the regional equation a zero-sum game. Neither of the two states have an abundance of hard power as the wealthy Saudi kingdom is military weak, while Iran with strong military capabilities has been severely affected economically by the international community’s sanction regime. From this perspective of competition for regional supremacy, I consider the focus on soft power particular pertinent to analysis due to the legitimising importance of religion in both Saudi Arabia and Iran and the central role of sectarianism, thus leading to a situation of what I would define a soft power supremacy dilemma .21

Thomas Hegghammer argues that there are five main rationales for action that underlie most forms of Islamist activism. One of the five rationales is ‘sectarian Islamism’, which is defined by a desire to reduce the influence and power of the competing sect (Shia or Sunni). 22 Although his framework is applied in a specific context of militant Islamism and specific Islamist movement, I believe it is valid to apply it more generally as well. It is from this perspective that one can begin to understand attempts of Saudi and Iranian actors abroad – even outside the Gulf region – to engage in power struggles by diffusing their particular religious discourse. Mara Leichtman exemplifies this in her study of Shia communities in Senegal, stating that Shia history in Senegal has been influenced by an Iranian strategy to counter ‘Saudi objectives of spreading Wahhabi-influenced Islam’. 23

However, to believe that such attempts of religious diffusion abroad started with the Iranian Revolution would be misleading. According to David Commins, the prominent role of ’s foreign policy started already in the 1960s. Not only to battle Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Pan-Arabism, this was also to protect against increased western cultural influence. 24 Al-Rasheed dates the initiation of this process a decade later. In the 1970s, da’wa activities abroad became a political strategy of the Saudi state, she argues, and through charity and

18 Momen, An introduction to Shi i Islam , p. 192; Commins, The Wahhabi mission and Saudi Arabia , pp. 169-170. 19 In the Iranian constitution, the Guide of the revolution (referring to Khomeini) is also considered to be the Guide of the entire Umma, see Roy, ‘The Impact of the Iranian Revolution on the Middle East., p. 29. 20 Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran , p. 64. 21 Recent events like the Saudi reaction to US-Iran rapprochement during the Iranian nuclear program talks (See http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/26/iran_and_the_us_saudi_bargain) and the Saudi and Iranian involvement in and attitude to the civil war in vividly show that the power contestation is indeed ongoing. 22 Thomas Hegghammer, ‘Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism’, in Global Salafism: Islam's new religious movement , ed. Roel Meijer (London: Hurst and Co., 2009) p. 258; See also Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia , introduction. 23 Leichtman, The Authentication of a Discursive Islam, p. 113. 24 Commins, The Wahhabi mission and Saudi Arabia , p. 150.

20 CHAPTER 2 education the regime tried to diffuse its religious doctrine. Such transnational engagement occurred too on grassroots level and probably with greater efficiency. Al-Rasheed explains how mosques, charitable organisations, religious schools, research centres, and da’wa institutions were set up to complement the more formalised and institutionalised efforts of organisations like the (MWL) 25 and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY). From 1979 onwards, same intentions became part of Iranian political and religious identity, as exporting the revolution was an explicit objective of the clergy regime. 26 What has been equal for both states is that several methods or arenas – both on a state and on a sub-state level – have been used to wield their soft power objectives. Whereas neighbouring countries and the Middle Eastern region has been at the forefront of their sphere of interest, Muslim communities further away are increasingly considered relevant for da’wa activities. This interest now seems to include Sub-Saharan Africa, which is considered a great potential for conversion.

Because of their respective Islamic history and tradition, both Saudi Arabia and Iran have strong soft power in the eyes of Muslims worldwide depending on their sectarian affiliation. Besides being central centres of religious education, both states have been proponents of a Pan-Islamism and are self-proclaimed defenders of the interests of Muslims globally. Hegghammer describes how Pan-Islamism has been a central part of Saudi identity and, particularly, its foreign policy for decades in order to claim political leadership in the Islamic world. 27 For Iran, focus has especially been on defending Muslims’ rights through the support of oppressed Muslim population and sympathy with both Sunni and Shia Islamist movements. 28 For both states, this Pan-Islamism has taken the form of humanitarian work and support for Muslim causes through discourses and in diplomatic circles. To exercise their soft power, three methods appear central:

 Education: Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are considered centres of religious education and for decades Muslims from all over the world have travelled to places like Mekka, Medina, , and to study Islam. Of a more active character, Saudi and Iranian clerics are travelling to educate Muslims outside their respective states in order to enhance their sphere of influence. As students often stay in Saudi Arabia and Iran in prolonged periods for education, influencing foreign students’ doctrinal understanding becomes relatively easy due to the power of structural norms in the hosting society and the religious authority Saudi and Iranian clerics posses. That education is considered of great importance is illustrated by the establishment of the Islamic University in Medina, which was created to train proselytisers and with regulations that 75% should come from abroad. 29  Literature and digital material: Publishing and distribution of Salafi or Shia literature is another important source to wield soft power. Examples include handing out general Islamic works to increase the Islamic awareness and, more importantly,

25 Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi state , pp. 126-127. 26 Roy, ‘The Impact of the Iranian Revolution on the Middle East’. 27 Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia. 28 Ehteshami, ‘The Foreign Policy of Iran’, p. 287. 29 Commins, The Wahhabi mission and Saudi Arabia , p. 152.

21 SAUDI-IRAN RELATIONS: A SOFT POWER SUPREMACY DILEMMA

fatwas and literature, videos, and sermons on ‘aqida by Salafi and Shia authorities. In an African context, this has become increasingly important due to the growing literacy of Sub-Saharan populations.  Hajj: The is particularly important from a Saudi perspective as it provides an incredibly opportunity to influence pilgrims’ understanding of Islam during their stay – normally of several weeks – in the kingdom. During such stays, foreign pilgrims become acquainted with Islam as it is practised in Saudi society, while engaging with the local population.

To wield such powers, established networks of ‘ulama and international institutions are central. Commins explains for instance how the WML is utilised as an instrument for religious diffusion by the Saudi state. 30 As most of these institutions are tools of the Saudi establishment, Iran has been using connections to Lebanese diaspora on the African continent to counter such disadvantage. 31 But not only soft power is used as the use of funding by both Saudi Arabia and Iran underlines the importance of a ‘harder currency ’. In the context of Yemen, Bonnefoy has shown the importance of Saudi funding for the development of Salafism in Yemen. 32 This typically happens through funding of scholarship to study in Saudi Arabia or Iran, to the establishment of mosques and Islamic schools, and to arrange conferences. As will be shown in the analysis, funding is paramount to successful diffusion, which severely has affected Iran’s recent efforts.

It is within this framework that I intend to analyse Saudi and Iranian attempts to win over the African street in the specific localities of Lagos and Cape Town.

30 Ibid., p. 152. 31 Mara Leichtman, ‘Migration, War, and the Making of a Transnational Lebanese Shi’i Community in Senegal’, International Journal for Middle East Studies 42 (2010), p. 273. 32 Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen , p. 151.

22

CHAPTER 3

ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN LAGOS Islamic history in Nigeria has its origin in the 9 th century when Arab traders accompanied by crossed the Sahara desert and initiated a process of conversion. Long before the establishment of modern states in West Africa and indeed before colonial created polities, Islamic influence was mainly among the Hausa and Fulani tribes in the northern region of today’s Nigeria. This signalled the beginning of both Islam and the language in a region, where it later came to dominate social and religious life. Forwarding to approximately 1450, Sunni Sufi brotherhoods came to Nigeria and has since enjoyed the following of the majority of Muslims in western Africa. 1 Although this is not a study of Sufi brotherhoods, a few general characteristics of Sufism are appropriate. With a focus on spirituality and direct communication between man and God, Sufis claim ‘a knowledge of the Real that could not be gained through revealed religion’ 2 thus pitting them directly against Sunni . Historically, Sufism developed as a reaction against the rationalisation of Islam in order to secure the spiritual freedom of man. Sufism was thus a way ( tariqa ) of purification and its followers consider it ‘the inner doctrine of Islam, the underlying mystery of the Qur’an’. 3 Often organised in hierarchical systems with the or marabout at the top, focus is more on guiding than actual teaching the followers ( murid ). Over time in syncretism with traditional religious practices, Sufism developed into what scholars have labelled African Islam and which generally has been understood to be more moderate and tolerant than the Islam practised in the Middle East. The early 19 th century saw the rise of the jihad movement of Usman danFodio, an Islamic Fulani preacher in northern Nigeria, which resulted in the establishment

1Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria , p. 69. 2 J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi orders in Islam (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971) p. 2. 3 Ibid., p. 2.

23 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN LAGOS of the in 1809 as has been extensively described by Murray Last. 4 Incorporating many Hausa and Fulani kingdoms and institutionalising Islamic practices, the Caliphate attained substantial influence in the region, which has continued until present day despite it being formally abolished by British colonial power. When the British colonised Nigeria in 1914, they united the north and the south, which up to then had been separate entities, but despite unification they continued to govern them as separate states until the de- colonisation process. Notwithstanding the abolishment of the Caliphate, the British rulers accepted the title of of Sokoto to remain and thus the sultan is still an influential religious force particularly in the north as stressed by John Paden. 5 Although not entirely clarified, the movement of danFodio and the following Caliphate rule had some attachment to Sufi brotherhoods, mainly the 6 and Tijaniyya, 7 which historically have been the most dominant brotherhoods in Nigeria. Sufi sentiments aside however, the emergence of the Sokoto Caliphate also entailed increased religious interaction with Saudi Arabia. This relationship became more important during the 1950s and 1960s when Ahmadu Bello was the Sardauna of Sokoto . Bello himself occupied at some point the position of Vice President of the Muslim World League (MWL), a Saudi established NGO, while his close associate Abubakar Gumi functioned as liaison between Muslims in Nigeria and the Saudi establishment because of his Islamic credentials and his fluency in Arabic. After Nigerian independence from British rule, the relationship even included Saudi funding of the Caliphate. 8 Until this period, Sufism was dominant and Nigerian Islamic culture had experienced an Africanisation over time, 9 but from the 1950s and onwards anti-Sufi sentiments began to flourish first propagated by political activist and Ahmadiyya follower Sa’aduZungur and later by Abubakar Gumi and the Izala movement. 10

Traditionally, the north has been defined as Muslim land whereas the south has been referred to as Christian. However, in the southwestern region and the cities of Lagos, Ibadan, and this description does not fit reality. Partly due to what Paden describes as a period of great conversion to Islam in Lagos in the 19 th and 20 th centuries and because of migration

4 For more on Sokoto Caliphate, see Murray Last, The Sokoto caliphate (London: Longman, 1967). 5 John Paden, and politics in Nigeria: Nigeria as a pivotal state in the Muslim world (Washington D.C.: United States Institute Of Peace Press, 2008), pp. 21-27. 6 The Qadiriyya brotherhood was established by the Persian ‘Abd al-Qadir (1077-1166), who himself was a Hanbali, but whose adherents condemned orthodoxy. Now one of the most widespread Sufi brotherhoods, it is interesting that a sheikh, who was not even a Sufi himself, founded it and thus the way or path of the brotherhood has been developed by his successors. The Hanbali creed of al-Qadir has implied that much emphasis is placed on the fundamentals of Islam as stressed by Salafis too. However, the latter are naturally very critically of the intermediary role of the sheikh, the loud characterising Qadiriyya in addition to other of their practices (See Trimingham, The Sufi orders in Islam , pp. 40- 44). 7 The Tijaniyya brotherhood was founded by the Algerian Ahmad al-Tijani (1737-1815) as a reformist line of Sufism to revive it in a period of decline. Particularly present in the Maghrib and in West Africa, the reformist Tijaniyya movement sought to change some of the traditional practices of Sufism among others the overtly hierarchical system. The brotherhood is characterised by simplicity as the rules followers are expected to follow are few and clear, while focus is upon the need for an intercessor between man and God thus placing much power in the hands of the marabout or leading sheikh (See Ibid., pp. 107-110). 8SakahSaidu Mahmud, ‘Islamism in West Africa: Nigeria’, African Studies Review Vol. 47, No. 2 (2004), p. 86. 9 The radical movement in the 1970s led by Mohammad Marwa is an example of such Africanisation as he preaching included not to follow the sunna, to only pray three times daily, and the prohibition of facing during in order to align Islam more with local culture and tradition. See John AlembillahAzumah, The legacy of Arab- Islam in Africa: a quest for inter-religious dialogue (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001), p. 188. 10 Muhammad Sani Umar, ‘Changing Islamic Identity in Nigeria from the 1960s to the 1980s: From Sufism to Anti- Sufism’, in Muslim identity and social change in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. Louis Brenner (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 157-159.

24 CHAPTER 3 from Hausa-land to Lagos, approximately half of Lagos’ population is Muslim. Despite these demographical changes regarding religion, structural differences between the south and the north continue to exist. In contrast to the north, the state is not directly involved in Muslim religious affairs in the southwest, where voluntary Islamic organisations rather take on this role. 11 Another striking difference is the local division of Muslims. In Lagos, Muslims seem to be divided into small and localised societies often irrespective of sects. This is in contrast to the much larger communities in places like , where sectarian and doctrinal differences seem more determining for the social division.

Based on the interviews I have conducted in Lagos city in the Muslim dominated neighbourhoods of Mushin, Surulere, Apapa, Agege, Lagos Island, Egbe, and Idi Araba, my impression of the Muslim communities in the city differs substantially from the one outlined in existing literature. Far from the monopolised position of Sufi brotherhoods, my findings suggest the presence of a much more diverse doctrinal adherence and even an imminent dominance of orthodox Sunni Islam if not more radical interpretations quite similar to the Islamic development in the north dating back to the 1960s. This is closely related to what I will define as a renewed religious consciousness among Muslims in Lagos. Hence, I believe the Muslim communities are indeed characterised by a higher degree of pluralism than so far acknowledged in academic literature and that this development to some degree has been influenced by the political interests of foreign states including Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. As Ousmane Kane argues, ‘it is widely believed that this success [of Iranian influence] led to a local countermove by another Islamic power and rival of Iran, Saudi Arabia, to curb Iranian influence and sponsor its own conception of Islamic puritanism’. 12

CHALLENGING EXISTING STRUCTURES : NEWCOMERS TO A MONOPOLISED FIELD Visiting the different neighbourhoods of Lagos, talking to Imams, and observing peoples’ prayer, , and appearance it becomes evident that the Islamic religion is practiced in several different ways and is indeed characterised by pluralism. As already explained, from a scholarly perspective it has generally been assessed that Sufi brotherhoods ( turuq, sing. tariqa ) have had almost a monopoly in the Islamic field in southern Nigeria in contrast to the north, where diverse Islamic doctrines were present. In this regard, it is important to mention that what is understood as a monopoly is the power to dictate the interpretation of Islam and define religious goods due to the dominant actors high accumulation of powerful capitals as understood by Bourdieu and because of this power being capable of influencing the religious habitus of the Muslim population, thus leading to a reproduction of existing structures. 13 This dominant position of the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya brotherhoods staunchly argued by scholars has indeed been the case previously in and around Lagos, but such description seems no longer appropriate to describe the contemporary situation. Instead Islam in Lagos appears to

11 John Paden, Muslim civic cultures and conflict resolution: the challenge of democratic federalism in Nigeria (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), pp. 64-99. 12 Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria , p. 78. 13 Bourdieu, ’Genesis and structure of the religious field’, pp. 9-10.

25 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN LAGOS be characterised by the existence of several different Islamic sects and multiple understandings of what constitutes the correct creed ( ‘aqida ).

Surely this change in the religious landscape or transformation of structures in the Islamic field in Lagos has not happened over night, but has rather been a lengthy process taking place over the last few decades. The structural transformation is due to the entrance of newcomers to the field, who have managed to establish themselves through the preaching of new Islamic doctrines and differing creed. Thus, these newcomers have succeeded in their propagation of discourses that have challenged the hitherto dominance of a Sufi Islamic discourse and as such created a more diverse Islamic field, characterised by a discursive competition for dominance. During my stay in Lagos, I came across several Islamic sects namely the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya brotherhoods, Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at, Ahl al-Sunna, Salafis, Izala, Tablighi Jama’at, and Shia. Several others exist but I believe that the ones mentioned constitute the most dominating groups. Using the terminology of Bourdieu, one could argue that all of these sects with the exception of Shiism have managed to restructure the Islamic field and its doxa by stressing the importance of new forms of capital, by meeting the desires of the religious consumers, and finally influencing their religious habitus.

Although the situation differs from neighbourhood to neighbourhood, my intention here is to outline some general characteristics of the restructuring of the field and the effects of the entrance of newcomers. Based on interviews in Lagos, my major argument is that Sufi brotherhoods and particularly the Tijaniyya, which has been most dominant in recent times, have experienced a radical decline in the number of followers while more orthodox Sunni interpretation by radical groups of Salafis has attracted adherents. This conclusion seems to be supported by the full Islamic spectrum, as the majority of my talks with Imams are testament to. Ismail Yusuf, a 50-years-old Salafi Imam from the Epe area of Lagos, who spends most of his time on da’wa activities throughout the city confessed his personal assessment that approximately 60 % of Lagos Muslim youth adhere the doctrine of Ahl al-Sunnawal-Jama’a thus following the Qur’an and sunna only. Although he himself did not follow any maddhab and argued against any form of ‘taqlid, he explained that in practice the term Ahl al-Sunnawal- Jama’a covered followers of both the Maliki and Hanbali school of jurisprudence in addition to Muslims like himself, who refused the following of any school. However, what defined most of the Ahl al-Sunna is the following of a literalist Athari creed. 14 Identifying himself as a Salafi, appearing with a long beard, shaved moustache and ankle-long thawb, Ismail Yusuf represents a somehow biased grouping. However, many other actors including the Chief Tijaniyya Imam of the Egbe Central and an Ahmadiyya Imam in Agege have confessed similar statements thus supporting its validity.

A Salafi in doctrine and appearance, Ismail Yusuf represents a group of the Islamic community in Lagos that is increasingly more common in the daily picture. However, the group of people who claim to adhere strictly to the Qur’an and sunna is more nuanced than this as exemplified by Mubarak Abdelkhader, an Imam from the neighbourhood

14 Athari takes its roots in the creed of and is characterised by textualism or literalism thus making it synonymous with what could be referred to as Neo-Hanbalism. Interestingly, the word Athari is often used by Madkhalis, the followers of the Saudi Sheikh Rabi' al-Madkhali, whose branch of Salafism () is defined by a quietist approach.

26 CHAPTER 3 of Mushin, who identifies himself as Ahl al-Sunna. Unlike Imam Yusuf, Mubarak Abdelkhader follows the Maliki school of jurisprudence as is the in West Africa. Furthermore, he does not identify himself as neither a Salafi nor Izala as he beliefs both terms signify specific movements, which de does not wants to be identified with although he agree on the doctrines of the so-called groups to a large extent. Following the Qur’an and sunna, but not in what he refers to as the ‘radical’ way of Salafis, his position could be termed ‘liberal Ahl al-Sunna’ – a term also applied within the Muslim community in the north – in contrast to more literalist interpretations of the sacred texts. Illustrating the Islamic diversity in Lagos, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’t is another example. A sect originating from , it stands out due to the stark contrast between the sect’s self-image and how other Islamic sects consider it. In 1889, MirzaGhulam Ahmad created the Ahmadiyya, controversially claiming to be the – the second coming of the Prophet – as proclaimed by Prophet Muhammad himself. Not before 1960 was the movement established in Nigeria, but it has since gained many followers and branches all over the country. Talking to the Imams of both the branch in Mushin and in Agege, it becomes clear that representatives of the movement consider themselves as one of the major sects in the community. However, much controversy surrounds Ahmadiyya, as most other Muslim sects do not consider them as Muslim at all due to their belief in another prophet after Muhammad, who in Islam is considered the last prophet of God. 15 In contrast, followers of Ahmadiyya claim to be the most pious Muslims as they too follow only the Qur’an and sunna, while rejecting any form of ‘taqlid. 16 In Mushin, the Imam assessed his number of devoted followers around 200, while Imam Abdulsalaam in Agege believes the number to be in the thousands in his local mosque. They explain how the Jama’a is very active in peaceful da’wa activities in their local communities, trying to correct any deviations from what they believe to be the correct practice of Islam with the intention to convert Muslims to the Ahmadiyya creed.

These are just a few examples of the diversity within the Islamic field in Lagos. Differing in creed and in jurisprudence ( fiqh ), all these movements or denominations share an opposition to Sufism and what they regard as religious innovations ( bid’a ) introduced by the brotherhoods. Taking the form of a discursive struggle, these newcomers actively try to counter the influence of Sufism while caring less about the differences between themselves. African Islam is often referred to not only as moderate, but also peaceful in the co-existence between different Islamic belief systems. Although peaceful co-existence is still prevalent, it seems that internal hostility is increasing between different Islamic doctrines with particularly Sufi brotherhoods on one side and more orthodox and radical Ahl al-Sunna including Salafis on the other. Talking to Imams from different denominations, it is evident that in several neighbourhoods in Lagos a discursive battle takes place between the ‘ulama (producers of religion) through activities such as da’wa and public lectures. From a consumer perspective , a struggle is indeed also present as illustrated by the main online debate forum for Islamic issues, Nairaland , where Muslims clearly show a curiosity for and knowledge of diverse interpretations of Islam, leading to fierce debate between users. Interestingly, when looking more closely into this struggle for determination of ‘ correct Islam’ , it becomes clear that

15 Author’s interviews with Salafi Sheikhs KamoladdeenJuma’a (Lagos, August 27, 2013) and AbdulhameedSalahudeen (Lagos, September 1, 2013), and with the Executive Secretary of WAMY Nigeria, El-ShamiNoshy Ali (Lagos, August 26, 2013). 16 Author’s interview with Imam Abdulsalaam Hakim (Lagos, September 3, 2013).

27 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN LAGOS strategies differ from one side to the other. Sufis, that being mainly Tijaniyya, have for centuries found themselves in a dominant position in the Nigerian society and probably as a result they simple try to keep status quo by avoiding any controversial statements regarding other sects and try to downplay any problems or differences among Islamic groups. Adherents of Ahmadiyya, Tablighi, Ahl al-Sunna, and Salafism are much more hostile in their attitude as they constantly criticise Sufi practices and stress the need for substantial Islamic education in order to really understand Islam 17 as particularly Salafis oppose what they define Sufi deviations and the intermediary role of the marabout. These attacks on Sufism are conscious attempts to restructure the Islamic field among the producers of religion through emphasising particular capitals as essential for Islamic knowledge with the intention of influencing the religious inclination and religious habitus of what Bourdieu refers to as the laity. Put into the framework of Bourdieu, it could be stated that different doctrines within Islam try to reinforce the symbolic force of their religious interpretation and practice in the social structure. 18 It thus becomes a process of legitimation of a particular religious practice in society.

Whereas the presence and well-established character of these different sects is certain, the presence of Shiism is much more complex to assess. Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran it has generally been the perception that the number of Shias in Nigeria as elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa was close to none. However, the revolution by Khomeini changed the situation as particularly the revolutionary character of the events if not the doctrine itself attracted Nigerian Muslims. Initially after the revolution the number of Nigerian Muslims converting to Shiism has been understood to be rather significant as this trend of conversion, which was regarded as a threat by Sunnis, enjoyed substantial backing from the Iranian religious and political establishment. 19 Due to this perceived threat and because the denomination is an small – but increasing – minority in Nigerian, Shias have been continuously oppressed making it more convenient for Shias to hide their true religious identity ( taqiyya ). Hence, assessing the number of Shias in Lagos and their actual influence within the Islamic field is a complex matter, which I consider more carefully in a separate section. At this stage, it is sufficient to state that proponents of Shiism in a Nigerian context have tried vigorously to influence the Islamic field since the early 1980s and that foreign support has been integral to these efforts.

From a structural perspective, the emerging pluralism and radicalisation is not surprising. Backed by Gilles Kepel, Kane has argued in the context of Egypt how rapid urbanisation and few livelihood options for the population led to increasing appeal of radical Islamist movements. 20 Considering Lagos from this perspective, it is obvious that Lagos has the structural conditions that could lead to increasing puritanism too. Hence, with a focus on particularly Salafism and Shiism and the role of external actors Saudi Arabia and Iran, I will elaborate on attempts of structural transformation of the Islamic field in the following sections introducing brief case studies while applying theoretical notions.

17 Author’s interviews with Imams from the Salafi movements Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a (Lagos, August 27, 2013, Idi Araba Community Mosque (August 30, 2013), and Monar Islamic Reformative Movement (Lagos, September 1, 2013) illustrate this hostility. 18 Bourdieu, ’Genesis and structure of the religious field’, p. 15. 19 Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria , and AbiodunAlao, ‘ Islamic Radicalisation and Violence in Nigeria – Country Report ’, King’s College. 20 Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria , p. 16 and p. 249.

28 CHAPTER 3

THE EMERGENCE OF SALAFI DOCTRINE The Salafi doctrine much associated with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been present in Nigeria for several decades, but its introduction to the southern part of the country is rather new. As explained, Salafism has attracted worldwide attention in recent years due to its strict literalist creed, owning it labels such as fundamentalist and extremist . Associated to terror and jihadism, the spread of the Salafi doctrine has been feared by international actors and, particularly since ’s statement February 11 2003 that Nigeria was one of the nations qualified for an Islamic revolution, 21 the prominence of Salafis in Nigeria has been a focus of international scholars and policy makers.

As briefly explained above, the introduction of a Salafi creed in modern Nigeria is closely linked to the person of Abubakar Gumi and the Izala movement in the north. Although members of the organisation preferred to identify themselves as Izala rather than Salafi, they clearly admit that they followed the Salafi path. Due to their importance for the rise of a Salafi doctrine in Nigeria, Gumi and Izala require brief descriptions. A cleric of piety, Gumi managed to rise to the top of both the religious and the political sphere in northern states. During the prominence of Ahmadu Bello, Gumi became the Grand Khadi (Islamic judge) in the north making him central to the interpretation of shari’a. Due to his fluency in Arabic, he became the liaison with Saudi clerics and institutions and he later translated the Qur’an to , which naturally increased its local popularity. Emphasising his importance, he was awarded the King Faisal International Prize for his ‘services to islam’. 22 However, Gumi was indeed also a controversial figure despite his popularity as he constantly challenged Sufi practices in the Nigerian society. Through his teaching and public debates, he started discursive conflicts with the dominant Sufi brotherhoods and thus he should be regarded as the initiator of religious radicalisation in northern Nigeria. Although Gumi was never directly affiliated with Izala, he was from the beginning the patron of the movement. 23 Established in 1978 in the city of Jos, Izala has grown into the potentially most popular movement in northern Nigeria. In his exhaustive study of the movement, Kane argues that based on external doctrinal inspiration, Izala followers became ‘actors of social change’, not accepting traditional Sufi practices and their hierarchical structure with the marabout in the top, even considering Sufism as heresy. 24 Izala has been particularly successful in attracting young and educated northerners, whose religious habitus has not been steeped in traditional Sufi doctrine. 25 Interestingly, exactly the same patterns are now taking place in Lagos, as my research will reveal in the following sections. Despite popular support, the Izala leadership was co-opted in the early 1990s through government engagement as the movement was regarded a threat, but this formal failure did not eradicate support for the doctrine. In 2011,

21 In his statement, Osama bin Laden listed Nigeria among the six nations (along with Jordon, , , Yemen and Saudi Arabia) most qualified for "liberation" from unjust and renegade rulers, through jihad (See Douglas Farah, ‘Nigeria and the ’). 22 International Crisis Group, ‘ Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict ’, Africa Report N°168 – 20 December 2010. 23 See Gumi’s biography, Where I stand (Spectrum, 2008). 24 Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria. 25 Alao, ‘Islamic Radicalisation and Violence in Nigeria – Country Report’.

29 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN LAGOS the Izala leadership managed to unite once again thus symbolising the strength of its social embeddedness. 26

Gumi’s dead in 1992 and the co-optation of the Izala leadership did not mean Salafi doctrine disappeared in the north as several popular Salafi sheikhs have managed to make the literalist doctrine more popular than ever. AminudeenAbubakar, 27 AbubakarMujahid, Sheikh Bin Uthman in Kano, and the late Sheikh Ja’far Mahmoud Adam are vivid examples of popular Salafis, all widely followed in the north. 28 Their lectures on ‘aqida are flourishing in cities like Kano, , and Jos where the legacy of Gumi is still evident. The prominence of Salafi doctrine has even become so prominent in Kano and its surroundings that it would be fair to say that the majority in the city’s Muslims identify themselves either as Izala or Salafi. Hence, the Izala movement characterises the first step of the presence of the Salafi doctrine in Nigeria. In contrast to what is stated in most literature on Islam in Nigeria, the Salafi doctrine is no longer exclusively a phenomenon of the north. However, as I will claim, the Salafi creed has during the last decade or two gained many followers in Lagos. However, one difference seems to exist between the Salafi blossoming in the north and in Lagos as the former was much inspired by external actors mainly from Saudi Arabia and Yemen due to the role of Gumi, while the latter seems to be much more inspired by domestic religious actors from the north. Nonetheless, the popularity of Sheikh-al-Islam, ibn Taymiyyah, his rejection of taqlid, and a strong focus on tawhid are gaining prominence. To illustrate the increasing prominence of the Salafi doctrine in Lagos, three case studies will be presented.

In the heart of Lagos Island, not far from the great central mosque of Lagos and the Muslim- dominated bazaar, one finds the office of the group Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a . Located in primitive surroundings, the group claims to follow only the Qur’an and sunna identifying themselves as Salafis in ‘aqida. 29 All with long beard, shaved moustache and dressed in ankle- long thawb, as is typical Salafi appearance, they focus on da’wa and social development in the local community. As central Lagos Island is mainly populated by Muslims, their focus is not conversion of people to Islam but rather to correct what they define as ‘the deviating behaviour of Muslims and alleviate innovation’ which is a clear reference to Sufi practises. 30 Such ‘corrections’ happen through lectures on creed, discussion circles on the Islamic value system and training in fiqh, where they strongly condemn taqlid of any madhhab, which clearly distinguishes them from the Wahhabi trend following the Hanbali madhhab. Describing local Shias, their becomes even more fierce as one refer to the Shia doctrine as ‘infected’, while another tells that he ‘once saved a friend form Shiism’ thus showing clear examples of vilification. Besides their religious training in religious schools (mad āris ), most of them are university graduates and they stress the importance of their

26 Andrea Brigaglia, ’A Contribution to the History of the Wahhabi Da’wa in West Africa: The Career and the Murder of ShaykhJa’far Mahmoud Adam (Daura, ca. 1961/1962–Kano 2007)’. Islamic Africa , VOL. 3, NO. 1 (2012). 27 Initially inspired by the doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh AminudeenAbubakar adopted the Salafi-inspired creed of Abubakar Gumi and got close to the Saudi religious establishment. This connection is indicated by the funding he received from the Dar al-Ifta, a religious body led by Bin Baz, in addition to funding from the Kuwaiti Ministry of Religious Endowments; Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria , pp. 76-78. 28 An example of their popularity, Sheikh Aminudeen and Sheikh bin Uthman give weekly-televised lectures in English, which are much followed. 29 Author’s interview with the administrative coordinator of the ASWJ group, KamoladdeenJumu’a (Lagos, August 27, 2013). 30 For more elaboration of Salafi condemnation of Sufi practices, see Alexander Knysh, ‘Contextualizing the Salafi – Sufi conflict (from the Northern Caucasus to Hadramawt)’, Middle Eastern Studies , 43:4 (2007) pp. 503-530.

30 CHAPTER 3 continued education in the realisation of the ‘correct Islamic path’. Typical of most Salafis in the southwest, they identify their doctrinal inspiration as national rather than international, emphasising the importance of some 1992 lectures by the Salafi Sheikh QamarudeenJuma’a for their personal religious transformation from Sufism to Salafism, although they continuously mention their great admiration for the wisdom of ibn Taymiyyah. Much in line with the purist tradition of Sheikh Nasir al-Din al-Albani, 31 they regard religion as a private matter and thus detached from the political sphere. The group argue that their followers number in the thousands, constantly rising at the expense of the Sufi brotherhoods. To exemplify this new dominance of stricter Islamic doctrine, they tell that most mosques in Lagos have changed the time of Salat so that it is now in accordance with hadith, whereas before it was on fixed times thus disregarding the changing length of the day. Despite denying that they are funded externally and only receive financial support from the local community, they reveal that the office we are sitting in including the numerous books particular on the topic of ‘aqida and their pamphlets are provided by a Saudi patron from Medina.

Moving west to the neighbourhood of Idi Araba, one finds the Idi Araba Community Mosque led by Imam Mohammad Salis. Appearing like a typical Salafi, the imam without hesitation defines himself as a ‘radical Salafi ’ who ‘follows only the Qur’an and sunna as done by the Sahabah’. 32 Like the Salafis on Lagos Island, Mohammad Salis’ focus is on Sufi deviations like the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet ( mawlud ) and the use of charms, which he lectures about for an increasingly large audience in the mosque. During jumuah, he explains, several thousands attend prayer. In contrast to most other Salafi movements though, the Idi Araba community is registered under the Izala name, which only emphasises their Salafi identity. Just next to mosque is a madrasah, where they educate the local youth in the Salafi doctrine thus making it a centre for diffusion of Salafism. Their experience from the local community is that the popularity of the Salafi creed is increasing, particularly in the neighbourhood of Idi Araba, which despite its large Tijaniyya mosque is known for the prominence of more radical interpretations. Mohammad Salis explains that he was introduced to Salafism himself during his studies in Ghana and he links this with his increasing level of schooling as it made him able to critically read Islamic literature hence discovering ‘the true path of the Sahabah’.

Moving further west to the suburb of Egbe, the Monar Islamic Reformative Movement is found in a newly established mosque. Still very much in its infancy, the reform movement also adheres to a Salafi creed with imam AbdulhameedSalahudeen explicitly stating their objective to ‘revert their lifestyle back to the Prophet and the Sahabah’. 33 Imam Salahudeen explains how his trajectory towards Salafism has been shaped by the reading of both national and Saudi Salafi theologians 34 in addition to his religious studies in Ile-Ife and Ilorin, where he followed courses taught by sheikhs from Medina, which heavily inspired him. Being less than a year old, the movement has only a core following of approximately 25, but the interest from the local

31 Stéphane Lacroix, ’Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism’, in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement , ed. Roel Meijer (London: Hurst, 2009), pp. 58-80. 32 Author’s interview with Sheikh Mohammad Salis (Lagos, August 30, 2013). 33 Author’s interview with Imam AbdulhameedSalahudeen (Lagos, September 1, 2013). 34 Of national sheikhs he mentions Abubakar Gumi and AminudeenAbubakar while the Saudis include classics such as ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad ibn al-Uthaymin and ibn Baz.

31 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN LAGOS community of Muslims increases through a ‘desire to learn more about Islam’. The low number is somehow misleading though as the core followers are actively participating in proselytising the Salafi doctrine in their local environment. Believing in the necessity of education to understand Islam, the imam has been writing several books to educate people with two of them dealing with the deviations of Sufi practices and ideology and one on the wrong path of Shiism.

Another neighbourhood where Salafism is prominent is Agege in the north of town, where one of the city’s biggest Salafiyya mosques is located. Since the arrest of suspected Boko members in Agege in early 2013 suspicion has arisen towards non-local actors showing interest in the more radical segments and thus all attempts to talk to people were refused. 35 Through local assistance though, I managed to get to know that the mosque is primarily visited by , has a core following in the range of 500-600, and teaches courses on tafsir and ‘aqida. Discussing the matter with the imam of the local Ahmadiyya mosque, the conclusion of Salafi dominance in Agege was confirmed and when considered the Salafi animosity towards Ahmadiyya, I believe the validity of such assessment. 36

Furthermore, the Muslim Student Society of Nigeria (MSSN) needs to be mentioned in this context. Although MSSN executives themselves claim that the organisation is far from the radicalism of the Salafi creed, history illustrates differently as the major trends of Nigerian radicalism emerged in the auspices of the MSSN. 37 With more than 500.000 members, the student organisation covers most if not all Islamic sects in Nigeria. With a strong political focus not least through the publication of the newspaper Al-Fahm (the Understanding), I believe it is fair to say that the MSSN is the closest you get to a Muslim Brotherhood-like organisation in Nigeria as the organisation gave rise to an institutionalised Islamism. As this would be in contradiction to a Salafi presence within the organisation due to rivalry and even animosity between the two groups, it seems like the doctrinal diversity does exist. The administrative secretary of the Lagos branch, Ghazali Yusuf, explained that radical elements certainly do exist within the movement, which is not surprising considered the relatively high educational level of their members – a point that I will elaborate on in a later section. 38 Again to no surprise, Yusuf explains how Salafi tendencies are found particularly among students, who participate in the organisation’s courses on tawhid and among those who the MSSN sends to the King Fahd University in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, for study exchanges. In general, however, Salafi youth prefer not to be members of the MSSN as it is not ‘convenient for them’ since the organisation has a practice of reporting radicals to school authorities. 39

To sum up, the previous paragraphs have sought to establish prove of a Salafi presence in Lagos contradicting hitherto scholarly claims that Lagos is heavily dominated by Sufism. From

35 ChiemelieEzeobi, ‘Suspected Members Arrested in Lagos’. 36 Interview with Imam Abdulsalaam Hakim (Lagos, September 3, 2013). Salafis do not regard the Ahmadiyya sect as part of the Muslim ummah due to the Ahmadiyya belief in the coming of a new prophet. 37 Particularly two personalities are important in this regard. First, Sheikh AminudeenAbubakar, a prominent figure within the MSSN and later the found of the radical Da’wa Group. Close to the Saudi religious establishment and the Dar al-Ifta, he propagated a Salafi-inspired doctrine much in line with Abubakar Gumi. Second is Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, who initially was part of the MSSN before turning to Shiism and creating the IMN; See Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria , pp. 73-81. 38 Author’s interview with Ghazali Yusuf, administrative secretary of MSSN Lagos branch (Lagos, August 21, 2013). 39 Ibid.

32 CHAPTER 3 all Salafis I met, a consistency appeared in their explicit animosity towards Sufis and Shias, in the importance they ascribe to education, in their focus on religious issues rather than political, and in their assessment of the increasing popularity of Salafism. Salafi ‘ulama clearly challenges local perceptions of Islam through their strict adherence to a literalist approach, which one easy becomes aware of in their appearance and how they reference to sacred sources.

SAUDI INSPIRATION AND INTERFERENCE Being the heartland of Salafism, it becomes pertinent to consider the degree of Saudi influence on the development of Salafism in Lagos. My argument is that Saudi influence and interference is taking place, but that it is happening through subtle methods and indirect relations. Hence, I do neither claim nor believe that this influence is only taking place on a state level through official Saudi channels, but rather through sub-state interaction of various characters.

Relations between Saudi religious actors and Nigerian Muslims are not new phenomena though. In the north such relations have been present for decades, indeed assisting Muslims with Salafi inclination to gain prominence both individually and structurally. Examples count Saudi donations to the building of mosques in the 1960s, 40 Saudi financial support to the Jama’atuNasril Islamiyya established by Ahmadu Bello, and Saudi distributed books. 41 Of more recent incidents are the funding of the Nigerian , which later turned into Boko Haram , by the Saudi NGO al-Muntada al-Islami, 42 who also funded the northern-based group Al Sunna walJamma 43 through the local al-Muntada al-Islami leader Sheikh MuhiddinAbdullahi, a Sudanese national. 44 This relation is further personified through the statement of Sheikh AminudeenAbubakar, a beneficiary of Saudi Arabia, who said ‘those who label me a Wahhabi are right, those who say I am a supporter of Izala are right. I have come to understand that Iran is not a Muslim country and that Ayatollah Khomeiny is a demagogue’. 45

The fact that Saudi actors are engaged in exerting their influence in southwestern Lagos has been much less documented though and is thus of an uncertain character. Madawi al-Rasheed has stated that Salafi literature and Saudi sponsored Islamic education centres have been found in Lagos 46 and this is indeed in accordance with my own observations. Visiting the neighbourhoods of Mushin and Oshodi, where most Islamic bookstores are located, it becomes evident that Salafi literature is easily available. Besides Muhammad al-Wahhab’s Kitab

40 Paden, Ahmadu Bello , p. 543. 41 Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria , p. 83 and p. 127. 42 Alao, ‘Islamic Radicalisation and Violence in Nigeria – Country Report’, p. 21. According to Dr. Andrea Brigaglia, al- Muntada al-Islami was founded by Muhammad Surer, who although not being Saudi himself, lived in Saudi Arabia for many years and follow a Salafist creed, while stressing an activist manhaj, see Andrea Brigaglia, ‘Ja‘far Mahmoud Adam, Mohammed Yusuf and Al-Muntada Islamic Trust: Reflections on the Genesis of the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria’, ARIA Annual Review of Islam in Africa Issue , No. 1 (2012), Centre for Contemporary Islam University of Cape Town, pp. 39-40. 43 The group was established by graduates of the Islamic University in Medina and principally devoted to teaching and implementing Wahhabi doctrine (See Ibid., p. 37). 44 Elizabeth Kendal, ‘Nigeria: Investigating Wahhabi Insurrection and Saudi Funds’, Assist News Service, February 26, 2004: http://www.assistnews.net/Stories/2004/s04020098.htm . The Almundata Al-Islam Foundation is characterised as a charity that builds new mosques in Nigeria (42 just in Kano), promotes Wahhabism and being funded by wealthy Saudis. 45 Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria , p. 79. 46 Al Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi state , p. 127.

33 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN LAGOS al-Tawhid , I found books Saudi published books on ‘aqida such as The Fundamentals of Tawhid by Abu Ameenah and Islamic Creed based on the Qur’an and Sunna by Muhammad bin JamilZino. 47 In line with al-Wahhab’s classic, the objective of the latter two is through the presentation of hadiths to outline the correct Islamic creed as understood by Salafis. This include systematic refusal of many of the practices traditionally followed by Sufis including celebration of mawlud, how to pray correctly, and the use of charms and . At the bookshops, sermons and lectures are plentiful both by Saudi and Saudi-educated Salafis. As all Saudi sermons are in Arabic, their influence in a society like Lagos is probably not too substantial as full proficiency in Arabic is relatively rare. Thus, sermons by Nigerian Salafis in either Yoruba or Hausa or by foreigners like the Indian ZakirAbdulkarimNaik or the American-born Sheikh Abdullah Hakim Quick in English are probably more influential in spreading the Salafi discourse. Although not part of Salafi literature, radical Islamist writing like ’s is also available, thus probably assisting in priming local perceptions for more radical Islamic literature.

Another interesting institution is the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), a Saudi NGO established in 1972 with the Lagos office opening three years later. Fully financed by the head office in Saudi Arabia, WAMY is considered ideologically linked to the Saudi religious doctrine. Although three Egyptians lead the WAMY office in Lagos, the objectives of the organisation are nevertheless coming from Saudi Arabia and their creed is Salafi-inclined although some Muslim Brotherhood sentiments are present too. 48 Thus, the fact that WAMY funds the building of mosques, the establishment of religious schools, and provides Islamic education is potentially a great source of Saudi influence on social practices among the youth. So far more than 100 mosques have been built and more than 10,000 copies of the Qur’an and Islamic textbooks including works and fatwas by al-Uthaymin and ibn Baz. Furthermore, WAMY also arranges for approximately 75 students per year to go to Saudi universities for further studies.

In addition to funding through organisations like WAMY, more direct funding also takes place. However, such practices are generally not admitted and happen in secrecy. While Salafis rarely acknowledge any external funding, other sects and denominations feel assured that financial support from Saudi actors is widespread. 49 As such discursive reactions are what could be expected, one should be careful when analysing them. However, since such practices have been prevalent in northern Nigeria, where Salafi sheikhs have received funding, such practices should be considered likely too in Lagos although is surely happens on a lesser scale. A more direct interaction between Saudi religious actors and Muslims in Lagos occurs during hajj . Estimating the doctrinal influence of these visits to Mecca and Medina is almost impossible, but according to Paden ‘the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, undertaken by Muslims from around the world, and various educational links with Saudi Arabia have had enormous

47 Although none of them are Saudi nationals, Bilal Philips a Jamaican and JamilZino from Syria, the former has studied extensively in Medina and in Riyadh while the latter taught in the Grand Mosque and in Dar-ul-Hadith al-khairiyah both of them in Mecca. Furthermore, both books have been published by Saudi publication houses, which are Tawheed Publications Riyadh and Maktaba Dar-us-Islam respectively. 48 Author’s interview with El-ShamiNoshy Ali (Lagos, August 28, 2013). El-Shami explains that they do not follow any madhhab and he is fierce in his critique of the deviating path of both Sufis and Ahmadiyya. 49 During interviews, Ahmadiyya and Shia imams explained that they are confident Saudi funding is taking place.

34 CHAPTER 3 influence on Nigerian Muslim perspectives in recent years’. 50 Though covered in uncertainty such statement does sound plausible as visits of often three to four weeks entailing numerous encounters with Saudi religious practices and the religious legitimacy such practices are steeped in do set a context for doctrinal influence. 51

THE ROLE OF SHIISM AND THE RELATION TO IRAN Turning to Shiism, it becomes evident that in Nigeria as a whole the trajectory of Shiism differs much from that of any other Islamic sect. Before 1979 it is generally believed that Shiism had no followers in Nigeria, but as happened many places in the world, the Iranian Revolution led to an increase in Muslims converting to Shiism, which nevertheless still constitutes an extreme minority. Assessing numbers in situations like this is always carrying much uncertainty and this is no less the case in the context of Nigeria as many of the so-called Shia should in fact be defined as political Shias or Khomeinists 52 rather than Shia in doctrine. 53 Based on estimations by scholars and Nigerian Shias themselves, the number is believed to be in the range of three to five million making it a clear but still substantial minority. 54 Despite the relative number of Shias was low, the increasing conversion during the 1980s influenced the Islamic field in Nigeria by bringing in new religious discourses both regarding doctrine and politics. Particularly the latter gained prominence within the field as it helped change the Islamic awareness to include political issues more explicitly by stressing the revolutionary legitimacy of Iranian events.

Like Salafism, the Shia centre in Nigeria is in the north and more exactly around Zaria in state as this is the stronghold of the main Shia organisation the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN). Led by Imam Ibrahim Zakzaky, the IMN takes its roots in Sunni radicalism and the Iranian Revolution. A prominent member of the MSSN in the north, Zakzaky initially established the Nigerian Muslim Brothers with a revolutionary objective much inspired by and his concept of Jahiliyya (ignorance) and the revolutionary discourse of Khomeini. In fact Milestones by Qutb was mandatory reading for members of the group, which helped infuse an idealistic ideology into the group. 55 However, in the aftermath of the revolution Imam Zakzaky started to adopt the Shia doctrine and after a visit in 1980 to the now Islamic Republic of Iran, he initiated a campaign of Shia propagation at Nigerian universities. 56 This led to a split within the Muslim Brothers and the creation of the IMN, as some members could not support the Shia doctrine as they only subscribed to ideals of Islamic revolution. This division represents the historical split between political Shiism and religious Shiism in Nigeria. Since then, the IMN has grown into Africa’s largest Shia movement, managing more

50 Paden, Muslim civic cultures and conflict resolution , p. 14. 51 The 2012 issue regarding 1,000 Nigerian female pilgrims shows that hajj can also be a potential source of controversy between the two countries although this is probably more influential on a state level as explained by Alexander Thurston in ’To Hajj Without an Escort’, the Revealer , October 16 2012. 52 Zenn, ‘The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria’, CTC Sentinel , October 2013, Vol. 6, Issue 10, p. 13. 53 Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria , p. 97. 54 Shireen Hunter, Iran's foreign policy in the post-Soviet era: resisting the new international order (Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger, 2010) and author’s interview with the representative of the IMN in Lagos, Ilorin and Ibadan, Imam Miftah (Lagos, September 11, 2013). 55 Alao, ‘Islamic Radicalisation and Violence in Nigeria – Country Report’. Interestingly, Milestones is still found in many Islamic bookshops in Lagos hinting at an interest in radical Sunni literature. 56 Zenn, ‘The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria’, p. 14.

35 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN LAGOS than 300 Islamic schools, known as Fudiyyah , nation-wide and being capable of rallying more than a million people to religious events like Ashura (the commemoration of Hussein’s martyrdom in ), where former and current Shia leaders Khomeini, Khamenei, and -leader are being revered. This stresses an important fact, that members of the IMN are in fact following as their marja al-taqlid (source of imitation)and not Ayatollah Ali Sistani in , who traditionally has been the preferred marja outside of Iran. 57 That Shia doctrine indeed has gained popularity in Nigeria is illustrated by the numerous videos on YouTube showing Ashura processions with people dressed in black engaged in dancing and .

As could be expected, the IMN is clearly less prominent in the south including Lagos than in the north. According to Imam Miftah, who is the representative of the movement in Lagos, Ibadan, and Ilorin, one reason for this difference is that Shias in Lagos do not feel comfortable explicitly following Shia doctrine due to fears of persecution. Because of this, Shias practice taqiyya that is concealing their true religious identity from the Sunni majority. Lately it has been the objective of IMN though to strengthen activities in and around Lagos in order to improve religious conditions for their followers through activities such as debating tafsir, the reading of hadith, and the celebration of religious events, while also assisting students getting to Qom to study Shia doctrine. Since Shias in Lagos practice taqiyya, it is neither possible to identify them through appearance nor practice in public areas, which makes conclusions regarding popularity, geographical domination, and actual influence very challenging. The impression of most of the Sunni imams I spoke to was that initially (right after the revolution in Iran) there was many Shias in Lagos, but that their number has decreased during the last decade. 58 Whether this is due to Shias hiding their religious identity or because of increasingly nuanced perception of differences between political Shiism and doctrinal Shiism seems impossible to answer. Geographically, the neighbourhood of Apapa, which is an enclave of Lebanese diaspora, could be a potential ‘Shia centre’ in Lagos. Mara Leichtman, who has studied the Lebanese diaspora in Senegal extensively, claims that Lebanese immigrants in West Africa are almost exclusively Shia, but that their doctrine is characterised by a general lack of religious knowledge, which entails confusion about the correct practice of doctrine and rituals. 59 Although not entirely clear, such conclusions are assumed to be valid in the case of Nigeria too.

As already mentioned, Nigerian Shias have Iran as their main source of doctrinal influence. However, history and current events show that this relationship is more complex and potentially more pronounced than hitherto believed. In an article in the CTC Sentinel Jacob Zenn argues that there is nowhere outside the Middle East where Iranian ideology has a stronger impact than in Nigeria and an un-named Iranian diplomat even refers to the IMN as an ‘Iranian proxy’. 60 Describing the relationship between Iran and Nigerian Shias, one has to start with the Iranian Embassy in Nigeria, as the embassy has been the historical cornerstone for Iranian engagement. Right after the revolution, books and folders were handed out to the

57 The other identifiable Shia movement in Nigeria is called the RasululA’azam Foundation and follows Ali Sistani, Ibid., p. 13. 58 Based on interviews with several Sufi and Salafi imams in Lagos. 59 Mara Leichtman, ‘Migration, War, and the Making of a Transnational Lebanese Shi’i Community in Senegal’, International Journal of Middle East Studies , No. 42 (2010). 60 Zenn, ‘The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria’, pp. 13-14.

36 CHAPTER 3 public and according to Imam Miftah of the IMN, such practices continue to present day. Furthermore, the IMN has continuously been financed by Iranian sources, while also publication of Islamic newspapers and magazines have been funded by Iran. 61 It has even been argued that Iran has provided economic, organisational, and propaganda support for Sufi brotherhoods with the objective of countering the increasing popularity of Salafi inclinations, which clearly indicates less hostility of Shias towards Sufis than is the case with Salafis. 62 Just the attitude of Imam Zakzaky himself is telling. On YouTube one can find videos from conferences, where the imam is praising Khomeini and Khamenei and his regular visits to Iran – last year he visited the holy cities of Qom and Mashhad for instance – illustrates his close relations to the Iranian clerical regime. And much in line with Iran, the IMN has even its own paramilitary guards called the hurras imitating the organisational setup of Hezbollah. 63

Of more recent occurrence, two events are striking in the narrative of the relationship between Iran and Nigerian Shias. In October 2010, custom officials in Lagos seized 13 containers of weapons being shipped from a Teheran-based company owned by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, an institution close to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, destined for Nigerians with affiliation to the Quds forces. In February 2013, Nigerian forces uncovered an ‘Iranian-funded cell whose leader admitted to plotting attacks on prominent Nigerians to unsettle the West’ with the Saudi ambassador to Nigeria being one of the targets. The leader of the cell was identified as a Shia imam, who studied in Qom at the Imam Khomeini University back in 2006, while receiving military training in Iran in 2011. 64 On a state-level, relations between the two states have been improving lately as well as indicated by the signing of several bilateral agreements in August 2012 covering electricity, agriculture, and education. Furthermore, both states are members of the Developing Eight, which is a group of Islamic countries working for increased economic collaboration. 65

Despite the lacking studies of Shiism in Nigeria in general and in Lagos in particular, the assumption that they only constitute a small minority is correct. However, it could be argued though that the actual influence of Shiism – politically rather than religiously – is more significant than one would think. As the IMN emerged from the ranks of the MSSN and developed among the educated class, members now include central people in politics, in business, and in media thus placing them in positions of great influence. 66 The introduction of Shiism in Nigeria and in Lagos post-1979 has without a doubt affected the Islamic field as both the political revolutionary aspect and the Shia doctrine have influenced Islamic discourse in the sense of broadening the perception of what Islam is and how it is practiced and by constituting a legitimate alternative to Sunnism. Nonetheless, the influence whether of religious or political character of Shias in Lagos should not be overstated as their social presence and influence has been rather limited. Events in recent years though could be an

61 See Paden, Faith and politics in Nigeria , p. 35 and Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria , p. 78. 62 Irit Back, ‘Iran and Nigeria: Friendship or Rivalry?’, The Alliance Centre for Iranian Studies - Iran Pulse, No. 54, 14 January 2013. 63 Zenn, ‘The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria’. 64 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 65 Back, ‘Iran and Nigeria: Friendship or Rivalry?’. 66 Author’s interview with the representative of the IMN in Lagos, Ilorin and Ibadan, Imam Miftah (Lagos, September 11, 2013).

37 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN LAGOS indication of a more prominent Shia presence than generally assumed and a strengthened Iranian focus on Nigerian Shias to counter the increasing popularity of Salafi discourse.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE ISLAMIC FIELD : THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION The objective of the previous sections has been to illustrate how the Islamic field in Lagos has transformed during recent decades with a particular focus on the emergence of Salafi and Shia doctrines and any potential relations to Saudi and Iranian sources of inspiration. On this basis the intention of this section is to apply the theoretical framework more explicitly in order to draw some conclusions. An assumption in Bourdieu’s field theory is that struggles occur between newcomers and dominant actors. Specifically for newcomers is that they try to undermine the structure of the socio-religious field or to restructure the field (by breaking doxa), while actors in general seek to convert specific capitals into what Bourdieu defines as symbolic capital with the objective of increasing their dominance in the field. 67 Based on my fieldwork and existing literature, I believe these processes have taken place not only in the north, but also in the south in a city like Lagos thus causing profound changes within the Muslim community.

In this process, education has been a particularly important factor. When assessing the Islamic field in Lagos, it becomes evident that its transformation has generally followed the pattern of the north, where the field changed from the 1970s in an increasingly radicalised direction. As already mentioned, these changes were spearheaded by the efforts of Abubakar Gumi and the creation of the Izala movement. Due to his prominent position, Gumi was capable of causing a politicisation of the Islamic field as political issues and concerns – not least discussions of the imposition of Shari’a rule – suddenly started to influence a social arena, where religious considerations traditionally had been the only concern. 68 As a result, the Islamic communities in the north became much more interrelated with both the domestic and the international political spheres. Additionally, Gumi and Salafi imams after him began to emphasise the importance of Islamic education as a prerequisite to understand Islam correctly. Education had not been an issue of particular interest for Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya imams as they preach strict following of their sheikhs and thus individual knowledge of Islam is of less importance. In Lagos, politicisation of the Islamic field has been less widespread however. This could partly be due to the historical situation in the south, where the state has never been involved in Muslim affairs like has been the case in the north through the Sokoto Caliphate. Hence, the majority of Salafis in Lagos seem to follow a quietist trend, generally framing their discourse on a religious level rather than through political references.

Regarding the role of education it is interesting that in all my interviews with Salafis or Muslims who identify themselves as Ahl al-Sunnawal-Jama’a, conclusions were unequivocal stating that Islamic education and knowledge is essential to understand the ‘correct Islamic path’ and that deviating Islamic doctrine as is claimed practiced by Sufis or Shia is due to lacking knowledge. 69 Thus their argument is that an increasing educational level of the public

67 Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria , pp. 227-229. 68 See for instance Alao, ‘Islamic Radicalisation and Violence in Nigeria – Country Report’, p. 56. 69 Such comments are shared by both Salafi and Ahmadiyya imams and by WAMY executives.

38 CHAPTER 3 including increasing literacy enables Muslims to critically read and assess Islamic literature by themselves with the result that they decide to adopt a literalist approach and to follow only the Qur’an and sunna as legitimate sources. Furthermore, in accordance with statements by Salafi imams and verified by my own observations, Salafi mosques are predominantly visited by younger Muslims with many of them being professionals or pursuing a university degree on the side of their religious education.

This emphasis on religious education to understand Islam by newcomers like Salafis is a clear example of a challenge to the structure of the field by stressing the importance of new forms of capital. Thus when Salafi imams preach a doctrine which entails a particular appearance, particular praying rituals, and the legitimacy of specific Islamic sources over others, while saying that religious education and knowledge is imperative to understand this ‘correct Islam’, they try to redefine what sources that should constitute power in the field. This is particularly interesting since the objective of Sufi sheikhs is rather than to guide their followers than to teach them. While Sufi sheikhs have traditionally been dependant on aspects of what Bourdieu calls social capital meaning their family relations, local network, and reputation, then Salafis seek to empower aspects of cultural capital and particular Islamic education. Furthermore, in the situation of an uneducated public, as Nigeria certainly is an example of, exercising symbolic violence – a situation where the laity accepts being subjected to power structures without realising it – becomes more feasible. Without sufficient knowledge ordinary Muslims potentially find themselves in a situation not understanding the religious rhetoric of the educated Imams, but nevertheless they internalise the discourse propagated by the religious elite. In non-Arab countries, the fact that proficiency in Arabic is often limited to the religious elite helps strengthen symbolic power relations by increasing the level of esoteric knowledge. For decades Sufi imams have been in a position where they could exercise symbolic violence, which has implied a continuously reproduction of power structures within the Islamic field. Hence, the major objective of Salafi imams is to break this Sufi monopoly to exercise symbolic violence by propagating the need for Islamic education. Interestingly, while attempting to do this, Salafis themselves try to increase the level of abstraction by discussing important theological concepts (such as tawhid and the role of taqlid) and specific theologians, generally unknown to the public and thus producing relations characterised by symbolic violence themselves. What Salafis hope for is affecting the religious habitus of Muslims in Lagos to increase the attractiveness of their doctrine. This however is a much longer process and probably a greater challenge particularly towards the older generations, whose habitus is steeped in Sufi practices. Shias on the contrary are not capable of seriously challenging field structures besides the ‘shock-effect’ caused in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. This impotence is primarily due to their practice of taqiyya and the absence of an institutional base, which the control of mosques and religious schools would provide, thus leaving them in a situation without much authority or credibility. In a society so heavily dominated by Sunnism, some aspects of the theological beliefs of Shias is on the verge of being outside the field’s doxa.

At the core of these structural challenges to transform the Islamic field is a discursive battle between the producers of religion with the objectives of defining powerful capital and influencing the religious habitus. This battle easily takes on a sectarian character. In the context of Lagos,

39 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN LAGOS this sectarian animosity is mainly caused by aggressive Salafi rhetoric against both Sufis and Shias. During my interviews with Salafi imams, deviations of Sufi and the ‘wrong path’ of Shias were constantly pointed out in order to legitimise their own doctrine while some of them have even authored books on the topic. In a symposium titled Shiism Incursion: Covetousness and Malevolence , which is sold on DVD throughout Lagos, a Salafi movement devotes five lectures of 40 minutes duration each to discredit Shia doctrine in fierce language. The attitude of Shias and Sufis is generally less confrontational with Shias focusing their verbal attacks on Salafis only while Sufi sheikhs try to downplay the sectarian element. On the Nairaland forum, discussions between Salafis and Shias are ongoing too where followers of each sect accuse the other part of religious misinterpretation and hostility. The latest example is several discussions regarding the permissibility of celebrating mawlud, in which Shias argue in favour while Salafis vehemently oppose. Interestingly, Shias are using Sahih al-Bukhari and the example of ibn Taymiyya to critique the Salafi opposition, thus using sources normally invoked by Salafis. A historical review of the discussions in the forum illustrates that the number of discussions regarding Shiism, Salafism or internal disagreements have increased considerable in numbers during the previous year and that the discursive character is increasingly hostile. These discursive battles are all part of a power struggle between the sects with the objective of obtaining positions in the field from where they can credibly exercise their influence on Muslims in Lagos. From the perspective of a struggle for sacred authority, it is clear that Salafi and Shia followers are constantly praising ingroup intellectuals (most often ibn Taymiyya in the case of Salafis with Shias invoking Khomeini and the martyrdom of Hussein), while decredentialing the expertise of rivals.

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS : THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF THE EDUCATED YOUTH The analysis of the Islamic community in Lagos has revealed a field transformation from a state of Sufi monopolisation in the 1960s to a situation characterised by religious pluralism through the emergence of several Islamic sects. Albeit not being the only newcomers to the field, the analysis focuses on the presence of Salafi and Shia discourses and potential relations to Saudi and Iranian actors. From this perspective, two conclusions are of particular interest.

First, based on the fieldwork it was evident that orthodox Sunni and Salafi discourses have gained much prominence in Lagos at the expense of Sufi brotherhoods. Muslims are increasingly abandoning the blind following of their Sufi sheikhs, they start to dress differently, and prayer times have been adjusted in accordance with orthodox practices as particularly stressed by Salafis. A central factor in this process is the dual role of education, which has been integral both on a societal basis and from the perspective of changing power structures within the field.

 Societal role: An argument stated by all interviewees except Sufis is the crucial effect of the improved educational level of the public. Literacy and education are currently increasing with incredible pace in Lagos, changing the way people relate to religion as it enables the public or the consumers of religion to read religious writings themselves. From a situation in the past, where most religious input came from the mouth of the Sufi imams, Muslims are now to greater

40 CHAPTER 3

extent capable of consuming and critically assess religious literature without any filter.

 Structural role: From a field perspective, education in a religious sense has been constantly emphasised by Salafis as a requisite for understanding Islam properly. As Salafis are often well educated and well versed in the Qur’an and sunna, the emphasis on religious education is an attempt to influence the hierarchical order of capitals within the field and thus affecting their relative position of power and credibility. Assessed by debates on forums, it seems Salafis have been successful in stressing the importance of religious education as users increasingly use education as an argument to enhance the legitimacy and authority of statements.

These two perspectives on the role of education, the latter of them so far successfully managed by Salafis, have been strong factors in the increasing prominence of Salafi doctrine in Lagos among the youth. This development could likely continue in the future due to four other circumstances. First, the educational level will only increase during coming decades. Second, technological development has implied that traditional structures for religious knowledge have exploded and continuously make religious literature more accessible. Third, because the ‘price’ of following orthodox Sunni or Salafi doctrine is decreasing as more and more start to adopt the doctrine 70 and, fourth, since the contemporary youth will affect future young generations through their Salafi-inclined habitus. Based on these circumstances, I believe the educated Muslim youth is essential in the process of influencing and changing the Islamic landscape.

The second conclusion is how Salafi and Shia discourses in Lagos have been influenced by Saudi and Iranian sources. 71 Due to limited financial means partly as a result of international sanctions regime and the minimal presence of Shiism in Lagos, Iranian influence seems much less prevalent than Saudi influence.

 S audi influence: Doctrinal inspiration appears to be of both direct and indirect character. Directly through Saudi publications in Lagos’ bookshops, through the provision of scholarships to study in Saudi Arabia, and interaction during hajj. Indirectly, it happens through northern-based Salafi sheikhs, who have strong Saudi links either through educational experiences or financial relations thus indicating several levels of interaction. From the perspective of funding, again this seems to happen indirectly through Saudi NGOs, who distributes funds strategically in the society, and more directly to specific Salafi Sheikhs or organisations although the latter is of a covert character. While most of such

70 Starting to adhere to a religious interpretation, which differs from the norm will normally come at a cost initially, but as the doctrine gains support, the ‘price’ is reduced. 71 Although it is not part of the scope of this thesis, it is important to state that Islam and Islamism in Nigeria has been influenced by other Middle East actors of which particularly Sudan and Egypt have been influential during the 1960s, see Alexander Thurston, Interactions Between Northern Nigeria and the in the Twentieth Century , M.A. Thesis at Georgetown University, April 22 2009.

41 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN LAGOS

funding appears as developmental activities, it certainly has an influence on the soft power of the provider in religious regards too.

 I ranian influence: The Iranian revolution instigated a process of conversion to Shiism in Nigeria and has ever since continued to be the source of doctrinal inspiration as members of the main Shia movement follow Ali Khamenei as marja al-taqlid. Furthermore, Qom is also the primary destination for Nigerian Shias to pursue religious studies, while the Iranian Embassy continuously distribute Shia literature. As recent events have shown, Iranian relations to Shias in Lagos have been of a clandestine character as the objective has been to support militant actions. As the main Shia movement in Nigeria, the IMN is the central source for diffusion of Shiism and thus interaction with Iranian actors happens mainly through the northern-based organisation. However, as the limited Shia presence in Lagos indicates, it seems Lagos is not yet ripe for more substantial adoption of Shia doctrine due to unfavourable opportunity structures.

42

CHAPTER 4

ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN CAPE TOWN Turning the focus to Cape Town, initially a brief historical introduction to Islam in the specific context is necessary. The historical trajectory of differs much from how the religion was introduced to most other parts on the continent. Whereas Islam started to spread to the African continent in the 8th century, it did not reach South Africa before the 17 th century where after the arrival of Muslims can be divided into three periods. 1 The first wave started in 1652 when the governing South Africa at the time brought back Indonesian and Malay prisoners to the Cape region. The second wave took place around 1750 and is characterised by the arrival of large numbers of Indonesian slaves, while the third wave was initiated with the abolition of slavery in 1838 as the British created depositories in South Africa for former slaves from around the African continent. Later from around the 1860s, indentured labourers of Indian origin emigrated to the eastern province of Natal and later to Transvaal while African Muslims from mainly Eastern Africa known as Zanzibaris were brought to South Africa to mitigate labour shortage. That the Muslim community in South Africa developed late compared to other African states is furthermore stressed by the fact that the first madrasah was established in 1793, while the first mosque was created five years later in 1798. From the outset, Islam in South Africa and particular in Cape Town was dominated by Sufism as Sufi sheikhs from like Tuan Guru, who is generally referred to as the ‘founder’ of Islam in South Africa, managed to spread their doctrine in an environment without much religious contestation. This Sufi dominance has particularly been the case in Cape Town, regarded as the centre of tasawwuf (can be translated ‘Islamic spirituality’) tradition in South Africa, where brotherhoods such as

1 Charlotte A. Quinn and Frederick Quinn, Pride, faith, and fear: Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

43 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN CAPE TOWN

Qadiriyya , Alawiyya , and Chistiyya have been present for centuries 2 and where practices such as the visitation of Sufi , the use of talismans and amulets, celebration of mawlud, and collective prayer to bless the dead have been the normality. In its initial period, Islam also appeared to appeal much to the indigenous black communities, who were subjected to the strict rule of Dutch, British, and Afrikaner powers and as a consequence some converted to Islam. Despite a Sufi monopolisation of Islamic doctrine, ample ethnic diversity existed thus representing a complex and sociologically diverse community. 3 This trajectory of Islam in South Africa has implied the influence of different Islamic traditions, which through time has developed in the particular sociocultural milieu of Cape Town into what scholars have labelled a ‘local Islam’. 4 In an attempt to generalise, it is fair to argue that the vast majority of South African Muslims are Ash’ari in ‘aqida. In fiqh however, the Shafi’i madhhab has traditionally been followed in the Cape due to the arrival of Indonesian Muslims, while Indian Muslims in the eastern part of the country are Hanafi .5

Right from the beginning, the Islamic faith has developed within a context of constant challenges. During colonial rule, law prohibited the practice of non-Christian denominations why Muslims were forced to follow their religion covertly, which naturally prevented the development of an Islamic embeddedness in society. In addition, Islam’s late introduction to Cape Town has implied a lacking tradition of Islamic teaching and a low level of relational links into the historical centres of Islam in the Middle East and its institutions of Islamic education. Two interesting processes started in the 19 th century, which affected the future development of Islam in South Africa. First, a demise of African traditional religion and, second, a decline in legislative restrictions on the public expression of non-Christian religion causing a proliferation of Muslims institutions in the Cape. 6 During the era, governmental attempts were made to counter Muslim unity through the racial groupings system, which divided Muslims into either ‘coloured’ or ‘Indian’ with the result of reinforcing already prevalent ethnical divisions. Despite immense structural challenges, Muslims have now become one of the most significant groups in Cape Town as recent decades have helped transform the community considerably as will be illustrated in the following sections. 7

RELIGION TURNING INCREASINGLY PUBLIC AND PLURALISTIC For centuries the Cape region had been the epicentre of Sufism in South Africa, but from the mid-20 th century two simultaneous processes started and later on challenged if not changed this Sufi monopolisation of the Islamic field in Cape Town. While the first process is centred

2 Yunus Dumbe, ‘Salafism and its Impact on Sufi Movements in the Cape’, Annual Review of Islam in Africa , 2008- 2009, No. 10 (2009) p. 23. 3 On a country basis, Islam in South Africa in comprised of indigenous Blacks, Indians, , Indonesians, Arabs, and East Africans. 4 See for instance Suleiman Dangor, ‘The expression of Islam in South Africa’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs , 17:1 (1997) p. 143 or Quinn and Quinn, Pride, Faith, and Fear. 5 Michael Mumisa, ‘Islam and Proselytism in South Africa and Malawi’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 22:2 (2002) pp. 275-298. 6 See David Chidester, Religions of South Africa (London: Routledge, 1992) and EbrahimMoosa, ‘Islam in South Africa’, in Living in South Africa, eds. Martin Prozesky and John W. De Gruchy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 135. 7 Abdulkhader Tayob, ’Islamism in South Africa’, Al-Mesbar Monthly Book Muslims in South Africa, History, groups and Politics (2011) p. 3.

44 CHAPTER 4 on an increasing politicisation of the Islamic field, the second concerns the emergence of new sects to the Cape Islamic landscape.

Although political concerns had been driving Muslim initiatives earlier, its prominence really started with the establishment of the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) in 1945 and the engagement of Imam Abdullah Haron in the 1950s. As an organisation of Sunni sheikhs and imams in the Cape, the MJC had both the objective of influencing religious and social affairs with the latter necessarily connected to the political sphere. Of equal importance was the role played by Imam Haron in his anti-apartheid struggles. At the time, religious authority was very much in the hands of the MJC sheikhs and imams, who dominated the religious scene. This was reinforced by the symbolic power of the sheikh concept as religious education at foreign institutions and preferably in the Middle East was a requisite to acquire the title. Although not being a sheikh, Imam Haron managed to rise to prominence and initiated a process of empowering the religious youth to counter the dominance of MJC leaders. In 1958 he created the Claremont Muslim Youth Association, which through its newsletter Islamic Mirror started to circulate the writings of Pakistani ideologue AbulA’laMawdudi and Sayyid Qutb. This created the foundation for the emergence of that Tayob refers to as the ‘paradigm of Islamic resurgence’ in the Cape pioneered by the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) created in 1970. Much engaged in the empowerment of Muslims and fighting against the social injustices of apartheid, the MYM initially tried to impose a stricter interpretation of Islam, which they considered ‘a way of life’. Although the young and educated MYM leaders later discovered that their struggle against the established religious elite was too challenging, thus making them ease their approach and accommodate it to the South African environment, their engagement was an important step towards increasing politicisation of the Muslim community and a move towards orthodox Sunnism. 8

Simultaneously with this process, the Cape region saw the influx of , Tablighi, and doctrines in the 1960s from the Indian-dominated eastern regions, which diversified the hitherto Sufi centre. The coming of Deobandi and Tablighi doctrine implied an introduction of stricter interpretations of Islam critical of most Sufi practices, while were less critical of practices such as mawlud and thus more lenient towards Sufism. 9 The Iranian Revolution in Iran caused further diversification with the awareness of Shi’ism and the establishment of the Ahlul Bait Foundation of South Africa with its headquarter in Cape Town. However, the greatest change followed the 1994 abolishment of the apartheid system as it facilitated a structural change within the Islamic field by easing restrictions on religious and political organisation. One effect of the new system was the emergence of new Sufi brotherhoods through immigration from around the continent. Hence, brotherhoods such as Naqshabandiyya, Murabitun, and Tijaniyya became part of the Islamic field in Cape Town and increased the internal struggle between Sufi brotherhoods to attract followers. 10 However, another – and probably more critical – outcome was the introduction of Sunni reformist and later a Salafi discourse propagated initially by Azhari graduates followed by graduates from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. As explained by prominent Salafi Sheikh FaaikGamieldien, the rise of these new discourses was accompanied by an increasing Islamic consciousness in general

8 Abdulkhader Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa , pp. 16-77. 9Moosa, Islam in South Africa, p. 146. 10 Dumbe, ‘Salafism and its Impact on Sufi Movements in the Cape’, p. 23.

45 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN CAPE TOWN and the transformation of religion from being a personal matter to suddenly becoming a public issue. 11 Thus as argued by Yunus Dumbe, at the start of the 21 st century the Cape ‘Islamic traditions have been influenced by those of southeastern Africa and Indo-Pakistan, as well as the Middle East’, with the latter as the strongest source of inspiration lately. 12

THE EMERGENCE OF SHIISM IN CAPE TOWN As in the case of Lagos, Shiism emerged in Cape Town in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. While few Capetonians did convert at the outset, Shia influence initially took the form of an anti-apartheid political struggle through the Qibla movement. The movement, which was created two years prior to the revolution, has been described a Shia movement by scholars, however such definition lacks nuances. Probably some members of Qibla had converted to the Shia doctrine, but it was rather the political discourse of Khomeini that inspired AchmatCassim, the founder of the movement.13 Thus, it was much more a Muslim- struggle than a Shia-struggle. During the 1980s, the early followers of Shia doctrine assembled in Jama’at in different parts of the country, where they engaged in activities like Du’aKumayl (a supplication recited to protect against enemies) every Thursday night. Such organisation and limited Shia presence continued until 1989, when Ahmad Irvani, an Iranian alim, arranged a month long educational camp in Harare, Zimbabwe, with the objective of teaching the Shia doctrine. According to Imam Bashier Rahim of the Ahlul Bait, the camp turned out to be a success, as it became the beginning of a process of Shia proselytising in South Africa both verbally and through the circulation of Shia literature. 14 In 1991, the Shias in South Africa became formally organised when MaulanaAftabHaider founded the Ahlul Bait in the auspices of the global Ahlul Bait movement. Since then, the movement has expanded considerably now counting 20 Shia centres nationwide with their head office and mosque in the Ottery suburb of Cape Town. During the 1990s, Iran’s role in promoting the Shia doctrine in South Africa continued as the Iranian Ambassador, Mahdawi, lectured on Shia ‘aqida in the evenings in his private house. 15 Despite this clear Iranian relation, members of the Ahlul Bait are free to choose which marja al-taqlid to follow.

As the major Shia movement in Cape Town and South Africa in general, the Ahlul Bait is an interesting case study. Placed in the southern suburb of Ottery, the organisation has a mosque, a library, and a bookshop. Both politically and religiously engaged, they focus on issues such as economic empowerment of black and coloured communities, minority rights, and propagating the Shia doctrine. Adopting a non-confrontational stance, Imam Rahim explains that they only focus on non-Muslims in their da’wa activities, as Sunnis already are Muslims. As a result, their focus is on black communities, who generally have been following traditional religious practices now in decline. According to a local Shia, the Ahlul Bait provides bus services from black and coloured neighbourhoods like Mitchell’s Plain to the mosque in

11 Author’s interview with Sheikh FaaikGamieldien (Cape Town, September 30, 2013). 12 Yunus Dumbe, ‘The Salafi Praxis of Constructing Religious Identity in Africa: A Comparative Perspective of the Growth of the Movements in Accra and Cape Town’, Islamic Africa , Vol. 2, No. 2 (2011) pp. 92-93. 13 Author’s interview with AchmatCassim (Cape Town, October 2, 2013). In his article ‘Islamism in South Africa’, Tayob describes the Qibla movement stating that the movement was founded in 1981 and caused fears among the Sunni ‘ulama that Shi’ism was on the rise. However, not only is Tayob mistaking about the founding year, which is of relevance due to the Iranian Revolution, but he is probably also overestimating the Shia character of Qibla. 14 Author’s interview with Imam Bashier Rahim, Ahlul Bait (Cape Town, September 20, 2013). 15 Ibid.

46 CHAPTER 4

Ottery in order to facilitate easy access to jumu’ah and other events. 16 Attending a jumu’ah at the mosque, the diversity of the Shia followers was evident both regarding social classes and ethnicity. 17 In regards to the former, it was interesting to see that food was served afterwards and food rations were handed out to the needy. Based on the sermon delivered by Imam Rahim on the inequalities in society, it certainly appears as if the Shias try to depict themselves as supporting the struggle of the poor. There is absolutely no doubt that Shias constitute a small minority within the Islamic field of Cape Town as they have not managed more than a slow but steady growth in followers since the 1980s. According to the imam, there are two reasons for the difficulties in attracting people to the Shia doctrine. First are insufficient finances, which are essential to establish a strong organisational structure and to organise events for potential followers, while the second is insecurity about how to engage in the communities either heavily dominated by Sunnism or other religions. Nonetheless, recent years have seen a rise in the interest for Shiism, which is illustrated by the high attendance to the weekly Sunday classes in ‘aqida in another of their centres in the township of Phillipi, where the limited allowance of 100 people is no longer sufficient. 18 Despite being a minority, the imam stresses that the actual influence of Shias in Cape Town outweighs their numbers – a situation much similar to the one in Lagos. Many Shias occupy powerful position in regional politics, which is a result of the educational level among the followers. Furthermore, of the two Muslim radio stations in the Cape, one of them is Shia-led, which is indeed a significant resource to spread the Shia message. Finally is the library and bookshop of the Ahlul Bait, which is the primary source of Shia literature to Capetonian Shi’ites. Among an impressive collection of works in English, Arabic, and important works such as Shara’i’ al-Islam Fi Masa’il al- wal-Haram by Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, an influential 13 th century Shia Mujtahid writing on fiqh, and as-Salat: The Disciplines of the Prayer by Ruhollah Khomeini on the discipline of praying correctly are available. In addition, one finds biographies of several Shia Imams, books on Hussein and his martyrdom and more generally on Shia ‘aqida and fiqh. Interestingly, all books are published and sponsored by Iranian-based publishing houses such as Ansariyan Publications in Qom and The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works .

As an offspring to Ahlul Bait, although still somehow affiliated on an organisational level, is the Al Jihad group. Led by Imam Abdullah Shafiq, Al Jihad provides a doctrinal alternative to Ahlul Bait as they have a more strict religious focus and thus the two organisations divide the Shia community in the Cape. Gaining his religious training in Iran and in , Imam Shafiq has close relations to Shia centres in the Middle East, which represents a strong doctrinal influence on the movement. As an objective of this thesis is to analyse sources of Iranian influence, it is striking to see that relations between Iranian institutions and South African Shi’ites are quite substantial. Besides the 1989 Iranian organised educational camp in Zimbabwe and the educational role of the Iranian Ambassador to South Africa in the 1990s, Iranian influence continues to be instrumental in present days. Once a year the Al Mustafa

16 Author’s interview with Khalid Sayed, a Shi’ite and the Chairman of ANC Youth in the (Cape Town, September 19, 2013). 17 The Jumu’ah was attended by , Indians, Iranians, Iraqis, Nigerians, Congolese, Turks, and South African blacks. These clearly included people from all levels of society and more youth than at any of the jumu’ah I attended in Sunni mosques. 18 Author’s interview with Imam Bashier Rahim.

47 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN CAPE TOWN

International University in Qom organises an educational conference in with the objective of teaching the Shia ‘aqida and fiqh to South African Shias. Fully financed by Iran and the religious legitimacy of Iranian clerics considered, these conferences are potentially a strong source for diffusion of religious discourse. As the Shia tradition in South Africa is of recent origin, educational inspiration from external actors is imperative to disseminate the doctrine. Therefore, clerical delegations from Iran visiting the Shia mosque in Ottery, which takes place on a regular basis according to the imam, are instrumental to increase the religious legitimacy of the Shia doctrine in a Cape context and to support da’wa activities. Besides education, financing is an aspect the Ahlul Bait in Cape Town is dependant on Iran for. It is indeed telling that at the time of my visit at the Ahlul Bait, MaulanaAftabHaider was on a fundraising campaign to Najaf and Karbala in Iraq and Qom in Iran to secure financing for the construction of a new and modern mosque in Ottery. 19 Due to the strained economic situation of the Iranian state and institutions as a result of international sanction regimes, funding of Shia movements around the world is an increasingly critical problem, which will be further elaborated in chapter five.

As a central perspective of the thesis, the analysis will in a later sections deal more explicitly and more detailed with how Shia doctrine has influenced the Islamic field in Cape Town and how Iranian sources have been instrumental in facilitating this process.

THE EMERGENCE OF SALAFISM : LITERALISM IN A TOLERANT COMMUNITY Turning the focus to Salafism in Cape Town the immediate paradox appears as the presence of a staunch literalist doctrine in an Islamic environment historically characterised by moderation and tolerance. Nevertheless, since the early 1990s Salafi-inclinations have increased in popularity as a result of the activities of religious graduates from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt returning to the Cape to diffuse Salafi interpretation. 20 The relationship between Middle East graduates and Salafi diffusion in Cape Town has not been a straight positive line though as a lacking local tolerance for such literal and somehow confrontational doctrinal interpretation has been prevalent. Thus, a process of priming of a stricter Islamic interpretation has been ongoing since the 1960, which has prepared, or from a Salafi perspective matured , the Islamic field for the introduction of Salafi discourse. This priming process can be divided into two stages. The first stage started with the migration to the Cape of Indian Muslims from the eastern regions in South Africa bringing in Deobandi and Tabligh doctrines. Although different to Salafism, 21 these doctrines are stricter in their interpretation of religious sources than the more lenient Sufi brotherhoods and thus gave the Cape Muslims a taste of a more pious Islamic discourse. The second stage in the 1980s and 1990s continued this trend through the introduction of what can be labelled Islamic reformism . This doctrine, neither Sufi nor Salafi, was directly related to graduates from Cairo and Medina and somehow

19 Ibid. 20 Dumbe, ‘Salafism and its Impact on Sufi Movements in the Cape’, p. 23. 21 This difference will become evident later on in the section, but the Deobandi and Tabligh adherence to the Hanafi madhhab is a clear point of disagreement with Salafis.

48 CHAPTER 4 resembles the thoughts of 22 as its proponents stress the imperative to follow only the Qur’an and sunna, while dismissing many Sufi practises and embracing modernity. Linked to clerics such as Sheikh Thafier Najjaar 23 and Sheikh Abrahams, 24 this doctrine is likewise far from the Salafi literalism and their rejection of reason, but it has helped prime a discourse challenging Sufi practices, 25 while emphasising the sacred legitimacy of only the Qur’an and sunna. These two stages moulded the structures of the Islamic field in the Cape, making a transition from Islamic reformism to Salafism feasible. This process is characterised by Sheikh FaaikGamieldien, a self-declared Salafi despite never studying in Saudi Arabia. Instead he obtained his degrees from Al-Azhar and the Pakistan International Islamic University, while he is now pursuing a Ph.D. degree in fiqh in Malaysia. Growing up with a Sufi father and a non-religious mother, Sheikh Gamieldien ascribes his Salafi-inclination to his educational experience in Cairo and in Pakistan, where he got in contact with Salafis. Although defining his ‘aqida as Hanbali, he is not exclusively rejecting the use of reason in religious interpretation indicating some accommodation to the local religious environment. When it comes to Sufism though, he is indeed very critical arguing from the religious terminology of Salafis. Initially he was the imam in the Gatesville Masjid, but his time there was short as his interpretation of Islam was not accepted. From then on, he turned focus to criticism of Sufism arguing that many of their practices are bid’a and that they do not adhere to tawhid, clearly indicating a Salafi focus. Particularly an article on the subject of worshipping, 26 which he fiercely criticises, made him infamous within the Cape Islamic environment to a degree where he needed bodyguard protection during a three month period. 27

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the presence of a more pure Salafi doctrine reached Cape Town through younger graduates from Medina and Yemen. So far Salafism had been confined to individuals, as no Salafi-movements existed until a few years ago. But as Dumbe rightly points out, ‘the absence of an organised Salafi movement cannot be translated into the absence of Salafism from the Muslim community of the Cape’. 28 This lacking organisation changed however as younger sheikhs founded organisations to bolster their efforts of proselytization. Of particular interest are Sheikh Abu Ilhaam Jameel Adam and Sheikh Ismail Gqamane.

Growing up in the township of Mitchell’s Plain in a religious family, Sheikh Jameel Adam experienced several traditions of Islamic learning including the Shafi’i tradition of the Cape,

22 For an elaboration of the Islamic thought of Muhammad Abduh, see Mark Sedgwick, Muhammad Abduh – A Biography (Cairo: AUC Press, 2009). 23 Sheikh Najjaar is a product of both the Islamic University of Medina, where he studied for nine years ending with a BA honour in Da’wa, and Al-Azhar, where he studied a master. In contract to the brief biography of Najjaar given by Dumbe and Tayob (2011), I find it misleading to categorise Sheikh Najjaar as a Salafi as he decline this himself and as his ‘aqida clearly differs from a Salafi ‘aqida (Author’s interview with Sheikh Thafier Najjaar, Cape Town, September 26, 2013). 24 A graduate from Medina, Sheikh Abrahams define himself as a Islamic reformist and has indeed accommodated his ’aqida to the Cape environment. Though he has been challenging popular Sufi practices like Sheikh Najjaar, describing him a Salafi as done by Dumbe is incorrect (Dumbe, ‘Salafism and its Impact on Sufi Movements in the Cape’, p. 25). 25 Yunus Dumbe and Abdulkader Tayob, ‘Salafis in Cape Town in Search of Purity, and Social Impact’, Die Welt des , No. 51 (2011) p. 201. 26 FaaikGamieldien, ‘Letter to the Cape Argus by ShaykhFaaikGamieldien’: http://www.sunnah.org/aqida/cape_town_wahabi/letter_by_sh_gamieldien.htm , January 8, 2001. 27 Author’s interview with Sheikh FaaikGamieldien (Cape Town, September 30, 2013). 28 Dumbe, ‘Salafism and its Impact on Sufi Movements in the Cape’, p. 24.

49 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN CAPE TOWN

Deobandi and Tabligh doctrine before being introduced to the serious study of hadith by a Yemeni trader, who settled in Cape Town. 29 With the help from his Yemeni friend, Jameel Adam learned the Mukhtas arBukha rī ̄ before he was suggested to go to Dammaj in Yemen and study under Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi’i at the Dar al-Hadith madrasah. Here he discovered the ‘authentic way’ of Islam, which in contrast to local Sufi traditions in the Cape was the ‘path towards ’. 30 Returning to Cape Town and Mitchell’s Plain in 2002 as a 25-year-old, Jameel Adam started preaching as an assistant imam in the Portland mosque, and as the following statement indicates he had returned with a firm belief in the Salafi doctrine:

I will lead the sala t̄ but my methodology after sala t̄ is the prophetic methodology, which is to make individual dhikr, whereas they have this collective dhikr in tone. Because he [the imam] has a problem with me because I don’t do it the way they do it. I told them that this is the way I believe it’s supposed to be done. 31

This uncompromising approach got him dismissed from the mosque and as a result, he has since focused on educating the public through activities such as private classes in several Islamic disciplines 32 and da’wa initiative like public lectures at the Portland Recreational Centre in Mitchell’s Plain. These activities take place in the auspices of the Ahl-us-Sunnah Society established by Jameel Adam himself. During Dumbe and Tayob’s 2008 study of Salafism in Cape Town, the society was still in its infancy, but it has since developed into a more efficient and legitimate source to diffuse the Salafi thought. Right from the beginning upon his return, Jameel Adam adopted a very critical and fierce approach to local practices. Just short of characterising the society as jahiliyya , he has spent his time criticising the practices of local imams, while teaching Muslims what he considers the only true Islam as illustrated by a situation from one of his classes:

I always ask them to go and search for their proof, and I will present to you my proof, and then you judge what the correct way is. [...] Sometimes, they will bring me the proof from their teachers. Like some of the students attend another class, which is being organised by one Maulana Abdul-Nabi, they will bring me writings proof by him on the permissibility of Mawlu d.̄ [...] So I will destroy all his to the students. [...] Eventually, they find out that not all their teachings are rooted on the Qur ʿan̄ and Sunna. 33

Attending a lecture titled Are the Shia Muslim?, the same self-confidence and aggressive rhetoric was evident. In front of approximately 60 devoted and pious-looking Salafis, Sheikh Jameel Adam talked for an hour and a half in critical terms about the deviating path of the Shia. Although he accepted the Muslim identity of more moderate Shia like the Zaidi in Yemen, he

29 It needs to be stated that the biographical details on Sheikh Jameel Adam stem from Dumbe and Tayob’s (2011) article, which is referred to for more detailed biography, as the Sheikh turned down all my invitations to talk due to suspicion. However, the following analysis of him and his movement is based on a lecture of his I attended and video, audio, and literary material from his website: http://www.ahlussunnah.co.za . 30 Dumbe and Tayob, ‘Salafis in Cape Town in Search of Purity, Certainty and Social Impact’, pp. 195-196, 31 Ibid., p. 195. 32 Classes are counting disciplines such as ’aqida, tawhid, fiqh, hadith, and tafsir. 33 Ibid., p. 197.

50 CHAPTER 4 was definite in his of Jafari Shia due to their ‘belief in the infallible and divine character of Ali and his offspring […] implying their of other than ’ against the principle of tawhid. 34 Such lectures have become a landmark of Jameel Adam and theAhl-us-Sunnah Societywith previous lectures concerning issues like Bid’a in Islam, What is the Salafiyya and who are the Salafees, The manhaj of Ahlus Sunnah, Tawhid, Does Allah have body parts and Shia’s & Sufi’s are there similarities? 35 On their website, one can also find Muhammad al-Wahhab’s Kitab al- Tawhid and fatwas by Abdul Aziz ibn Baz on the impermissibility of celebrating mawlud 36 among a great achieve of texts by Saudi Salafis. On the audio front, there is a lecture series Jameel Adam on Kitab al-Tawhid, a 23-lesson series on Ahmad ibn Hanbal’s Usool as-Sunnah , and several refutations of among others the Ashari ‘aqida, the Sufi, Shia, and Tabligh doctrines, and the manhaj of the Muslim Brotherhood37 . Handing out these digital videos, literature, and audio on CDs, the Ahl-us-Sunnah Society has managed to create a digital source to diffuse the Salafi discourse in addition to preaching it in the masjid, which is effective particularly among the younger audience. Despite Sheikh Jameel Adam obtaining his religious education at the Dar al-Hadith in Yemen and thus not being a ‘Saudi graduate’, I believe the history of his teacher Muqbil al-Wadi’i and the doctrinal affiliations of the Dar al- Hadith institute validates a Saudiconnection . Spending many years in Saudi Arabia, where he obtained his religious education being taught by prominent Salafi sheikhs like ibn Baz and al- Albani, al-Wadi’i is very much a product of the Saudi Salafi tradition as taught in the universities and practiced in society. This is clear from the connections the institute that he later created in Yemen has to the Saudi Jamiyya movement and to Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali, a prominent Saudi sheikh and former head of the Sunna Studies Department at the Islamic University of Medina. 38 Being moulded in this Islamic tradition, Sheikh Jameel Adam’s Salafi doctrine is closely related to Saudi religious institutions.

The trajectory of Sheikh Ismail Gqamane differs considerable from that of Jameel Adam. This is not only due to his educational history, but also because his Salafi approach is much less confrontational than Jameel Adam’s aggressive rhetoric. Sheikh Gqamane’s educational experience started in a Tabligh madrasah, where he completed the memorisation of the Qur’an at the age of 11. 39 Later he went to a madrasah in Johannesburg before being accepted to the Islamic University of Medina, where he initially studied two years of Arabic followed by four year at the School of Shari’a. Immediately after his return to Cape Town, Sheikh Gqamane started as Imam in Langa, but as the practices he preached often contradicted the dominant Sufi discourse, his time there was brief. Afterwards he moved to his childhood neighbourhood of Gugulethu, where he became part of the local Masakhane Community. According to Gqamane, the community seeks to ‘establish a society around Islam’ and ‘make Islam an African religion’. Certainly not compromising on his personal ‘aqida upon his return, Sheikh Gqamane has nonetheless adopted a rather moderate and non-confrontational approach to his da’wa. His objective has been to preach and explain what he considers the correct Islamic path while pinpointing when he sees shirk (), but avoiding the more

34 Sheikh Abu Ilhaam Jameel Adam, lecture on ’Are the Shia Muslim?’ (Cape Town, September 15, 2013). 35 Videos of the lectures can be found at: http://www.ahlussunnah.co.za/video/ 36 From Nur `Ala Al-Darb by ibn Baz. 37 Audio files can be found here: http://www.ahlussunnah.co.za/video-and-audio/. 38 For information on Muqbil al-Wadi’i see Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen , pp. 54-61. 39 This section is based on author’s interview with Sheikh Ismail Gqamane (Cape Town, September 23, 2013).

51 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN CAPE TOWN radical approach of excommunication applied by Jameel Adam. During our talk he continuously refers to ibn Taymiyya to justify his arguments, a scholars he labels the ‘greatest Islamic scholar to date’, which underlines his Salafi influence. Despite moving back to Cape Town, he has maintained connections to Saudi Arabia from where he just came back after participating in a conference on the subject of the Unity of Muslims . Engaged in a neighbourhood characterised by low education level and low literacy with the majority without a strong religious foundation, the initial struggle for the sheikh has been to introduce the basics of Islam in line with his own beliefs. He believes that his preaching has become particularly popular due to the ‘simpleness of the Salafi doctrine’, which attracted himself a lot during his time in Medina. Although the Masakhane Community was established in 2002, its institutional foundation is relatively new with the recent establishment of a mosque as part of the complex.

Based on the research on Salafi presence in Cape Town in 2008, it is evident that its acceptance and popularity has increased since. This seems particularly to be the case with Sheikh Jameel Adam, whose lectures are well-visited and through his movement he manages to educated people in the Salafi doctrine, while doing extensive da’wa. A characteristic of the new Salafi trend is that it finds its followers mostly among coloured and blacks in townships such as Mitchell’s Plain, Lansdowne, Langa, and Gugulethu, where religion traditionally has not been particularly embedded in society. This leaves both a potential and a challenge for da’wa in these areas as the volatile religious affiliation makes it easier for people to embrace Islam, while their lacking religious knowledge makes proper understanding of the religious message a challenge. The increasing attractiveness of Salafism is backed by Imam Rashied of the Claremont Main Road Mosque – a liberal and progressive imam much against Salafi – stating that ‘the context seems supportive for Salafis’. 40 This beneficial context saw the emergence in 2011 of Al Huda Foundation , a new Salafi da’wa movement, with the objective to ‘propagate the pristine teachings of the and Sunnah as shown by the Holy Prophet Muhammed [SAW], his illustrious Sahaabah [companions](ra) and our Pious Predecessors’. 41 Still in its infancy, the movement is in the process of building an Islamic centre and a masjid at Victoria Road and currently focuses on educational events on the of ‘aqida, fiqh, hadith, and tafsir, while trying to reach out to the youth through extensive use of . 42 This increasing Salafi popularity transpires in practical influence too as the Salafi sheikhs’ opposition to several Sufi practices has implied growing doubt and confusion among the youth as some begin to neglect popular religious practices such as dhikr and the celebration of mawlud. 43 Sufi sheikhs have noted this increasing Salafi popularity and have recently reacted to counter Salafi doctrine with the establishment of the Medina Institute , which provides educational programs for the youth taught by some of the most prominent Sufis in the Cape.

All these initiatives show that Salafi sheikhs have managed to challenge the Islamic discourse previously so dominated by Sufis and emphasise the importance of Islamic education as was illustrated in Lagos too. Although on the rise, the numerical presence of Salafis is still inferior

40 Author’s interview with Imam Rashied Omar (Cape Town, September 26, 2013). 41 Al Huda Foundation website: http://www.al-huda.co.za 42 Author’s discussion with Al Huda member IhssanIdriss. 43 Dumbe, ‘The Salafi Praxis’, pp. 96-97.

52 CHAPTER 4 to the discursive influence the Salafi sheikhs have obtained and their presence is still only felt in heavily populated southern suburbs among coloured and blacks.

A SUNNI -SHIA SECTARIAN STRUGGLE Having discussed the introduction of Salafi and Shia thought to Cape Town, the internal discursive relationship becomes significant due to the fierce animosity existing between the doctrines. As chapter two outlined, sectarian differences between Shiism and Salafism are an important source of the reciprocal hostility. This is no news and well known from particularly the Middle East. 44 Interviewing Shia and Salafi imams in Cape Town this hostility is evident as they each try to discredit the other part with Salafis accusing Shias for being on the wrong path , while Shias highlight the extremist and confrontational character of Salafis. Sheikh Jameel Adam’s takfir of Jafari Shia and his numerous lectures and sermons on the deviation of Shia are vividly illustrating this strained relationship. Somehow surprising though considered the historical prominence of tolerant Sufism in the Cape, this sectarian struggle had lately become organised on a strict Sunni-Shia division with even moderate Sunnis attacking Shias too.

Discussing the issue of sectarianism with Sunnis and Shias, the general perception of a Shia threat since 1979 seems to be central to the Sunni hostility, which is well illustrated by three separate initiatives:

- Ahlus-Sunnah Defence League (ADL): The ADL is a rather recent initiative primarily on Facebook 45 organised by a united Sunni front against Shiism. They state their objective to be ‘creating awareness on the dangers of Shiism’, while they in a post argue that Shias are not Muslims as they do not acknowledge the authenticity of books on hadith by ‘Sahih Al-Bukhari, , Sunan Abu Dawood’ and due to their ‘hatred towards the Sahabah’, the latter being continuously praised in posts on the site. Also on the site one finds the anti- Shia magazine Al-Khutoot Al-Areedah , which strongly refutes Shiism.The general hostility in their rhetoric indicates a situation far from the moderation normally characterising South African Sunnis and since the Muslim Judicial Council supports the ADL initiative and collaborates in arranging conferences, it should not be regarded simply as an isolated extremist faction of the Sunnis.

- Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) anti-Shia educational campaign : Independent of the ADL, the MJC has initiated an educational campaign, which according to MJC spokesman, Shuaib Appleby, is levelled at Shia proselytization. 46 In a November 2013 conference on the Finality of Prophethood , sheikhs from India, the UK, and Saudi Arabia, lectured on ‘aqida with the purpose to ‘educate the local scholars and Muslim public about the various deviant sects that are often incorrectly

44 Lacroix describes how anti-Shiism became commonplace of the Saudi religious discourse; Lacroix, Awakening Islam , p. 124. 45 For Facebook see: https://www.facebook.com/ShiaAwarenessPage , and for blog see: http://youpuncturedtheark.wordpress.com. 46 Author’s interview with Imam Shuaib Appleby, Spokesperson of the Muslim Judicial Council (Cape Town, September 25, 2013).

53 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN CAPE TOWN

perceived to be an extension of Islam’. 47 As an educational campaign, focus has particularly been on the youth as this demographical group is considered vulnerable for doctrinal influence and thus as a doctrinal battlefield.

- Muslim Student Association (MSA) constitutional amendment : Although comprising several different Islamic sects, the MSA at the University of Cape Town illustrates sectarian animosity between Sunnism and Shiism too. In 2009 when a Shia tried to run as a candidate for the executive committee, the association amended their constitution to prevent the eligibility of the Shia student to run due to the perceived deviance of the Shia doctrine.48 This shows that sectarian animosity is taking place at all levels within the Muslim community in Cape Town.

The three examples above are all of Sunni antagonism against Shiism, which can be viewed as a struggle for sacred authority. The general rhetoric and response of the latter has been rather moderate probable due to their extreme minority position. To relax tensions Shias try rhetorically to create a sense of unity by stating all sects are Muslim and that they do not focus on Sunnis in their proselytising work. However, from the perspective of a central MJC imam, Shias threaten that if the fierce Sunni agitation against Shias does not stop, it will develop into a more serious sectarian battle. 49

Besides the historical discourse of a Shia revival and expansion in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, two aspects seem to be central to this sectarian struggle. First is an actual Sunni conviction that Shias do focus on Sunni in their da’wa despite Shia denial. Even rather moderate sheikhs like Thafier Najjaar explains that he is certain of the Shia intention to convert Sunni Muslims. 50 Second is a common focus of Shia and Salafis on black communities in their da’wa. With a heavy on-the-ground presence in a neighbourhood like Mitchell’s Plain, Shias and Salafis become direct competitors in their attempt to attract people to Islam and their specific sect. This second aspect highlights the centrality of Salafis in the sectarian animosity. Although the ADL consists of a unified Sunni front against Shiism, the rhetoric used both by the ADL and the MJC is evidently inspired by Salafi criticism of Shia doctrine. As such critical and fierce rhetoric would have been difficult to imagine some decades ago, it seems reasonable to argue that the critical religious discourse introduced by Salafis in Cape Town has influenced the Islamic environment considerably.

The fierce rhetoric of Jameel Adam and the Ahlus-Sunnah Defence League in addition to the general discursive animosity between Sunni and Shia in Cape Town vividly illustrate a struggle for sacred authority in the eyes of local Muslims. Explicit praise of ingroup scholars, while criticising opponents in hostile terms is transforming the previously so tolerant Islamic

47 Muslim Judicial Council ’Finality of Prophethood’ conference: http://www.mjc.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=532:the-finality-of-prophet-hood- conference&catid=15:press-releases&Itemid=13 , accessed December 3, 2013. 48 Author’s interview with Dr. Andrea Brigaglia, Assistant Professor University of Cape Town (Cape Town, September 29, 2013). 49 Author’s interview with Imam Shuaib Appleby, Spokesperson of the Muslim Judicial Council (Cape Town, September 25, 2013). 50 Author’s interview with Sheikh Thafier Najjaar (Cape Town, September 26, 2013).

54 CHAPTER 4 environment into a discursive battlefield, indicating that all actors are aware of the challenge they pose to each other.

THE TRANSNATIONAL CHARACTER OF SHIISM AND SALAFISM As became clear in the sections on the emergence of Shiism and Salafism, respectively, the introduction of both Shia and Salafi doctrines have been closely related to transnational relations, with Iran and Saudi Arabia being the main sources of influence. When assessing the transnational character of Shiism and Salafism, a situation much resembling the one in Lagos appears as education and financing stand out as the most central sources for diffusion of and influence on the religious doctrine practised in Cape Town among Shias and Salafis.

Considering the role of education, the role of the sheikh term is of particular importance in the context of South Africa. In order to become a sheikh, one has to obtain religious education outside of the country and preferably in the Middle East. 51 Naturally this emphasises the attractiveness of studying in the Middle East, where Iran and Saudi Arabia stand out as some of the most important educational centres, and the accompanying symbolic power in obtaining a religious degree from one of these countries. Hence, graduates from Middle Eastern religious centres are bestowed with religious authority upon their return to Cape Town. This is important as it makes it more attractive for Capetonians to pursue education in the Middle East and because of the religious influence they will have when returning home. For both Iranian and Saudi actors, educating South Africans becomes the strongest method of da’wa in their toolbox. Studies in Iran is almost exclusively arranged through the Ahlul Bait foundation with MaulanaAftabHaider personally in charge of the process, and they send regularly students to universities in Qom or Mashhad to pursue education fully financed by Iranian sources. Maybe because this is a relatively costly affair, the Al Mustafa International University in Qom arrange a yearly seminar in South Africa to provide teaching in Shia doctrine in order to enable South Africans to proselytise in their local environments. 52 As stressed by Khalid Sayed, a local Shia, finances definitely seems to be a constraint for Iranian institutions in this regard and therefore alternative methods to educate people need to be explored. This is less the case for Saudi Arabia. Studies in the kingdom is mainly organised through the MJC and by former graduates. In the past, the number of students going to mainly Mecca or Medina was quite high, but it has been decreasing lately due to two factors; reduced intake at the universities and a fear by the MJC that students become radicalised during their studies. Although the number of students is not vast, history has shown that particularly graduates from Saudi religious institutions – and Dammaj in Yemen in the case of Jameel Adam – are inclined to return to proselytise the doctrine, they were introduced to on the Arabian Peninsula, thus underlining the incredibly powerful role of education in the diffusion of religious doctrine. According to Dumbe, this influence has lately been amplified by ‘the fact that many Ulama of Cape Town today depend on Saudi scholars in matters of religious doctrine, also contributes to an overall decrease of interest in Sufism’. 53 It is important to stress, however, that studies in for instance Saudi Arabia do not necessarily lead to students embracing Salafism, as Sheikh Seraj Hendricks is testimony to. A graduate from

51 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa , p. 51. 52 Author’s interview with Imam Bashier Rahim, Ahlul Bait (Cape Town, September 20, 2013). 53 Dumbe, ‘Salafism and its Impact on Sufi Movements in the Cape’, p. 26.

55 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN CAPE TOWN

Saudi Arabia Sheikh Hendricks returned to Cape Town only to become a staunch critic of Salafi doctrine, which he defines as extreme. Imam of the Sufi Azzaviya order and one of the founders of the anti-Salafi Medina Institute, Sheikh Hendricks has engaged in an anti-Salafi discursive struggle, vividly illustrated by his attack on Sheikh FaaikGamieldien, whom he labels ‘a Wahhabi and a Kharijite whose religious fervor is embedded in extremism and fanaticism’. 54

Another source to exert influence is through more direct financing practices. As mentioned, due to financial constraints such practices have been less widespread by Iranian institutions lately compared to Saudi engagement. However, the Ahlul Bait foundation does receive financial support from Iranian sources as the ongoing process of building a new mosque witnesses although it probably is not an entirely institutionalised process. Also, most of the literature in the Ahlul Bait library and bookshop is provided by Iranian sources. Although far from being of extensive character, Saudi funding is occurring too. Besides financing Capetonians’ studies in the kingdom, it is also widely believed that continued funding of graduates’ activities upon their return is taking place. Sheikh Ismail Gqamane is one example, 55 but it is generally believed – by Sufis and Shias though – that such financing practices are more widespread. Despite the obvious strategic motives Sufis and Shias have to promote such arguments, the assertion is far from unrealistic. The provision of Islamic literature is another case in point. Previously a member of the MYM, Abdulkhader Tayob explains how the Saudi WAMY provided most of the movement’s literature. 56 Such Saudi trend seems to have continued as the literature I received when visiting the MSA at the University of Cape Town was provided by al-Muntada Al-Islami.

State-level economic relations between South Africa and Iran on one side and between South Africa and Saudi Arabia on the other indicate an interesting tendency too. In the post- Apartheid period until 2012, South African-Iranian economic relations were strong with Iran providing South Africa more than a quarter of its crude oil import, while also investing billions in South Africa’s power-generation sector. 57 However, in June 2012 South Africa temporarily halted the import of Iranian oil due to the international sanction regime on Iran leading to Saudi Arabia becoming the main exporter of oil to South Africa. In June 2013 South Africa made the halt of importation of Iranian oil permanent. 58 Interestingly, in June 2012 Saudi Arabia and South Africa sat up a $2.4 billion holding company, the Saudi Arabian South Africa Holding (SASAH), with the intend to invest in South African business to assist the struggling economy. 59 Furthermore, according to AchmatCassim, Saudi Arabia is also a major shareholder in the South African media industry. 60 These relations indicate a change in state- level economic leverage in South Africa in favour of Saudi Arabia. How this relates to the diffusion of religious doctrine is difficult to assess, but it certainly illustrates closer relations and thus a stronger interface between Saudi and South African actors.

54 Dumbe, ‘The Salafi Praxis’, p. 97. 55 Dumbe and Tayob, ‘Salafis in Cape Town in Search of Purity, Certainty and Social Impact’, p. 203. 56 Tayob, ’Islamism in South Africa’, p. 13. 57 Eliot Pence and MehrunEtebari, ’Reaching Iran through South Africa’, The National Interest , May 23, 2012. 58 See IOL News, ’ SA cuts oil imports from Iran’. August 1, 2012 and IOL News, ’ SA ends Iranian oil imports’. June 7, 2013 . 59 Reuters, ’South Africa, Saudi Arabia earmark $2.4 billion for joint ventures’. June 11, 2006. 60 Author’s interview with AchmatCassim (Cape Town, October 2, 2013).

56 CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS : FIELD TRANSFORMATION AND LIMITATIONS The Islamic community in Cape Town – historically so embedded in Sufism – experienced a first step towards religious pluralism in the 1960s when , Barelvi, and Tablighi migrated from the eastern part of the country. From the perspective of this paper, however, the introduction of Shiism from the early 1980s and Salafism in the 1990s is of greater interest. Although of a more limited character than in Lagos, Shias and Salafis have managed to influence Muslim communities in Cape Town and again education has been central. Sufi brotherhoods and traditions are characterised by strong hierarchy with the imam or sheikh at the top, who guide his followers in their religious practices thus reducing incentives for religious education or reflection by the separate Muslim. It is exactly this lack of self-reflection that Salafis like Sheikh Jameel Adam and to a lesser degree Shias have challenged by stressing a critical approach to Islam, naturally as an attempt to reduce the Sufi grip on power, which in Bourdieudian terms could be translated into a situation of symbolic violence. Simply the existence of Shiism as an Islamic alternative and the Salafi emphasis on education to legitimise their own position, has led to an ‘ educationalisation’ of the Islamic field in Cape Town as Sufi sheikhs and imams have chosen to accept education as the battlefield as proposed by newcomers. It is in this perspective that the recent establishment of the Medina Institute should be regarded.

Despite bringing some ‘disturbances’ to this near-monopolisation of Sufi brotherhoods, Shias and Salafis have been critically limited in their challenges. These limitations can be defined on a social level and on a structural level.

 Societal limitation: From a social perspective, the da’wa of Salafis and Shias has been limited in their success due to a continued South African perception that both sects somehow represent deviations, which is easily observed either through their appearance (in the case of Salafis) or during prayer (in the case of Shias). As both sects are regarded as alternatives to the norm, Capetonian Muslims in general still hold reservations towards Salafism and Shiism as they probably consider ‘the price’ too high to follow such abnormal doctrines.

 Structural limitation: An equally critical limitation of the diffusion of Shiism and Salafism is structural and posed by Cape Town’s mosque system, which limits the access of non-Sufis to positions of authority including preaching in mosques. This seems to have been a particular problem for young Salafi graduates returning to Cape Town as they initially lacked a platform to proselytise. This lack of access is aggravated by the fact that sacred authority is to a large extent attached to these formal positions. In a comparative analysis between Salafism in Cape Town and in Accra, Ghana, Yunus Dumbe stresses this structural limitation as the main reason for the lacking Salafi prominence compared to Accra, where Salafis have become a dominant Muslim movement. 61

61 Dumbe, ‘The Salafi Praxis’, pp. 89-94.

57 ISLAMIC DOCTRINE AND DISCOURSE IN CAPE TOWN

To further elaborate on these limitations in general, it becomes clear in the case of Cape Town that Islamic newcomers have struggled due to lacking opportunity structures – except potentially the complacency on the behalf of Sufi religious leaders regarding their grip on power. In the words of Salafi Sheikh Gqamane, ‘Cape Town welcomes everything except Shiism and Salafism’ and he continues by stating regarding Salafism that ‘the Cape Town community is very tolerant – therefore, it was problematic for people when Salafis suddenly turned up and started telling them what to do and what not to do’. 62 Among the implications of these limitations is that Salafi graduates accommodate their views upon return to Cape Town in order to get ‘food on the table’ according to Sheikh FaaikGamieldien. 63 Another more ‘self-inflicted’ Salafi cause for the initial slow growth could be due to the manhaj itself of the Salafis as expressed by Sheikh Jameel Adam, who states that da’wa should be focused on yourself and your closest family. 64 Despite limitations, Salafis have recently become more organised as is evident with the examples of the Ahl-us-Sunnah Society and the Al Huda Foundation, and although integration into formal institutions have continued to be an issue, Salafis have managed to create their own platforms to propagate their discourse. This development is mostly due to Sheikh Jameel Adam as he, according to Sheikh Gqamane, has managed to bring new energy to the Salafi struggle.

In brief, more than any of the other non-Sufi doctrines new to Cape Town, Salafism and Shiism have entailed an intensified interaction on both a producer-producer level – through discursive struggles – and on a producer-consumer level – through increased Islamic education and da’wa initiatives, which particularly focus on black communities. For the Shia, their situation is rather stagnant as they experience difficulties in attracting high numbers of followers. Nonetheless, they are expanding their institutional facilities and activities and they are clearly considered a threat by Sunnis. The trajectory of Salafism has differed as its proponents initially experienced serious difficulties, but considered recent developments such as a renewed Islamic focus in society, an increasing organisation of Salafis, and the sacred authority attached to education it seems reasonable to argue that Salafi organisations will gain in popularity in coming years. This process will be eased as the symbolic cost associated with leaving Sufi brotherhoods is slowly decreasing. This leads to another important conclusion of how Iranian and Saudi influence, respectively, should be assessed in the rise of Shiism and Salafism in Cape Town.

 I ranian influence: The Iranian relation was integral for the initial process of conversion to Shiism in South Africa exemplified by the Iranian organised conference and regular lectures. This was in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and it seems like the intensity of relations has decreased somehow since to now consist of yearly conferences on Shia doctrine organised by an Iranian university, occasional funding, and the provision of scholarships to South African students going to Iran to study. Nonetheless, Iran continues to be the geographical centre for doctrinal inspiration as highlighted by

62 Author’s interview with Sheikh Ismail Gqamane (Cape Town, September 23, 2013). 63 Author’s interview with Sheikh FaaikGamieldien (Cape Town, September 30, 2013). 64 See lecture ’Manhaj of Ahlus Sunnah’ by Sheikh Jameel Adam: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EVG8VTKvRsU

58 CHAPTER 4

publications available at the AhlulBayt and the Iranian clerical delegations visiting from time to time.

 S audi influence: The recent emergence, the outspoken character, and the critical attitude to the established Muslim community of Salafis in Cape Town make them an interesting phenomenon. The Salafi emergence has been heavily influenced by the Saudi educational system and Salafi/Wahhabi literature with the latter providing the discursive arguments to criticise other Islamic sects. This clearly shows how powerful a tool the provision of scholarships to study an Islamic education at Salafi institutions in the Arabian Peninsula really is to instigate doctrinal diffusion abroad. Although the extent is of uncertain character, funding of Saudi graduates from Saudi sources seems to be occurring too thus emphasising a financial relation.

59

CHAPTER 5

EXPLAINING RELIGIOUS DIFFUSION : THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ISLAMIC COLD WAR PRISM

The previous two chapters have sought to describe and analyse the development of Islamic doctrine in Lagos and Cape Town paying special attention to the influence of Saudi and Iranian actors. Leaving such closer examinations, I now turn focus more specifically to the efforts of Saudi Arabia and Iran with the intention to assess and explain transregional relations. This implies a change in analytical perspective from a micro perspective on Lagos and Cape Town to a macro perspective on the Persian Gulf and transnational relations and the logic guiding the regional contestation for power. My objective in the assessment of transnational influence is to contemplate to what extent the Islamic Cold War framework or prism offers a valid explanatory perspective on the diffusion of Islamic discourse or if other motives should be considered more crucial.

Right from the beginning – which I date as the revolutionary period in Iran – the Iranian regime has been much more aggressive than Saudi Arabia in its religious diffusion with the objective to export the revolution. Because of Khomeini’s rhetoric and the establishment of the Quds force with the explicit purpose of exporting the revolution, few Sunni governed states – least of all Sunni Iraq and the Gulf monarchies – felt safe in this period. Events in Saudi Arabia such as the Shia rebellion in Qatif in 1979 1 and in Kuwait and Bahrain 2 are clear

1 Toby Craig Jones, ‘Rebellion on the Saudi Periphery: Modernity, Marginalization, and the Shi’a Uprising of 1979’, International Journal of Middle East Studies , Vol. 38, No. 2 (2006), pp. 213-233. 2 Laurence Louër, Transnational Shia politics: religious and political networks in the Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

60 CHAPTER 5 examples of Iranian interference or support in external states. As explained by Toby Jones and Laurence Louër, these examples are characterised by efforts of clerical networks around a marja al-taqlid, which in the context of the Gulf has been the Shiraziyyin after the late Ayatollah Mohammad al-Shirazi and through al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya established in Najaf by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. 3 Although Shia communities in nearby states like the Gulf monarchies, Iraq, and Lebanon were of primary interest of the Iranian regime, Muslim communities in Sub-Saharan African were not completely neglected. Kane even argues that outside the Middle East, nowhere did revolutionary Shia ideology become more popular than in the case of Nigeria. 4As described by several authors, this led to a countermove from the Saudi political and religious establishment to instigate processes to diffuse Salafi doctrine among Africans.

It is evident that neither Lagos nor Cape Town is the epicentre of Saudi and Iranian interests. This was never my intention to prove. However, I believe the two case studies are useful to test my hypothesis andto assessthe transregional efforts of Saudi and Iranian actors to diffuse their religious doctrine in Sub-Saharan Africa more generally as both countries should be considered attractive from a proselytising perspective. Neither has it been the intention of the study to measure the Salafis or revolutionary Shias in Lagos or Cape Town in terms of their numbers. This is simply not possible and potentially not even relevant. My approach has been qualitative rather than quantitative with the intention to discover and assess tendencies and trends in the societies. More precisely, it has been a study of doctrinal transformation in Lagos and Cape Town, the recent prominence and societal influence of new doctrines, and to what degree external sourceshave been influential in this transformation. As focus has been on Salafi and Shia doctrines and the external influence of Saudi and Iranian actors, many interesting aspects have been left out. This is, however, an inevitable limitation of research.

ASSESSING RELIGIOUS DIFFUSION The analyses have so far shown that Salafi and (revolutionary) Shia doctrines are indeed not absent in the Muslim communities in Lagos and Cape Town as academic literature otherwise seems to indicate to some extent. Furthermore, I feel confident in arguing that the emergence of these doctrines can partly be ascribed to external sources with Saudi Arabia and Iran being two examples. The question becomes how such diffusion of Salafism and Shiism can be interpreted in the context of the Islamic Cold War.

Salafis and Shias in Lagos and Cape Town are not products of official policy papers produced in Riyadh or Teheran stressing the importance of spreading their religious doctrine. Neither are they the results of organised proselytising efforts from the Gulf. Hence, if the Islamic Cold War framework or logic is to make sense, one has to consider other and subtler dynamics, which poses extreme difficulties from a research perspective. In an attempt to summarise, I will argue that both the Saudi and the Iranian state have developed institutions partly for the purpose of exerting their soft power by diffusing their religious discourse and that – either directly or indirectly – Muslim communities in Lagos and in Cape Town have been influenced

3 Ibid. The Shiraziyyin has been dominant in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia with minor presence in Bahrain and Kuwait where al-Da’wa has been the prominent Shia network. 4Kane, Muslim modernity in postcolonial Nigeria .

61 EXPLAINING RELIGIOUS DIFFUSION through this institutionalised setup. On a general level, the same overall conclusion, although to different degrees, can be made regarding the sources of diffusion of Salafi and Shia doctrine in both Lagos and Cape Town. Rather than being an active engagement in Lagos and Cape Town, the diffusion is more due to African Muslims visiting the Saudi kingdom or the Islamic Republic of Iran, where they become exposed to Salafi and Shia doctrine. Thus one could argue that the process is less Saudi and Iranian in character as it is often the indigenous actors who are active. They are what TerjeØstebø has labelled the returnees .5

This does not imply however, that Saudi and Iranian actors do not play a role, but simply that it is of a more indirect character. Two aspects seem to be immediately important; the role of educational institutions and of clerical networks.

Inherent in the Islamic Cold War logic is that efforts by one side occur as a reaction to an action by the other side. Despite accounts differing in who reacted against whom –Ousmane Kane’s argues that Saudi interest in Nigerian Muslims came as a counter-reaction to the success of Shia proselytization in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution while Mara Leichtman’s describes how Iranian actors started to exert influence through the Lebanese diaspora to counter the spread of Wahhabi doctrine – these insights are clear examples of this logic. At an indirect level, institutionalised Saudi efforts to wield soft power started as early as the 1960s when several universities were established in the kingdom. Probably the most important of these is the Islamic University of Medina founded in 1961 with an objective of attracting foreign students as a counter-move to Nasser’s Pan-Arabism. Following the demise of Pan-Arabism, focus changed to the threat posed by the revolutionary Shia discourse post- 1979. Not surprisingly, most Salafis and Shia I interviewed in Lagos and Cape Town have either had direct or indirect exposure to Saudi or Iranian educational institutions. Whereas in Lagos contact with Saudi universities appears as more of an indirect character through Saudi educated clerics from northern Nigeria or from attending lectures by visiting Saudis, in Cape Town several Saudi educated sheikhs are to be found. Interestingly however, the most ardent proponent of Salafi doctrine in Cape Town was educated in Yemen in the tradition of Muqbil al-Wadi’i. The situation with the Shia is much more difficult to assess, which is largely due to the smaller number of Shias and, in the case of Lagos, because it is Shia practice to hide their religious identity. Discussing the matter with a Shia imam in Cape Town, he emphasises the importance of receiving religious education in Shia centres in Iraq or Iran in order to develop a Shia identity. 6 The yearly practice by the Iranian Al Mustafa International University to arrange a conference in South Africa confirms that Iranian actors likewise consider education as a central tool for diffusion, which is supported by the frequent visits to the Shia society in Cape Town by delegations from Iranian universities. These dynamics indeed indicate that neither Salafism nor Shiism in the two case studies is entirely ‘home-grown’ or a result of domestic dynamics. What is interesting – and particularly evident in the case of Cape Town – is how students influenced by Saudi and Iranian educational institutions have become religious pioneers upon their return and actual entrepreneurs of social change in the society in regards to how religion is understood and exercised.

5 See online lecture by Professor TerjeØstebø titled ’Salafism in Africa: Religious Purity and the Politics of Purity’, February 27, 2013. 6Author’s interview with Imam Bashier Rahim.

62 CHAPTER 5

The role of clerical networks is linked to educational institutions, but nonetheless deserve a few additional comments. Scholars like Louër in the context of the Gulf and Leichtman with a focus on Senegal have described the importance of transnational clerical networks for the development of Shiism. As both Nigeria and particularly South Africa are on the outskirts of the Islamic world and far from traditional Shia centres, the connection to such networks is much less clear. In Nigeria, IMN members follow Ali Khamenei as their marja, whereas in Cape Town Shias are free to choose. Both IMN leader Zakzaky and Chief Imam AftabHaider of the AhlulBayt in Cape Town have relations to Iranian clerical networks due to their time studying in the Islamic Republic and from several visits to Iran. Despite being much less substantive than the transnational prominence of clerical networks in the Middle East, it should still be regarded as an important channel for initial doctrinal diffusion. Louër introduces an important point, however, as she argues that a secularisation of Shia political Islam is taking place. This implies an increasing autonomy of peripheral Shia movements as they are predominantly motivated by domestic concerns and thus move away from traditional centres of Shia power and the marja’iyya whether that is in Qom or in Najaf. 7 Attending several jumu’ah in the AhlulBayt mosque in Cape Town, I can verify the same observation as Louër in the context of the Gulf region as domestic issues dominate the focus entirely. Nonetheless, talking to local Shia it is clear that theological and perhaps to a smaller extent political sympathy for the Iranian state continues to be prevalent. Thus despite this domestication of interests, the influence of transnational bonds still impacts.

A final point on the diffusion is related to the applied channels. Interestingly – and much in contrast to Salafi methods – Iranian actors are using media propaganda heavily as a tool to influence the perception of Shiism in both Nigeria and South Africa. Particularly through the Iranian channel Press TV and the Ahlul Bait TV , where programs and news on the emerging prominence of Shiism are broadcast. 8Without considering the validity of the information, I will argue that the intentions of these broadcasts are twofold. On the one hand it is a message to the world and particularly the local Sunni population that Shiism is on the rise, while on the other it can beconsidered as a form of auto-communication to the local Shia population with the intention of changing the perception of being Shia in Sunni dominated communities. If analysed from the latter perspective, it is closely related to the process of ‘lowering the price’ of following Shia doctrine. Observing the discussions on the Nigerian online forum for Muslims, Nairaland , these programs get a good deal of attention as Sunni and Shia alike discuss the validity of the information, which indicates the success of these programs in instilling the perception that Shiism is gaining ground.

Considering the discourse between Salafis and Shia in both Nigeria and South Africa it is striking how it resembles the fierce discursive animosity between Saudi Salafi sheikhs and their Iranian counterparts. Hence, one could argue that the logic of the Islamic Cold War has been extended and created what could be defined as proxy-struggles in local contexts. If considered more closely the Salafi and Shia discourses give indications of how they have been constructed. Starting with the Shia, any substantial revolutionary aspect is difficult to identify

7Louër, Shiism and politics in the Middle East , p. 125. 8 For examples see YouTube, where one can find videos on Ashura processions in Nigeria and South Africa in addition to longer programs on how the number of Shia is rising.

63 EXPLAINING RELIGIOUS DIFFUSION in their discourse. Among Shias in Cape Town, revolutionary objectives are all but absent. They do indeed have a political focus, but they do not regard Shiism as the general solution for society. This is less the case with the IMN, which actually considers Shiism as part of the solution. To argue their case, they have adopted much of the fierce rhetoric of revolutionary Shiism to discredit others while promoting their own doctrine. If we consider their actions in practice however, the revolutionary objective seems to fade, their opposition to the implementation of shari’a in the north being a clear example. For Salafis, the discourse is interesting too. First, it is important to stress that Salafism is not a homogenous movement. Scholars have traditionally divided them into three groups depending on their manhaj (perception of ‘how to engage in the world’ or methodology); these are Purists, Politicos, and Jihadis .9 Interestingly, as emphasised by TerjeØstebo and confirmed by my own interviews, Salafis in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to be purists, focusing on da’wa, religious reform, and on Islamising society rather than political engagement. However, more than an inspiration from the official religious establishment in Saudi Arabia, which opposes direct political activity, this should probably be considered an effect of the local environment and its constraining structures. When studying Salafis and Shia in Nigeria and South Africa, the influence of glocalising effects is evident, as they clearly have sought to adjust themselves to their local environment. The best example of this is Sheikh Ismail Gqamane in Cape Town, who defines himself as a ‘relaxed Salafi’ as he considers it imperative to adjust his behaviour to the Capetonian discourse. Despite being rather uncompromising in theory, such accommodation makes sense from the logic of Bourdieu, as it is a method to influence doxa from within.

As I focus on soft power structures, it is relevant to reiterate Joseph Nye’s characterisation of such power. He argues ‘power means the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants’. 10 If this characterisation is taken to its extreme, neither Saudi nor Iranian actors’ efforts to project their soft power on Muslims in Lagos or in Cape Town should not be considered successful. Despite the existence of transnational relations, Salafis and Shias in Lagos and in Cape Town are not necessarily agents of Saudi Arabia or Iran or of their ideological sub-state patrons. Rather it would be fair to argue they probably regard the Saudi and Iranian institutional and ideological authority with sympathy and consider their world-views attractive.

LIMITS OF THE ISLAMIC COLD WAR PRISM From the outset, it was my intention to test through an examination of two case studies to what extent the Islamic Cold War prism explains diffusion of Salafism and Shiism in Sub- Saharan Africa. Thus it was never my intention to argue that this perspective is the sole source of influence, as this certainly is not the case and would be a grave oversimplification. Surely, other factors such as socio-economic deprivation and instable political situations should be considered important parameters too.

The constructivist approach inspiring the analysis emphasises the importance of the identity of religious actors in their desires to diffuse their doctrine rather than being the result of state

9 See for example Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’. Other scholars have applied different terms such as Quietists instead of Purists, but all with the same meaning. 10 Nye, Soft power , p. 1.

64 CHAPTER 5 policies. While I believe this approach offers some important insights, it also poses a difficulty in assessing motives behind the diffusion. As Salafis and Shia are part of what can be defined as identity movements, it is their interest to spread their religious doctrine, especially if they consider da’wa as the core of their activities. This leaves a question that seems impossible to answer with certainty; is diffusion a result of the Islamic Cold War or of aspirations stemming from the identity of religious actors in Saudi Arabia and Iran? The most likely answer seems to be that the motives are profoundly intertwined. Taking the example of educational institutions again, in both Saudi Arabia and in Iran teaching positions at these institutions have been occupied by a wide range of actors with different levels of loyalty to the ruling regime and the dominant doctrine. This has varied through time in the case of Saudi Arabia 11 and more recently in Iran. 12 As universities have been influential in religious diffusion, the identity of the professors and their logic for diffusing religious doctrine becomes relevant.

Another circumstance, which complicates the explanatory capacity of the Islamic Cold War prism, is the glocalised nature of the doctrines practised in Lagos and Cape Town, which is partly a result of the actors, who introduced them in the respective societies. I believe that the Islamic Cold War to some extent can account for the introduction of Salafism and Shiism Lagos and Cape Town, but falls short in explaining why the doctrines have developed as they have. Unlike in the Gulf where Shia movements were often led by Iranians or Iraqis, in Nigeria and South Africa indigenous returnees have been the local pioneers. I believe this glocalisation partly explains why Salafis and Shia in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to differ in practice and discourse from their Middle East counterparts. For Salafis this often manifests itself in more moderate behaviour and a lenient approach to the surrounding society whereas the Shia to a large extent abandon the revolutionary discourse of the Iranian regime.

WHAT DOES IT INDICATE FOR THE FUTURE ? As has been shown in the contexts of Nigeria and South Africa, Saudi and Iranian efforts to diffuse their religious doctrines are taking place to varying degrees. Just as it was expected, in neither Nigeria nor South Africa would it be correct to talk about a Saudisation or Iranisation , but it seems reasonable to define it as processes of attracting sympathy . The question then becomes, what these observed dynamics indicate for future development of Salafism and Shiism in Lagos and Cape Town.

Assessing the current tendencies in Lagos and in Cape Town, it is fair to argue that the popularity of the Salafi doctrine is increasing while the number of Shia is stagnant if not even decreasing. In Cape Town the Shia community is well established and embedded in society but finds it difficult to increase its popularity. In Lagos, on the other hand, it seems the case that the number of Shias is potentially decreasing although such estimation is very uncertain. At a general level, however, it seems that current structures and dynamics are beneficial for Salafism as the liberal Imam Rashied Omar of the Claremont Main Road Mosque in Cape Town argued as well. These dynamics include a general spread of the Salafi doctrine on a global level and the increasing level of education in Lagos and Cape Town, which – as has

11 Lacroix, Awakening Islam . 12 Mohammad Ali Kadivar, ‘The Battle Over Higher Education in Iran’, Middle East Research and Information Project , February 20 (2014).

65 EXPLAINING RELIGIOUS DIFFUSION been shown – has been imperative to the hitherto growth of Salafism. With the doctrinal inspiration from the north in the case of Lagos and the propagation campaign led particularly by Sheikh Jameel Adam and Sheikh Ismail Gqamane in Cape Town, it is likely that Salafism will continue to grow in importance in the coming years. One should be careful, however, of not overestimating the potential growth of Salafism, as Salafis need political support or power to dominate with their doctrine as stated by Madawi Al Rasheed in her analysis of the Saudi state. Furthermore, the general in Sub-Saharan communities and the connotation of Salafism associated with terrorism will counteract, to some extent, the effects of these beneficial structures. As became clear throughout the research, the heavy Sunni dominance, general animosity towards Shiism, and the scant resources of Iranian actors make increasing Shia prominence unlikely. That said, the revolutionary discourse put forward by the Iranian clerical establishment will always be capable of attracting parts of societies – particularly the underprivileged in societies characterised by high inequality. A general factor that is influencing the future role of Salafism and Shiism is the low level of religious knowledge prevalent among lay Muslims. This lack of knowledge should be regarded as both holding potential and as an obstacle. It holds potential from the perspective that is increases the religious elites’ possibilities of manipulating or indoctrinating the Muslim masses. At the same time however, it can be an obstacle since Islamic doctrines regarded as foreign are perceived with great suspicion. Considering the societal influence of Salafi and Shia discourses in Lagos and Cape Town, two trends stand out. First is increasing discursive animosity between the two sects, which almost takes the form of a soft power proxy conflict with reference to Saudi Arabia and Iran. This is particularly the case in Cape Town, where both sides believe that animosity could spiral into a serious crisis if the opposite side does not soften its rhetoric. In Lagos, this fierce rhetoric is evident too both among ‘ulama and between lay Muslims on Internet forums. The second circumstance is the apolitical approach of the Salafis. According to TerjeØstebo most Salafi movements in Sub-Saharan Africa are Purists (or Salafiyya da’wiyya ) as they oppose political engagement and focus on religious reform, da’wa and to Islamise society. 13 This seems also the case with Salafis in Lagos and in Cape Town, who primarily focus on eradication of local customs and religious innovations thus making them actors of social change rather than politically engaged.

13 See online lecture by Professor TerjeØstebo titled ’Salafism in Africa: Religious Purity and the Politics of Purity’, February 27, 2013.

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION Commenting on the recent Geneva negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme, Mehdi, a 45-year-old florist in Teheran, stated that 'Saudi Arabia is afraid Iran will become the number one power in the region. It is obvious. The Arabs have feared Iran for many centuries, and they’re frightened now.’ 1 Despite the contextual difference, the comment highlights the continued relevance of the Islamic Cold War narrative today approximately 35 years after the Islamic Revolution took place in Iran and it is within this narrative the thesis positions itself. It is my argument that Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran are struggling for regional hegemony in the Gulf thus producing what I define as a soft power supremacy dilemma . With inspiration from the conceptual framework of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, the thesis has sought to test the hypothesis that religious diffusion of Salafi and revolutionary Shia doctrine and discourse in the Sub-Saharan metropolises of Lagos and Cape Town can be explained and interpreted from the perspective of the ongoing Islamic Cold War context. Furthermore, it has been my objective to define what level of interaction and through which types of actors religious diffusion occurs, while more generally seeking to describe the reciprocal influence of Salafi and Shia doctrines in the local environments of Lagos and Cape Town, respectively.

Based on extensive study of Islamic doctrine and its historical development in Lagos and Cape Town including two months of fieldwork in the local environments, I feel confident to present three general conclusions from the research:

 An increased Islamic pluralism in Lagos and Cape Town is affecting the structures of the Islamic field.

1Guardian, ’ In Iran, France, not Britain, now the 'Little Satan'. November 13, 2013.

67 CONCLUSION

 Radicalisation of religious discourse functions as a tool for consolidation and condemnation.  Indirect – but crucial – influence of Saudi and Iranian actors takes place in the diffusion of Salafi and Shia doctrine in Lagos and Cape Town.

First, increased Islamic pluralism refers to the emergence of new doctrines in the Islamic landscape of Lagos and Cape Town. Traditionally, Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa has been associated with Sufi brotherhoods, which have been dominant guiding the practice of the religion on the continent. In the 1960s-70s however, this monopolisation of Islamic practice was challenged by the emergence of movements like Deobandi, Tablighi Jama’a and Ahmadiyya. The proliferation of Islamic doctrines was further increased in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and in more recent decades when Shia- and Salafi-inspired doctrines have become parts of the doctrinal landscape thus challenging not only how Islam is practiced but also the discourse within the Islamic field. Understood through the terminology of Bourdieu, the result is a substantial change in the structure of the field and how religious authority is constructed and achieved.

Second, the introduction of new doctrines has influenced the religious discourse of both imams and lay-Muslims critically. The presence of Shia- and Salafi-inspired discourses has implied a discursive radicalisation with the dual objective of consolidation within the Islamic field and religious condemnation vis-à-vis the other sect and of Sufi brotherhoods. This discursive struggle focuses on contentious issues regarding what constitutes religious knowledge and what ‘true’ Islam is and has led to the introduction of rhetoric for religious accusation to define the opponent sect and their practices. A second aspect is an increased focus on religious knowledge, which is considered paramount by newcomers to the field like Salafis. Directly attacking the paternalistic relation in Sufi brotherhoods between the marabout and his followers, Salafis stress the necessity of acquiring substantial religious knowledge and to assess Islamic sources critically, which in both the context of Lagos and Cape Town has instigated an Islamic revivalism .

Third, the emergence of Salafism and Shiism in Lagos and Cape Town cannot be understood properly without considering the impact of the Islamic Cold War and the role of Saudi and Iranian actors in religious diffusion. It is my argument that neither Salafism nor Shiism is a home-grown phenomenon but a product – either direct or indirect – of educational ties to Saudi Arabia or the Islamic Republic of Iran. Having been exposed to Salafi or Shia doctrine, Nigerians and South Africans return home to become religious pioneers and actors of social change by adopting Salafism or (revolutionary) Shiism as their discursive reference. It is my belief, however, that both Salafism and Shiism take a native character due to structural restrictions in the local environments and as a result of the processes of diffusion. As so-called returnees pioneer diffusion locally in both Lagos and Cape Town, the result is a glocalisation of Salafi and Shia doctrine, which influences how the doctrines develop in the local context.

Analysed and interpreted within the Islamic Cold War narrative, I argue that this narrative can account for specific dynamics of the development of Salafism and Shiism in Lagos and Cape Town, specifically, and potentially more generally in Sub-Saharan Africa. I do not argue, however, that the Islamic Cold War offers a complete explanation for the presence of Salafism

68 CHAPTER 6 and Shiism as I find it inadequate to explain certain aspects. Hence, despite its explanatory prowess being far from complete, I nonetheless believe the research helps identify interaction with Saudi and Iranian actors and institutions, which has been essential to the development of Salafi and Shia doctrines outside the Gulf in environments like Nigeria and South Africa.

Historically, academic studies of Islamic doctrine in Sub-Saharan Africa have been largely dominated by a focus on Sufism thus neglecting alternative doctrines like Salafism and Shiism. Not only does this indicate a critical lack of studies on challenging Islamic doctrines, it also implies an absence of research considering the transregional influence of religious centres in the Middle East on the development of contemporary Islam south of Sahara. In my research I identify critical changes in the Islamic landscape in Lagos and Cape Town compared to conventional wisdom and illustrate the importance of external influence in regards to the emergence of new Islamic doctrines. Hence, I believe that the conclusions can contribute not only with important perspectives on the development of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa but also on the dynamics of the Islamic Cold War and its geographical scope. Because so little research has been conducted in the field, the potential for continental generalisation becomes desirable. As argued by Mara Leichtman, an assumed absence of Shias does not necessarily imply they are not present, but more likely it indicates an absence of scholarly research. As the same can be said for Salafism, the general absence of scholarly work on the topic presents a challenge to our understanding of the development of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa. One should always be careful when generalising and particularly regarding a geographical area as vast as Sub-Saharan Africa.Considering the diversity of the case studies –on matters of geography, religious composition, historical trajectory and closeness to Islamic centres – I believe the tendencies illustrated in Lagos and Cape Town indicate patterns that are valid for several others cities, regions or even states on the continent.

With a stringent focus on the prominence of Salafism and Shiism and the analytical prism of the Islamic Cold War, many interesting perspectives have been left out intentionally. A premise inherent in research, this exclusion nonetheless entails certain limitations of the descriptive and explanatory prowess of the analyses. Neither Salafism nor Shiism has developed solely as a result of Saudi or Iranian influence, as other factors such as socio- economic deprivation and instable political situations must be assumed to have been important parameters too. These constrains underline the importance of further research of Islamic radicalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, how external sources influence such processes of radicalisation, and how doctrines become glocalised . Meanwhile, I consider this research as an important first-step contribution to the field, which hopefully will instigate continued interest.

69

ANNEX : MAPS

LAGOS

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CAPE TOWN

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SOURCES CONSULTED

WEBSITES

Alao, Abiodun, ‘Islamic Radicalisation and Violence in Nigeria – Country Report’. King’s College: http://www.securityanddevelopment.org/pdf/ESRC%20Nigeria%20Overview.pdf,acces sed October 20 2013 Back, Irit, ‘Iran and Nigeria: Friendship or Rivalry?’, The Alliance Centre for Iranian Studies - Iran Pulse No. 54, 14 January 2013: http://humanities.tau.ac.il/iranian/en/iran-pulse/10-iran- pulse-en/207-iranpulse-54 , accessed August 12 2013 Ezeobi, Chiemelie, ‘Suspected Boko Haram Members Arrested in Lagos’. This Day Live , March 22 2013: http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/suspected-boko-haram-members- arrested-in-lagos/142896 , accessed November 13, 2013 Farah, Douglas, ‘Nigeria and the Muslim Brotherhood’. March 10th, 2006: http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.94/pub_detail.asp , accessed November 9 2013 International Crisis Group, ‘Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict’. Africa Report N°168 – 20 December 2010: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west- africa/nigeria/168%20Northern%20Nigeria%20- %20Background%20to%20Conflict.ashx , accessed November 9 2013 IOL News, ’ SA ends Iranian oil imports’. June 7, 2013: http://www.iol.co.za/business/international/sa-ends-iranian-oil-imports- 1.1528937#.UrBBhJHfZCU

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IOL News, ’ SA cuts oil imports from Iran’. August 1, 2012: http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/sa-cuts-oil-imports-from-iran- 1.1354428#.UrA-FJHfZCU, accessed November 20, 2013 Kadivar, Mohammad Ali, ‘The Battle Over Higher Education in Iran’, Middle East Research and Information Project , February 20 (2014): http://www.merip.org/mero/mero022014 , accessed March 13 2014 Kendal, Elizabeth, ‘Nigeria: Investigating Wahhabi Insurection and Saudi Funds’, Assist News Service, February 26, 2004: http://www.assistnews.net/Stories/2004/s04020098.htm , accessed November 14 2013 Pence, Eliot and Etebari, Mehrun, ’Reaching Iran through South Africa’. The National Interest , May 23, 2012: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/reaching-iran-through-south- africa-6956 , accessed December 3, 2013 Reuters, ’South Africa, Saudi Arabia earmark $2.4 billion for joint ventures’. June 11, 2006: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/11/us-safrica-saudi- idUSBRE85A0DV20120611 , accessedJanuary 5, 2014 Thurston, Alexander, ‘To Hajj Without an Escort’, in the Revealer , October 16 2012: http://therevealer.org/archives/14039 , accessed November 13, 2013 Guardian, ’ In Iran, France, not Britain, now the 'Little Satan'. November 13, 2013: www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/13/iran-france-not-uk-now-the-little-satan , accessed March 25, 2014

INTERNET SOURCES AhlulBayt Islamic Mission ( http://www.aimislam.com/about-us/ ) AhlulBayt Foundation of South Africa ( http://www.afosa.org/about-afosa/ahlul-bayt-in- south-africa.html ) AhlulBayt Digital Islamic Library Project ( http://www.al-islam.org ) Ahl-us-Sunnah Cape Town ( http://www.ahlussunnah.co.za ) Al Huda Foundation ( http://www.al-huda.co.za ) Islamic Movement in Nigeria ( http://www.islamicmovement.org ) Muslim Forum South Africa ( http://www.muslimforum.co.za/forum.php ) Muslim Students’ Society of Nigeria, Lagos State Area Unit ( http://www.mssnlagos.org ) Nairaland, Nigerian Forum for Muslims ( http://www.nairaland.com/ ) Salafi Manhaj ( http://www.salafimanhaj.com )

VIDEO SOURCES

78 BIBLIOGRAPHY

‘Are you from Ahl-us-Sunnah?’ . Sheikh Jameel Adam, Ahl-us-Sunnah Cape Town (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gKNob9KuLgg ) ‘Imam Khomeini Conference 2009 ’. Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5rs6L7oUdY ) ‘Rise of in Nigeria ’. Press Tv ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=flCJjDWWlTo ) ‘Salafism in Africa: Religious Purity and the Politics of Purity’ . TerjeØstebo (online lecture), February 27, 2013 ( http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BovxTcXw0aQ) ‘Shia Islam in South Africa part 1 to 4 ’.AhlulBaytTv (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qTTX48qZok0 ) ‘Shia Muslims mark Ashura in Nigeria ’. Press Tv (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jrrIewfJatg ) ‘The Manhaj of Ahlus Sunnah ’. Sheikh Jameel Adam, Ahl-us-Sunnah Cape Town (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EVG8VTKvRsU ) ‘Tauhid conference ’. Sheikh Jameel Adam, Ahl-us-Sunnah Cape Town (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NAlw1o0Gdts )

AUDIO SOURCES

 Sheikh Jameel Adam: Lecture series including talks on (lectures can be found here: http://www.ahlussunnah.co.za/pages/main_pages/audio.html): – The Aqeedah of the Salaf – The Manhaj of the Salaf – What is Salafiyya & Who are the Salafis – Are you from Ahlussunnah – Bidah In Islam – Shia's & Sufi's – – Shufism

 Sheikh Muhammad bin Uthman: Lectures on Salafiyya and Tafsir  Sheikh Abubakr Gumi

FIRST-HAND INTERVIEW

Name Title / Occupation Place and date AbdulhameedSalahudeen Imam at Monar Islamic Lagos: September 1, Reformative Movement (Salafi) 2013 Abdul MonineOmolajaYousuph Head of the Islamic and Arabic Lagos: September 3, Training Centre in Agege 2013 Abdurrahma Ibrahim Imam at MusbauDeen Mosque Lagos: August 21, 2013 (Tijaniyya) AchmatCassim Political activist and founder of Cape Town: October 2, Qiblah (Shia) 2013

79 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ahmad Imam at the Ahmadiyya Muslim Lagos: August 22, 2013 Jama’at, Mushin (Ahmadiyya) AlhajiTijaniAdisa Chief Imam at Egbe Central Lagos: September 1, Mosque (Sufi) 2013 Bashier Rahim Imam at the AhlulBayt Mosque Cape Town: September Cape Town (Shia) 20, 2013 El-ShamiNoshy Ali Executive Secretary of WAMY Lagos: August 26, 2013 Nigeria FaaikGamieldien Imam at Masjid al-Sunni (Salafi) Cape Town: September 30, 2013 Ghazali Yusuf Administrative secretary of the Lagos: August 21, 2013 MSS Lagos branch IdrissaEbrahim Head of Africa Muslim Agency Cape Town: September (NGO) 20, 2013 Ismail Gqamane Imam at Masakhane Muslim Cape Town: September Community (Salafi) 23, 2013 Ismail Yusuf Imam in Epe, Lagos (Salafi) Lagos: August 21, 2013 KamoladdeenJuma’a Administrative Coordinator at the Lagos: August 27, 2013 Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a Lagos group (Salafi) Khalid Sayed Chairman of the ANC Youth Cape Town: September Western Cape (Shia) 19, 2013 Miftah Head of Islamic Movement in Lagos: September 11, Nigeria in Lagos, Ilorin and 2013 Ibadan (Shia) Mohammad Abubakar Imam at Central Mosque Idi Lagos: August 30, 2013 Araba (Tijaniyya) Mohammad Salis Imam at Idi Araba Community Lagos: August 30, 2013 Mosque (Salafi) Mubarak Abdelkhader Imam in Mushin (Ahl al-Sunnah) Lagos: August 23, 2013 Rashied Omar Imam at Claremont Main Road Cape Town: September Mosque 26, 2013 Shuaib Appleby Imam and Spokesperson of the Cape Town: September MJC, Cape Town (Sunni-Ashari) 25, 2013 ShuaibBooley Former Imam at Al Jihad and a Cape Town: September founding member of Hezbollah in Cape Town (Shia) SulaimonOpeyemiBuhariOlaniyo Chief Imam at Central Mosque Lagos: August 22, 2013 Mushin, Lagos (Tijaniyya) TajuddeenEkemode General Secretary at the Ansar- Lagos: August 23, 2013 ud-Deen, Fadeyi Branch Thaffir Najjar Head of ICSA (Islamic reformist) Cape Town: September 26, 2013 UstazAbdulsalaam Imam at Ahmadiyya Mosque, Lagos: September 3, Agege (Ahmadiyya) 2013 Zakaria Chairman of Muslim Student Cape Town: October 1, Association, UCT 2013

SECOND-HAND INTERVIEW/DISCUSSIONS

 Abdulkhader Tayob , Professor, , Religion and Public Life, University of Cape Town

80 BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Alexander Thurston , Ph.D. candidate in the Religion Department at Northwestern University and runs Sahelblog.wordpress.com  Andrea Brigaglia , Associate Professor, University of Cape Town  Brandon Kendhammer , Assistant Professor, Political Science, Ohio University  BukolaAdeyemiOyeniyi , Professor, Political Studies and Governance Department, University of the Free State (South Africa)  , Leader of Al Jama’ah South Africa  Irit Back , Professor, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University  John Paden , Professor, Public and International Affairs at George Mason University  Mara Leichtman ,Assistant Professor at Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University  Muhammad Kabir Isa , Professor, (Zaria, Nigeria)  Roman Loimeier , Professsor at Institute for Social and Cultural Anthropology, UniversitätGöttingen  TerjeØstebø , Assistant Professor, Department of Religion and the Center for African Studies, University of Florida

81