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ASIA MAIOR Vol. XXX / 2019 CENTRO STUDI PER I POPOLI EXTRA-EUROPEI “CESARE BONACOSSA” - UNIVERSITÀ DI PAVIA

Foreword Torri, Mocci, Boni, Asia in 2019 XXX Essays 2019 S. Menegazzi, China 2019: Xi Jinping’s new era and the CPC’s agenda B. Onnis, China 2019: Xi Jinping’s summit diplomacy Michelguglielmo Torri, Nicola Mocci, Filippo Boni (eds.) tensions and authoritarian involution Asia in 2019: Escalating international ASIA MAIOR A. Berkofsky, Mongolia 2019: Crisis, obstacles & achievements Vol. XXX / 2019 M. Milani, Korean peninsula 2019: The year of missed opportunities G. Pugliese & S. Maslow, Japan 2019: Inaugurating a new era? A. Tritto & A. Abdulkadir, Hong Kong 2019: Anatomy of a social mobilisation through the lenses of identity and values Asia in 2019: A. Insisa, Taiwan 2019 and the 2020 elections: Tsai Ing-Wen’s Triumph Escalating international tensions S. Iglesias & L. Ordenes, The Philippines 2018-2019: Authoritarian consolidation under Duterte and authoritarian involution R. Graça Feijó, Timor-Leste 1945-2019: From an almost forgotten colony to the first democratic nation of the 21st century S. Saleem, Malaysia 2019: The politics of fear and UMNO’s renewed relevance N. Mocci, Vietnam 2019: Pursuing harmonious labour relations Edited by and consolidating its reliable international role M. Fumagalli, Myanmar 2019: «The Lady and the generals» redux? Michelguglielmo Torri D. Maiorano, India 2019: The general election and the new Modi wave Nicola Mocci M. Torri, India 2019: Assaulting the world’s largest democracy; Filippo Boni building a kingdom of cruelty and fear Y. Joshi, India 2019: Foreign policy dilemmas and their domestic roots M. Miele, Nepal 2019: Attempts at mediation in domestic and foreign policies M. Corsi, Pakistan 2019: The challenges of the first PTI government F. Boni, Afghanistan 2019: Between peace talks and presidential elections P. Sorbello, Kazakhstan 2018-2019: Change and continuity amid economic stagnation

Reviews Appendix

€ 50, 00 www.viella.it ISSN 2385-2526 viella centro studi per i popoli extra-europei “cesare bonacossa” - università di pavia ASIA MAIOR The Journal of the Italian think tank on Asia founded by Giorgio Borsa in 1989 Vol. XXX / 2019

Asia in 2019: Escalating international tensions and authoritarian involution

Edited by Michelguglielmo Torri Nicola Mocci Filippo Boni

ISBN 978-88-3313-490-1 (Paper) ISBN 978-88-3313-491-8 (Online) ISSN 2385-2526 (Paper) ISSN 2612-6680 (Online) Annual journal - Vol. XXX, 2019

This journal is published jointly by the think tank Asia Maior (Associazione Asia Maior) & the CSPE - Centro Studi per i Popoli extra-europei «Cesare Bonacossa», University of Pavia

Asia Maior. The Journal of the Italian Think Tank on Asia founded by Giorgio Borsa in 1989 is an open-access journal, whose issues and single articles can be freely downloaded from the think tank webpage: www.asiamaior.org. The reference year is the one on which the analyses of the volume are focused. Each Asia Maior volume is always published in the year following the one indicated on the cover

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EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor-in-chief (direttore responsabile): Michelguglielmo Torri, University of Turin.

Co-editors: Nicola Mocci, University of Sassari. Filippo Boni, The Open University.

Associate editors: Axel Berkofsky, University of Pavia; Diego Maiorano, National University of Singapore, ISAS - Institute of South Asian Studies; Giulio Pugliese, King’s College London; Elena Valdameri, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology - ETH Zurich; Pierluigi Valsecchi, University of Pavia.

Consulting editors: Elisabetta Basile, University of Rome «Sapienza»; Kerry Brown, King’s College London; Peter Brian Ramsay Carey, Oxford University; Rosa Caroli, University of Venice; Jaewoo Choo, Kyung Hee University (Seoul, South Korea); Jamie Seth Davidson, National University of Singapore; Ritu Dewan, Indian Association for Women Studies; Laura De Giorgi, University of Venice; Kevin Hewison, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Lucia Husenicova, University Matej Bel (Banská Bystrica, Slovakia); David C. Kang, Maria Crutcher Professor of International Relations, Univer- sity of Southern California; Rohit Karki, Kathmandu School of Law; Jeff Kingston, Temple University – Japan Campus; Mirjam Künkler, Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study – Uppsala; Noemi Lanna, University of Naples «L’Orientale»; James Manor, School of Advanced Studies – University of London; Aditya Mukherjee, Jawaharlal Nehru University; Mridula Mukherjee, Jawaharlal Nehru University; Parimala Rao, University of Delhi; Guido Samarani, University of Venice; Marisa Siddivò, University of Naples «L’Orientale»; Eswaran Sridharan, Institute for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania; Arun Swamy, University of Guam; Akio Takahara, University of Tokio; Edsel Tupaz, Harvard University alumnus, Ateneo de Manila University and Far Eastern University; Sten Widmalm, Uppsala University; Ather Zia, University of Northern Colorado;

Book reviews editors: Francesca Congiu, University of Cagliari; Oliviero Frattolillo, University Roma Tre.

Graphic project: Nicola Mocci, University of Sassari.

Before being published in Asia Maior, all articles, whether commissioned or unsolicited, after being first evaluated by the Journal’s editors, are then submitted to a double-blind peer review involving up to three anonymous referees. Coherently with the double-blind peer review process, Asia Maior does not make public the name of the reviewers. However, the reviewers’ names – and, if need be, the whole correspondence between the journal’s editors and the reviewer/s – can be disclosed to interested institutions, upon a formal request made directly to the Editor in Chief of the journal.

Articles meant for publication should be sent to Michelguglielmo Torri (mg. [email protected]), Nicola Mocci ([email protected]) and Filippo Boni (filippo. [email protected]); book reviews should be sent to Oliviero Frattolillo (olivie- [email protected]) and Francesca Congiu ([email protected]). Associazione Asia Maior

Steering Committe: Marzia Casolari (President), Francesca Congiu, Diego Maiorano, Nicola Mocci (Vice President), Michelguglielmo Torri (Scientific Director).

Scientific Board: Guido Abbattista (Università di Trieste), Domenico Ami- rante (Università «Federico II», Napoli), Elisabetta Basile (Università «La Sapienza», Roma), Luigi Bonanate (Università di Torino), Claudio Cecchi (Università «La Sapienza», Roma), Alessandro Colombo (Università di Mila- no), Anton Giulio Maria de Robertis (Università di Bari), Thierry Di Costan- zo (Université de Strasbourg), Max Guderzo (Università di Firenze), Franco Mazzei (Università «L’Orientale», Napoli), Giorgio Milanetti (Università «La Sapienza», Roma), Paolo Puddinu (Università di Sassari), Adriano Rossi (Università «L’Orientale», Napoli), Giuseppe Sacco (Università «Roma Tre», Roma), Guido Samarani (Università «Ca’ Foscari», Venezia), Filippo Sabetti (McGill University, Montréal), Gianni Vaggi (Università di Pavia), Alberto Ventura (Università della Calabria)

CSPE - Centro Studi per i Popoli extra-europei “Cesare Bonacossa” - Università di Pavia

Steering Committee: Axel Berkofsky, Arturo Colombo, Antonio Morone, Giulia Rossolillo, Gianni Vaggi, Pierluigi Valsecchi (President), Massimo Zaccaria.

viella libreria editrice via delle Alpi, 32 I-00198 ROMA tel. 06 84 17 758 fax 06 85 35 39 60 www.viella.it Contents

9 Michelguglielmo Torri, Nicola Mocci & Filippo Boni, Foreword. Asia in 2019: The escalation of the US-China contraposition, and the authoritarian involution of Asian societies 25 silvia Menegazzi, China 2019: Xi Jinping’s new era and the CPC’s agenda 47 barbara Onnis, China’s 2019: Xi Jinping’s tireless summit diplomacy amid growing challenges 73 axel Berkofsky, Mongolia 2019: Crisis, obstacles & achievements on the domestic, economic and foreign policy fronts 93 Marco Milani, Korean peninsula 2019: The year of missed opportunities 125 giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow, Japan 2019: Inaugurating a new era? 163 angela Tritto & Alkan Abdulkadir, Hong Kong 2019: Anatomy of a social mobilisation through the lenses of identity and values 185 aurelio Insisa, Taiwan 2019 and the 2020 elections: Tsai Ing-Wen’s triumph 215 sol Iglesias & Lala Ordenes, The Philippines 2018-2019: Authoritarian consolidation under Duterte 241 Rui Feijó, Timor-Leste 1945-2019: From an almost forgotten colony to the first democratic nation of the 21st century 267 saleena Saleem, Malaysia 2019: The politics of fear and UMNO’s renewed relevance 287 nicola Mocci, Vietnam 2019: Pursuing harmonious labour relations and consolidating its reliable international role 311 Matteo Fumagalli, Myanmar 2019: «The Lady and the generals» redux? 327 Diego Maiorano, India 2019: The general election and the new Modi wave 345 Michelguglielmo Torri, India 2019: Assaulting the world’s largest democracy; building a kingdom of cruelty and fear 397 Yogesh Joshi, India 2019: Foreign policy dilemmas and their domestic roots 419 Matteo Miele, Nepal 2019: Attempts at mediation in domestic and foreign policies 435 Filippo Boni, Afghanistan 2019: Between peace talks and presidential elections, another year of uncertainty 451 Marco Corsi, Pakistan 2019: The challenges of the first PTI government 473 paolo Sorbello, Kazakhstan 2018-2019: Change and continuity amid economic stagnation 491 Reviews 523 Appendix When this Asia Maior issue was finalized and the Covid-19 pandemic raged throughout the world, Kian Zaccara, Greta Maiorano and Giulio Santi, all children of Asia Maior authors (Luciano Zaccara, Diego Maiorano and Silvia Menegazzi), were born. We (the Asia Maior editors) have seen that as a manifestation of Life, reasserting itself in front of Thanatos. It is for this reason that we dedicate this issue to Kian, Greta and Giulio, with the fond hope that they will live in a better world than the one devastated by the Covid-19 pandemic. Foreword

Asia in 2019: The escalation of the US-China contraposition, and the authoritarian involution of Asian societies

No meaningful analysis of the continuing political and economic evolution of Asia can avoid focusing on the increasingly evident and increasingly dangerous contraposition between a declining superpower – the US – and a rising one – China. Also, the point must be stressed beyond any possible doubt that, at least up to the moment in which this Foreword is being penned, the declining power, the US, is still overwhelming powerful and, more importantly, overwhelmingly more so than its competitor, China. As noted elsewhere1 – there is every reason to believe that, under Donald Trump’s dysfunctional and intellectually opaque leadership, the decline of the US has accelerated. Nonetheless, US resources remain such that it would be unwarranted to expect either an imminent collapse of US power, or even a decline of such significance to endanger the US position of most-powerful world nation. As history teaches us, the decline of imperial powers – as shown by the examples of Rome, Spain, and Britain– are long-drawn, centuries-long affairs. Even if history moves today much faster than before, there is every reason to think that the collapse of US power is far from being imminent.2 The contraposition between the US and China has long been in the making, but it was only during the concluding years of Barack Obama’s presidency that the consensus in Washington on China finally and decisively shifted. The idea that China had to be engaged as a constructive strategic partner and a responsible stakeholder in the US-dominated world order was then discarded. The view accepted in its stead was that the Asian giant was an increasingly dangerous, unrelenting strategic adversary, whose clear ambition was the conquest of world hegemony through the subversion of the existing, US-centred world order. As such, China, far from being engaged as a friendly country, had to be confronted and faced down.3 During Obama’s second term, the new adversarial consensus on China found expression in a well-reasoned and coherent grand policy,

1. Michelguglielmo Torri, ‘Asia Maior in 2017: The unravelling of the US foreign policy in Asia and its consequences’, Asia Maior 2017, p. 8. 2. For a discussion of this question, see Michelguglielmo Torri, ‘Premessa: De- clino e continuità dell’egemonia americana in Asia’, Asia Maior 2009, pp. 9-31. 3. Ashley J. Tellis, ‘The Return of U.S.-China Strategic Competition’, in Ashley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, & Michael Willis (eds.), ‘U.S.-China competition for global influence’, Seattle and Washington, D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019 (also available on the web at https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sa20_overview_tellis_dec2019advance.pdf).

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior based on two pillars: the «Pivot to Asia», namely the redeployment of the bulk of US military forces in the Asia-Pacific area, and the TPP (Trans Pacific Partnership), a 12-country free trade agreement.4 The TPP aimed at establishing a set of US-decided new rules, which would mould not only any future economic interexchange in the Asia-Pacific but the working itself of the local economies. Its political aim was the imposition of these new, US- made rules on China, by confronting Beijing with the dilemma of either accepting the Washington-dictated rules, entering the gigantic free market created by the TPP, or being excluded from it, with heavy – and possibly disastrous – negative consequences for its economy.5 Trump’s presidency did not see the transition from a China policy based on engagement to a different one, one centred on active containment, but, rather, the transformation of an already existing confrontational policy. This transformation, nonetheless, was highlighted as a startlingly new policy, which extended the «America First» political approach, espoused by Donald Trump during his electoral campaign, to the field of foreign relations. The claim that the new President’s foreign policy charted a «new course», aimed at «putting the interests and security of the American people first»,6 was made credible above all by his particular and flamboyant personal style. This claim was so effectively advertised that, by the year under review, many analysts and commentators appeared to have become convinced that a new cold war, based on the US-China confrontation, had begun.7 In fact, if a new cold war began, it happened not under the Trump administration but under that of his predecessor. Once the continuity in the Trump administration’s China policy as compared with the preceding administration has been underlined, it is nonetheless important to clarify the distinctive features of the «America First» anti- China Trumpian strategy. These were many,8 but for the purpose of putting in perspective the essays included in this volume, only two will be highlighted.

4. In 2016 the TPP included Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States. 5. Francesca Congiu, ‘China in 2014: China and the Pivot to Asia’, Asia Maior 2014, pp. 15-41. 6. The White House, Fact Sheets, President Donald J. Trump’s Foreign Policy Puts America First, 30 January 2018. 7. Some analysts claimed that 2019 marked the actual starting point of the new Cold War between the two countries. See, e.g., Robert D. Kaplan, ‘A New Cold War Has Begun’, Foreign Policy, 7 January 2019; Niall Ferguson, ‘The New Cold War? It’s With China, and It Has Already Begun’, The New York Times, 2 December 2019; Min- ghao Zhao, ‘Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US–China Strate- gic Competition’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 12, 3, 2019, pp. 371–394. 8. Ashley J. Tellis – calling them «avenues of resistance» (to China’s aggressive challenge to «overall U.S. hegemony in the international system») – lists no less than six distinctive features of Trump’s anti-China policy. Ashley J. Tellis, ‘The Return of U.S.-China Strategic Competition’, pp. 11, 26-31.

10 The first and most visible hallmark of the transformation of the US China policy under Trump was the abandonment of any caution in highlighting the administration’s confrontational stand vis-à-vis China. Contrary to the caution which had surrounded the enunciation of the Obamian anti- China policy – which, to a certain extent, had disguised its real objective, namely taming what had come to be seen as the US’ main world competitor – the fact that the US now viewed China as a strategic rival was, so to speak, shouted from the rooftops. The other hallmark of the transformation of the US China policy under Trump was the abrupt jettisoning of the economic containment network that Barack Obama had been building around China through the TPP. This decision, in line with Donald Trump’s anti-globalist and anti-multilateral pacts inclination, was coupled with the reliance on the threat of overwhelming military force, strengthened by a series of bilateral military pacts with those Asian countries which felt threatened by China’s rise. Openly branding China as the most dangerous strategic rival of the US began soon after Trump’s election. As pointed out in the Foreword to the previous Asia Maior volume, it was made clear beyond any possible doubt in a series of public statements and official documents: the speech on US-India relations, given by then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (18 October 2017), the publication of the new document on the National Secu- rity Strategy (NSS) (18 December 2017), and then-US Secretary of Defense James Mattis’ public enunciation of the summary of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) (19 January 2018).9 To these statements and documents – already discussed in the Foreword to the previous Asia Maior issue – one must add the publication, in November 2019, of the Department of State’s A Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Advancing a Shared Vision. In it, the US approach to «an Indo-Pacific composed of open societies and open markets» was coun- terpoised to that of China, based on the practice of repression «at home and abroad».10 The Vision was especially critical of the repressive practices which, according to the document, the People’s Republic of China employed «at home and abroad». According to the Vision: «Such practices, which Beijing exports to other countries through its political and economic influence, undermine the conditions that have promoted stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific for decades».11 The reference to Beijing’s «political and eco-

9. On the 2017 NSS document see Michelguglielmo Torri, ‘Asia Maior in 2017: The unravelling of the US foreign policy in Asia and its consequences’, Asia Maior 2017, p. 15; on the NSS of 18 December 2017 and the presentation of the summary of the NDS of 19 January 2018, see Michelguglielmo Torri & Nicola Mocci, ‘Fore- word. Asia Maior in 2018: Caught between Trump’s trade and sanctions war and the internal problems of inequality and exploitation’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 9-10. 10. US Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Advancing a Shared Vision, 4 November 2019, p. 21. 11. Ibid.

11 nomic influence» was a not-so-veiled critique of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), seen by Washington as Beijing’s attempt to create a sphere of influence based on radically different values than the ones advanced by the US. The jettisoning of the TPP promotion, namely the second hallmark highlighting the transformation of the US’ China policy under Trump, also became apparent immediately after the election of the new President. Although in line with the aforementioned Trumpian aversion of globalisation and disdain for multinational pacts and organisations, it was a frankly disconcerting decision. There is every reason to think that it was seen with dismay even by some ruling circles in Washington. Certainly, the reintroduction of some form of US economic support to the Asian countries within the US political sphere of influence was welcomed by most US decision makers and, indeed, realised, although in a limited fashion, in 2018.12 The attempt to find some economic props for the Trumpian US’ China policy was however de facto undermined by the President himself. A great deal of political and scholarly attention has been devoted to the fact that one of the highlights of the Trumpian foreign policy was the trade war on China, started in 2018 by the US President with his decision to impose tariffs on imported industrial and technology goods from the East Asian country. The focus on China, however, often obscures the fact that China, while the main target of the trade war unlashed by Trump, was far from being the only one. The trade war was simply part of Trump’s «America first» policy, which the US President and his administration pursued not only against China but all nations with a favourable commercial balance vis-à-vis the US. Hence, Washington’s goal became that of forcing the «erring» countries to tilt their trade balance towards parity, lest they risk the imposition of punitive tariffs on their imports. This amounted to the unleashing of a trade war not only on China, but on most US formal allies and non-treaty partners in the Indo- Pacific region, and could not but make redundant the limited programme of economic support launched in place of the TPP, and endanger Washington’s relations with most of its Asian formal and informal allies.13

 During the year under review, since the start of the US policy of China containment, Beijing determinedly moved to counter Washington’s increasingly confrontational posture, both at the rhetoric and factual level, in Asia and world-wide. At the rhetorical level, Beijing argued that the trade imbalance with the US, in its favour, was the natural result of free trade rather than unfair practices, as alleged by the US. Also, Beijing constantly rejected claims that

12. Michelguglielmo Torri & Nicola Mocci, ‘Foreword. Asia Maior in 2018’, p. 11. 13. Michelguglielmo Torri, ‘Asia Maior in 2017: The unravelling of the US foreign policy in Asia and its consequences’, Asia Maior 2017, pp. 9-11.

12 the BRI represented an expansionist economic and ultimately military endeavour. As noted by Barbara Onnis in her comprehensive assessment of the major developments in Chinese foreign policy in 2019, the Chinese leadership made use of the 2nd BRI forum held in Beijing (25-27 April 2019) both to showcase the BRI acceptance by major international organisations and consultation fora, such as G20 and the World Bank, and to challenge the US narrative of the BRI being a «debt trap» for the countries involved in it. The 2019 White Paper China’s National Defense in the New Era was another example of Beijing’s attempt to highlight its outlook on the most pressing international and domestic matters. With regards to its own global ambitions, the document stated that «China will never follow the beaten track of big powers in seeking hegemony» and that it «will never threaten any other country or seek any sphere of influence».14 With specific reference to the US, and how China perceives its moves, the White Paper stated that, as international competition was growing, the US «has provoked and intensified competition among major countries, significantly increased its defense expenditure, pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, cyber and missile defense, and undermined global strategic stability.»15 On a practical level, during the year under review President Xi Jin- ping was engaged in what Barbara Onnis describes as a «tireless summit diplomacy», which saw the Chinese leader travelling throughout the world and attending «hundreds of bilateral and multilateral meetings». Among them, the Chinese President’s visit to Russia in June 2019 deserves particular mention, as this visit marked the apex of years of growing economic and military cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. Beyond the long-standing cooperation channelled through the Shanghai Coopera- tion Organisation (SCO), the Sino-Russian partnership featured regular joint military exercises as well as an ever-stronger energy collaboration in both the oil and gas sectors. While it is unclear at the time of writing whether or not the Sino-Russian entente will transform into a fully-fledged alliance, it nevertheless represented a key geopolitical alignment that brought together two of the most prominent revisionist powers in global geopolitics.16 Beyond the Russian case, the results of Xi’s diplomatic activism in the year under review are, however, a contentious point. According to Bar- bara Onnis, they were «both positive and negative». «While Xi Jinping was successful in pursuing personal relations with his Indian and Japanese counterparts, that could be used to address the trust deficit with both the

14. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, ‘China’s National Defense in the New Era’, July 2019, p. 8. 15. Ibid. 16. Marcin Kaczmarski, ‘The Moscow-Beijing Relationship: Increasingly Asym- metrical and Resilient’, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2 July 2019; Lyle J. Goldstein, ‘The Fate of the China-Russia Alliance’, The National Interest, 25 January 2020.

13 neighbouring countries – points out Onnis – the same cannot be said for the Chinese government’s attempt to reassure one of its most relevant partners, namely the EU». Here, however, the problem is that good «personal relations» appear to be a widely overrated element in assessing the actual state of relations between sovereign countries. To be convinced of this it is enough to refer to the strange case of the continuing allegedly good personal relations between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in a period when, according to most analysts and commentators, the increasingly adversarial relations between their respective countries had become so extreme as to justify the judgement that a new cold war had begun. No doubt, in 2018 Trump’s policy of forcing countries with a favourable balance of trade vis-à-vis the US to tilt their trade balance towards parity provoked the ill-concealed negative reaction of some key US allies or quasi-allies, in particular Japan and India. It was a negative reaction which opened the possibility of an international realignment on the part of Tokyo and New Delhi, characterised by a more or less deliberate move away from the US sphere of influence and a parallel gradual thawing of relations with China. Xi Jinping’s diplomatic effort to bridge the historical gap separating China from Japan and India addressed the disquiet felt because of Trump’s aggressive trade policies, and was designed to promote personal good relations with both Shinzō Abe and Narendra Modi. Xi Jinping’s attempted rapprochement, however, although ostensibly impressive, was short in substance. In fact, as Giulio Pugliese and Sebastian Maslow argue in this Asia Maior issue, in 2019 Japan’s foreign policy was characterised by an ever-closer relationship with the US, while simultaneously maintaining the country’s security agenda squarely focused on how to engage and contain China. Accordingly, the limited 2019 Sino-Japanese rapprochement was coupled with an unprecedented level of engagement between Japanese Prime Minister Abe and US President Trump. As pointed out by Pugliese and Maslow, the «Japanese government was mostly satisfied with the Trump administration’s foreign and security policy recalibration, and essentially welcomed America’s more confrontational China policy». Clearly, during 2019, Washington and Tokyo appeared aligned on a number of issues, primarily on their interpretation of the BRI, especially its maritime component, as a geopolitical endeavour aimed at strengthening Beijing’s economic and, in the long run, military clout in the Indo-Pacific. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept – at the core of the Trump administration’s Asia policy – provided a common ground for cementing also the ties between India and the US. As Yogesh Joshi argues in his article, the strategic relationship between New Delhi and Washington – which in 2018 had appeared to be threatened by the US aggressive trade policies – recovered during 2019, it being strengthened notably through a 2+2 ministerial dialogue, bringing together the foreign and defence ministers of both countries. In spite of the novel good personal climate characterising the

14 Xi-Modi relations ever since 2018, any real progress in India’s relations with China remained hostage to territorial disputes and appeared hampered by a growing Sino-Pakistani partnership (its most visible manifestation being the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). According to Joshi’s appraisal, in the year under review India unambiguously sided with the US in the global struggle for hegemony. Interestingly, this happened after a period in 2018 which saw India doubt the wisdom of maintaining its US connection as the keystone of its foreign policy. It is worth stressing that, in firmly siding with Washington in 2019, New Delhi made the choice of favouring a policy which advanced the expansion of its own military power, rather than its economic interests. But, significantly, overlooking a declining economy and focusing instead on the pursuit of political goals related to its own brand of «Hindu nationalism» is what, during the year under review, characterised the Modi government’s policies, even domestically.

 In the end, in 2019 Beijing’s effort at countering Washington’s strategy of containment had limited or disappointing results as far as China’s relations with the EU, Japan and India were concerned. However, in the year under review as in previous years, the Sino-US rivalry took place in a series of other geographical theatres, where its results were sometimes different. Outside India, in South Asia the Sino-US competition mainly played out in two contexts, Pakistan and Nepal. With regards to the former, it is worth stressing once again that Pakistan is at the very heart of China’s BRI strategy, as shown by the planning of the China-Pakistan Economic Cor- ridor (CPEC). The CPEC is a set of infrastructural and energy investments worth around US$ 20 billion, whose political and economic implications, analysed by Marco Corsi in this and previous Asia Maior issues, are hard to overestimate. Given its relevance on the wider global chessboard, CPEC and the related investment practices have been the object of a great deal of scrutiny and adverse criticism, especially by the US administration. In particular, in November 2019 Ambassador Alice Wells, the principal deputy assistant secretary of State for South and Central Asia at the US Department of State, made public the US’ concerns about CPEC, criticising the issues of cost, debt, jobs and transparency of Chinese investments in Pakistan. She noted how, «in contrast to the Chinese Communist Party, the United States leads a vision for the Indo-Pacific region that is free and open». She also called Islamabad to «ask Beijing the tough questions and insist on accountability, fairness and transparency». «Ask the Chinese government – she concluded – why it’s pursuing a development model in Pakistan that significantly deviates from what brought China its own economic success».17 Pakistan’s

17. United States Department of State, ‘A Conversation with Ambassador Alice Wells on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’, 21 November 2019.

15 Foreign Office and the Chinese Ambassador’s reaction to Wells’ remarks was immediate, with Beijing’s ambassador to Islamabad, Yao Jing, saying he was «shocked and surprised» and asking the media to play an important role in countering anti-CPEC propaganda.18 Ultimately, the increased pressure exercised by the US was not particularly successful in weakening Sino-Pakistani relations. Of course, this is a far from surprising result, considering that the Sino-Pakistani alliance is a cornerstone both in the case of Pakistan’s foreign policy and China’s BRI strategy. Less evident, but equally significant, is the case of Nepal. As noted by Matteo Miele, Nepal’s leadership had to strike a careful balancing act in 2019 when managing its relations with the United States, China and India. The deepening ties between Kathmandu and Beijing, exemplified by the number and relevance of agreements signed during Xi Jinping’s visit to the country in October 2019, were perceived as a threat both by India – which, as noted by Yogesh Joshi, considers China’s inroads into its immediate neighbourhood a major concern – and the US, which is keen to cajole countries into its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Overall, during 2019, Beijing’s growing clout in Nepal was visible, with over 90% of foreign direct investment (FDI) in this Himalayan country coming from China. This, coupled with the deal signed in 2018 by Huawei to develop 4G infrastructure in Nepal, demonstrates that the relationship between Beijing and Kathmandu has become increasingly close.19 In Afghanistan, as Filippo Boni points out, the US remained the primary international actor in 2019, as shown by its proactive policy aimed at negotiating a peace deal with the Taleban. Peace in Afghanistan was an objective very eagerly sought by Donald Trump, in view of the approaching 2020 US presidential elections. China, nonetheless, continued to be a keen actor, attempting to mediate a political settlement in the country. Here too, as with the US, domestic considerations were paramount: no doubt, China’s effort to stabilise its Western periphery was the main driver behind its engagement with Afghanistan. Equally interesting is the case of Mongolia. The latter finds itself in the difficult position of being caught between her inevitable dependence on Russia and China, and the convenience of promoting positive relations with the US. As Axel Berkofsky reports in his article, 90% of Mongolia’s exports are to China, and the latter accounts for more than one third of Mongolia’s imports, in addition to being its major foreign investor. Simi- larly, Mongolia’s economic relations with Russia have grown significantly in the past few years, as a result of the Kremlin’s renewed interest in Mongolia as a potential transit corridor for goods and energy supplies to, and from, China. In this situation, Russia, Mongolia and China established, under the

18. ‘Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan Yao Jing is shocked and surprised’, Times of Islamabad, 23 November 2019. 19. Rupert Stone, ‘China’s silent foray into Nepal’, TRT World, 21 October 2019.

16 aegis of the BRI, the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC) in 2014. Furthermore, in 2019 Russia pledged to invest US$ 1.5 billion to be used to modernise Mongolia’s railways. Against such backdrop of heavy economic dependence, Mongolia’s decision to sign a Strategic Partnership Agreement in July 2019 with the United States caught many observers by surprise. The agreement came in the wake of the US Department of De- fence’s Indo-Pacific Strategy report, which referred to Mongolia as one of the «natural partners of the United States» in the region. The US’ strategy – aimed at scoring a political point by obtaining Ulaanbaatar’s support for the Indo-Pacific strategy – also included an economic component through the Mongolia Third Neighbor Trade Bill. Introduced into Congress on 10 April 2019, the Bill, in sharp contrast with the usual US trade policy under Trump, intended to grant Mongolian cashmere duty-free access to the Unit- ed States, creating great potential for growth in Mongolia’s cashmere and textile industry. Its political goal was offering the land-locked Asian nation an alternative economic option to the ones provided by China and Russia. As Berkofsky notes, Beijing’s reaction to these developments was to warn «Mongolia not to ‘misbehave’» by teaming up with Washington on a level «too close for comfort for Beijing». The whole episode, which at the time of writing had not yet reached its conclusion, demonstrates both the difficulties and opportunities for third countries, created by the escalating tensions between China and the US. Another flashpoint in the US-China rivalry during the year under review was Vietnam. As shown by Nicola Mocci, in 2019 the Vietnamese economy witnessed two main developments related to the China-US confrontation. The first was the increase in Chinese FDI in Vietnam and the relocation of Chinese companies there. The second was the steep increase of made- in-China goods that were exported first to Vietnam and then – after being labelled as Vietnamese – re-exported to the US. Nonetheless, the attempt to bypass higher US tariffs did not pass unnoticed by the Trump administration. As pointed out by Mocci: «In June, the President himself described Vietnam as “almost the single-worst abuser of everybody”». More importantly: «Words were soon followed by deeds. The US Commerce Department imposed duties of more than 400% on steel imports from Vietnam».

 In 2019, if the US-China increasingly-harsh contraposition was the main development in Asia, at least one other occurrence must be highlighted as characterising the year under review in many of the Asian countries analysed in the present Asia Maior issue. As observed in previous years, and in line with events in the remainder of the world, political freedom radically contracted. By looking at Freedom House scores for the countries included in this Asia Maior volume, we find six which are not-free (China, North Korea, Vietnam, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan), four that are partly

17 free (the Philippines, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan) and only six that are free (Japan, Mongolia, Taiwan, Timor Leste, India, South Korea). However, one of the countries classified as free by Freedom House, India, includes a territory, indicated as «Indian Kashmir», that Freedom House itself classifies as «Not Free».20 The snapshot given by Freedom House is possibly over-optimistic. It does not register the contraction of the spaces of freedom across the border, affecting – with very few exceptions – all kind of countries, from the «Not Free», to the «Partly Free», to those officially classified as «Free». The most egregious example of a country «Not Free», which has seen a fast and conspicuous reduction of political liberty, is China. As documented by Silvia Menegazzi, under Xi Jinping’s increasingly authoritarian leadership, even education – in an Orwellian move – has been transformed into a tool to mould the individual mentality according to the indications of the one and only leader. Another example worth remembering, drawn from the class of countries classified by Freedom House as «Not Free», is that of Kazakhstan. As shown by Paolo Sorbello, in the Central Asian country, in spite of the unexpected decision made public in March by Nursultan Nazarbayev to step down from the presidency, the former President continued to be firmly in control of the ultimate power. Also, the harassing of opposition forces and independent media persons continued unabated. Finally, among the countries characterised by Freedom House as «Not Free», the case of Myanmar is worth recalling. Even Myanmar is a most distressing example of political involution, in particular when one thinks of the high hopes once engendered by Aung San Suu Kyi and her democratic credentials. During the year under review, as shown by Matteo Fumagalli, there was no significant progress in the solution of the shameful problem of the Rohingya refugees. At the same time, a new insurrectional wave, led by the Arakan Army, started in the Rakhine state and spread throughout Myanmar’s northern and eastern borderlands. At the closing of the year – when Aung San Suu Kyi was in The Hague, defending her country from the accusation of genocide before the International Court of Justice, and the campaign for the 2020 parliamentary elections was underway – the hopes for any kind of significant democratic progress in Myanmar appeared to be illusionary.21

20. Freedom House, Countries and Territories (https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores). 21. On the problem of the «authoritarian resilience» characterising the political system in Myanmar see: Stefano Ruzza, Giuseppe Gabusi & Davide Pellegrino, ‘Au- thoritarian resilience through top-down transformation: making sense of Myanmar’s incomplete transition’, Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 49, Special Issue 2 (Autocracy Strikes Back: Authoritarian Resurgence in the Early 21st Century), July 2019, pp. 193-209.

18 Examples of the deteriorating situation of «Partly Free» countries are those offered by Malaysia and the Philippines. In Malaysia, as shown by Saleena Saleem, the political context was characterised by the eruption of a spate of ethno-religious controversies «that only served to exacerbate the inter-ethnic distrust». These controversies were promoted by the two main opposition parties’ «polarising fear-mongering rhetoric», and were fed by «the ineffectual and disunited responses» of the coalition in power. Sadly, at the end of the year under review, Malaysian society appeared divided once again along communal lines. Ethno-religious ideologies were still a force to be reckoned with, with the potential to seriously damage social peace and political progress. Even more worrying was the case of the Philippines. As Sol Iglesias and Lala Ordenes show in their article, under President Rodrigo Duterte the country was reverting from democratic to authoritarian rule. The authors detail how the process of democratic deconsolidation was progressively taking place in the country, through a systematic weakening of the opposition and attacks on media freedoms and human rights. These actions were coupled with an active erosion of democratic institutions, in particular the judiciary, and a simultaneous strengthening of the military and the executive. Among the territories assessed by Freedom House, there is Hong Kong, which is classified as «Partly Free». During the year under review, this de facto city state was in the grip of a major democratic crisis, which, while less significant than similar developments in other parts of Asia – as exemplified in particular by the Philippines, discussed above, and India, on which more later – was closely monitored by the Western press. This conveyed the impression, at least in the West, that the events in Hong Kong were of epochal importance and a crucial struggle for democracy. Indeed, the Hong Kong crisis was serious and a struggle for democracy. Its importance, nonetheless, was undeniably inferior to other – sadly unreported by the Western media – analogous confrontations in other parts of Asia. Once the above has been pointed out, it is safe to assert that the events in the city state in 2019 can only be fully understood by highlighting the interconnected nature of the different roots of the crisis. On the one hand, it was propelled by internal causes; on the other the position of the city state in the Chinese area of influence deeply conditioned the political space of the protest. As Angela Tritto and Abdulkadir Alkan detail in their analysis, the Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Bill protests represented the largest mobilisation of people in the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China since the Hong Kong handover in 1997. The roots of the protests can be found in the shifting values and identities of the younger generation; nonetheless a full assessment of the dynamics of the Hong Kong struggle would be incomplete without its contextualisation within the wider framework of China’s increasing global reach, for which Hong Kong represents «a key node».

19 At the closing of the year under review, no final result of the Hong Kong crisis was in the offing. Nonetheless, in the context of Hong Kong’s geopolitical, strategic and economic importance for China, it is difficult to be optimistic about the success of the pro-democracy forces. None of the above examples of the contraction of political liberties is, however, as worrying as the one represented by the political involution of a country that Freedom House classifies as «Free», namely India. Con- sidered the world’s largest democracy, India is usually viewed as a success story in managing diversity. However, since Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014, India has gone through a progressive erosion of its political liberties, well documented in previous Asia Maior issues. This erosion has become headlong after Modi’s massive – and from many viewpoints unexpected – victory at the 2019 general election (discussed by Diego Maio- rano). Since then, in Michelguglielmo Torri’s appraisal, a «systematic and massive assault» on Indian democracy has taken place. The on India’s democracy was primarily articulated around two areas. First, two key articles of the Indian Constitution, which had guaranteed the autonomy of Jammu & Kashmir, the only Union state with a Muslim majority, were hollowed out and the state was de facto transformed into an internal colony brutally ruled through military force. Second, there was the attempt to modify the concept of Indian citizenship by introducing a religious criterion aimed at excluding persons of Muslim religion. While protests mounted in the country against this second decision of the Modi government, these two developments amounted to the most massive democratic crisis in India since the infamous imposition of the «internal emergency» regime of 1975-77, which saw then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi take over dictatorial powers.

 To the above drawn picture of contracting political liberties, there are, nevertheless, some exceptions, in particular those represented by Taiwan – expertly analysed by Aurelio Insisa – and South Korea – knowledgeably discussed by Marco Milani. Particularly interesting, however, are the cases of two countries which Asia Maior examines for the first time in this issue: Mongolia and Timor Leste. The small island state of Timor Leste is an enthralling case, on which it is worth briefly dwelling, if for no other reason than the immense amount of suffering and resilience which made the country a success story. In fact, the Timorese democracy is the outcome of a long and harrowing struggle against Indonesian colonialism, covertly supported by an Australia only interested in promoting its own egoistic national goal of exploiting the natural wealth of the Timor Gap. Although badly served by the UN, Timor Leste has succeeded in reaching not only independence but in creating a working democracy. In recent years this democracy has experienced some difficulties, but, as shown by Rui Feijó, these difficulties, far from signalling the

20 danger of an imminent democratic collapse, are those typical of the semi- presidential form of government chosen by the small island state. In fact, as argued by Feijó: «In any semi-presidential regimes the risk of conflict between a president and a prime minister representing different political forces is high, as shown by the well-known experience of France and many other countries having adopted this system». In turn, this results from the fact that, in the semi-presidential system, both the president and the prime minister enjoy «a direct electoral legitimacy that sustains their claims to a fair share of power». Hence, there is every hope that this small democracy will go on successfully pursuing the goal of enhancing both political liberties and economic well-being for its people. Mongolia too is a most interesting case of democratic endurance and success. Surrounded by the two biggest authoritarian states in the world – China and Russia – this landlocked country has nevertheless been, since the 1990 revolution, a «democratic oasis». As in the case of Timor Leste, Mon- golia’s political system is semi presidential; in it a 76-member unicameral legislature cohabits with a directly-elected president. As pointed out by Axel Berkofsky, and as shown by the above-mentioned case of Timor Leste, this kind of system does not work at its best when the prime minister and the president are expressed by different political majorities. This has been the case in Mongolia during the past 30 years. Nonetheless – as pointed out by Berkofsky – the existence itself of such a political system is evidence of the fact that «democracy is functioning and that the parties and politicians in power or opposition are making use of their constitutionally-granted rights and mandates». In fact, in the case of Mongolia, this system has shown itself to be resilient enough to resist and stop the authoritarian temptations of President Khaltmaagiin Battulga, a populist politician sometimes described as the «Trump of the steppe». The resilience of Mongolian democracy became apparent in 2019, during a crisis which saw the attempt, piloted by President Battulga, to reduce the independence of the judiciary. The law aimed at this goal, initially adopted by parliament in March 2019, was however superseded by the passing of additional legislation in mid-November. The November legislation streamlined the powers of both the prime minister and parliament and stipulated that the presidential terms «will, from 2025, be limited to one six-year term as opposed to the current two four- year terms».

 At the conclusion of our discussion of the contraction of political liberty in Asia – and to conclude this Foreword – it is opportune to briefly deal with a problem which, although not central to the essays included in this Asia Maior issue, is crucial in the anti-China discourse promoted by the Trump administration. This is the idea that China’s influence abroad translates into the encouragement of the anti-democratic and authoritarian ten-

21 dencies so visible in the majority of Asian countries. While it is possible to produce examples, such as the Philippines, which would seem to strengthen this theory, there is no doubt in the mind of the authors of these lines that the theory in question is a simplistic and possibly disingenuous explanation of a much more complex problem. To try to begin to give a more correct answer, the first point that must be highlighted is that the decline of political liberties – in Asia as elsewhere – has both endogenous and exogenous causes. If we take what, in this Foreword, is indicated as the most worrying case of political involution in Asia, that of India, it is beyond doubt that no present-day exogenous influence is behind it. The extremely worrying, rapid and conspicuous erosion of democracy in India has nothing to do with China’s influence or Chinese authoritarian ideologies. It is a phenomenon grounded on the intellectual historical roots of political Hinduism, or, as it is nowadays fashionable to call it, «Hindu nationalism». Of course, as shown by historical research, political Hinduism was deeply influenced by two closely connected foreign ideologies, namely Fascism and Nazism. But this happened in the 1930s and early 1940s.22 Since then, the nefarious ideology of «Hindu nationalism» has evolved autonomously, without any need of exogenous feeding, in particular from China, which political Hinduism considers as a dangerous enemy. Coming to the exogenous influences behind the progressive crisis of political liberties in many Asian countries, and besides China’s influence, another one is present and extremely dangerous, even if rarely or ever put under the focus of analysis by western or pro-West commentators. It is the influence of that extremely regressive version of Islam that is Wahhabi Is- lam. In previous decades its influence has spread throughout the world, but most particularly in Asia, thanks to the generous financial and organisational efforts on the part of that faithful ally of the West, but most particularly of the US: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.23 Unfortunately, for reasons beyond the control of the Asia Maior editors, this issue is the second in succession without an essay focused on the most populous Muslim country world-wide: Indonesia. Indonesia, nevertheless, is a most glaring case in point, illustrating the deleterious effects of the Saudi Arabia-promoted Wahhabi Islam. As shown by the latest Indonesia- related essays published in Asia Maior and other research, during previous decades the open and tolerant Islam which was characteristic of Indonesia24

22. E.g., Marzia Casolari, ‘Hindutva’s Foreign Tie-Up in the 1930s: Archival Evidence’, Economic and Political Weekly, 35, 4, 22-28 January 2000, pp. 218-228. 23. For one of the few studies on Saudi Arabia’s promotion of Wahabi Islam worldwide, see James M. Dorsey, ‘Creating Frankenstein: The Impact of Saudi Export Ultra-Conservatism in South Asia’, Social Science Research Network, 24 July 2016. 24. On the original characteristics of the Indonesian Islam see Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed. Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971 (1st edition 1968).

22 has been undergoing a most worrying mutation, becoming an increasingly intolerant, aggressive and anti-libertarian religious ideology, which has in fact narrowed the space of political liberty.25 A similar involution, even if less pronounced, is visible in Malaysia, as shown by Saleena Saleem. The decline of democracy and the contraction of political liberties in most of Asia – and in most of the world – is a quite serious and extremely worrying issue. The explanation of its causes – which, at the end of the day, is the necessary first step to counter this extremely dangerous and highly disquieting phenomenon – should not be held hostage to the anti-China discourse, promoted by the Trump administration to prop up the declining world position of the US.

Michelguglielmo Torri, Nicola Mocci & Filippo Boni

25. E.g. Tomáš Petrů, ‘Jokowi’s not so surprising re-election: A victory for «moderate» Islamism in Indonesia?’, Home Publications CEIAS Insights, 30 May 2019; Edward Aspinall & Marcus Mietzner, ‘Southeast Asia’s Troubling Elections: Nondem- ocratic Pluralism in Indonesia’, Journal of Democracy, 30, 4, January 2019, pp. 104- 118; Meredith L. Weiss, ‘Indonesia in 2019. Democracy and Its Critics’, Asian Survey, 60, 1, January/February 2020, pp. 109-116.

China 2019: Xi Jinping’s new era and the CPC’s agenda

Silvia Menegazzi

Luiss Guido Carli University [email protected]

In 2019, China’s domestic politics was characterized by Xi Jinping’s striking consolidation of power. This stabilization involved three important trends. First, institutional events organized through the course of the year were all aimed at fortify a political narrative envisioning Xi Jinping as the one and only leader able to guide China toward a New Era. To this extent, total and unconditioned support to the Party was seen as essential to guarantee China’s development and stability. Political documents analysed in this article exemplify such trend and highlight the significance Xi Jin- ping’s political theory plays today in Chinese domestic politics. Second, ideological education was dramatically transformed into a tool in the hands of the leadership to cement support and Party’s legitimacy. Along with a «repoliticization» of the educational system, the article suggests that patriotic education was also increasingly directed toward political elites and Party cadres. Third, the Xi Jinping’s administration undertook measures to bypass economic stagnation; however, the necessity to avoid discontent among different stakeholders, from local governments to private firms, also contributed to slow down the recovery of the Chinese economy.

1. Introduction

The year 2019 marked the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For the Communist Party of China (CPC), which has ruled the country since 1949, the year 2019 stands out as a glorious year, one that marks a precious occasion to celebrate the PRC’s numerous achievements, reached in the course of its history. Founded in 1921, the CPC is today the world’s largest political organization and has been the PRC’s governing party since October 1949. When Xi Jinping took up office in 2012, the CPC’s role became of strategic importance to build Xi’s image as China’s supreme political guide. Through the CPC, Xi strengthened its political power as China’s supreme leader, precisely by envisioning a more efficient and centralized, yet more authoritarian, Party. Strong censorship increased, and propaganda and ideological control became consolidated elements of the CPC and its governance. Xi Jinping’s speech at the ceremony of the 70th anniversary reflects his vision for China’s prominence in the 21st century on the basis of a strong national pride: a great nation and a great civilization, which «has stood up, grown rich and is becoming stronger» and «has come

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Silvia Menegazzi to embrace the brilliant prospects of national renewal».1 However, the year 2019 was also the anniversary of two other emblematic – yet problematic – events, which, in mainland China, went uncelebrated. They were the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests, and the 100th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement. The legacy of the May Fourth is controversial in China, not to mention Tiananmen; the two events are interrelated, as they are both symbols of the potency of the Chinese civil society, rebelling against discredited leaderships. Today, this legacy appears lost in a distant and undetermined past, while the younger Chinese generations are asked more and more to obey the Party, renouncing their political rights.2 For some observers, there is no doubt that Xi’s rule has been marked by a return to personalistic leadership in which authoritarian elements are on the rise. Not only has he taken charge of the most powerful political and military institutions – he chairs eight of the leading small groups (LSGs)3 and serves as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) – but he has also intensified CPC propaganda and social control.4 Xi Jinping has embarked on a systematic blueprint to reorganize party leadership and, especially, give it paramount legal powers; as a consequence of this programme, the politicization of decision-making has increased at the expense of transparency and accountability. Consequently, this article presents an evaluation of the Chinese domestic political dimension by analysing some major political institutional events that occurred in the course of 2019. More precisely, through the analysis of official documents, the article will show to what extent the Xi Jinping administration spared no effort to strengthen an increasingly centralized leadership system that envisions absolute loyalty to the Communist Party as the only means to expand his influence and power. This however coincided with China’s economic slowdown and a rising criticism in economic policy implementation that may put Xi Jinping’s future credibility at risk. The year opened with the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on 3 March, the annual meeting of China’s top lawmakers and political advisers. This was followed by the National People’s

1. ‘Speech by Xi Jinping at the reception in celebration of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China’, China Daily, 30 September 2019. 2. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, ‘May Fourth, the Day that Changed China’, The New York Times, 3 May 2019. 3. As pointed out by a CSIS commentary, one of the most important innovations of Xi’s leadership has been the expansion in number and role of leading small groups (LSGs). As explained in the same commentary, LSGs are coordinating bodies that address important policy areas that involve several different (and occasionally competing) parts of the bureaucracy. See Christopher K. Johnson, Scott Kennedy & Mingda Qiu, ‘Xi’s Signature Governance Innovation: The Rise of Leading Small Groups?, CSIS, 17 October 2017. 4. Susan L. Shark, ‘China in Xi’s «New Era»: The Return to Personalistic Rule’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 29, No. 2, April 2018, pp. 22-36.

26 China 2019 (1)

Congress (NPC), held immediately afterwards, on 5 March, arguably the most powerful unicameral legislative body in China. Known as the «Two Sessions» (两会), NPC and CPPCC meetings are two of the most significant events in the Chinese political calendar. At the 13th NPC, Prime Minister Li Keqiang presented a brief report titled Government Work Report (政府工作报告), with the intent to discuss China’s major economic achievements in 2018, and future directions. However, the NPC was caught in the spotlight of attention because of the adoption of the new Foreign Investment Law (to take effect from 1 January 2020). The law replaces existing laws on wholly foreign-owned enterprises, Sino-foreign contractual joint ventures and Sino-foreign equity joint ventures. It aims to improve the business environment for foreign investors and to ensure that foreign-invested enterprises participate in market competition on an equal basis. However, the law was introduced in the midst of the harsh trade conflict with the United States and so far has not achieved the desired results.5 At the same time, the article investigates one of the most discussed and renowned political institutional events to have occurred in China in 2019: the 4th Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of CPC, held between October 28 and 31, in Beijing. As one of the most secretive events in China’s political life, the «Fourth Plenum» attracted intense attention among «China Watchers»; an attention that was further enhanced by the continuous postponements of the Plenary Session and widespread speculations about possible internal struggles within the CPC. The core theme of the Plenary Session was the discussion and further accreditation of Xi Jinping’s political doctrine. Other topics discussed during the plenum concerned the protests in Hong Kong and the US-China trade dispute. In addition, 2019 was also the year in which the State Council Infor- mation Office (SCIO) – the main organ in charge of political propaganda in China – released a new White Paper titled China’s National Defence in the New Era (24 July). Although the White Paper is primarily relevant for its open strategic challenge to the United States, it touches on significant aspects concerning the domestic dimension of military reform, as well as the reorganization of the military and paramilitary apparatus in China. Xi Jinping has constantly repeated his call for China’s military apparatus to serve the Party, as he conceives the military as one of the country’s real strengths against internal struggles.6 In the Xi Jinping era, even CPC-PLA relations are characterized by an extreme centralization of power in the hands of the leader, which further strengthens the image of Xi as the most powerful commander-in-chief in charge of civil-military relations in China since Mao’s time.

5. Zhou Xin, ‘China’s New Foreign Investment Law is Too Vague, Says US Busi- ness Group’, South China Morning Post, 13 March 2019. 6. Liu Zhen, ‘Xi Jinping Reiterates Rallying Call To Chinese Military, Stresses Need For Communist Party’s «Grip», South China Morning Post, 11 November 2019.

27 Silvia Menegazzi

It is worth noting that 2019 has also been the year in which the Xi Jinping administration devoted substantial efforts to boost political and ideological propaganda. The importance of two documents published in autumn deserve to be highlighted: the first, released on 11 November 2019, is entitled 2019-2023 National Work Programme for the Education and Cultiva- tion of Party Members; the second, released immediately afterwards, on 12 November 2019, was entitled Implementation Guidelines for Patriotic Education in the New Era. Once again, they represent the CPC’s attempt to forge ideological education in China based on the so-called «Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era». The three issues under scrutiny in this article – political reform, Party- army relations and ideological education – are all interlinked. They demonstrate the determination of the Xi administration to strengthen the ideology legitimating Xi’s personalistic control above all sectors of Chinese society. Lastly, by assessing China’s political and economic developments in the course of 2019, major trends in the country’s political economy and the challenges facing it are also discussed. Descripted by a trend that oscillates between continuity and uncertain change, the Chinese economic situation in 2019 was heavily affected by international factors, such as the US-China trade conflict, and the relations with the European Union (EU).

2. Domestic politics: The governance of Xi Jinping

During 2019, China’s domestic politics was characterized by Xi Jin- ping’s power consolidation efforts on the political, military and educational fronts. Though it is now abundantly clear Xi’s intention to stay in office indefinitely, in a situation characterized by the absence of any direct political challengers to its leadership, the year 2019 appeared one of the hardest for the Xi Jinping administration. China’s trade fight with the United States increased fears of economic slowdown while Hong Kong protests intensified the preoccupation for the spread of anti-government sentiments in the mainland. On top of that, other dangers jeopardized the credibility of the Chinese political system, prime among them the data leaks made to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). In the year under review, these data leaks attracted increasing international condemnation about the mass detention of Chinese Muslims in the internal province officially known as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).7 As a result, 2019 was marked by a greater assertiveness of the CPC to strengthen Xi Jinping’s paramount control over most of institutional events and documents published in China. For most Chinese people, China’s latest authori-

7. ‘Data leak reveals how China «brainwashes» Uyghurs in prisons camps’, BBC, 24 November 2019.

28 China 2019 (1) tarian turn might not be perceived as negative as it is in the West. However, it is certainly true that the Xi Jinping’s administration cautioned itself by devoting considerable efforts to indoctrinate Party cadres and officials as to how to be observant of any threat undermining China’s political stability and reforms.8

2.1. Two session event (Lianghui) In early March 2019, the Chinese Government witnessed two of its most important leadership gatherings: the Chinese People’s Consultative Congress (CPPCC) and the National People’s Congress (NPC). Although labelled as the rubber stamps of the Party, with no real political authority, these two annual meetings provide a unique opportunity to observe and study the major directions of China’s economic policies, government administration, legislation and politics. The number of NPC deputies who attended the conference was 2,975, of whom only 752 were female. Minori- ties were also represented, although the number was minuscule, when compared with the Han ethnic group, which amounted to 2,538 deputies.9 The CPPCC functions as the advisory body to the NPC and its membership for 2019 was 2,157. The first of the Two sessions event was the meeting of the CPPCC, which included members from outside the Communist Party, such as representatives from the other eight legally recognised political parties in China, including the China Democratic League or Jiusan Society, as well as representatives from civil society and the business sector. The two sessions event is often criticized for the high presence of Chinese billionaires showing off their loyalty to the CPC. Indeed, the gathering is mostly defined by a total absence of meaningful policy debates during which rich delegates avoid to say anything critical to the official Party-line. However, according to a research from Hurun Report, conducted in 2018, the number of Chi- nese billionaires taking part in the two sessions has decreased in the last two years: only 7.5% or 142 individuals among the richest billionaires in China were delegates of the NPC or the CPPCC. Numbers also show a decrease of 10%, compared with the previous year and of 15.7%, compared with five years ago. NPC delegates were down 48 to 77, CPPCC down 23 to 65.10 According to Wang Huiyao, president of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) but in fact former counsellor for the State Council,

8. ‘Be vigilant about threats to China’s stability and reforms, Xi Jinping tells top cadres’, South China Morning Post, 22 January 2019. 9. In 2019, minorities deputies were so divided: Hui 68; Zhuang 47; Manchu 44; Mongol 37; Tibetan 33; Miao 31; Uygur 25; Tujia 23; Yi 22. China Global Tel- evision Network. However, according to the last census – 2010 – minorities in Chi- na represent only 8.49% of the total population. See Yun Zhou, ‘Question of ethnic group formulation in the Chinese census’, in China Population and Development Studies, n. 3, 2019, pp. 67-83. 10. ‘2018 Lexus- Hurun China Rich List’, Hurun Report, 10 October 2018.

29 Silvia Menegazzi the two sessions represent an essential moment to build confidence in Chi- na – among private enterprises, in particular, and more generally in the private sector.11 Overall, more recently the discussion about how to better develop the private sector has been at the core of China’s domestic economic policies, notwithstanding the intent by the leadership to also continue to consolidate the public sector.12 In spite of the above, in the year under review the Chinese press was more interested in praising the commitment of the CPPCC in sustaining Xi Jinping, rather than the contribution made by Chinese private entrepreneurs to the assembly. For instance, Wang Yang, Chairman of the CPPCC, stressed how «CPPCC work is centred on Comrade Xi Jinping», whereas Gui Huijun, CPPCC Zhejiang provincial representative, affirmed that «Xi Jinping’s viewpoints and methods are essential elements to strengthen and improve the work of the CPPCC».13 In 2019, the agenda focused on what are usually defined in China as «three critical battles»: those against poverty and pollution and that for the development of a socialist democracy. A total of 5,113 proposals were submitted by political advisors between 3 and 7 March.14 The key event of the NPC’s full session was Li Keqiang’s speech, presenting the Government Work Report. The official document was divided into two parts: the first reviewed China’s economic performances in 2018; the second dealt with China’s social and economic developments in 2019. Re- garding the first part, Li Keqiang’s comments presented a positive evaluation of the Chinese economy: a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grow rate fixed at 6.6%, and 13.61 million new urban jobs created in parallel, with an average of more than 18,000 new businesses opening daily. According to the report, China’s total volume of trade in goods exceeded 30 trillion yuan in 2018, with a utilized foreign investment totalling US$ 138.3 billion.15 How- ever, the Premier’s enthusiasm was not shared by major international media outlets, which reported a sharp decline in China’s economic performance – in fact, China’s economic performance in 2019 was defined as its worst since the late 1990s.16

11. ‘What to expect from China’s Two Sessions in 2019?’, CGTN, 3 March 2019. 12. Wang Yiming, ‘Create Favourable Conditions for the Development of Pri- vate Enterprises’, Development Research Center of the State Council of China, 7 January 2019. 13. ‘两会首场新闻发布会凸显政协元素’ (The first Lianghui Conference highlights CPPCC perspectives), 人民政协报People’s Political Consultative Daily, 3 March 2019. 14. The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Top Political Advisory Body Concludes Annual Session, 14 March 2019. 15. ‘Full Text: Report on the Work of the Government’, China.org, 16 March 2019. 16. ‘China’s Economic Slowdown: how Bad Is It?’, BBC News, 26 September 2019.

30 China 2019 (1)

Regarding expectations for 2019, Li Keqiang’s official statement projected formidable targets, however denied by major international financial organizations as they were only partially achieved: a GDP growth estimated at 6-6.5%, more than 11 million new urban jobs, and large-scale tax cuts, coupled with a consistent reform of the economic, business and monetary sectors. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while China’s economic growth reached the estimated peak of 6.2% in 2019, the reform and opening up process did not fully achieve the expected results: reforms increased, rather than decreasing, the dominance of State-Owned Enter- prises (SOEs), and damaged the environment for private businesses. Fur- thermore, at the time of writing the IMF forecast a short-term outlook that remained particularly uncertain, given the trade tensions with the United States, in which economic growth is estimated at 5.5% in 2020.17

2.2. The fourth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Among the most significant political events on the Chinese agenda in 2019 was the Fourth Plenum of the 19th Party Congress. On 24 October, the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee of the CPC announced the Fourth Plenum of the 19th Party Congress to be held from 28 to 31 October. The plenum represents a cathartic moment to the CPC, as it is the mandated annual assembly when major political decisions for China’s domestic and foreign policy are discussed and approved. This deserves special attention, as the Fourth Plenum under analysis had been announced and then postponed numerous times by the Chinese leadership, at least since August 2019. International media reporting on the plenum claimed that its delay was due to the internal power struggles between President Xi and the political elite in Zhongnanhai.18 However, the results of the plenum denied the rumours of crisis, confirming the centrality of the charismatic leader as the true core «核心» (hexin) of the Party.19 The CPC’s Central Com- mittee, which is the highest political organ in China, is expected to convey seven plenary sessions every five years term. The previous three sessions provided essential opportunities for endorsing Xi Jinping’s leadership. On 25 October 2017, during the First Plenum of the 19th CPC National Con- gress, Xi was re-elected as general secretary of the CPC Central Committee. The Second Plenum, held between 18 and 19 October 2018, discussed the proposal of the CPC Central Committee to revise the Constitution, which, in fact, abolished the two-term limit on the presidency and granted Xi to

17. IMF, Country Report No. 19/266, August 2019. 18. ‘What Is Happening at China’s Secret Plenum?’, Foreign Policy, 30 October 2019. 19. ‘19th CPC Central Committee concludes Fourth Plenary Session, releases Communique’, Xinhua, 31 March 2019.

31 Silvia Menegazzi remain «president-for-life». The Third Plenum, held from 26 to 28 February 2018, focused on institutional reforms and the consolidation of the Party through the so-called «Plan of deepening reform of Party and state institutions» (深化党和国家机构改革方案).20 The Fourth Plenum was expected to trace the socialist path of the «Xi Jinping Thought in the New Era», sketch- ing out specific guidelines to strengthen its governance and «make China great again».21 A comment provided by the SCIO further exemplifies the three dimensions of socialist governance with Chinese characteristics, as it was presented at the Fourth Plenum: that is, party governance, state governance and global governance. CPC’s centralization of power and control above state institutions would guarantee better practices, especially when compared with Western models, in which politicians and political parties are focused only on the next elections. Furthermore, the guidance of «Xi Jin- ping Thought» is also expected to improve global governance worldwide, from North to South, by promoting a fairer and more just international order.22 A central component of Xi Jinping’s political vision is its linkage of the domestic role of the Party with the role China plays at the global level, aimed to strengthen its soft power abroad. On the occasion of the 2019 Fourth Plenum, Xi Jinping confirmed the significance of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics as a constituent element of China’s political tradition, namely the combination of Marxism-Leninism with a market economy approach. However, at this particular moment in history, according to Xi Jinping the socialist system with Chinese characteristics’ main objective is also that to guarantee the so-called two hundred years goal (China’s forthcoming two centenaries, i.e., the founding of the CPC in 2021 and the PRC in 2049) and the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of China.23 More practically, the political message sent to the masses means that the socialist system with Chinese characteristics in the Xi Jinping’s era must assert a full and unconditioned support to the Party, its leadership and its governance. Since Xi Jinping took office in 2012, the integration between the Party and the State has been visible on all fronts, and, for this reason, Xi’s position is often compared with that of the PRC’s first leader, Mao Zedong. In an opening speech

20. Francesca Congiu, ‘China 2018: bringing the Party Back into State Institu- tions’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 23-41. 21. ‘Xi Jinping Thought Explained: A New Ideology for a New Era’, The New York Times, 26 February 2018. 22. ‘The Three Dimensions of Chinese Governance’, SCIO Website, 23 October 2018. 23. (授权发布) 习近平关于中共中央关于坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化若干重大问题的决定的说明 (Authorized for Release: «Xi Jinping: explanation for the ‘Central Committee CPC’s Decision on Adhering and Improving the Socialist System with Chinese Characteristics and Promoting the National Governance and the Modernization of Governance Capabilities’»), Xinhua, 5 November 2019.

32 China 2019 (1) on 5 January 2018, deliberately quoting the Great Helmsman, Xi Jinping affirmed that «in order to win the ultimate victory of the revolution, the CPC must be built through a nationwide, broad mass, ideologically and politically consolidated organization».24 Since taking power, Xi Jinping has initiated a challenging programme to reform the Party-state in China, while incurring increased criticism due to high degree of power centralisation generated by the integration of Party and state. In contrast with Deng Xi- aoping and his successors, who envisioned a clear separation of party and state institutions, Xi Jinping has focused on a massive and systematic reorganization of party-state relations, which has translated into the realization of an overly personalistic regime based on «the cult of Xi». Seemingly aware of a negative image that depicts him as the most authoritarian leader since Deng Xiaoping – if not Mao Zedong – Xi, in the course of his years in power, has heavily relied on the Chinese middle class to cement the consensus regarding the reforms that he was sponsoring and that are substantially modifying the political and institutional structure of China. In 2014, for instance, the Fourth Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee was presented through a precise political narrative to the Chi- nese population, and that was by combining populism with programmatic politics but within a framework in which the personality of a strong leader is key to China’s successful development.25 In October 2019, 202 CPC Central Committee members and 169 CPC Central Committee members attended the Fourth Plenum of the 19th CPC Central Committee. The official document approved during the session was titled Decision on Some Major Issues Concerning How to Uphold and Im- prove the System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and To Advance the Mod- ernization of China’s Governance System and Capacity for Governance (中共中央关于坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度，推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化若干重大问题的决定).26 The relevance of the document is represented by

24. 习近平推进党的建设新的伟大工程要一以贯之 (Consistently Promote New Great Project of Party Building) 求是 (Seeking Truth – People’s Daily Website), 2 Oc- tober 2019 (http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2019-10/02/c_1125068596.htm). 25. Kerry Brown, ‘The three «P’s» of the Fourth Plenum’, Asia Dialogue, 6 Oc- tober 2014. 26. ‘中共中央关于坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度，推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化若干重大问题的决定’, (Decision on Some Major Issues Concerning How to Uphold and Improve the System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and To Advance the Modernization of China’s Governance System and Capacity for Governance), People’s Daily Online, 6 November 2019. The document offers at first a general historical introduction presenting all the traditional elements as core leadership theories and major political guidelines followed by 13 sections listing the important elements deemed to be essential for understanding the functioning and working mechanism of a so-called socialist system with Chinese characteristics – but which also part of Xi’s core vision for China’s political and economic developmental path. These are, as listed in order of appearance: 1) the Party leadership system; 2) the political-institutional system of a socialist democracy; 3) the socialist legal system;

33 Silvia Menegazzi the significant turning point in Xi Jinping’s political narrative. Through the document, Xi signalled to the country his role as the only Marxist-Leninist commander in charge rather than the head of a collective leadership. In 2007, in the 17th Party Congress Communique, his predecessor, Hu Jin- tao, defined collective leadership as «a system with a division of responsibilities among individual leaders to prevent arbitrarily decision-making by a single-top leader».27 In the 2019 document, however, the relative ease with which it was reframed the role of the CPC Central Committee, «with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core», raises questions about China’s political system capacity to avoid the rise of strong authoritarian rules and practices in China.28 At the same time, from an analysis of official documents, it is evident that Xi Jinping’s most ambitious political objective is to transform the CPC and its bureaucratic environment into a more disciplined and politically loyal regime. China’s President has made Party’s discipline a centrepiece of his political agenda and has concentrated more power than any Chinese leader (except Mao) in his hands. In this process, governing the Party «with strict discipline» stands as a fundamental element to maintain the authority and unified leadership of the CPC Central Committee.29 Among the most important elements evinced in the document, it is worth mentioning the 9th section, which makes clear reference to the «Fengqiao Experience» (枫桥经验). Here too, the nostalgia of the Great Helmsman re-emerges, as this formula was widely used during Mao Zedong’s time to discuss the concept of class struggle before the eruption of the Cultural Revolution. More specifically it refers to a pilot program launched by Mao Zedong in 1963 in the Fengqiao District located in the Zhejiang Province. Better known as the «Four-clean-ups campaign» because of its targeted fields, i.e., political, economic, organizational and ideological, the program was a method created to control those considered as class enemies, but in fact a socialist education movement to turn the masses against the masses, as groups of citizens were in charge of monitor

4) the governance of the socialist administration; 5) the features of the socialist economic system; 6) socialist culture and ideology; 7) the system of ensuring people’s livelihoods across rural and urban areas; 8) improvements in social governance to safeguard national security; 9) the system of ecological civilization; 10) the absolute leadership of the CPC over the military apparatus; 11) the «One Country, Two Sys- tems» principle; 12) the independent foreign policy of peace and the building of a community of a shared future of mankind; and 13) the Party and State oversight system. The final section presents some concluding remarks on strengthening the Party’s leadership. 27. ‘以改革创新精神全面推进党的建设新的伟大工程’ (Advance the great new project of Party building with the spirit of reform), Guangming Daily, 29 September 2016. 28. ‘China Focus: CPC decision on system, governance released’, Xinhua Net, 5 November 2019. 29. An Bajie, ‘Xi urges Strict Party Discipline’, China Daily, 12 January 2018.

34 China 2019 (1) those subjected to surveillance.30 The «Fengqiao Experience», however, was discarded by Mao’s successors: Deng, Jiang and Hu. Not surprisingly, Xi Jin- ping has validated this term again, to denote the importance of the regime’s stability preservation in China at the expense of political reform.31 In addition, to augment his power and personal authority, Xi Jinping has not only promulgated new rules, but has also modified some foundational political documents in the history of the CPC, such as Several Principles of Political Life in the Party. According to Minxin Pei, this is part of Xi Jinping’s strategy to further reinforce personalistic politics in China, centralize the decision-making process, and extend the control of the CPC over state and society.32

2.3. Defence and security: Enhancing the absolute control of the party leadership As with the major changes that occurred in the sphere of political decision-making, defence and national security reforms in China are part of Xi Jinping’s strategy to increase political authority based on two main thrusts: first to emphasize his role in controlling the military sector and reinvigorating CPC’s power; second, to strengthen and intensify ideological control through absolute devotion to the Party in the national security and defence domains. This trend has been particularly evident in some of the structural changes conducted by the CPC in the domestic security context. Since Xi took office in 2012, changes to the organizational structure and the legal frameworks of the domestic security policy context and its apparatus were implemented to increase CPC’s control over the domestic security environment and society. The most significant changes were related to the establishment of new institutions: the Central National Security Commis- sion – 2013 (中央国家安全委员会), the National Supervisory Commission – 2018 (国家监察委员会), and the restructuring of the People’s Armed Forces 2017-2018 (中国人民武装警察部队). In parallel, new laws were also drafted: counter-espionage – 2014 (反间谍法); national security – 2015 (国家安全法); counter-terrorism – 2016 (反恐怖注意发); cyber-security – 2016 (网络安全法); management of foreign Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) – 2016 (境外非政府组织境内活动管理法) and national intelligence – 2017 (国家请爆发).33 Such measures and institutional adjustments were part of a political line aimed at consolidating Xi Jinping’s personal power over the internal coercive arm of the governing structure, including the military sector.

30. For a discussion of the Fengqiao Experience and its political meaning, see David Bandurski, ‘Xi Jinping, playing with fire’, China Media Project, 17 October 2013. 31. David Bandurski, ‘Xi Jinping, Playing with Fire’, China Media Project, 17 October 2013. 32. Minxin Pei, ‘Rewriting the Rules of Chinese Party-State: Xi’s Progress in Reinvigorating the CCP’, China Leadership Monitor, summer 2019, Vol. 60, 1 June 2019, pp. 1-9. 33. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, ‘Domestic Security in China Under Xi Jinping’, China Leadership Monitor, spring 2019, Issue 59, pp. 1-19.

35 Silvia Menegazzi

China’s military reform in 2019 followed the same trend and was marked by the publication, released by the SCIO in July 2019, of the New Defence White Paper (NDWP) – the first since Xi Jinping took office, titled China’s National Defence in the New Era. Even though Chinese white papers are mainly tools of propaganda, they deserve accurate reading because of the availability of information concerning guidelines for China’s leadership. The July paper starts with a presentation of China’s major challenges at the international level; goes on focussing on the Asia-Pacific security dimension; and concludes by analysing the intensification of military confrontation at the global level. Notwithstanding the relevance of the international dimension, what confers a particular importance to the 2019 white paper is its discussion in section IV of the «Reform in China’s National Defence and Armed Forces». There a detailed documentation on current structural reforms of the Chinese military system and its organs is available. Of particular interest is the paramount role assigned to the CMC, envisioned as the principal organ in charge of optimizing the reform in the leadership and command system. The CMC oversees a law-based supervision system through different organs: the CMC Discipline Inspection Com- mission (CMCDIC); the CMC Politics and Law Commission (CMCPLC); and a CMC Audit Office (CMCAO). The supreme role assigned to the CMC is strengthened by the autonomous control that the reform has given to it over the People’s Armed Police (PAP), which was previously exercised together with the State Council.34 The fact that the PAP has been placed under strict military control denotes Xi Jinping’s intention to gain direct hold of all China’s primary instruments of coercion. The reform of the PAP also implies further strict social and political control in highly problematic provinces, such as Tibet and Xinjiang. In this light, the focus on the role of the PAP as guarantor of internal stability also means increasing the defence of the Party against domestic unrest and opposition.35 Not surprisingly, media outlets in 2019 lamented the PAP’s presence in Hong Kong, with no official denials from the Beijing Government.36

2.4. Ideological education Since assuming office in 2012, Xi Jinping has demonstrated what could be defined as an obsession towards ideological education and political propaganda. In fact, it is no secret that Comrade Xi is one of the few Chinese leaders whose name appears alongside his own doctrine in China’s

34. ‘China’s Military Reform Helps to Ensure Political Stability’, SCMP Editorial, 11 January 2018. 35. Joel Wuthnow, ‘China’s Other Army: the People’s Armed Policy in an Era of Reform’, China Strategic Perspectives, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 16 April 2019, pp. 1-58. 36. ‘Exclusive: China Has Doubled Troop Levels In Hong Kong, Envoys Esti- mate’, Reuters, 30 September 2019.

36 China 2019 (1)

Constitution. «Xi Jinping Thought» (XJT) in China today is everywhere: in the Government and the media, schools and universities, think tanks, not to mention the Internet. The new doctrine is articulated in a few, extremely populist slogans: make China great again, rejuvenate the nation, the China Dream, etc. Xi Jinping’s doctrine also stresses the importance of a more powerful Party, as only a CPC firmly in charge can guarantee a unified and invincible China. For all these reasons, the paramount leader believes the ideological education of the elites and members of the Party of all ranks is a vital element of the party’s action. The Chinese Communist propaganda system and its ideological-educational reform have always played a central role in the CPC control system. However, with Mao Zedong’s death, China’s propaganda system atrophied and the Party-state’s control over the dissemination of educational contents weakened.37 With Xi Jinping, there has been an unprecedented revival, if not disentombment, of ideological education as a tool to educate –nay, condition – the Chinese population, especially the youngest, to support national ideology, the new leader and his doctrine. In 2014, Xi Jinping declared: «China’s educational institutions must have Chinese characteristics, a global vision and modern features».38 In 2016, he reaffirmed «the prominent role of philosophy and social sciences in building Socialism with Chinese characteristics».39 Recent studies have observed that ideology and politics in history textbooks in China are used today to consolidate CPC’s domination. It has been also noted that, in pursuing this goal, the promotion of Xi’s doctrine and authority has played such a growing role that is legitimate to think that an ideological transition is occurring. Ideological education in 2019 has affected all the most important sectors of Chinese society, from the ideological education of Party members to the patriotic education of the ordinary people. From this standpoint two documents, both issued in the year under analysis appear to be particularly relevant. The first is the 2019-2023 National Work Program for the Education and Cultivation of Party Members (herein the Program), issued on 11 Novem- ber 2019. Published by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee, the document consists of five parts: 1) a preamble (general requirements); 2) Xi Jinping’s Ideological Education and Training of Socialism with Chi- nese Characteristics in the New Era; 3) the main contents of education and

37. David Shambaugh, ‘China’s Propaganda System: institutions, Processes and Efficacy’, The China Journal, No. 57, 2007, pp. 25-58. 38. ‘深入学习贯彻习近平同关于教育工作的重要论述’ (In-depth study and implementation of Comrade Xi Jinping’s important discourse on education), Renmin Ribao, 10 September 2016. 39. ‘习近平：在哲学社会科学工作座谈会上的讲话（全文）’ (Xi Jinping: Speech at the Symposium on Philosophy and Social Sciences (Full Text), Xinhua News Agency, 17 May 2016.

37 Silvia Menegazzi training for Party members; 4) the methods of Party members’ education and training; and 5) organizational leadership and basic guarantees. The Program emphasizes Xi Jinping’s «Thought» as the most important political mission (政治任务). As such, all Party members, regardless of their grade, should take XJT as a compulsory course by studying its full content (Sec. 2, art. 2). Party cadres are also required to diffuse the study of XJT through a series of public lectures and learning forums, with the intention of further spreading the study of the new doctrine to the Chinese population (Sec. 2, art. 3). At the same time, the Program states clearly how the implementation of the study of XJT is directed towards all sectors of the Chinese society: from peasants (农村) to the urban population (接到社区); from state authorities (机关) to public institutions (事业单位) from private (非公有制经济组织) to social organizations (社会组织). Last but not least, particular attention is addressed to ethnic groups, whose members should of course also study XJT, while Party cadres in charge of ethnic policies must pay attention to how to shape and reinforce the study of XJT on the basis of ethnicity. The second document issued by the Xi Jinping administration, on 12 November 2019, and concerned with ideological education, is the Im- plementation Guidelines for Patriotic Education in the New Era (新时代爱国主义教育实施纲要) (herein the Guidelines). The document is divided into six parts for a total of thirty-four paragraphs. Worth mentioning here is part 3 titled «Patriotic education in the New Era is important for all but especially the youth». This part envisions young generations as the main target for patriotic education, even since primary and secondary schools (paragraph 15). Publications on patriotism must be implemented, specifically children’s books but efforts should be made in all sectors such as online literature, animation, audio books, mobile games, short-videos, etc. (paragraph 17). Similarly, students’ activities should also be strictly organized with the intent to boost patriotic sentiments, from visiting to memorial halls and volunteer services up to military training (paragraph 18). In its final part, the document stresses the role of Party Committees and governments at all levels to implement patriotic education. This should be carried out in synergy with Propaganda departments by following CPC guidelines (paragraph 32). What is clear from the document is therefore the Party’s commitment to cement nationalist sentiments in the Chinese younger generations, in all probability to prevent unpleasant episodes of rebellion against the Party as it happened in recent years outside mainland China. It should be noted that only few days earlier, on 27 October, another document related to ideological propaganda had been published in China, namely, the Outline for the Implementation of the Moral Construction of Citizens in the New Era (新时代公民道德建设实施纲要), released by the CPC Central Committee. The objective of the latter document was once again to promote patriotism with Chinese characteristics, this time intended as to strengthen citizens’ moral construction through the full support of a «Chinese spirit»

38 China 2019 (1)

(中国精神). Among the major tasks required to respect Chinese morality in line with XJT are a complete devotion to the Marxist ideology and So- cialist values, and a strong commitment to ancient traditions, particularly Chinese traditional values. The document once again emphasizes moral education and Party-politics education in schools, which is related not only to the educational system in general, but specifically to teaching materials. It is important to mention that the document considers the role of the In- ternet and the cyberspace as relevant to forging moral construction: more rules are needed in order to repress harmful behaviour online.40 The international media saw the publication of the document only few days ahead of the Fourth Plenum as a clear demonstration of Xi Jinping’s willingness to demonstrate his political authority against the backdrop represented by the severe international challenges faced by his administration, from protests in Hong Kong to the protracted trade war with the United States.41 More generally, patriotic education has always played a fundamental role in reinforcing Communist ideology in China. As observed by Suisheng Zhao 20 years ago, in the 1990s nationalism was used by the Chinese Com- munist regime to avoid a legitimacy crisis in Post-Tiananmen China. In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping launched a campaign to reassess Maoism; the result was the demise of the official ideology or the so-called «three beliefs crisis» (三芯危机): a crisis of faith in socialism; a crisis of belief in Marx- ism; and a crisis in the trust of the Party. Communist state sponsorship was therefore at the core of a massive ideological campaign, which made use of patriotic education to ensure loyalty in a population that was otherwise subject to national discontent.42 The current patriotic educational campaign is consistently aimed at rebuilding Communist ideals in line with Marxism-Leninism propaganda and Xi Jinping Thought. Yet it is also very much intended to educate the younger generations against separatism and foreign intrusion, whose dangers, in Beijing view, were exacerbated by the crisis in Hong Kong. Hence Beijing’s intention to forge patriotic education within the ex-British colony. The official document released by the CPC’s Central Committee after the Fourth Plenum announced the intention to extend education programs to Hong Kong, in order to cultivate «a national consciousness and patriotic spirit», especially among civil servants and the younger generations.43

40. ‘中共中央国务院引发新时代公民道德建设试试纲要’ (Implementation Out- line of Citizen Moral Construction in the New Era), Central Committee of the CPC, 27 October 2019 (http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-10/27/content_5445556.htm). 41. ‘Defend China’s Honour: Beijing Releases New Morality Guidelines for Citizens’, The Guardian, 28 October 2019. 42. Suisheng Zhao, ‘A State-led Nationalism: the Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 287-302, 1998. 43. Minxin Pei, ‘Beijing’s High Risk Endgame in Hong Kong’, The Japan Times, 18 November 2019.

39 Silvia Menegazzi

The lengthy Guidelines, published by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, are divided into six sections, with a total of 24 articles. In the preamble, patriotism is defined as: The national heart and soul of the Chinese people, the most important spiritual wealth of the Chinese people, and the strong spiritual driving force to safeguard national independence and national dignity. Patriotism is deeply rooted in the hearts of the Chinese people. It maintains the unity of all ethnic groups on the Chinese land and inspires generations of Chinese children to strive for self-improvement and unremitting struggle for the development and prosperity of the motherland. The Communist Party of China rests a firm advocate and practitioner of patriotism. The goal of patriotic education is therefore to tighten ideological control and follow party values, in order to «repoliticize» China’s educational system, but more generally, China’s youngest generations. To this end, official documents issued by the CPC Central Committee and the State Coun- cil, such as the Guidelines or the Program, were in line with other documents issued in parallel to promote nationalist sentiments in schools. An example is the document issued on 8 July 2019: Opinions of the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council on Deepening Education and Teaching Reforms and Improving the Quality of Compulsory Education (中共忠言国务院关于深化教育教学改革全面提高义务教育质量的意见).44 The documents discussed for the year under review therefore exemplify the relevance dedicated by the Xi Jinping administration to patriotic education in China. In a bid to achieve ideological unity, the selective publication of educational documents with strong nationalistic taste are intended to boost the party’s legitimacy over sensitive issues requiring the iron fist of the CPC.

3. China’s political economy in 2019

China faces numerous threats to its economic stability, among which figure the «middle-income» debt trap and an increasingly scarce reliability of the Chinese stock market conditions, as well as the consequences of the harsh trade war with the United States. Contrary to the positive domestic narrative about an unproblematic economic slowdown

44. ‘（授权发布）中共忠言国务院关于深化教育教学改革全面提高义务教育质量的意见’, (Authorized for release: Opinions of the Central Committee of the Com- munist Party of China and the State Council on deepening education and teaching reforms and comprehensively improving the quality of compulsory education), Peo- ple’s Daily Online, 23 June 2019.

40 China 2019 (1) in China, international economists and media outlets contend that Chi- na’s economic crisis is real and its economy has slumped now to its lowest level in nearly thirty years. To buffer the negative implications of an economic growth far from its heydays, the Chinese leadership announced in November 2019 a new industrial plan. The National Reform and Development Commission (NDRC) published on November 6 the «Catalogue for Guiding Industry Restructur- ing». It was a concise manual released as a guide for national and foreign enterprises as well as government agencies on how to deal with China’s intention to upgrade its industrial structure.45 In fact, China’s supply-side structured reform was launched several years ago, with the intent to support productivity improvements and tax reduction mainly targeting the private sectors. Only recently, however, stronger incentives were directed at increasing investment in the supply end to leverage the domestic market and stabilize the internal demand.46 Many believe that governance errors coupled with the scarce attention of Chinese decision-makers on the implementation of basic structural reforms reduced growth in the world’s bigger trader and second largest economy. On top of that, consumer spending slowed down, retail sales growth declined and factory output growth decelerated to unprecedented levels in 2019.47 In terms of key events, the year under review saw the Chinese Presi- dent Xi Jinping welcoming at the Second Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing (25-27 April) leaders from 37 countries and delegates from over 150 countries worldwide. The 35 specific economic corridors listed in the Joint Communique represented a strong message about the determination to expand the already ambitious geopolitical project from an economic-strategic point of view.48 Amidst growing discontent about China’s economic performance and its protracted deceleration, Xi Jinping and his economic advisors held on to the estimated growth of at least 6%. Still, there are more pressing issues to be addressed, as they are indicative of the inadequate reliability operated by the Xi administration in the field of economic governance. These concern the misinformation of Chinese Communist Party cadres and badly briefed politburo-level officials that within an authoritarian system as it is the one inherited by Xi often sacrifices local governments to safeguard central gov-

45. ‘China’s new industrial plan seems a lot like the old one’, Politico, 20 No- vember 2019. 46. ‘Economic Watch: China’s supply side structural reform fosters new growth engine’, Xinhua, 20 May 2019. 47. ‘China’s Economic Slowdown Deepens, Weighing on Global Growth’, The Diplomat, 18 October 2019. 48. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Joint Commu- nique of the Leaders’ Roundtable of the 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Coopera- tion’, 27 April, 2019.

41 Silvia Menegazzi ernment’s power and interests.49 Seemingly unworried about the ups and downs of the escalating economic tensions with the United States, Xi Jin- ping placidly chaired the annual three-day Central Economic Work Confer- ence (CEWC) in Beijing from 10 to 12 December. The Chinese President relied on the reassuring narrative of «achieving developmental progress on the basis of first ensuring stability».50 However, by emphasizing the importance to be prepared with contingency plans, he also affirmed that «while fully acknowledging our achievements, we must see that China is at a pivotal stage of transforming its growth model, improving its economic structure, and fostering new drivers of growth».51

3.1. A first look at macroeconomic data… In April 2019, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) issued the report OECD Economic Surveys: China 2019 for the year under review. The report recognizes China’s economic growth in the first quarter (Q1) as robust and considers the PRC as a main contributor to the world economy. The OECD report also acknowledges China’s rapid changes in economic development in the last decades: from a country in which the economy was mainly based on manufacturing production and capital accumulation to one in which today services represent a driving force for growth, such as the financial sector and digital services.52 Today, China is one of the fastest-growing e-commerce markets in the world and in 2019 total e-trade volume reached 40 trillion Yuan. The year under review is also particularly symbolic for the Chinese e-commerce sector, as it marks the 25th anniversary of China’s access to the Internet, and the 20th anniversary of Alibaba, a worldwide giant in the e-commerce industry. In the last five years, China’s population and territory faced substantial changes related to the transformation of its economy. For instance, there has been an exponential growth of so-called «Taobao villages»: areas where the e-commerce sector represents at least 10% of households actively engaged in e-commerce, with annual online sales of at least 10 million yuan. Data show that Taobao villages in China are a booming phenomenon as their number grew from 20 in 2013 to 3,202 in 2018.53

49. ‘China’s Xi Jinping has more to worry about than slowing economic growth’, Financial Times, 20 October 2019. 50. Yun Jiang & Adam Ni, ‘China 2020 Economic Agenda: Maintaining Stabil- ity Amid Flux’, China Brief, Vol. 19, Issue 22, 31 December 2019. 51. ‘China holds key economic meeting to plan for 2020’, Xinhua, 12 December 2020. 52. Margit Molnar & Patrick Lenain, ‘Where is China Headed? Five Key Insights from the 2019 OECD Economic Survey on China’, OECD Ecoscope, 16 April 2019. 53. The World Bank and Alibaba Group, E-commerce Development: experience from China, 2019.

42 China 2019 (1)

The IMF Economic Outlook, released in August 2019, also presented an evaluation of the Chinese economy. In the data exemplified by the six charts published online, China’s economy is again positively assessed, especially regarding the quality of growth. Overall, debt accumulation has slowed down, the financial system appears better regulated, and the current account surplus is no longer excessive. The report analyses Chinese economy across six main areas: 1) debt; 2) opening up; 3) lending framework; 4) balancing out; 5) household debt and 6) borrowers. Domestically, China still faces some difficulties related to an accelerated debt accumulation in the first quarter of 2019, as well as the rapid growth of household debt, which now exceeds the limit of emerging markets (55%). According to IMF estimates, increasing the role of the private sector at the expense of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is also necessary to improve credit allocation and limit SOEs advantage in accessing credit. Globally, China is still among the less open countries, compared with other G20 economies; in this regard, the IMF welcomed China’s BRI as a further stimulus to the Chinese economy, increasing cooperation, coordination and transparency with partner countries. China is also expected to further increase the internal market access to foreign competition, as well as reducing the share of credit going to SOEs. Notwithstanding the OECD and IFM basically positive assessments, the Chinese microeconomic data published by the National Bureau of Sta- tistics of China in the first quarter of 2019 show that the real performance of Chinese economy was poorer than expected. Not only statistical data revealed a decline in industrial growth, but also domestic demand and manufacturing production declined in the first quarter of 2019.54 To some observers, the major problems are caused by a lack of policy coordination between the local and the national level, and local governments’ preference for local interests above national interests.55 Overall, economic data on China show that, in recent years, the country’s performance has been astonishing. By 2014, China had overtaken the United States to become the world’s largest economy in purchasing-power-parity (PPP) terms. Only four years later, in 2018, China accounted for 16% of world GDP and today it is the second-largest economy in the world. However, objective difficulties still persist, which do not allow China to fully develop its global economic potential. According to the management consultancy firm McKinsey, notwithstanding that Chinese capital markets have hugely expanded, the financial system remains far from being fully glo- balized. For instance, in 2019, foreign ownership in the Chinese banking system accounted for only 2%. However, the greatest substantial limitation is the scarce availability of data flows between China and the world. Due to

54. Yu Zhongxin, ‘China’s Latest Economic Data Calls for Cautions’, The Dip- lomat, 22 May 2019. 55. Liu Zhiqin, ‘Opening-up Policies Need Firm Application’, Chongyang In- stitute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China, 4 December 2019.

43 Silvia Menegazzi the «Great Firewall» of China, data generated in China remain essentially in China, and this has important repercussions for generating information about China’s economic performance.56

3.2 …and then to China’s political economy in 2019 Although macroeconomic data remain very important in order to determine the performance of the Chinese economy, the role played by politics, and specifically by the CPC, in promoting China’s economic development is fundamental and cannot be underestimated. In fact, the implementation of economic policies is always driven by the CPC’s pragmatism and interests. At the time of Dengist reforms, when China’s policy was based on the reform of the economic system, but particularly on the opening to foreign trade, the Chinese government gave preferential treatment to foreign firms during the earlier stage of market reforms. It then became more discriminatory toward foreign enterprises when local firms acquired management and know-how and Chinese local firms no longer needed foreign expertise.57 Since Xi Jinping assumed office in 2012, he has maintained that China’s economic performance is primarily aimed at eliminating poverty, and secondly, at transforming China into a middle-income country.58 The Chinese political economy in the era of Xi Jinping appears trapped amidst a constant struggle to generate sufficient growth – that is, further improving living standards and employment opportunities for the Chinese population – and to enhance China’s economic capacity to defend its core interests as a global power.59 China’s political economy during the Xi Jinping era has been characterized by three distinct phases: a first phase (2012-2015), in which the anti-corruption campaign was conducted in parallel with the prosecution of a «new economic model», that is, market forces were deemed as the principal organizing principle for the allocation of resources in the economy; a second phase (2015-2018), characterized by the Chinese financial crisis, when authorities struggled first to manage a stock market bubble and then both state and private institutions were obliged, as part of the national team, to invest heavily to stabilize the market. As a consequence, Chinese private firms were strangulated by a heavy regulatory clampdown and capital control; furthermore, millions of citizens lost their

56. McKinsey Global Institute, ‘China and the World: inside the Dynamics of a Changing Relationship’, Full Report, July 2019. With the term «Great Firewall» of China is intended the virtual barrier that limits the flow and exchange of information enforced by the Chinese government to regulate the Internet. 57. Shaomin Li, ‘The Relocation of Supply Chains form China and the Impact on the Chinese Economy’, China Leadership Monitor, 1 December 2019. 58. ‘China Wants its Middle Class to Spend Big…But They Have Bills To Pay’, South China Morning Post, 13 October 2018. 59. Kevin Rudd, ‘China’s Political Economy into 2020’, Asia Society Policy Insti- tute, 11 July 2019.

44 China 2019 (1) savings and blamed the Party for this. The current third phase (2018-present) of China’s political economy is characterized by the recognition from China decision-makers of the country radically delayed growth and the resulting «package of reforms» needed to remedy this situation. This implies a full re-endorsement of the private sector, an acceleration of the reform of the financial sector, political recommitment to a systemic economic reform, the universalization of trade coupled with massive investment economic reforms; and a re-embracing of economic stimulus.60 To achieve its economic goals, China launched a series of reforms and regulatory changes that came into effect on 1 January 2019. The new individual income tax (IIT) reform is a clear example of such a trend, which follows China’s major transformation of its tax system reform, begun in 2018. The reform is intended to ease the tax burden for low-income earn- ers in particular, and to enhance the taxation equity principle and boost consumption, while combating the effects of rising living costs under fast economic growth.61 A second regulatory change concerns the e-commerce law and cross-border e-commerce regulations. The new law was drafted to improve the regulations of China’s booming e-commerce sector, as well as to extend the legal protection for consumers and brand owners. The new law is also intended to benefit consumers: if goods and services provided on an e-commerce platform violate customers’ rights and interests, the operator will be liable to the vendor and obliged to remedy the situation and protect its customers.62 Notwithstanding numerous efforts by leaders in office to raise the bar regarding China’s regulatory frameworks, with the scope to improve living conditions and economic opportunities for the Chinese population, other sectors, such as labour policy reform, have not yet achieved the desired results. According to a survey conducted by the Asia Society Policy Institute, in 2019 migrant and urban wage growth weakened, compared to GDP, in parallel with mounting labour shortages across China, together with a decline in government social spending. Furthermore, Beijing moderately reduced both employee-related expenses for companies and the costs of early education and basic medication for households. These policies are supposed to improve social welfare, although marginally, but appear insufficient to address the larger sources of labour market dislocation and inequality.63

60. Ibid. 61. ‘Spotlight on China’s Individual Income Tax Reform’, Eurobiz Online, 11 April 2019. 62. ‘Here’s how China’s New e-commerce Law Will Affect Consumers, Platform Operators’, South China Morning Post, 1 January 2019. 63. ‘Labour and Welfare Policy Reform’, Asia Society Policy Institute, Winter 2019.

45 Silvia Menegazzi

Conclusion

The year under review was characterized by two important institutional events: the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPP- CC), the National People’s Congress (NPC), and the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. In the military sphere, the year 2019 saw the publication of a New Defence White Paper (NDWP), the first since Xi Jinping took office in 2012. Although the paper has specific relevance in relation to China’s role in the context of global security, this article highlighted the relevance of the document in relation to the modernization and development of the military and police sectors and the Party’s role. This article has also pointed out how, during 2019, the Xi Jinping administration devoted clear efforts to reinforce political propaganda through the publication of numerous documents concerning ideological education. As far as China’s economy is concerned, this article has pointed out how economic growth was in line with expectations (between 6.1% and 6.5%) but decreasing in comparison with the previous year (6.6% in 2018). Although China’s GDP figures can still be considered as an indicator of robust and positive performance on the part of the world’s second largest economy, difficulties persist. How leaders in Beijing intend to tackle China’s current delayed growth and how the «package of reforms», needed to remedy the protracted economic crisis, will be articulated, particularly as far as the reform of the private and financial sectors, remain unclear. Finally, in the year under review, the deployment of China’s «New Era» ideology, as envisioned by Xi Jinping, provided the Party with the legitimacy to increase its control over institutions, ideology and economic performances. Yet, the Party’s legitimacy was not unquestioned.

46 China’s 2019: Xi Jinping’s tireless summit diplomacy amid growing challenges

Barbara Onnis

University of Cagliari [email protected]

The aim of this article is to analyse the developments in Chinese foreign policy in 2019, which can be summarised by two main trends. On the one hand a strong diplomatic activism by the Chinese paramount leader aimed at both deepening the tendencies that had become apparent in 2018 – the mending of fraught relations with some neighbours and the reassurance of some partners about Chinese intentions – and confirming Beijing’s vocation to the cause of peace and global governance. On the other hand, China had to face serious challenges to its leadership and its international reputation that risked seriously undermining Xi Jinping’s long-term plans. Above all, the protracted trade war and growing antagonism with the US was certainly the greatest challenge and fraught with consequences. On this basis, the article describes the major events that best represent both trends. The final part of the article is dedicated to the 2nd BRI Forum and the increasingly heated debate around the Initiative, both domestically and internationally.

1. Introduction

In the year under review China’s foreign policy was characterised mostly by two trends. One was strong diplomatic activism by President Xi Jinping who undertook seven overseas trips (four in June alone) and attended hundreds of bilateral and multilateral meetings. Its first aim was to continue and deepen the tendencies that had become apparent in 2018. In particular, the mending of fraught relations with some of China’s neighbours, notably India and Japan; the reassurance of some partners about Chinese intentions, as in the case of Europe and the EU in particular. A separate objective was represented by the visit to North Korea where Xi Jinping finally made his long-awaited first trip on 20-21 June, exactly a week before the G-20 summit in Osaka, when Xi was expected to meet with US president Donald Trump. The second aim was to confirm Beijing’s vocation to the cause of peace and global governance by hosting important global events, namely the 2nd Belt and Road Forum, the International Horticultural Exhibition, the Conference on Dialogue of Asian Civilization, and the 2nd China International Import Expo. Arguably the first of these was the most relevant diplomatic event of the year, which saw extensive consensus reached on promoting high-quality cooperation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Barbara Onnis

On the other hand, when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was preparing to celebrate its 70th anniversary, it faced serious challenges to its political leadership and international reputation. The year 2019 was in fact a very sensitive period because of the many politically delicate commem- orative anniversaries (from the May 4th Movement to Tiananmen), which caused some criticism and charges of alleged interference from the West. Apart from the protracted trade war with Washington which escalated into a full-on rivalry, and represented one of the main causes of China’s economic slowdown – in 2019 the economic growth reached its lowest rate since 1992 – months of protests in Hong Kong captured global attention and mobilised citizens to push back against Beijing’s influence over the former British colony. In November the publication in «The New York Times» of the so- called Xinjiang Papers, more than 400 pages of internal documents detailing PRC’s progressive mass detention of Muslims in the Xinjiang autonomous region, contributed to further embolden global critics. Because of these «converging crises», the year under review turned out to be a sort of «annus horribilis» for China.1 These challenges did not materialise out of the blue. In a speech on 21 January, at the Central Party School of the CCP, Xi Jinping himself sounded the alarm warning officials that, globally, sources of turmoil and points of risks were multiplying. Accordingly China had to be ready to face major risks (重大风险)2 on all fronts, comparable to «black swans» (黑天鹅) and «grey rhinos» (灰犀牛).3 Chinese worries had been amplified by what party journals warned was an increasingly hostile bloc of Western governments led by Washington aiming to «shake our ideological foundation, destroy people’s self-confidence and cohesion, and finally fundamentally subvert the leadership of the Communist Party and the guiding position of Marxism».4 In short China had to fight to protect the country’s «political security», preventing the spread of «colour revolutions» (颜色革命).5 According to Minxin Pei, the majority of the setbacks which occurred in 2019 had their roots in the period preceding Xi Jinping’s rise to power, but their escalation could be considered a direct result of PRC’s excessive

1. Minxin Pei, ‘Xi Jinping’s Annus Horribilis’, Project Syndicate.org, 16 Decem- ber 2019. 2. ‘习近平在省部级主要领导干部坚持底线思维着力防范化解重大风险专题研’ [Xi Jinping insists on bottom-line thinking at the provincial and ministerial level to focus on preventing and resolving major risks], Xinhuanet.com, 21 January 2019. 3. A «black swan» refers to a serious, unforeseen incident that defies conventional wisdom; while a «grey rhino» indicates a potential risk that is highly obvious but tends to be overlooked. Generally, the terms are used in investor jargon, indicating surprise economic shocks and financial risks hiding in plain sight. 4. Chris Buckley, ‘2019 Is a Sensitive Year for China. Xi Is Nervous’, The New York Times, 25 February 2019; 蔡晓红,李春华[Cai Xiaohong, Li Chunhua], ‘以«三个自信»筑牢意识形态安全屏障’ [Building ideological security barriers with «three confident»], 中国社会科学网 [Chinese academy of Social Sciences.com], 24 January 2019. 5. Ibid.

48 China 2019 (2) centralisation of power under Xi’s administration. For Pei, China’s former collective leadership, despite its corruption and indecisiveness, had managed to limit the escalation of these crises, thanks largely to their aversion to risk. Conversely, «Xi’s intolerance of dissent and vulnerability to bad information has made his government much more prone to policy blunders».6 That said, the biggest challenge China faced in 2019 was undoubtedly the fierce battle with the US for both trade and dominance over high technology, with the two countries apparently locked in a prolonged trade war, with «no end» in sight. Despite the existing tensions, on 13 December the two countries were able to reach an agreement on a «phase one» trade deal. It required structural reforms and other changes to China’s economic and trade regime in the areas of intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, currency and foreign exchange, which left China only partially satisfied. A second, though non-secondary, crisis, was related to the increasing criticism around the activities of the Confucius Institutes – one of the major soft power instruments of Chinese cultural and public diplomacy. They were accused of interference in the academic work of the host universities and, even worse, in the national security of the host countries. As a result of some specific events which occurred in the UK and Belgium, a heated debate spread around the world and reached countries with a long tradition of cultural ties with China. At the end of December, well-known Italian sinologist Maurizio Scarpari wrote a very harsh commentary, inviting the prestigious Venice University of Ca’ Foscari to set an example in Italy by closing its Confucius Institute. There is no doubt that PRC’s image and international reputation suffered a severe setback from these episodes and risked seriously undermining Xi Jinping’s long-term plans. Interestingly, most observers’ analyses emphasised how Xi Jinping’s triumphalism had receded in just one year, and offered mixed evaluations (tending to pessimism) in their year-in-review reports. Some analysts went so far as to argue that, given the evidence, 2020 would be even worse. In the following analysis the article explores the major events which occurred in both the aforementioned trends. The last part of the article will focus on the 2nd BRI Forum, which took place in Beijing from 25 to 28 April, and the increasingly heated debate around the Initiative, both domestically and internationally.

6. Minxin Pei, ‘Xi Jinping’s Annus Horribilis’. Reportedly, since Xi abolished the term limit on his presidency in 2018, murmurs of discontent have risen among academics, the business comaormer officials, despite censorship and the security police. See Chris Buckley, ‘2019 Is a Sensitive Year for China.’

49 Barbara Onnis

2. Xi Jinping’s strong diplomatic activism

2019 was a year of strong diplomatic activism for Xi Jinping, which produced notable achievements on different fronts, not only symbolically but also in substantial terms. In truth the total number of the overseas trips made by Xi was quite in line with the average number of foreign visits undertaken since his arrival in power. Strikingly, they were mostly concentrated in the month of June, when Xi also attended hundreds of bilateral and multilateral meetings. In some cases these trips were important «first times» for Xi Jinping; on other occasions, they represented a confirmation of the importance attached by Beijing to its bilateral relations. One of the key elements of Xi’s diplomatic activism has been the «personal component» in the conduct of international relations, which has always been a privileged tool for Chinese diplomacy and one that Xi Jinping has exploited with great intelligence. The destination of the first official trip of the Chinese president in 2019, from 21 to 26 March, was Europe. It was Xi’s second trip to Southern Europe in five months and the first state visit to Italy and France in ten and five years respectively. The two visits were part of a bigger European trip which also included a visit to Monaco, the first time a Chinese head of state has visited the Principality, while Prince Albert II has paid ten visits to China since 1993. A common topic during the visits to both Italy and France was the BRI. In Rome the two parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in the area of the Economic Silk Road and the Maritime Silk Road, making Italy the first G-7 country to formally back the BRI. It took place amid a heated debate, both internally and externally.7 The signing of the MoU for the BRI on 22 March was presented by the Italian government, in particular by the Five Star Movement, the driving force behind Italy’s collaboration in the BRI, as an opportunity to help Italy revive its sluggish economy by obtaining greater access to China’s huge market. But there were some discordant voices (including a component of the Italian government itself) that interpreted the agreement with China as a move going against both the European integration project and the traditional Euro-Atlantic alliance.8 Italy decided to sign the agreement in defiance of Washington’s loud warnings, according to which endorsing BRI would lend legitimacy to China’s predatory approach to investment and bring no benefits to the Ital- ian people, as well as the more quietly-voiced concerns from some countries in Europe.9 In particular, Brussels feared that the accord between Rome and

7. Teresa Coratella, ‘Italy’s China dilemma’, ECFR, 20 March 2019. 8. Angela Giuffrida, ‘Italy rattles US and EU with likely support for China’s Belt and Road’, The Guardian, 20 March 2019. 9. Nick Squires, ‘Italy to sign up China’s Belt and Road despite concern from allies’, The Telegraph, 6 March 2019; Vernon Silver & Sheridan Prasso, ‘Italy’s Em- brace of China’s «Belt and Road» Is a Snub to Washington’, Bloomberg, 19 March 2019.

50 China 2019 (2)

Beijing would deepen the divisions with member states wary of Beijing’s expansionist goals.10 France, one of the «heavyweights» of the EU, was one of the most vocal critics of the BRI, and only a month before Xi’s visit to France, Clement Beaune, adviser to French president Emmanuel Macron, had said: «Five years ago, the [EU] member states were still divided and naive in relation to China, now the time of naivety is over».11 On his arrival in France, Xi Jinping tried to reassure his French counterpart (and implicitly Brussels) pledging that China would continue to improve market access for foreign companies, would strengthen intellectual property protection, and would continue to open-up the economy. For his part, French President Emmanuel Macron, as reported by Xinhua, expressed a willingness to increase French cooperation on connecting to the BRI.12 The most substantial result of the bilateral meeting was the signing of 15 business contracts, including a € 30 billion deal for China to buy Air- bus aircraft.13 As part of the French visit, Xi had the occasion to meet also with German chancellor Angela Merkel and the EU Commission President, Jean-Claude Junker, as France pushed for a coordinated response to China. The leaders of China, France, Germany and the EU held in Paris «unprecedented talks» on building a new global governance, recognising that the challenge for Europe was how to balance ties in the face of Beijing’s growing global influence.14 The second overseas trip took Xi Jinping to Moscow at the beginning of June (5-8). It was Xi’s eighth visit to Russia and the twenty-first meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin since Xi’s rise to power, which gives an idea of the absolute relevance attributed to the bilateral relationship by Beijing. Actually, while Xi did not hesitate in defining Putin his «best friend among global leaders», and stating that the China-Russia relationship was «at its best in history», the visit represented the occasion to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the bilateral diplomatic relationship and upgrade the bilateral relations to a «comprehensive strategic partnership of coordi-

10. Exactly a week before the deal between Rome and Beijing was due to be signed, the European Commission released a joint statement on China’s growing economic power and political influence that underlined the need to «review» relations. ‘Italy joins China’s New Silk Road project’, BBC.com, 23 March 2019. On the Eu- ropean Commission statement, see European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, ‘EU-China: A strategic outlook’, 12 March 2019. 11. Keegan Elmer, ‘«The time of naivety is over»: Europe’s China problem is on the agenda at next European Commission meeting as states focus on competition’, South China Morning Post, 27 February 2019. 12. Lu Zhenhua, ‘Xi Jinping urges France to help build trust with China ahead of meeting with Germany and EU’, South China Morning Post, 26 March 2019. 13. Ibid. 14. ‘Xi, Merkel, Macron and Junker meet in Paris’, Deutsche Welle, 12 March 2019.

51 Barbara Onnis nation for a new era».15 China-Russia relations were actually one of the few bilateral relations mentioned in the White Paper released in September by the Chinese government, on the eve of the celebrations for the PRC’s 70th anniversary. Titled China and the World in the New Era,16 the paper confirmed the importance of the «Beijing-Moscow axis» for China’s foreign relations, despite their potential clash of interests in the Central Asian region.17 Central Asia was the destination of Xi’s third trip. From 12 to 16 June Xi visited Kirghizstan, to take part in the 19th SCO summit, and Tajikistan, to participate in the 5th summit of the Conference on Interaction and Con- fidence Building Measures in Asia. On each occasion Xi Jinping had the opportunity to meet with his counterparts. Both Kirghizstan and Tajikistan have very positive relations with China and are included in the BRI trajectory. In particular, China is the largest investor and trading partner of Bishkek and Chinese companies are carrying out several projects aimed at strengthening the infrastructures of the mountainous country. China and Kyrgyzstan signed a strategic partnership in 2018 and the meeting between the two presidents just before the SCO summit contributed to further strengthening the partnership. China is very active in Tajikistan as well. At the meeting with the Tajik president, Xi pledged China’s support and experience-sharing in the development of special economic zones, to make the Central Asian country more attractive to foreign investors.18 From 20 June Xi was in Pyongyang for a two-day state visit. It was his first official trip to the country since he came to power in 2012, and also the first visit of a Chinese president in 14 years. One week later Xi Jinping was in Japan – the first time for Xi and the first of a Chinese president in seven years – to take part in the G-20 group summit. Xi’s visit to Japan continued the positive trend in the personal relationship between the Chinese president and Abe Shinzō, begun the year before. The Osaka meeting followed Abe’s visit to Beijing in October 2018 – the first official visit to China by a Japanese leader in seven years – and a bilateral meeting in December on the side-lines of the G-20 summit in Argentina.

15. ‘China, Russia agree to upgrade relations for new era’, Xinhuanet.com, 6 June 2019. 16. The White Paper listed all the successes achieved by China in various fields, confirming the fundamental role played by the country on the world stage. Interest- ingly the Paper made reference to some Western authoritative sources to corroborate China’s results. See: The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, Full Text: China and the World in the New Era, 27 September 2019. 17. An interesting analysis of the state of the relations between the two parties, including potential clashing geopolitical interests in Central Asia, is offered by Na- dège Roland, ‘A China-Russia Condominium over Eurasia’, Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 61, 1, February-March 2019, pp. 7-22. 18. ‘Xi Jinping’s visit to Central Asia (1): Kyrgyzstan’; ‘Xi Jinping’s visit to Cen- tral Asia (2): Tajikistan’, Oboreurope.com.

52 China 2019 (2)

In autumn Xi made two further significant trips abroad. From 11 to 12 October he was in India for an «informal» summit with Narendra Modi in the southern coastal city of Chennai, the second in just over a year. The trip confirmed the importance of building personal relationships to address the trust deficit between the two countries and set out a clear blueprint for the long-term and strategic development of bilateral ties.19 Right after the Chennai summit, Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Ne- pal – the first of a Chinese president since 1996 – which resulted in the two sides signing 20 deals covering railway, port and energy projects, including a trans-Himalayan railway to connect the two countries.20 This was confirmation of the crucial importance the Himalayan country had for Beijing and the potential frictions the increasingly close Kathmandu-Beijing connection could cause between New Delhi and Beijing. Xi Jinping’s last tour abroad in the year under review, which was hailed by officials and observers as a major diplomatic success, included Greece and Brazil. According to the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Xi Jinping used his time in Greece to «cement ties with the European Union member, deepening pragmatic co-operation and exchanges between civilizations.»21 At the same time, he used the visit to stress the strategic significance of intensified relations between China and the EU, arguing that positive interactions and mutually beneficial co-operation were in line with their common interests. Despite the official rhetoric, it is worth mentioning that Greece is considered to be one of those states which China can use to gain access to the EU and its market, owing to Greek resentment towards the EU and its need for investments. It is no coincidence that Greece was among the first countries in the EU to sign an intergovernmental co-operation document with China aimed at promoting co-operation in the BRI. Moreover, in April, Greece joined the Sino-CEEC co-operation mechanism (the so-called 16+1 Format) as a full member, creating new opportunities for the development of the mechanism, as well as new potential frictions with Brussels.22 In Brazil Xi attended the 11th BRICS summit and took the opportunity to push for the strengthening of the strategic partnership within the bloc, encouraging its member states to jointly deal with the various risks and challenges, and to safeguard their national sovereignty, security and development interests. Xi also used the gathering to call for multilateralism in pursuit of world peace and common development as well as international fairness, justice and win-win co-operation. The BRICS leaders reiterated

19. Shi Jiangtao, ‘Xi Jinping’s trip to India and Nepal «was a much-needed win for China at critical time»’, South China Morning Post, 15 October 2019. 20. Ibid. ‘Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Visit to Nepal: Highlights, Agreements and Announcements’, Nepali Sansar, 15 October 2019. 21. Cao Desheng, ‘Xi’s visit to Greece and Brazil widely praised’, The Telegraph, 25 November 2019. 22. Ibid.

53 Barbara Onnis the fundamental importance of rule-based, transparent, non-discriminatory, open, free and inclusive international trade, stating their continuing commitment to preserving and strengthening the multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organization at its centre.23 At home, China hosted four important big events: (1) the second Belt and Road Forum for international cooperation, in April – arguably the most relevant one, and to which a specific paragraph is dedicated in this same issue of Asia Maior; (2) the International Horticultural Exhibition, the largest expo of its kind in the world, that reflected China’s vision of green and sustainable development and its unwavering commitment to improving the global environment; (3) the Conference on Dialogue of Asian Civiliza- tions, on 15 May, which served as a platform for dialogue and exchanges on an equal footing among Asian and world «civilizations»; (4) finally, the 2nd China International Import Expo, that took place in Shanghai from 5 to 10 November, with the participation of more than 3,800 enterprises from 181 countries and regions across the world. Focused on China’s achievements in economic development on the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the expo represented a clear confirmation of China’s openness for business.24 These events were all included among the diplomatic successes mentioned by Xi Jinping in his New Year Speech on 31 December, even if its focus was on the increased number of countries that had established diplomatic ties with China (180) and the fact that China had «friends in every corner of the world».25

2.1. China-India’s second «informal summit»: The growing understanding between Xi and Modi In October Xi Jinping reciprocated the informal visit Narendra Modi had made to Wuhan in April 2018, with another informal visit to the Indian southern coastal city of Chennai. Not unlike Modi’s visit to China, which took place when bilateral relations were strained because of the «Doklam

23. Ibid. For the ‘Declaration of the 11th BRICS Summit’ see http://brics2019. itamaraty.gov.br/en/2-uncategorised/109-declaration-of-the-11th-brics-summit. 24. ‘China in 2019: Diplomacy breaks new ground’, CGTN.com, 26 Decem- ber 2019. 25. ‘Full Text: Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2020 New Year Speech’, CGTN. com, 31 December 2019. Actually, in September, Beijing obtained two relevant diplomatic results since it began diplomatic relations with two tiny but «very significant» countries, namely the Solomon Islands and the Republic of Kiribati, that cut ties with Taipei within just a week of each other, leaving Taiwan with only 15 formal allies. See Kate Lyons, ‘Taiwan loses second ally in a week as Kiribati switches to China’, The Guardian, 20 September 2019; John Braddock, ‘Solomon Islands and Kiribati cut ties with Taiwan, shift to China’, World Socialist Web Site, 28 September 2019.

54 China 2019 (2) standoff»,26 Xi’s visit to India came at a time when bilateral relations were shaken by New Delhi’s drastic move to revoke the special autonomous status of India-administered Kashmir. That is why the majority of analysts – based on official statements released separately by the two sides – considered the Chinese president’s visit «more symbolic than substantial», as both leaders avoided sensitive bilateral topics (from frictions over Kashmir to the Chi- nese telecom giant Huawei 5G aspirations in India).27 As stated by Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research: «The summit was big on pomp, pageantry and nice sounding phrases but short on tangible results».28 Reportedly, during the meeting, the two leaders reaffirmed the pledge made at the Wuhan summit that both sides would prudently manage their differences and not allow differences on any issue to become disputes.29 According to Sun Shihai, an India expert at Sichuan University, it was not surprising that the Chennai summit failed to produce quick solutions to long-standing issues that for decades have hindered bilateral ties, and it would be unrealistic to expect breakthroughs, especially in their bitter territorial disputes in the remote Himalayan region, which saw a war in 1962 and a 70-day stand-off in 2017. Nonetheless Sun was convinced that the «personal rapport» formula was the best one, since it was useful to «address the trust deficit and set out a clear blueprint for the long-term and strategic development of bilateral ties».30 The fact that in Chennai, as reported by Indian Foreign Secretary Vi- jiay Gokhale, «the two leaders spent quality time, spending over five hours together of which all the time, except the 30 minutes of the cultural performance, were spent one-on-one […]», confirmed the importance of cultivating personal relations, and the relevance of the «informal summits».31 So, while for Xi Jinping the occasion offered the opportunity to have «candid discussions as friends» with Modi, for the Indian prime minister the Chen- nai meeting marked «a new era of cooperation between the two countries».32

26. On the Doklam standoff see Michelguglielmo Torri & Diego Maiorano, ‘India 2017: Narendra Modi’s continuing hegemony and his challenge to China’, Asia Maior 2017, pp. 285-88. 27. Rajesh Roy, ‘China’s Xi and India’s Modi Talk Up Trade, but Turn Aside Touchy Topics’, The Wall Street Journal, 12 October 2019. 28. Shi Jiangtao, ‘Xi Jinping’s trip to India and Nepal «was a much-needed win for China at critical time»’, South China Morning Post, 15 October 2019. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Kunal Purohit, ‘Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi bank on chemistry as they talk trade and terrorism’, South China Morning Post, 12 October 2019; Sidhant Sibal, ‘From «Wuhan Spirit» to «Chennai Connect»: PM Modi, Xi Jinping agree to continue positive momentum’, DNA India, 13 October 2019. 32. Shi Jiangtao, ‘Xi Jinping’s trip to India and Nepal ‘was a much-needed win for China at critical time’.

55 Barbara Onnis

Right after the summit with Modi, Xi Jinping paid a two-day state visit to Nepal – the first of a Chinese president since 1996 – where the two sides signed 20 deals covering railway, port and energy projects, including a trans-Himalayan railway to connect the two countries.33 While Indian analysts had mixed views and opinions about Xi Jinping’s visit to their country, they were quite critical of his trip to Nepal.34 In recent years New Delhi had been observing with increasing concern the strengthening of ties between China and Nepal. Sino-Nepali commerce had grown rapidly and, by the year under review, China had become Nepal’s top foreign direct investment partner.35 In Kathmandu, Xi upgraded China’s ties to a strategic partnership with a country that although symbiotically linked to India, in recent years has resented New Delhi’s heavy-handed interference in its internal affairs and, as a consequence, has been trying to countervail India’s overbear- ing influence by opening an alternative connection to the external world through China.36 By taking advantage of this situation, Xi Jinping appeared to give a clear demonstration of his continuing willingness to fortify China’s strategic position on India’s doorstep.37 The moves in Kathmandu had been preceded by Xi Jinping’s decision to host Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan in Beijing (Khan’s third visit in less than one year) on the eve of Xi’s own trip to India. The Xi-Khan meeting had among its objectives the discussion of the Kashmiri situation.38 If one bears in mind that Beijing had already supported Islamabad in raising the Kashmir issue at the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York at the end of September,39 it is clear that, despite Wuhan and Chennai, the relationship between the two Asian giants remained as fragile and unstable as ever.40

33. ‘Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Visit to Nepal: Highlights, Agreements and Announcements’, Nepali Sansar, 15 October 2019. 34. Wendy Wu, ‘Xi Jinping promises to step up Chinese support for Nepal as two-day visit concludes’, South China Morning Post, 13 October 2019. 35. ‘China’s Xi Jinping visits India with ties strained by Kashmir’, Deutsche Welle.com, 10 October 2019. 36. Michelguglielmo Torri & Diego Maiorano, ‘India 2015: The uncertain record of the Modi government’, Asia Maior 2015, pp. 396-401; Matteo Miele, ‘Nepal 2015-2017: A post-earthquake constitution and the political struggle’, Asia Maior 2017, pp. 309-330; Matteo Miele, ‘Nepal 2018: The Communist search for new political and trade routes’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 322-336 and Matteo Miele, ‘Nepal 2019: Attempts at mediation in domestic and foreign policies’, in this same Asia Maior issue. 37. Sisir Devkota, ‘The Strategic Stopover: President Xi’s state visit to Nepal, Modern Diplomacy, 16 October 2019. 38. Tom O’Connor, ‘China’s Xi supports Pakistan on Kashmir, boosts military ties ahead of meeting with India’, Newsweek, 10 October 2019. 39. ‘China supports Pakistan on Kashmir’, The News, 10 August 2019. 40. Kinling Lo, ‘Steer clear of India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, New Delhi warns Beijing’, South China Morning Post, 11 October 2019.

56 China 2019 (2)

2.2. Xi in Japan: Preparing the ground for a state visit At the end of June, Xi Jinping was in Japan to attend the G-20 group summit in Osaka. This was his first visit to Japan as PRC’s president and coincided also with the first visit of a Chinese president in nine years – after Hu Jintao’s visit to Japan in 2010. In Osaka, Xi and Abe had the opportunity to deepen their «personal relationship». Begun in 2018 as a direct consequence of the US policies under the presidency of Donald Trump, the Xi-Abe personal relationship had contributed to a relaxation of the strained relations between their two countries. As stated by Da Zhigang, director of the Institute of Northeast Asian Studies at the Heilongjiang Province Acad- emy of Social Sciences, «as another victim of U.S. protectionism and unilateralism, [Japan] shares common interest with China, and pressure from the U.S. might bring a new driving face for China and Japan to establish a new pragmatic’s relationship for the new situation».41 The Osaka G-20 summit took place «amid a complex global situation», declared Xi Jinping during the bilateral meeting with Abe, apparently referring to the US-China trade war and the US administration’s growing unilateralism; in these circumstances the two Asian leaders agreed to safeguard multilateralism and the free trade system and build an open world economy. In particular, Xi proposed to Abe that the two countries achieved «close communications on various challenges and forge[d] a common understanding»; Xi also called for the two countries to work together to «maintain a free trade system» and «give predictability and fresh energy to the global economy».42 Abe concurred but urged the Chinese President to ensure that trade took place on a sustainable basis by refraining from forced technology transfers or the provision of subsidies to industries. He also stressed that trade disputes needed to be resolved through dialogue. As Asian economic powerhouses, the two countries shared the responsibility to join hands to promote regional stability and prosperity, especially in a context where the multilateral trading system was increasingly under attack. That said, one of the most important goals reached in Osaka by Xi Jinping was the formal invitation Abe offered to him at the beginning of their bilateral meeting to visit Japan the following year. «We would like to welcome President Xi as a state guest around the time of the cherry blos- soms next spring and wish to take Japan-China relations to a higher level».43 Reportedly, Xi responded immediately, saying the invitation was «a good idea».44 Abe’s invitation was a definitive demonstration of improved ties be-

41. Obe Mitsuru, ‘Xi and Abe inch closer under Trump’s «America First» pressure’, Asia Nikkei, 28 June 2019. 42. Ibid. 43. Walter Sim, ‘Japan and China vow to be «eternal neighbours»’, The Straits Times, 28 June 2019. 44. Li Xuanmin, ‘Xi agrees to pay state visit after meeting with Abe’, The Global Times, 28 June 2019.

57 Barbara Onnis tween the two neighbours, and certainly contributed to the opening of a new chapter between the two Asian economic superpowers.45

2.3. China-EU: A fluctuating relationship In 2019 China-EU relations were characterised by an evident fluctuating trend, a direct consequence of some «open issues» between the two parties (the BRI, the 16+1 Format, human rights) and the persisting variable represented by the US. The fact that Xi Jinping opened and closed his annual overseas trips in Europe was emblematic of the relevance of Europe (and the EU in particular) for China. Furthermore, the positive conclusion of the XXI China- EU summit, held in Brussels on 9 April, confirmed the intention to further strengthen the bilateral strategic partnership. Despite the difficulties of the negotiations, the two parties agreed a joint statement setting the direction of their partnership based on reciprocity, as remarked by Donald Tusk, at the end of the summit. In the joint statement the two parties referred to their joint support for multilateralism and rules-based trade; their joint engagement to reform the World Trade Organization, and the agreement to work together to address the industrial subsidies’ issue, the climate change threat, among others.46 In Brussels the two parties also agreed to create syn- ergies between the BRI and the EU’s initiatives aimed at improving Europe- Asia connectivity. That said, the Summit was preceded by the publication of a document by the EU commission where, depending on the policy areas, China was simultaneously and rather contradictorily defined: «a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives»; «a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests»; «an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership» and «a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance».47 This, together with the controversies that preceded and followed the signing of the Italia-China MoU and the 16+1 Format meeting in Dubrovnik, Croatia on 12 April, which registered the new membership of Greece – an evident demonstration of China’s persistent divide et impera strategy – underlined the «highs and lows» of the relations between Beijing and Brussels. In fact some scholars examined closely the «strategic» nature of the EU-China relations and even their existence.48

45. Reiji Yoshida & Tomohiro Osaki, ‘Underlining improved Japan-China ties, Abe and Xi meet ahead of G20 summit’, Japan Times, 27 June 2019. 46. Council of the European Union, EU-China Summit Joint Statement, Brussels, 9 April 2019. 47. Joint Communication to The European Parliament, The European Council and The Council, EU-China – A strategic Outlook, 12 March 2019, p. 1. 48. For a brief account of the debate, see Barbara Onnis, ‘Cina-Unione Eu- ropea e la prospettiva di un nuovo ordine internazionale’, Rivista Italiana di Studi Internazionali, vol. 2/2019, pp. 265-294.

58 China 2019 (2)

In the year under review the bilateral relationship experienced some tensions related to the human rights issue, with Beijing accusing Brussels of intermittent interference in its domestic affairs. Particularly jarring for Bei- jing was the adoption, by the European parliament, of the resolution calling for the Hong Kong government to formally withdraw its highly unpopular extradition bill, just hours after Beijing accused the motion of being full of «ignorance and prejudice». Equally disturbing for China was the Europe- an parliament’s condemnation of the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.49 Adding fuel to the fire, the Xinjiang resolution was approved following the presentation by the EU parliament of the 2019 Sakharov prize – its top human rights award – to the jailed Uyghur economist Ilhalm Tohti, for «fighting for the rights of China’s Uyghur minority» in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.50 Yet it would appear that China was unsuccessful in its attempt to reassure the EU about its intentions, and indeed the bilateral ties remain quite unstable.

2.4. Xi in North Korea: «All style, no substance» Xi Jinping’s state visit to North Korea from 20 to 21 June was the first since he assumed office in late 2012 and the first by any Chinese president since 2005. Xi’s visit followed four visits by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in China in 2018, apparently confirming a definitive «return to normal» between the two neighbouring countries and historical allies, and reflecting, in the words of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, «a deep and profound friendship» of both parties.51 Interestingly, the visit had been expected at some point during the year under review, but was then apparently arranged quickly so that the Chinese leader could use it as leverage with the US President a week later in Osaka, where the two were scheduled to meet.52 This gave rise to speculation of its real significance. The visit was preceded by a rare article written by the Chinese president himself, which appeared on the front page of the North Korean ruling

49. Sophia Yan, ‘China criticises foreign interference as Hong Kong braces for further protests over extradition law’, The Telegraph, 11 June 2019; Teddy Ng & Stuart Lau, ‘European Parliament approves motion on Hong Kong, as Beijing calls it «full of ignorance and prejudice»’, South China Morning Post, 18 July 2019; ‘European Parlia- ment Passes Resolution Condemning China on Treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang’, Radio Free Asia, 19 December 2019. 50. Jailed Uighur economist Ilham Tohti receives Sakharov Prize’, Al Jazeera, 18 December 2019. 51. Shannon Tiezzi, ‘Xi’s North Korea Visit: All Style, No Substance?’, The Dip- lomat, 22 June 2019. 52. Jane Perlez, ‘Xi Jinping Arrives in North Korea, With Many Eyes on Trump’, The New York Times, 20 June 2019.

59 Barbara Onnis party’s official newspaper, «Rodong Sinmun». In the article, titled «Let us continuously engrave a new chapter of the era inheriting the friendship of China and the DPRK», Xi, without giving details, wrote that China was willing to draw up a «grand plan» with North Korea, which would «realize permanent peace» on the Korean Peninsula.53 According to Minyoung Lee, a senior analyst with NK News’s sister site «NK Pro», it was the first time that a visiting Chinese president or CPC general secretary had contributed an article to North Korea’s party daily, and this, taken together with the rare «state visit» status accorded to Xi’s visit, underscored the significance that the two sides were attaching to the event.54 In Minyoung Lee’s opinion, Xi’s article indicated that China wanted to use the visit to further elevate DPRK- PRC relations and maintain or even expand its role in Korean affairs.55 Many other observers noticed, instead, that Xi’s state visit to Pyongyang was «all pomp and circumstances». Apart from the sumptuous welcome offered by Kim to Xi Jinping and his wife, in fact there was no flurry of business, trade deals or signing of Memoranda of Understandings, that usually accompanied the Chinese President’s normal visits abroad. The main reason could be found in the fact that, since the UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea were still in force, any public business would risk catching Beijing out as a sanction violator. A second reason might be found in the comprehensible reluctance on the Chinese side to invest in North Korea, given the slow progress of previously agreed-upon projects, like the special economic zones along the Sino-North Korean border, and the dramatic experience with Jang Song Taek.56 That said, the only concrete takeaway was that the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to find a political solution to longstanding issues on the Korean peninsula.57 Speaking alongside Kim, Xi pointed out that «the international community hopes that talks between the DPRK and the United States will move forward and bear fruits».58 In the opinion of Wang Sheng, a professor at the Jilin University in Changchun, Xi’s visit to North Korea was very timely, since it could facilitate denuclearisation in the Ko- rean peninsula. The Chinese president was due to hold talks with US president Trump and South Korean leader Moon Jae-in at the upcoming G-20 summit in Japan.59 In short, the visit served to send a dual message to the rest of the world: on the one hand it was about the unbreakable friendship

53. Dagyum Ji, ‘In rare article for N. Korean party daily, Xi offers «a grand plan», NK News.com, 19 June 2019. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. On the Jang Song Taek case, see Marco Milani & Barbara Onnis, ‘La peni- sola coreana: tra «facce nuove» ed un continuo déjà vu’, Asia Maior 2013, pp. 378-381. 57. Shannon Tiezzi, ‘Xi’s North Korea Visit: All Style, No Substance?’. 58. ‘Xi says China supports political settlement of Korean Peninsula issue’, Xin- huanet, 20 June 2019. 59. ‘Xi Jinping arrives in North Korea’, DW, 20 June 2019.

60 China 2019 (2) between China and North Korea, as Xi was preparing to meet the US president in Japan;60 on the other hand the visit reiterated China’s intention to stabilise the situation in its neighbourhood. Andrei Lankov, a well-known Russian specialist in North Korean studies, considered Xi’s decision to visit Pyongyang as being merely symbolic, as the Chinese president envisaged playing the «middle man» between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump over the stalemate in trade talks. For Lankov it did not signal any new warmth in China’s relations with North Korea.61

3. China-US: The protracted trade war and the full-on rivalry

Arguably, one of the major challenges that China’s foreign policy had to face in 2019 was the escalating tensions with the US. Being locked in a prolonged trade war was proving to be costly for both countries. At the same time it was increasingly evident that the trade war was not (only) about trade, but rather about technological dominance. China and the US had the opportunity to end the trade war in May if Beijing had accepted the 150-page draft trade deal prepared by the Trump administration in five months. But at the last minute, China backtracked on a number of issues the American negotiators had considered settled. The Chinese wanted the US draft to be reduced to 105 pages, stating that the original version was comparable to «an unequal treaty».62 In each of the seven chapters of the draft trade deal, China deleted its commitment to change laws to resolve core complaints, which had first led Washington to start a trade war, namely the theft of US intellectual property and trade secrets; forced technology transfers; competition policy; access to financial services; and currency manipulation. With the US also incurring high costs as a result of the trade war, President Donald Trump reacted not only by imposing new tariffs, but also escalating his efforts to limit China’s access to vital technologies. Less than two weeks after the trade deal collapsed, Trump signed an executive order,63 declaring a national emergency and barring US companies from using telecommuni-

60. Jane Perlez, ‘Xi arrives in North Korea, With Many Eyes on Trump’, The New York Times, 20 June 2019. 61. Ibid. 62. Jen Kirby, ‘US-China trade talks end with no deal — and more tariffs’, Vox. com, 10 May 2019; David Lawder, Jeff Mason & Michael Martina, ‘Exclusive: China backtracked on almost all aspects of U.S. trade deal – sources’, Reuters, 9 May 2019. 63. «The executive order invokes the International Emergency Economic Pow- ers Act, which gives the president the authority to regulate commerce in response to a national emergency that threatens the United States. The order directs the Com- merce Department, working with other government agencies, to draw up a plan for enforcement within 150 days», Zak Doffman, ‘Trump Signs Executive Order That Will Lead To U.S. Ban On Huawei’, Forbes, 15 May 2019.

61 Barbara Onnis cations equipment from manufacturers that his administration deemed a national security risk.64 Among those manufacturers, the most prominent was the Chinese tech giant Huawei, which Trump had been targeting for months, as the arrest of Meng Wenzhou in December 2018 clearly demonstrated.65 Moreover, the US Commerce Department placed Huawei and 70 of its affiliates on a so-called «Entity List», which was basically a blacklist that prevented the Chinese companies from purchasing US tech without government approval.66 At the same time, the Trump administration launched an aggressive campaign warning other countries not to use Huawei equipment to build 5G networks, claiming the Chinese government could use the company for spying activities.67 Despite tensions over the failure to agree, in late June, top Chinese and US trade negotiators held a secret meeting on the side-lines of the G-20 Summit in Osaka. The meeting took place at a prestigious hotel where the US delegation, led by the president himself, was staying, on the eve of the long-awaited meeting between the Chinese and the American presidents. The two countries’ negotiators paved the way for a temporary truce in the trade war and in December they were able to reach what they called a «phase-one» trade deal. The partial agreement came after China accepted many of the US requests.68 Reportedly, neither Saturday’s prime time news programme on state-run «China Central Television» nor the Sunday edition of the «People’s Daily» dedicated a word to it, despite the media fanfare in much of the rest of the globe, clearly showing the limited satisfaction on the Chinese side.69 In the meantime, the hostility continued on other fronts. After China’s Central Bank let the yuan weaken significantly amid the ongoing trade tensions, the Trump administration labelled China a «currency manipulator».70 The designation, applied to China for the first time since 1994, was mainly symbolic but it came less than a week after the US president announced new tariffs for Chinese imports as a direct consequence of the failed agreement

64. The White House, Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communi- cations Technology and Services Supply Chain, 15 May 2019. 65. See Barbara Onnis, ‘China’s Foreign Policy in 2018: Implementing the China Dream’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 43-68, esp. pp. 60-61. The issue is not resolved yet, as the extradition trial is still ongoing. 66. David Shepardson & Karen Freifeld, ‘China’s Huawei, 70 affiliates placed on U.S. trade blacklist’, Reuters, 16 May 2019. 67. Julian E. Barnes & Adam Satariano, ‘U.S. Campaign to Ban Huawei Over- seas Stumbles as Allies Resist’, The New York Times, 17 March 2019. 68. Shawn Donnan, Miao Han & Jenny Leonard, ‘U.S., China Reach Phase- One Deal, Easing Trade Tensions’, Bloomberg, 13 December 2019. 69. Katsuji Nakazawa, ‘Did Xi surrender to Trump? China struggles to silence chatter’, Asia Nikkei, 19 December 2019. 70. Donna Borak, ‘Trump administration labels China a currency manipulator’, CNN.com, 5 August 2019.

62 China 2019 (2) in May. Beijing’s Central Bank firmly rejected the US Treasury’s designation stating that the accusation could trigger financial turmoil.71 Amid all these events, China did not miss the occasion to openly criticise the US for its destabilising role. Two specific cases deserve to be mentioned here. In its new defence paper titled China’s National Defense in the New Era – the first since Xi Jinping began a major military overhaul in 2015 – China accused the US of undermining global stability, by stating that it had provoked competition among major countries. «International security system and order are undermined by growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism and constant regional conflicts and wars», declared the defence paper.72 Its language represented a departure from the previous report, which focused on efforts to improve military-to-military cooperation between the two countries. According to MIT professor M. Taylor Fravel, author of Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949, the 2019 defence paper «was the first to be much more explicit about Chinese concerns regarding the United States», clearly reflecting the deepening of the tensions and rivalry between Beijing and Washington.73 In the same vein, in early December, in a quite unusual move, the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs joined Twitter to accuse the US of being a «SUPER LIAR» (referring to the latter’s remarks on human abuse against the minority Uighurs), a move that, according to some observers, showed China’s nervousness.74 Despite everything, China continued to recognise that the China-US relationship was one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world, even if it was (and still is) living through the most complex and sensitive period since diplomatic relations were formalised in 1979. According to Xi «There are 1,000 reasons to make China-U.S. relations work, but not a single reason to derail them».75 Apparently this was also the view of an important component of American well-educated public opinion. On 3 July «The Washington Post» published an open letter addressed to the US president and the US Congress, written by five well-known scholars, including MIT Professor M. Taylor Fravel, former American Ambas- sador to China J. Stapleton Roy, senior Carnegie Endowment for Interna- tional Peace Fellow Michael D. Swaine, former Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Susan A. Thornton, and Har-

71. Sam Meredith, ‘China responds to US after Treasury designates Beijing a «currency manipulator»’, CNBC, 6 August 2019. 72. The State Council Information of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in the New Era, 24 July 2019, p. 3. 73. ‘China Says the U.S. is Undermining Global Stability’, Bloomberg, 24 July 2019. 74. Lily Kuo, ‘China’s leaders seeking to «draw strength from weakness» in 2020’, The Guardian, 28 December 2019. 75. Quoted by Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng, ‘China’s Foreign Policy in a Fast Changing World: Mission and Responsibility’, Speech by Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng at the Lunch Meeting of the Eighth World Peace Forum, 8 July 2019.

63 Barbara Onnis vard University Professor Emeritus Ezra Vogel. It was signed by 100 well- known figures from various fields to voice their concerns about the country’s current policies towards China. Entitled «Making China a U.S. enemy is counterproductive», the letter articulated seven issues which the authors had with current American policy towards China. It ended by stressing that «there is no single Washington consensus endorsing an overall adversarial stance toward China, as some believe exists.»76 As expected, China reacted positively to such a move by American scholars. However, the government’s response came indirectly a few weeks later as the Ministry of Commerce was responding to another open letter signed by more than 100 Americans (mainly veterans and former intelligence officers) to US president Donald Trump, which called on the US government to stay the course on the path of confronting China. According to Gao Feng, spokesperson of the Ministry of Commerce, the letter «is full of hegemonic thinking and Cold War mentality, defames and discredits China’s domestic and foreign policies, incites “decoupling” of the two economies and provokes confrontation and conflict between the two countries.»77 In Gao’s opinion: «From the different reactions by the media and people of the two countries in response to the two letters, it can be seen that inciting confrontation between China and the United States is not supported by the majority of the U.S. public,» while «promoting win-win cooperation between the two countries accords with the wishes of the people».78

4. China’s reputation at risk: The Confucius Institutes «under attack»

According to Adam Ni – co-editor of «China Neican», a Newsletter on Chinese power, and China researcher at the Department of Security Stud- ies and Criminology at Macquarie University in Australia – 2019 was a very bad year for China’s international reputation across a whole range of fronts. Months of protest in Hong Kong captured global attention and mobilised Hongkongers against Beijing’s influence over the former British colony. In November two major leaks of classified government documents detailing PRC’s progressive mass detention and abuse of Muslims in Xinjiang (the so-called Xinjiang Papers), considered «reliable» by the United Nations,79 further emboldened global critics, and in some countries the Confucius In- stitutes were under attack for being perceived as a national security threat.

76. Taylor Fravel et.al., ‘China is not an enemy’, The Washington Post, 3 July 2019. 77. ‘China’s commerce ministry responds to U.S. open letter on confronting China’, Xinhuanet, 26 July 2019. 78. Ibid. 79. Human Rights Watch, UN: Unprecedented Joint Call for China to End Xinjiang Abuses, 10 July 2019.

64 China 2019 (2)

As this same issue of «Asia Maior» contains two more articles dealing with China’s domestic politics as well as Hong Kong, attention is focused in this article on the Confucius Institutes. The Confucius Institutes are officially a bridge between China and the rest of the world, promoting China’s culture and language, and, de facto, one of the major soft power instruments of Chinese cultural and public diplomacy. In the year under review, though not for the first time, they have often been the subject of heavy criticism for their alleged political interference in host universities. The debate has been going on since the so-called Braga incident in the summer of 2014, on the occasion of the 20th biennial Conference of the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) held in Portugal, between Braga and Coimbra. At the time, the local Confucius Institute, by means of the Hanban Director Xu Lin, asked for the removal of the pages referring to Taiwanese academic institutions (the prestigious Jiang Jing Kuo Foundation among others) from the list of the conference organisers, included in the published programme. Xu claimed in fact that the information was «contrary to Chinese regulations».80 Such a move was described by «The Wall Street Journal» as the «bullying approach to academic freedom»,81 and as a direct consequence of this episode some Ameri- can universities, namely the University of Chicago and the Pennsylvanian State University, left the network of the Confucius Institutes.82 In December 2014, the Stockholm University, the first university in Europe to host a Con- fucius Institute, also announced its decision to terminate the programme.83 In relation to the year under review, some specific cases deserve to be mentioned. In the United Kingdom a report released by the British Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee at the beginning of November, just before the suspension of parliament for the December general elections, found «alarming evidence» of China’s interference on UK campuses. The report indicated that these activities appeared to be coordinated by the Chinese embassy in London,84 and accused China of infiltrating university campuses across the United Kingdom and threatening academ-

80. ‘Adam Minter, ‘China’s Soft Power Fail’, Bloomberg, 8 October 2014. 81. ‘Beijing’s Propaganda Lessons. Confucius Institute officials are agents of Chinese censorship.’, The Wall Street Journal, 7 August 2014. An interesting analysis of the topic is offered by Christopher Hughes, ‘Confucius Institutes and the university: distinguishing the political mission from the cultural’, Issues and Studies, 50 (4), 2014, pp. 45-83. 82. Elizabeth Redde, ‘Chicago to close Confucius Institute’, Inside Higher Ed, 26 September 2014; Elizabeth Redden, ‘Another Confucius Institute to close’, Inside Higher Ed, 1 October 2014. 83. Elizabeth Redden, ‘Stockholm University to close Confucius Institute’, 5 January 2015. 84. Patrick Wintour, ‘«Alarming» Chinese meddling at UK universities exposed in report’, The Guardian, 5 November 2019.

65 Barbara Onnis ic freedom.85 In particular, the committee in charge of the report highlighted the role of China-funded Confucius Institutes’ officials in con- fiscating papers that mentioned Taiwan at an academic conference (the above mentioned 20th biennial Conference of the European Association for Chinese Studies), the use of the Chinese Students and Scholars Asso- ciation as an instrument of political interference, and produced evidence that dissidents active while studying in the UK were being monitored and their families in China harassed.86 The UK case was not an isolated one.87 In Australia a task force was formed to crack down on foreign governments’ attempts to meddle in Aus- tralian universities, as concerns grew over Chinese influence.88 But the apex was reached in December when a Belgian university (the Vrije Universiteit Brussel) decided to close its Chinese state-funded Confucius Institute after Belgian security services accused Song Xinning, former head of the Insti- tute of the University, of being a recruiter for Chinese intelligence.89 As a consequence of these events, a heated debate spread around the world and reached countries with a long tradition of cultural ties with China. In 2006 Italy became one of the first European countries to host a Confucius Institute (the Confucius Institute at the University of Rome «La Sapienza» was the first one established in Italy and the second in Europe). As already noted, at the end of December Italian sinologist Maurizio Scar- pari wrote a very explicit article inviting the prestigious Venice University of Ca’ Foscari to promote a policy less dependent on external influences and set the example in Italy by closing its Confucius Institute.90

5. China and the BRI: The 2nd Belt and Road Forum

The 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF), focused on the theme «Belt and Road Cooperation: Shaping a Brighter Shared Future», was one of the key diplomatic events in 2019. It took place in Beijing from 25 to 28 April and was attended by 36 heads of state or gov-

85. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, A cautious embrace: defending democracy in an age of autocracies, Second Report of Session 2019, Report, HC 109, 5 November 2019. 86. Patrick Wintour, ‘«Alarming» Chinese meddling at UK universities exposed in report’. 87. Gordon Watts, ‘How China infiltrates colleges across the globe’, Asia Times, 8 November 2019. 88. Rod McGuirk, ‘Australia tries to curb foreign interference at universities’, AP News, 28 August 2019. 89. Stuart Lau, ‘Belgian University closes its Chinese state-funded Confucius Institute after spying claims’, South China Morning Post, 11 December 2019. 90. Maurizio Scarpari, ‘Ca’ Foscari dia l’esempio: sia il primo Ateneo a fare uscire l’Istituto Confucio’, Il Corriere della sera, 19 December 2019.

66 China 2019 (2) ernment. Its works, however, unfolded in a context of growing scepticism, especially in Europe, on China’s lack of respect for international standards and on the alleged «debt trap diplomacy» practised by Beijing, which left some small countries in precarious financial situations due to their incapac- ity to repay Chinese loans. Prior to the Forum, Yang Jiechi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), and director of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, who oversaw the preparations of the event, released an interview to the CPC mouthpiece «People’s Daily» at the end of March. Yang talked about the progress in pursuing Belt and Road cooperation and stressed the fact that since its inception the BRI had received strong endorsement and warm support from the international community.91 He pointed out that the BRI vision had been included in documents of major international institutions, including the United Nations, the G-20, the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Shanghai Co- operation Organization. Yang quoted World Bank studies to demonstrate that the BRI had created new impetus and opportunities for global growth. At the same time, he took the opportunity to reject accusations that Beijing was using the BRI as a «geopolitical tool» that left its partners in financial difficulty. «No country has been left in a debt crisis after taking part in the Belt and Road plan. […] Quite the contrary, it is through cooperation that many countries have got out of the ‘no development’ trap».92 Yang’s comments followed and countered US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s declarations about his being «saddened» by Italy’s decision to sign a BRI deal with China, during Xi Jinping’s visit to Rome on 21-22 March, while at the same time accusing Beijing of practising «debt trap diplomacy».93 In fact, as already mentioned above, this last issue remained one of the main criticisms against Beijing as well as one of the most debated in the relations between China and the EU. As far as the Forum is concerned, an article published in «The Diplo- mat» on 27 April focused on the geographical origin of the attendees and proposed some interesting points of reflection.94 The first was that, despite frictions related to the South China Sea and lingering concerns over the

91. By the end of March 2019, a total of 124 countries and 30 international organisations had signed 173 cooperation agreements with China under the BRI framework. 92. ‘Full Text: Yang Jiechi on the Belt and Road Initiative and Preparations for the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation’, Xinhuanet, 8 April 2019. 93. ‘US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo «saddened» as Italy signs up for Chi- na’s belt and road project’, South China Morning Post, 28 March 2019. 94. Shannon Tiezzi, ‘Who Is (and Who Isn’t) Attending China’s 2nd Belt and Road Forum?’, The Diplomat, 27 April 2019. The complete list of heads of state and government in attendance at the Second Belt and Road Forum can be found in ‘Sec- ond Belt and Road Forum Top-Level Attendees’, The Diplomat, 27 April 2019.

67 Barbara Onnis debt trap, the BRI was booming in its core regions, namely China’s immediate periphery. Beijing secured the participation of top leaders from nine out of the ten ASEAN member states, with Indonesia being represented by its vice-president.95 Similarly, four out of the five Central Asian countries sent their top leaders. The only exception was Turkmenistan, notoriously adverse to multilateral cooperation projects. The second consideration referred to the fact that European countries accounted for one third of the top-level attendees – 12 of the 36 heads of state and government came from the European continent (including Russia and Azerbaijan). This demonstrated that, despite some pushback from Brussels, the BRI was arousing growing interest especially among the smaller European countries. The list of those sending top-level representatives to the Forum – Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cyprus, the Czech Repub- lic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Switzerland – included seven EU members. However, as expected, the EU «heavyweights», namely France and Germany, did not send their representatives, being the most vocal in expressing concern about the initiative. A further consideration was that the BRI was apparently eliciting a growing interest in Africa as well. While in 2017 there were just two African heads of state (Ethiopia’s prime minister and Kenya’s president), in 2019 the figure jumped to five (in addition to Ethiopia and Kenya there were also top-level representatives from Djibouti, Egypt, and Mozambique). «The Diplomat»’s article reflected on some remarkable absences, some expected, others not. Among the first was the absence of India (despite the growing understanding between Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi), and other South Asian countries – of the eight SAARC member states only Pakistan and Nepal sent their representatives.96 Similarly, another remarkable, but predictable absence, was that of the US, considering the difficult state of China-US relations (while in 2017 Washington sent its NSC senior director for Asia). Among the unforeseen absences were those of the Middle East, despite the region’s prominence on the historical Silk Road and the

95. Jakarta was actually represented by its vice-president, which was likely due to the close timing after President Joko Widodo’s re-election bid, rather than being a deliberate snub. 96. As already mentioned in previous Asia Maior volumes, India continued to be deeply concerned that the CPEC – one of the six economic corridors – passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Apart from this specific aspect related to the CPEC, according to a study conducted by Alicia Garcia Herrero and Xu Jiangwei, India, Buthan and the Maldives feature in the list of top ten countries with the most negative attitude towards the BRI, reflecting the region’s long term competition with China over border and economic issues; another relevant aspect to consider is the fact that some South East Asian countries are among the most affected by the so- called «debt trap diplomacy» (Sri Lanka and the Maldives). See Alicia Garcia Herrero & Jiangwei Xu, ‘Countries’ Perceptions of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Big Data Analysis’, Bruegel Working Paper, no.1, 6 February 2019.

68 China 2019 (2) friendly ties China had with major regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel. Only the United Arab Emirates sent its top-level representative. In conclusion, while in numerical terms the 2nd BRF could be considered a relative diplomatic success (particularly considering that the heads of state and government who had participated in the 1st Forum in 2017 numbered only 29), it is evident that China still has a lot of work to do to promote the BRI outside of the Silk Road’s historical region of significance, and needs to revise some critical aspects of the project. In fact, Xi Jinping acknowledged the criticism levelled against the initiative and pledged to reform it in a number of ways, making it more sustainable and more respectful of international standards.97

5.1. The domestic debate: Reassessing the BRI Ahead of the Forum, the Chinese media focused on Italy’s signing of the MoU, considered as a «landmark event», Italy being the first G-7 country to participate in the BRI. Italy’s decision was perceived as helping to absolve China of the allegations of practising predatory economics and confirming the appeal of the initiative despite the criticisms and negative publicity surrounding it.98 Meanwhile, Chinese strategic circles were animated with debate and discussion, some focusing on a strategic review of the BRI constructions over the past five years, others finding problems, analysing the causes and trying to propose solutions, in order to ensure the BRI smooth implementation over the following years. A report released on 28 March by the Institute of International Stra- tegic Chinese at Beijing University, titled反思“一带一路”：问题与应对 (Re- flections on the Belt and Road: Problems and Responses) emphasised how over the course of previous five years the scope of the project had been expanded beyond recognition and Chinese investments under the initiative had even superseded those of the post-World War II Marshall Plan.99 The study also reported that the «unrestricted global investments» (无限制的全球性投入) under the BRI were causing an unprecedented burden on China’s foreign exchange reserves and risked becoming unsustainable for the country.100 Moreover, China’s resulting hyperactivity alarmed the US, Europe and other major powers, who interpreted it as a «comprehensive attack on the West- ern-led world order and thereby taking several countermeasures aimed at

97. Bickram Rana Pradumna & Ji Xianbai ‘Belt and Road Forum 2019: BRI 2.0 In the Making?’, RSIS Commentary, No. 086, 2 May 2019. 98. Antara Ghosal Singh, ‘China’s Belt and Road Debate’, The Diplomat, 26 April 2019. 99. 反思“一带一路”：问题与应对 (Reflections on the Belt and Road: Prob- lems and Responses), 北京大学国际战略研究院, 第 79 期，2019年3月28日, Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Peking University, n. 79, 28 March 2019, p. 2. 100. Ibid., p. 2.

69 Barbara Onnis checking not just the progress of the BRI but also the overall rise of Chi- na».101 That is why China had to rationally «slim down» (瘦身) the initiative,102 trying to redraw its boundaries by focusing primarily on Central Asia or China’s immediate neighbourhood, namely the regions of major success, as shown by the presence of the attendees at the 2nd BRF. A previous report released in 2017 by the authoritative think-tank China Institute of International Studies (中国国际问题研究院) had already focused on the striking rhythm impressed to the construction of the BRI. In the short term, that created the global impression of being too aggressive, raising too many suspicions over Beijing’s intentions. The report argued that, the BRI being a long-term project, it had to be executed in a phased manner, through a step-by-step approach, to avoid all unnecessary noise around it.103

5.2. The international debate: The «debt trap» and the «debt trap diplomacy» In 2019 the international debate around the BRI persisted in focusing on the «debt trap» and on the alleged «debt trap diplomacy» pursued by Beijing. Some new elements of reflection were introduced by the American scholar Deborah Brautigam, a renowned specialist on China-Africa relations and director of the China-Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University. In an article written for «The New York Times», titled Is China the World’s Loan Shark? and published on 26 April, Brautigam reported both the information collected by the China-Africa Research Initiative on more than 1,000 Chinese loans in Africa between 2000 and 2017, totalling more than US$ 143 billion, and the findings of the Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center, which had identified and tracked more than US$ 140 billion in Chinese loans to Latin America and the Caribbean since 2005.104 She concluded that, according to the findings of both institutes, the risks of BRI were often overstated or mischaracterised. In Brautigam’s words: «[…] a number of us academics who have studied China’s practices in detail have found scant evidence of a pattern indicating that Chinese banks, acting at the government’s behest, are deliberately over-lending or funding loss-making projects to secure strategic advantages for China.»105

101. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 102. Ibid., p. 4. 103. ‘一带一路”倡议在南亚的机遇与风险’ (Opportunities and Risks of the Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia), 中国国际问题研究院, 第 17 期, April 2017, p. 40. 104. Deborah Brautigam & Jyhjong Hwang, ‘China-Africa Loan Database Re- search Guidebook’, China-Africa Research Initiative, John Hopkins University; Mar- garet Meyer & Kevin Gallagher, ‘Cautious Capital Chinese Development Finance in LAC, 2018’, China-Latin American Report, February 2019. 105. Deborah Brautigam, ‘Is China the World’s Loan Shark?’, The New York Times, 26 April 2019.

70 China 2019 (2)

In her article, Brautigam also focused on the case of Sri Lanka, «often cited as the poster child for the ills of Chinese debt-trap diplomacy», reporting the conclusions of a study conducted by two Sri Lanka scholars, Dushni Weerakoon and Sisira Jayasuriya. According to Weerakoon and Jayasuriya, the Hambantota loans – which at the end of December 2017 determined the decision of the Sri Lanka government to formally hand over its southern port to China on a 99-year lease – accounted for only a tiny share of Sri Lan- ka’s overall debt; and most importantly, only 10% of it was owed to China.106

6. Conclusion

This article has focused on the main developments in Chinese foreign policy in 2019 and highlights two key trends. The first, that Xi Jinping’s attempt to address the trust deficit making difficult China’s relations with a series of important international players, registered both positive and negative results. Xi Jinping was successful in pursuing increasingly close personal relations with his Indian and Japanese counterparts, which could be used to address the lack of trust of those neighbouring countries towards China. The same, however, cannot be said for the Chinese government’s attempts to reassure one of its most relevant partners, namely the EU. In particular, the persistent divide et impera approach adopted by Beijing in its relations with Brussels and the smaller European countries, together with the debate around Italy’s decision to sign the MoU on the BRI, only confirms the unstable nature of China-EU relations. The second trend was characterised by China’s attempt to confront and contain several challenges which seriously risked undermining Xi Jin- ping’s long-term plans. These challenges included Washington’s unrelenting hostility, the growing international criticism of China’s management of the Hong Kong protests, the alleged abuses against the Xinjiang Uyghur minorities, and the activities of the Confucius Institutes. Finally, apart from the discussion of the above two main trends, the article provides an update on the 2nd Belt and Road Forum and sums up the main points of the debate around the Initiative both at the domestic and international level. Summarising, China’s foreign policy in the year under review strived to contain the adverse reactions triggered internationally by its own rapid rise in world power and influence, but was only partially successful in its effort.

106. Dushni Weerakoon & Sisira Jayasuriya, ‘Sri Lanka’s debt problem isn’t made in China’, East Asia Forum, 28 February 2019.

Mongolia 2019: Crisis, obstacles & achievements on the domestic, economic and foreign policy fronts

Axel Berkofsky

University of Pavia [email protected]

This article analyses the main issues and developments on Mongolia’s domestic, foreign economic and foreign policy agenda in 2019, and concludes that the country’s almost complete dependence on Russia and China in terms of trade and energy is here to stay. On a positive note, the article concludes that Mongolia’s democratically-elected institutions are able to address and reverse its president’s anti-democratic power-grabbing and is able to stand its ground in a decisively non-democratic and authoritarian neighbourhood. The resource-rich Mongolia with estimated reserves of copper, coal and other minerals valued at US $1-3 trillion, achieved economic growth close to 7% in 2019. This makes Mongolia one of the world’s fastest growing economies although the country’s economic growth rises and falls with commodity prices. Adding to its economic vulnerability is its near-complete dependence on China. In 2019, China was – as in previous years – by far the biggest purchaser of Mongolian coal and copper and China buys more than 90% of its exports. In March 2019, Mongolia experienced a constitutional controversy, which in November of the same year resulted in constitutional amendments. Mongolia’s hybrid political system remains a recipe for political stalemate and the country’s still rampant corruption contributes to that instability. In the year under review the country continued to diversify its foreign and foreign economic relations through its «Third Neighbour» Policy, i.e. the expansion of political, trade and economic and security relations with fellow democratic countries such as the US, India and Japan.

1. Introduction

Mongolia, at times referred to in the US and the West in general, as a «democratic oasis», is surrounded by the authoritarian states Russia and China. That «oasis», it is hoped among Mongolian policymakers critical of excessive Chinese influence on Mongolia’s economy and politics, will join forces with the US and its Asian neighbours such as Japan and Taiwan and also India to counterbalance Chinese political and economic dominance in Asia. This is part of Mongolia’s so-called «Third Neighbour» policy. The term was first used in 1990 by then US Secretary of State James A. Baker who referred to the United States as Mongolia’s «Third Neighbour» What Baker intended at the time was a US policy to develop relations with Mon- golia, providing the country with an alternative to relations with its «first» and «second» neighbours: China and Russia. Mongolia later adopted the

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Axel Berkofsky

«Third Neighbour» policy as a strategy to expand its relations with Japan, the United States and India seeking to reduce its economic dependence on China.1 To be sure, that is easier said than done. Mongolia heavily depends economically on China and as the recent past has shown is very vulnerable to Chinese political and economic pressure, and indeed blackmail. While China buys more than 90% of Mongolia’s exports, it supplies Mongolia with more than one-third of its imports. Mongolia’s dependence on others, however does not stop there: Russia provides the country with 90% of its energy supplies.2 Since 1991 Mongolia’s political system has been of a hybrid nature: a 76-member unicameral legislature with a directly-elected president. Gov- erning power is shared by an elected president and a government which is elected by parliament and headed by a prime minister. It is a system of political cohabitation in which Mongolia’s president – very much the case over the last 30 years – belongs to the parliamentary opposition, and is authorized to veto legislation and propose his own. Such a hybrid political system has created difficulties for governments wishing to implement their policy agendas, always fearful of a presidential veto. The Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) holds 65 out of 76 seats in the parliament (the State Great Khural). The Democratic Party (DP) – the party of Mongolia’s president – currently finds itself in opposition holding just 11 seats. The positions of both prime minister and MPP chairman have been occupied by Ukhnaa Khurelsukh since October 2017. In the case of Mongolia, the DP – MPP party duopoly, has often led to political stalemate.3 That together with corruption has been a constant problem for Mongolia which passed its first constitution in 1992 after decades of communist rule. One can be tempted to conclude – as Mongolia scholar Julian Dierkes does – that the above-mentioned political stalemate by default leads to or is accompanied by political instability. However, that is not necessarily always the case. While Mongolia’s party duopoly has over the years indeed obstructed efficient decision-making and policymaking, it does have a democratically elected political mandate. Therefore, the party duopoly can also be cited as evidence that Mongolia’s democracy is functioning and that the parties and politicians in power or opposition are making use of their con-

1. Mongolia is one of the least densely populated countries in the world with two people living per square kilometre. It is a US$ 13.5 billion economy with a population of a little more than 3 million. Twice as many ethnic Mongols – more than 6 million – live in Inner Mongolia in neighbouring China (in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region of China); for details see also ‘Country Report Mongolia July 1st, 2019’, Economist Intelligence Unit, London, UK. 2. See ‘Mongolia CIA World Fact Book’, December 2019. 3. See Julian Dierkes, ‘Mongolia Hamstrung by Political Paralysis and Corrup- tion’, East Asia Forum, 1 February 2019.

74 Mongolia 2019 stitutionally-granted rights and mandates. The November 2019 constitutional amendments discussed below are further evidence that the system of checks and balances – albeit imperfect and prone to controversy – is functioning.The country has had 15 different cabinets since 1992, each lasting an average of 1.5 years.4 The current president, Khaltmaagiin Bat- tulga, is a former wrestling champion and is, because of his populist and nationalist rhetoric and policies, at times described as the «Trump of the Steppe». He was elected in 2017, in part on a pledge to defend the country from Chinese economic and political hegemony in Asia. However, the Mongolian economy’s dependency on commodity exports to China will continue to make sure that such an objective remains difficult to achieve. While Mongolia is self-sufficient in oil with, almost all of its crude oil is exported (mostly to China) and all of its finished petrochemical products are imported – more than 90% from Russia. Consequently, problem-free relations with both China and Russia are essential to Mongolia’s economic stability and prosperity. Back in 2016, Mongolia had a good taste of what angering China could lead to. As a predominantly Buddhist country, Mongolia decided to host a visit from the Dalai Lama, to which Beijing responded immediately by imposing punitive tariffs on Mongolian exports. Mongolia had de facto no choice but to submit to Chinese blackmail politics, apologize and promise not to receive Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader ever again in order for Chinese tariffs to be revoked.5 Economic dependence on the authoritarian China and Russia, Mon- golia’s political leadership has decided, will continue to be counterbalanced by increased economic exchanges and security ties with the aforementioned non-authoritarian countries. Political pressure and indeed blackmail politics exerted by Beijing in the recent past has also probably done its share to convince the capital Ulaanbaatar to look for friends beyond its immediate geographic vicinity. To be sure, ties with Russia and even more importantly China will remain central to Mongolia’s economic stability and prosperity, and it is probably fair to conclude that Mongolia’s political weight and influence is not big enough for Moscow and Beijing to worry too much about increased political security ties with Washington and its allies.

2. Constitutional controversy and constitutional amendments

In March 2019, a constitutional controversy erupted when amendments to the Laws on the Legal Status of Judges, Public Prosecutor’s Office

4. See ‘I am not a Dictator: Mongolian PM Survives Attempted Ousting’, The Guardian, 1 December 2018. 5. See James Crabtree, ‘Mongolia Needs Allies to Withstand China’s Looming Threat’, Nikkei Asian Review, 9 October 2019.

75 Axel Berkofsky and Anti-corruption was adopted in an emergency session of Parliament on 27 March 2019. The amendments authorized Mongolia’s Judiciary Council and National Security Council to recommend the dismissal of judges, prosecutors and the head of the country’s Anti-Corruption Agency. The new legislation was proposed by President Battulga and ratified by a majority of the ruling Mongolian People’s Party (MPP), which holds 65 out of 76 seats in the parliament. The Democratic Party – the one to which Battulga belongs – as well as a minority of MPP parliamentarians voted against the law. Conversely, 82.1% of the lawmakers in parliament voted to amend the existing prosecutorial system.6 The law was in clear violation of the principle of separation of powers, given that the National Security Council is made up of the president, the prime minister and the speaker of the parliament, whereas the Judicial General Council is appointed by the president. As a matter of fact, Battulga immediately used his new power to dismiss the chief justice of the country’s supreme court, the general prosecutor and his deputy (who supervise the appointment process of more than 500 Mongolian prosecutors).7 Battulga did so in an attempt to obstruct and/or terminate ongoing investigations into the 49 out of 75 Mongolian parliamentarians accused of corruption and misuse of public funds. At the time, the President and the above-mentioned 82% of parliament’s lawmakers called the law a matter of national security and passed it within 24 hours. The reason why the large majority voted in favour of the laws is explained by the fact that 49 out of 75 Mongolian parliamentarians are currently under investigation by public prosecutors and the Anti-Corrup- tion agency over allegations that they misused public funds for small and medium-sized enterprises and distributed the loans to businesses of their own choice. In mid-November 2019 then, the constitutional crisis became a constitutional opportunity. The Mongolian parliament submitted a number of constitutional amendments,8 aimed at strengthening the powers of the prime minister and equally importantly, to supersede the above-mentioned March 2019 legislation, the cause of the said crisis. Through these amendments, the prime minister – as is the case in most parliamentary democracies – will be thus armed with the authority to appoint and dismiss his cabinet members as opposed to parliament voting to appoint them. Parlia- ment in turn has been given more oversight powers over the government’s budget as well as the authority to set up investigative committees (as a result

6. See Anand Tumurtogoo, ‘Mongolia’s President Is Slicing Away Its Hard-Won Democracy’, Foreign Policy, 29 March 2019. 7. See Transparency International, Mongolia should Uphold the Independence of the Judiciary and Anti-Corruption Agency, 29 March 2019. 8. For the second time since 1992.

76 Mongolia 2019 of recent high-profile corruption scandals involving lawmakers and policymakers, for details see below). Furthermore, the constitutional amendments stipulate that Mongolia’s presidents’ terms will, from 2025, be limited to one six-year term as opposed to the current two four-year terms.9 These constitutional amendments are scheduled to enter into force on 25 May 2020, and have yet to be approved by Mongolia’s Constitutional Court.10 Ironically, the constitutional amendments aimed at reducing the president’s powers and superseding the aforementioned law equipping the National Security Council with the authority to fire judges and prosecutors, were approved by President Battulga. This led Mongolia scholar Julian Dierkes to conclude that the majority Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) – struck a deal with the president’s Democratic Party to jointly endorse President Battulga’s intention to again stand in the 2021 presidential election (to be elected for another 6 years).11

3. Corruption

Mongolia’s political stability continues to be challenged by high levels of corruption, leading to latent political instability.12 Transparency Interna- tional, the non-governmental organization documenting public corruption, ranked Mongolia 106 out of 180 countries in its 2018 Corruption Percep- tions Index.13 In late-2018 Mongolian domestic politics were convulsed by a major corruption scandal related to a public-funded financing initiative for private businesses provided by the so-called SME Fund which offered low-interest loans to small and medium-sized private companies. It turned out that the large majority of firms receiving loans from the SME Fund in 2016 and 2017 had financial connections14 as well as family ties with government officials from both the governing and oppositions parties. Another corruption scandal, the so-called «60 billion case», involved politicians from the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) and relates to audio recordings during the 2016 election campaign, which revealed that political posts had been assigned in return for financial donations. These revelations led to a leg-

9. See ‘Mongolia Amends Constitution in Bid to End Political Instability’, Reu- ters, 15 November 2019. 10. For further details see also Julian Dierkes, ‘Constitutional Amendments Adopted’, Mongolia Focus, 15 November 2019. 11. See Julian Dierkes, ‘Preserving the Political Status Quo in Mongolia’, East Asia Forum, 10 January 2020. 12. See Julian Dierkes, ‘Corruption is a Cancer that Mongolia Can’t Cut out’, East Asia Forum, 12 January 2018. 13. See ‘Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2018’, (https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019). 14. Received bribes.

77 Axel Berkofsky islative shutdown for two months from November 2018 to January 2019. In November 2018, Prime Minister Ukhnaa Khurelsukh and his cabinet survived parliament’s attempt to oust them over the aforementioned corruption scandal.15 Following these scandals, Mongolia has pledged to seek to tackle and reduce corruption. Accordingly, with the endorsement of the Mongolian authorities, the US is assisting Mongolia by among other ways, retraining its judges and prosecutors.

4. The mining business and Oyu Tolgoi mining project

Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mongolia’s extractive industries – copper, gold, coal, molybdenum, fluorspar, uranium, – has over the last decade fundamentally transformed Mongolia’s economy away from its dependence on herding and agriculture. FDI in Mongolia from 1990 to 2018 amounted to roughly US$ 24 billion, more than 70% of which came from the mining sector. With immense reserves of copper, coal and other minerals valued at US$ 1-3 trillion, Mongolia became one of the fastest growing economies in the world.16 Thanks to the country’s mining business boom, its economic growth reached a staggering 17% in 2011 and FDI connected to the mining sector poured into Mongolia. At the time, the country was referred to as «Minegolia» and by 2013 the country’s GDP per capita reached US$ 4,400 (today it is lower than this, roughly US$ 4,100). After three years of double-digit growth driven by the mining revenues (2011-2013), however, commodity prices together with Mongolia’s economic growth collapsed. By 2016, growth had fallen to 1.2% and the country had to ask for a bail out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). All this was accompanied by a financial and fiscal economic s as the Mongolian tugrik’s freefell collapsed against the US dollar by close to 80% between March 2013 and January 2017. Within a five-year span, FDI in Mongolia fell from US$ 4.5 billion to just US$ 94 million in 2015.17 During 2018 and 2019 the price for cooper and coal18 recovered and with it Mongolia’s copper and coal export earnings. Export earnings from coal over the first three months of 2019 reached US$ 644 million, more

15. For details see also ‘Cornered by Corruption’, Economist Intelligence Unit,16 January 2019. 16. See Tsolmon, Baatarzorig, Ragchaasuren, Galindev, Helene Maisonnave, ‘Effects of Ups and Downs of the Mongolian Mining Sector’, Environment and Develop- ment Economics Vol. 23 Special Issue No.5 October 2018, pp. 527-542. 17. See Nicholas Muller, ‘Mongolia’s New Mining Boom’, The Diplomat, 22 Oc- tober 2019. 18. Since 2017, Mongolia’s coal exports have become more profitable than the country’s copper exports, thanks to the rising price of coal and strong demand from China.

78 Mongolia 2019 than 25% compared to 2018. China imported more coal from Mongolia when it decided to reduce imports from Australia (Chinese-Australian relations deteriorated dramatically during 2019).19 The Oyu Tolgoi mine (also referred to as OT), located in the southern part of the Gobi Desert roughly 550 kilometres south of Mongolia’s capital Ulaanbaatar and 80 kilometres north of the Chinese border, is the crown jewel of Mongolia’s mining industry. The mine’s operator Rio Tinto has become Mongolia’s biggest taxpayer and the mining project employs more than 15,000 workers, of whom more than 90% are Mongolian. Fur- thermore, the project supports another 45,000 jobs indirectly. Indeed, it is hard to overstate the importance of the Oyu Tolgoi mining project for Mongolia’s economy. By the time the mine is fully operational, it will be the world’s third-largest copper mine, with an estimated life of 50 years. It is by far the biggest foreign investment ever made in Mongolia and the costs so far amount to US$ 11.9 billion (and will cost billions more before the construction is completed). However, Mongolia has yet to resolve questions related to ownership of the Oyu Tolgoi mining project. OT is jointly owned by the government of Mongolia, 34%, and Turquoise Hill Resources, 66%, of which Rio Tinto owns 51%.20 Access to what is one of the largest copper deposits in the world will make an important contribution to economic growth in Mongolia, which relies on mining revenues to fund more than 30% of the country’s national budget. Production from the surface part of the mine began in 2013. The underground expansion has been delayed by difficult ground conditions and extraction will go as deep as 1.3 kilometres. The completion of that phase – expected to increase production from 125,000-150,000 tons of copper concentrate a year to 550,000 tons – has already been delayed by more than two years and is now (notwithstanding further delays) scheduled to be completed by May 2022 at the earliest. Expected costs for that phase have risen by roughly US$ 1.9bn from the original estimate of US$ 5.3 billion. And there are other Mongolian mines with enormous resources. The Khushuut coal mine, for example, located in the Khovd Province. Since 2007, the Khushuut mine has been controlled by the Mongolia Energy Cor-

19. The year in which Australia, together with other countries, began to express its concerns over human rights abuses in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, and accused Beijing of seeking to recruit and plant a spy in the Australian parliament as well as when it continued to ban the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei from supplying equipment to Australia’s 5G mobile network. All of this of course was dismissed as «hysteria» and «unfounded allegations» in Beijing and led the Chinese political leadership to retaliate economically by reducing coal imports from Australia. For details see e.g. Christina Zhou, ‘China-Australia Relations Became Complex in 2019 with Spy Claims and Human Rights Abuses’, ABC News, 7 January 2020. 20. For details of the agreement see ‘Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement between the Government of Mongolia and Rio Tinto International Holdings Limited’, Turquoise Hill, 6 October 2009.

79 Axel Berkofsky poration (MEC), a Hong Kong-based company. The volume of coal exported to China from Khushuut in 2018 reached 36.2 million tons, of which 27.7 million tons was coking coal, above all for use in China’s steel industry. Estimated to have reserves amounting to 460 million tons of coking coal, it is among the largest reserves in Asia. And then there is the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine, like the Oyu Tolgoi mine also located in the Gobi Desert. It is one of the world’s largest untapped coking and thermal coal deposits. It has a total estimated resource of 6.4 billion tons, one-third of which is high-grade hard coking coal.21 Mongolian miners, however, must deal with tempera- tures ranging from minus to plus 40 Celsius in the Gobi Desert, which is why mining is limited to the period March to November. Most other mining-rich regions on the other hand operate all year round. Mongolians have long complained about the inability of its leadership to allow larger parts of the population to benefit from the country’s natural resources. Opinion regularly shows overwhelming support for the public ownership of natural resources, and the November 2019 constitutional amendments include provisions which stipulate that the Mongolian people must receive major benefits from the country’s «strategic deposits», in essence Mongolia’s main copper and coal mines. How exactly such a provision will be translated into reality remains yet to be seen.

4.1. Renegotiating the terms In April 2019, a group of parliamentary lawmakers requested the re- negotiation of the OT mining contract terms in order to increase the state’s ownership stake.22 In addition, they sought to review the 2015 so-called Dubai Agreement, which created the legal basis for the underground extension of the project. The group of lawmakers submitted a 200-page review to Mongo- lia’s National Security Council and a parliamentary standing committee on economic matters.23 At the end of November 2019, parliament completed a two-year investigation with a resolution demanding improvement to the terms of the two most important contracts governing the project: the first, surface-mine phase signed in 2009 and the second signed in Dubai in 2015 which gave Rio Tinto the go ahead to work on the underground mine. The Mongolian parliament and government are aiming to reduce the interest rates on loans it uses to fund its share of development costs. The government does not receive any dividends from its 34% stake in the Oyu Tolgoi mine and is obliged to repay the funds borrowed from Rio Tinto to finance its invest-

21. See Vinicy Chan, Dinesh Nair, Carol Zhong, Julia Fioretti, ‘Mongolia’s Tavan Tolgoi Ramps Up Work on $ 1 Billion Hong Kong IPO’, Bloomberg, 30 Oc- tober 2019. 22. See Munkhchimeg Davaasharav, ‘Mongolia Lawmakers Seek to Rewrite Oyu Tolgoi Deal’, Reuters, 5 April 2019. 23. See ‘Mongolia Seeks Better Terms for its Vast Mining Project’, The Econo- mist, 26 November 2019.

80 Mongolia 2019 ment. At the current pace of debt repayment, it is estimated that the government will not receive any dividends before 2030 at the earliest. Furthermore, the government is requesting Rio Tinto to build a power plant to provide electricity for the mining complex.24 Until a planned local power plant comes on stream (estimated for 2023 at the earliest) the Oyu Tolgoi mine will continue to pay about US$ 130 million for electricity to Chinese providers annually. If all of the above-mentioned parliamentary recommendations were to be implemented and the contract terms changed, this could inject further uncertainty into the regulatory environment and possibly further delay the implementation of the mining development’s second phase.25 The US government holds a 35% American equity-ownership stake in the Oyu Tolgoi mine and in mid-2019 US Ambassador to Mongolia Michael Klecheski described OT as a «bellwether» for foreign investors.26 What he meant was that the OT mining project is a test as to whether Mongolia – together with foreign investors – will be able to fully exploit its estimated US$ 1-3 trillion mineral wealth.

5. Growth, debts and resource curse

The health of Mongolia’s economy is heavily dependent on global commodity market prices. When the first contract between the Mongolian government and Rio Tinto was signed in 2009, copper from the Oyu Tol- goi mine was expected to add 5% per year to the country’s annual growth rate between 2013 and 2020. But then the price for copper collapsed and fell by almost 50% between 2011 and 2015. While Mongolia’s economic growth reached an eyebrow-raising 17% in 2011 (before the price for copper collapsed), it sank to 1.2% in 2016. As a result of collapsing copper prices, Mongolia had to be bailed out twice by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 2009 and 2017. In 2017, Mongolia received a three-year IMF-led bail-out, in the form of an Extended Fund Facility (EFF). This consisted of contributions from the IMF (US$ 434.3 million, which was distributed in Mongolia until late 2019), US$ 3 billion from bilateral donors, and contributions from the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. The 2017 bail-out has eased the pressure on Mongolia’s fiscal accounts by helping to fulfil some of the country’s external public-debt obligations due in 2019. Thanks to stable prices for commodities, 2019 was a very good year for Mongolia’s economy and growth rates According to the Asian Develop-

24. See Neil Hume, ‘Mongolia Says Rio-led Copper Projects will go Ahead’, The Financial Times, 26 November 2019. 25. At the end 2019, negotiations between the Mongolian government and Rio Tinto on the contract terms were ongoing. 26. See Roncevert Ganan Almond, ‘Can Mongolia Shape the World Once Again?’, The Diplomat, 7 July 2019.

81 Axel Berkofsky ment Bank (ADB) high copper prices Mongolia’s fiscal position has in 2019 significantly improved as the deficit declined from 15.3% of GDP in 2016 to a surplus of 2.6% in 2018 and 3.4% from January-July 2019.27 However, according to World Bank statistics Mongolia’s current total external debt – both public and private – amounts close to US$ 30 billion, more than double the amount of its US$ 13.5 billion economy. In 2018 the government announced a sovereign wealth fund.28 However, the establishment of the fund was delayed (now scheduled to take place sometime in 2020) due to a legislative backlog caused by the 2018 corruption scandals. The envisioned fund is called Future Heritage and the government has announced it will be set up with an estimated US$ 219 million initial capital. An additional US$ 400 million will be added each year thereafter.29 Like similar funds in other countries, it is envisaged that it will be used to stabilize fiscal expenditure in the event of revenue volatility – something to which Mongolia is vulnerable on account of its dependence on external demand for commodities, above all coal and copper. Mongolia’s attempt to expand trade and investment ties with countries other than China (above all the US, Japan and India, for details see below) is part of the country’s efforts to disengage itself from what is referred to as «resource curse», i.e. the concept that countries with enormous natural resources find themselves highly vulnerable to economic boom-bust cycles.30 The «resource curse» (also referred to as «resource trap») is a para- doxical situation, in which countries with an abundance of non-renewable natural resources experience low economic growth or even economic contraction. This situation occurs when a country focuses all of its production means on a single industry, such as mining or oil production, neglecting investment in other industrial sectors. As a result, the country in question becomes overly dependent on the price of commodities, and the overall GDP becomes extremely volatile – as was the case in Mongolia between 2011 and 2015 when the price for copper collapsed.

6. Suspicious of and depending on China

Mongolians have cherished their democracy ever since its «democratic revolution» of 1990, after decades of Soviet Union influence and hegem-

27. See ‘The World Bank in Mongolia – Overview’, 10 October 2019. 28. See ‘Mongolia to Establish Sovereign Wealth Fund’, Mongolian News Agency, 1 October 2018. 29. Funding for the wealth fund will above all be generated from mining roy- alty fees, dividends of government shares, revenues from oil and natural gas production sharing agreements. 30. See Lucy Hornby, ‘Mongolia: Living from Loan to Loan’, The Financial Times, 12 September 2016.

82 Mongolia 2019 ony. Therefore it is no surprise that they are fundamentally suspicious of communist China, for decades having been subject to Soviet influence and interference in Mongolian politics until the country’s transition to democracy 30 years ago.31 Indeed, Mongolia’s involvement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is – at least for the time being – limited and even if the country is in desperate need for infrastructure, opinion polls reveal that the majority of the Mongolian people is opposed to depending too much on Chinese BRI infrastructure investments. However, Mongolia’s dependence on China as its main buyer of commodities could not be greater. China receives roughly 90% of all Mongolian exports: coal, copper and other ores, crude oil, and unprocessed cashmere. At the same time, China supplies Mongolia with more than one-third of its imports and is also the country’s single largest foreign investor. China has been building or funding hundreds of coal-fired power plants in Asia and elsewhere. Coal’s share of China’s total energy consumption amounts to roughly 60% and it today consumes more coal than the rest of the world combined.32 Consequently, unless there is a major and abrupt economic slowdown in China, it will continue to import coal on a large scale from Mongolia. Indeed, China will in the years ahead continue to remain Mongolia’s largest export market, and Beijing’s financial and technical assistance under China’s Belt and Road Initiative will ensure that economic and trade ties with China remain central. Mongolia’s inclusion in the BRI encompasses Chinese investments in Mongolian transport links. To be sure, Beijing, as previously mentioned, has never failed to punish Mongolia economically whenever it dared to «misbehave» politically («misbehave» obviously as defined by Beijing). Indeed, it probably does not do justice to the overall quality of Mongolian-Chinese relations to conclude that Beijing will always and by default resort to economic and/or blackmail politics in order to address disagreements and conflict between the two countries. Specifically, the imposition of tariffs on Mongolian exports in 2016 after hosting the Dalai Lama is not necessarily representative of how China will deal with Mon- golia in the case of disagreements and bilateral conflict. It should not go unmentioned that a very harsh reaction to hosting the Dalai Lama – from Beijing’s perspective a separatist challenging China’s territorial integrity –

31. For an excellent analysis of Mongolia’s contemporary history, politics and its transition to a democracy see Michael Dillon, Mongolia. A Political History of the Land and its People, London: I.B. Tauris Bloomsbury 2018. See in particular chapter 6 (‘Democratic Revolution: Mongolia after the Collapse of Soviet Power’) and chapter 9 (‘The Mongols and China: Inner Mongolia and Ulaanbaatar’s Relations with Beijing’). 32. For details see also ‘How is China’s Energy Footprint Changing’, China Power Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Washington D.C. 10, February 12 2020.

83 Axel Berkofsky falls under what Beijing defines as defending the country’s non-negotiable ‘core interests.’33 Furthermore, Mongolia is not alone in finding itself subject to Chi- nese pressure and sanctions.34 In 2016, China temporarily interrupted ba- nana imports from the Philippines after the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled that China’s territorial claims over much of the South China Sea have no legal basis. It also ruled at the time that China cannot claim what it calls ‘historical rights’ over territories in the South China Sea that are also claimed by a number of other countries, among them the Philip- pines (which in 2013 submitted the case to the PCA). In July 2019 Beijing reminded Mongolia that teaming up with China’s rivals does not go unnoticed. It warned Mongolia not to «misbehave», on this occasion by teaming up with Washington on a level too close for comfort for Beijing. President Battulga had just announced the adoption of the (below- mentioned) strategic partnership with the US. Beijing reacted by ordering its state-controlled media to warn Mongolia that it would sooner or later fall under Chinese suzerainty. This in turn led to concern among some Mongo- lian policymakers and lawmakers that the strategic partnership with Washing- ton would inevitably be interpreted in Beijing as a provocation as well as an act directed against it. Conversely, some in Mongolia’s law and policymaking circles critical of Chinese meddling in Mongolia’s internal affairs were also concerned that the government was caving in to Chinese pressure to avoid the impression that Ulaanbaatar was developing Mongolia’s relations with Washington at the expense of those with China. These same circles cited Chi- nese government speeches which, in their view, indicated that the year 2049 – the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – will be the year when Mongolia (together with Taiwan) is absorbed by Beijing.35 Of course, all this was in line with the usual pattern of Chinese-style interference and threats to play by Chinese rules or face the consequences.

33. China has decided that Tibet, Taiwan and large parts of the South China Sea are integral and indisputable parts of Chinese territory and at the center of Chi- na’s ‘core interests’. Consequently, challenging China’s territorial claims has in the past led and will continue to lead in the future to harsh sanctions imposed on those who ‘dare’ to contest the definition and expansion of Chinese national territory as defined by China. For an analysis on China’s ‘core interests’ see e.g. Shaun Breslin, Jinghan Zeng, ‘Securing China’s Core Interests: The State of the Debate in China’, International Affairs 91 (2) March 2015, pp. 245-266. 34. For details see also Suisheng Zhao, ‘China and the South China Sea Arbi- tration: Geopolitics versus International Law’, Journal of Contemporary China, Volume 27, 2018, pp.1-15. 35. See Michael Green, ‘The United States Should Help Mongolia Stand up to China’, Foreign Policy, 26 September 2019. The US scholar (and former Senior Direc- tor for Asian affairs at the US National Security Council, NSC) Michael Green bases his conclusions on numerous conversations with Mongolian scholars, lawmakers and policymakers in Mongolia in 2019.

84 Mongolia 2019

6.1. China-Russia-Mongolia Economic Corridor (CMREC) In 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the establishment of the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC) as part of the Belt and Road Initiative’s (BRI) objective to develop infrastructure and industrial projects to establish free trade and economic cooperation zones in cross-border cities. The China-Mongolia Cross-border Economic Cooperation Zone from Erenhot (in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Re- gion along the Sino-Mongolian border) to Zamiin Uud (in the Dornogovi Province in south eastern Mongolia) and the Northern Railway Corridor which extends railway network connections between Mongolia, Russia and China can be cited as examples. In June 2016 then, China, Mongo- lia and Russia signed another agreement to build an economic corridor to increase transport links between the three countries. Among others they agreed to cooperate in transport infrastructure connectivity and port construction.36 It was announced that Mongolia would be used as what is referred to as a «transit corridor»’ to facilitate oil and gas deliveries from Russia to China. Russia in turn announced in September 2019 that it would provide Mongolia with a US$ 1.5 billion fund to build infrastructure The Mongolian President Battulga pledged to use the funds to build new railroads in order to further expand coal and mineral exports to Russia. Battulga also plans to build a Mongolian terminal in a Russian port in order to facilitate the exporting of natural resources through Russia. At a joint ceremony to mark the occasion, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his counterpart Bat- tulga signed a permanent treaty on friendly relations and comprehensive strategic partnership. Part of that partnership is Moscow’s commitment to continue modernizing the Ulaanbaatar Railway in order to increase freight traffic along the CMREC.37

7. Relations with the US

In April 2019 the US Congress took the initiative to strengthen trade and investment ties with Mongolia when it submitted the so-called «Mongo- lia Third Neighbor Trade Act».38 That act authorizes duty-free treatment for certain articles imported from Mongolia, namely cashmere wool. Mongolia produces over a third of the world’s raw cashmere, but most Mongolian

36. See ‘China, Russia, Mongolia Ink Economic Corridor Plan – Xinhua’, Reu- ters, 24 June 2016. 37. See Russia, ‘Mongolia Sign New Treaty To Bring Partnership To Whole New Level’, Radio Free Europe, 3 September 2019. 38. See Congress of US, 116th US Congress (2019-2020), H.R. 2219 – Mongolia Third Neighbor Trade Act.

85 Axel Berkofsky raw cashmere is exported to China, and the US in turn buys nearly all of its cashmere products from China. In June 2019, Mongolia and the US co-sponsored the 17th iteration of Khaan Quest, a military exercise simulating United Nations peacekeeping operations involving military troops from 31 countries. Roughly 10% of Mon- golia’s armed forces are currently serving in UN peacekeeping operations. US-Mongolian military interoperability has been tested and strengthened through contributions to US-led military and coalition campaigns in Afghan- istan and Iraq from 2003-2009.39 The following month, Mongolia and the US signed a bilateral Strategic Partnership Agreement. Mongolia has in the recent past adopted strategic partnerships with four other countries, namely Russia in 2006; Japan in 2010; China in 2014; and India in 2015. Through the bilateral agreement Washington and Ulaanbaatar pledge to strengthen security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, promote international law and transparency and the protection of human rights, media and internet freedom. The timing of the agreement’s adoption complemented the US De- partment of Defense’s May 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy report, which refers to Mongolia as one of the «democracies in the Indo-Pacific, that are reliable, capable, and natural partners of the United States».40 Furthermore, in July 2019 both countries agreed to cooperate in the area of law-enforcement, to strengthen cooperation in multilateral engagements such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster preparedness and relief operations, and pledged to expand trade and investment relations.41 The US-Mongolia strategic partnership furthermore aims at strengthening Mongolia’s economic security by increasing the flow of foreign direct investment, supporting small and medium enterprises (SMEs), involving state-owned enterprises, and further exploring emerging new markets such as technology, science, and space exploration.42 Finally, the June 2019 bilateral strategic declaration calls for the utilization of the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFI), the US development bank. Among others, the DFI offers debt financing programmes, equity financing, political risk insurance as well as technical assistance and

39. From 2003 to 2009, Mongolia contributed in ten rotations a total of 1,200 troops to the Polish-led military operation «Multinational Division South-Central Iraq». In 2009, Mongolia deployed 115 troops to Afghanistan, where they contributed to the operations «Enduring Freedom» and «International Security Assistance Force.» For further details see e.g. Christopher Pultz, ‘The Role of Peacekeeping in Mongolia’s Military Strategy: A New Paradigm for Security’, Asia Policy, No. 17, 2014, pp. 127-146. 40. See US Department of Defense, DOD Releases Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, 31 May 2019. 41. See US Department of State, Declaration on the Strategic Partnership between The United States of America and Mongolia, 31 July 2019. 42. See Bolor Lkhaajav, ‘US Becomes Mongolia’s 5th Strategic Partner’, The Diplomat, 5 August 2019.

86 Mongolia 2019 development in developing and emerging economies (e.g. Mongolia). During his visit to the US in July 2019 Mongolian President Battulga raised the above-mentioned expansion of security cooperation with Wash- ington in the Indo-Pacific by announcing that Mongolia will become an active contributor to the May 2019 US Indo-Pacific Strategy. While it would be unwise to overestimate Mongolia’s geo-political and geo-strategic influence and impact on Asian security, its endorsement of Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy would not be welcome in either Moscow or Beijing. Not least because China and Russia see themselves as the «target» of that strategy: a US-driven containment strategy, supported by the expansion of bilateral security with Japan, India, Australia. In August 2019, US Secretary of Defence Mark Esper visited Mongo- lia. Washington’s strategy to intensify its ties with Mongolia has to be understood in light of the fact that Mongolia is bordered by the two countries which the US Pentagon identifies as posing the greatest long-term threat to the United States: Russia to the north and China to the south. Esper announced that Washington plans to increase its trade ties with Mongolia to help the country reduce its dependency on China. He also discussed the possibility of expanding joint US – Mongolian military training.43 In the past, Mongolia has contributed to the US-led military operation in Af- ghanistan and today continues to allow US military troops to conduct cold- weather training on Mongolian territory.44

8. Ties with Tokyo

In 2015, Japan became Mongolia’s first «third neighbour». The rapidly increasing Chinese political and economic influence in the region has encouraged Japan to develop new political and economic alliances, and Mongolia is one the countries with which Tokyo is planning to upgrade its ties. Back in October 2015, Japan and Mongolia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which among others agreed to jointly develop mining and infrastructure at Tavan Tolgoi, the country’s biggest coal mine.45 In the same year, Japan and Mongolia also adopted a free trade agreement.46 Over the first two years since the agreement entered into force in June 2016,

43. See Lara Seligman, ‘In Rare Mongolia Stop US Defense Secretary Get an Unusual Gift’, Foreign Policy, 8 August 2019. 44. See Mendee Jargalsaikhan & Julian Dierkes, ‘US Offensive Toward Mongo- lia’, Mongolia Focus, 28 August 2019. 45. See Lkhaajav Bolor, ‘Mongolia’s Third Neighbor Policy Blooms’, The Dip- lomat, 28 March 2016. 46. The Japan-Mongolia Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). The agreement went into force in June 2016; for details see ‘Japan-Mongolia Economic Part- nership Agreement (EPA)’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 3 June 2016.

87 Axel Berkofsky

Japanese-Mongolian bilateral trade volume increased by a very impressive 72%. By the end of 2018 it amounted to US$ 98.5 million.47 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe in 2015 also announced he would reduce tariffs on Mongolian exports and provide the Mongolian government with an additional US$ 330 million in loans at 0.1% annual interest for the construction of a new international airport in Ulaanbaatar.48 In March 2016 Japan’s Marubeni Corporation won the Tavan Tolgoi Power Plant project tender to build a power plant adjacent to Tavan Tolgoi. Coal resources at Tavan Tolgoi, one of the world’s largest untapped coking and thermal coal deposits located in the Umnugovi Province in southern Mon- golia, are estimated to amount to 6.4 billion tons, one quarter of which is high quality coking coal.49 In mid-2019 Tokyo turned to Mongolia for support in its efforts to resolve the so-called «abduction issue»: Tokyo’s attempts to receive credible as opposed to bogus information from Pyongyang on the fate of those Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korean secret service agents in the 1970s.50 Mongolia’s friendly relations with Pyongyang, Tokyo hopes, will help Japanese efforts to resume a dialogue with Pyongyang on the matter.51 In June 2019, Tokyo was planning to talk to Pyongyang on the side-lines of the the annual Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security.52 Pyong- yang, however, cancelled its participation and the Mongolian-brokered Jap- anese-North Korean encounter did not take place. But by mid-2018 Mongo- lia had sought to facilitate Japanese-North Korean talks.53 Like its previous attempts, however, their efforts were not successful. Finally, Japan in 2019, as in previous years, has been Mongolia’s largest donor of development aid, charging just 1% interest for Japanese loans.

9. Strengthening Ties with India

India’s prime minister Narendra Modi became the country’s first prime minister to visit Mongolia in 2015. At the time the visit was inter-

47. See ‘Japan-Mongolia Trade Turnover up by 71.2 percent as result of FTA’, Mongolian News Agency, 11 April 2018. The data for bilateral trade for the year 2019 is not yet publicly available. 48. Scheduled to be completed by mid-2020. 49. See Erdene Kash, ‘Japan’s Marubeni Wins Tavan Tolgoi Power Plant Invest- ment Tender’, The UB Post, 2 March 2016. 50. Which Pyongyang in 2002 officially admitted. 51. See ‘Japan Seeks Cooperation from Mongolia in North Korean Abduction Issue, Denuclearization’, Japan Times, 16 June 2019. 52. See Jo He-rim, ‘Tokyo’s Attempts at Talks Fails as Pyongyang Skips Ulaan- batar Dialogue’, The Korea Herald, 6 June 2019. 53. See ‘Mongolia Intends to Help Realize Japan-North Korea Summit’, Kyodo News, 28 July 2019.

88 Mongolia 2019 preted as New Delhi’s attempt to strengthen relations with countries willing to reduce their dependence on China. In September 2019, Battulga visited India with the goal of expanding already ongoing cooperation in the fields of infrastructure development, energy, disaster management, defence, security and capacity building.54 During that visit Mongolia and India agreed to expand bilateral trade and investment ties, including in the field of agricultural commodities, dairy products and animal husbandry, mining, information technology and pharmaceuticals. The Ministry of Agriculture of Mongolia and the Indian Ministry of Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying signed an agreement on cooperation on animal husbandry and dairy products. That agreement facilitates the export of animal raw materials to India and the import of Indian high-quality animal pharmaceuticals.55 As mentioned above, Mongolia and India adopted a strategic partnership in 2015 and in the framework of that partnership India announced during Battulga’s September 2019 visit an increase in its financial contributions to the Mongol Refinery Project by another US$ 236 million. India’s overall financial contributions to the project are estimated to amount to roughly US$ 1.2 billion, provided by an Indian soft credit line to Mongolia established in 2015. In February 2019, the state’s wholly- owned Mongol Refinery State Owned LLC signed a memorandum of understanding with Engineers India Ltd. (EIL) to jointly contribute to Mongolia’s first refinery project under construction in the Altanshiree Soum district in the south eastern province of Dornogovi. India’s contribution to the project is expected to help Mongolia reduce its energy dependence on China and Russia. When completed, the refinery will process Mongolia’s own shale crude, with an annual production of 560,000 tons of gasoline, 670,000 tons of diesel, and 107.000 tons of liquefied gas for domestic use. This production will also help Mongolia to reduce its refined product imports from Russia.56 The petrochemical refinery is expected to be completed by 2022. In addition to providing funds for the construction of the refinery, India is also financing the supporting infrastructure in the Altanshiree Soum district. So far, Indi- an contractors have built 27 kilometres of railway line, 17.5 kilometres of road and 19 kilometres of power transmission lines connecting the refinery to already existing networks.57

54. See ‘Mongolian President Receives Ceremonial Reception at Rashtrapati Bhavan’, The Times of India, 20 September 2019. 55. See Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Joint Statement on Strengthening the Strategic Partnership between India and Mongolia, 20 September 2019. 56. See Oil and Gas Journal, 11 February 2019. 57. See ‘EIL to Soon Start Work on $1.2 Bn Mongolian Refinery Project’, The Economic Times, 7 October 2019.

89 Axel Berkofsky

10. Timid in Shanghai, Active in Korea

Mongolia – at least for the time being – remains reluctant to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO58), a regional security forum dominated by Russia and China, as full member. Currently, Mongolia – like Afghanistan – has observer status and has so far resisted joint and regular Chinese-Russian encouragement to join the organization as full member – the last time being the occasion of the SCO Summit in the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek in June 2019. Mongolia has had SCO observer status since 2004 and Mongolian policymakers and lawmakers are divided between those who maintain that full SCO membership would increase trust and cooperation with Russia and China, and those who warn that membership could compromise Mongolia’s «Third Neighbour» policy.59 Opponents of full Mongo- lian SCO membership furthermore point out that Mongolia’s policy priorities are not compatible with those of the SCO and hence full membership is no added value to Mongolian foreign policies. SCO member countries put the fight against separatism, terrorism and extremism at the top of its joint policy agenda, none of which features prominently on Mongolia’s foreign policy agenda. Besides, with the exception of India, the image of the SCO is that of an «authoritarian club». Three more authoritarian countries – Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey – are currently seeking SCO membership, which leads Mendee Jargalsaikhan & Julian Dierkes to conclude that the democratic Mongolia would not do itself any favours by opting for membership of such an organization.60 And so far Mongolia’s leadership has proven to be steadfast, sending out the message that it values democracy – albeit a fragile version of it and as we have seen, one not immune to constitutionally controversial power-grabbing tactics – enough to resist Russian and Chi- nese invitations to join an organization of largely authoritarian regimes and dictatorships. To be sure, China and Russia can continue to live without Mongolian SCO membership and are unlikely to use that membership as an instrument of political and/or economic power over Mongolia. Finally, opponents of Mongolian SCO membership warn that the country’s too-close involvement in the SCO could be perceived as anti-American and anti-NA- TO.61 Instead, they urge the government to intensify and expand the country’s «Third Neighbour Policy».

58. The SCO was founded in 2001 and its members are: China, Russia, Ka- zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and since 2017, India and Pakistan. 59. For a comprehensive analysis on the pros and cons of Mongolian’s SCO membership see e.g. Anthony Rinna, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Mongolia’s Quest for Security’, Indian Journal of Asian Affairs Vol. 27/28, No. 1/2 (2014-2015), pp. 63-80. 60. See e.g. Mendee Jargalsaikhan & Julian Dierkes, ‘Mongolia doesn’t Need to Join the SCO, Mongolia Focus, 7 June 2018. 61. See Elizabeth Wishnik, ‘Mongolia: Bridge or Buffer in Northeast Asia’, The Diplomat, 19 June 2019.

90 Mongolia 2019

On the Korean Peninsula Mongolia is seeking to make an active contribution to help defuse the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The country was mooted as a possible location to host the first Trump – Kim Jong-un meeting in June 2018. Instead, Singapore was chosen as the venue, but Mongolian Foreign Minister Damdin Tsogtbaatar continues to show a strong interest in assuming a mediating role on the Korean Peninsula. Hence, expect Mongolia, thanks to its good relations with North Ko- rea, to seek resuming its mediating role once meetings and negotiations – either between North Korea and the US, North Korea and South Korea or North Korea and Japan, resume.62

11. Conclusions

Mongolia’s economic dependence on Russia and more importantly China is here to stay and trade and energy ties with both countries will remain central for Mongolia’s economic growth and well-being. A Chinese economic slowdown and a further decrease of growth rates, as caused by the economic consequences of the ongoing corona virus crisis63 – will inevitably be felt in Mongolia. The re-negotiation of the Oyu Tolgoi mining project will continue to occupy the country’s lawmakers and policymakers in 2020, while Mongolia will not see the project’s (full) economic and financial benefits before 2030. Calls from the public and parliament for the country’s wealth to be more quickly distributed have been frequent in 2019. However, re-negotiating the Oyu Mining project agreements with Rio Tinto are expected to be difficult and time-consuming. Mongolia’s hybrid political system continues to be a recipe for political stalemate, although its constitutional amendments which equipped the country’s prime minister with additional powers and competencies were a step in the right direction to safeguard the rule of law and the principle of separation powers. The crisis in 2019 which preceded the constitutional amendments is worrying evidence that Mongolia is not immune to Presi- dent Battulga’s strongman politics, populism and attempts to insert authoritarian policymaking into Mongolian politics. Either way, Mongolia is a fragile democracy but still a democracy, with ambitions to continue expanding relations with its «Third Neigh- bours» the US, Japan and India in order to reduce economic dependence and strategic and political pressure from Russia, and more importantly,

62. For further details see e.g. Alicia Campi, ‘How North Korea-Mongolia Rela- tions have Jump-Started the Korean Peninsula Peace Process’, Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 457, East-West Center Honolulu Hawaii February 2019. 63. Which most analysts think is likely although there is no agreement on the extent of the epidemic’s impact on Chinese economic growth in 2020.

91 Axel Berkofsky

China. However, it is fair to conclude that Mongolia’s geopolitical might and reach, together with the expansion of security ties with the US, Japan or India, are not nearly significant enough to set off any geopolitical alarm bells in Moscow or Beijing.

92 Korean peninsula 2019: The year of missed opportunities

Marco Milani

University of Sheffield [email protected]

Despite very high expectations for the Korean peninsula, the disappointing outcome of the summit between Kim Jong Un and Trump in Hanoi led to a progressive deterioration of the relations on the peninsula and also in the region. In South Korea, President Moon Jae-in had to struggle with a falling approval rating, mostly related to the disappointing economic results, especially in terms of economic growth and unemployment rate. This situation increased the opposition to the president from the conservative part which resulted in a re-emergence of a strong political and social polarization in the country. In North Korea, Kim Jong Un consolidated his position through a reshuffle of several key roles in the leadership. At the same time, the disappearance of any short- term possibility of sanctions relief led to a new emphasis on self-reliant economic development. For what concerns relations on the peninsula, the North Korean leadership made clear that it was not interested in continuing dialogue with the South unless Seoul was ready to pursue economic cooperation despite the existing sanctions. As for relations between Washington and Pyongyang, dialogue stalled but Trump and Kim refrained from direct personal attacks and maintained a positive personal relation. These developments pushed North Korea towards its traditional partners, China and Russia. As for South Korea, practical disagreements over defence costs with the US and historical controversies with Japan further complicated the situation also with its main ally and partner.

1. Introduction

After the unexpected and positive developments that took place on the Korean peninsula, in particular from the perspective of inter-Korean relations and foreign policy, during 2018, the expectations for the following year were very high. The historical summit between Kim Jong Un and Trump in Singapore (12 June 2018) seemed to have set in motion a process of negotiation that could lead to a major diplomatic breakthrough between the two countries. Similarly, the positive and productive relationship between Kim and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, sealed by three inter-Korean summits in only one year, appeared to be the beginning of a new era of inter-Korean cooperation. These developments had also positive repercussions on North Korea’s image in the international community, and

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Marco Milani on the domestic politics of both Koreas: with Moon benefiting in terms of popular consensus in his country and Kim focusing on the economic development of North Korea. Despite these positive signals, the developments of 2019 proved to be more disappointing than satisfactory, leading to a year of missed opportunities. The seeds of the political, diplomatic and economic failures and stalemates on the Korean peninsula can be traced back to the last months of 2018. In South Korea, the popularity rate of President Moon, which had skyrocketed during the Pyeongchang Olympic Games and the following months, was strongly affected by the problematic economic results in the second half of 2018. The same negative trend continued during 2019. The disappointing economic results led to a downward trend in Moon’s approval rating and an increasingly weakened position vis-à-vis the political opposition and part of the public opinion. This confrontational trend reached its apex in the second half of the year. The controversies on the management of the country’s economy and foreign policy – from the government emphasis on the «income-led» strategy, to the conciliatory approach toward North Korea and the confrontational one against Japan – played an important role in determining the rise in tension. But an even more important cause of strain was the controversial appointment of Cho Kuk as justice minister. The scandals of nepotism and ethical misconduct that involved Cho led to a new wave of street protests both in favour and against the newly appointed minister and Moon’s progressive government in general. The demonstrations signalled the activism of South Korean civil society, but also the deep polarization existing between progressives and conservatives and the inability of the political system to channel this activism into political institutions. For what concerns North Korea, 2019 was also a year of missed opportunities. After the partial failure of the Hanoi summit with the United States, the possibility to obtain the removal of some of the sanctions in order to support economic development disappeared, as well as the chances for improved economic cooperation with South Korea. This development led the leadership to re-focus toward economic self-reliance and the revival of trade with traditional partners such as Russia and China. From the political perspective, the new Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) that took office in April gave Kim Jong Un a new chance to reshuffle some key political position and tighten his grip on the regime even more. From the perspective of missed opportunities, inter-Korean relations and US-North Korean relations were certainly the ones affected the most by the developments of 2019. The high expectations after the series of summits during the previous year were quickly frustrated by the stalemate after the Hanoi summit (27-28 February 2019). The distance between Washington and Pyongyang on how to proceed with denuclearization led to a substantial

94 Korean peninsula 2019 failure of the talks. This had strong repercussions on inter-Korean relations, which started to deteriorate immediately afterwards. During the summer, with North Korea resuming short-range missile launches, the situation worsened even more with a clear marginalization of inter-Korean dialogue by the North Korean leadership. A similar path was followed in the relations between US and North Korea, although in this case Kim Jong Un tried to salvage his personal relation with Trump while attacking other members of the administration. In this complicated situation, North Korea tried to reinvigorate relations with traditional partners such as China and Russia. Kim’s fourth visit to China and first to Russia, which took place in the first part of the year, and Xi Jinping first trip to Pyongyang, attested this renewed trend. For what concerns South Korea’s foreign policy, 2019 turned out to be a difficult year. While relations with China continued to improve, the differences with the American administration on how to share defence- related costs remained a controversial point in the alliance. However, the major concern for Seoul was represented by the rapid deterioration of relations with Tokyo. In this case, historical controversies that have plagued the relationship for many years escalated and started to affect not only economic and trade exchanges, but also security cooperation, with potential adverse repercussions on the regional stability and systems of alliance.

2. Domestic politics

2.1. Moon Jae-in’s popularity decline and economic problems The problems that had affected Moon Jae-in’s presidency in the last half of 2018 remained as a major concern for the President and his government also in the following here. The decline in economic growth and the scarce practical results of the governmental policies aimed at improving social justice strongly reduced the president’s popularity in the eyes of the public opinion. The considerable achievements of 2018 in terms of inter- Korean and foreign policy, such as the three summits with Kim Jong Un or the first historical meeting between the North Korean leader and President Trump, partly shielded Moon Jae-in from the mounting criticisms of the domestic opposition. In 2019, the continuing obstacles in promoting inter- Korean dialogue and cooperation and the stalemate in nuclear diplomacy that followed the Hanoi summit in February drastically undermined Moon’s domestic position. In January, the Bank of Korea (BOK) reported a GDP growth rate for 2018 of 2.7%, the lowest rate since 2012.1 The same results were

1. Oh Yong Yeon & Kim Sung Ja, ‘Real Gross Domestic Product: Q4 and An- nual 2018 (Advance Estimate)’, The Bank of Korea News Release, 22 January 2019.

95 Marco Milani confirmed by the BOK in its March report. The data released by the BOK also certified for the first time that the per capita gross national income had surpassed US$ 30,000, reaching US$ 31,349, the 11th in the world. Despite the sluggish economic growth, this rise of national income supported the government goal of creating a more balanced economic system that relied more on national consumption and less on exports. Along the same line, private spending also rose 2.8%, the highest rate in seven years.2 During the same week, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) lowered South Korea’s growth projection for 2019 form 2.8% to 2.6% and for 2020 from 2.9% to 2.6%, mostly for international factors such as uncertainty about the Brexit process and the US-China trade dispute.3 Within these mixed results, the slowdown in economic growth was perceived as the most important adverse factor, contributing to Moon’s decline in popularity. The negative data on the unemployment rate, with a 9-year- high at 4.4%, further put into question the government’s «income-led» strategy and in particular the decision of substantially raising the minimum wage.4 In late April, the Bank of Korea released new data attesting that the country’s economy had shrunk by 0.3% in the first trimester of the year, for the first time since the 2008 financial crisis.5 A Gallup Korea survey published in early May summarized the difficulties of the government in the first months of the year: Moon’s overall approval rating was at 45%, but in terms of economic policy he went down to a meagre 23%.6 In order to address the growing concerns about the government’s economic strategy and to revitalize his image, Moon decided for a reshuffle of the executive and nominated seven new ministers in March, among them for key positions such as Interior and Security, Transportation, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Unification. The move was aimed at re- launching the government action before the beginning of the second half of the presidency and also allowing some of the ministers to run for a seat in the National Assembly for the 2020 election. The appointment of the head of the Korean Institute for National Unification, Kim Yeon-chul, as unification minister in particular was considered as aimed at giving new impetus to inter-Koran dialogue and cooperation.7

2. ‘S. Korean economy grows 2.7 pct in 2018: BOK’, Yonhap News Agency, 5 March 2019. 3. ‘Global Growth weakening as some risks materialise’, OECD Interim Economic Outlook, 6 March 2019. 4. Cynthia Kim, ‘South Korea jobless rate jumps to 9-year peak as minimum wage hike roils labour market’, Reuters, 13 February 2019. 5. Joori Roh & Cynthia Kim, ‘South Korea economy unexpectedly contracts in first quarter, worst since global financial crisis’, Reuters, 25 April 2019. 6. Kim Min-na, ‘Moon’s approval ratings at 45% after 2 years in office’, Han- kyoreh English Edition, 5 May 2019. 7. ‘President Moon names 7 new ministers in Cabinet reshuffle’, Yonhap News Agency, 8 March 2019.

96 Korean peninsula 2019

The confirmation process for the new ministers in the National Assembly, however, did not go smoothly, emphasizing the existing strong polarization in the country’s political landscape, which would characterize the second half of the year. Between March and April, two of the nominated new ministers and one presidential spokesperson were forced to step down, on ethical grounds including real estate speculation.8 In addition, two other appointed ministers, of Unification and SMEs, received official presidential approval on 8 April despite the fact that the National Assembly had not published the report of the confirmation hearings, because of strong objections from opposition lawmakers of the Liberty Korea Party (LKP).9 While, according to the Constitution, the president has the power to nominate ministers without parliamentary consultations, except in the case of the prime minister, the decision further aggravated political conflicts between the two main parties. The reshuffle resulted in an even bigger rift between the two political camps and did not help the president in terms of popularity. Despite the disappointing economic results, in the following months Moon’s administration reiterated its commitment to maintain the existing economic and fiscal policies, focusing on boosting domestic consumption and on measures aimed at helping low wage workers.10 In late April the government proposed a supplementary budget bill, to be approved by the National Assembly, of ₩ (won) 6.7 trillion (about US$ 5.9 million). It had the twofold goal of fighting air pollution and stimulating the economy through public investments.11 This new bill, and more in general the government approach to economic policy, became a new battleground in the parliament between the two main parties. After a long deadlock in the National Assembly, the bill was finally approved on 2 August, after the main parties agreed to cut ₩ 860 billion from the original proposal.12 Despite this temporary agreement, due also to the need of taking counter measures against Japan’s decision to limit exports of some key products to South Korea, the Democratic Party (DP) of President Moon and the LKP remained at loggerheads for what concerned economic and fiscal policy. In a further effort to stimulate economic growth, the BOK in July decided to cut interest rates of a quarter point to 1.5%, for the first time since 2016. According to BOK Governor Lee Ju-yeol, the measure was required

8. Kang Tae-hwa & Ser Myo-ja, ‘Blue House under pressure to fire aides’, Korea JoongAng Daily, 1 April 2019. 9. Park Han-na, ‘Moon approves nomination of unification, SME ministers’, The Korea Herald, 8 April 2019. 10. Edward White, ‘South Korea defends economic restructuring despite growth fears’, Financial Times, 6 June 2019. 11. Joori Roh & Cynthia Kim, ‘South Korea proposes $5.9 billion extra budget to fight air pollution, aid exports’, Reuters, 24 April 2019. 12. ‘National Assembly passes W5.8tr extra budget bill’, The Korea Herald, 2 August 2019.

97 Marco Milani after a first quarter that marked the worst contraction since the 2008 financial crisis, with continuing trade frictions between China and the US. In this context, the trade restrictions imposed by Japan further deteriorated economic circumstances.13 Together with the fiscal stimulus unleashed by the government, also the monetary policy was aligned in order to improve economic conditions and boost growth. Following the same rationale, but this time not as unexpectedly as in July, the Bank of Korea decided to further cut interest rates in October to 1.25%. The economic outlook for economic growth in 2019 continued to remain below expectations with a number of national and international institutions predicting a lower growth than the forecasted 2.0%.14 In addition to these economic problems created by a stagnant growth rate, unionized railway workers held two separate strikes in October and November – the first one for three days and the second one for five – in order to obtain a salary raise and the hiring of additional workers.15 The collective action ended only on 25 November, when the union reached an agreement with Korea Railroad Corp. (KORAIL), the public operator of train services.16 Despite the disappointing results for the government economic policy, Moon Jae-in remained committed to pursue his income-led strategy without any major change. A confirmation of this direction came with the approval by the National Assembly of the 2020 national budget, set at ₩ 512.3 trillion, with a 9.1% increase from the previous year. The biggest part of the budget was aimed at boosting economic growth through job creation and public infrastructure, but also at countering the effects of the trade disputes with Japan and between China and the US.17 The vote for the budget in the National Assembly was a further example of the political division between progressives and conservatives in the country. The LKP staged protests in the Parliament during the vote and then did not take part into the final vote. The bill was passed thanks to the agreement reached by the ruling Democratic Party and other minor parties in the Assembly.18 The parliamentary battle for the budget represented the latest case of a growing political and social split within South Korea between the two main political camps.

13. Kwanwoo Jun, ‘Bank of Korea Cuts Base Rate First Time in 3 Years’, The Wall Street Journal, 17 July 2019. 14. Choonsik Yoo & Joori Roh, ‘Bank of Korea cuts rates, keeps door open for more as economy loses steam’, Reuters, 16 October 2019. 15. ‘Railway workers’ strike reduces train operations, causes passenger inconvenience’, Yonhap News Agency, 20 November 2019. 16. ‘Railway workers end strike with deal with management’, Yonhap News Agen- cy, 25 November 2019. 17. ‘S. Korea to frontload 2020 budget spending: finance ministry’, Yonhap News Agency, 10 December 2019. 18. Park Ji-won, ‘Parties pass 2020 budget bill without LKP’, The Korea Times, 10 December 2019.

98 Korean peninsula 2019

2.2. The rise of political polarization in South Korea Together with the economic troubles and the declining popularity of the current president – and strictly connected to it – the rise of political and social division in the country represented the second paramount characteristic of the development of domestic politics during 2019. The effects of the strong polarization between progressives and conservatives that was caused by the impeachment of Park Geun-hye in 2016 and 2017 remerged powerfully during 2019. This trend was mostly due to two different political dynamics. First, Moon’s presidency enjoyed a long honeymoon with the country’s public opinion, characterized by astonishingly high rates of popularity during his first year in office. This consensus was a direct consequence of the dire situation in which Park’s impeachment left the conservative party and also of Moon’s achievements in terms of inter-Korean relations and foreign policy.19 At the same time, the conservative party had to undergone a difficult period of internal reconstruction to regain credibility in front of the public opinion and to propose a clear political alternative to Moon and the Democratic Party. The difficulties in terms of economic growth and the diplomatic stalemate with North Korea and the United States that had characterized the second half of 2018 paved the way for a comeback of the conservatives both at the political and civil society levels. Between January and February 2019, former Prime Minister and interim President Hwang Kyo-ahn joined the LKP and was elected as head of the party, with more than 50% of the votes.20 The election of Hwang, who immediately became the most likely candidate for the 2022 presidential election, represented a new start for the conservative party in preparation for a long electoral period leading to the legislative election of April 2020 and the following presidential election. The hard-line political opposition of the LKP was translated into practice in the National Assembly, in which the conservatives held more than one third of the seats. When in mid- March the Democratic Party found an agreement with three minor parties for a partial proportional reform of the electoral system, the LKP strongly opposed it.21 The same situation was repeated on the last days of April, when the conservative party tried to block the decision to put on the fast- track22 important bills, including the electoral reform and the creation of

19. Marco Milani, ‘Korean Peninsula 2018: The calm after the storm’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 72-76. 20. Ser Myo-ja, ‘Hwang Kyo-ahn wins chairmanship of LKP’, Korea JoongAng Daily, 28 February 2019. 21. Seo Young-ji & Jung Yu-gyung, ‘All major parties except LKP tentatively agree to reform electoral system’, Hankyoreh English Edition, 19 March 2019. 22. A bill that is put on the fast-track has to be voted by the Assembly within 330 days, even without bipartisan support. The related standing committees have 180 days to review the bill. If this is not done, the legislative and judiciary committee is given 90 more days. In the last step, the bill is put to a vote in the Assembly within 60 days.

99 Marco Milani a new anti-corruption special investigation unit. After days of stalemate, characterized also by sit-ins and physical violence inside the National Assembly,23 the bills were finally put on the fast-track on 30 April.24 The parliamentary opposition of the LKP continued over the following months. When in late June a special session of the Assembly was convened, which was mainly aimed at approving the supplementary budget bill for supporting the country’s economic growth. The main opposition party, however, did not honour a previous commitment to participate into it. The failure to resume regular parliamentary work led to a new stalemate in the legislative proceedings.25 The situation partially improved in July, when President Moon organized a meeting with the leaders of all the main opposition parties in order to address the fallout of Japan’s decision to limit exports of key products to South Korea.26 In the aftermath of the meeting, the Assembly convened a plenary session to pass the supplementary budget bill, with a spirit of national unity mostly due to the threat represented by the new trade dispute with Tokyo. This renewed spirit, however, proved to be short-lived. In early September, the appointment by Moon Jae-in of his Senior Secretary for Civil Affairs Cho Kuk, as the new justice minister, sparked widespread opposition within the National Assembly and the public opinion. The decision to nominate Cho Kuk, one of his closest advisors since the beginning of his presidency, probably represents the most controversial political decision taken by Moon Jae-in. The move was motivated by the resolve of the current administration to reform the country’s judicial system and in particular the role and power of state prosecutors over the law enforcement system. Immediately after his nomination to the position on 9 August, amid a new reshuffle of nine government positions, allegations about Cho’s unethical and even criminal conducts emerged, complicating the process of confirmation in the National Assembly. The main scandals consisted in the preferential treatment that Cho’s daughter had allegedly benefited from in entering a very prestigious university, and in a suspicious investment in a private equity fund, which included fabrication of official documents and attempts to destroy evidence.27 The first allegation resonated in particular with the South Korean public opinion and specifically the

23. Kim Bo-gyung, ‘What is behind political impasse, violence at National As- sembly?’, The Korea Herald, 29 April 2019. 24. Park Ji-won, ‘Four parties put reform bills on fast track’, The Korea Times, 30 April 2019. 25. Jeong Hwan-bo, ‘Liberty Korea Party Agreed to Resume Parliamentary Af- fairs, Then Threw the Opportunity Out the Window’, The Kyunghyang Shinmun, 25 June 2019. 26. ‘Moon to hold meeting with political party leaders on Thursday’, Yonhap News Agency, 16 July 2019. 27. Kang Tae-jun, ‘South Korea Divided Over Nomination of Controversial Justice Minister’, The Diplomat, 14 September 2019.

100 Korean peninsula 2019 younger generation, given the importance of university admission for upward social mobility in the country. A similar scandal had triggered the first street protests against Park Geun-hye in 2016.28 To make things more damaging for Moon Jae-in’s government was that it had championed the importance of creating a fairer and more just society since the beginning of his presidency.29 Cho Kuk denied all the allegations during his parliamentary confirmation hearing on 6 September, also apologizing for the public disappointment caused by the suspicions about his conduct.30 Despite failing to obtain the confirmation from the National Assembly and a growing negative opinion in the public, Moon decided to confirm the appointment, citing the lack of evidence of illegal conduct and the need to reform the country’s prosecution system.31 The controversial decision immediately polarized the public opinion and led to a renewal of demonstrations both by the political and social opposition. For what concerns street protest, radical conservatives had been holding rallies and demonstrations for weeks before Cho’s appointment, focusing mostly on the request of releasing Park Geun-hye and against Moon’s conciliatory North Korea policy.32 With the escalation of the polarization between the conservative opposition and the government, these demonstrations started to attract larger numbers of protesters asking for the removal and arrest of Cho Kuk and also for the resignation of President Moon. In September several demonstrations attracted an increasingly large number of protesters from a less radical political background. In this context, the LKP tried to present itself as the main representative of this popular movement, with very symbolic gestures, such as when Hwang Kyo- ahn and other party leaders decided to shave their heads in public as a form of protest.33 A key role started to be played also by Evangelical Christian movements and in particular their leaders, such as the right wing pastor Jun Kwang-hoon, who used his inflammatory rhetoric against Moon Jae-in and his policies.34

28. Marco Milani, ‘Korean Peninsula 2016: The never-ending crisis’, Asia Maior 2016, pp. 98-101. 29. Kang Tae-jun, ‘Public Anger Grows in South Korea Over Justice Minister Nominee’, The Diplomat, 29 August 2019. 30. ‘Justice minister nominee denies role in corruption allegations involving his family’, Yonhap News Agency, 6 September 2019. 31. Jihye Lee, ‘Moon Names Ally Under Probe as South Korea’s Justice Minis- ter’, Bloomberg, 9 September 2019. 32. Ock Hyun-ju, ‘Radical conservatives call for Park’s release, condemn Moon’, The Korea Herald, 10 March 2019. 33. Kim Tong-hyung, ‘S. Korean opposition leader shaves head to protest minister’, AP News, 16 September 2019. 34. ‘Protestant evangelicals in South Korea wield outsize political power’, The Economist, 28 November 2019.

101 Marco Milani

By the end of September, the progressive side of the civil society started to gather in public demonstrations in favour of Cho Kuk’s appointment, and more in general to support Moon’s government and counter the conservative growing initiatives. From their perspective, Cho was the right person for an overall reform of state prosecution, considered as too powerful. More importantly, the progressive elements of civil society wanted to defend the progressive revolution started by the 2016 demonstrations, Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and, finally, the election of Moon Jae-in in May 2017. The political polarization was thus quickly translated into social polarization, with both camps attesting the activism of South Korea’s civil society. At the same time, this dynamic confirmed once more the very weak situation of political parties in the country and their inability to channel the people’s concerns and needs. These large demonstrations represented a clear proof of the citizens’ distrust in the political system. On 3 October, the anti-Cho demonstration brought together several hundred thousands citizens in the larger demonstrations since the Park Geun-hye scandal. Two days after a similar crowd got together in a pro-Cho demonstration. Exactly the same dynamic was repeated the following week, on 10 and 12 October.35 After months of controversies and weeks of demonstrations, on 14 October Cho resigned from the position of Justice minister, saying that he had done what he could to reform state prosecution, but also apologizing for the damage created by his appointment and the scandals surrounding his family.36 Moon Jae-in, who staunchly defended Cho for weeks, publicly apologized for creating social conflicts with his appointment. At the same time, he also emphasized once again the need for a reform of the prosecution, considered as too powerful.37 The investigation on Cho Kuk, which had started in late August, led to the arrest of Cho’s wife on 24 October.38 On 30 December, Cho was indicted for a series of charges, including bribery and documents forgery, related to the two scandals, but was not arrested.39 Cho Kuk’s scandal certainly had a cost for Moon Jae-in in terms of popularity, with numbers dropping toward 40%.40 But even more it showed the escalation of political polarization in the country between conservatives and progressives. This increased polarization was demonstrated once

35. Choe Sang-hun, ‘In Seoul, Crowds Denounce a Divisive Politician. Days Later, Others Defend Him’, The New York Times, 12 October 2019. 36. Choe Sang-hun, ‘South Korean Politician Resigns After Weeks of Protests’, The New York Times, 14 October 2019. 37. ‘Moon offers public apology over justice minister issue’, Yonhap News Agen- cy, 14 October 2019. 38. Lim Jae-woo & Jang Ye-ji, ‘Court issues arrest warrant for Cho Kuk’s wife Chung Kyung-shim’, Hankyoreh English Edition, 24 October 2019. 39. ‘Former Justice Minister Cho Kuk indicted on family-related charges’, Yon- hap News Agency, 31 December 2019. 40. Jihye Lee, ‘South Korea’s Moon Sees Approval Rating Hit New Low Amid Scandal’, Bloomberg, 18 October 2019.

102 Korean peninsula 2019 more by the LKP’s continuous opposition and filibustering in the National Assembly toward the end of the year. The LKP tried to prevent the approval of the annual budget and the reforms that had been put on the fast-track in spring; they, however, were finally approved on 27 and 30 December. This polarization had the results of lowering public trust toward the political parties and the National Assembly more in general, considered as a weak and ineffective institution.

2.3. Political reshuffle and consolidation in North Korea The trend of reconfiguration of the regime’s institutional architecture and the focus on economic development remained the two most relevant characteristics of North Korean domestic politics throughout 2019. The process of rapprochement with the United States – and other regional actors – that took place during 2018 paved the way for a new emphasis on the second pillar of Kim Jong Un’s policy line: the economic development of the country. Nonetheless, the UN economic sanctions related to the nuclear and missile programmes remained in place, creating major obstacles for the achievement of this crucial goal. At the same time, Kim continued in his process of restructuring the country’s political system. He pursued the double objective of reinforcing his position at the centre of the system, while, at the same time, also «normalizing» the institutional architecture, especially in the field of foreign relations. The New Year’s speech that the North Korean leader traditionally gives on 1 January summarized and explained this new approach, already put in motion during 2019. Sitting in an armchair in his office, conveying a more informal image of a hard-working leader, Kim focused most of his speech on domestic issues and in particular economic directives and observations, with specific mentions to major construction projects such as the Wonsan tourism zone and Samjiyon County.41 The first indication that could be drawn from the address was then that the new strategic line totally focussed on economic construction, launched at the third plenary meeting of the seventh Central Committee of the party in April 2018, was still the main guideline for the new year. In addition, Kim reiterated the regime’s commitment not to make, test or use nuclear weapons, emphasizing the fact that North Korea had taken practical measures to respect the Singapore agreement and pointed out that, as a consequence, it was the United States that had to take a step toward North Korea. Following the tradition of North Korea’s rhetoric, the conciliatory part was followed by a veiled threat about finding a «new way for defending the sovereignty of the country» in case the US would not

41. Rudiger Frank, ‘Kim Jong Un’s 2019 New Year’s Address: Dropping a Stra- tegic Bombshell’, 38 North, 2 January 2019.

103 Marco Milani respect their promises or take unilateral measures.42 Lastly, Kim pointed out the importance of the agreements reached by the two Koreas in the previous year and also of moving forward toward more cooperation, including in economic aspects.43 After the flurry of diplomatic activities in the first months of the year, culminated with the Hanoi summit between Kim and Trump, important domestic political events dominated the leadership agenda. In March the country held nationwide elections for the 687 members of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) – the main legislative body of the country albeit with very limited influence on state affairs – with a reported turnout of 99.99%.44 With only one name in each ballot, the vote did not represent a real consultation of the citizens. However, elections have been used as a tool of control by the local party officials to monitor the population, providing important information about the changes in the country’s leadership. In this case, the absence of Kim Jong Un’s name from the ballot – he held a seat in the Paektusan constituency – certainly represented the most relevant news. The decision was probably related to the his effort to project himself as a leader of a «normal» state in which the executive and legislative branches are separate, in line with the changes undertook by Kim himself in the previous years.45 One month after the SPA election, on 10 April, a meeting of the Central Committee of the party was held ahead of the first session of the newly elected Assembly. This event represented a crucial turning point in the process of power consolidation and institutional transformation led by Kim Jong Un. During his speech at the Central Committee, Kim pointed out the tense and difficult situation for the country, but he also emphasized several times the importance of self-reliance in supporting the national economy, despite the sanctions regime in place. He also seemed to be open to a third summit with Trump, but also set the end of the year as a clear deadline for the United States to come up with a new approach to negotiations. The speech confirmed the main priorities set by Kim with the New Year’s speech, adapted to the new situation after the disappointing outcome of the Hanoi summit. During the first session of the Supreme People’s Assembly on 11 April the institutional transformations were officially sanctioned. Kim Jong Un was re-elected as the chairman of the State Affairs Commission (SAC), the highest decision-making body in the country. He was also elevated to

42. Ankit Panda, ‘Four Takeaways from Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Address’, The Diplomat, 3 January 2019. 43. Ibid. 44. ‘Report on Results of Election of Deputies to SPA Issued’, KCNA News, 12 March 2019. 45. ‘N.K. leader not mentioned among deputies newly elected to parliament’, Yonhap News Agency, 12 March 2019.

104 Korean peninsula 2019 the status of supreme representative of all Korean people, a possible move toward becoming also the formal head of state of the country. The session was also an important occasion for a major reshuffle of prominent political posts in the regime: Choe Ryong Hae, number two of the regime, replaced Kim Yong Nam as president of the Presidium of the SPA; Kim Jae Ryong replaced Pak Pong Ju as premier, a key position for the supervision of the country’s economic development; Choe Son Hui, a vice foreign minister who held key roles in the country’s diplomacy, became a new member of the State Affairs Commission.46 The disappointing results of the Hanoi summit led to an important reshuffle of the negotiating team: Kim Yong Chol, who had been a key emissary to the United States and had taken part in both summits, retained important roles but apparently was no longer in a key diplomatic position; Kim Hyok Chol, a career diplomat who was surprisingly appointed as one of the chief negotiator in February, disappeared from official state media reports.47 The Supreme People’s Assembly also changed the country’s constitution. The details of the revision were revealed only a few months after it took place and basically incorporated the features that had already emerged in April, stating that the chairman of the State Affairs Commission represented the country and also signalling a shift in focus from the military to economic development.48 The constitution was later revised again during the second session of the SPA in late August. The powers of the leader were further expanded with the inclusion of the authority to promulgate ordinances, decrees and decisions, and to appoint or recall diplomatic envoys to foreign countries. In addition, the chairman of the SAC, which was not elected as a deputy of the Supreme Assembly, was recognized as the supreme leader of the party, state and armed forces.49 The political reshuffle and the constitutional revisions served as a form of rejuvenation of some of the main political positions and also as a further consolidation of Kim’s role. Furthermore, the specific new formal roles awarded to the leader, as the chairmanship of the SAC, signalled not only Kim’s will to be directly involved in several domestic and diplomatic activities, but also the desire of «normalization» of the image of the country’s institutional architecture. Despite the fact that the real decision-making power was always in the hands of the leader, the new revisions introduced some form of pseudo-separation between executive and legislative functions,

46. Choe Sang-hun, ‘Kim Jong-un Says He’s Open to Another Trump Meeting, With Condition’, The New York Times, 12 April 2019. 47. Youkyung Lee, ‘Kim Jong Un’s cryptic personnel changes puzzle North Korea watchers’, Bloomberg, 2 May 2019. 48. ‘N. Korea changes constitution to make Kim Jong-un official head of state’ Yonhap News Agency, 11 July 2019. 49. Koh Byung-joon, ‘N.K. constitutional revisions signal Kim’s more active involvement in diplomacy, domestic affairs’, Yonhap News Agency, 30 August 2019.

105 Marco Milani and clearly designated the State Affairs Commission as the main executive body, with its chairman as head of government. Besides political consolidation, economic development dominated the agenda of North Korea’s domestic politics in 2019. Despite the disappointing results of the Hanoi summit in terms of lifting the sanctions and the sharp downturn in inter-Korean dialogue, the North Korean regime remained fully committed to achieve substantial economic results. After the disastrous data about the country’s economy in 2018 released by the Bank of Korea, with an estimated contraction of the economy around 4% and a downfall of exports and trade exchanges, around 86% and 48% respectively,50 the trend for 2019 appeared to be more stable, with also some increase in the trade volume with China.51 Even more important was the fact that, according to some analysts such as former South Korean Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok, the North Korean leadership has started a structural economic and social transformation aimed at focusing on productive capacity and technology, with a substantial prioritization of economic development over military strengthening in terms of distribution of state resources.52 The construction boom of recent years and the strategic focus on tourism activities, which are exempted from sanctions, point towards this direction.53 Obviously, the international sanction regime still represents a major obstacle on the path to the achievement of rapid and stable economic growth, and thus remains the key issue on the table during any future negotiations at the international level and even more so in relation to the development of inter-Korean cooperation.

3. Inter-Korean relations

The positive developments that had characterized the last months of 2018 in terms of inter-Korean dialogue created high expectations about the possibilities of opening new avenues for cooperation on the peninsula during 2019. After the Pyongyang declaration, the two Koreas had successfully cooperated in the De-militarized zone (DMZ) for the removal of military guard posts and joint demining operations. In addition, the inspections of the North Korean railway and road systems conducted by South Korean technical teams toward the end of the year seemed to open

50. Lee Kwan Kyo, ‘Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2018’, Bank of Korea, 26 July 2019. 51. Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, ‘The North Korean Economy in 2019: Tread- ing but Not Underwater in the New Year’, 38 North, 16 January 2020. 52. Lee Je-hun & Noh Ji-won, ‘Former unification minister speaks on N. Ko- rea’s current transformative changes’, Hankyoreh English Edition, 1 December 2019. 53. Thomas Maresca, ‘Report: North Korea economy developing dramatically despite sanctions’, UPI, 4 December 2019.

106 Korean peninsula 2019 the possibility for a future re-connection of transportation links and possibly even of the Kaesong industrial park and Kumgangsan tourist project.54 The commitment of the North Korean leadership toward continuing and even enhancing inter-Korean cooperation was reaffirmed in a personal letter that Kim Jong Un sent to Moon Jae-in on 30 December 2018 and also in the televised New Year’s address by the North Korean leader. After only two months, however, it appeared clear how the high expectations created by the latest positive events were not going to be translated into actual advancements of the relations between the two Koreas. In fact, the situation turned more confrontational throughout the entire year. As demonstrated by the timing of North Korea hostile repositioning toward the South, the main reason for this negative turn lied in the disappointing outcome of the Kim-Trump summit in Hanoi, in late February, and the following worsening of North Korea-US relations. The coincidence of these two trends signalled that Moon’s dual-track strategy was having the consequence of linking inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation to the improvements of denuclearization talks between Pyongyang and Washington. If, on one hand, this strategy worked well in 2018 in order to kick-start both processes, on the other hand it reduced the operating space for South Korea’s government in pursuing more autonomous inter-Korean dialogue, undermining Moon’s ambition to put Seoul back in the «driver’s seat» of inter-Korean relations.

3.1. Disappointment after high expectations During the first months of 2019, inter-Korean relations seemed to proceed along the positive path set out by the summits and the joint declarations of 2018. In the private letter Kim sent to Moon on 30 December 2018, the North Korean leader expressed his regret for not having visited South Korea during the year – after the invitation of the South Korean president during his visit to Pyongyang – and stated that he would like to meet frequently with Moon during 2019.55 The New Year’s address also contained several remarks regarding future developments in inter-Korean relations, but also the need to move forward in cooperation without the influence of external forces. This was a direct reference to the tension created by the joint US-South Korea military exercise of November 2018.56 Despite the cordial tone of both statements, the idea that Kim Jong Un was pursuing a strategy of decoupling the nuclear talks with the US from inter-Korean relations started to emerge more clearly.

54. Marco Milani, ‘Korean peninsula 2018: The calm after the storm’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 84-88. 55. Chad O’Carroll, ‘In letter, Kim Jong Un says he wants to meet Moon Jae-in «frequently» in 2019’, NK News, 30 December 2018. 56. Ankit Panda, ‘Four Takeaways from Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s Address’.

107 Marco Milani

On 17-18 January 2019, Kim Yong Chol, former head of the North Korea intelligence service and top negotiator in the talks with the US, travelled to Washington where he met with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and also with President Trump. On the second day of the visit, the White House announced that a second summit between Trump and Kim was going to take place in late February.57 During his State of the Union speech, on 5 February, Trump then announced that the summit would take place in Vietnam on 27 and 28 February.58 Given the central role played by South Korea in mediating between the US and North Korean leaders during 2018 and the aforementioned importance of improving US-North Korea relations in order to achieve substantial improvements in inter-Korean cooperation, the Moon administration looked at the Hanoi summit with high expectations. On 19 February, in a phone call between Moon and Trump about the upcoming summit, the South Korean President proposed the resumption of inter-Korean cooperation as a possible incentive for North Korea toward denuclearization.59 Moon’s strategy seemed to be designed to kill two birds with one stone: on the one hand, it was a way to propose economic incentives without the direct involvement of the US administration; on the other, it would pave the way for practical improvements in inter-Korean cooperation. However, unfortunately for Moon Jae-in, the disappointing outcome of the summit left the South Korean administration with no birds killed and no stone left to throw. In the weeks after Hanoi, the North Korean regime and official media started to reverse the tone about the dialogue both with the US and with South Korea. Inter-Korean meetings at the lower level, especially through the liaison office established in Kaesong, started to decrease before stopping completely. According to a report of the Ministry of Unification, the two sides had met 285 times in the first 100 days of operation of the office.60 After the Hanoi summit, the regular meetings between the two directors of the office stopped – the last one took place on 22 February – and on 22 March the entire North Korean staff left altogether, only to return on 25 March without giving explanations to the South Koreans other than that they had received instructions from higher authorities.61 Despite the fact that the office remained open, it became mostly ineffective, losing its supposed role of constant and «institutionalized» coordination

57. Mark Landler & David E. Sanger, ‘Trump and Kim Jong-un to Hold Sec- ond Summit Meeting Next Month’, The New York Times, 18 January 2019. 58. ‘State of the Union: Trump announces second North Korea summit’, BBC News, 6 February 2019. 59. Hyonhee Shin & Josh Smith, ‘South Korea’s Moon offers to resume cooperation with North Korea to help denuclearization’, Reuters, 19 February 2019. 60. Colin Zwirko, ‘285 meetings held at inter-Korean liaison office since Sep- tember: MOU’, NK News, 20 December 2018. 61. Aidan Foster-Carter, ‘Grinding to a halt – Then Kim pulls the plug’, Com- parative Connections, Vol. 21, No. 1, May 2019, p. 77.

108 Korean peninsula 2019 between the two Koreas. The same non-cooperative pattern characterized also military relations along the DMZ. Although the agreements of the Pyongyang declaration remained in place, North Korea did not participate in the excavation of remains of dead soldiers from the Korean War carried out by the South Korean army.62 In an effort to revive US-North Korea talks and even more to regain the role of mediator between the two parties, Moon Jae-in met with Trump in Washington on 11 April. After the encounter, the US President appeared to be open to a more incremental approach, rather than one big comprehensive agreement, with «various smaller deals» and working «step-by-step» as one of the possibilities.63 This diplomatic effort was not particularly welcome by Kim Jong Un, who, in his speech before the newly elected Supreme People’s Assembly on 12 April, dismissed the role of Moon as officious mediator, calling for a more independent position by Seoul in order to fulfil the Panmunjom and Pyongyang declarations.64 Kim’s remarks about inter-Korean relations confirmed the idea that the North Korean regime was aiming at separating cooperation with the South from nuclear talks with the US, using to its advantage the clear willingness of Moon’s administration to move forward with practical results. Upon returning to South Korea, on 15 April, Moon proposed the idea of a fourth summit with Kim Jong Un in order to break the diplomatic stalemate after Hanoi and revive the momentum for inter-Korean dialogue.65 Moon’s call apparently fell on deaf ears in Pyongyang. After these further disappointing developments, South Korea tried to maintain dialogue focusing on humanitarian aid. In early May, the World Food Program (WFP) reported that, because of the worst harvest in ten years, 40% of the North Korean population was at risk of severe food shortages and in need of food assistance.66 After a phone call between Moon and Trump, in which the American president declared his support for sending food aid to North Korea,67 the South Korean government announced its decision to send US$ 8 million to the WFP and the United Nations Children’s Fund for cooperation projects, and, later, its plan to send 50.000 tons of rice to

62. Jo He-rim, ‘North Korea drags its feet on joint work to return Korean War dead’, The Korea Herald, 1 April 2019. 63. ‘Remarks by President Trump and President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea Before Bilateral Meeting’, The White House, 11 April 2019. 64. Shim Kyu-seok, ‘Kim scorns Moon as «mediator»’, Korea JoongAng Daily, 15 April 2019. 65. Dagyum Ji, ‘South Korean President says he’s ready to meet Kim Jong Un «regardless of venue»’, NK News, 15 April 2019. 66. ‘After worst harvest in ten years, 10 million people in DPRK face imminent food shortages’, World Food Program News Release, 3 May 2019. 67. Choe Sang-hun, ‘Trump Supports Food Aid for North Korea, South Says’, The New York Times, 7 May 2019.

109 Marco Milani the North.68 Despite these efforts, Pyongyang did not show any interest in receiving this aid, rejecting Seoul’s offer.69

3.2. A new crisis looming on the horizon? If the first months of 2019 marked the passage from high expectations to a big disappointment in inter-Korean relations, the second part of the year continued in the same downward trajectory, with even more negative signals from the North Korean regime that could represent an ominous preamble to a new crisis. The situation started to take an even further adverse turn in May, when North Korea restarted missile testing. After the test of a long-range ballistic missile in November 2017, North Korea had refrained from missile testing. This improvement substantially contributed to the positive atmosphere that led to the rapprochement on the peninsula and between Pyongyang and Washington. After this months-long hiatus, the missile testing restarted in May 2019. The first launches of short-range projectiles took place on 4 and 9 May. South Korea’s government tried to downplay these actions stating that it was not able to confirm if the testing involved ballistic missiles or not.70 A window of opportunity for reopening dialogue seemed to briefly open in June. On 12 June, Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, met in Panmunjom with South Korean officials – Chung Eui-yong, Suh Ho e Park Jie-won – to deliver a condolences letter from the North Korean leader for the death of Lee Hee-ho, women’s rights activist71 and widow of Kim Dae-jung, South Korean president during the Sunshine Policy years.72 The meeting lasted around 15 minutes and did not include any message from Kim to Moon, only the delivery of the letter and flowers. A few weeks later, somehow surprisingly, the fourth summit between the two Korean leaders took place, again in Panmunjom, after Kim accepted the Twitter invitation of President Trump to meet at the border on the 38th parallel.73 Despite the fact that Moon was in theory the host – the summit took place on the southern side – and certainly had been the main facilitator of the US-North Korea dialogue, he only had a handshake and a few words with Kim Jong

68. Kim Tong-hyung, ‘South Korea to send 50,000 tons of rice to North Korea’, AP News, 19 June 2019. 69. ‘N. Korea refusing to accept Seoul’s food aid over allies’ joint military drill’, Yonhap News Agency, 24 July 2019. 70. ‘S. Korea not yet able to determine details of N.K. missiles’, Yonhap News Agency, 12 May 2019. 71. Dagyum Ji, ‘North Korea delivers letter, flowers to South following former first lady’s death’, NK News, 12 June 2019. 72. See also: Moon Chung-in, The Sunshine Policy: in defense of engagement as a path to peace in Korea, Seoul: Yonsei Univesity Press, 2012. 73. Eli Stokoled, ‘Trump invites Kim Jong Un to meet him at Korean DMZ on Sunday’, Los Angeles Times, 28 June 2019.

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Un, before being side-lined by the two real protagonists and excluded from their private meeting.74 The positive momentum created in June proved to be short-lived. On 25 July, North Korea restarted missile launches and went on at a very rapid pace until September, focusing on short-range ballistic missiles and multiple launch rocket systems, in eight different occasions in only 6 weeks. Besides the important technical aspects of these tests, the decision to restart the launches was probably part of a strategy by the North Korean leadership aimed at several goals: first, to put pressure on both South Korea and the US, without crossing the dangerous threshold of restarting long-range missiles launches; second, trying to decouple the positions of the two allies with moves that represented a threat for Seoul but not for Washington; lastly, to respond to the joint military exercises and other decisions of the South Korean government considered as hostile, such as the acquisition of F-35 fighter jets.75 President Trump did not seem to be particularly worried about the launches, which he defined as «very standard».76 President Moon also tried to maintain a low profile about the tests, limiting himself to calling them «a series of worrying actions» in his Liberation Day speech on 15 August.77 Despite South Korea’s efforts to keep talks alive and the optimistic description given by President Moon, the «momentum for dialogue» did not remain unshaken.78 In fact, it seemed to be vanishing rapidly. On 2 October, North Korea tested another missile, this time saying it had successfully launched it from underwater, most likely a Pukguksong-3 solid-fuel missile.79 In a continued effort to put pressure both on Seoul and Washington, short-range missiles continued to be launched on 30 October and 28 November, while on 8 and 12 December the regime claimed to have conducted very important new tests at Tongchang-ri, a satellite-launching site partially dismantled in 2018 after the Singapore summit.80 But what probably was the most relevant military provocation conducted against South Korea took place on 25 November, when Kim Jong Un personally

74. Aidan Foster-Carter, ‘Pyongyang shuns and snarls; Seoul seems in denial’, Comparative Connections, Vol. 21, No. 2, September 2019, p. 75. 75. Vann H. Van Diepen & Daniel R. Depetris, ‘Putting North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles Into Perspective’, 38 North, 5 September 2019. 76. David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, ‘North Korea Missile Tests, «Very Standard» to Trump, Show Signs of Advancing Arsenal’, The New York Times, 2 Sep- tember 2019. 77. ‘Address by President Moon Jae-in on Korea’s 74th Liberation Day’, Cheong Wa Dae, 15 August 2019. 78. Ibid. 79. Hyung-jin Kim, ‘North Korea says underwater-launched missile test succeeded’, AP News, 4 October 2019. 80. David E. Sanger & Choe Sang-hun, ‘North Korea Links 2nd «Crucial» Test to Nuclear Weapons Program’, The New York Times, 14 December 2019.

111 Marco Milani assisted and directed a military drill with live fire artillery on Changrin, a small island very close to the Northern Limit Line that form the maritime border between the two Koreas. This time the South Korean authorities strongly complained against this clear violation of the military agreement reached at the Pyongyang summit the year before.81 Tensions and disagreements between the two Koreas were not limited to military and security issues. A clear example can be found also for what concern cooperation in sport, an area in which inter-Korean relations flourished in 2018 after the Olympic diplomacy in Pyeongchang. In October the football teams of the two Koreas competed in Pyongyang for the qualifying round for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. All the requests and enquiries advanced by the South Korean federation were not answered and the permission to enter was given to the team only at the last minute, with no media or supporters allowed.82 The match took place on 15 October in the surreal atmosphere of an empty stadium without spectators. The event clearly exemplified the rapid deterioration in just a few months of inter- Korean relations. A further example is represented by the sudden announcement by the North Korean regime that Kim Jong Un, after a highly publicized visit to Kumgangsan in late October, had ordered the removal of all the tourist facilities that had been built for the joint tourism project between the two Koreas. Kim also stressed the importance to replace them with new and modern facilities and of the self-reliant development of the tourist site, with an indirect criticism to his father Kim Jong Il, who relied on Seoul assistance for the development. In the weeks following the announcement the South Korean government responded asking for a meeting to discuss the issue, also taking this as an opportunity to revive the Kumgangsan project. However, Pyongyang explicitly refused to discuss the matter face to face, insisting on proceeding only with the exchange of documents.83 Despite the fact that no practical measures for the dismantling were undertaken after the announcement, this unexpected move by the North Korean leader was aimed at hitting one of the key examples and symbols of inter-Korean cooperation, which was also directly mentioned by Kim himself in his 2019 New Year’s address. This decision can be interpreted as a clear signal to Moon Jae-in that the mood and momentum for inter-Korean dialogue have drastically changed, and also that if Seoul still wants to maintain a glimmer of hope in terms of inter-Korean cooperation it has to move forward with practical economic cooperation despite the sanctions and US opposition.

81. Oh Seok-min, ‘S. Korea lodges strong complaint with N.K. over recent firing drills near sea border’, Yonhap News Agency, 26 November 2019. 82. Hyonhee Shin, ‘North Korea World Cup qualifier with South played to empty stands’, Reuters, 15 October 2019. 83. Aidan Foster-Carter, ‘Still nothing doing’, Comparative Connections, Vol. 21, No. 3, January 2020, pp. 81-82.

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4. International relations

4.1. The Hanoi summit and the deterioration of US-North Korea relations The rapprochement between North Korea and the United States after years of open hostility, culminated with the Singapore summit, dominated the agenda of international relations on the peninsula for much of 2018. Despite this historical event, a lot of diplomatic work remained to be done in order to translate the declarations of intent of the two leaders into actual policies. Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his willingness to negotiate over the nuclear program, but at the same time he stressed the importance of the US taking practical steps in this direction – i.e. lifting sanctions – with the veiled threat of finding a «new way» to defend his country. Preparations for the second summit between Kim and Trump, which had been already discussed during Pompeo’s visit to Pyongyang in 2018, started in January, specifically when Kim Yong Chol visited the US. The main North Korean negotiator met with the Secretary of State first, and subsequently with President Trump at the White House. After the encounter the second summit was officially announced.84 In the same days, a North Korean delegation led by Foreign Vice-Minister Choe Son Hui travelled to Stockholm for an international conference in which also Stephen Biegun, American special representative for North Korea, took part. The two delegations held working-level talks in Sweden, preparing the ground for the following diplomatic steps.85 This time, after the ice- breaking summit in Singapore, the two parts seemed to be aware of the need to achieve some practical results, rather than just a joint declaration, out of the summit. On 31 January, Biegun gave an important speech at Stanford University laying out some key elements of the US approach to achieve a denuclearization deal with North Korea. The core idea of significant economic and other benefits in exchange for denuclearization remained, as well as the possibility to sign a peace treaty to officially end the Korean War. Also the American position seemed to be less strict for what concerned turning over an inventory list of all North Korea’s nuclear assets, previously considered as one of the preliminary conditions for a deal.86 Biegun, however, remained firm on the idea that sanctions would not be lifted until a complete denuclearization, a position in clear contrast with Kim’s demand of practical steps from the US. The speech

84. Mark Landler & David E. Sanger, ‘Trump and Kim Jong-un to Hold Sec- ond Summit Meeting Next Month’, The New York Times, 18 January 2019. 85. Kim Ji-eun & Noh Ji-won, ‘Choe and Biegun meet for first time in Sweden’, Hankyoreh English Edition, 21 January 2019. 86. Department of State of United States, Stephen Biegun, ‘Remarks on DPRK at Stanford University’, 31 January 2019 (https://www.state.gov/remarks-on-dprk-at- stanford-university).

113 Marco Milani pointed out an existing dichotomy within the Trump’s administration between hard-liners – such as National Security Advisor John Bolton – and more conciliatory officials, as Biegun himself, more willing to concede something in order to achieve a deal, perhaps even through a step-by-step approach. In early February, Biegun travelled to Pyongyang for a three days visit where he met with Kim Hyok Chol, special representative of the SAC for US affairs and newly promoted North Korea’s top negotiator. The main goal of the meeting was to set the agenda for the upcoming summit, with the difficult task to find a balance between North Korea’s steps toward denuclearization and the corresponding measures of the US.87 The second summit between a US sitting president and the leader of North Korea took place in Hanoi on 27 and 28 February 2019. This time Kim Jong Un travelled from North Korea to Vietnam with a special train, in a 2-day trip, and then by car from the China-Vietnam border to Hanoi. The North Korean leader used the occasion of the summit also for a state visit to Vietnam, on 1 and 2 March, as part of his diplomatic outreach to the South-east Asian country, which had started the year before. On the first day, after the handshake and photo opportunities, the two leaders held a short private meeting followed by a dinner with the closest collaborators. The second day proved to be much more complicated. The two parts met in the morning in what was supposed to be the crucial negotiation session to find a deal. According to the schedule, the meeting had to be followed by an official lunch and then the signing of a joint declaration. However, the US delegation decided to cut the summit two hours before the scheduled end, given the impossibility to find common ground for an agreement.88 Despite this unexpected outcome, both sides tried to maintain a positive outlook on the summit and also on possible future diplomatic developments. At the same time, both delegations gave their own explanation for the failure of the meeting. The US version, presented by Trump in a press conference in the afternoon of the same day, focused on the fact that North Korea apparently asked for lifting all the sanctions in exchange for dismantling one of its main nuclear facility in Yongbyon, while the American administration wanted to include in the deal all other nuclear facilities, included the covert ones.89 Hours after Trump’s news conference, North Korea’s Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho gave a different explanation to the press, saying that the request was to lift part of the sanctions – specifically five key sanctions imposed between

87. Yoo Kang-moon & Noh Ji-won, ‘Biegun arrives in Pyongyang for working- level discussions with Kim Hyok-chol’, Hankyoreh English Edition, 7 February 2019. 88. Edward Wong, ‘Trump’s Talks With Kim Jong-un Collapse, and Both Sides Point Fingers’, The New York Times, 28 February 2019. 89. Julian Borger, ‘Vietnam summit: North Korea and US offer differing reasons for failure of talks’, The Guardian, 1 March 2019.

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2016 and 2017 – in exchange for the dismantling of Yongbyon and a written commitment to stop all nuclear and long-range missile tests, as previously stated by Kim Jong Un.90 The crucial difference between the two positions was clearly expressed by the accounts given by the two governments: while Trump, probably influenced by hard-liners such as Bolton, was aiming at a comprehensive big deal, Kim’s position was for a step-by-step approach. In this perspective, the offer of dismantling Yongbyon represented an important commitment for the North Korean leadership in order to signal its willingness toward some form of denuclearization. From the Trump administration’s perspective, however, the nuclear facility represented only a part of the nuclear program and thus not enough to show that denuclearization had been achieved. The differences of substance given to the word denuclearization represented a crucial element in the breakdown of negotiations, together with the existing lack of trust between the parties. Despite the absence of results at the Hanoi summit, in the following weeks North Korea refrained from strong attacks against the US administration or President Trump. At the same time, however, the regime clearly started to demonstrate its disappointment for the missed opportunity that also meant no relief from international sanctions. In mid-March Vice- minister Choe Son Hui, who was becoming the informal spokesperson of the regime for what concerned nuclear negotiations, threatened to end talks with the US and stated that Kim Jong Un was considering resuming nuclear and long-range missile testing.91 From this moment onward relations between US and North Korea slowly deteriorated, with the corresponding negative consequences for inter-Korean relations. It is interesting to notice however that, compared to previous cases in which the dialogue between the two parties broke down, this time the North Korean regime did not directly attack the US president, but kept the door open for future improvements. As pointed out by Choe during the press conference on 15 March, the US needed to change its position on the issue; however, the relation between Kim and Trump remained very good and the blame for the failure of the negotiations in Hanoi was mostly attributed to Pompeo and Bolton.92 As a further example of this new ambivalent position of the North Korea regime, Kim, during his address at the newly elected Supreme People’s Assembly in April, explicitly said to be open to a third summit if the US changed its position, especially on the sanctions.

90. Philip Rucker, Simon Denyer & David Nakamura, ‘North Korea’s foreign minister says country seeks only partial sanctions relief ’, The Washington Post, 1 March 2019. 91. Ed Adamczyk, ‘North Korea threatens to end nuclear talks with U.S., resume testing’, UPI, 15 March 2019. 92. Ibid.

115 Marco Milani

A third meeting between the two leaders actually took place in the following weeks, albeit in a very unexpected way. On 29 June, during a short visit to South Korea after attending the G-20 summit in Osaka, Trump invited via Twitter Kim Jong Un for a meeting at the DMZ, «just to shake his hand and say hello». Choe Son Hui immediately considered it as a very interesting suggestion.93 The following day, Trump announced that he was going to meet Kim after he positively responded to the invitation. Despite the historical value of a sitting US president crossing the border in Panmunjom and entering North Korean territory for the first time, the short encounter did not lead to significant practical results. The two leaders met for about fifty minutes inside the Freedom House – the main building on the South Korean side of Panmunjom – and agreed to resume working-level talks about denuclearization.94 This unexpected third meeting confirmed the situation that was already in place after the Hanoi summit: at the highest level, Kim and Trump maintained a good personal relationship, as demonstrated also by the exchange of letters in June and again in August; at a lower level, negotiations between the two governments remained extremely difficult. After the meeting in Panmunjom, North Korea kept testing short- range missile throughout the entire summer. In early September Choe Son Hui affirmed that the regime was finally ready to go back to negotiating with the US, as promised by Kim Jong Un. However, this new round of working-level talks, that took place in early October in Stockholm and was led by Biegun and the new North Korean chief negotiator, Kim Myong Gil, ended after a few hours, when the North Korean delegation denounced the hostile attitude and the lack of new proposals by the American delegation.95 The last weeks of the year were characterized by the same trend. The North Korean regime continued to focus on propagandizing self-reliance in economic development to counter international sanctions, while conducting missile tests. When Biegun visited South Korea on 16 December, the US envoy expressed his willingness to meet with his North Korean counterpart but did not receive any answer.96 When the self- proclaimed deadline of the end of the year arrived, North Korea did not perform any major military provocation against the US or its allies in the region, as many had feared. Nonetheless, in his speech during the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party in late December, Kim announced

93. Choe Sang-hun, ‘North Korea Threatens to Scuttle Talks With the U.S. and Resume Tests’, The New York Times, 15 March 2019. 94. ‘Trump meets North Korea’s Kim at DMZ in landmark visit’, Al Jazeera, 30 June 2019. 95. Johan Ahlander & Philip O’Connor, ‘North Korea breaks off nuclear talks with U.S. in Sweden’, Reuters, 5 October 2019. 96. Song Sang-ho, ‘Biegun wraps up trip to S. Korea with his call for N.K. dialogue unanswered, Yonhap News Agency, 17 December 2019.

116 Korean peninsula 2019 a strategic shift in order to guarantee the security of the country, pointing out that the regime was no longer bounded by the 2018 moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests.97 Undoubtedly, the latest events represent a deterioration of the North Korea-US relation, compared to the post-Singapore situation; however, this does not mean that Pyongyang has entirely given up the possibility to pursue a diplomatic solution with the US. The presidential election in November 2020 will certainly represent a crucial moment for American diplomacy, a moment to which the North Korean leadership is paying a lot of attention before deciding its next strategic move.

4.2. North Korea’s diplomacy toward China and Russia If on the one hand diplomacy with the United States stalled and deteriorated during 2019, on the other North Korea continued its diplomatic outreach to other countries. In particular, Pyongyang turned towards its traditional allies and partners in the region: China and Russia. Kim Jong Un inaugurated the new year with a 3-day visit to Beijing, from 7 to 9 January, the fourth time in less than one year that the North Korean leader travelled to China. Beside the traditional expressions of friendship and cooperation between the two allies, Xi Jinping reiterated China’s support for stability on the peninsula and also for denuclearization, including negotiations and summits with the United States.98 According to the North Korea’s official news agency, Kim confirmed his support for the goal of denuclearization of the peninsula.99 The visit had the important political-diplomatic aim of coordinating the position of the two countries ahead of the second meeting between Kim and Trump, similarly to what had happened when the North Korean leader visited Dalian a few weeks before the Singapore summit. From the perspective of economic exchanges, a priority for Kim’s domestic policy, there were not significant improvements, most notably because of the sanction regime in place. However, China was maintaining a trend of relaxation of the economic pressure on North Korea that had already started in the previous months, in order to support the regime and maintain stability.100 In addition to not actively enforcing some of the sanctions and tolerating evasions, such as in the case of ship-to- ship transfers of oil, China began to publicly advocate for a relaxation of

97. Min Joo Kim & Simon Denyer, ‘North Korea’s Kim threatens to resume nuclear, long-range missile tests, The Washington Post, 31 December 2019. 98. Cristopher Bodeen, ‘Kim Jong Un travels to China ahead of possible 2nd US summit’, AP News, 8 January 2019. 99. Colin Zwirko, ‘Kim, Xi committed to «joint handling» of nuclear diplomacy at fourth summit: KCNA’, NK News, 9 January 2019. 100. Scott Snyder & See-won Byun, ‘Post-Hanoi hopes trapped in a Sino-Kore- an smog’, Comparative Connections, Vol. 21, No. 1, May 2019, pp. 88-89.

117 Marco Milani international sanctions to accompany the process of negotiations toward denuclearization, following a step by step approach. This position was also supported by Russia. Despite the rumour about a possible stop-over by Kim Jong Un in Beijing, on his way back from Hanoi, the North Korea leader went straight to Pyongyang. Nonetheless Kim and Xi met again in a few months, when the Chinese President visited North Korea on 20 and 21 June, the first visit of China’s leader since 2005 and the fifth since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1949.101 Xi himself, in an op-ed article on the official newspaper of the party, Rodong Sinmun, had called for a new chapter in China-North Korea relations.102 Nonetheless the visit seemed to come less as the opening of a new chapter than as a confirmation that the alliance between the two states was «back to normal». The Chinese delegation, which included other important members of the leadership, received an impressive welcome at the airport and then a salutation at the Kumsusan Palace. The two leaders and their wives assisted to a performance of the Mass Games, with the friendship between the two countries as the main theme.103 The visit was certainly very important for its symbolic value, especially considering the cold relation between the two countries in the first years of Kim Jong Un’s leadership. However, it did not produce particular practical results. Xi reaffirmed China’s commitment in supporting North Korea’s security and peace on the peninsula. The timing of the visit was also interesting, as it took place one week before the G-20 summit in Osaka – and the Xi-Trump bilateral meeting there – and before the surprise encounter between Kim and Trump in Panmunjom. Xi’s visit to North Korea reinforced the positive relationship between the two countries and the two leaders, after years of difficult relations. It also signalled the importance of China’s role on the peninsula and in regional diplomacy more in general. With South Korea increasingly side-lined after the Hanoi summit and the negative turn in inter-Korean relations, Beijing could again play a central role for what concerned nuclear negotiations and also economic cooperation and exchanges. In addition to China, Kim Jong Un also cultivated positive relations with Russia. In 2019, the North Korean leader held his first bilateral summit with Russian President Putin and his first official visit to Russia. The meeting did not produce significant practical results, other than Putin’s support for a multilateral diplomatic solution for the nuclear issue and even the possibility for Russia to play a bigger role in breaking the stalemate in negotiations between US and North Korea. The two leaders also reportedly

101. Scott Snyder & See-won Byun, ‘A New Chapter?’, Comparative Connections, Vol. 21, No. 2, May 2019, pp. 88. 102. Ibid. 103. Shannon Tiezzi, ‘Xi’s North Korea Visit: All Style, No Substance?’, The Diplomat, 22 June 2019.

118 Korean peninsula 2019 discussed possibilities for improving economic cooperation, in particular the problematic issue of the North Korean workers in Russia that should be repatriated before the end of the year.104 Kim Jong Un’s diplomatic outreach towards Moscow and Beijing can be interpreted in the broader perspective of North Korea’s attempt to diversify its diplomatic and economic options. The stalemate of nuclear negotiations with the United States, together with South Korea’s reluctance to improve inter-Korean cooperation with sanctions in place, forced Pyongyang to try to open different paths for economic development. In this perspective, China and Russia seemed to be the best options, both for improving economic exchanges in the short-term, but also as important supporters at the United Nations for easing the international sanction regime. In December 2019, the two countries made a proposal at the Security Council to reduce economic sanctions. The United States did not endorse the proposal; however, this move clearly showed that the united front for «maximum pressure» was losing support, with some important countries promoting a more conciliatory approach.105

4.3. South Korea’s diplomatic troubles during 2019 The year of missed opportunities for South Korea impacted also its foreign relations. In this case, the negative trends that had emerged in the last months of 2018 started to become major issues for the country’s diplomacy. While relations with China continued on a positive track, the main sources of concerns for South Korea came from its main partners and allies in the region: the United States and Japan. The worsening of relations between Seoul and Washington certainly represents one missed opportunity for South Korea’s foreign policy during 2019. While the alliance between the two countries was never put into question, several unresolved issues became points of controversy. Among these, one of the most relevant was the cost sharing agreement for the US military expenses on the peninsula. During his campaign and first two years in office, Trump prioritized, in his foreign policy, the revision of what he considered as «unequal» free trade deals and the request of higher contributions to military expenses by the US allies. South Korea qualified in both these aspects. While the trade issue was resolved through a revision of the KORUS FTA in 2018, the new cost sharing arrangement for defence remained on the table.106 After several rounds of negotiations, a provisional agreement for 2019 was found in early February. Seoul increased its share

104. Iuliia Stashevska & Eric Talmadge, ‘Kim Jong Un leaves Russia after summit with Putin, AP News, 26 April 2019. 105. Josh Smith, ‘U.S.-led pressure fractures as China, Russia push for North Korea sanctions relief ’, Reuters, 17 December 2019. 106. Marco Milani, ‘Korean Peninsula 2018: The calm after the storm’, p. 97.

119 Marco Milani of costs of 8.25%, to a total of US$ 925 million, despite Washington initial request of a 50% increase to US$ 1.3 billion.107 The deal cleared the air, but only temporarily, as it was valid only for one year. The problems ahead for the negotiation of a new cost sharing agreement for 2020 remained. Over the course of 2019, Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in met several times. The most important high-level meetings were Moon’s visit to the US in April and Trump’s visit to South Korea in June. As discussed in the previous sections, both encounters were dominated by the North Korea’s nuclear program and relative negotiations. In April, Moon tried to play the role of mediator between the two parties after the stalemate in Hanoi and also to secure US support for inter-Korean humanitarian exchanges and, possibly, economic cooperation. As noted above, when the American president visited South Korea in June all the attention turned to the meeting between Trump and Kim Jong Un at the DMZ. South Korea’s administration, on its part, played a major role in shifting the focus of the negotiation on the North Korea’s nuclear issue and a possible diplomatic resolution. For Moon it represented a historical opportunity to advance inter-Korean relations and also to obtain vast popularity at home. One of the downside of this strategy was that other relevant issues in the US-South Korean relations were neglected and did not play a significant role in high- level summit between Trump and Moon. This trend risked to undermine the solidity of the alliance and to decrease mutual trust. Against this backdrop, the issue of cost sharing for the US military expenses on the peninsula re-emerged in the second half of the year. Despite reassuring messages conveyed by the new secretary of Defence, Mark Esper, in his inaugural visit to South Korea in August and the resumption of joint military exercises, albeit in a very limited scale, by the two countries, the situation remained tense.108 Trump and the US administration vocally asked for a sharp increase in Seoul’s financial contribution to its defence. When Esper visited again South Korea in November, he clearly stated that, as a wealthy country, South Korea «should and could pay more».109 An unconfirmed initial request was for a contribution of US$ 5 billion dollars, with an astonishingly fivefold increase compared to the previous year.110 Such a request was absolutely unacceptable for South Korea’s negotiators, especially given the economic slowdown of the country. Regardless of the exact financial request, the distance between the two parties seemed to be

107. Choe sang-hun, ‘U.S. and South Korea Sign Deal on Shared Defense Costs’, The New York Times, 10 February 2019. 108. Stephen Noerper, ‘Friction, impasse, and projectiles’, Comparative Connec- tions, Vol. 21, No. 2, September 2019, pp. 41-42. 109. Robert Burns, ‘Esper says S Korea wealthy enough to pay more for US troops’, AP News, 15 November 2019. 110. Kyle Ferrier, ‘More Money? More Problems for the US-South Korea Bur- den-Sharing Talks’, The Diplomat, 1 August 2019.

120 Korean peninsula 2019 very significant, considering that the US delegation left the first negotiations in mid-November.111 Despite further talks in the following weeks, the issue was not resolved, although there were reports of a reduction of the difference between the two positions.112 Just like in the previous year, the resolution of the issue was postponed to 2020, signalling a distance between the two allies on the future management of this strategic relation. The sharing of defence costs was not the only controversial issue between Seoul and Washington during 2019. In fact, Esper’s frequent visits to the peninsula were motivated also by the need to reduce the escalation of tension between the two most important US allies in Asia: South Korea and Japan. Relations between Seoul and Tokyo had been negatively affected by the controversial legacy of the colonial period for decades, especially after the end of the Cold War. Issues such as «comfort women», forced labour, revisionist history textbook and official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine still represented open wounds for the Korean public opinion and strongly influenced the South Korea-Japan relationship.113 One key factor that has helped to mitigate the controversy has been the role of the US and its strategic priority of maintaining positive relations between its two major regional allies. After the election of Moon Jae-in, the Seoul-Tokyo relation, which had improved during the last part of Park Geun-hye’s administration, especially after the 2015 agreement on the «comfort women» issue, was again put under pressure. During 2018 some of these historical controversies started to resurface and to create tension. In 2019 this tension exploded into a major trade dispute, seriously risking to adversely affect security relations. Following the strategy already implemented by President Trump in several contexts,114 Japanese Prime Minister Abe decided to weaponize trade in the dispute with South Korea.115 In the first months of 2019, relations between Seoul and Tokyo were already under pressure because of the tensions that had emerged the previous year. The main point of contention revolved around the decision of the South Korean Supreme Court that Japanese companies that had employed forced labour during the colonial period could be held accountable and required to pay compensations to Korean plaintiffs. In addition to going against Japan’s interpretation that all the disputes about the colonial period had been settled with the 1965 normalization agreement, this ruling could

111. ‘U.S., South Korea defense cost talks break down over Trump’s $5 billion demand’, The Japan Times, 19 November 2019. 112. Park Min-hee, ‘2019 S. Korea-US defense cost-sharing negotiations end without agreement’, Hankyoreh English Edition, 19 December 2019. 113. See: Brad Glosserman & Scott Snyder, The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. 114. Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, ‘Trump’s Weaponizing Of Tariffs Is A Rude Wake-Up Call To Global Financial Markets’, Forbes, 1 June 2019. 115. Henri Farrell & Abraham Newman, ‘Japan and South Korea are being pulled into a low level economic war’, The Washington Post, 1 August 2019.

121 Marco Milani open the door to massive compensation requests and also to the seizing of assets owned by Japanese companies. In the first months of the year the dispute remained within the borders of diplomacy and public statements. However, the situation quickly escalated during the summer. In May, Japan proposed to establish an international arbitration panel with a third party involved; South Korea ignored the request and in June proposed the establishment of a fund with both South Korean and Japanese companies to compensate the plaintiffs, which Japan rejected.116 On 1 July Tokyo decided to restrict the export to South Korea of three chemicals that are crucial for manufacturing high-tech products.117 While the Japanese government kept denying any relation between this decision and the forced labour dispute – claiming national security reasons due to the risk that these chemicals would be re-exported to North Korea118 – the move was widely seen as retaliation against the Supreme Court ruling. The decision to include trade and economic exchanges in the dispute set in motion an escalation in the tensions between the two countries that went on in July and August. A grassroots boycott movement against Japanese companies and products immediately developed in South Korea, and the government decided to appeal to these citizens hardening its position against Japan. The positions quickly became irreconcilable: Japan broadened the restrictions by withdrawing South Korea from the whitelist of preferred trading partners, while Seoul removed Tokyo from its own whitelist, accelerated its efforts to file a formal complaint to the WTO against Japan, and announced additional measures to mitigate the economic effects and also to reduce the dependence on Japanese exports.119 The economic aspects of the dispute, however, only represented a limited part of it. Given the emotional side of the controversy over historical legacies, also the political and rhetoric aspects became crucial. Eventually the dispute escalated to the point of affecting strategic and security aspects. On 22 August, President Moon announced that South Korea was withdrawing from the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan, a security agreement that was signed in 2016 and strongly supported by the United States.120 The decision represented a major concern for the US-South Korea alliance and also for the trilateral security cooperation between Seoul, Washington and Tokyo.

116. ‘Japan rejects S. Korea’s offer for wartime labor talks’, Kyodo News, 19 July 2019. 117. Mayumi Negishi & Eun-Young Jeong, ‘Japan Curbs Exports to South Ko- rea, Hitting Global Chip Makers’, The Wall Street Journal, 1 July 2019. 118. Taro Kono, ‘The real issue between Tokyo and Seoul is trust’, The Japan Times, 4 September 2019. 119. Ji-Young Lee & Mintaro Oba, ‘Cold Economics, Cold Politics’, Comparative Connections, Vol. 21, No. 2, September 2019, pp. 106-107. 120. Elizabeth Shim, ‘South Korea decision to terminate GSOMIA rocks Seoul, Tokyo’, UPI, 22 August 2019.

122 Korean peninsula 2019

An interesting aspect was represented by the very limited interest of the US administration in trying to mediate between the two allies, unlike what happened during the Obama administration for example, with the risk of undermining the trilateral relation and creating spaces for other regional powers to intervene.121 After several unsuccessful diplomatic attempts, in the following months the situation gradually de-escalated. In late October, South Korean Prime Minister Lee met with Abe and delivered a letter from Moon Jae-in and a few days later the two leaders briefly met on the margins of the East Asia Summit in Bangkok. Diplomacy quietly kept working in the following days with a more incisive role of the United States. During his November visit to South Korea, Esper pointed out the importance of GSOMIA, and on 21 November Pompeo called Foreign Minister Kang. The following day, only a few hours before the deadline for the official expiration of the treaty, the South Korean government announced a conditional and temporary suspension of the withdrawal to give more time for negotiations.122 The decision was welcomed both in Tokyo and Washington and paved the way for a further improvement of the bilateral relation. The Foreign Ministers of South Korea and Japan met on the margins of the G-20 meeting on 23 November and agreed to organize a bilateral summit between the leaders of their countries during the China-South Korea-Japan Trilateral Summit, planned for late December in Chengdu. The two Foreign Ministers met again on 16 December on the side-lines of the ASEM summit and concurrently the two countries held the first high-level meeting on exports restrictions.123 On 20 December, Japan decided to lift restrictions to one of the chemical product in a conciliatory gesture facilitating future negotiations.124 These diplomatic improvements created the condition for a positive atmosphere of the bilateral summit between Moon and Abe in Chengdu on 24 December.125 While the latest events of 2019 in the relation between South Korea and Japan certainly represent a positive development, they are far from representing a real solution to the existing controversy. Seoul’s decision about the GSOMIA is a clear example, with South Korea emphasizing the fact that the agreement can still be terminated at any time. The situation is thus still very precarious between the two countries, and a solution to

121. Celeste L. Arrington & Andrew Yeo, ‘Japan and South Korea Can’t Get Along’, Foreign Affairs, 31 July 2019; Bonnie S. Glaser & Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘How an Alliance System Withers’, Foreign Affairs, 9 September 2019. 122. Ji-Young Lee & Mintaro Oba, ‘Thaws and Tremors’, Comparative Connec- tions, Vol. 21, No. 3, January 2020, pp. 123-124. 123. Ibid. 124. ‘Japan lifts S Korea chip-material export curbs’, Asia Times, 23 December 2019. 125. Norihiko Shirouzu & Hyonhee Shin, ‘Japan’s Abe asks South Korea’s Moon to act on row at first meeting for 15 months’, Reuters, 24 December 2019.

123 Marco Milani the forced labour issue does not seem to be easily at hand, let alone a broader solution for other historical controversies. In this perspective it remained to be seen what role the United States are willing to play, and also if the emergence of other regional players – especially China – can play a significant role in the dispute.

124 Japan 2019: Inaugurating a new era?*

Giulio Pugliese and Sebastian Maslow

King’s College London, Sendai Shirayuri Women’s University [email protected] [email protected]

2019 ushered in a new era for Japan. The Cabinet framed the Reiwa era through a committee of experts responsible for its christening. The name was chosen with reference to a well-known medieval text of Japanese poetry, rather than ancient Chinese literature, a notable first. But did the imperial succession and the start of Reiwa actually reflect the dawn of a new era in Japanese domestic and international politics? By taking stock of primary sources, including a substantial number of interviews with scholars and policy-makers in Japan, Washington DC and elsewhere, this article suggests that the dawn of the Reiwa era appears to be characterised by a return to the conservative camp’s grip on domestic politics, suspiciously similar to Japan’s old way of doing politics. Yet, a stable prime ministerial executive, which is front and centre of the decision-making machine, has allowed for considerable change in Japan’s diplomatic and security policies. This has taken place during heightened US-China strategic competition and greater volatility in the international system. Aside from an ongoing (in fact, deepening) US-Japan entente vis-à-vis China, the year under review testifies to new developments in Japan’s international relations. Particularly worth noting are Japan’s acquisition of offensive capabilities, its expanding strategic horizons, its careful balancing act in the Middle East, and its rounder engagement with economic statecraft. These events provide a testament to important developments in Japan’s standing in world politics and to Abe’s legacy.

1. Introduction: Debating Abe’s legacy

On 20 November 2019, Abe Shinzō became modern Japan’s longest serving prime minister when he surpassed Meiji-leader Katsura Tarō, who had managed to stay in office for a total of 2,886 days. If he serves in full his third consecutive term as the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) president (a post usually linked to the position of prime minister given the party’s parliamentary majority), Abe will be in power until September 2021. There is plenty of discussion over a post-Abe LDP, and some have suggested that

* The present chapter is the outcome of a joint research effort. The introduction and conclusion were co-authored, part 2 was written by Sebastian Maslow, and parts 3 and 4 were written by Giulio Pugliese. The authors wish to acknowledge the valuable feedback provided by Masashi Murano, Brad Glosserman, Mike Mochizuki, Liselotte Odgaard, two practitioners and three reviewers. Japanese names are cited with surnames first, then followed by given names.

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow

Abe may also serve a fourth term.1 With political stability the new normal, Abe’s long-term government has triggered intense debate over its legacy.2 In office for a short period in the years 2006-2007, Abe returned to power in December 2012, pledging to depart from the nation’s post-war regime of constitutional pacifism, and restore a strong Japan, domestically and internationally. As he steered his LDP from opposition back to power, Abe criticized a deflated Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) – splintered into a Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan and Democratic Party for the People − for its handling of the 11 March 2011 triple disaster of the earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima nuclear meltdowns, and the DPJ’s foreign policy approach vis-à-vis China and the US-Japan alliance. Thus, reflecting on the LDP’s time in opposition in the years 2009-2012, Abe has repeatedly called this period a «nightmare» for the Japanese people.3 Raising fears of a declining Japan and national crisis, Abe, in his years in office, effectively delegitimized the opposition and entrenched a powerful and united LDP in power. Apart from restoring the conservative dominance, akin to the post- war «1955 system», though this time lacking a veritable opposition on the left, what is Abe’s legacy in terms of policy and institutional change? At the core of Abe’s agenda to build a «new» Japan, was his pledge to revise the country’s 1946 constitution and its constraints on the use of military force in international affairs.4 In lower house elections in 2012, 2014, and 2017, Abe’s LDP together with its junior coalition partner Komeito secured the necessary two-third majority to push for this agenda. Abe’s coalition, as we will show later in this section, also performed well in the upper house elections in 2016 and 2019, thus bringing Japan increasingly closer to constitutional revision. This was still unaccomplished in the year under review, although Abe has renewed his emphasis on achieving it, as part of his mission.5 Obstacles remain, however, as vast portions of the Japanese population, and his Komeito coalition partner, remain sceptical of the need to change the country’s constitution. With attention locked on its war-renouncing Article 9, according to some opinion polls, only 28% were in favour of Abe’s plans of revising the constitution.6 In 2017, Abe initially expressed his hopes for constitutional revision to be realized before

1. Kyodo, ‘Abe «not thinking about» fourth term as Liberal Democratic Party head’, Japan Times, 13 December 2019. 2. See, for example, Hugo Dobson, ‘Abe’s lasting legacy’, East Asia Forum, 24 November 2019. 3. ‘安倍首相また«悪夢のような民主党政権» 麻生派パーティーで発言’ (Prime Minister Abe insists on «Nightmarish DPJ Government» at Asō Faction party), Mainichi Shinbun, 14 May 2019. 4. Shinzō Abe, 新しい国へ (Towards a New Country), Tokyo: Bungei Shunju,̄ 2013. 5. Ryō Aibara, ‘Abe again calls for constitutional revision in policy speech at Diet’, The Asahi Shimbun, 4 October 2019. 6. Linda Sieg, ‘Mission unaccomplished – Abe’s drive to revise pacifist Consti- tution’, Reuters, 19 November 2019.

126 Japan 2019 the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games scheduled for late July and August.7 In the meantime, no consensus has emerged and ruling and opposition parties have in late 2019 postponed their bipartisan discussion on a referendum bill (the Act on Procedures for Amendment of the Con- stitution of Japan).8 The revised bill would allow the government to install polling stations in public places, such as railway stations or shopping centres, to secure the necessary 50% majority of all voters. This year-in-review essay sheds light on major developments in Ja- pan’s domestic and international politics. It does so to highlight transformation, or lack thereof, in Japan’s conducts of public affairs, in line with Abe’s afore-mentioned aspiration of building a new country. Do the imperial succession and the start of Reiwa reflect the dawn of a new era in Japanese domestic and international politics? This essay – basing itself on primary sources, including a substantial number of interviews, suggests that a return to the conservative camp’s grip on domestic politics resembles Japan’s old way of doing politics, but with a notable exception: a prime ministerial executive that is front and centre of the decision-making machine.9 In turn, domestic stability and a centralized policymaking machine have allowed for considerable change in Japan’s diplomatic and security maturation. Japan’s acquisition of offensive capabilities, its expanding strategic horizons, its careful balancing act in the Middle East, its surprising economic coercion towards South Korea are a testament to important developments in Japan’s international relations and to Abe’s legacy. After a panoramic perspective on Japanese domestic politics at the dusk of the Heisei and dawn of the Reiwa era, the essay provides a detailed analysis of Japan’s international relations in 2019.

2. Japan’s domestic politics in 2019: Reset for a new era? Notwithstanding Abe’s dreams of a constitutional revision, his legacy contains deep institutional changes, most notably to Japan’s post-war security and defence system. These include: the 2013 establishment of a Na- tional Security Council and issuing of a National Security Strategy, the 2014 easing of Japan’s virtual ban on arms exports and legalizing of participation in collective self-defence operations to aid Tokyo’s allies, the building of new security partnerships, a new Development Cooperation Charter, and the current push for a strategic vision under the rubric of a Free and Open

7. Sakura Murakami, ‘Abe’s push to change Japan’s Constitution hits roadblock as parties scrap Diet discussion’, The Japan Times, 21 November 2019. 8. ‘改憲「２０年施行」断念首相、任期中こだわらず’ (Constitutional Revi- sion: «realization in 2020» Given Up – The Prime Minister Not Particular to Change During His Mandate), Mainichi Shinbun, 7 December 2019. 9. Aurelia George Mulgan, The Abe Administration and the Rise of the Prime Minis- terial Executive, New York and London: Routledge, 2018.

127 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow

Indo-Pacific (FOIP).10 Moreover, Abe’s legacy entails more centralization of executive power under the Prime Minister’s Office (Shushō Kantei, hereafter Kantei). This has rerouted decision-making from the halls of ministries, Diet commissions and party headquarters to Abe and his aides, who have further strengthened their power through new mechanisms of appointing career bureaucrats.11 These changes became pivotal to a series of political scandals that have plagued the Abe government over the years and continued to do so in 2019. With career decisions now directly linked to the Kantei, few bureaucrats openly questioned Abe’s directions; in fact, bureaucrats often anticipated or pre-empted those directions (a practice referred to as sontaku). The ongoing controversy over the Moritomo and Kake school scandals have shown that in anticipation of favourable treatment from the Kantei, bureaucrats were increasingly willing to cover the trails of murky legal decisions involving the PM and his inner circle.12 In combination with recurrent attempts to intervene in media, art and education, in 2019 this development renewed concerns among Japanese public intellectuals, journalists, and social scientists of Abe causing a democratic breakdown.13 And yet, despite a stream of political scandals and concerns of a dying post-war democracy, Abe has remained relatively strong in public polling over the years. Seven years into this second term as PM at the end of 2019 and amidst an unfolding political scandal over a publicly funded annual cherry blossom party, exploited for catering to the PM’s local political support base, polls still recorded sufficiently high support for Abe. Although the approval rating dropped following the scandal, the second straight month of decline, almost 43% were still in favour of his leadership (see below),14 As in previous years, driving Abe’s sustained support were the public’s interest in bread and butter issues.

10. Yuichi Hosoya, ‘FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo- Pacific Strategy’, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 26 (1), 2019, pp. 18-28. 11. Aurelia George Mulgan, The Abe Administration and the Rise of the Prime Min- isterial Executive, London and New York: Routledge, 2018; Izuru Makihara, 崩れる政治を立て直す―２１世期の日本行政改革論 (Rebuilding Crumbling Politics: A Plea for Administrative Reform in 21st Century Japan), Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2018. 12. Moritomo and Kake were two educational institutions, which sought governmental approval for the building of new school facilities; they obtained politically- backed preferential treatment thanks to their proximity to the Prime Minister’s Office and key Abe lieutenants. See Sebastian Maslow and Giulio Pugliese, ‘Japan 2017: Defending the domestic and international status quo’, Asia Maior 2017, pp. 107-10. 13. Philip Brasor, ‘Outrage over Aichi Triennale exhibition ignites debate over freedom of expression in art’, Japan Times, 17 August 2019; Yōichi Higuchi, リベラル・デモクラシーの現在―「ネオリベラル」と「イリベラル」の間で (Liberal De- mocracy Today – Between ‘Neoliberal’ and ‘Illiberal’), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2019; Jirō Yamaguchi, 民主主義は終わるのか―瀬戸際に立つ日本 (Will Democracy End? Japan at a Critical Moment), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2019. 14. ‘Japan Cabinet support rate at 42%, falls for 2nd month’, Kyodo News, 15 December 2019.

128 Japan 2019

2.1. Reiwa and Naruhito’s enthronement On 1 April, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide announced that the name for Japan’s new era, which followed the Heisei period, was «Rei- wa», officially translated as «beautiful harmony», but also translatable as «venerable peace».15 Interestingly, while conventionally Japan chooses its era names with reference to classical Chinese literature, the new name was a neologism from an ancient collection of Japanese poetry, the Man′yōshū. In 2017, Emperor Akihito announced his wish to abdicate. Throughout 2018, this triggered discussions over a new law to allow for the transfer of the Chrysanthemum Throne to his son Naruhito. With a new law in place, Akihito abdicated on 30 April 2019, and the next day, Naruhito inherited the imperial regalia and seals as proof of his ascension to the throne, thus marking the beginning of the Reiwa era. Associated with Japan’s wartime past, the death of Shōwa Emperor Hirohito in 1989 triggered discussions over the country’s long post-war period.16 The sudden end of the Cold War, the bursting of Japan’s bubble economy and the collapse of Japan’s «1955 system» of conservative LDP rule in the early 1990s morphed the Heisei era into a period of reform and uncertainty. Marked by chronic deflation, growing social disparities and political instability, Heisei become synonymous with Japan’s «lost decades». Even so, and similarly to the end of Shōwa, the dawn of Heisei did spur hope for renewed growth and change in Japan.17 Embodying a break with his father’s wartime Shōwa Japan, Akihito was a «people’s» emperor, who was praised for his attempts at historical reconciliation and outreach to the public.18 In this vein, the imperial couple’s visit to China in 1992 was a landmark in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Akihito’s travels to disaster hit areas in the aftermath of the 2011 tsunami furthered Akihito’s popularity. Thus framed as a critical juncture, PM Abe also embraced Reiwa to renew his pledge for restoring a strong and rejuve- nated Japan through constitutional revision and economic reform.19 Under the Japanese constitution, the emperor possesses no political rights and his role is defined as a symbol of the Japanese state. While Abe and many of his political followers wished to reinstate the emperor as the head of Japan, many conservatives are deeply opposed to discussing reforms of the

15. Ryan Shaldjian Morrison, ‘Thoughts on the New Japanese Era Name, Rei- wa: «Comely Peace»’, Nippon.com, 19 April 2019. 16. Carol Gluck, ‘The «End» of the Postwar: Japan at the Turn of the Millen- nium’, Public Culture, Vol. 10 (1), 1997, pp. 1-23. 17. Ben Dooley, Makiko Inoue & Hisako Ueno, ‘Japan Has a New Emperor. Now It Needs a Software Update’, New York Times, 23 April 2019. 18. Kenneth J. Ruoff, The People’s Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. 19. Ryō Aibara, ‘Abe again calls for constitutional revision in policy speech at Diet’, The Asahi Shimbun, 4 October 2019.

129 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow imperial household, including a female emperor.20 Often considered a liberal counterpoint to Abe’s conservative viewpoints, Akihito’s wish for abdication triggered a debate on reforming the old institution of the Imperial Household. Reflecting on the Heisei era, many have departed from narratives of a declining Japan mired in crisis and shifted towards praise of the ruptures and changes which have made Japan more diverse, dynamic and international.21Thus critically revisiting the «lost decades» narrative, observers have, for instance, acknowledged the rise of a vibrant civil society after the mid-1990s. A non- profit sector and volunteerism became critical in post-disaster recovery such as after the triple disaster of «3.11».22 As indicators for deep social changes, others have focused on the implications of a post-growth era in form of inequality and shrinking regions,23 as well as the push for gender equality in politics and the economy, legal recognition of same-sex partnerships, and multiculturalism that has established itself with a growing population of foreign workers and residents in Japan.24 On 22 October, Naruhito formally proclaimed his ascension to the Chrysanthemum throne and he did so in a Japan that was very different from that of the late Showa and early Heisei eras.

2.2. Old politics in a new era Despite hopes for profound change, Abe and his LDP-led government remained embroiled in political scandals after allegations over the PM’s involvement in the 2017 Moritomo and Kake cronyism scandals, lingered on.25 On 5 April 2019, Abe’s deputy Land Minister Tsukada Ichirō was forced to

20. Takeshi Hara,平成の終焉―退位と天皇・皇居 (End of Heisei – Abdication and the Emperor, Abdication and the Imperial Court), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2019. 21. Sebastian Maslow, ‘Japan zwischen Stillstand und Aufbruch: Waren die dre- issig Jahre der Heisei-Ära unter Kaiser Akihito wirklich verlorene Jahrzehnte?’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 30 April 2019. 22. Shunya Yoshimi, Heisei Jidai (The Heisei Era), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2019; see also Yoichi Funabashi & Barak Kushner, Examining Japan’s Lost Decades, Abingdon: Routledge, 2015; Jeff Kingston, Japan’s Quiet Transformation: Social Change and Civil Society in 21st Century Japan, Abingdon: Routledge, 2004; Koichi Hasegawa, Beyond- Fukushima: Toward a Post-Nuclear Society, Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2015. 23. Stephanie Assmann (ed.), Sustainability in Contemporary Rural Japan: Chal- lenges and Opportunities, Abingdon: Routledge, 2015; David Chiavacci & Carola Hom- merich (eds.), Social inequality in Post-Growth Japan: Transformation During Economic and Demographic Stagnation, Abingdon: Routledge, 2016. 24. Emma Dalton, ‘Womenomics, «Equality» and Abe’s Neo-liberal Strategy to Make Japanese Women Shine’, Social Science Japan Journal, Vol. 20 (1), 2017, pp. 95-105; Yasuo Takao, ‘The Politics of LGBT Policy Adoption: Shibuya Ward’s Same Sex Partnership Certificates in the Japanese Context’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 90 (1), 2017, pp. 7-27; Malliga Och & Linda Hasunuma, ‘Womenomics under Abe’s Leadership: Signs of Feminisation of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party?’, Representation, Vol. 54 (2), 2018, pp. 177-193. 25. ‘Abe may be in the clear on land sale scandal, but questions remain’, The Asahi Shimbun, 10 August 2019.

130 Japan 2019 resign after reports of inappropriate interventions to fund a highway linking the constituencies of Abe and his deputy PM-cum-Finance Minister Asō Ta r ō.26 Then on 11 April, Abe’s Olympics Minister Sakurada Yoshitaka handed in his resignation after it was reported that he had suggested that support for an LDP Diet member would be more important than the economic revival of the 3.11-hit Tohoku area, where the lawmaker came from.27 Amidst this cascade of political scandals in the new Reiwa Japan, the old sense of crisis was renewed after a report by the Financial Services Agency in early June suggested that in rapidly aging Japan new pensioners would require 20 million yen in savings to cover living costs for 30 years post retirement.28 With elections coming up, this bombshell report was quickly retracted by Finance Minister Asō, as many in the government and the LDP feared that it would erode the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of an aging population.29 With a majority of voters frustrated by the government’s response, Abe’s approval ratings dropped 3 points to 40% by mid-June.30 The report regained its relevance later in the year. Data published in Sep- tember by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications showed that Japan’s elderly population (defined as over 65) had risen to 35.9 million, thus constituting 28.4% of its total population and 12.9% of the labour force – the highest rank worldwide.31 In the first national election of the new era, on 22 July, Japan elected one-half of the 245-seat Upper House of the Diet. Enabled by a fragmented opposition, the LDP and its coalitions partner Komeito won 57 and 14 seats, respectively. Combined with the 70 seats already controlled by the ruling coalition Abe was handed a comfortable majority in this chamber of the Diet. And yet, the PM fell short of securing a two-third majority which would have enabled him to push for constitutional revision. The Constitutional Demo- cratic Party of Japan received 17 seats, thus consolidating its role as leading opposition party. Abe has considered his electoral victory as evidence for public support of this agenda for constitutional revision, while voices within the LDP − notably Secretary-General Nikai Toshihiro − have argued that

26. Reiji Yoshida, ‘Deputy land minister quits after using graft buzzword sontaku to describe his decision to fund project for Abe’, Japan Times, 5 April 2019. 27. ‘Japan Olympics minister sacked over 2011 disaster insulting remarks’, Kyodo News, 11 April 2019. 28. Financial Servicing Agency, 金融審議会市場ワーキング・グループ報告書「高齢社会における資産形成・管理」(‘Formation and Management of Assets in an Ageing Society’, a Report by the Market Working Group of the Council on Financial Services), 3 June 2019, https://www.fsa.go.jp/singi/singi_kinyu/tosin/20190603/01.pdf 29. Isabel Reynolds, ‘Japan’s Creaking Pension System Could Deal Abe Elec- tion Blow’, Bloomberg, 18 June 2019. 30. ‘68% unconvinced about Aso’s refusal of report on pension issue: Mainichi poll’, The Mainichi Shinbun, 17 June 2019. 31. ‘Elderly citizens accounted for record 28.4% of Japan’s population in 2018, data show’, Japan Times, 15 September 2019.

131 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow

Abe’s electoral performance provided reasons for the PM to serve a fourth term.32 Yet, this election was important for other reasons: first, it marked the second lowest voter turnout recorded at 48.80% (the lowest was 44.52% in 1995).33 Second, the elections produced new parties of which the Reiwa Shin- sengumi led by Yamamoto Tarō performed relatively well. While Yamamoto lost his seat, his party secured mandates for two candidates with disabilities, spurring new debates over inclusivity, social welfare and human rights.34 To build on the post-electoral momentum and to recover his approval ratings further, Abe reshuffled his Cabinet on 11 September. Espe- cially noteworthy was the appointment of the young LDP member Koizumi Shinjirō, son of former PM Koizumi Junichirō (2001-2006), as environment minister. Koizumi is seen by many as potential candidate to succeed Abe as prime minister, but responsibility over the Environment Ministry will certainly test his leadership skills in post-Fukushima Japan. Following the reshuffle, the Cabinet’s approval recovered, going up above 50%.35 Yet, this was only a brief interval as the new cabinet quickly disintegrated over yet another round of scandals. By the end of October two members resigned from the brand-new cabinet: Trade and Industry Minister Sugawara Isshū and Justice Minister Kawai Katsuyuki both resigned over violations of the election law.36 Both Sugawara and Kawai were close aides to Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga. It is thus likely that their resignations have strained Suga’s influence within the Kantei, damaging his chances as a potential player in the race to replace Abe.37 At the end of 2019, the series of scandals cumu- lated into fresh allegations of PM Abe’s abuse of power, this time over use of public funds for lavish cherry blossom parties aimed at his local support organizations. The scandal gained further traction as Abe failed to produce guest lists for these events, claiming that these had already been shred- ded, and conveniently so on the very same day of the Japanese Communist Party’s request.38 Criticism over Abe’s lack of accountability, as in previous

32. ‘二階氏「総裁任期延長に期待集まっていると思う」’ (Mr. Nikai: ‘I think expectations are high for an extension to term of LDP Presidency), NHK Seiji Magajin, 22 July 2019. 33. Tomohiro Osaki, ‘Abe’s ruling coalition victorious, but pro-revision forces suffer electoral setback in drive to amend Constitution’, Japan Times, 22 July 2019. 34. ‘Reiwa Shinsengumi makes splash in Japanese election debut, giving voice to people with disabilities’, Japan Times, 22 July 2019. 35. 第4次安倍再改造内閣支持率は5割以上に (4th Abe Cabinet, Support Be- yond 50%), Terebi Asahi, 16 September 2019. 36. ‘Second minister in a week resigns from Japan cabinet’, Reuters, 31 Oc- tober 2019. 37. Ryutarō Abe, ‘Suga’s influence could wane with resignation of second associate’, The Asahi Shimbun, 1 November 2019. 38. ‘桜を見る会名簿、共産議員の請求当日に「廃棄」内閣府’ (Cabinet Office revealed that the name list of cherry blossom party was destroyed on the day Japan Communist Party Diet Member demanded the list), The Asahi Shimbun, 15 No- vember 2019.

132 Japan 2019 school scandals involving the PM’s documents being falsified or destroyed, resurfaced.39 According to the «Asahi Shimbun», by late December, Abe’s approval ratings fell to 38% from 44% in the previous month, with other polls confirming this downward trend.40 Still, these episodes were further evidence that Abe’s Kantei was particularly deft at information control, possibly also through dirty tactics, such as the 2017 smear campaign against a former administrative vice-minister of education willing to provide sworn testimony at the Diet on the Kake scandal.41

2.3. The fading impact of «Abenomics» Economic reform remains a key pillar of the Abe administration’s agenda and of its sustained support. Yet, the year under review began with revelations that cast doubt on the fate of Abe’s reform package, popularly known as «Abenomics». In January 2019, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) was forced to revise its monthly labour survey for the years 2012-2018, i.e. the period during which Abe promoted his economic reforms. These revisions became necessary, as the MHLW overstated nominal annual wage increases, data that is key for the Bank of Japan’s own statistics and economic forecasts. In short, the incident has raised serious doubts over the impact of Abenomics, its positive effects on wages and the achievement of Abe’s proclaimed 2% inflation target.42 By early 2019 data also emerged suggesting that Japan’s exports had been plummeting since December 2018, while industrial output was also decreasing. This resulted in the Abe government’s downgrading of its economic assessments – the first time since 2016. As a major cause for its revision, the Abe government cited China’s economic slowdown. The opposition in Japan was quick to forecast «the beginning of the end of Abenomics».43 Similar forecasts were made as Japan’s October planned increase in consumption tax from 8 to 10% approached.44 After the tax was increased according to schedule, polls among firms revealed broad concerns over an

39. Rintarō Tobita, ‘Abe cherry blossom scandal stirs up tweet storm of rare intensity’, Nikkei Asian Review, 30 November 2019. 40. ‘Disapproval rate for Abe Cabinet exceeds approval rate in survey’, The Asahi Shimbun, 24 December 2019; Yusuke Yokota, ‘Abe’s approval rating flat at 50% after November slide’, Nikkei Asian Review, 23 December 2019. 41. ‘Probe Abe’s ties with the media, Maekawa urges’, Japan Times, 23 June 2017; Conversation with Japanese government official, Tokyo, 2018; ‘Anonymous LDP lawmaker pressured Nagoya school board for details on lecture by Kake Gakuen whistle-blower’, Japan Times, 19 March 2018. 42. ‘Faulty data scandal reveals lower 2018 wage growth in Japan’, Nikkei Asian Review, 23 January 2019. 43. Ben Dooley, ‘Japan Stumbles as China’s Growth Engine Slows’, New York Times, 3 April 2019. 44. Toru Fujioka & Emi Urabe, ‘Japan Tax Hike Will Mean Failure of Abenom- ics, Abe Ally Says’, Bloomberg, 23 May 2019.

133 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow economic slowdown in Japan.45 To temper the negative impact of the tax hike, for the first time since 2016, Abe issued a massive 13.1 trillion yen (ca. 121.5 billion US dollars) stimulus package to counter risks of an economic slowdown and to revive Abenomics. Advertised as a «15-month budget» and primarily marshalling the same fiscal instruments of similar measures in the past,46 the money was largely to be invested in infrastructure projects and new technologies such as 5G. Abe promoted his policy as the «first economic stimulus of the Reiwa era».47 The measures were also meant to address the damage caused by typhoon Hagibis, which hit Japan on 12 October, resulting in 98 deaths, large-scale power outages across the Tokyo and Shizuoka areas, and damage to businesses and infrastructure.48 Interestingly, by December economic data was suggesting that between July and September Japan’s economy grew faster than initially projected, with its GDP growing by 1.8%.49 It remains to be seen, however, whether this growth is the result of spending prior to the tax hike and whether the Octo- ber tax hike has actually resulted in the anticipated economic slowdown; in fact, there were clear downward trends in the last quarter of the year.

3. Japan in an age of great power competition

Great power politics continued to shape Japan’s international relations throughout 2019 and the Abe administration gave ample proof of deft management, without too much fanfare, of world affairs. It did so against the semblance of a Japan that blindly followed disruptive, and potentially dangerous, US foreign and security policy initiatives. In the authors’ view, the Japanese government cleverly shaped the debates and the environment around the US government both by taking advantage of the amateurishness of the Trump administration’s policy team,50 and by emphasizing common strategic objectives vis-à-vis China − the strategic priority of both governments. In the words of Michael J. Green, a former Special Assistant to the

45. ‘Poll: Firms see «Abenomics» sputter, tax hike hurting economy’, The Asahi Shimbun, 11 October 2019. 46. ‘Abe’s stimulus brings back «bridges to nowhere» spectre in Japan’, Financial Times, 6 December 2019. 47. ‘Shinzo Abe launches $121bn stimulus package for Japan’, Financial Times, 5 December 2019. 48. Motoko Rich & Ben Dooley, ‘Typhoon Hagibis Slams Into Japan After Landslides, Floods and a Quake’, New York Times, 12 October 2019. 49. ‘Japan’s economy grew much faster in third quarter than first estimated’, Japan Times, 9 December 2019. 50. ‘In Leak, U.K. Ambassador to U.S. Calls Trump Administration «Inept» and «Clumsy»’, New York Times, 7 July 2019; Interview with former high-ranking US government official in charge of Asian affairs, 7 February 2020, Washington DC; In- terviews with European diplomats, Washington DC (2019 and 2020).

134 Japan 2019

US President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council: «No other country in the world is as prepared to compete against China, with us, as Japan»,51 a statement that found in agreement the panel moderator, former National Security Advisor to President Trump, General H.R. McMaster.52 The year under review witnessed a steady crescendo in the US pushback against China across the military, economic and communication dimensions. Economic nationalists and a hyper-empowered national security establishment informed the Trump administration’s heavy-handed strategy towards China. This strategy went well beyond action/reaction dynamics proper of the security dilemma or the US government’s stated goals of taming Chinese economic predation and coercion «through strength», not to mention the president’s more profane extraction of economic concessions. In fact, there was little room left for US-China cooperation or consultations – as evidenced by the US decision to shut down the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Trump’s national security team and some of the economic hawks, which became more prominent in 2018, held a strong anti- China ideological bent. They were convinced that the Chinese Communist Party engaged in malign activities aimed at exporting its autocratic system of governance, ensnaring developing countries into neo-colonial «debt trap» diplomacy, hollowing out rich markets through economic predation, and sabotaging liberal democracies.53 In light of this maximalist diagnosis, the Trump administration’s national security team, and senior economic officials, acted above and beyond the China-sceptical bipartisan and bureaucratic consensus within the Beltway. Since the diagnosis was of malevolent international intent, the US government’s prescription to deal with China demanded a new «X Article» policy, namely a policy analogous to the Soviet containment advocated by George Kennan in an anonymous Foreign Affairs article in 1947.54 These drivers translated into a patchy, heavy-handed policy of containment, qualified by (partial) economic decoupling. One regular strategic consultant to the Department of Defense went as far as suggesting that the US government’s mission was actually «regime change», especially by halting the leading engine behind the Chinese Communist Party’s domestic legitimacy:

51. ‘Historical Reflections on U.S.-Japan Relations: The 60th Anniversary of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security’, 27 February 2020, Hudson Institute, Washington DC (https://www.hudson.org/events/1783-historical-reflections- on-u-s-japan-relations-the-60th-anniversary-of-the-1960-treaty-of-mutual-cooperation-and-security22020), quote from minute 44:50. 52. Ibid. 53. Multiple interviews and conversations with European diplomats, Japanese academics and US officials in Washington DC and Tokyo: 2018-2020 54. Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Sources of Chinese Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, N. 5, pp. 89-92. For the text of Kennan’s article, see X, ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, 25, 4, July 1947, pp. 566-582.

135 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow economic growth.55 Authoritative Japanese analysts recognized this fringe uber-hawkish group as partly informing the US government’s all-out-offensive, along with those in favour of weakening China (the «containers»), and the «balancers», who recognized the need to concomitantly engage China.56 The latter faction was hardly to be seen in the government. Still, there was tension between the US administration’s national-security hawks and the «America First» economic nationalists, who also eyed Japan and the Euro- pean Union’s trade surpluses; finally, Washington’s unilateralism frustrated its allies.57 Given these dangers and the potential downsides to Japan’s economic investments into regional supply chains, specialists have posited that «Japan clearly wants to avoid being entangled in the growing conflict between the US and China», and given Trump’s extortionist and protectionist instincts a degree of diplomatic hedging was only natural.58 In the authors’ view, however, Japan’s hedge against the United States was quite blunt given a relatively common assessment on the composite nature of the China challenge (see below) and the permanence of the US- Japan alliance as the key vector of Japan’s foreign policy, with no clear alternative in sight.59 Japanese officials also reasoned that a modicum of stability in Sino-Japanese relations rested on the very US China pushback: according to this logic, Chinese policymakers would seek strategic latitude by mending relations with Japan. In fact, Japanese advocacy under the Abe administration has been particularly effective in cajoling a US rethink of its China policy − a matter of deep frustration during the Obama years.60 One notable example of these efforts in 2019 was Tokyo’s ability to share its Free and Open Indo- Pacific strategic vision with the United States and other likeminded par-

55. Conversation with US strategist involved in China matters, 17 June 2019, Washington DC; for more details on the US economic pushback against China, please refer to: Giulio Pugliese, ‘A Global Rorschach Test: Responding to the Belt and Road Initiative’, Defence Strategic Communications, NATO Excellence Centre Riga, Vol. 7 (2), December 2019, pp.113-32; Giulio Pugliese, ‘China Confronts «America First»: Re- cent Developments and Likely Scenarios’, Asia Trends, N.4, Paris: Asia Centre – Centre Études Asie, Autumn 2018, pp. 21-9. 56. Ryō Sahashi, ‘米中対立と日本: 関与から戦略的競争に移行するアメリカを中心に’ (US-China Confrontation and Japan: With a Focus on America’s Shift from Engagement to Strategic Competition), Kokusai Mondai, Vol. 688, January-February 2020, pp. 5-17, pp. 12-3; conversation with Japanese academic, 24 June 2019. 57. Hiroyuki Akita, ‘China hawks in Trump administration jostle for power’, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 26 January 2019. 58. Raymond Yamamoto, ‘Understanding Abe’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision Through Japan’s Development Assistance’, Pacific Forum Issues and Insights, Honolulu: Pacific Forum CSIS, Vol. 20 (1), March 2020, pp. 7-11. 59. Hiroyuki Akita, ‘Time for Asia to rethink its deep dependence on US for security’, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 3 March 2019. 60. YA (anonymous Japanese government official) ‘The Virtues of a Confronta- tional China Strategy’, The American Interest, 10 April 2020.

136 Japan 2019 ties. In short, the Japanese government was relatively sanguine about the US-China confrontation, because it left sufficient space for Japanese initiatives and facilitated a rethink in Chinese policymakers’ attitude towards its neighbour, a vital US ally.

3.1. Japan in an age of great power competition I: FOIP and broadened strategic horizons The FOIP concept provided a tangible measure of Japan’s and, to a lesser extent, Australia’s successes in sharing the narrative with allies and strategic partners, first and foremost the United States of America. To be sure, inter-governmental differences in interpretation of FOIP remain, also in terms of its geographic scope, but there is a degree of division of labour. Under the FOIP rubric Japan largely played «good cop» by providing economic alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This was quite different from Washington’s more militarized and disruptive «bad cop» approach, one that also aimed at the relocation of supply chains away from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Still, to better confront the China challenge, the evolution from «policy coordination» to «shared policy vision» testified to Japan’s appetite for growing interoperability with its American ally, and other like-minded partners, well beyond traditional security. At the same time, Japan’s recalibration of its FOIP messaging cleverly emphasized the inclusive qualities of Japan’s vision.61 Tokyo behaved so to assuage external players that were less inclined in picking sides in a US-China «Cold War». This was the case, for example, of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. The June 2019 endorsement by ASEAN of a constructive and ASEAN-centred reading of FOIP was pre-approved by China.62 Indeed, China refrained from venting public criticism of FOIP; this was a notable difference from the caustic words uttered by then-Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who, in March 2018, had alluded at the concept as a «headline-grabbing» idea that, «like the sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean», might get some attention, but was bound to soon «dissipate».63 In all likelihood, Washington’s aggressive China pushback and ASEAN leaders’ reassurances that their definition of the Indo-Pacific did not exclude China shaped State Councillor’s Wang Yi’s marked change of tone.64

61. Yuichi Hosoya, ‘FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo- Pacific Strategy’, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 26, 2019, pp. 18-28; Kitaoka Shinichi, ‘Vi- sion for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific’, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 26, 2019, pp. 7-17. 62. ‘ASEAN «インド太平洋の中心に»独自構想を採択’ (ASEAN ‘towards centrality of the Indo-Pacific’ – Opting for its Own Concept), Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 23 June 2019; conversation with Japanese academic, 20 November 2019, London. 63. ‘Scepticism over free and open Indo-Pacific strategy’, Straits Times, 12 Au- gust 2018. 64. ‘ASEAN – 米と距離’ (ASEAN Keeps its Distance from the US), Asahi Shim- bun, 2 August 2019, p. 9.

137 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow

Notably, FOIP testified to Japan’s expanding strategic horizons. Japa- nese policymakers under the security-conscious and China-wary Abe administration understood the BRI’s Maritime Silk Road squarely in geopolitical terms. According to this understanding, Chinese economic clout and investment into port facilities in the Indian Ocean aimed at expanding control of the seas through a «String of Pearls» strategy. Hence, China-controlled harbours across that Ocean would − slowly but surely − assist the Chinese People Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) military deployment into the In- do-Pacific.65 On the Eastern front, Japan and like-minded parties followed with apprehension China’s growing economic and physical presence in the Pacific Islands for similar reasons.66 Along with Japan, Australian policymakers too feared China’s «double-edged» economic embrace and regional assistance.67 In their view, China’s economic assistance entailed the risk that Chinese influence across the small Pacific islands would eventually translate into Chinese military power in waters close to Australia.68 As a consequence, 2019 testified to Japan’s growingly concerted and coordinated regional engagement, with Australia, the United States, New Zealand, France, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, India. Interestingly, Japan’s connectivity push extended all the way to East Africa, where Japan intended to pursue a joint maritime capacity building project with the United Kingdom, and possibly start joint connectivity initiatives with the European Union through the EU-Japan Strategy for Sustainable Connectivity and High-quality Infrastructure.69 It helped that capacity-building projects were relatively cheap, but coordination among donors and with recipient countries was no easy task. Japan’s engagement with Sri Lanka and the Pacific Islands provides an excellent window on Tokyo’s multi-faceted statecraft through economic inducements, diplomatic visits and little-appreciated mini-lateral coordination. Tokyo offered to develop portions of the Colombo port, to donate de-commissioned coast guard patrol vessels to the Sri Lankan Navy and

65. Interview with former high-ranking Japanese government official from the Prime Minister’s Office, Tokyo, 20 December 2019; conversations with Japanese officials in charge of Sri Lanka and FOIP: MOJ official, 23 December 2019, Tokyo; MOFA official, 11 February 2020; MOFA official, 21 February 2020, Washington DC; conversation with Japanese academic specializing on Chinese development finance, 26 January 2020. 66. ‘ソロモン諸島染まる中国色’ (Solomon Islands Falling into China’s Hands), Asahi Shimbun, 18 July 2019; ‘特別区構想揺れるマーシャル諸島’ (Special Zones Concept – The Marhsall Islands Shake), Asahi Shimbun, 18 July 2019; ‘人口５万の島国に中国の影’ (China’s Shadow over Islands Country of Fifty Thousand Souls), Asahi Shimbun, 18 July 2019. 67. On China’s «double-edged aid»: Liselotte Odgaard, Double-Edged Aid: China’s Strategy to Gain Influence through Regional Assistance, Hudson Institute, 12 March 2020. 68. Participant presentation at ‘Economic Statecraft in the Indo-Pacific’ Work- shop, 27-28 May 2019, Center for Rule-making Strategies – Tama University, Tokyo. 69. Conversation with European diplomat, 9 January 2020, Tokyo.

138 Japan 2019 to assist in the infrastructure developing of the Trincomalee harbour. This latest project was an evident jab at China’s appropriation of the Hamban- tota port and its potential militarization.70 Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official visit to Japan in 2018 resulted in a Japan-India Vision State- ment that remarked the synergy in joint connectivity projects in the region, including Sri Lanka.71 First-hand interviews suggest that India had directly asked Japan to push for a physical presence there, and was particularly welcoming of successive strategic port calls by Japanese warships.72 Similarly, Japan’s 2019 engagement in the Pacific – replete with new exchange and capacity building programmes, economic diplomacy, and the first high-level diplomatic visits in 32 years by a Japanese foreign minister – clearly worked in lockstep with initiatives taken in Washington, Canberra and Wellington.73 Vanuatu, where Japan inaugurated a new diplomatic mission in January 2020, was the most likely island country to host a Chinese military facility in the future, which would allow the PLAN to extend beyond the so-called First Island Chain.74 The Japanese government also engaged in joint infrastructure projects through public-private partnerships sponsored by the Japanese, Australian and American policy banks: these included an expansion of Papua New Guinea’s electric power grid, as well as co- financing of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply and telecommunications systems there.75 Marking the increased importance of connectivity competition in the broadened Asia-Pacific, in 2019 the United States inaugurated its new International Development Finance Corporation, which overtook and expanded the firepower and responsibilities of its earlier incarnation. On its part, Canberra established the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific and expanded the mandate and financial capacity of its export credit and overseas infrastructure financing agency.76 It is all the more

70. Fabio Leone, ‘Sri Lanka 2018: The Unfinished Drama of an Island State Democracy’, Asia Maior 2018, p. 350. 71. India Ministry of External Affairs, India-Japan Vision Statement, 29 October 2018 (https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30543/IndiaJapanVision- Statement) 72. Interview with high-ranking Japanese official from the Prime Minister’s Office, Tokyo, 20 December 2019; conversations with Japanese officials in charge of Sri Lanka and FOIP: 23 December 2019, Tokyo, 11 February 2020. 73. Satohiro Akimoto, ‘The great power game in the Pacific: What Japan can do’, Japan Times, 24 December 2019. 74. ‘中国と南太平洋 – 影響力拡大に警戒が必要’ (China and the Southern Pacific Islands – Alert Needed Given Its Expansion of Influence), Yomiuri Shinbun, 24 September 2019. 75. ‘日米豪、パプアに協調融資LNG開発に1100億円超’ (Japan-US-Australia Co-Financing in Papua – More than 110 Billion Yen for LNG Development), Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 25 June 2019. 76. Japan Bank for International Cooperation, ‘OPIC(US), JBIC(Japan), DFAT/Efic (Australia) Reaffirm Commitment to Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Develop- ment’, 25 June 2019.

139 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow remarkable that Japan’s efforts in the Pacific also rested on the good offices of a major Japanese Non-Profit Organization, which complemented and supported the government’s activities there, to «increase the effectiveness of the Japanese government’s strategy for the regional security of the Pacific islands», as per one of its financed projects.77 Finally, the United States’ Blue Dot Network, an infrastructure certification system established in 2019 in close partnership with Japan and Australia, built on the «partnership for quality infrastructure» agenda that Tokyo had consistently pushed for since the 2016 G-7 Ise-Shima Summit and 2019 G-20 Osaka summit.

3.2. Japan in an age of great power competition II: Economic statecraft and relations with the US, China and South Korea 3.2.1. Japan’s relations with the US Abe has gone to great lengths to appease and have a fruitful working relationship with Trump. In February 2019 it emerged that the US President had asked for Abe’s endorsement to his (the US President’s) nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize, in light of the historic US-North Korea summit.78According to Japanese diplomatic sources, the Japanese Prime Minister diligently fulfilled Trump’s request for a nomination by producing a five-page letter. This was a remarkable event, considering Abe’s deep reservations of Washington’s opening towards North Korea and his preference for a maximum pressure policy.79 Similarly, Trump’s four-day visit to Japan, starting on 25 May, was short on deliverables, but high on symbolisms and targeted communication that appealed to the US President’s ego-narcissism and electoral base. For instance, Trump was the first foreign leader to meet the new Emperor whereas most foreign dignitaries, including China’s, would salute him only in October. This was a record that Trump duly tweeted,80 and highlighted with usual bombast: «I am the guest, meaning the United States is the guest, but Prime Minister Abe said to me, very specifically, ‘You are the guest of honour. There’s only one guest of honour.’ [I] represent the country. Of all the countries in the world, I’m the guest of honour at the biggest event they’ve had in over 200 years.»81 During the same visit, Trump attended a

77. Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Pacific Island Nations Program (https://www. spf.org/en/programs/pacific-islands); conversation with European diplomat, 9 Janu- ary 2020, Tokyo. 78. Philip Rucker & Carol Leonning, A Very Stable Genius: Donald J. Trump’s Test- ing of America, London: Penguin Press, 2020, p. 187. 79. ‘Abe shushō «Toranpu-shi wo Nōberu-shō ni» no hamon’ (The Ripple Ef- fects of Prime Minister’s Abe endorsement of Trump to the Nobel Prize), Tōyō Keizai, 22 February 2019. 80. ‘An Old Tweet Haunts Trump As He Brags About Meeting Japanese Em- peror’, Hill Reporter, 27 May 2019. 81. ‘For Trump, a «very big event» in Japan that he struggles to explain’, Wash- ington Post, 24 May 2019.

140 Japan 2019 sumo tournament and presented the winning wrestler with an eagle-topped «President’s Cup», a first for an American president.82 At the same time, Japan compromised on a bilateral trade agreement with the United States, which remained its most valuable foreign market. On 17 May, the White House announced that the Commerce Department’s investigation into automobile imports under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 found that the automotive industry was critical to US «national security» (a term often overused by the Trump administration to raise protectionist measures); concomitantly the White House instructed the US Trade Representative to engage into negotiations with the European Union and Japan to rectify impairments resulting from their exports in the industry.83 This was a clear means of increasing US leverage in ongoing US-Japan trade negotiations, but − differently from the European Union’s more confrontational posture − the Abe administration did not stall negotiations. The Trump administration was still embroiled in a protracted tariff war with China throughout 2019, which could have allowed Japan to wait out the US President. Instead, the Abe government announced a limited bilateral trade deal that essentially created a levelling field in the rich Japa- nese market between American agricultural and farm producers on the one hand and competitors from the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership on the other.84 While the trade agreement did not explicitly spell out the abandonment of future US automobile tariffs/negotiations, the Japanese government left the European Union to deal with the unpleasant issue of dealing with Trump,85 preserved a good relationship with Trump, and appeared to bide its time to lure a future American administration back into the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

3.2.2. Economic statecraft and Japan’s relations with China The Japanese government aimed many of its international economic initiatives at China more decisively in 2019, and hinted that it would up its game in the coming years. The Abe administration acted on a clear distinction between win-win Sino-Japanese complementarities and techno-hegemonic risks associated with China’s rise. With regard to the former, the Japanese government welcomed and pushed for summit di-

82. ‘Bei daitōryō-hai, rainen ikō mo zōtei he’ (US President’s Cup to be Pre- sented Also from Next Year Onwards), Asahi Shimbun, 26 May 2019. 83. The White House, Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts Into the United States, 17 May 2019 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/adjusting-imports-automobiles-automobile-parts-united-states). 84. The White House, Joint Statement of the United States and Japan, 25 Septem- ber 2019; ‘U.S., Japan reach a limited deal on agriculture, digital trade’, POLITICO, 25 September 2019. 85. Conversation with Japanese automotive industry representative, 21 Janu- ary 2020, Washington DC.

141 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow plomacy with the Chinese leadership, also to improve its national appeal among Chinese public opinion and enhance Japan’s market access to Chi- na. In 2019, Japan registered its record amount of foreign tourists – 30 million − most of them Chinese, who also travelled to Japanese regions off the beaten track.86 On their part, Japanese automakers preferred to take advantage of the rich Chinese automotive market by setting up shop there, including advanced electric car factories.87 On the other hand, Ja- pan was roughly on the same page with its US ally. Tokyo became growingly aware of the «dual-use» risks of new technologies – especially under China’s «military-civil fusion» path to technological innovation. Moreover, Japanese government officials acknowledged the strong competitive elements behind China’s technological superiority in the Internet of Things, robot technology, Artificial Intelligence, Quantum technology and the like.88 The Japanese government was particularly concerned with China’s dominant position in the telecommunication industry, as evidenced by Huawei’s advances in 5G technology and its forays in submarine cables. As a consequence, Tokyo quietly lined up with Washington’s decision to embargo, weaken and offer alternatives to the Chinese Information and Communications Technology industry, for both security and economic reasons (i.e. to protect its industries).89 Thus, the Japanese government was redoubling its efforts at economic statecraft, the use of economic and tech policy to advance security and diplomatic goals. After all, US-China strategic competition has led to increased uncertainty in the global economy and as a result Tokyo was seeking to adjust to the new and more difficult environment. The Japanese government announced that it would add an Economic Team within its National Security Secretariat, and would reportedly formulate a National Economic Security Strategy by the end of 2020, possibly through a revised National Security Strategy.90 Thus, aside from infrastructure competition, securitized aid, strategic free trade agreements – all topics already covered by these authors elsewhere91 − Tokyo inaugurated tighter investment

86. ‘訪日客「地方へ直行」急増’ (Inbound Visitors: Sudden Increase in ‘Di- rect Flights to Rural Areas’), Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 22 December 2019. 87. Interview with METI official, 7 January 2020. 88. Cabinet Office of Japan,「国家安全保障戦略」の現時点での評価について (Evaluation of the ‘National Security Strategy’ at present), 18 December 2018 (https:// www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/anzenhoshouhyouka.html). 89. Hiroyuki Akita, ‘海底が握る大国の命運’ (The Bottom of the Seas Holds the Destiny of Great Powers), Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 23 May 2019; Mathieu Duchâtel, Japan’s 5G: a Mirror for Europe, Institut Montaigne, 26 February 2020; ‘Govt looks to counter China’s growing submarine cable presence’, Yomiuri Shinbun, 8 January 2020. 90. ‘Japan likely to draw up economic security strategy in 2020’, The Japan News, 5 January 2020. 91. Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow, ‘Japan 2018: Fleshing out the «Free and Open Indo-Pacific» strategic vision’, Asia Maior 2019, pp. 101-128.

142 Japan 2019 screening, and more seriously considered trade embargoes, wider export controls, and technological protection, mostly with China in mind. For instance, the government pushed for revisions to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, through tougher rules to screen acquisitions by foreign firms on national security grounds; foreign investors would be required to notify authorities of acquisition of 1% or more in stakes in Japanese companies; this measure targeted a broad set of designated sectors to prevent «leakage of information on critical technologies as well as disposition of business activities».92 Japan’s tightening of foreign investment screening mechanisms closely followed in the footsteps of similar initiatives in the United States, Eu- rope, Israel and the like. The willingness to better coordinate actions with the White House’s National Security and National Economic Councils was also part of the calculus.93 Still, a reconsideration of Japan’s presence in regional and global supply chains, as well as preservation of its technological edge was likely also aimed at defusing the political risks associated with US economic offensive towards China. Ministry of Economics Trade and Industry (METI) officials agreed with the US government on the technological and economic risks associated with China’s rise, but not with the US potent decoupling prescription, given Japanese embeddedness in regional supply networks; still, fieldwork research found − on balance – sanguinity concerning US economic countermeasures vis-à-vis China.94 Concomitantly, the Japanese government countered China’s Digital Silk Road through a mix of norm/standard-setting initiatives with likeminded counterparts concerned with «data free flow with trust», as well as providing regional players with software and hardware infrastructure alternatives to China’s.95 Japan moved in the same direction with regard to multilateral summits preoccu- pied with global governance.96 Compounded by a relatively buoyant business community, the Japanese government’s initiatives suggested there was real momentum for a more assertive set of economic statecraft initiatives that targeted China.

92. Ministry of Finance of Japan, Frequently Asked Questions on the Amendment Bill of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, 31 October 2019 (https://www.mof.go.jp/ english/international_policy/fdi/faq_191031.pdf, accessed on 4 April 2020). 93. Interview with high-ranking Japanese official from the Prime Minister’s Office, Tokyo, 20 December 2019. 94. Interview with METI officials, 29 May 2019, 23 December 2019, 7 January 2020, Tokyo. 95. Dai Mochinaga, ‘The Expansion of China’s Digital Silk Road and Japan’s Response’, Asia Policy, volume 15, number 1 (January 2020), pp. 41–60; On the normative side of things, an EU-Japan Data Transfer adequacy agreement entered into force on January 2019: Samantha Green, ‘Will the EU-Japan Data Transfer Partner- ship Agreement Have Global Influence?’, Law.com, 27 March 2019. 96. Government of Japan, The G-20 Leaders Osaka Declaration, (https://g20.org/ en/g20/Documents/2019-Japan-G20%20Osaka%20Leaders%20Declaration.pdf).

143 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow

Amidst a deepening uncertainty of regional dynamics, Japan looked forward to project an idea of stability with China through summit diplomacy. But competitive undercurrents still defined Sino-Japanese interaction. The year under review registered a substantial increase of Chinese incursions in the contiguous zones of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, almost doubling the previous year’s number, but one needs to make a distinction between Chinese activity in the contiguous zones and the territorial waters: the former would be legal even if China recognized Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku. Sino-Japan diplomatic engagement did not prevent To- kyo from emphasizing China’s activities around the disputed islands, even when such activities were not necessarily unlawful.97 On infrastructure competition, Tokyo’s recourse to diplomatic property and its unwillingness to publicly condemn China’s BRI – unlike Washington’s grotesque and ama- teurish public diplomacy offensive – ought not to be taken at face value, because Tokyo remained highly sensitive to China’s economic influence.98 In 2019, Italy’s accession to the BRI, and, separately, the expansion of the «16 + 1» China and Central and Eastern Europe Countries initiative to include Greece worried especially American and Japanese diplomats, no matter the actual content of those initiatives.99 Concomitantly, Japan’s infrastructure cooperation with China in third countries was premised on shaky grounds, to the extent that former Ambassador to China, Niwa Uichirō, suggested that it was mostly «just rhetorical»,100 an important testimony since the general trading company he once chaired, Itōchū, signed one of the many MoUs with Chinese counterparts in late 2018. Abe was also among the first world leaders to − reportedly − criticize, at the bilateral level, Xi Jinping’s stance on Xinjiang, asking for restraint in Hong Kong and on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.101 Moreover, direct Kantei pressure on Zhongnanhai, headquarters for the Chinese Communist Party leadership and the State Council, allowed for the release of a Japanese academic − accused of seizing materials related to

97. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Records of Intrusions of Chinese Govern- ment and Other Vessels into Japan’s Territorial Sea, (updated monthly) (https://www.mofa. go.jp/files/000465486.pdf). 98. On Japan’s securitized approach to infrastructure competition: Nikolay Murashkin, Japan and the New Silk Road. Diplomacy, Development and Connectivity, Rout- ledge: London, 2020, pp. 53-4. 99. Liselotte Odgaard, ‘Europe’s Place in Sino-U.S. Competition’, in Ashley Tellis, Allison Szalwinski & Michael Wills (eds.), Strategic Asia 2020: U.S.-China Compe- tition for Global Influence, Seattle and Washington DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2020, pp. 247-74; Giulio Pugliese, ‘A Global Rorschach Test: Responding to the Belt and Road Initiative’, Defence Strategic Communications, NATO Excellence Centre Riga, Vol. 7 (2), December 2019, pp. 113-32. 100. Interview with former Ambassador Niwa, 22 December 2019, Japan. 101. ‘首相尖閣自制を要求’ (Prime Minister Requests Self-Restraint around the Senkaku), Sankei Shinbun, 24 December 2019.

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Chinese state secrets − and whose detention had generated quite an uproar among the intellectual community.102 These developments did not restraint Abe’s eagerness to host Xi for a state visit, which was originally planned for spring 2020 and subsequently postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The summit promised to be short on substance (not unlike the Italy-China BRI framework MoU), no matter the CCP leadership’s overtures and its insistence on unveiling a 5th bilateral statement highlighting the supposed start of a «New Era» of Sino-Japanese relations under Xi.103 It was indicative of US maximalism that American policymakers in Washington, DC fretted that Japan was com- promising too much by signing a bilateral statement that somewhat sought to stabilize Sino-Japanese relations. This attitude resembled the exagger- ate US pushback on the rather constructive (if symbolic) Italy-China BRI MoU.104 In fact, Sino-Japanese competition was more of the same if we include techno-economic competition, but with both governments grasping for new spin.

3.2.3. Japan’s relations with South Korea As noted above, Japan resorted to economic coercion in its relationship with South Korea. The South Korean Supreme Court ruled in favour of individual claims for wartime compensation –relinquished under the 1965 Republic of Korea-Japan normalization treaty – and the forced seizure of Japanese corporations’ assets to that end. Japan’s calls for international arbitration on the matter were consistently rebuffed by Seoul. Thus, shortly after the Osaka G-20 Summit in June 2019, the Japanese government introduced export controls on three materials used in smartphone displays and semiconductor manufacturing, requiring export licenses on an ad hoc basis. This decision effectively added South Korea to the list of countries for which export controls were required. Japan has a near monopoly of some key chemical and advanced industrial products used as smartphone components. Accordingly, Japan’s decision to delist Korea from the «white list» of trustable countries for dual-use items was bound to make it more bur- densome to export some products there, with the need for singular export

102. Scholars at Risk, ‘On October 21, 2019, it was reported that Chinese authorities detained a professor of Chinese history from Japan’s Hokkaido University on suspicion of spying,’ (https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/report/2019-10-21-hokkaido- university); ‘中国、北大教授を解放当局、「スパイ容疑」と主張’ (China Frees Hokkaido Professor, but Authorities Label Him as ‘Suspected of Spying’), Mainichi Shinbun, 16 November 2019. 103. Interview with Japanese academic, 27 December 2019, Tokyo. 104. Japan Society, ‘Geopolitics of Coronavirus: Japan and Korea’, 10 April 2020, Minute 48:20 onwards, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j57vsx5e5HM).

145 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow licenses on a case by case basis.105 Essentially, this measure was intended as an informal sanction towards South Korea, one that would slow down its export-led manufacturing economy. In reality, though, the delisting of South Korea eventually turned out to be a symbolic measure, aimed less at hitting Seoul than pandering Japanese nationalist crowds. The move was planned in advance, made after the G-20, and was certainly contradictory with Japan’s attempt to salvage an open world economy in Osaka.106 Evi- dence also suggests that the Prime Minister’s Office initiated these pressure tactics by empowering fellow hawks in METI, and these measures coincided with the Upper House elections and a high tide of anti-Korean feelings.107 Allegations of South Korean trade diversion of some exports to countries, such as North Korea or China, helped Japan to prepare its case in the event of international litigation. Still it was evident that Tokyo was making use of coercive economic statecraft with a quasi-ally, and the move suggested that it may well do so in the future with strategic rivals, such as China; these tactics were under review of the new National Security Secretariat team.108 The United States’ hands-off approach reinforced the conflicting tides between South Korea and Japan. Still, private and public US pressure made South Korea reconsider earlier threats to quit the General Security of Military In- formation Agreement, a military intelligence pact with Japan. This was the worst crisis between Tokyo and Seoul since 1965 and promised to result in major economic boycotts and the crystallization of mutual mistrust.

3.3. Japan’s security and diplomatic maturation The year under review provided further evidence that Abe’s Japan qualified as a proactive and security-conscious player in the international chessboard. A report confirmed Abe’s pet interest in security and foreign policy matters throughout his tenure by detailing the numerous work meetings with the head of the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office and new head of the National Security Secretariat, Kitamura Shigeru, and outgoing

105. Suzuki Kazuto, ‘対韓輸出管理問題がここまでこじれた理由’ (Why Did the Export Controls Towards South Korea Worsen to This Point?), The Asahi Shimbun, 19 July 2019. 106. Conversation with Japanese diplomat, 16 July 2019, Washington DC. 107. Yakushiji Katsuyuki, ‘高まる｢嫌韓｣､対韓強硬論にこれだけのリスク事態を打開するには｢日韓首脳会談｣しかない’ (Rising ‘Anti-Korea’ Tide, The Only Way to Solve the Crisis of an Anti-Korea Maximalist Policy is to Do a ‘Japan-South Korea Summit’), Tōyō Keizai, 12 June 2019; Kawase Tsuyoshi, ‘日本政府は韓国の輸出規制を再考すべきだ’ (The Japanese Government Should Reconsider its Export Controls Towards South Korea), Tōyō Keizai, 13 July 2019; interview with Japanese government officials from MOFA testified to frustration among strategic players in Japan on the rushed decision: 10 July 2019 and 16 July 2019. 108. Conversation with Japanese official, Tokyo, January 2020.

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National Security Advisor Yachi Shōtarō.109 Abe also made key security appointments by choosing among close bureaucratic loyalists, many of whom were his former executive secretaries.110 The Japanese government’s appetite for the procurement and deployment of offensive capabilities, as per the December 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), and its initiatives in the Iran crisis (on which, more later) testify to its security and diplomatic maturation. In the face of a rapidly changing power balance, Chinese military expansion and «grey zone» pressure tactics, Abe and his policy team’s credo translated into an overhaul of Japan’s security regime. This was mainly aimed at balancing China, which was seen as Japan’s most pressing security challenge in the 21st Century. In the words of a prominent scholar, the two Abe administrations unveiled «the most security and deterrence-prone China policy you would ever get in Japan.»111

3.3.1. Japan’s security and diplomatic maturation I: Towards offensive capabilities According to the literature, deterrence can be disentangled into a more offensive «punishment» strategy that allows states to strike an adversary’s territory through long-range strike capabilities, and a more defensive «denial» approach that prioritizes the development of capabilities aimed at tailoring and limiting the damage of potential military threats.112 Japan’s inability to match the pace of Chinese military modernization meant that it was bound to rely on US extended deterrence (through the nuclear umbrella) along with closer alliance cooperation, based on promoting «jointness» and interoperability between the armed forces of Japan and the USA. Still, Japan’s main deterrence strategy was premised on denial, because it aimed at shoring up its asymmetric capabilities to make a Chinese invasion of the archipelago as costly as possible. Japan’s strategy somehow reflected China’s own Anti-Access Area Deni- al (A2/AD) approach and was still largely in line with Japan’s traditional «defensive realist» stance that maximized security for the purpose of homeland defence, while mitigating the regional security dilemma.113 And Japan’s recalibration of its defences towards its far-flung southwestern flank, along with

109. ‘Gaikō anpo medatsu menkaisū’ (The Number of Meetings Reveal Impor- tance of Foreign and Security Policy), Asahi Shimbun, 27 December 2019. 110. ‘Abe names close aides to key security posts, raising concerns’, The Asahi Shimbun, 24 September 2019. 111. Interview with prominent China specialist, 1 June 2019, Tokyo. 112. Luis Simón, ‘Between punishment and denial: Uncertainty, flexibility, and U.S. military strategy toward China’, Contemporary Security Policy, published online on 21 January 2020, p. 2. 113. See for example: Eivind Lande, ‘Between Offensive and Defensive Real- ism – The Japanese Abe Government’s Security Policy toward China’, Asian Security, Vol. 14 (2), 2018, pp. 172-92.

147 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow the establishment of an amphibious rapid deployment brigade, the installation of new mid- and short-range surface-to-ship and surface-to-air missile units, deployment of ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems − both ashore and at sea − and redoubled efforts in promoting anti-submarine warfare all point at the prioritization of homeland defence and deterrence by denial. The United States had actively sponsored the development of its Asia- Pacific allies’ denial capabilities to prevent China’s regional dominance. For instance, the US-Japan alliance deterred Chinese expansionism into the China Seas by performing activities in support of freedom of navigation and strengthening the denial capabilities of Southeast Asian states through military/constabulary capacity building (e.g. provision of coast guard ships and training of coast guard forces there).114 These initiatives were welcome by Japan, and many arguably followed in the footsteps of earlier Japanese initiatives.115 Throughout 2019 Japan was seeking new Western partners in joint capacity building programmes in the Indo-Pacific all the way to East- ern Africa.116 Under the Trump administration, the US increased the number of freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), while more actively en- listing the participation of likeminded partners in the deterrence mix, and deploying its military and Coast Guard vessels in East Asian waters. In order to reassure its allies, the US claimed it would retain the ability to «punish», or defeat China, especially through strategic and, «if necessary», tactical nuclear weapons.117 In line with this promise, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Re- view strengthened the flexibility of the US nuclear force structure through submarine-launched tactical nuclear weapons that may come in handy in Northeast Asia. The latter being a move that was reportedly in line with the expectations of some influential Japanese defence planners and analysts.118 The Japanese government was reassured by the Trump administration’s «principled realist» overhaul of US strategic posture, which underscored inter-state competition and great power rivalry. Significantly, Japanese policy planners were reportedly «relatively appreciative of a

114. Scott W. Harold, Yoshiaki Nakagawa, Junichi Fukuda, John A. Davis, Keiko Kono, Dean Cheng & Kazuto Suzuki, The US-Japan alliance and deterring grey zone coercion in the maritime, cyber and space domains, Santa Monica, California: Rand Cor- poration, 2017. 115. Jay Tristan Tarriera, ‘What Is the US Coast Guard’s Role in the Indo- Pacific Strategy?’, The Diplomat, 21 June 2019. 116. Conversation with European diplomat, 9 January 2020, Tokyo. 117. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review - 2018, Washington DC, 2018, p. 48 (https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018- NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF). 118. David McNeill, ‘Strategic approach: Washington’s shifting nuclear policy in the Asia-Pacific region is putting Japan in a difficult position’, Japan Times, 29 July 2017; Masashi Murano, ‘What the New US Nuclear Posture Means for Northeast Asia’, The Diplomat, 29 August 2018.

148 Japan 2019 harsh US China policy».119 In fact, Japan’s summit diplomacy with China was grounded on those very foundations. China was front and centre of Washington’s prioritization of states-based threats, which was addressed through a «whole-of-government» approach, based on the employment of all sources of US power, including counterintelligence and raw propaganda.120 Behind the US president’s crude mercenary instincts, an empowered national security establishment sought to increase US strength and credibility, ramp up the confrontational rhetoric, and exert pressure on foes and friends alike to comply with US objectives. The high number of officials in charge of East Asian security and diplomatic affairs hailing from the military was indicative of this logic.121 In 2019, the Department of Defense’s inauguration of a new deputy assistant secretary position with exclusive oversight over China matters and the promotion of a hawkish China specialist to the ranks of deputy national security advisor, a first in the history of the US National Security Council (NSC), showed the importance assigned to the People’s Republic of China.122 The US executive office had also changed the language register to wage an all-out communication war against China and its signature policies, such as the BRI.123 In the process, the legislative branch of government has followed through, by promoting the Congress-led National Defense Authorization, the Asia Re- assurance Initiative, the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, and the Uighur Intervention and Global Humanitarian Unified Response Act. The administration’s budget proposals for national security were the highest since the height of the Iraq War, and set to increase further the following year.124 Washington’s escalation dominance traditionally also targeted and circumscribed Japan’s manoeuvrability, but this was changing under Trump. According to a former US defence official, the ability for «the US to ‘concentrate on the offensive side of things’ would mean that ‘Japan would not have to do it itself,’ and that ‘would also be most welcome from the perspective

119. Interview with high-ranking Japanese official, Tokyo, 20 December 2019. 120. Robert Sutter, ‘Washington’s «Whole-of-government» Pushback Against Chinese Challenges—Implications and Outlook’, PacNet, No. 26, Honolulu: CSIS Pacific Forum, 23 April 2019. 121. For instance: in 2019 retired Brigadier General David Stillwell was nominated Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the Department of State. 122. ‘Trump Picks Matt Pottinger as Deputy National Security Adviser’, Wall Street Journal, 20 September 2019. Matt Pottinger’s uninterrupted service at the NSC under four very different National Security Advisors also testifies to his centrality in crafting the US China strategy. 123. Robbie Gramer & Elias Roll, ‘With New Appointment, State Department Ramps Up War Against Foreign Propaganda’, Foreign Policy, 7 February 2019. 124. ‘Trump signs $738 billion defense bill. Here’s what the Pentagon is poised to get’, CNBC, 20 December 2019.

149 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow of managing the Japan alliance adequately.’»125 After all, the Obama administration had prevented Abe’s Japanese acquisition of strike capabilities.126 In these authors’ view, the advent of the Trump administration allowed for a change in US defence planners’ calculus, one that provided incentives for Japanese rearmament beyond deterrence by denial. This was the end product of the new, more confrontational approach of the US government towards China, one that enlisted like-minded partners for its «big stick diplomacy» towards China, and the US President’s desire to boost American exports, including expensive arms sales. In 2019, Japan procured power projection capabilities that would have allowed for a more offensive declination of deterrence, although capabilities were still limited. To be sure, Japanese armed forces remain politically constrained to strictly defensive functions: a deeply engrained antimilitarist and anti-nuclear ethos both prevented the acquisition of nuclear weapons and curtailed Abe’s ability to make a rounder use of the military as a tool of statecraft.127 But most scholars do not appreciate the full extent of the Abe administration’s relaxation of the legal constrains previously limiting Japan’s offensive capabilities. For instance, constitutional reinterpretation in favour of collective self-defence contained a subtle, if notable, expansion of the rationale behind self-defence: the government would exercise self-defence and collective self-defence to protect an ill-defined – and therefore amenable to flexible interpretation – people’s «right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness».128 An influential public official closely linked with Abe’s security reforms wondered why the Prime Minister was so fixated with constitutional revision, since there was, in fact, ample room of manoeuvre within the boundaries of the 2014 constitutional reinterpretation and 2015 peace and security legislation.129 Thus, since «interpretations of the constitution have contributed to set expectations over what capabilities should and should not be within the reach of the national defense posture»,130 a more malleable interpretation of

125. Former US defense official (October 26, 2016) cited in Luis Simón, ‘Betwe- en punishment and denial: Uncertainty, flexibility, and U.S. military strategy toward China’, Contemporary Security Policy, p. 12. 126. ‘US voices objections to Japan’s plan to ensure «preemptive strike capabilities»’, Hankyoreh, 5 October 2013. 127. Sheila A. Smith, Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019. 128. Ministry of Defense of Japan, 憲法と自衛権－(2)憲法9条の下で許容される自衛の措置 (The Constitution and the Right to Self-Defense – (2) Measures Al- lowed for Self-Defense Under Article 9 of the Constitution), https://www.mod.go.jp/j/ approach/agenda/seisaku/kihon02.html, accessed on 26 March 2020. 129. Interview with high-ranking Japanese government official, 23 May 2019, Tokyo. 130. Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘Alessio Patalano on Japan’s Growing Naval Power’, The Diplomat, 4 June 2019.

150 Japan 2019 the anti-militarist constitution was allowing for gradual, yet potentially significant, changes in Japan’s security posture. For instance, during Trump’s visit to Japan, in a historic first, Trump addressed military personnel along with Abe on top of the Kaga helicopter carrier that − as per the December 2018 Cabinet-approved NDPG − was now allowed to host aircrafts, such as expensive F-35Bs with their short take-off and vertical landing capabilities.131 In fact, in 2019 Japan confirmed its acquisition of 105 F-35s: 62 F-35A for the Air Self-Defense Force and 43 F-35Bs for Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). By 2030 the fleet was poised to reach a total of 147 F-35s, making Japan the largest foreign buyer of the Lockheed Mar- tin-made jet, possibly tipping the balance of fifth-generation air power in Japan’s favour, especially if the F-35s worked through a seamless alliance integration, allowing Japan to share US carriers. Moreover, Japan announced its intention to procure long-range joint strike missiles and joint air-to-surface stand-off missiles, tailored for its F35 fleet.132 The capacity for Japan’s two carriers to host up to ten F-35Bs, the aircraft’s stealth technology and its multirole capabilities suggest that Japan was moving beyond air defence to also include penetration of adversaries’ air defences. At the same time, the Kantei’s dependence on US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme risked holding Japan’s force structure and military planning hostage of Trump’s «Buy American» desiderata, and, at the same time, potentially weakening Japan’s defence industrial base.133 The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) officially maintains that the two Izumo-class warships are «multifunctional destroyers», but they are in fact aircraft carriers. As such, they endow Japan with mobile air defence platforms and a degree of power projection, albeit a modest one given the limited number and size of the JMSDF carriers. At the same time, authoritative voices doubted the appropriateness of procuring large military vessels, in light of China’s sophisticated anti-ship missiles (from ground, air and sea), and the steep costs of procuring, operating and maintaining an aircraft carrier.134 On the other hand, since the China challenge was often based on showcasing resolve and overwhelming military and constabulary

131. ‘In symbolic first, Abe and Trump jointly address military personnel aboard Japan’s Kaga carrier’, Japan Times, 28 May 2019. 132. Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘Japan’s Ministry of Defense Confirms Plans to Pro- cure New Stand-off Missiles’, The Diplomat, 4 February 2020; Mike Yeo, ‘Japan inks deal with Kongsberg for F-35 standoff missile’, Defense News, 13 March 2019. 133. ‘F-35組み立て中止技術継承は’ (What Does Interruption of F-35 Assembly [in Japan] Mean for Technological Continuity?), Asahi Shimbun, 13 July 2019; ‘官邸主導くすぶる不満’ (Smouldering Discontent at Kantei Leadership), Asahi Shimbun, 13 July 2019. 134. Masashi Murano, ‘The Future of Deterrence Strategy in Long-Term Stra- tegic Competition’, in Yuki Tatsumi & Pamela Kennedy (eds.), Key Challenges in Japan’s Defense Policy, Washington DC: Stimson Center, March 2020, pp. 61-72; ‘Aircraft-carriers are big, expensive, vulnerable – and popular’, The Economist, 14 November 2019.

151 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow presence to its smaller neighbours, Japan’s carrier groups would likely be used to reassure Indo-Pacific littoral states through presence operations, possibly in close cooperation with other like-minded countries, such as the US, India, Australia France and the United Kingdom. The US President’s aforementioned May visit to Japan was meant to cater to Trump’s ego-narcissism, also by underlining Japan’s big ticket arms purchases, and showcase the strength and vitality of the US-Japan alliance. The latter was a distinct message − one of deterrence − that was aimed at North Korea and China. After all, a month earlier, the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee led by the ministries responsible for foreign affairs and defence matters emphasized «cooperation to introduce advanced weapons systems to Japan and to further streamline the foreign military sales process».135 Moreover, the 2+2 meeting would also aim at increasing deterrence in the cyber domain, by stating that «a cyberattack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article 5».136 This was a noteworthy development in alliance politics, one that went hand-in-hand with Japan’s quest for offensive cyber capabilities – for deterrence purposes during peacetime and defensive aims during a contingency – as per the 2018 overhaul of the NDPG.137 In 2019, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces’ (JSDF) cyberdefence unit had expanded from 150 to 220 personnel from the army, navy and air force,138 and reportedly «outsourced the development of offensive cyber capabilities to one or several unnamed private Japanese companies».139 Finally, the Abe administration and Japanese defence planners likely felt reassured by the US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.140 The withdrawal was nominally aimed at Russia’s violation of the treaty, but China’s development of nuclear and conventional missile capabilities was arguably a more pressing reason that hinted at a US- China missile race,141 prompting US overtures towards Japan’s acquisition

135. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Com- mittee (Japan-U.S. ‘2+2’), 19 April 2019 (https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/fa/page3e_001008. html, accessed on 27 March 2020). 136. Ibid. 137. Stefan Soesanto, Hotspot Analysis A one-sided Affair: Japan and the People’s Republic of China in Cyberspace, CSS – ETH Zurich, January 2020, p. 15. 138. Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense Programs and Budget of Japan, 21 December 2018 (https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/190510b.pdf). 139. Stefan Soesanto, Hotspot Analysis A one-sided Affair: Japan and the People’s Republic of China in Cyberspace, p. 15. 140. U.S. Department of State, ‘U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty on Au- gust 2, 2019’, 2 August 2019 (https://www.state.gov/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-inf-treaty-on-august-2-2019). 141. Tsuyoshi Minami, ‘Do China’s new missiles change the game?’, East Asian Forum, 29 February 2020.

152 Japan 2019 of conventional strike capabilities.142 In order to counter China’s ballistic and ground-launched cruise missile capabilities − on full display during the 1 October 2019 military parade celebrating the 70th Anniversary of the establishment of the PRC − the United States government swiftly considered installing land-based intermediate-range missiles in China’s proximity, Ja- pan being a prime candidate for deployment.143 The government was likely happy with the potential deployments, but Okinawa already made clear its opposition.144 In fact, in 2019 the Abe administration signalled its intention to counter China’s advances with its own intermediate-range missile force, deterring China through denial. Nonetheless, in line with this essay’s argument, the Japanese government also considered both the deployment of longer-rage strike missiles that could hit enemy territory, and development of its own hypersonic gliding vehicles.145 Concerning the latter point, it is worth stressing that China’s development of its hypersonic weapons questioned Japan’s missile defence system’s capacity to predict the course of incoming gliding missiles, a task that the US-developed Aegis Ashore system, designed to intercept and destroy incoming missiles, was unable to perform.146 As a consequence, Japan’s best defensive course was building up its offensive capabilities, on the premise that «tactically, having the option to go on the offensive will complicate the opponent’s calculations».147 Summing up, as evident in the year under review, Japan was, slowly but steadily, acquiring offensive capabilities, in close coordination with the United States.148 As a result, Japanese defence policy was venturing into a new era. It however remains to be seen whether Japan can elaborate an appropriate retaliatory military doctrine and create a credible offensive coun- terforce – especially with only conventional weapons and warheads.

142. ‘INTERVIEW/ Brad Roberts: Conventional strike capability by Japan good for deterrence’, Asahi Shimbun, 5 April 2020. 143. Sheila A. Smith, ‘Japan’s Interests in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Com- petition’ in Ashley Tellis, Allison Szalwinski & Michael Wills (eds.), Strategic Asia 2020: U.S.-China Competition for Global Influence, Seattle and Washington DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2020, pp. 45-74, p. 67. 144. ‘Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki Warns of Strong Resistance to U.S. Missiles in Japan’, Straits Times, 3 November 2019, cited in Sheila Smith, ‘Japan’s Interests in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition’, p. 67. 145. ‘Japan deploying longer-range missiles to counter China’, The Asahi Shim- bun, 30 April 2019. 146. Kazuto Suzuki, ‘深まる世界秩序の不確実性’ (Deepening Uncertainty of the World Order), Gaikō, December 2019, pp. 84-91; pp. 86-7. 147. Masahi Murano, ‘The Future of Deterrence Strategy in Long-Term Stra- tegic Competition’, p. 69. 148. ‘New missile deployment in Asia raised at Japan-U.S. talks’, The Asahi Shimbun, 22 October 2019.

153 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow

3.3.2 Japan’s security and diplomatic maturation II: Crisis diplomacy in Iran Amidst an exacerbation of US-Iran tensions, the Japanese government cut itself a space to reassure Tehran of Japan’s goodwill, providing at the same time a communication channel with Washington. In short, Japan’s initiatives over the worsening Iran crisis were, on balance, a success. In light of their alliance relationship with Washington and support of non-proliferation, past Japanese governments have sustained international efforts at curbing Tehran’s nuclear breakout. However, Tokyo’s earlier proposals to act as a mediator were reportedly rebuffed by the Obama administration.149 Tokyo was satisfied with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and supported the framework to allow its oil companies to resume development of oil fields in Western Iran.150 After all, Japan’s oil imports depend heavily on the Middle East – for about 87% by one account.151 Washington’s 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA and the reintroduction of sanctions for businesses trading with Iran meant that Japanese companies had to comply, if re- luctantly, to preserve good economic relations with the world’s largest economy. 152 Japan did not invest diplomatic energies in salvaging the JCPOA − an initiative it did not pursue − and preferred to avoid challenging its most important ally. Following Trump’s symbolic visit to Japan in May 2019, Abe secured a blessing for directly mediating with Tehran. Japan’s initiative culminated in the Japanese Prime Minister’s historic two-day diplomatic visit to the Islamic Republic in mid-June, reciprocated by Iranian President Has- san Rouhani’s visit to Japan in December. US Secretary of State Pompeo remarked during a press briefing that «President Trump had sent President Abe to take a message of his to the leadership in Iran»,153 but this was likely an oversimplification. In fact, Japan plausibly obtained a green light from the Trump administration for an independent diplomatic initiative that, not unlike France’s surprise invitation to Iran’s Foreign Minister during the 2019 G-7 Summit, aimed at curbing the US-Iran escalatory spirals.154 It was a diplomatic démarche that had the additional advantages of preserving Japan’s traditional goodwill with Tehran and boosting Abe’s support back home. After all, Tokyo wanted the US to keep focusing on East Asia and avoid need- less military engagements in the Middle East. The Prime Minister’s Office ability to «spin» the 12-14 June diplomatic visit – the first time a Japanese premier had visited the Islamic Republic

149. Conversation with think-tank expert, 5 January 2020, Tokyo. 150. ‘Inpex eyes bid for Iran’s Azadegan oil project’, Japan Times, 17 August 2017. 151. ‘Japan Still Reliant on Middle Eastern Oil’, Nippon.com, 25 June 2019. 152. ‘Inpex may drop second bid for Iran’s Azadegan oil project after sanctions decision’, Reuters, 10 May 2018. 153. U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo Remarks to the Press, 18 June 2019 (https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo- remarks-to-the-press-2). 154. Conversation with Japanese gov’t official; 10 July 2019, Washington DC.

154 Japan 2019

– did prop up Abe’s support rate.155 Abe’s foreign policy credentials and his perceived successes provided the premier with much needed political oxygen as the administration faced recurrent domestic scandals and an impasse in the domestic political agenda. Regular polls indicated that the Japanese government’s handling of diplomatic affairs was consistently well-regarded by public opinion.156 For that very reason Abe’s record-breaking diplomatic tours,157 televised speeches and multilateral summits have often aimed at polishing his political charm back home. For instance, the Prime Minister’s Office’s careful management of the domestic messaging surrounding Abe’s consistent, albeit unsuccessful, Rus- sia overtures demonstrates that political substance was not necessary for that diplomatic charm to work its magic.158 This was also facilitated by active control over information pertaining diplomatic discussions, characterized by a tightening unmatched by past practice (including secretive summit meetings with the North Korean leadership).159 Abe’s engagement with Rus- sia was, after all, premised on cool-headed calculations of Russia’s shrinking strategic horizons in the near future. According to a high-ranking government official, Moscow will eventually see the merits of responding positively to Japan’s overtures.160 The PM’s Russia policy has antagonized and alienated traditional MOFA diplomacy towards Russia. Many experts doubt the justifiability and manageability of negotiating in this style at this time with President Putin, who has antagonized much of Europe (when Japan is expanding security partnerships).161

155. ‘41年ぶり首相のイラン訪問・日本の中東外交は新たな局面’ (After 41 Years a Japanese Prime Minister Visits Iran – A New Stage in Japan’s Middle East Diplomacy), Sankei Shinbun, 19 June 2019. 156. According to the progressive-leaning Asahi Shimbun, Abe’s foreign policy was appreciated by more than 50% respondents throughout 2019. See, for example, ‘世論調査・質問と回答 (6月22，23日)’ (Public Opinion Polls – Questions and An- swers (22-23 June), Asahi Shimbun, 23 June 2019. 157. Abe holds the world record for countries visited by a sitting head of government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 総理大臣の外交訪問一覧 (A Look at the Prime Minister’s Diplomatic Visits), (https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/ page24_000037.html). 158. Akihiro Iwashita ‘Abe’s Foreign Policy Fiasco on the Northern Territories Issue: Breaking with the Past and the National Movement’, Eurasia Border Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, Fall 2019, pp. 111-33; Akihiro Iwashita, ‘安倍首相は元島民の声を聴いたのか’ (Did Abe Listen to the Voices of [the Northern Territories’] Former Residents?), Masukomi Shimin, Vol. 577, 2017, pp. 42-47; Akihiro Iwashita, ‘二〇一六年十二月安倍プーチン首脳会談に寄せて’ (Apropos the December 2016 Abe-Putin Summit Meet- ing), Gakushikai Kaihō, Vol. 2, 2017, pp. 23-37; 159. ‘Government’s state secrecy law still vague, rapped 5 years after enactment’, Mainichi Shinbun, 6 December 2018; interview with retired high-ranking Japa- nese diplomatic official from MOFA, 25 January 2019, Tokyo. 160. Interview with former high-ranking Japanese government official from the Prime Minister’s Office, Tokyo, 20 December 2019. 161. We are indebted to the third reviewer for raising these issues.

155 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow

Similarly to Japan’s Russia policy, Abe’s gamble in Iran did not seem to bring immediate results, quite the opposite. A new round of US sanctions ahead of his visit seemed to undermine Japan’s mission, while Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Hosseini Khamenei told the visiting guest, according to the Iran state media, that he «[did] not see Trump as worthy of any message exchange, [nor did he] have any reply for him, now or in future.»162 Finally, Iran’s reluctance to talk was seemingly demonstrated by unidentified attacks on a Japanese oil tanker, attacks that took place while Abe was in Iran. The course of events suggested that Abe’s visit wasn’t very prudent since it endangered a Japanese tanker’s safety. The Japanese government demonstrated an independent streak when it refuted US conclusions that Iran was behind the attack, in marked contrast with other US allies. After all, the nature of the attack was rather murky since it was designed to send a message rather than harm sailors or sink the tanker, with the limpet mine that hit the tanker placed relatively high. Moreover, even if the culprits may have hailed from the Revolution- ary Guard they may have not been acting in line with the senior Iranian leadership’s desires.163 On the other hand, Japan would have political interests in downplaying the incident: it would have exacerbated US-Iran tensions and put to test the actual merits of Abe’s hastily arranged historic visit to Iran. Only diplomatic archives will reveal the political machinations behind Abe’s surprise Tehran visit. Still, there is broad agreement among specialists and diplomats alike that Abe managed to act as a communication channel between the US and Iranian leaderships, constructively carv- ing out a diplomatic space for Japan, while avoiding entanglement in a potential conflict.164 Importantly, Abe’s trustworthiness was recognized in the aftermath of Trump’s decision to assassinate by drone Iranian General Qassem Soleimani on 3 January 2020; the Iranian leadership apparently communicated to Prime Minister Abe, among others, that there would not be further retaliation following a «face-saving» missile strike of a deserted US base in Iraq.165 The clear intent was to have the message passed to the US leadership. The Abe administration’s crisis diplomacy in Iran policy outgrew decades of timidity in the Middle East. Recent archival research has discredited the view of Japan’s allegedly independent balancing act during the hot years of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with its response to the 1973 Yom Kippur War as a prime example of such supposedly autonomous path. According

162. ‘Iranian leader tells Japan’s Abe Trump «not worthy» of a reply to message’, Reuters, 13 June 2019. 163. Interview with European diplomat, 10 January 2020, Tokyo; interview with Japanese government official, Prime Minister’s Office, 10 January 2020, Tokyo. 164. Conversation with European diplomat, 9 January 2020, Tokyo. 165. Interview with Japanese government official, Prime Minister’s Office, 10 January 2020, Tokyo.

156 Japan 2019 to the historical canon, in 1973 the Japanese cabinet sided with oil producing countries in the face of a threatened embargo, against US desiderata.166 Yet, declassified documents showed that the Japanese cabinet’s support for Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied during the 1967 War and statements in favour of the Arab camp were closely coordinated with the US government, which understood Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s electoral pressures. The US government, in fact, welcomed Tanaka Kakuei’s strategy, which was dovetailed nicely with US initiatives in favour of oil consumers’ cooperation.167 According to German political scientist Kai Schulze, the Jap- anese government inaugurated an independent and forceful Middle East policy only under the first and second Abe administrations. A set of initiatives that also eyed Chinese indents in the region culminated in the 2014 Japan-led Conference on the Cooperation among East Asian countries for Palestinian Development, now at its third round.168 The December 2019 Cabinet decision to dispatch two P-3C patrol planes and one destroyer in open seas off Yemen and Oman was sympto- matic of Japan’s security transformation. To be sure, the two P-3C aircraft were merely moved eastward from the Horn of Africa, where they were previously engaged in anti-piracy operations, in relatively safe waters. But, by doing so, Japan highlighted its determination in defending international shipping lanes throughout the Indo-Pacific, from Eastern Africa, to the Middle East, throughout the China Seas, Japan’s most important theatre. After all, about 80% of the oil Japan imported from the Middle East passed through the Strait of Hormuz. And with the dispatch of the P-3C planes and the destroyer to international waters away from Iran, the Japanese government solved the dilemma of providing support to the United States while avoiding a deterioration of relations with Tehran.169 In short, Tokyo was able to fend off US requests to participate in a military coalition responsible for patrolling Arab Gulf waters, thus steering clear of the area around the Strait of Hormuz, while showing commitment to the preservation of international public good. Arguably, Abe’s shuttle diplomacy and close reading of Presi- dent Trump and the US Congress’ instincts informed Japan’s mission: the

166. Kai Schulze, ‘Rivalry in the Middle East? Japan’s CEAPAD initiative and China’s rise’, Pacific Review, Vol. 32 (5), 2019, pp. 809-30; especially pp. 816-18. 167. Erika Miller, The United States, Britain and Japan in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1974: the Competing Claims of the Cold War and Oil, Unpublished PhD Thesis, King’s College London, 2019: pp. 173-185; 196-201; and Erika Tominaga, ‘Japan’s Middle East Policy, 1972–1974: Resources Diplomacy, Pro-American Policy, and New Left’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 28 (4), 2017, pp. 674-701. 168. Kai Schulze, ‘Rivalry in the Middle East? Japan’s CEAPAD initiative and China’s rise’, pp. 816-18; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Third Conference on Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development (CEAPAD), 27 June 2018, (https://www.mofa.go.jp/me_a/me1/palestine/page3e_000879.html). 169. ‘商船警護・日本のジレンマ’ (Protection of Commercial Ships – Japan’s Dilemma), Asahi Shimbun, 8 August 2019.

157 Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow probability of entrapment were low, although a potential emergency may still put its 260 military officials in the line of fire. Swift domestic approval of the mission testified to the soundness of the Abe administration’s security handling. The Japanese government entirely bypassed the legislative branch to sanction the dispatch of military assets overseas. It issued a Cabinet decision by invoking an obscure Law on the Es- tablishment of the Ministry of Defense that allowed for JSDF’s «investigation and research» activities.170 This is a lesser known security law, drafted during the early post-war, that has allowed the Minister of Defense to deploy Japa- nese military assets for intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions within Japan’s immediate proximity. Nonetheless, prior to 2019 it was never used to dispatch forces overseas. Interestingly, Japanese decision- makers mulled over the opportunity of using this law for sending military aid and perform refuelling operations in the Indian Ocean following the 2001 UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force intervention into Af- ghanistan, but to no avail given intra-LDP opposition.171 Opposition forced the Koizumi government to go through the Diet and secure an ad hoc special law with a sunset clause instead, and this process has been the norm for post- Cold War Japan’s international security engagements.172 The prompt 2019 decision was also a far cry from Japan’s small steps against piracy in the Gulf of Aden ten years earlier, which caused Washington’s frustration. In 2009, according to a former director at the US Department of State Japan Desk, the Japanese government was relatively late in deploying two destroyers and two P-3C aircraft for surveillance activities during another UN Security Council (UNSC)-mandated mission. Moreover, the military activities under the Self- Defense Force Law were grossly curtailed and awaited the Diet’s passage of an Anti-Piracy Law to augment its operational efficiency.173 In contrast, in 2019 the government swiftly issued a Cabinet Decision without waiting for a (highly unlikely) UNSC mandate and with no need for an ad hoc law. The dispatch may be renovated on an annual basis through other Cabinet Decisions, essentially allowing the prime minister to exercise his leadership. Finally, the manner and timing of the decision was also exemplary of the Prime Minister’s Office’s careful handling of domestic public opinion. The Cabinet decision neutralized the opposition party’s uproar by

170. ‘Japan’s Cabinet adopts plan to send SDF to Mideast amid Iran tensions’, Japan Times, 27 December 2019. 171. Shigeru Handa. ‘自衛隊は «調査研究»のために中東へ行く? 日本政府の奇妙な論理’ (The Self-Defense Forces’ «Investigation and Research» Activities as Ra- tionale for Middle East Dispatch? The Japanese Government’s Bizarre Logic, Gendai Media, 30 October 2019. 172. Sheila A. Smith, Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019. 173. Lecture notes, Johns Hopkins SAIS, Washington DC, Autumn 2009; Vic- tor Teo, Japan’s Arduous Rejuvenation as a Global Power, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019, pp. 182-83.

158 Japan 2019 providing less time in the Diet to grill Prime Minister Abe and his Cab- inet.174 The decision, moreover, was further legitimized by obtaining an acknowledgement of Japan’s ISR missions in international waters by Iran President Rouhani during his diplomatic visit to Tokyo on 20 December.175 Another development of note was the relative lack of public demonstrations worthy of note against the decision, which was likely made to coincide with the end-of-year season on purpose.176 In short, the Rouhani visit and strategic calendarization of the cabinet decision defused opposition and public questioning about the rationale and interests at stake behind the nebulous JMSDF dispatch. To be sure, the new security bills and Japan’s decision to exercise the right of Collective Self-Defense did not apply to the dispatch of the mission off Yemen and Oman. Foreign security experts, for example, were rather baffled by the fact that JMSDF was poised on an «independent» mission, for the purpose of «research» and also out of more dangerous areas (Strait of Hormuz) with no clear «rules of engagement».177 More importantly, this is another example where the JSDF overseas dispatch is covered up by bureaucratic language and as a result. Japan as a polity is fundamentally evading more direct discussions about the meaning of an «independent» mission (vis-à-vis the US ally and its partners), purpose and goals of such missions, acceptability of risk-taking, and what the criteria of effectiveness/success of such missions are.178 Nevertheless, the mission de facto constituted a significant evolution in that direction because it theoretically placed Japanese military assets in proximity of US and European maritime security initiatives in the Arab Gulf. Thanks to the afore-mentioned constitutional reinterpretation and peace and security legislation, the SDF could also engage in individual and collective self-defense, should the situation require it. The Japanese government’s diplomacy and security activism in 2019, and its use of security decisions for diplomatic gains and vice-versa, were all noteworthy developments.

174. ‘EDITORIAL: Rigorous debate needed in Budget Committees of both houses’, Asahi Shimbun, 12 October 2019; ‘In Japan’s Diet, is there such a thing as too much time for questions?’, Japan Times, 26 February 2018. 175. ‘海自、中東派遣決定’ (Decision to dispatch Maritime Self-Defense Forces to Middle East), Mainichi Shinbun, 28 December 2019; ‘Iran welcomes Japan opting out of US-led naval mission in Gulf ’, Al Jazeera, 21 December 2019. 176. The strategic calendarization of controversial bills or policy initiatives has defined the post-2012 Abe governments: Paul Midford, ‘Foreign Policy as an Election Issue’ in Robert Pekkanen, Steven R. Reed & Ethan Scheiner (eds.), Japan Decides, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, pp. 179-94. 177. The authors are indebted to the third reviewer for comments and citations. 178. The authors are indebted to the third referee for very perceptive feedback.

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4. Conclusions

In sum, Abe further cemented his power in 2019 despite a series of political scandals. While it remains to be seen what his political legacy will be and how sustainable the institutional and policy changes implemented since 2012 are, the year under review showed Abe’s position in power remained largely unchallenged. As in previous years, this was primarily the result of a fragmented opposition, which locked its attention on Abe’s scandals thus failing to challenge the LDP-led government’s policies. The cascade of new political scandals also effectively redirected the media’s attention away from critical discussion of the government’s policies. In addition, Abe succeeded in maintaining the LDP’s unity behind his government and, through a strengthened Kantei, controlled the bureaucracy. Yet, as Abenom- ics has lost steam the public may lose its patience with Abe. And while restoration of political stability remains a key achievement of Abe’s reign, the past has shown that after long-term governments such as Nakasone’s in the 1980s and Koizumi’s in the 2000s, periods of political instability, with a high turnover of prime ministers, are likely to follow. In this perspective, Abe’s inability to groom his successors and, arguably, to avoid confronting Japan’s long-term structural trends were potentially big failures.179 While Japan has entered the new Reiwa era, the year 2019 showed that its politics and economic policy remain in the past, with scandals and conventional fiscal policies continuing to be the norm. As evidenced by the healthy state of Japan-US relations in 2019, the Japanese government was mostly satisfied with the Trump administration’s foreign and security policy recalibration, and essentially welcomed America’s more confrontational China policy. To be sure, by late 2019 Japanese officials started worrying about the US President’s more disruptive and «unhinged» traits,180 highlighted by military escalation in Iran and exorbitant requests to cover US forward military deployment, in Japan and elsewhere in the region. No doubt, the Japanese government’s overtures did not shield it from the US President’s mercenary request of a four-fold increase of Japan’s already generous host nation support budget, which the Trump administration possibly strengthened also by holding US extended deterrence as ransom.181 Yet, on balance, US government officials confirmed that the level of engage-

179. See for instance: Brad Glosserman, Peak Japan, Washington DC: George- town University Press, 2019. 180. Conversation with former US government official, Washington DC. 181. ‘米軍駐留経費、日本に4倍増の負担額を要求か・7月来日のボルトン氏’ (During his July Visit to Japan, Did Mr. Bolton Ask for a Four-Time Increase to Ja- pan’s Budget Devoted to US Military Forward Deployment Costs?), Yomiuri Shinbun, 16 November 2019; Akita Hiroyuki, ‘米政権が«核の傘»に課金か・米軍費の分担どこまで’ (Is the US Government Charging for its ‘Nuclear Umbrella’? What’s the Limit to Covering US Military Costs?), Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 30 January 2020.

160 Japan 2019 ment between Abe and Trump was «absolutely unprecedented»,182 and the White House actively sought Japanese mediation with foreign leaders, such as Hassan Rouhani and Vladimir Putin. In fact, a major Japanese academic and government advisor believed that the Japanese Prime Minister’s relatively smooth relationship with his American counterpart was a source of envy among foreign leaders.183 In light of the dismal state of relations between the US and many of its Western NATO allies, with Trump’s mercenary and trade bully tactics in full display, this was not a far-fetched analysis. The year under review demystified accounts of a Japan that reacted to US initiatives, or hedged the Trump risks by opening to China. As evidenced by this essay, there was still little substance to Sino-Japanese rapprochement, aside from diplomatic property and face-saving overtures that assuaged Chinese public opinion. Chinese pressure in the East China Sea, and the military build-up there continued unabated. Meanwhile, Japan’s diplomatic and security agenda kept prioritizing China. The year under review pointed at new developments in Japan’s management of international affairs under Abe: coercive economic statecraft aimed at South Korea, a broadening of Japan’s strategic horizons under FOIP, the acquisition of offensive capabilities and a careful balancing act in the Iran crisis. Against a backdrop of a relatively stable domestic environment and, concomitantly, a fluid and unstable international order, Reiwa Japan ventured into new uncharted waters. As shown, this move deserves wide attention, because it hints at an overhaul of past practice.

182. Michael Crowley, ‘«Absolutely Unprecedented»: Why Japan’s Leader Tries So Hard to Court Trump’, POLITICO, 24 May 2019. 183. Conversation with Japanese academic, 29 May 2019, Tokyo.

161

Hong Kong 2019: Anatomy of a social mobilisation through the lenses of identity and values

Angela Tritto and Alkan Abdulkadir

Institute of Emerging Market Studies Independent scholar The Hong Kong University [email protected] of Science and Technology [email protected]

Our contribution analyses the Anti-Extradition Bill protests in Hong Kong, which constitute the largest mobilisation of people in the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China so far since the handover in 1997. We examine the dimensions and stakeholders of this protest, arguing that its roots reside in the shift of values and identity of the next generation of Hong Kong people. In our analysis, we use first-hand experiences, informal interviews, and secondary materials to illustrate the underlying triggers of this mobilisation, which come from a combination of political, economic, and social factors. We situate this analysis in the context of China’s increasing global reach through foreign policy and outward investments, for which Hong Kong constitutes a key node.

1. Introduction

Like the flower that represents it, the Bauhinia blakeana or Hong Kong orchid, modern Hong Kong is a hybrid species, born out of two different ones, but different from both. This sterile plant can never reproduce, yet somehow Hong Kong is trying to give birth to something new. Caught between «the modern clash of civilisations» as Professor Kishore Mahbubani put it during one of his talks in the city on 4 September 2019 – the same day that the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Carrie Lam, announced the final withdrawal of the controversial extradition bill – Hong Kong becomes one of its battlegrounds. As a Special Administrative Region that enjoys a certain degree of autonomy from China, Hong Kong has also been treated separately from Beijing by the United States and the broader international community.1 This preferential status makes Hong Kong an important bridge between China and the West. Hence, when the proposed Extradition Bill threatened the precarious balance between China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong and Hong Kong’s autonomy, this caused considerable preoccupation not only in the city, but in the world at large. As Denise Ho Wan-See, a prominent speaker of the movement put it: «Hong Kong protesters are ac-

1. The Sino-British Declaration of 1984 established Hong Kong as a Special Ad- ministrative Region of China regulated by its own Basic Law. The United States–Hong Kong Policy Act 1992 allows the US to treat Hong Kong as a separate entity from China.

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Angela Tritto & Alkan Abdulkadir tually in a global fight for universal values. […] This is a fight against suppression and censorship, which are also spreading to more and more old democracies. Therefore, we should all stand with Hong Kong.»2 This is why, using water as a metaphor, just as the movement did,3 we sketch the multiple layers of what is described as the city’s «worst crisis since the handover.»4 The aim of this article is to analyse the roots of the 2019 Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Bill movement. We argue that the most important driver in spreading the related protest across society was the shift in identity and core values of the younger generation. We also discuss the background of this mobilisation, made up of several elements: the culture of protests in the city; the lessons learned from them; the existing economic and political grievances. However, these elements are secondary to a main one, represented by the question of values, whose importance is also evident in the polls of protesters, consistently showing economic factors as less important than ideas.5 The first part examines what is above water: the history – even tradition – of protests in Hong Kong and outlines the main pressure points in the city, which are triggering a major identity crisis. These pressures are evident in institutions and regulations, in the economy, and in language and education. While this article tries to highlight the continuity of the 2019 protests with those of the past, seeing both the former and the latter in the context of the above listed pressure points, it also highlights the unicity of the 2019 protests. It does so by underlining the events that contributed to the escalation of violence, to a strong feeling of distrust of most people in Hong Kong towards the Hong Kong Police Force, and to a renewed impetus of the fight for Hong Kong’s democracy. The second part analyses the shift in identity and core values of the younger generation of Hong Kong people, which is what we understand as the movements’ underwater current. While people from all ages and all strands of life participated in the movement, its fulcrum was composed by people aged between 20 and 30, who lived most of their lives in a «Chi- nese» Hong Kong SAR, in fear of what the formal handover to mainland

2. ‘International Women’s Day: Meet 11 of Asia’s trailblazers’, Nikkei, 4 March 2020. 3. «Be like water», as in the quote by famous martial arts movie star Bruce Lee, has become one of the slogans of the 2019 Anti-Extradition Bill movement. It points to the tactic of being a seemingly leaderless and formless movement that fluidly moves between places. Bruce Lee’s quote is a reference to Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. See, e.g., Sun Tzu’s statement: «Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.», chapter 6, 31. 4. Farah Master & James Pomfret, ‘Hong Kong facing worst crisis since handover: senior China official’, Reuters, 7 August 2019. 5. Jamil Anderlini. ‘Hong Kong’s «water revolution» spins out of control’, The Financial Times, 2 September 2019.

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China in 2047 would mean for their lives. This second part analyses this paradox, but also discusses the generational and status gap of the people at the core of this fight for democracy, examining how they differ from the older generation. The third and final part looks at the water surface by unpacking the individual and collective values of the core group of protesters, and how these values affect the organization and dynamics of the mobilization. It provides examples from first-hand experience that illustrate the organization of the movement and its decision mechanism, and what these mean for a generation that seeks to break the hitherto prevailing cycle of passivity, taking control not only of their individual lives, but of their city’s future.

2. Above water – social movements in the Asian hive of capitalism: China’s grasp on Hong Kong’s identity

The 2019 Anti-Extradition Bill protests of 2019 are the latest and largest of a long series of mobilisations in the Hong Kong SAR. While they share some commonalities with their predecessors, they are very distinct from most of them. This section explains why, providing a short background of protests in Hong Kong, as well as some key facts about the 2019 protests. In 2015, the Information and Services Department of the Hong Kong Government reported that between 1997, the year of the return of the SAR to Chinese sovereignty, and 2013, over 50,000 assemblies of various sizes and motivations had taken place in Hong Kong. It comes as no surprise that a growing number of scholars and commentators have started to call Hong Kong as «the city of protests».6 How did this culture of protests become part of Hong Kong’s tradition? As explained by two local scholars, protest gradually became a means of airing grievances by various groups, especially the underprivileged. This action at first seems iro- nic. But the fact is that the propensity to protest has existed for some time, and the underprivileged have been resentful of being neglected.7

6. Daniel Garrett, ‘Counter-hegemonic Resistance in China’s Hong Kong Visualizing Protest in the City’, London: Springer, 2015, p. 1. 7. Joseph Man Chan & Lee Chin-Chuan, ‘The journalistic paradigm on civil protests: A case study of Hong Kong’, in Andrew Arno & Wimal Dissanayake (eds.), The news media in national and international conflict, Boulder: Westview, 1984, pp. 183- 202. In their examination of Hong Kong protests, scholars have often referred to the «underprivileged» without giving a precise definition of the term. The past protests in Hong Kong were initiated mostly by people belonging to the lower classes of society, such as factory workers, who were seeking better welfare. In this article, we make use of the term «underprivileged» as synonymous of «lower classes».

165 Angela Tritto & Alkan Abdulkadir

The feeling of resentment and neglect comes no doubt from economic and political factors that characterise Hong Kong quintessentially capitalist system, where the laissez-faire attitude of the government ultimately surrendered the welfare of its people. In the past, this resentment often constituted a primary trigger, as in the case of the leftist protests of 1967, where the conflict originated from labour disputes.8 We argue that while this sentiment is indeed evident in some segments of the 2019 movement, it is only an additional supplementary factor. Over the years, speculations over land became so rampant that Hong Kong has maintained the record of least affordable housing market for almost a decade.9 The Gini coefficient rose from 0.533 in 2006 to 0.539 in 2016 as a testimony to the widening inequality.10 In 2018, 1.3 out of 7.5 million people (one in three people aged over 65) lived in poverty in Hong Kong, while the wealthiest tycoons still enjoyed amongst the lowest profits tax rates worldwide.11 Despite having a large fiscal surplus of over HK$ 1.1 trillion (US$ 1.2 billion), the SAR Government lagged behind other OECD countries’ expenditure in healthcare and social welfare. In fact, some scholars have argued that the post-handover period saw a crisis in governance «due to the inability of the political institutions in providing a coherent leadership, a good governing political machine, and also in incorporating and aggregating social and political interests from society.»12 The development of political parties also lost momentum, leaving the least privileged largely under-represented. Meanwhile, the emergence of pressure groups such as tradr unions and professionals, religious and other civil society organisations, which grew fond of spearheading the cause of the underprivileged, as well as their own also contributed to the promotion of mobilisations.13 This internal affairs picture is further complexified by the pressure of China’s global expansion and hegemonic ambitions, in which Hong Kong plays a special role. Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, Hong Kong has become a key node for outward investments from Chinese companies, which enjoy the city’s largest offshore market for the Renminbi (RMB) and free flow of capital and goods. Accordingly, the volume of trade and investments passing through Hong Kong has considerably increased. At the same time, the attitude of the central government towards the SAR

8. Gary Ka-wai Cheung, Hong Kong’s Watershed: The 1967 Riots, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009, vol. 1. 9. Sandy Li, ‘Hong Kong most expensive housing market in the world for the sixth year in a row: survey classifies our homes as «least affordable» ever’, SCMP, 25 January 2016. 10. Oxfam, Hong Kong Inequality Report, 2018. 11. Ibid. 12. Ngok Ma, ‘Political Development in Hong Kong’, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Uni- versity Press, 2007, p. 2. 13. Joseph Man Chan, & Chin-Chuan Lee, ‘The journalistic paradigm on civil protests: A case study of Hong Kong’.

166 Hong Kong 2019 signalled a shift. While some argued the People Republic of China «has largely abided by the strictures of the ‘one country, two systems’ approach», there is also evidence of increasing stress triggered by the «compelled cultural, economic, and political integration with China».14 For Hong Kongers, two main concerns seem to be reoccurring: the push to use Mandarin as the Preferred Medium of Instruction (PMIC), which started in 2008 and has hitherto remained a sensitive topic, and the potential revival of the National Security Bill of 2003.15 They see the first as the ultimate loss of their cultural identity as a possible implication of China’s contentious language policies, aimed at promoting its nationalistic goals.16 They fear the second as a potential threat to Hong Kong’s freedom of expression and its historical status as a safe haven for activists and dissidents.17 Most importantly, as pointed out by former Hong Kong Legislative Council President Jasper Tsang, a particular document released by China in 2014, the white paper «One Country, Two System»., marked Beijing’s shift in defining the city’s autonomy. The document stated: «The high degree of autonomy of the HKSAR is not full autonomy, nor a decentralized power. It is the power to run local affairs as authorized by the central leadership. The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR is subject to the level of the central leadership’s authorization.»18 The implications of the white paper, along with the dissatisfaction caused by the failed consultations to bring about a more democratic system to nominate the members of the Legislative Council and the Chief Execu- tive constituted the major triggers of the Occupy Central and Umbrella Movement of 2014.19

14. Daniel Garrett. ‘Counter-hegemonic Resistance in China’s Hong Kong Visualizing Protest in the City’. 15. The bill aimed to amend the Crimes Ordinance, the Official Secrets Ordi- nance and the Societies Ordinance to put into effect the Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law. The Article states: «The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.» The quotation is from https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_2.html. 16. Minglang Zhou & Hongkai Sun (eds), Language policy in the People’s Republic of China: Theory and practice since 1949, Vol. 4, Boston: Springer Science & Business Media, 2006. 17. These concerns are clearly expressed by the Hong Kong movie «Ten Years», released in 2015 and immediately banned in China. 18. Karen Cheung, ‘Ex-LegCo head: 2014 white paper was turning point of Beijing exercising «overall jurisdiction» in Hong Kong’, Hong Kong Free Press, 20 No- vember 2017. 19. Johannes Chan. ‘Hong Kong’s umbrella movement’, Round Table, 2014, 103 (6), pp. 571-580.

167 Angela Tritto & Alkan Abdulkadir

Occupy Central – where «Central» refers to the area in Hong Kong that is the core of the financial district – was a product of academic circles, at least in its infant stage, as it was launched at the end of 2012 by Law Pro- fessor Benny Tai of the University of Hong Kong. In 2014, he movement, which aimed at promoting a more democratic set-up in Hong Kong by making use of civil disobedience techniques, morphed into the Umbrella Move- ment – sometimed referred to as the «Umbrella Revolution». The occupations were initially characterized by a massive student participation, and later supported by other elements of the population. In December 2014, however, the organisers of the movement, confronted by the danger of massive police repression, decided to suspend mass demonstrations, continuing their struggle through community work and education instead.20 The 2019 Anti-Extradition protests share similar roots with the Oc- cupy Central/Umbrella movement, and yet are also quite distinct in certain respects. Whereas the Occupy Central/Umbrella Movement was a product of academic circles, at least in its infant stage, the pro-democracy groups that initiated the 2019 protests had a strong backup by the economic circles in the city. In addition, the Occupy Central/Umbrella Movement was a civil disobedience movement that, despite the disruption caused, was largely non-violent. On the contrary, in 2019, while most people gathered in peaceful marches, the protests also involved many violent confrontations between police and protesters, several acts of vandalism towards government offices and pro-establishment businesses, as well as suicides, deaths, injuries, and aggressions, although admittedly isolated ones. The intensification of violence distinguished the 2019 protests from the previous ones. As pointed out by several scholars, previous protests had always upheld the underlying premise of not disrupting the social fabric of the city, and were often employed as an effective tool by underprivileged groups to «make their feelings known (to the government) and contribute towards problem solving.»21 The 2019 protests diverted from this somehow tacit agreement between people and government. In fact, they showed that quite the opposite was true. After the failure of the Umbrella Movement in 2014, banners along Harcourt Road, a key hotspot for the occupation, announced: «We will be back». Since then, key events in the city contributed to an increasing dissatisfaction and concern over its governance and ability of the political institutions to safeguard basic rights. Leaders of the Umbrella Movement were jailed; candidates from Demosistō – one of the main pro-democracy organizations that included student leaders of the movement – were banned from

20. Benny Yiu-ting Tai, Kin-man Chan & Yiu-ming Chu, ‘Occupy Central Trio’s Letter to the Hong Kong People’, Occupy Central with Love and Peace, 2 December 2014 (http://oclp.hk/index.php?route=occupy/eng_detail&eng_id=61). 21. Joseph Man Chan & Chin-Chuan Lee, ‘The journalistic paradigm on civil protests: A case study of Hong Kong’.

168 Hong Kong 2019 running in district council elections. Nathan Law, the youngest-ever elected Legislative Council member at age 23, was ousted from it together with other five lawmakers for improper oath taking, and later jailed. In 2015, the disappearance of five Hong Kong booksellers connected to Mighty Current,22 which eventually turned up in the custody of mainland Chinese authorities, sparked outrage amongst people. A year later, news reported Chinese billionaire Xiao Jianhua’s abduction from the Four Seasons hotel in Hong Kong’s Central district and his deportation to mainland China, reinforcing serious concerns over «mainland agents acting outside of their jurisdiction».23 The event, as well as the «unprecedented act of retribution»24 of denying the renewal of work visa to Victor Mullet,25 led to serious concerns over Hong Kong’s human rights safeguard by various international concern groups.26 These, among other similar events, constitute the background of the 2019 protests that «whipped up paranoia»27 as well as distrust on the part of Hong Kong’s residents towards their government. In the next section, we argue, the dissatisfaction came not only from the underprivileged, but also from different social groups including the intellectual and economic elites.

2.1. From spark to wildfire: how the anti-extradition bill turned into a quest for democracy The 2019 Anti-Extradition Bill protests started with the decision of the Hong Kong government, influenced by China’s anti-corruption campaign to promote extradition treaties with countries and territories across the world,28 to review the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordi-

22. Mighty Current is a Hong Kong-based large publishing house best known for its salacious publication featuring prominent Chinese political figures. 23. Raymond Yeung, Choi Chi-yuk, Christy Leung, Clifford Lo & Phila Siu, ‘Missing Chinese billionaire Xiao Jianhua «last seen at Hong Kong’s Four Seasons Hotel» before entering mainland’, SCMP, 31 January 2017. 24. Quote by Former Hong Kong Chief Secretary Anson Chan Fang On-sang in Alvin Lum & Kimmy Chung, ‘Reason for Financial Times journalist Victor Mallet’s Hong Kong visa denial to stay secret after Legco motion calling for explanation fails’, SCMP, 1 November 2018. 25. Victor Mullet was a well-known Hong Kong-based Financial Times correspondent, who hosted a talk at the Foreign Correspondent Club by Andy Chan Ho- tin, a supporter of Hong Kong’s independence whose political party was later banned 26. See Freedom in the World 2019, Hong Kong report available at: https:// freedomhouse.org/country/hong-kong/freedom-world/2020; Sarah Zheng, ‘Human rights in Hong Kong in rapid decline, global non-profit group claims in report’, SCMP, 11 January 2017; Amnesty International, ‘Beijing’s «red line» in Hong Kong’. 27. Ling Man Tsang, ‘If Hong Kong fugitives bill is whipping up paranoia, can the people be blamed?’, SCMP, Letters, 2 June 2019. 28. Michael Laha, ‘Taking the Anti-Corruption Campaign Abroad: China’s Quest for Extradition Treaties’, Centre for Advanced China Research, 14 March 2019.

169 Angela Tritto & Alkan Abdulkadir nance (Cap 525) and the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (Cap 503). After an unusually short consultation period, the controversial «Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019» was born. With the initial proposal for the treaty, the Hong Kong government sought to «tackle existing loopholes in Hong Kong’s legislation» by allowing extraditions for a total of 46 crimes recognised by both the SAR and Chi- na.29 This proposal was put forward in response to a murder case whereby the offender from Hong Kong committed the crime in Taiwan and, due to the existing loopholes, could not be extradited. Assemblies organised by Demosistō and the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) started in March and April 2019 to raise concerns over the Bill. What is unusual is that the anti-Bill action by Demosistō and the CHRF was accompanied by expressions of concern of traditionally pro-establishment leaders and prominent figures in Hong Kong. One example is Priscilla Le- ung Mei-fun, a vice-chairwoman of the Business and Professionals Alliance (BPA), who suggested amending the Bill by exempting people suspected of white-collar crimes. Others include former Government’s Chief Secretary Henry Tang Ying Yen; Chairman of the Trade Development Council Peter Lam Kin Ngok; Executive Council member Jeffrey Lam Kin Fung; and representatives of the American Chamber of Commerce.30 The Demosistō and CHRF action coupled by the expressions of concern of traditionally pro-establishment personalities obviously amounted to «clear messages from diverse sections of society that there were serious concerns regarding the Bill».31 The consultations led to amendments in the initial proposal by reducing the extraditable crimes from 46 to 37. The 9 withdrawn offenses were mostly white-collar crimes. The new amendment also raised the threshold for its applicability from three to seven years in prison and to crimes that could not be political in nature or punishable by death.32 Nonetheless, there were still worries that the Bill could be used to extradite activists, dissidents, and political opponents to mainland China, raising concerns over their fair treatment. When, once again, the government did not heed to the demands of hundreds of thousands of people33 that marched peacefully from Victoria

29. Legislative Council Brief, File Reference: SBCR 1/2716/19. ‘Fugitive offenders and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters legislation (amendment) bill 2019’ (https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr18-19/english/bills/brief/b201903291_brf.pdf). 30. Martin Purbrick, ‘A report of the 2019 Hong Kong protests’, Asian Affairs, 2019, 50 (4), pp. 465-487. 31. Ibid. 32. Mary Hui, ‘Everything you need to know about Hong Kong’s extradition law’, Quartz 11 June 2019. 33. There is a discrepancy between numbers as reported by the Police authority, claiming that the march peaked at 240,000 people, and its organisers, the CHRF, which claimed over a million people attended.

170 Hong Kong 2019

Park to the Central Government Offices on 9 June,34 this triggered a much stronger backlash. The subsequent gathering in front of the Legislative Council on 12 June, the proposed day of the second reading of the Bill, managed to block legislators from entering the building and effectively postponed the reading. The day of June 12 marked a key escalation in the protests, as a core group of protesters, convinced of the failure of peaceful tactics and resenting the government’s inaction, started to contemplate using force. Eventually, confrontations with the Police Force started and turned extremely violent, leaving 70 people injured. That day, and again on July 1, protesters managed to forcefully enter and vandalize the Legislative Council building.

Picture 1. Protester sits on chair after breaking in the Legislative Council, Admiralty, Hong Kong, 1 July 2019. Source: Alkan Abdulkadir.

34. ‘Carrie Lam defiant, insists extradition bill will go ahead’, The Standard, 10 June 2019.

171 Angela Tritto & Alkan Abdulkadir

A later report by Amnesty International outlined 14 instances of excessive use of force by the Hong Kong Police on 12 June, which «violated international human rights law and standards».35 These included the unlawful use of batons and rubber bullets, improper use of tear gas and pepper spray often directed at the entire protest crowd as opposed to the smaller violent crowd, the lack of visible Police identification, and restrictions on journalists and medical aid providers. Moreover, the subsequent statement by the Commissioner of Police labelling the protest as a «riot» – an offence that carries a maximum penalty on conviction of ten years imprisonment – caused a general uproar. The following Sunday (16 June), over two million gathered again in the streets of Hong Kong, despite Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced, the day before, that the Bill would be indefinitely delayed. The demonstrators started to ask what later, after some revisions, became known as the «Five Demands». The original demands included: 1) complete withdrawal of the Bill; 2) Carrie Lam’s resignation; 3) release of all those arrested in connection with the protest; 4) an independent investigation into the police actions on 12 June; 5) retraction of the characterization of the protest as a riot.36 Point 2 later turned into the request for universal suffrage. Amongst the series of marches, confrontations, and protests that followed, there was an event that contributed to plunging the distrust of people towards the Hong Kong Police Force to the lowest levels: the Yuen Long incident. On 21 July, during a series of mobilisations across different districts in Hong Kong, a group of just over a hundred people dressed in white shirts and armed with steel rods and canes, believed to be members of triad groups, chased and beat up protesters as well as ordinary citizens, journalists, and lawmakers. Despite thousands of calls for help to the 999 emergency line, the police only arrived after the mob had left. The live scenes, broadcasted by popular media outlets, «were perceived by Hong Kong citizens and the international community as a proof of the collusion between the police and local triad gangs to strike back against the anti- extradition bill movement.»37 The resulting sentiment of distrust reverberated across different parts of Hong Kong’s society, ultimately causing strong societal divisions as well as a series of incidents involving either police and citizens, or citizens with opposing views. At its peak, the 2019 anti-Bill movement recorded around two million people, meaning that one in three citizens in Hong Kong partook in the manifestation. In addition to this group, there were also many

35. ‘How not to Police a Protest: Unlawful use of Force by Hong Kong Police’, Amnesty International, June 2019; Martin Purbrick, ‘A report of the 2019 Hong Kong protests’. 36. ‘Hong Kong extradition law: A timeline of events that led to the current mass protests’, Young Post - SCMP, 12 June 2019. 37. Kaxton Siu, ‘Governing Hong Kong like any other Chinese City’, Made in China journal, Issue 3, 2019.

172 Hong Kong 2019 people who, while not being physically in the streets, also backed this cause. The large support was also evident in the results of the latest district council elections. Hong Kong has a multi-party system where political parties are grouped in either a pro-democracy or a pro-establishment (or pro-Beijing) camp. For the first time in the history of Hong Kong, the pro-democracy camp won 17 out of 18 districts with a record turnout of 2.94 million voters representing 71.2 percent of registered electors.38 While pro-establishment voters widened their demographical component since the 2000s, the protests clearly triggered a change in the electorate, especially across districts in the New Territories and in the Southern District of Hong Kong Island, where extremely young pro-democracy leaders beat the incumbents.39 That being said, opposing sentiments and political views were undoubtedly present in the remaining part of the population. More than once people that were part of the anti-Bill movement, either during protests or outside, were engaged in heated discussions with people who would not sympathise with their cause for a variety of reasons: from political, to economic, from idealistic to matters of simple inconvenience of transportation, since most residents were affected by the blocking of roads, tunnels connecting the Hong Kong districts, or even its airport. The next section outlines the root cause of these differences: the different identity, values and, hence, priorities, between generations and social groups.

3. Why now? Underwater currents in the mobilization of Hong Kong’s generation Y and Z

The results of a survey conducted by four of Hong Kong’s leading universities speak clearly: most protesters in Hong Kong are young – between 20 and 30 years of age, educated to university level, coming from different political orientations including moderate democrats, localists centrists or people who identified themselves as having no political affiliations. Moreo- ver, most participants identified themselves as middle class, followed by lower class.40 This shows that the underlying dynamics of the protests include demographical change, along with a change of values, identity, and expectations towards the government by the younger generation of Hong Kong.

38. Jeffie Lam, Lok-kei Sum & Kang Chung Ng, ‘Hong Kong elections: pro-democracy camp wins 17 out of 18 districts while city leader says she will reflect on the result’, The South China Morning Post, 25 November 2019. 39. K.K. Rebecca Lai & Jin Wu, ‘Hong Kong Election Results Mapped’, The New York Times, 24 November 2019. 40. Francis L. F. Lee, Gary Tang, Samson Yuen & Edmund W. Cheng, ‘Onsite Survey Findings in Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Bill Protests’, Centre for Communica- tion and Public Opinion Survey, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, August 2019.

173 Angela Tritto & Alkan Abdulkadir

As Chang and Lee41 forecasted, «the drastic change in Hong Kong’s demographic structure that occurred in the past decade has a significant implication for political culture. For the first time, the first-generation of Hong Kongers – locally born, educated, and below 30 – comprise 60 percent of the population.» According to Chang and Lee, this generation differs from the previous in several important aspects. First, although they value and understand Chinese culture, they feel obliged to participate in public affairs as a matter of caring about the future of Hong Kong as their home. This means also defending its special status and autonomy. Second, they are less fearful of participating in protests, and are more inclined to place society’s interest above self or familial interest. The reasons for this can be found in the gradual erosion of parental authority, the diminishing social control exercised by the family units, but also the primarily liberal education, supported by a set of freedoms – of speech, internet, assembly – which ultimately shaped them and awakened a new sense of social consciousness. Additional reasons may also be a combination of economic and political pressures. Many have argued that this generation feels less hopeful about its future than the previous one. A recent survey by Hong Kong universities found that Hong Kongers felt the most unhappy in almost a decade, and that this sentiment was stronger in younger people.42 The high cost of housing, starting salaries for university graduates that are almost 10% lower than 25 years ago, limited social mobility are well-known economic factors.43 These, mixed with the feeling of defeat after the 2014 Umbrella movement and the perceived erosion of the city’s civil liberties and lack of political reforms all contributed to the sense of «now or never», and of «having nothing to lose» that empowered the 2019 movement. Graffiti writing across the streets of Mong Kok, one of the major shopping areas in Hong Kong, read: «7K for a house like a cell and you really think we out here scared of jail», with supporters of the movement describing this fight for their city’s freedom and democracy as a «life or death situation».44 In contrast, the generation of their parents, mostly Chinese immigrants or refugees, still holds a rather traditional view of government – people relations, summarised by Hoadley45 in seven points. These are: 1) the government–people relationship is analogous to that between parent and child, hence it does not contemplate direct participation but rather the con-

41. Joseph Man Chan & Chin-Chuan Lee, ‘The journalistic paradigm on civil protests: A case study of Hong Kong’. 42. Singh Harminder, ‘Hongkongers frowning deeper as happiness index shows decline’, SCMP, 23 November 2019. 43. Rein Shaun, ‘Social mobility the key to addressing Hong Kong discontent’, The Nikkei, 16 July 2019. 44. Marius Zaharia & Anne Marie Roantree, ‘«Now or never»: Hong Kong protesters say they have nothing to lose’, Reuters, 28 August 2019. 45. J. Stephen Hoadley, ‘Political participation of Hong Kong Chinese: patterns and trends’, Asian Survey, Vol. 13, no. 6, 1973, pp. 604-616.

174 Hong Kong 2019 formity of the people to the directions of the government; 2) the understanding that their status as Hong Kong citizens is transient, and the connection to the motherland is still important; 3) the tendency, in particular by some that may have had a difficult past, to see «China as the sea and Hong Kong as the life boat». Hence, the conviction that it would be unwise to stir trouble in the place that lent them a lifeline; 4) the feeling that their relatively modest needs and desires were fulfilled by the government; 5) the local elites’ rather conservative views, which make them unwilling to alter an institutional framework that has allowed them to prosper; 6) the perception that the general low participation of people in the city’s politics made reforms unlikely. Hence, it would be more meaningful to channel energies into their careers and economic pursuits; 7) the fact that the oligarchy at the apex of Hong Kong’s society was unwilling to share their powers and privileges. Amongst the above, point 2 and point 5 deserve further elaboration. Point 2 exemplifies the gap in perceived self-identity between the older and the younger generations. A survey conducted by the Hong Kong Public Opin- ion Research Institute (HKPORI) on the feeling of identity in the city exemplifies this point by showing that the percentage of young people identifying themselves as Chinese has dropped to a 20-year low.46 A question that asked people to identify themselves as Hong Kongers, Chinese, or a mixed identity found that across all sampled people, 37% identified as Hong Kongers, 21% as Chinese, whilst 40.2% identified as «Hong Kongers in China» or «Chinese in Hong Kong». However, amongst respondents aged between 18 and 29, 65% identified as Hong Kongers and only 3.1% identified as Chinese, showing a staggering difference between the younger and older generations. Point 5 represents instead the view of the factions of Hong Kong’s society opposing the protests. A prominent opinion amongst Hong Kong conservatives and business leaders living in or out of the SAR is that they feel their generation put considerable effort in building the modern, successful, wealthy model of Hong Kong. They feel this new, «idealistic» young generation is endangering the equilibrium they created, and could severe the ties with Beijing that, for most conservatives and business leaders, are also of vital economic importance. These inextricable connections between what now constitute some of the largest and most powerful corporations in Hong Kong and mainland Chinese stakeholders has in turn generated a series of lay-offs, threats, and retaliations that have crowded tabloid headlines. Two examples are the cases of Cathay Pacific and the Maxim Group. Cathay Pacific, Hong Kong’s flagship airline, is a company whose largest shareholders are Swire Group, a large conglomerate that owns 45% of it and has important parts of its business depending on the Chinese mar-

46. Kris Cheng, ‘HKU poll: Only 3.1% of young Hongkongers identify as Chi- nese, marking 20 year low’, Hong Kong Free Press, 21 June 2017; HKPORI, ‘People’s Ethnic Identity’, Survey Results.

175 Angela Tritto & Alkan Abdulkadir ket, and Air China, which owns 22.65%.47 Around three quarters of Cathay Pacific’s flights use China’s airspace. Hence, when on 9 August the Civil Aviation Authority of China (CAAC) called for the suspension of staff who supported or participated in the demonstrations, rejecting entire crew lists without explanation,48 and summoned British billionaire Merlin Swire to Beijing, asking for management changes, a series of repercussions ensued.49 Four days later came the shock resignation of Cathay Pacific Group’s CEO Rupert Hogg and his deputy, Paul Loo Kar-pui. News circulated that Hogg allegedly decided to resign rather than identify employees linked to protests.50 According to the Hong Kong Cabin Crew Federation, 30 rank-and- file staff, including eight pilots and 18 flight attendants, have been fired or resigned under pressure.51 New layoffs followed claims of sabotage of oxygen tanks in the flights, which added to the severe drop in booking and the rise of cancellations for the airline flights.52 As of December 2019, members of the senior management of Cathay kept resigning.53 The case of Maxim Group, which triggered a large-scale boycott of all its outlets, started from a declaration by Annie Wu, the daughter of the firm’s founder. During her appearance on 11 September at the United Na- tions Human Rights Council as representative of the Hong Kong Federation of Women, Wu stated that the «small group of radical protesters», which made use of «systematic and calculated violent acts», did not represent all Hong Kongers and, in fact, caused a nuisance to ordinary citizens’ lives and tore families apart. Together with billionaire businesswoman Pansy Ho, Wu defended the use of tear gas and rubber bullets by Hong Kong police, claiming this was a necessary crowd control tactic, adopted elsewhere in the world.54 Later, students of the Chinese Foundation Secondary School in

47. Grace Shao, ‘«Cathay’s unusual position» makes it «vulnerable to pressure» from Beijing, analyst says’, CNBC, 19 August 2019. 48. Jamie Freed, ‘As protests rack Hong Kong, China watchdog has Cathay staff «walking on eggshells»’, Reuters, 3 October 2019. 49. Danny Lee, ‘Hong Kong protests have caused severe turbulence at Cathay Pacific but has airline done enough to appease Beijing after heads rolled at top?’, SCMP, 18 August 2019. 50. Billie Thompson, ‘Former Cathay Pacific CEO is hailed a hero after rumours suggested he handed over a list with just his name on it when asked by Beijing to identify staff who backed Hong Kong protests’, Daily Mail, 20 August 2019. 51. Jamie Freed, ‘As protests rack Hong Kong, China watchdog has Cathay staff «walking on eggshells»’. 52. Danny Lee, ‘Two fired over oxygen bottle sabotage aboard Cathay Pacific planes, amid fallout from Hong Kong anti-government protests’, SCMP, 24 Septem- ber 2019. 53. Danny Lee, ‘Cathay Pacific staff leaving in new round of employee exits at airline hit by Hong Kong protests’, SCMP, 18 December 2019. 54. Holmes Chan, ‘Hong Kong uni students boycott Maxim’s caterer after founder’s daughter blasts pro-democracy protesters at UN’, Hong Kong Free Press, 25 September 2019.

176 Hong Kong 2019

Hong Kong accused Wu of taking advantage of her role of former supervi- sor and member of the school’s sponsoring body to threaten the expulsion and lay-off of students and staff who partook in the protest-organised strikes.55 In November, Annie Wu declared, during an interview with Global Times: «I have given up hope [on these youngsters] and will not waste my time talking to them, as they have no idea what they are doing and what they should do [...]. Their brains have been occupied by other ideas and that is irrevocable.» A response by Chan, a student at the University of Hong Kong was emblematic of the status and generational divide, but also of a change in attitude towards authority. He said: «I don’t think she has done much for youngsters. […] She has been enjoying the protection of her elder generation, and the support of Hong Kongers who have spent much on her brand, in climbing up to that social status.»56 Declarations of the Maxim Group that Ms. Wu «does not hold any position at the company» did not serve to stop the series of boycotts and vandalism of outlets linked to the Group during the year under review. Similar episodes have also targeted mainland Chinese-linked businesses, especially retail and food and beverage outlets especially around the area of Kowloon. During the year under review, several outlets exhibited flags and icons symbolizing their allegiance to the movement, and a mobile application was created to help people choose them. The restaurants in the city were categorised as yellow if they support the movement or blue if otherwise.57 The use of digital tools in the cause of the movement is part of its unique features, discussed in the following section.

4. On the surface, «Be like water»: How values and identity shaped the strategy, ethos, and organization of the protest

On the surface of water, when this new generation gathers in the streets, they are actively seeking to build and assume a new form of identity, which gives them much more say and a much bigger role in the politics of the city. They defy the prescribed social pattern of their existence, which puts them under various forms of pressure. In the streets, what matters is the spirit one puts forward rather than social status. This may also explain the popularity of the 2019 movement amongst the youth. The characteristics of this identity building process can be classified into four aspects.

55. Kimmy Chung, ‘Daughter of Maxim’s founder hits out again at Hong Kong protesters, saying she has lost hope in the next two generations’, SCMP, 4 November 2019. 56. Ibid. 57. Fiona Sun, ‘Not the Michelin guide: Hong Kong restaurants branded «yellow» if they support protests, «blue» if they don’t’, SCMP, 2 November 2019.

177 Angela Tritto & Alkan Abdulkadir

The first and perhaps most intriguing characteristic of this process is its highly adaptive nature, or the clarion call of «be water»,58 which also brings about an ever-continuing transformation in its other characteristics. As noted above, the 2019 movement can be considered as the prosecution of previous protest movements; however, the modalities of the 2019 movement have greatly evolved when compared to those adhered to in the previous movements. To give a few examples, the decision-making process used to be much more centralized during the early stages of the Umbrella Move- ment in 2014, after which many of its leaders were arrested and pressured.59 On the contrary, in 2019, protesters learned how to make decisions in a de-centralised yet collective manner by using technological means, voting on online platforms such as LIHKG or chat groups such as Telegram.60 Another example of the adaptive nature of the movement is its move from peaceful means towards violent methods, due to the perceived inefficiency of former peaceful protests.

Picture 2. Peaceful march on 18 August 2019, Wan Chai MTR station. Source: Angela Tritto.

58. The protesters adopted Bruce Lee’s philosophy to be «formless and shape- less, like water». 59. Tiffany May, ‘Hong Kong Umbrella Movement Leaders Are Sentenced to Prison’, New York Times, 23 April 2019. 60. A Reddit-like forum.

178 Hong Kong 2019

Kay, one of the frontline protesters in 2014, told one of the authors that «if a protester threw a petrol bomb in 2014, which is part of the routine in protests nowadays, the protesters would think that that person should be arrested and jailed. We used to be criticised for being violent because we were blocking streets with crowd control barriers. However, today we are replaced by the next generation of hard-core front-liners who think our tactics were inefficient and not violent enough.» Joshua Wong, who has been amongst key influencers of the movement, also highlighted this point in a piece for Times magazine. He refers to United States former President J.F. Kennedy’s famous quote: «those who make peaceful revolution impossible, will make violent revolution inevitable.»61 That being said, a survey carried out by the HKPORI found that most of the respondents agreed that «the maximum impact could only be achieved when peaceful assembly and confrontational actions work together» and «the use of radical tactics by protesters is understandable when the government fails to listen».62 The second characteristic of the evolution of the 2019 movement is its culture of unity under democratic decision-making. This culture is consistent with what the demonstrators fight for. In other words, they are fighting for democracy by enacting a textbook example of participative democracy via digital tools. Whenever a situation emerges where protesters feel the need to make a decision, they pick up their mobile phones and start voting on how to react to the situation, creating a virtual democratic system. In most cases, protesters acted in accordance to what the majority voted for, despite their disagreement. Professor Francis Lee calls this methodology the «open-source protest model»63 where decisions are made in an egalitarian manner. When they surrounded the Legislative Council on 1 July 2019, the protesters voted on Telegram groups whether to enter the building and whether to leave when the police were on their way to disperse them. On that day, when the majority voted for «let’s leave now», there were still a few protesters who were determined to remain inside the Legislative Council. However, they were forcefully pulled out by their fellow protesters who were chanting «if we stay, we stay together; if we leave, we leave together.» Other examples of functioning of the open source protest model are the way protesters start discussions on online platforms to decide the purpose, time, and venue of their gatherings and the way they diffuse posters that include relevant information about the protests. The latter are dissemi-

61. Joshua Wong, ‘What freedom is worth’ Time Magazine, 24 June 2019. 62. Francis L. F. Lee, Gary Tang, Samson Yuen & Edmund W. Cheng, ‘Onsite Survey Findings in Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Bill Protests’. 63. Francis Lee, ‘(第十八講) 李立峯：無大台 – 理解抗爭新世代’ (Open-source protest: Understanding a new generation of resistance), video in Cantonese, 29 June 2019.

179 Angela Tritto & Alkan Abdulkadir nated on online platforms as well as through AirDrop requests in public places to quickly transfer the information between Apple devices.64 The third characteristic of the movement’s evolution is the conscious reconstruction of its identity. The movement’s identity is constantly being shaped in accordance with the experience of the movement, with protesters taking initiatives as if constituting a single and homogeneous entity. There seems to be a tacit understanding that anybody and everybody can represent the movement. In other words, the movement takes responsibility for the actions of its participants as a single unity. After some protesters at the airport assaulted two Chinese men on 14 August 2019, the majority of protesters tried to stop them and voted to release a public apology about what happened. On the next day, several protesters held banners at the arrival hall of the airport that read: «Dear Tourists, We’re deeply sorry about what happened yesterday. We were desperate and we made imperfect decisions. Please accept our apology».65 This is a manifestation of how protesters often choose to take responsibility for and at the same time own the actions of other protesters as their own, even if they disagree with them. Instead of denouncing or excluding them, they acknowledge the mistakes of a minority and apologise as a majority, which represents the level of active reconstruction of the identity of the movement. The fourth characteristic of the 2019 movement is the continuously widening range of its tactics, through a trial and error process, which is a function of the collective philosophy of the movement. The creative tactics and forms through which protesters manifest and promote the values and philosophy of the movement include a mix of peaceful, poetic and violent demonstrations. As a means to resist the status quo, the most frequently used forms of demonstration are civil disobedience, spatial occupation, non-cooperative movements and human chains. Since 2012, protestors have been occupying various public and symbolic spaces which are of political and economic significance. According to Daniel Garrett of the City University of Hong Kong, this subversive visual co-option of key cultural, economic, social, and political venues of the city is an attempt to actively shape the contested past, current, and future narratives of the city. It also aims at rejecting the ruling regime’s efforts to visualize Hong Kong simply as an economic, not political, metropolis on the periphery of China.66 During the rush hours in the mornings, protesters block the flow of public transportation by means of non-cooperative actions such as preventing the doors of MTR (Mass Transit Railway, the major public transport network serving Hong Kong)

64. Mary Hui, ‘Hong Kong’s protesters put AirDrop to ingenious use to breach China’s Firewall’, Quartz, 8 July 2019. 65. Jeffie Lam et al., ‘Hong Kong protesters apologise for disruption at airport, plan to suspend demonstrations’, SCMP, 14 August 2019. 66. Daniel Garrett. ‘Counter-hegemonic Resistance in China’s Hong Kong Visualizing Protest in the City’, preface.

180 Hong Kong 2019 from closing. Having been inspired by and celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Baltic Way,67 the protestors joined hands to build a human chain of 50 kilometres on both sides of the Victoria Harbour.68 Moreover, as a means to convey and promote the philosophy of the movement, the protesters have often created new catchy slogans and symbols, as well as various forms of arts, displaying them in contested public spaces through visual and audial representations. Lennon Walls are one of the collective visual artworks of the movement, where people write slogans, epigrams, lyrics, and poems on colourful post-its and stick them on public walls in contested public spaces demanding freedom and democracy.

Picture 3. Lennon wall on the way to Choi Hung MTR station, 8 July 2019. Source: Angela Tritto.

Other forms of demonstrations focus on attracting attention both at home and abroad. These include petition campaigns, seminars and public discussions, online activism, advertising on media outlets, and citizen press conferences, among others. In addition to aforementioned forms, protesters

67. In 1989, around 2 million people protested the Soviet rule by forming a human chain, also known as the Baltic Way, across Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. 68. Michelle Wong. ‘Demonstrators offer sparkling visions of unity as an estimated 210,000 people form 60km of human chains to encircle city in «Hong Kong Way»’, SCMP, 23 August 2019.

181 Angela Tritto & Alkan Abdulkadir employ numerous methods and tactics to protect, reconstruct, and promote the identity of the movement. These methods include doxing (the Internet- based practice of researching and broadcasting private or identifying information), graffiti and vandalism, violence, songs of freedom, laser shows, displaying the movement’s flag in various landmarks around the world, and so on and so forth.

Picture 4. Three different posters found in tunnel near Choi Hung estate, with three key messages. Poster on the left «We are one» (in Chinese, 香港人, 一条心) that translates into «Hong Kong people, one single heart». Poster in the center to promote a «Global anti-totalitarianism march» (in Chinese, 全球反極權大遊行) on 29 Septem- ber. Posters on the right are left by protesters to inform people about good practices to prevent the spreading of the Corona virus, as the movement turned increasingly critical towards the government, taken in February 2020. Source: Angela Tritto.

In light of the aforementioned four characteristics, what protestors are fighting for is in line with their methods of demonstrations. The democratic and egalitarian ways deployed by the protesters in taking their decisions reflect what they have been seeking to achieve in the electoral system of Hong Kong, i.e. universal suffrage. The level of inclusivity and, to a great extent, lack of marginalisation, which have hitherto characterised the movement, are representations of the pluralism the protesters desire to see in Hong Kong. In addition, the conscious reconstruction of the identity of the movement as well as its highly adaptive nature are manifestations of the change that protestors want to accomplish in the city. When they own the mistakes of the fellow protestors and apologise on behalf of them, they convey the message that the government and the police force should be accountable for their wrongdoings. In short, the movement leads by example. However, while Hong Kong’s youth have indeed shown an unprecedented innovativeness in the governance of their grassroots movement, their action has taken a toll on what is generally considered as a safe and politically stable city. According to the Information and Services Department

182 Hong Kong 2019 of the Hong Kong Government, between 9 June and 21 November 2019, the police arrested more than 5,800 persons in major public order events (POEs), and 923 of them had been charged.69 Over the same period, «more than 2,600 people were injured in large-scale POEs and sought treatment at public hospitals. More than 470 of them were police officers».70 Some argue that the number may be higher as most protesters avoid seeking treatment for protest-related injuries in public hospitals as they are afraid of being reported and thereby facing legal consequences. In addition, two protesters have died, and the setting on fire of a man, gun shooting,71 and stabbing incidents, one targeting Pro-Beijing lawmaker Junius Ho, have shocked the city as well as the international community. Since June, the city has been in a limbo, growing increasingly hopeless about the ability of the government to provide a solution.

5. Conclusion

Throughout this article we examined the underlying dynamics of the protests. Above water, we see the political and economic pressures on society. Below water, we see the different way in which the old and new generation respond to these increasing pressures and interferences. We also see a change in identity and values, which are translated into how the protests unfold. Even if temporarily tamed, these pressures will keep bubbling under the fast-paced and hectic life of the city, until a truly viable compromise is found. The evolution of identity building and increasing level of bonding within the movement was a mechanism that was triggered and reinforced as the tactics deployed by the police became more severe. The heavy-handed crowd control response by the police, along with the support for the protesters revealed by local elections, motivated the movement to continue in its organisation of mass rallies in a more assertive way. As scholars, journalists, and experts organised forums, discussion, and talks to mediate and resolve the situation, government responses maintained an elusive character.

69. ‘LCQ3: Complaints against police officers’, Press Releases, Information and Services Department, 27 November 2019. 70. Ibid. 71. On 11 November, a man was set on fire by protesters after a heated discussion. Hours before, a police officer shot three live rounds in the city center, harming a young protester. See Jessie Yeung & Julia Hollingsworth. ‘Man set alight hours after Hong Kong protester shot by police as clashes erupt citywide’, CNN, 11 November 2019.

183

Taiwan 2019 and the 2020 elections: Tsai Ing-Wen’s triumph*

Aurelio Insisa

The University of Hong Kong [email protected]

The year in review was one of the most tumultuous in the recent history of Taiwan and cross-Strait relations. At the beginning of 2019, President Tsai Ing-wen appeared destined for an ignominious defeat after the Democratic Progressive Party’s rout in the 2018 local elections. By the end of the year, her victory in the presidential election looked certain. On 11 January 2020, Tsai won her second term in office beating the controversial Kuomintang candidate Han Kuo-yu. Cross-Strait, international, and domestic factors converged to realise this improbable electoral comeback. The stagnation of China’s Taiwan policy over the «1992 Consensus» and the «one country, two systems» formula largely opposed in Taiwan, coupled with the increasingly assertive posture of the People’s Republic of China under the leadership of Xi Jinping, worried the Taiwanese public and revitalised Tsai and the pan-Green camp. The resonance in Taiwan of the unexpected eruption of violent protests in Hong Kong against the local and central government then cleared a path for Tsai’s electoral victory, while exposing the inherent contradictions of the Kuomintang’s own China-friendly approach to cross-Strait relations. Tsai’s recovery benefited also from the deepening support provided by the Trump administration, and from the positive spillover effects of the Sino-American trade war, which fostered a convincing economic growth in the period leading up to the election. Within Taiwanese politics, the populist wave raised by Han Kuo-yu swept over the Kuomintang and appeared ready to conquer national politics throughout the first half of 2019. However, it ultimately failed to address the concerns of the domestic electorate over the future status of Taiwan and also dragged the pan-Blue camp to defeat in the legislative election, in which the Democratic Progressive Party obtained a stable parliamentary majority to support Tsai’s second term in office.

* Relevant terms and expressions are reported in English followed by a transcription in Chinese characters. Traditional characters are used for terms and statements drawn from Taiwanese sources, while simplified characters are used for terms and statements drawn from Chinese sources. Given the lack of a standardised system for proper nouns in Taiwan, people’s names and place names are transliterated either in Wade-Giles or in Gwoyeu Romatzyh, following their most common usage. Proper nouns from the PRC are transliterated in Hanyu Pinyin.

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Aurelio Insisa

1. Introduction

This essay explores the developments which occurred in the Repub- lic of China (Taiwan) – henceforth ROC – in the fields of cross-Strait relations, international politics, domestic economy and politics in 2019, as well as the results of the general election held on 11 January 2020. The first section of the essay, covering cross-Strait relations, consists of four segments. The first examines the communicative dynamic between the ROC and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2019, as both countries shaped narratives aiming to legitimise their positions to domestic and international audiences. The second segment assesses the articulation of China’s Taiwan policy in 2019 and how it affected the ROC’s international presence. The third discusses instead the impact of the 2019 protests in Hong Kong both on cross-Strait relations and on the trajectory of Taiwan’s elections. The last segment of this section analyses the China policy of the administration of President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), with a focus on its political, legal, and defence initiatives. The second section covers major developments in Taiwan’s international relations beyond their cross-Strait dimension. It starts with an account of the deepening relation between Washington and Taipei, and it is followed by an assessment of Taiwan’s relations with both Japan and the target countries of the New Southbound Policy. The third part of the essay – chapter four – covers domestic politics and economics. While cross-Strait and international factors influencing the electoral campaign are analysed in the previous sections, this portion of the essay informs such events to the domestic economic and political processes occurring in Taiwan. In order to do so, section four is divided into three segments. The first segment presents estimates and official data on the performance of the Taiwanese economy in 2019. The second segment maps the unfolding of the campaign for the 2020 presidential election. Finally, the third segment presents the results of the general elections, with a focus on the contest for the Legislative Yuan (LY).

2. Cross-Strait relations in 2019

Two major events shaped the path of cross-Strait relations in 2019. The first was the key speech delivered by Chinese leader Xi Jinping (习近平) in January, which doubled down on previous pledges to alter the current status quo. The second was the unexpected emergence of mass protests in Hong Kong since June, which accentuated the existing cleavage between China and most of Taiwanese society. Against this backdrop, Beijing and Taipei continued to pursue their competing strategies vis-à-vis the counterpart. Beijing mixed co-option and coercion, while Taipei continued to implement a comprehensive defence agenda against the threat of military invasion and infiltration of its civil society.

186 Taiwan 2019

2.1. China’s stagnant Taiwan policy On 2 January, PRC President and CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping delivered a speech on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the «Message to Compatriots in Taiwan» issued by the Standing Committee of the Na- tional People’s Congress in 1979. For the occasion, Xi reiterated the cor- nerstones of his administration’s Taiwan policy: acceptance of the so-called «1992 Consensus» (九二共识) and of the «One China principle» (一中原则) enshrined within it; «peaceful reunification» (和平统一) according to the «one country, two systems» (一国两制) framework; non-negotiable opposition to any form of «Taiwan independence» (台独) and to any «external interferences» (外部势力干涉). The Chinese leader envisioned «reunification» (统一) with Taiwan as the coronation of the process of «national rejuvenation» (民族复兴). Moreover, Xi reiterated his predecessors’ claims that China would never renounce the use of «military force» (武力) and vowed that it would «reserve the option of taking all necessary measures» (保留采取一切必要措施的选项) to achieve reunification.1 The speech was a summa of Xi’s previous statements on the Taiwan issue, but it put the spotlight firmly on the «one country, two systems» formula as Beijing’s only solution to the current deadlock in cross-Strait relations. At the same time, Xi’s message ominously reminded the Taiwanese public about the possibility of a military invasion of the island. Predictably, Presi- dent Tsai responded with a stern rejection of the «1992 Consensus» and of «one country, two systems», admonishing China to «face the reality of the existence of the Republic of China (Taiwan)» (正視中華民國臺灣存在的事實) and to recognise its democratic system.2 Xi’s January speech was glaring evidence of the calcification of China’s Taiwan policy since the collapse of cross-Strait rapprochement between 2015 and 2016. His pledge to «fully consider Taiwan’s current situation» (充分考虑台湾现实情况) hardly reflected the overwhelming opposition to «one country, two systems» among the Taiwanese public, as well

1. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, PRC (TAO), 习近平: 为实现民族伟大复兴推进祖国和平统一而共同奋斗 -- 在«告台湾同胞书»发表40周年纪念会上的讲话 (Xi Jinping: Working Together to Realize the Great Rejuvenation of the Nation and Ad- vance the Fatherland’s Peaceful Reunification – Speech Delivered for the Fortieth Anniversary of the «Message to Compatriots in Taiwan»), 2 January 2019 (http://www.gwytb.gov. cn/wyly/201901/t20190102_12128140.htm). The term 统一 (tongyi) should generally be translated as «unification». However, in the context of cross-Strait relations, PRC sources translate it as «reunification». In this essay, «reunification» is used exclusively when referring to the PRC’s use of the term. 2. Office of the President of the ROC (Taiwan) (OPROC), 總統針對中國國家主席習近平«告台灣同胞書»40周年紀念談話說明我政府立場 (The President Explains Our Government’s Position Regarding the Speech for the Fortieth Anniversary of the «Message to Compatriots in Taiwan» by the Head of the Chinese State Xi Jinping), 2 January 2018. On the «Taiwan Consensus», see: Aurelio Insisa, ‘Taiwan 2012-2016: From Consolidation to the Collapse of Cross-Strait Rapprochement’, Asia Maior 2016, p. 56.

187 Aurelio Insisa as the consolidation of a localist political identity on the island.3 Com- mentators have explained this apparent cognitive dissonance in China’s Taiwan policy by highlighting two causes. One was a hasty reading of the results of Taiwan’s local elections held in November 2018, which interpreted the Democratic Progressive Party’s (民主進步黨, DPP) resounding defeat as a condemnation of the Tsai administration’s cross-Strait policy, rather than as a protest vote on the state of the economy and the quality of its local governance. The other cause was indicated as Xi’s need to reassure the hawkish constituencies within the Party-State apparatus and to create a «rally ’round the flag» effect in the context marked by economic slowdown and the Sino-US trade war.4 Polls suggest that Xi’s message had an immediate negative impact on Taiwanese attitudes towards China, increasing support for President Tsai’s presidency, thus partially softening the damage caused by the DPP’s defeat in the November local elections.5 The impact of the Chinese leader’s message was also felt in the pan-Blue camp,6 affecting the Kuomintang’s (國民黨, KMT) attempts to shape a China policy, acceptable to the Taiwanese public. During the Ma presidency, the KMT had relied on a «One China, respective interpretations» (一中各表) narrative to argue that the «One China»

3. In 2018, before the beginning of the Hong Kong protests, only 3.3% of Tai- wanese wanted to achieve «unification as soon as possible», while a combined 74.5% preferred either a continuation of the status quo or independence. Moreover, only 3.7% identified as «Chinese», compared to 38.2% identifying as «both Chinese and Taiwanese» and 54.5% identifying as «Taiwanese». See: Election Study Center, Na- tional Chengchi University, ‘Changes in the unification - independence stances of Taiwanese as tracked in surveys by Election Study Center, NCCU (1994-2019.06)’, 10 July 2019; Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, ‘Changes in the Tai- wanese - Chinese identity of Taiwanese as tracked in surveys by Election Study Center, NCCU (1994-2019.06)’, 10 July 2019. 4. Michael Reilly, ‘Who Was Xi’s Audience? Xi Jinping’s New Year Message to Taiwan «Taiwan Compatriots»’, Global Taiwan Brief, Vol. 4, Issue 2, 30 January 2019. 5. Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation, ‘內閣改組、總統聲望與兩岸關係 (2019 年1月21日)’ (Cabinet reshuffle, presidential approval and cross-Strait relations - 21 January 2019), 21 January 2019 (https://www.tpof.org/圖表分析/內閣改組、總統聲望與兩岸關係（2019年1月21日)/）. 6. In Taiwanese politics the term «blue» (藍) is used to describe the KMT and, more broadly, actors advocating a spectrum of political positions ranging from cooperation to unification with the PRC. Conversely, the term «green» (綠) is used to describe the DPP and other actors advocating a spectrum of political positions ranging from the maintenance of Taiwan’s de facto independence from Beijing to the establishment of a «Republic of Taiwan». The related terms «pan-blue» (泛藍) and «pan- green» (泛綠) are used to describe loose political alliances along this divide. On the articulation of this political divide in contemporary Taiwanese politics, see: Nathan F. Bhatto, ‘Cleavage Structure and the Demise of a Dominant Party: The Role of Na- tional Identity in the Fall of the KMT in Taiwan’, Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2019, pp. 81-101.

188 Taiwan 2019 mentioned in the 1992 Consensus was in fact the ROC.7 Xi’s words, however, further strengthened pre-existent perceptions of Beijing’s progressive, unilateral shift in the interpretation of the 1992 Consensus, from what was originally a common baseline for relations between two one-party states into a byword for the PRC’s «reunification» agenda.8 President Tsai skilfully fleshed out the conundrum that Beijing posed to the pan-Blue camp by explicitly identifying the Consensus with «one country, two systems» in the aftermath of Xi’s speech.9 Unsurprisingly, KMT officials struggled to disentangle the party’s own support for the 1992 Consensus from the «one country, two systems».10 KMT Chairman Wu Den-yih’s (吳敦義) decision in February to reintroduce once again the idea of a «peace agreement» (和平協議) in the Taiwanese political debate, was arguably an attempt to resolve this impasse and regain momentum.11 The CPC’s annual Taiwan Work Conference held later in January, as well as Premier Li Keqiang’s (李克强) work report at the annual plenary session of the National People’s Congress, confirmed the monolithic nature of Beijing’s Taiwan policy and its complete identification with Xi’s message, highlighting a risky linkage between unification with Taiwan and the Chi-

7. Aurelio Insisa, ‘Taiwan 2012-2016’, pp. 54-55. 8. On the origins and the articulation of the 1992 Consensus, see: Shirley A. Kan, ‘China/Taiwan: Evolution of the «One China» Policy: Key Statements from Wash- ington, Beijing, and Taipei’, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 10 October 2014, p. 50. A more detailed but partisan account has also been provided by the current MAC Minister Chen Ming-tong (陳明通) in an essay published on the MAC website. See: Chen Ming-tong, ‘「九二香港會談」與「九二共識」～歷史事實與解讀’ (The «1992 Hong Talks» and the «1992 Consensus»: Historical Facts and Interpretations), (https://ws.mac.gov.tw/001/Upload/295/relfile/0/6286/71ffe86e- ea79-42b1-8825-36ef2901db3d.pdf). 9. ‘與外媒茶敘總統籲全台政黨不要再講九二共識’ (The President Appeals to All Political Parties in Taiwan to Stop Discussing the 1992 Consensus at a Tea-Time Meeting with the Foreign Press), 中央通訊社 (CNA), 5 January 2018. It must be pointed out that, at the time of writing, Chinese official statements have always stopped short of explicitly identifying the Consensus with «one country, two systems». 10. ‘朱立倫: 蔡總統無權要求各政黨不要講九二共識’ (Eric Chu: President Tsai Has No Right to Demand Political Parties to Avoid Discussing the 1992 Consensus), CNA, 6 January 2018. 11. ‘吳敦義拋兩岸和平協議綠批絕非和平保障’ (Wu Den-yih Proposes Cross- Strait Peace Agreement – The DPP Says That It Is by No Means a Guarantee for Peace), CNA, 14 February 2019. The idea of a legal document declaring the end of Civil War-era hostilities has been intermittently discussed in Pan-Blue environ- ments since the proposal of a peace treaty in 1995 by former PRC President Jiang Zemin (江泽民). The legal and political ramifications of such a move for the status of the ROC remain however unclear. See: Yijiang Din, ‘Cross-Strait Peace Agree- ment: Diminishing Likelihood’, Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 39, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 1-20.

189 Aurelio Insisa nese leader’s own legacy.12 The National Defence White Paper issued in July also contributed to this process, incorporating, almost verbatim, key passages of the January message and focusing in particular on the linkage between national rejuvenation and reunification.13 Foreign commentators noted how the use of language echoing Xi’s message in the newly released white paper shaped a more assertive, if not downright ominous, narrative on Taiwan when compared to its previous editions.14

2.2 China’s use of co-option and coercion towards Taiwan As the language of China’s Taiwan policy calcified, its modus operandi, characterised by a mix of co-optation and coercion, also remained unchanged. «United front work» (统一战线工作) continued to foster pro- Beijing actors in Taiwan via a network of forums, platforms, and recruit- ment schemes, with a particular focus on education.15 Covert operations focused instead on the infiltration of Taiwan’s media, either via paid news or by agenda-setting.16 China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) also maintained close contact with KMT heavyweights, party delegations and local officials throughout the year to foster a perception of cross-Strait support for Bei- jing’s Taiwan policy.17 Among these initiatives, it is worth highlighting Ka- ohsiung mayor Han Kuo-yu’s (韓國瑜) visit to Mainland China and Hong Kong. Retrospectively, especially after the beginning of the Hong Kong protests, this visit shaped public perception of Han as a pro-China candidate in the presidential election. Han officially visited the PRC to sign bespoke

12. ‘2019年对台工作会议在京召开汪洋出席并讲话’ (The 2019 Taiwan Work Conference Opened in Beijing – Wang Yang Chaired the Conference and Delivered a Speech), 中国共产党新闻网 (CPC News), 23 January 2019; ‘十三届全国人大二次会议开幕会’ (Opening Ceremony of the Second Session of the Thirteenth National Peo- ple’s Congress), Xinhua, 5 March 2019. 13. The State Council Information Office of the PRC, «新时代的中国国防» 白皮书 (全文) («National Defence in a New Era» White Paper - Full Text), 24 July 2019 (http:// www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/dtzt/39912/41132/41134/Document/1660318/1660318.htm). 14. Elsa Kania & Peter Wood, ‘Major Themes in China’s 2019 National Defense White Paper’, China Brief, Vol. 19, Issue 14, 31 July 2019, p. 21. 15. On «united front work», see: Anne-Marie Brady, ‘On the Correct Use of Terms’, China Brief, Vol. 19, Issue 9, 9 May 2019, pp. 2-5. For recent analyses on Chinese political warfare in Taiwan, see: J. Michael Cole, ‘Beijing Ramping Up Political Warfare against US-Taiwan Ties’, Global Taiwan Brief, Vol. 4, Issue 18, 25 September 2019. 16. See section 2.4. of this essay. 17. TAO, 刘结一会见南投县长林明溱一行 (Liu Jieyi Meets Nantou County Magistrate Lin Ming-chen), 21 March 2019 (http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201903/ t20190321_12150146.htm); TAO, 刘结一会见中国国民党台商党代表参访团 (Liu Jieyi Meets a KMT Delegation of Taishang Representatives), 10 April 2019; TAO, 刘结一会见王金平一行 (Liu Jieyi Meets Wang Jin-pyng), 8 May 2019 (http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/ wyly/201905/t20190508_12162940.htm).

190 Taiwan 2019 trade deals.18 However, he also met with TAO director Liu Jieyi (刘结一) in Shenzhen and with the director of the Hong Kong Liaison Office Wang Zhimin (王志民).19 Following the backlash to Xi’s January speech back in Taiwan, Han tried to downplay the glaring political implications of the visit, emphasising instead its business-friendly nature, but TAO reports of the meeting predictably stressed Han’s public support for the 1992 Consensus.20 As the Hong Kong protests rapidly worsened, starting in June, China’s Taiwan policy did not see any relevant development until November, when 26 new measures of preferential treatment towards Taiwanese people and business were released.21 The new package expanded the set of privileges previously introduced with the «31 Measures» implemented in 2018.22 Such measures were then followed by a further revision of the law for Taiwanese investments in December.23 The timing and content of these initiatives suggest that the Chinese leadership inferred a direct correlation between their Taiwan policy and the DPP’s defeat in the November local elections, possibly expecting similar dividends for the January 2020 general elections. Successive official statements on cross-Strait relations did not introduce any relevant change. Among them, one of the resolutions of the fourth plenum of the 19th Congress CPC repeated previous pleas to respect Taiwan’s «social system and way of life» (社会制度和生活方式) after unification.24 TAO of-

18. Beijing has implemented a preferential treatment of Taiwanese local administrations not ruled by the DPP in recent years. See: David Gitter & Elsa Kania, ‘How Beijing uses people-to-people ties as leverage over Taiwan’, The Diplomat, 1 October 2016. 19. Kristin Huang, ‘Senior Chinese officials give Taiwanese politician Han Kuo- yu the red carpet treatment on «non-political» tour of Mainland’, South China Morning Post (SCMP), 29 March 2019. 20. TAO, 国台办: 韩国瑜大陆之行成果丰硕两岸城市交流前景广阔 (TAO: Han Kuo-yu’s Mainland Visit Had Fruitful Results – City Exchanges across the Straits Have a Bright Future), 25 March 2019 (http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201903/ t20190325_12151150.htm). 21. TAO, «26条措施»逐条解读 (A Point-by-Point Explanation of the «Twenty-Six Meas- ures»), 4 November 2019 (http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201911/t20191104_12214955. htm); see also: Shunsuke Tabeta & Kensaku Ihara, ‘China offers 5G olive branch to Taiwan as Island’s election nears’, Nikkei Asian Review (NAR), 5 November 2019. 22. Aurelio Insisa, ‘Taiwan 2018: Heavy Setbacks for the Tsai Administration’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 134-135. 23. TAO, 全国人大常委会通过关于修改«中华人民共和国台湾同胞投资保护法»的决定 (Resolution of the Standing Committee of the NPC on the Amendment of the «Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Investments of Tai- wan Compatriots»), 30 December 2019 (http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201912/ t20191231_12229441.htm). 24. ‘中共中央关于坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化若干重大问题的决定’ (Resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPC About Some Major Issues on Upholding and Improving the Socialist System with Chinese Characteristics, the Enhancement of the System of National Governance, and the Modernization of Governance Capacities), Xinhua, 5 November 2019.

191 Aurelio Insisa ficials instead continued to profess confidence on reunification before the elections, and simply reiterated the key points of Xi’s Taiwan policy immediately after Tsai’s electoral triumph.25 Beijing’s playbook for international coercion also remained unchanged, as it further intensified punitive measures against Taipei. The Chinese government first stopped individual travel permits to Taiwan in July, and then banned group permits in August, in an attempt to turn the local tourism industry against the Tsai administration.26 Beijing also kept pursuing the suffocation of Taiwan’s international space, barring Taiwanese officials from attending International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), World Health Organization (WHO), and Interpol assemblies.27 In addition, the PRC poached two former ROC diplomatic allies, as both the Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched diplomatic recognition in September.28 The political implications of Beijing’s diplomatic victories in the South Pacific are assessed in the third section of this essay because, beyond their immediate cross-Strait dimension, they pertain to the broader Sino-American strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, Chinese military signalling did not deviate from the blueprint of incremental assertiveness established since 2016. On 31 March, People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) jets crossed the median line of the Strait, the de facto air space border between the PRC and the ROC.29 This new development was largely expected, following the previous Chinese decision to modify the M503 flight route in January 2018, and the begin-

25. Wang Yao & Feng Yuezhi, ‘坚定推进祖国和平统一进程 - 权威访谈’ (Reso- lutely carrying forward the process of reunification of the Fatherland – Authoritative interview), 人民日报 (People’s Daily), 19 December 2019; TAO, 中共中央台办、国务院台办发言人就台湾地区选举结果发表谈话 (The TAO Spokesperson Issues a Statement on the Results of the Elections in the Taiwan Area), 11 January 2020 (http://www.gwytb.gov. cn/wyly/202001/t20200111_12231917.htm). 26. ‘China Freezes Permits for Individual Travel to Taiwan’, NAR, 31 July 2019; ‘First Solo Travellers, Now Beijing Cuts Group Tours’, SCMP, 27 August 2019. The Tsai administration took partial countermeasures with a NT$4.6 bn (US$ 150 m) aid package to the local industry. See: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Taiwan: The Tourism Squeeze, 22 October 2019. 27. ‘Taiwan’s Absence from ICAO Creates Gap in Aviation Network: CAA’, Fo- cus Taiwan, 24 September 2019; Nicola Smith, ‘Taiwan at greater risks of pandemics after WHO exclusion, says Foreign Minister’, The Telegraph, 9 May 2019; ‘Taiwan Not Eligible to Join Interpol: Mainland Spokesperson’, China Daily, 16 October 2019. 28. ‘Taiwan Ends Relationship with Solomon Islands after It Votes to Cut Ties’, SCMP, 16 September 2019; ‘Taipei Down to 15 Allies as Kiribati Announces Switch of Diplomatic Ties to Beijing’, SCMP, 20 September 2019. 29. Ministry of National Defense of the ROC (MND), Defense News, 31 March 2019, (https://www.mnd.gov.tw/English/Publish.aspx?title=News%20 Channel&SelectStyle=Defense%20News&p=76193). The MND had previously reported PLAAF operations across the Bashi Strait in January see: MND, Defense News, 24 January 2019, (https://www.mnd.gov.tw/English/Publish.aspx?title=News%20 Channel&SelectStyle=Defense%20News&p=76011).

192 Taiwan 2019 ning of PLAAF operations in the proximity of the median line the following May.30 President Tsai responded to the PLAAF operation stating that she had ordered the ROC military to carry out the «forceful expulsion» (強勢驅離) of any similar «provocation» (挑釁) in the future.31 No other crossings of the median line were publicly acknowledged throughout the year. How- ever, other branches of the PLA continued to exert military pressure over Taiwan. The PLA Rocket Force held missile exercises in the South China Sea between June and July, a signal of the shifting balance of power between the US and China in these contested waters, which holds profound implications for the unfolding of a possible conflict across the Strait.32 The People’s Lib- eration Army Navy (PLAN), instead, repeatedly sailed through the Taiwan Strait, first with the air carrier Liaoning, and successively, in November and December, with a carrier group led by its first indigenous air carrier, the Shandong.33

2.3. The impact of the Hong Kong protests Against the backdrop of Beijing’s stagnant Taiwan policy, the mass protests which started in Hong Kong in June 2019 put Taiwan’s future relations with China at the centre of the political debate of the 2020 general election. The casus belli behind the upheavals in Hong Kong can be traced back to Taiwan, where, in February 2018 a Hong Kong resident murdered his partner while on holiday in Taipei. The culprit was then able to avoid a trial both in Taiwan and Hong Kong (where he had fled immediately after the murder) thanks to the absence of an extradition agreement between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and the ROC.34 The Lam administration in Hong Kong decided to use the media clamour around the case to push for an amendment of the existent extradition bill, which in turn could have opened the door to the extradition of Hong Kong residents to Mainland China. The mass popular protests that followed,

30. On the M503 route and its security implications, see: Aurelio Insisa, ‘Tai- wan 2018’, p. 134. 31. ‘共機蓄意越中線蔡英文下令軍方第一時間強勢驅離’ (Tsai Ing-wen Orders the Military the Immediate, Forceful Expulsion of PLAAF’s Deliberate Incursions across the Median Line), 自由時報 (Liberty Times Net, LTN), 1 April 2019. 32. ‘Chinese Military Conducts Anti-Ship Missile Tests in Hotly Contested South China Sea’, NBC, 2 July 2019. 33. MND, Defense News, 25 June 2019 (https://www.mnd.gov.tw/English/Pub- lish.aspx?title=News%20Channel&SelectStyle=Defense%20News&p=76453); MND, Defense News, 17 November 2019 (https://www.mnd.gov.tw/English/Publish. aspx?title=News%20Channel&SelectStyle=Defense%20News&p=76740); ‘China Sails Carrier Group through Taiwan Strait as Election nears’, Reuters, 26 Decem- ber 2019. 34. For details on this crime and its immediate connection with the protests, see: Ng Kang-chung, ‘Months of Hong Kong protests started with a murder. Will suspected killer’s return to Taiwan end it?’, SCMP, 23 October 2019.

193 Aurelio Insisa poorly managed by an increasingly weakened administration unable to propose a political solution and relying exclusively on the coercive response of the local police force, snowballed into months of urban guerrilla fighting. The vocal widespread rejection of progressive integration with the Main- land by the majority of Hong Kong citizens, was confirmed by the victory of the «pro-democracy» candidates over Beijing loyalists in the local elections in November.35 President Tsai skilfully navigated the budding political crisis in Hong Kong from its very beginning. Her government had previously refused to accept the transfer of the suspected murderer back to Taiwan, as proposed by Hong Kong authorities in May, stating concerns over the potential implications of the proposed amendment for ROC passport holders.36 Tsai later expressed support for Hong Kong activists fighting against the amendment just days before the first mass protest on 9 June.37 The consistency of her China policy and the firm handling of the legal dispute with the HKSAR government allowed Tsai to immediately reap the benefits of the widespread sympathy in Taiwan for the protests in the former British colony.38 In late June, Taiwanese pollsters gave Tsai a lead over KMT frontrunner Han Kuo-yu for the first time.39 Throughout the final months of the electoral campaign the President repeatedly highlighted the failure of the «one country, two systems» framework and accused Beijing of «authoritarianism».40 In doing so, she effectively framed the upheavals in Hong Kong as part of a global democratic struggle against the Chinese regime, with Taiwan at

35. For a profile of the protests see: Angela Tritto & Alkan Abdulkadir, ‘Hong Kong 2019: Anatomy of a Social Mobilisation through the Lenses of Identity and Values’, in this same Asia Maior issue. 36. Sum Lok-kei, ‘Taipei will not agree to transfer of Hong Kong murder suspect if Taiwanese citizens risk being sent to Mainland China’, SCMP, 9 May 2019. 37. Tsai Ing-wen (iingwen), ‘Lest We Forget June 4th’, 4 June 2019, Tweet. 38. Chris Horton, ‘«Today, Hong Kong; tomorrow, Taiwan» resistance to Chi- na spreads’, NAR, 26 June 2019. Polls conducted in August show support for the Hong Kong protests steadily above 50%. See: TVBS Polls Center, ‘2020 總統大選民調’ (Opinion Poll on the 2020 General Elections), 16 August 2019, p. 10, (https:// cc.tvbs.com.tw/portal/file/poll_center/2019/20190819/b52a754f219ebf7ee6bf84d- d0cda79d6.pdf). 39. ‘蔡英文40.6%上揚勝韓國瑜38.8% 緊咬郭台銘僅差3.1%’ (Tsai Ing-wen Rises to 40.6%, Surpasses Han Kuo-yu at 38.8% - She Tails Terry Gou by 3.1%), 蘋果即時 (Apple Daily), 25 June 2019; TVBS Polls Center, ‘民進黨初選後 2020 總統可能人選民調’ (Opinion Poll on the Potential Candidates for the 2020 Presidential Election after the DPP Primary), 22 June 2019, p. 5, (https://cc.tvbs.com.tw/portal/file/poll_ce nter/2019/20190624/85dda81cdb86284e8c509b1ceb7525f1.pdf). 40. ‘Hong Kong Government Should Stop Suppressing and Start Talking, Tai- wan Leader Tsai Ing-wen Says’, SCMP, 2 October 2019; OPROC, 「堅韌之國前進世界」總統發表國慶演說 (The President Delivers the National Day Address «Nation of Resilience, Forward into World»), 10 October 2019 (https://www.president.gov.tw/ NEWS/24860); ‘Taiwan President Says Not «Using» Hong Kong Protests for Election’, Reuters, 10 December 2019.

194 Taiwan 2019 its forefront. Tsai’s electoral strategy, in turn, enraged Chinese authorities already prone to blame domestic dissent on «external forces» and «black hands», causing a barrage of harsh statements against the Taiwanese authorities and the DPP.41 As previously mentioned, the protests had also a profound impact on the electoral prospects of the pan-Blue camp, which had aimed to side-track identity politics and cross-Strait relations in order to focus the campaign on the state of the domestic economy. Widespread popular support for the protests put the KMT frontrunner for the presidential election, Han Kuo- yu, further on the defensive after his controversial visit to the Mainland and Hong Kong. In June, the Kaohsiung mayor attempted to repair the damage by expressing support for Hong Kong localist groups and decisively rejecting the «one country, two systems» framework.42 Since the early weeks of the protests, virtually all the major political figures in Taiwan distanced themselves from Beijing’s policies towards Hong Kong, including Foxconn magnate and KMT-primary candidate Terry Gou Tai-ming (郭台銘), and the popular Taipei mayor and rumoured presidential candidate Ko Wen- je (柯文哲).43 During the remaining months of the campaign, neither Han nor Gou were able to successfully reconcile the contradiction inherent in the KMT’s China policy, namely how to achieve domestic economic growth through closer engagement with China without risking political assimilation.

2.4. The Tsai administration’s firewall against Beijing Since it came to power in 2016, the Tsai administration has engaged in the construction of a comprehensive firewall against both the threat of a Chinese military invasion and the infiltration of Taiwanese media and society via «united front work». This effort can be assessed in two distinct areas: defence and law. The dominant issue in Taiwanese defence in 2019 was the decision to scrap previous plans to modernise the fleet of the ROC

41. TAO, 国台办: 正告民进党及其当局立即收回伸向香港的黑手 (TAO: We Stern- ly Warn the DPP and Its Authorities to Immediately Withdraw their Black Hands from Hong Kong), 14 August 2019, (http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201908/t20190814_12192374. htm); ‘习近平在中央党校(国家行政学院)中青年干部培训班开班式上发表重要讲话’ (Xi Jinping Delivered an Important Speech at the Ceremony for the Beginning of the Training Course for Junior and Mid-Level Cadres at the Central Party School - National School of Administration), CPC News, 3 September 2019; ‘习近平: 任何分裂中国企图都是痴心妄想’ (Xi Jinping: Any Attempt to Split China Is Delusional), Xinhua, 13 October 2019. 42. ‘韓國瑜: 拒一國兩制除非OVER MY DEAD BODY’ (Han Kuo-yu: Reject One Country Two System, Unless It’s Over My Dead Body), Apple Daily, 16 June 2019. For a profile of Hong Kong «localism», see: Sebastian Veg, ‘The Rise of «Localism» and Civic Identity in Post-Handover Hong Kong: Questioning the Chinese Nation- State’, The China Quarterly, Vol. 230, June 2017, pp. 323-347. 43. Kensaku Ihara, ‘Taiwan candidates quickly shun China after Hong Kong protests’, NAR, 21 June 2019.

195 Aurelio Insisa

Air Force (ROCAF) with F-35 fighters and upgrade instead the existent fleet of F-16A and F-16B with the F-16V variant models.44 The ROC Ministry of National Defense submitted a Letter of Request for the F-16V to the US in March, and the Trump administration approved the sale in August with a US$ 8 billion deal for 66 models.45 Taiwan’s domestic military build-up in 2019 included also the beginning of mass production of missile corvettes and minelayers;46 and the further development of the indigenous submarine project, the first phase of which was completed in March. The factory where the submarines will be produced was inaugurated in May in Kaohsi- ung.47 The ROC military also regularly staged the annual Han Kuang military exercises at the end of May. The exercises were split into two phases, computerised war-games and live-fire drill, with this second leg focusing on the threat of an over-the-horizon amphibious invasion from China and new take-off and landing exercises.48 For the year 2020, the LY approved a budget of NT$ 343.5 billion (US$ 11.4 billion) for national defence within the proposed 2020 central government budget. The budget included NT$ 96 billion (US$ 3.1 billion) on military investment, with funds to produce an indigenous jet fighter trainer, the AIDC T-5 Brave Eagle, and for the continuation of the indigenous submarine production programme.49 Outside the realm of defence, Taipei strengthened its cordon sanitaire against China through law enforcement and a series of ad hoc legal responses. Between January and March, Chinese companies Huawei, ZTE, Tencent, and Baidu were banned as agents of Chinese influence.50 A series of high-profile scandals and cases followed these early measures as the general elections drew closer, creating an effective «emergency narrative» in the polarised ecosystem of Taiwanese media. In May, an official of the National Security Bureau (NSB) – the ROC intelligence agency – reported the existence of Taiwanese media closely working with Beijing in a LY session, even

44. For an analysis of the decision, see: David An, ‘Assessing the Advantages of F-16V for Taiwan’, Global Taiwan Brief, Vol. 4, Issue 4, 27 February 2019. 45. ‘President Tsai Confirms Taiwan Seeking to Buy F-16Vs from U.S.’, Focus Taiwan, 19 March 2019; ‘White House Pushes Ahead with $8bn Arms Sale to Taiwan’, The Financial Times, 16 August 2019. 46. ‘Taiwan Begins Mass Production of Home-Grown Missile Corvettes, Mine- layers’, SCMP, 25 May 2019. 47. ‘1st Phase of Indigenous Submarine Project Completed: Defense Minister’, Focus Taiwan, 28 March 2019; ‘Model of Taiwan’s First Indigenous Submarine Un- veiled’, Focus Taiwan, 9 May 2019. 48. ‘Military Tests Its Newest Weapons’, Taipei Times, 31 May 2019. 49. ‘Cabinet Approves 2020 Central Government Budget’, Focus Taiwan, 15 August 2019. 50. ‘Taiwan Preps China Blacklist Banning Huawei and ZTE’, NAR, 22 January 2019; ‘Taiwan to Block Tencent and Baidu Streaming Sites on Security Risk’, NAR, 29 March 2019.

196 Taiwan 2019 though he refused to reveal their identities.51 The same month, a widely circulated report from the Digital Society Project which cited Taiwan as the country most affected by foreign (Chinese) online disinformation campaigns, further contributed to strengthen perceptions of threat throughout the summer.52 In July, a «Financial Times» article reported collusions between China’s TAO and the constellation of media belonging to Tsai Eng- Meng (蔡衍明), chairman of the Want Want China group headquartered on the Mainland;53 while in August a «Reuters» investigation found evidence of Chinese payments to Taiwanese media.54 In November, ROC Foreign Min- ister Joseph Wu Jaushieh (吳釗燮), publicly accused Beijing of having med- dled in the November 2018 local elections, which saw sweeping KMT gains and the surprising victory of Han Kuo-yu in Kaohsiung.55 Perceptions of threat were further compounded by Chinese defector and alleged spy Wang Liqiang (王立强), who claimed to have participated in attempts to sway the general election in China’s favour.56 In December, a retired ROCAF senior officer was arrested for attempting to recruit military officials for the PRC, while local authorities proceeded to a crackdown on exchange schemes with China used to ease visits by CPC and PRC officials.57 Beyond law enforcement, the centrepiece of the Tsai administration’s efforts in 2019 was the new Anti-Infiltration Law (反滲透法), which crimi- nalised political activities and funding from «foreign hostile forces» (境外敵對勢力). The law was designed to stop Chinese co-option of political candidates and local media on the island. It was passed by the LY on 31 Decem- ber, days before the general election, and promulgated by President Tsai on 15 January 2020.58 The Anti-Infiltration Law was predictably met with vocal

51. ‘誰是中共同路媒體? 國安局拒點名’ (Who Are the Chinese Communists’ Fellow-Traveller Media? The NSB Refuses to Identify Them), 聯合新聞網 (UDN), 25 May 2019. 52. Valeriya Mechkova et al., ‘Measuring Internet Politics: Introducing the Dig- ital Society Project (DSP)’, Digital Society Project, May 2019, 18-19. 53. Kathrin Hille, ‘Taiwan primaries highlight fears over China’s political influence’, The Financial Times, 16 July 2019. 54. Yimou Lee & I-hwa Cheng, ‘Paid «news»: China using Taiwan media to win hearts and minds’, Reuters, 9 August 2019. 55. Kensaku Ihara, ‘Taiwan accuses China of election meddling’, NAR, 23 No- vember 2019. See also: J. Michael Cole, ‘Chinese Interference in Taiwan’s Electoral Mechanisms: Means and Aims’, Global Taiwan Brief, Vol. 3, Issue 24, 12 December 2018. 56. Katsuji Nakazawa, ‘«China spy» spills secrets that rattle Taiwan and Hong Kong’, NAR, 28 November 2019; Katsuji Nakazawa, ‘«China spy» and a last-ditch attempt to swing Taiwan’s elections’, NAR, 16 January 2020. 57. ‘Ex-Commander Allegedly Enlisted «Moles» for China’, Taipei Times, 26 December 2019; ‘Taiwan Investigates Exchange Programmes «Used for Illegal Visits by Mainland Chinese Government Officials»’, SCMP, 12 December 2019. 58. Gazette of the Office of the President of the ROC, 4ò-lp7=ù (Anti-Infiltra- tion Law), 15 January 2020 (https://glin.ly.gov.tw/file/legal/tw1501202003.pdf).

197 Aurelio Insisa opposition by the pan-Blue camp, which raised fears of a potential quashing of civil liberties, and by the TAO, which decried the imposition of a «green terror» (绿色恐怖) by the DPP.59 Tsai responded to critics in her 2020 New Year’s Address, stating that the Anti-Infiltration Law will not affect either freedom of speech and human rights in Taiwan, or economic and trade exchanges with the PRC.60

3. Taiwan’s international space in 2019

The US-Taiwan relation had already undergone a qualitative upgrade in 2018, as the strategic competition between the US and China became even more manifest. This trend continued and intensified in 2019 with Tai- pei’s closer diplomatic and military alignment with Washington. Taiwan’s relations with Japan and the target countries of the New Southbound Policy also experienced progress, but within the constraints of the One China policy to which these countries abide.

3.1. The US-Taiwan relation Three directives can be identified in US-Taiwan relation in 2019: increasing American political and diplomatic support, deepening military cooperation between Washington and Taipei, and a closer strategic alignment between the two administrations. In January, the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives introduced a bill to support Taiwan’s return to the WHO as an observer.61 Later in May, the House passed the Taiwan As- surance Act, which deemed Taiwan «an important part of U.S. strategy» in the Indo-Pacific and urged the conduction of «regular transfers of defense articles to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities».62 The 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, passed by the Republican-controlled Senate in December, contained a clause concerning the reporting of Chinese interference operations in Taiwan.63 These bills, notable for their bipartisan support, became part of a growing constellation of Congress initiatives, including the Taiwan Travel Act and the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act previously

59. ‘Han Campaign Offers Legal Aid to Protect Free Speech’, Taipei Times, 3 January 2020; TAO, 国台办: 民进党当局制造«绿色恐怖» 必须悬崖勒马 (TAO: The DPP Authorities Create «Green Terror», It Must Stop Before It Is Too Late), 11 September 2019 (http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201909/t20190911_12200834.htm). 60. OPROC, 總統發表「2020新年談話」 (The President Delivers the «2020 New Year Address»), 1 January 2020 (https://www.president.gov.tw/NEWS/25159). 61. United States Congress, All Information (Except Text) for H.R.353 - To direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan in the World Health Organization, and for other purposes. 62. United States Congress, H.R.2002 - Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019. 63. United States Congress, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020.

198 Taiwan 2019 passed in 2018, which signalled the increasing support for Taiwan in Ameri- can politics. Congress’ support, in turn, matched the increasing commitment of the Trump administration. In the spirit of the Travel Act, a number of American officials visited Taiwan throughout the year.64 Among the visiting officials, John Bolton was the most senior. Noticeably, this was the first publicly acknowledged meeting between a US National Advisor and its ROC counterpart, the secretary-general of the National Security Council David Lee Ta-wei (李大維).65 Within this context, the inauguration in May of the new venue of the American Institute in Taiwan (the de facto US embassy on the island), even though long-planned, acquired a more profound sym- bolical relevance, especially following the Trump administration’s decision to deploy Marines for the protection of personnel in the new structure.66 President Tsai stopped over in the US twice in July, before and after a diplomatic tour of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in the Caribbean. In line with the narrative of a global struggle for democracy pursued by the ROC administration, the island-state’s diplomacy used the tagline «Journey of Freedom, Democracy, and Sustainability» to describe both the US stopover and the diplomatic tour. The ROC President spent two days in New York, where she gave a speech at Columbia University before visiting the Carib- bean, and two days in Colorado on her way back to Taiwan, where she was guest of the state senator, Cory Gardner.67 The unofficial but high-profile visit to the US provided Tsai a prestigious platform at a crucial time of her electoral campaign, with protests in Hong Kong rapidly intensifying and favourable momentum back home increasing. Moreover, the visit represented a key moment in the ongoing strategic alignment between Taipei and Washington under the aegis of the Japanese-American strategy/vision of a «Free and Open Indo-Pacific» (FOIP).68 Tsai described Taiwan as «a vital

64. Cheng Ting-Fang & Lauly Li, ‘On rare Taiwan visit US official urges 5G investment screening’, NAR, 15 April 2019; Chinmei Sung & Adela Lin, ‘U.S. official heads to Taiwan to shore up support in Pacific’, Bloomberg, 5 October 2019; ‘Pentagon Sends Envoy to Taiwan amid Concern over Chinese Threat’, The Financial Times, 22 November 2019. 65. ‘China Bridles at Rare Meeting between Taiwan and U.S. Security Officials’, Reuters, 27 May 2019. 66. ‘Marines to Guard New US Compound in Taiwan’, Asia Times, 4 April 2019. The inauguration of the new venue was rapidly followed by a change of name for the ROC’s counterpart of the American Institute in the US, from the «Coordination Council for North American Affairs» into the «Taiwan Council for US Affairs». See: ‘Taiwan’s co-ordination body for the US renamed’, Taipei Times, 26 May 2019. 67. Chris Horton, ‘Tsai’s New York detour shows US-Taiwan ties at tightest in years’, NAR, 14 July 2019; ‘U.S. Should Stand with Taiwan amid Growing Threats: Senator Gardner’, Focus Taiwan, 19 July 2019. 68. On the FOIP, see: Giulio Pugliese & Sebastian Maslow, ‘Japan 2018: Fleshing Out the «Free and Open Indo-Pacific» Strategic Vision’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 120-126.

199 Aurelio Insisa bastion of democracy in the Indo-Pacific» during her speech at Columbia;69 and, later, in her National Day address on 10 October, as «the forefront of the Indo-Pacific strategy» (印太地區戰略前緣) and the «first line of defence for democratic values» (守護民主價值的第一道防線).70 Beyond statements, in September Taipei signalled its ever closer alignment with the Trump administration, pledging to buy US$ 2.2 billion of soybeans from Iowa, a key state for Trump’s own chances for re-election, previously targeted by Bei- jing’s retaliations at the beginning of the trade-war.71 Taiwan’s importance for the US was even further raised due to the broadening geo-strategic competition between Beijing and Washington; the ROC’s international presence, mostly relying on a handful of LAC (Latin American and Caribbean) and South Pacific small states targeted by China’s «chequebook diplomacy», increasingly overlaps with American concerns over the potential proliferation of Chinese dual-use infrastructures in the Western hemisphere.72 Washington has consequently stepped up its efforts to refrain Taipei’s allies from switching diplomatic recognition to Beijing. This was evident in the LAC region where, after Panama and El Salvador severed relations with the ROC between 2017 and 2018, the US pressured Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua to withstand Beijing’s charm offensive.73 However, as previously noted, China scored a key diplomatic victory in the South Pacific, where American pressure did not stop the Solomon Islands and Kiribati from switching sides.74 Against this backdrop, military cooperation between the two sides further deepened. In July, the Pentagon approved a US$2.2 billion arms sale package.75 The Trump administration followed up this decision with the approval of the largest-ever arms sale to Taiwan, a US$ 8 billion deal for the upgrading of the ROCAF with the F-16Vs – as mentioned in the previous section.76 The US Armed Forces also responded to Chinese pro-activism in the Strait. In August, a USAF airplane which took off from Okinawa flew

69. OPROC, President Tsai Attends Discussion Session at Columbia University, 13 July 2019 (https://english.president.gov.tw/News/5776). 70. OPROC, ‘「堅韌之國前進世界」’. 71. ‘Taiwan Pledges 2.2. bn of US Corn and Soybeans’, NAR, 25 September 2019. 72. The term «dual use» describes «a gray area of objects that serves both military and civilian functions». Matthew Waxman, International Law and the Politics of Urban Air Operations, Santa Barbara, CA: RAND, 2000, p. 10. 73. See: Margaret Myers & Isabel Bernhard, ‘Weighing the Effects of Tai- wan-China Competition in Latin America and the Caribbean’, Global Taiwan Brief, Vol. 4, Issue 14, 17 July 2019. 74. ‘U.S. Official Urges Pacific Island Nations to Keep Ties with Taiwan’, Reu- ters, 24 May 2019. 75. ‘US Approves Possible $2.2bn Arm Sale to Taiwan, Testing Beijing’, NAR, 9 July 2019. 76. ‘White House Pushes ahead with $8bn Arms Sale to Taiwan’, NAR, 17 Au- gust 2019.

200 Taiwan 2019 over the Strait’s median line, arguably in response to the PLAAF’s trespass in March.77 The US Navy instead further routinised sailing operations in the Taiwan Strait, with a series of passages publicly acknowledged between March and August.78 It is worth noting, however, how American activities in the Strait slowed down as Washington and Beijing worked towards their «phase one trade deal». Balancing such change of pace, which could re- ignite the «bargaining chip» narrative which first emerged after Trump’s phone call to Tsai in January 2016, was the first-ever joint ROC-US cybersecurity exercise, held in November;79 followed by the announcement, in De- cember, of the establishment of a joint maintenance centre for the expected F-16V fighter jets.80

3.2. Taiwan’s relations beyond Beijing and Washington Taiwan-Japan relations, after the setbacks suffered in 2018, experienced a revival in 2019.81 In a March interview with the Japanese newspaper «Sankei Shimbun», President Tsai expressed her wish to share military intelligence with Tokyo and the desire to establish a direct Japan-Taiwan security dialogue focused on China.82 Tsai’s requests were not deemed acceptable by an Abe administration in the midst of a complex act of surface-level normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations.83 Tokyo, however, took tangible, pro-active measures to impress a new momentum into its relations with Taipei. In April, the two sides reached an agreement on fishery rules in the contested waters of the East China Sea, after renewed tensions between Japanese and Taiwanese fishermen and two failed meetings in 2018.84 In May, Foreign Minister Kōno Ta r ō expressed for the first time Japan’s support for Taiwan’s membership

77. ‘US Warplane Flies along Dividing Line between Mainland China and Tai- wan’, SCMP, 29 August 2019. National Security Adviser John Bolton had previously condemned the PLAAF crossing of the median line in March: ‘US National Security Adviser John Bolton Rebukes Beijing for Incursions into Taiwanese Airspace’, SCMP, 2 April 2019. 78. ‘U.S. Warship Sails through Taiwan Strait, Ninth This Year’, Focus Taiwan, 13 November 2019. 79. ‘US and Taiwan Hold First Joint Cyber-War Exercise’, BBC, 4 November 2019. 80. ‘Taiwan to Team Up with US to Build Fighter Jet Centre, Sending another Defiant Message to Beijing’, SCMP, 17 December 2019. 81. On Japan-Taiwan relations in 2018, see Aurelio Insisa, ‘Taiwan 2018’, pp. 144-146. 82. ‘蔡英文総統、日本に安保対話要請’ (President Tsai Ing-wen Requires Secu- rity Dialogue with Japan), 産経新聞 (The Sankei News), 2 March 2019. 83. ‘與我安保對話? 日本政府: 沒有考慮’ (A Security Dialogue with Us? The Jap- anese Government: «We Did Not Take It into Consideration»), UDN, 5 March 2019. 84. ‘Taiwan, Japan Reach Consensus in Fishery Talks’, Focus Taiwan, 11 April 2019.

201 Aurelio Insisa in the World Health Assembly.85 Moreover, following Taiwanese efforts to renegotiate existing bans on Japanese food products, Furuya Keiji, House of Representatives’ delegate at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation Forum in Yushan, announced Tokyo’s support for Taiwan’s bid to the Comprehen- sive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) previously launched in 2018.86 Having been unable to sign any FTA with foreign countries since coming into power, membership in the CPTPP would represent a key prize for the Tsai administration, especially after the ROC’s predictable exclusion from the China-driven RCEP mega-FTA, signed in November.87 Events between the end of 2019 and the beginning of 2020 suggest a continuation of this «slow but positive» trend in the foreseeable future. Routinised bilateral dialogue was maintained throughout the 2019 edition of the annual dialogue on Maritime Cooperation, which was held in Taipei in December,88 while the message sent after Tsai’s electoral victory by new Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry Motegi Toshimitsu promised «further deepening cooperation and exchanges», if only on a continuing «non-governmental basis».89 Notwithstanding the diplomatic constraints of Japan’s «One China» policy, economic relations between Taipei and Tokyo possess relevant implication in the geo-economic scenario of the Asia-Pacific. The growing influx of Japanese tourists constituted a lifeline for the local Taiwanese industry left exposed by Chinese travel bans.90 Similarly, the Taiwanese semiconductor industry increasingly came to rely on business ventures with Japa- nese companies to sustain the impact of China’s strategic attack to this key industrial sector.91 Taiwan also provided lucrative opportunities for Japa- nese companies such as Hitachi and Toshiba in an increasingly competitive Asian railway market in which China now poses a formidable challenge.92 In particular, Japanese companies expect further revenues from the Taiwan

85. ‘Japan Supports Taiwan’s World Health Assembly Bid’, Kyodo News, 9 May 2019. 86. ‘Japan Will Seek Support for Taiwan’s CPTPP Bid: Parliamentarian’, Focus Taiwan, 10 October 2019. 87. ‘MOEA Offers Measured Response to Announcement of RCEP Trade Deal’, Focus Taiwan, 11 May 2019. 88. ‘Taiwan-Japan Hold Dialogue on Maritime Cooperation in Taipei’, Focus Taiwan, 2 December 2019. 89. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Result of the Presidential Election in Tai- wan (Statement by Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu), 11 January 2020. 90. Kensaku Ihara, ‘Taiwan President woos Japanese tourists to counter Chi- nese boycott’, NAR, 30 September 2019. 91. Kensaku Ihara, ‘Taiwan tech sector turns to Japan to counter «red supply chain»’, NAR, 28 November 2019; Kensaku Ihara, ‘Taiwan loses 3,000 chip engineers to «Made in China 2025»’, NAR, 3 December 2019. 92. Shinichiro Ibusuki & Yuichi Shiga, ‘Hitachi wins Taiwan order for 600 train cars’, NAR, 16 January 2019; Kensaku Ihara, ‘Toshiba wins $370m rail deal in Tai- wan’, NAR, 18 October 2019.

202 Taiwan 2019 market in the next decade thanks to the planned extension of the island’s shinkansen network.93 On a side note, the close resemblance of the first model of Taiwan’s indigenous submarine unveiled in May to Japanese Sōryū- class submarines seems to prove the unofficial involvement of Japan in the ROC’s defence industry in recent years.94 This, in turn, suggests at least the tacit approval, if not the support, of the Abe administration for Japan-Tai- wan co-operation. Another major trend of the Tsai administration’s foreign policy was the continuous engagement with the target countries of the New South- bound Policy (NSP) in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania.95 ROC governmental bureaus released a string of progress reports on the NSP in May, touting the success of the policy in the 2016-2018 period, including a 22% increase in trade and a 66% increase in investment to Taiwan from NSP countries.96 A more effective benchmark to assess the success of the NSP is to track its progress in the four «main areas» designed by the Execu- tive Yuan: «talent exchange» (international professional training), «resource sharing» («culture, tourism, medical care, technology, agriculture and small and medium-sized enterprises»), «economic and trade collaboration» (support to Taiwanese business in target countries) and «regional connectivity» (trade agreements, and institutional cooperation with partner countries).97 Tangible achievements were attained in the first two areas.98 Official data on «economic and trade collaboration» show an increase of outbound investment in NSP countries, up to 16.16% compared to 2018, and amounting to US$ 2.79 billion, even though it was largely concentrated in major regional economies such as Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand and Australia.99 Progress in «regional connectivity», however, stalled at a bilateral level, and was sub-

93. Kensaku Ihara, ‘Taiwan to extend bullet train line in boon to Japan players’, NAR, 11 September 2019. 94. Howard Wang, ‘Japan Considers a New Security Relation via «Networking» with Taiwan’, China Brief, Vol. 19, Issue 10, 29 May 2019. 95. On the NSP, see: Aurelio Insisa, ‘Taiwan 2012-2016’, pp. 82-83; Aurelio Insisa ‘Taiwan 2017: Stalemate on the Strait’, Asia Maior 2017, p. 125; Aurelio Insisa, ‘Taiwan 2018’, pp. 146-147. 96. ‘New Southbound Policy Bearing Fruit, Says Taiwan Trade Office’, Taiwan News, 23 May 2019. 97. Executive Yuan, ROC (Taiwan), New Southbound Policy, 4 July 2019 (https://english.ey.gov.tw/News3/9E5540D592A5FECD/2ec7ef98-ec74-47af-85f2- 9624486adf49). 98. Lindsay Black, ‘Evaluating Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy: Going South or Going Sour?’, Asian Survey, Vol. 59, No. 2, 2019, p. 264. 99. Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC (Taiwan) (MOEA), Investment Com- mission, 108年12月份核准僑外投資、陸資來臺投資、國外投資、對中國大陸投資統計月報 (Monthly Statistics on Approved Overseas Investments, Investments from Main- land China to Taiwan, Outbound Investments, and Investments towards Mainland China for December 2019), 20 January 2020, (https://www.moeaic.gov.tw/news.view?do=data- &id=1415&lang=ch&type=business_ann).

203 Aurelio Insisa sumed within an agenda of closer cooperation with the US.100 Ultimately, the NSP in 2019 appeared to have played an ancillary role to broader, mac- ro-trends which favoured the China policy of the Tsai administration, such as the economic slowdown of the Chinese economy and the consequent reshoring of foreign business, the rising cost of labour for Taiwanese business in Mainland China, and the impact of the Sino-American trade war.

4. Domestic politics and economics in 2019 and the 2020 general elections

Previous sections of this essay analysed how the unyielding Taiwan policy of the Xi administration, the Hong Kong protests, and the strengthening of US-Taiwan relations shaped Tsai Ing-wen’s path to victory in the presidential election. Against this backdrop, this section analyses how the performance of the Taiwanese economy in the year in review, as well as the unfolding of the electoral campaign for the presidential election, led to the results of the general election held on 11 January 2020.

4.1. The Taiwanese economy in 2019 The domestic economic policy of the Tsai administration in its first term focused on tackling divisive but structurally necessary measures to reform pensions and taxation, and to raise the minimum wage. At the same time, the administration implemented medium-term programmes aiming to modernise and expand the island’s infrastructures with its «Forward-Looking Infrastructure Plan». It also laid down the foundation for a new industrial policy, focusing on innovation and reshoring of Taiwanese business from the Mainland with the «5+2 Industrial Innovation Plan», and the «Industry 4.0» and «Asian Silicon Valley» initiatives. The government also aimed to address one of the most problematic issues in Taiwanese society, affordable housing, with a National Housing Act.101 None of these measures, however, had a widespread, immediate impact on the livelihood of the local population: stagnant wages and a housing market unaffordable for large swathes of the population remained pressing problems. This predicament left Tsai and the DPP exposed to a KMT electoral campaign promising economic growth while avoiding questions on the future of Taiwan’s status vis-à-vis the PRC. This was the situation at least until cross-Strait politics and the Hong Kong protests began to monopolise the political debate. In this complex scenario, the flaring up of the Sino-American trade war provided new challenges to the Taiwanese economy, but also new opportunities. The central administra-

100. Jeremy Huai-che Chiang, ‘Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy and the looming election’, The Diplomat, 25 October 2019. 101. Aurelio Insisa, ‘Taiwan 2017’, pp. 125-126; Aurelio Insisa, ‘Taiwan 2018’, pp. 147-148.

204 Taiwan 2019 tion promptly profited from the trade war with its «Action Plan for Welcom- ing Overseas Taiwanese Businesses to Return to Invest in Taiwan», launched in January 2019, which guaranteed subsided loans and eased land acquisitions.102 Throughout the year, major Taiwanese companies such as Hon Hai (Foxconn), Quanta, Lite-On, and Pegatron opted for reshoring to Taiwan, contributing to a total of US$ 23 billion of investments and 46,000 new jobs in manufacturing, according to government sources.103 By November, a report from a UN Secretariat agency defined Taiwan as «the largest beneficiary of the trade diversion effects of United States tariffs on China».104 Major economic indicators for 2019 show that Taiwan was able to withstand the impact unleashed by the trade war on the global economy. Na- tional statistics estimated the GDP rate of growth on a year basis to 2.71%, in line with the 2.75% reached the previous year, higher than other regional economies such as Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. Cru- cially, after experiencing a sharp drop in the first quarter of 2019, plunging to 1.84%, GDP grew convincingly in the last three quarters, reaching 3.31% in the final one.105 Industrial production dropped by 0.32% compared to 2018;106 total exports saw a 1.4% contraction, and imports rose 0.4%, with a trade balance ultimately shrinking by 11.7% compared to the previous year.107 Exports to China and the US reflected the patterns of the trade war and the Tsai administration’s policies, respectively shrinking by 4.1% (accounting for 40.1% of the total) and rising 17.2% (accounting for 14%).108 Private-sector estimates of the 2019 current-account balance indicate a US$ 71.6 billion surplus, compared to US$ 70.8 billion recorded in 2018.109 Es- timates of the labour force saw instead no changes in the unemployment rate, still at 3.7%.110 Foreign direct investments (FDIs) experienced a 2.14% contraction compared to 2018, amounting to US$ 11.2 billion, the fourth

102. National Developmental Council ROC (Taiwan), Action Plan for Welcoming Overseas Taiwanese Businesses to Return to Invest in Taiwan (https://www.ndc.gov.tw/en/ Content_List.aspx?n=286FD0E985C0EA44). 103. ‘China Poaches 3,000 Chip Engineers, but Taiwan Winning from Trade War’, Taiwan News, 3 December 2020; Kensaku Ihara, ‘Taiwan Inc. weighs loyalty to Mainland in presidential election’, NAR, 27 December 2019. 104. Alessandro Nicita, ‘Trade and Trade Diversion Effects of United States Tariffs on China’, UNCTAD Research Paper, No. 37, November 2019, pp. 11-12. 105. National Statistics, ROC (Taiwan), Latest Indicators (https://eng.stat.gov.tw/ mp.asp?mp=5). 106. MOEA, Industrial Production Indexes in 2019, 22 January 2019 (https:// www.moea.gov.tw/MNS/english/news/News.aspx?kind=6&menu_id=176&news_ id=88524). 107. Ministry of Finance, ROC (Taiwan), Trade Figures for December 2019, 7 Jan- uary 2020, p. 1 (http://service.mof.gov.tw/public/Data/statistic/trade/news/10812/1081 2_%E8%8B%B1%E6%96%87%E6%96%B0%E8%81%9E%E7%A8%BF.pdf). 108. Ibid., p. 3 109. EIU, Country Risk Service: Taiwan, January 2020, p. 16. 110. Ibid., p. 13.

205 Aurelio Insisa highest value ever recorded.111 Also reflecting the pattern of Beijing-Taipei- Washington relations during the trade war, FDIs from China collapsed to US$ 97 million, recording a 57.97% contraction,112 while investments by American multinationals Micron and Alphabet (Google) accounted for US$ 2.2 billion and US$ 853 million respectively.113 With an eye to the Janu- ary elections, the government also raised budget expenditure for 2019 and 2020. Compared to the 2018 budget balance, in which expenditure matched revenue, the 2019 balance was estimated at -0.9% for 2019 and forecast at -1.1% in 2020.114 Overall, the relatively solid performance of the Taiwanese economy, especially in the second half of 2019 helped sheltering Tsai from an electoral campaign focused exclusively on the domestic economy, defusing pan-Blue plans to side-line the «China question» in Taiwanese politics.

4.2. The road to the 2020 presidential elections Both Tsai Ing-wen and Han Kuo-yu faced internal challenges and the threat of a potentially disruptive third-party candidate on their road to the January 2020 elections. Tsai, initially weakened by the disastrous results of the November 2018 local elections, resigned from the DPP chairpersonship and reshuffled her cabinet in January.115 Her position was further threatened by the challenge of an internal primary launched in March by former Premier William Lai Ching-te (賴清德), but the party organisms repeatedly delayed the contest – originally scheduled in March – until early June.116 By then, at the onset of the Hong Kong protests, a resurgent Tsai was able to win the primaries by 8%.117 Lai’s shift from his original pro-independence position to the centre of the DPP political spectrum (already occupied by Tsai), together with the party’s decision to rally around the President, arguably led to his defeat.118 In a show of party unity, Lai would later join Tsai in November in the DPP presidential ticket as Vice-President.119

111. MOEA, Investment Commission, Monthly Statistics on Approved Overseas Investments, Investments from Mainland China, Outbound Investments, and Investments towards Mainland China for December 2019. 112. Ibid. 113. ‘Micron Secures Approval on NT$66 Billion Investment in Taiwan’, Focus Taiwan, 28 August 2019; ‘Google Gets Approval to Invest NT$26 Billion in Taiwan’, Focus Taiwan, 28 October 2019. 114. EIU, Country Risk Service: Taiwan, p. 14. 115. Aurelio Insisa, ‘Taiwan 2018’, p. 153. 116. ‘DPP Postpones Its Presidential Primary’, Taipei Times, 11 April 2019. 117. ‘Tsai Wins DPP Primary, Beating Lai by 8.2 Points’, Focus Taiwan, 13 June 2019. 118. See: Aurelio Insisa, ‘Taiwan 2018’, p. 137; Brian Hioe, ‘Lai fails to differentiate political program from Tsai during presidential primary debate’, New Bloom Magazine, 8 June 2019. 119. ‘Tsai Picks William Lai as Running-Mate’, Taipei Times, 18 November 2019.

206 Taiwan 2019

The KMT’s road to the nomination was far more tortuous. The initial favourites were institutional figures within the party: the 2016 presidential candidate Eric Chu Li-luan (朱立倫), the party chairman Wu Den-yih, and the former LY speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平). The intricacies of KMT factional politics and the rising popularity of Han Kuo-yu in the wake of the 2018 local elections altered this landscape, with Wu renouncing his candidature in April and throwing his weight in support of Wang’s own protégé, Han.120 The Kaohsiung mayor, in turn, refused to officially join the primaries until 5 June, a belated decision that arguably helped maintain the focus of local media on him.121 KMT’s intra-party struggles were further complicated by Foxconn tycoon Terry Gou’s decision to contest the nomination. Gou, after months of speculation, launched his bid in April. The eight-character slogan with which he opened the campaign, translatable as «peace, stability, economy, future» (和平、安定、經濟、未來), seemed to suggest a technocratic and China- friendly agenda.122 During his visit to the White House on 1 May, where he met President Trump, Gou cast himself as a key figure both in the Sino-Amer- ican trade war, due to Foxconn’s business interests in both countries, and in the Beijing-Taipei-Washington triangle, emphasising his personal connections with the Chinese leadership and Trump.123 Days later, he further detailed his China policy as essentially a rehash of the «One China, different interpretation» approach pursued by the Ma administration, ignoring Beijing’s fundamental shift in posture on the issue since the mid-2010s.124 Gou’s candidature, however, rapidly lost momentum, as he was neither able to mobilise popular support like Han,125 nor be trusted on cross-Strait relations by the general public, given Foxconn’s economic interests in the PRC.126 Han ultimately won the party primary held in July, decisively beating Gou by 17%. Eric Chu came a distant third, while Wang Jin-pyng had dropped from the race in June.127

120. For an extensive account of the build-up to the KMT primary, see: C. Donovan Smith, ‘Taiwan’s 2020 KMT wild primary is breaking all the rules’, The News Lens, 3 May 2019. 121. ‘Han Kuo-yu Agrees to Join KMT Primary’, Taipei Times, 6 June 2019. 122. ‘郭台銘領國民黨榮譽狀願參加初選不接受徵召’ (Terry Gou Is Conferred a KMT Honorary Certificate – He Wants to Participate in the Primary, Will Not Accept an Appointment), CNA, 17 April 2019. 123. ‘Hon Hai’s Gou Meets with President Trump at White House’, Focus Tai- wan, 2 May 2019. 124. Wuh Wan-yu et al., ‘郭台銘談兩岸和民主，首度表態: 九二共識、一中各表’ (Terry Gou discusses cross-Strait relations and democracy, publicly expresses his position on the 1992 Consensus and on «one China, different interpretations» for the first time), 天下雜志 (Commonwealth Magazine), 8 May 2019. 125. The role played by China-friendly, private media in Han’s rise should not be discounted. See: ‘CtiTV Gave 70% of May Airtime to Han Kuo-yu’, Taipei Times, 18 July 2019. 126. Kensaku Ihara, ‘Gou’s Taiwan presidential bid stalls over mainland ties’, NAR, 13 May 2019. 127. ‘Han wins KMT primaries’, Taipei Times, 16 July 2019.

207 Aurelio Insisa

Han’s own victory in the KMT primaries constituted the zenith of a social and political phenomenon, dubbed the «Han wave» by the local media, which had been sweeping Taiwanese politics since the electoral campaign for the 2018 local elections.128 Indeed, until the beginning of the Hong Kong protests, virtually all polls gave Han a consistent advantage over Tsai. Han shaped a populist political discourse focused on the plight of «common people» (庶民) against technocratic, corrupt elites,129 reflected in campaign slogans such as «never forget that in the world there are many who suffer» (莫忘世上苦人多) and the «common people’s President» (庶民總統).130 Taiwanese commentators observed how Han rallied a diverse array of supporters: traditional KMT constituencies affected by the pension and tax reforms of the Tsai administration; older generations threatened by the shifts in Taiwanese national identity and the increasing liberalisation of its society; younger generations with low-income occupations marginalised by a knowledge-based economy and alienated by the DPP’s technocratic outlook, as well as local interest groups historically aligned with the KMT, who felt increasingly dissatisfied with the party.131 Terry Gou remained however a potential threat to the KMT even after the primary, as he appeared ready to run either as an independent, or together with the popular mayor of Taipei, Ko Wen-je. Throughout August, after Ko’s decision to establish a new personal party, the Taiwan’s People Party (台灣民眾黨, TPP) and a much-publicised appearance together with the Foxconn tycoon and Wang Jin-pyng, a Gou-Ko-Wang alliance seemed ready to disrupt the two-way race between Tsai and Han.132 These expecta-

128. Han Kuo-yu’s surname is written with the same character used for Korea: han (韓). The term «Han wave» (hanliu 韓流), results then identical to the Chinese translation of the Korean term hallyu («Korean wave»), used to describe the global diffusion of South Korean popular culture. 129. For a definition of populism, see: Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism?, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016, pp. 19-20. On how Han’s populism has been articulated within the context of Taiwan politics, see: Wang Shun-min, ‘「鋼鐵韓粉」的排他性認同政治, 讓韓國瑜只能是獨行俠’ (The exclusionary identity politics of Han Kuo-yus hardcore fans gives him no other option than being a loner), 關鍵評論 (The News Lens), 17 September 2019. 130. ‘與書法大師合寫「莫忘世上苦人多」韓國瑜負責這個字’ (‘Han Kuo-yu Writes «Never Forget That in the World There Are Many Who Suffer» Together with a Master Calligrapher’), UDN, 17 November 2019; ‘庶民總統、團結台灣活動今公布旗幟、服裝’ (Banners and Clothing for the «Common People’s President, Unite Taiwan» Campaign Announced Today), UDN, 29 May 2019. 131. Yi-chi Wang, ‘Who are Han Kuo-yu’s hardcore fans?’, Commonwealth Maga- zine, 17 July 2019; Chang Yu-shao, ‘韓粉有四種, 而「庶民」只占一小部分’ (There are four types of fans of Han Kuo-yu, and the «common people» account only for a minority of them), The News Lens, 23 October 2019. 132. Lauly Li & Cheng Ting-fang, ‘Taipei mayor shakes up Taiwan politics with formation of new party’, NAR, 1 August 2019; ‘Gou-Ko-Wang Alliance Threat to KMT in 2020 Elections: Lawmakers’, Focus Taiwan, 27 August 2019.

208 Taiwan 2019 tions were quashed by the immediate emergence of personal tensions between the three, and in particular between Ko and Gou.133 The Foxconn tycoon ultimately announced his decision to drop from the race in Sep- tember, just before the deadline for submitting his candidature.134 Even though relations between the two had already soured, Ko eventually stated that Gou’s eleventh-hour decision did not leave him enough time to plan a presidential campaign.135 In fact, Ko’s decision can arguably be traced back to his own personal «China policy». The Taipei mayor was perceived as an independent politician somehow close to the pan-Green camp at the beginning of his mayoralty in 2014, but he has progressively moved closer to pan-Blue positions since then.136 Ko has indeed cultivated solid relations with Chinese authorities, which he publicly displays through the platform of the annual Shanghai-Taipei City Forum. While he has never acknowledged the 1992 Consensus, he consistently defines his cross-Strait policy as «the two sides of the Strait are one family» (两岸一家亲).137 Earlier in May 2019, before the beginning of the Hong Kong protests, the Taipei mayor criticised Tsai’s own stance on cross-Strait relations. He suggested instead that Tsai should avoid engaging in any kind of rhetorical confrontation with Beijing over Taiwan’s status.138 Squeezed between the flaring up of the Hong Kong protests and Tsai’s resurgence on one side, and the emergence of Han Kuo- yu on the other, Ko arguably did not see any chance of success for his brand of centrist, «techno-populist» politics in the presidential election.139 With Gou and Ko out of the picture in September, the last four months of the campaign focused squarely on Han and Tsai. Since August, enthusiasm within the KMT for Han had begun to fizzle out, as virtually

133. ‘Taipei Mayor Rejects Calls to Be Vice Presidential Candidate’, Focus Tai- wan, 16 August 2019. 134. Yimou Lee, ‘In a surprise move, Foxconn’s Gou drops Taiwan’s presidential bid’, Reuters, 16 September 2019. 135. ‘Ko also Decides Not to Run for President’, Taipei Times, 18 September 2019. 136. Brian Hioe, ‘The Taiwan People’s Party should not be mistaken for anything but a conservative pan-Blue party’, New Bloom Magazine, 2019. See also Aurelio Insisa, ‘Taiwan 2018’, p. 154. 137. TAO, 刘结一会见台北市长柯文哲一行 (Liu Jieyi Meets Taipei Mayor Ko Wen- je), 5 July 2019 (http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201907/t20190705_12180863.htm). 138. ‘柯文哲批蔡英文: 推台灣上衝突危險區’ (Ko Wen-je Criticises Tsai Ing- wen: She Pushes Taiwan into Dangerous Territory), UDN, 15 May 2020; ‘柯文哲談兩岸關係指不回答就是最好回答’ (Ko Wen-je Discusses Cross-Strait Relations, Says That No Answer Is the Best Answer), UDN, 31 May 2020. 139. Techno-populism can be described as ‘mix[ing] «anti-system», «antiestab- lishment» and «populist» elements with a seemingly irreconcilable «technocratic» discourse that shuns explicit ideological confrontation, insisting instead on the «competent» resolution of practical problems’. See: Christopher J. Bickerton & Carlo Maria Invernizzi, ‘«Techno-Populism» as a New Party Family: The Case of the Five Star Move- ment and Podemos’, Contemporary Italian Politics, Vol. 10, Issue 4, May 2018, p. 133.

209 Aurelio Insisa all polls, even from media in the pan-Blue camp, gave a clear advantage to Tsai.140 The unfolding of the final leg of the campaign was then marked by a series of controversial statements by Han and other major KMT figures.141 While these statements could be downplayed as simple gaffes, their targets (such as President Tsai’s status as a single middle-aged woman, Filipino immigrants, the local LGBT+ community), revealed a conscious last-ditch attempt to energise the more conservative constituencies in the islands against the pan-Green camp. While doubling down on identity politics, the Han campaign tried to re-adapt its China policy to the local sentiment, backtracking from a previous promise made in February to deliver a «peace agreement» with Beijing.142 Han’s perceived weakness was further highlighted by his campaign’s decision to avoid the customary visit for a presidential candidate to the US in October, officially due to a busy campaign schedule, but arguably out of fear of a cold reception in the US.143 By November, Tsai registered a decisive lead in the polls, with a 9% margin on Han, which rose to 19% a month before the vote.144 Two televised confrontations were then held in December, when Han tried to attack Tsai. The KMT candidate argued that Tsai maintained an ambiguous stance on the issue of Taiwan independence, and that her China policy was confrontational and aiming to stoke anti-mainland sentiment; Tsai, however, comfortably fended off the attacks insisting on the need to defend Taiwan from an aggressive China.145 With a comfortable lead after the last televised debate, Tsai’s victory on 11 January 2020 was taken for granted by all observers days before the vote.

4.3. The results of the January 2020 general elections President Tsai won the presidential election held on 11 January 2020 with 8,170,231 votes, 57.1% of the total. Tsai recorded 1,275,487 more votes than in 2016, reflecting a higher turnout – 74.9% against the 66.2% of the

140. TVBS Polls Center, ‘2020 總統大選民調’, p. 5; ‘藍綠對決、三腳督最新民調出爐’ (Blue-Green Showdown, Three-way Competition – The Latest Results of the Opinion Polls), Chinatimes.com, 13 September 2019. 141. Brian Hioe, ‘Han Kuo-yu causes controversy after recent string of gaffes’, New Bloom Magazine, 29 October 2019. 142. ‘韓國瑜: 中共沒放棄武統兩岸沒有簽署和平協議的條件’ (Han Kuo-yu: Un- less the Chinese Communists Do Not Abandon the Option of Reunification by Force, the Two Sides of the Strait Cannot Sign a Peace Treaty), UDN, 14 November 2019. 143. ‘Han’s Plans Leave No Time to US Trip’, Taipei Times, 19 October 2019. 144. TVBS Polls Center, ‘選前一個月, 2020 總統大選民調’ (Opinion Poll on the 2020 General Elections, One Month Before the Vote), 14 December 2019, p. 5. 145. ‘Presidential Candidates Clash over Cross-Strait Ties in TV Presentation’, Focus Taiwan, 18 December 2019; ‘韓談兩岸勿意識形態蔡批進中聯辦一國兩制氛圍’ (Han Says Cross-Strait Relations Must Not Become an Ideological Issue, Tsai Criti- cises His Visit to the Hong Kong Liaison Office Because It Created a «One Country, Two Systems» Atmosphere), CNA, 30 December 2019.

210 Taiwan 2019 previous election. Her share of the popular vote increased by 1%. Similarly, the geographical distribution of the vote for Tsai remained fundamentally the same, with only minor variations at county level. Han Kuo-yu obtained instead 5,522,119 votes, amounting to 38.6%. Perennial fringe candidate James Soong Chu-yu 宋楚瑜, representing the People First Party (親民黨, PFP), came a distant third, with a 4.26% share.146 The DPP coupled Tsai Ing-wen’s personal triumph with a success in the election for the 10th LY, a result crucial for the prospects of Tsai’s second term in office. The election was contested with a mixed system, assigning 73 seats to district legislators elected with a first-past-the-post system, 34 seats to legislators-at-large with a party-list proportional system, and six seats to indigenous constituencies, elected with single non-transferable system.147 The DPP won a parliamentary majority obtaining 61 of 113 seats in the LY. Even though its share in the nominal vote increased from 44.59% to 45.6%, the party elected only 46 district legislators, three fewer than in 2016. With 33.98% of the total vote for the legislators-at-large, a 10.08% decrease compared to 2016, the ruling party lost another five seats. This result was partially balanced by the two seats won in the aboriginal constituency, one more than in the previous election. In contrast with Han Kuo-yu’s performance in the presidential election, and thus confirming his weakness as a candidate, the KMT obtained instead 38 seats in the LY, three more than in 2016. It elected 22 districts legislators, compared to the 20 of the previous legislature, accounting for 40.57% of the total share (a +1.68% swing from the previous elections). It also elected the same number of legislators- at-large of the DPP, 13 (two more than in 2016), with an almost identical share of the vote, 33.36%, itself a notable 6.45% increase from the previous election, but lost one of its previously held aboriginal seats. Ko Wen-je’s TPP entered the LY for the first time with five seats, all legislators at-large, thanks to a 11.22% share of the total vote among the party-lists. The pan- Green New Power Party (時代力量) obtained three seats, also all legislators at-large. Even though the NPP obtained 7.75% of the total vote in the proportional system (a 1.64% increase), it lost in total two seats compared to the previous election. Another pan-Green, pro-independence party, the Taiwan Statebuilding Party (台灣基進黨, TSP), which contested the LY elections for the first time, elected instead a district legislator, but failed to elect legislators-at-large with 3.16% of the total vote. Pan-Blue junior parties PFP and Non-Partisan Solidarity Union exited the LY, having failed to elect representatives. Five candidates obtained their seats running as independents,

146. Central Electoral Commission, ROC (Taiwan) (CEC), 2020 Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election, 22 January 2020. 147. See: CEC, Election System, 1 January 2017. For a profile of the electoral system and dynamics in the ROC, see: Chi Huang, ‘Electoral System Change and Its Effects on the Party System in Taiwan’, in Christopher H. Achen & T.Y. Wang (ed.), The Taiwan Voter, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017, pp. 223-251.

211 Aurelio Insisa with three of them expected to caucus within the pan-Green camp.148 Over- all, these results appear to guarantee a relatively wide majority to Tsai for the next four years, barring unexpected intra-party fractures. However, it is worth noting the solid performance of many TPP and NPP candidates in those electoral districts won by the two major parties. While the TPP and the NPP have very different profiles, they both drew their voters from constituencies which have been generally considered close to the DPP, signalling the emergence of centrifugal dynamics outside the perimeter of the pan-Blue camp.149 While Tsai’s approval rating had started to climb in August 2019, virtually all national polls, except for few pollsters in the pan-Green camp, pointed towards a KMT majority until mid-November.150 Commentators argued that a backlash against the inclusion of many fringe deep-blue figures in the KMT party-list, also released in November, may explain that month’s approval rating shift from the Blue to the Green camp.151 In fact, the swing in the polls coincided exactly with the most violent phase of the Hong Kong protests, as a series of pitched battles between police and protesters occurred at a number of university campuses.152 The swing in Tsai’s approval rate suggests, once again, the renewed centrality of cross-Strait relations in Taiwanese national politics, in stark contrast with the political climate that emerged in the aftermath of the 2018 local elections. To conclude, it could be argued that a series of events and processes exogenous to Taiwanese politics, such as China’s apparent miscalculation of the reception of Xi’s January message, the flaring up of the protests in Hong Kong, and the unfolding of the Sino-American trade war and its positive spillovers for the Taiwanese economy, all converged to snatch an expected victory from the KMT. Such a reading, however, would underestimate the Tsai administration’s willingness and ability to strengthen relations with Washington at a critical juncture in the power politics of the Asia-

148. For official data on the election, see: CEC, ‘第 10 屆立法委員選舉’ (Elec- tion of the Representatives of the Tenth LY) (https://db.cec.gov.tw). For a comparison with the 2016 elections, see: Kevin Hsu, ‘Election 2020: Highlights from the legislative races’, Ketagalan Media, 17 January 2020. On the political orientation of the independent legislators, see: Kevin Hsu, ‘Election 2020’. 149. For the results of all candidates in the electoral districts, see: CEC, ‘第 10 屆立法委員選舉 (區域) 候選人得票數’ (Election of the Representatives of the Tenth LY, Number of Votes Received by Candidates in the Electoral Districts) (https://db.cec.gov.tw/ histQuery.jsp?voteCode=20200101T1A2&qryType=ctks). 150. C. Donovan Smith, ‘Can the KMT reclaim the legislature in the 2020 Taiwan elections?’, Ketagalan Media, 2 November 2019. 151. Lev Nachman & Brian Hioe, ‘Taiwan’s usually obscure party lists might swing its legislative election’, The Diplomat, 12 December 2019. 152. See: ‘Poly U Urges People to Leave Its Campus’, RTHK, 17 November 2019; ‘不分區政黨票藍綠均29%’ (Intention of Vote for At-Large Seats – Blue and Green both Stand at 29%), UDN, 18 November 2019.

212 Taiwan 2019

Pacific, and to shape an economic agenda aiming to reduce dependence on China, choices made since the beginning of her mandate in 2016. Above all, this reading would underestimate the consistency and coherence of the cross-Strait policy that the Tsai administration has built, on the assumption of increasing Chinese assertiveness under Xi Jinping’s leadership.

213

The Philippines 2018-2019: Authoritarian consolidation under Duterte

Sol Iglesias and Lala Ordenes

Independent scholar Independent scholar [email protected] [email protected]

Philippine democracy has crumbled under President Rodrigo Duterte. This article reviews the main political and economic developments in the country from 2018 to 2019. It argues that a process of authoritarian consolidation occurred during this period. This is not the result of a sudden breakdown or suppression of civil and political institutions for democracy, as would occur in a military takeover, but of democratic erosion and deconsolidation, catalysed by a popular but norm-breaking elected leader. An unprecedented scale of state-sponsored violence, President Duterte’s so-called «war on drugs», preconditioned the transition from democratic to authoritarian rule. The Duterte government and his allies then marginalised the opposition and vilified the media, politically captured the judiciary, broke the prevailing norms against martial law normalising emergency rule, as well as withstood pro-democracy influence from institutions like the European Union by aligning economically with China.

1. Introduction

From the day that Duterte took office in 2016 up until the end of 2019, local rights groups estimate that more than 27,000 people have been killed in the President’s anti-drug campaign – although the Philippine Na- tional Police puts the number at 5,552.1 The United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) called attention to the gravity of the situation in a 2019 resolution. Among other recommendations, the HRC asked the Philippine government to take all necessary measures to prevent extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances, and mandated the High Commissioner to report to the council’s 44th session in 2020.2 Moreover, the International Criminal Court (ICC) continues to conduct a preliminary inquiry into accusations that President Duterte has committed crimes against humanity.3

1. Human Rights Watch, Philippines: No Letup in «Drug War» Killings, 14 Janu- ary 2020. 2. United Nations, Human Rights Council, 41st Session of the Human Rights Council: Resolution on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Philippines, Adopted on 11 July 2019. 3. The investigation continues despite the withdrawal of the Philippines from the ICC in March 2019. Jason Gutierrez, ‘Philippines Officially Leaves the Interna- tional Criminal Court’, The New York Times, 17 March 2019.

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Sol Iglesias & Lala Ordenes

The violence in the Philippines under Duterte is unprecedented. In comparison, there were an estimated 2,427 extrajudicial killings under the notoriously violent dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos from 1972 to 1986.4 No administration in the three decades of democratic rule that followed produced this level of state-sponsored violence. Is the Philippines now under an authoritarian regime? Walden Bello argues that President Duterte is both the local expression as well as a pioneer of the global rebellion against liberal democracy. He calls Duterte a «fascist original», who, by making use of his distinct political methodology, has deployed great violence with impunity from the outset. This is in stark contrast with the incremental authoritarianism that culminated in the dictatorship of Marcos and declaration of martial law in 1972.5 Yet in the face of mass killing with impunity, the institutions of democracy in the Philippines ostensibly continue to function. Philippine democracy has not collapsed suddenly through a coup d’etat, nor through a declaration of military rule and suspension of the Constitution. Steven Lev- itsky and Daniel Ziblatt usefully distinguish between democratic collapse and democratic erosion. In the latter case – which, they argue, has occurred in the United States of America under President Donald Trump – there is no single moment in which the regime crosses over the line to authoritarianism. Instead, a gradual sequence of unanticipated events forms an «electoral road» to dismantling democracy at the hands of duly elected leaders who subvert the very processes that elevated them to power.6 In the case of the Philippines, democratic erosion occurred in the context of a weak democracy that had struggled to consolidate since 1986. Larry Diamond posits that the legitimacy of democracy and its desirability must pervade the norms and beliefs of elites, political organisations as well as the public in order for democracy to consolidate. This means that while elites compete peacefully for power, there is no group that seeks to overthrow democracy or employ violence or fraud in pursuit of power and there are no anti-democratic movements that enjoy a significant mass following.7 In the mid-1990s, Philippine democracy seemed to stabilise and some considered the country to be «off the endangered list».8 Indeed, compared to many Asian nations, the Philippines enjoyed a free press, regular

4. Estimate of extrajudicial killings from 1975 to 1985. Richard J. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. 5. Walden Bello, ‘Rodrigo Duterte: A Fascist Original’, in Nicole Curato (ed.), A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Dutertes’ Early Presidency, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017, pp. 78-79. 6. Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, New York: Crown Publishing, 2018, pp. 3; 75-77. 7. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999, p. 69. 8. Mark Thompson, ‘Off the Endangered List: Philippine Democratization in Comparative Perspective’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1996.

216 The Philippines 2019 elections and a robust civil society. Yet oppression, electoral violence, and corruption caused bouts of political instability. Furthermore, state-sponsored violence that peaked in the early stages of the Duterte presidency (2016 to 2017) adds an overtly coercive element to the Philippine case. In so doing, Duterte led a process of democratic deconsolidation by explicitly renouncing democracy, skirting constitutional restraints on the presidency, orchestrating violence and committing gross human rights violations.9 This analysis explores the notion of authoritarian consolidation in the Philippines under Duterte as the product of both democratic erosion and deconsolidation, catalysed by a norm-breaking elected leader able to expand political power yet evade accountability without technically violating the law. This allows the regime to retain the form of democracy without its substance. The article is subsequently organised into four sections that explain components underpinning authoritarian consolidation in the mid-term of Duterte’s presidency: marginalising the opposition (the Vice President, in particular) and attacking the media; capturing the judiciary by stacking the Supreme Court and ousting the Chief Justice; exploiting security crises to expand executive and military power; and diminishing external pro-democracy pressure of institutions such as the European Union by aligning economically with China and gaining leverage through economic growth.

2. Marginalising opponents and the media

One of the key processes of authoritarian consolidation in the Phil- ippines ironically lies with electoral politics and the outcome of the 2019 mid-term elections. An important element of democracy is an extensive provision for political and civil pluralism, thus allowing full expression of contending interests and values.10 Authoritarian leaders seeking to consolidate their power within the constraints of relatively free elections, instead aim to marginalise their political opponents. Whereas traditional dictators often jailed, exiled or killed their rivals, contemporary autocrats disguise repression behind a veneer of legality.11 In dealing with his opponents, Duterte has stretched those limits and revelled in anti-democratic behaviour by refusing to accept credible electoral results when it suited him, denying the legitimacy of his rivals, encouraging violence and indicating a willingness to curtail the media.12

9. On democratic deconsolidation, see Diamond, Developing Democracy, p. 74. 10. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 11. Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, pp. 83-85. 12. On indicators of anti-democratic behavior, see Ibid., pp. 23-24.

217 Sol Iglesias & Lala Ordenes

2.1. Weakening the opposition

The Philippine electorate stamped a seal of approval on Duterte’s presidency in the May 2019 mid-term elections. Prior to the May polls, observers had said that the national and local elections would serve as a referendum on Duterte’s past three years in office.13 The result was nothing less than a ringing endorsement. The Philippines elects a president every six years while half of the 24-seat Senate and around 300 members of the House of Representatives are elected every three years.14 The president and senators are elected nationally while the congressional representatives, except party list representatives, are elected by district. In 2019, eight of the 12 Senate seats went to candidates officially endorsed by Duterte,15 with two of his close associates, former Police Chief Ronald Dela Rosa and former Special Assistant to the President Christopher Go, among the top five with the highest votes. Duterte’s former political adviser Francis Tolentino clinched the ninth spot.16 The opposition Liberal Party was completely shut out, with their most successful candidate coming in at 14th place, past the cut-off to join the «Magic 12» senators elected. It was the first time in contemporary Philip- pine political history that the opposition was unable to win a single seat in a Senate election since the 1930s.17 This has intensified fears of a rubber- stamp Senate, with only four opposition senators, all elected in the 2016 elections, serving their terms.18 One of them, Duterte’s staunch critic Sena- tor Leila de Lima, is in detention (on this, more below) and thus cannot fully participate in proceedings.19

13. Dominic Faulder, ‘A Verdict on Duterte: Looming Midterms Are a Refer- endum on President’, Nikkei Asian Review, 27 February, 2019. See also Joshua Jervis, ‘The Philippines’ Coming «Duterte Referendum»’, The Diplomat, 16 March 2019. 14. Terms of Office of Senators. See also, House of Representatives, 18th Con- gress, First Regular Session, ‘The Constitutional Mandate’. 15. Dharel Placido, ‘Duterte Formally Endorses 11 Senatorial Bets’, ABS CBN News, 14 February 2019. 16. ‘Senatorial Summary Statement of Votes (by Rank)’, COMELEC, 23 Au- gust 2019. 17. Aries Arugay, ‘The 2019 Philippine Elections: Consolidating Power in an Eroding Democracy’, Heinrich Böll Stiftung Southeast Asia, 21 June 2019. 18. Vanne Elaine Terrazola, ‘Bracing for a Super Majority at the Senate in the 18th Congress’, Manila Bulletin, 14 May 2019. 19. ‘Senate P.S. Res. No. 51 Resolution Allowing Senator Leila M. De Lima to Participate in Plenary Sessions through Teleconferencing, Video Conferencing or Other Forms of Remote or Electronic Communications’, (Eighteenth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, First Regular Session).

218 The Philippines 2019

Moreover, out of 305 seats in the House of Representatives (243 regular and 62 party-list seats), only 28 officially belong to opposition parties.20 Duterte’s party, the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan or PDP-Laban, became the biggest one in the House, with 84 regular members elected; and another 138 regular seats went to candidates who were Duterte’s supporters or belonged to his daughter’s party Hugpong ng Pagbabago.21 President Duterte’s allies dominated local government elections as well. Local candidates who ran under his political umbrella also won the majority of the contested seats in local government. Half of the elected governors in the 81 provinces came from the ruling party PDP-Laban, and 1,156 out of the 1,634 elected mayors are also from political parties allied with the President’s, 605 of them from PDP-Laban.22

2.2. Sidelining the Vice President During the 2016 presidential campaign, Duterte stated that he would let Ferdinand Marcos Jr., son of the former dictator and vice presidential canidate of the Nacionalista Party, take over the presidency if he (Duterte) failed to curb criminality and corruption within his first three months in office.23 He was, after all, pandering to a crowd of local politicians in Ilocos Norte, bailiwick of the Marcoses, and the late dictator’s son was not even on his ticket. If it was intended as a mere jest, the joke has since become a most serious matter. Just days after the May 2016 elections, Marcos filed an election protest alleging massive cheating against winner Maria Leonor Robredo in one of the most contentious poll races for the vice presidency the country has ever seen.24 Robredo ran under the Liberal Party and leads the opposition.25

20. Mara Cepeda, ‘«Expect Tyranny» in House with Only 18 Elected LP Repre- sentatives – Kit Belmonte’, Rappler, 15 May 2019. See also ‘House Members,’ House of Representatives 18th Congress, First Regular Session. 21. Michael Bueza, ‘18th Congress, by the Numbers’, Rappler, 2 July 2019. 22. Dasha Marice Uy, ‘Duterte’s PDP-Laban Bets Dominate Gubernatorial Posts’, ABS CBN News, 23 May 2019; Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, Data Analysis of Votes, Voters, and Winners, 25 November 2019. 23. Miguel Paolo Reyes, ‘The Duterte-Marcos Connection’, ABS CBN News, 30 September 2019. 24. Cass Buenafe, Kennedy Caacbay, and ABC-CBN Investigative & Research Group, ‘Marcos vs Robredo: Understanding the Unfinished Battle for the Vice Presi- dency’, ABS CBN News, 1 October 2019. 25. Candidates for the presidency and vice presidency are elected separately so it is possible for the people in the roles to come from different political parties.

219 Sol Iglesias & Lala Ordenes

The Commission on Elections’ final tally showed that Robredo received 14,418,817 votes, just 263,473 more than Marcos.26 Three years on, the Supreme Court, sitting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), has yet to decide the case. In October 2019, the High Court stated in a resolution that the manual recount of ballots in test provinces showed that Ro- bredo had further increased her lead over Marcos.27 The PET decision will determine the rightful occupant of the second highest post in the land and, consequently, who will succeed Duterte in the event that he is unable to discharge the duties of his office due to death, disability, or resignation.28 There have been, over the years, concerns about the 74-year-old leader’s health, who, by his own admission, is suffering from a myriad of ailments including back pain due to spinal issues, migraines, Buerger’s disease and Barrett’s oesophagus.29 In the meantime, Duterte sought to undermine Vice President Ro- bredo. Duterte, apparently stung by Robredo’s criticism that his signature campaign failed to reduce illegal drug use in the country, had appointed the Vice President to co-chair the Inter-Agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs (ICAD).30 However, after only 19 days, Duterte fired Robredo. Soon after, the Vice President released a report evaluating the government’s campaign against illegal drugs, criticising the lack of constriction on supply as a massive failure. She also recommended that police operations – which, she pointed out, had become «synonymous with drug-related killings» – be abandoned.31 The President lashed out at Robredo in response, calling her election a «colossal blunder» and saying, in reference to the contested electoral margin, «[j]ust do away with the 200,000 plus (votes) that she got as a majority over Marcos – it was really a mistake».32

26. Jovan Cerda, ‘Duterte, Robredo Win in Final, Official Tally’, The Philippine Star, 27 May 2016. 27. Supreme Court Resolution: Ferdinand «Bongbong» R. Marcos, Jr. Vs. Ma- ria Leonor «Leni Daang Matuwid», G. Robredo P.E.T. Case No. 005, 15 October 2019. See also CNN Philippines Staff, ‘Robredo Widens Lead over Marcos in Initial Poll Recount – PET’, CNN Philippines, 18 October 2019. 28. Art. VII, Section 8, 1987 Constitution. 29. ‘Duterte Says He Suffers from Back Pains, Migraine’, ABS CBN News (Reu- ters), 13 December 2016. 30. CNN Philippines Staff, ‘Timeline: VP Robredo’s Short Stint as Anti-Drug Body Co-Chair’, CNN Philippines, 25 November 2019. 31. ‘Inter-Agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs: Co-Chairperson’s Report 6 to 24 November 2019’, Rappler, 7 January 2020. 32. Sofia Tomacruz, ‘After ICAD Report, Duterte Calls Robredo a «Colossal Blunder»’, Rappler, 7 January 2020.

220 The Philippines 2019

2.3. Attacking the media

From the beginning of Duterte’s presidency, it has been the Pres- ident versus the press.33 Duterte has called the media «bullshit», «gar- bage»,34 and journalists «vultures»,35 «lowlife(s)»,36 warning them that they are not safe from assassination since «freedom of expression cannot help you if you have done something wrong».37 Media watchdogs argue that the President, who has expressed a fervent wish «to kill journalism» in the country, has made it even more dangerous for media workers to practise their profession in what has become one of the world’s deadliest places to be a journalist.38 Reporters Without Borders reported three killings in 2019,39 while the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism has counted a total of 12 since Duterte assumed office.40 There has been an increase in the number of attacks, threats, «red tagging» as communists, harassment, and police visits to the offices of media agencies accused of plotting to oust the President.41 President Duterte, a former public prosecutor, has virtually weapon- ised legal processes to devastate what he perceives as enemies of his «war on drugs». He has also advocated the use of boycotts and has resorted to economic harassment of three prominent media outlets: the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Rappler and ABS-CBN. The Prieto family, the major stakeholder of the Philippine Daily In- quirer, one of the most important Philippine newspapers, was forced to sell under Duterte’s barrage of public accusations ranging from swindling to tax evasion.42 The buyer was one of Duterte’s close allies and a financier

33. ‘Duterte «Personally Spearheading» Assault vs Media: NUJP’, ABS CBN News, 4 May 2019. 34. ‘Philippine Media Groups Cry Foul over Duterte’s Diatribes’, Reuters, 31 March 2017. 35. ‘Duterte Blasts, ‘Vultures Pretending to Be Journalists’, ABS CBN News, 2 June 2016. 36. Tricia Macas, ‘Duterte: I Cannot Protect All Journalists in the Country, Even Honest Ones’, GMA News Online, 2 June 2016. 37. Robert Sawatzky, ‘Duterte Says Killing of Corrupt Philippines Journalists Justified’, CNN Philippines, 1 June 2016. 38. Rachel Reyes, ‘(Opinion) Duterte’s Wish: «Kill Journalism in This Coun- try»’, The Manila Times, 16 December 2018. 39. Reporters Without Borders, Philippines (2019 Data). 40. See also Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, The State of Philip- pine Media, under Duterte, 3 May 2019. 41. Ibid. See also CNN Philippines Staff, ‘Palace Tags Journalists, Lawyers in Alleged Ouster Plot vs. Duterte; PNP, AFP Deny Destabilization Plan’, CNN Philip- pines, 22 April 2019. 42. ‘Duterte’s Target: The Philippine Daily Inquirer’, Rappler, 16 August 2017.

221 Sol Iglesias & Lala Ordenes of his presidential campaign.43 Rappler, an online news website, found its licence to operate revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission, while the news website’s head, Maria Ressa, was subjected to multiple civil and criminal cases lawsuits, and its reporters barred from covering the President’s events.44 Duterte also turned his ire on television news channel ABS-CBN from the beginning of his term and has warned that Congress would not renew its media franchise. The country’s biggest media conglomerate faces possible closure in March 2020. «Better to sell the network», Duterte told its owners.45 Moreover, the media landscape has operated online since the mid- 1990s. Accordingly, modern autocrats use novel tactics. Whereas, in the past, the strategy was to restrict information, the current gambit typically is to flood the public with disinformation and propaganda while also attacking legitimate purveyors of the news.46 Sheila Coronel argues that the Duterte administration and its supporters «(let) loose an army of trolls, bloggers on the state’s payroll, propagandists and paid hacks who ensure the strongman’s attacks against the press are amplified in newspaper columns and on the airwaves, on social media and fake news sites».47

3. Capturing the judiciary

A second process on the road to authoritarianism is the capturing of the «referees»: sources of horizontal accountability of the executive to other officeholders. Placing constraints on executive power helps protect consti- tutionalism, legality and the deliberative process.48 Conversely, the capture of the judiciary provides would-be autocrats with a powerful weapon to enforce the laws selectively, punish opponents as well as protect regime elites and allies.49

43. Nestor Corrales, ‘Duterte Admits Ramon Ang Was One of His Campaign Financiers’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21 December 2016. 44. Rosette Adel, ‘SEC Revokes News Site Rappler’s Registration’, The Philip- pine Star, 15 January 2018. See also Amy Gunia, ‘Philippines Journalist Maria Ressa Arrested Again’, 29 March 2019. See CNN Philippines Staff, ‘Rappler Barred from Covering Malacañang Events’, CNN Philippines, 20 February 2018. 45. Alexis Romero, ‘Duterte Tells ABS-CBN Owners to Just Sell the TV Net- work’, The Philippine Star, 30 December 2019. 46. Sheila Coronel, ‘Opinion: A «Fraught Time» for Press Freedom in the Phil- ippines’, NPR, 17 January 2018. 47. Ibid. 48. Diamond, ‘Developing Democracy’, passim. 49. Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, passim.

222 The Philippines 2019

3.1. Stacking the courts As Duterte allies enjoy supreme authority in both houses of Congress, Duterte appointees have come to dominate the highest court in the land over the past two years. The Philippine Constitution provides that «The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices».50 The members are appointed by the President. Eleven out of the 15 current justices in the high tribunal are Duterte appointees. This happened in part because former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had filled the high court with relatively young justices who served out their terms beyond her successor Benigno Aquino III’s incumbency. These justices reached retirement age early in Duterte’s term.51 In 2019 alone, Duterte was able to appoint five justices owing to retirements.52 Four more justices will retire before Duterte’s term expires in 2022, two of them non-Duterte appointees. This means that by the time he leaves office, Duterte will have handpicked 13 out of 15 members of a co-equal branch of government that will decide the constitutionality of his policies and conduct.53 The Supreme Court, sitting as Presidential Electoral Tribunal, will also decide the 2016 election protest filed by former Senator Ferdinand Marcos Jr. against Vice President Robredo.

3.2. Ousting the Chief Justice When former President Aquino appointed Maria Lourdes Sereno as the head of the judiciary in 2012, it was intended that the country’s first female chief justice would remain at her post for 18 years. Sereno, who was named chief justice in 2012 when she was 52 years old, was expected to stay in office until the mandatory retirement age of 70 in the year 2030.54 This would effectively have denied the next three chief executives from making their own selections and prevented the sitting magistrates from moving up the ranks. Soon after assuming the presidency, Duterte named a number of judges and other officials, alleging their involvement in the illegal drug

50. According to Article VIII, Section 4, 1987 of the Philippine Constitution, «[i]t may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members». 51. Artemio Panganiban, ‘(Opinion) Duterte’s Appointees Dominate SC’, Phil- ippine Daily Inquirer, 16 December 2018. 52. Lian Buan, ‘Duterte Fills up 2 More SC Vacancies with Bedan, USC Jus- tices’, Rappler, 3 December 2019. 53. Lian Buan, ‘By 2022, Supreme Court Filled with Duterte Appointees’, Rap- pler, 30 July 2018. 54. Arianne Merez et al., ‘Supreme Court Ousts Chief Justice Sereno’, ABS CBN News, 11 May 2018.

223 Sol Iglesias & Lala Ordenes trade.55 Sereno responded in writing, reproaching the President by maintaining that the power to discipline judges belonged to the Supreme Court and not to him.56 Thus began the conflict between the President and the Chief Justice, with the two often at loggerheads, trading barbs on various issues including Duterte’s 2017 declaration of martial law in Mindanao.57 In November 2017, the president’s office called for Sereno’s resignation, after the Justice Committee of the House of Representatives allegedly found sufficient grounds to impeach the Chief Magistrate. The Justice Com- mittee based its decision on a complaint alleging that Sereno was untruthful in declaring her statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth (SALN), a document required by law of public officials.58 The Committee-approved Articles of Impeachment, which detailed the charges against her, opened the path to her trial by the Senate. Four months later however, the path to the Senate trial was cut short by Solicitor General Jose Calida’s decision to file a quo warranto petition – namely, in the Philippine system, a legal challenge to an individual’s right to or authority over the position he or she holds. Calida’s quo warranto petition aimed at nullifying Sereno’s appointment on the grounds that she was usurping public office by not filing a SALN.59 The animosity between the heads of the executive and the judiciary culminated in the President’s tirade in April 2018 telling Sereno, «I am now your enemy».60 Sereno then demanded that the President prove he had no hand in her imminent ousting. In response, the President said he would ask legislators to fast-track her impeachment because Sereno was «bad for the Philippines».61 On 11 May 2018, the Supreme Court (voting 8-6) stripped Sereno of her robe as head of the judiciary based on the quo warranto filed by the So- licitor General.62 Seven of the eight justices who favoured Sereno’s removal

55. ‘Full Text: Sereno’s Letter to President Duterte’, Rappler, 8 August 2016. 56. Nicole Lorena, ‘Timeline: The Many Times Duterte and Sereno Clashed’, Rappler, 20 May 2018. See also Ali Vicoy, ‘What Transpired Leading to the Ouster of Supreme Court Chief Justice Sereno’, Manila Bulletin, 11 May 2018. 57. Tetch Torres-Tupas, ‘Sereno Warns against Abuse of Martial Law Powers’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 26 May 2017. 58. CNN Philippines Staff, ‘Palace to CJ Sereno: Resign to Save Judiciary from Further Damage’, CNN Philippines, 6 November 2017. See also ‘Press Releases: House Panel Oks Impeachment vs. Sereno’, 19 March 2018. See also House of Representa- tives, 18th Congress, First Regular Session, What Is a SALN?, Official Gazette. 59. Ina Reformina, ‘Primer: The Office of the Solicitor General Quo Warranto Plea’, ABS CBN News, 11 May 2018. 60. ‘Duterte to Sereno: I Am Now Your Enemy’, ABS CBN News, 9 April 2018. 61. ‘Sereno Dares Duterte to Disprove Hand in Ouster Moves’, ABS CBN News, 9 April 2018. 62. G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 Republic of the Philippines, Represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, Petitioner, vs. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Re- spondent.

224 The Philippines 2019 were Duterte-appointees.63 The whole move, however, rested on dubious constitutional grounds. In fact, article XI, section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states that the members of the Supreme Court – together with the president, the vice president, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman – may be removed from office through a process of impeachment, while section 3 of the same article, clearly mandates that «The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment». Not surprisingly, Sereno’s removal from the position of Chief Justice, through a process other than impeachment in Congress, was seen by critics as unconstitutional.64

4. Expanding executive and military power

A system of checks and balances, particularly constraints on the executive branch, make the essential difference between democratic and authoritarian rule. The reality in the developing world and the post-communist world, however, is that most regimes are in a grey area in which they are not further democratising but nor are they outright dictatorships.65 Democra- cies like the Philippines have long been careening towards authoritarianism but without collapsing.66 Until recently, oligarchic forces tended to maintain the post-Marcos status quo.67 Duterte is the first Philippine president who neither rendered «even the minimum obeisance to liberal democratic politics» nor reiterated the af- firmations of democratic values espoused by other post-Marcos presidents.68 In the process of unravelling democracy and rendering its institutions inu- tile, autocrats like Duterte seek to change the «rules of the game» in order to entrench themselves in power and consolidate their dominance. Levit- sky and Ziblatt identify tactics of rules-changing that include reforming the Constitution and other political institutions in ways that disadvantage the

63. ‘Look: Who Voted for, against Sereno Ouster’, ABS CBN News, 11 May 2018. 64. Amita Legaspi, ‘Koko Pimentel: Quo Warranto Would Circumvent Rule That Only Senate Can Act as Impeachment Court’, GMA News Online, 19 April 2018. See also Anna Felicia Bajo, ‘NUPL Lawyer: Quo Warranto Petition vs. Sereno Un- dermines Constitutional Process’, GMA News Online, 7 March 2018. And Nicole-Ann Lagrimas, ‘Law Profs Say Quo Warranto vs. Sereno Unconstitutional’, GMA News On- line, 10 May 2018. 65. Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democ- racy, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2002, p. 18. 66. Dan Slater, ‘Democratic Careening’, World Politics, Vol. 65, No. 4, 2013. 67. Jeffrey Winters, Oligarchy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 68. Lisandro Claudio & Patricio Abinales, ‘Dutertismo, Maoismo, Nasyonal- ismo’, in Nicole Curato (ed.), A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte’s Early Presidency, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017, pp. 93-94.

225 Sol Iglesias & Lala Ordenes opposition and undercut their rivals.69 In this area, a critical element in Du- terte’s project of authoritarian consolidation has been a tactic of expanding military rule and emergency powers with the assent of Congress.

4.1. Imposing martial law On 21 May 2017, in Marawi City, a provincial capital in Mindanao, state security forces were overwhelmed in an attack by adherents of a group affiliated to the Islamic State (ISIS). Two days later, on 23 May 2017, Presi- dent Duterte declared martial law in Mindanao. The President had earlier placed the whole country under a State of National Emergency in September 2016 due to the bombing in the Mind- anao region of the Davao City night market – an attack that terrorism expert Sidney Jones attributes to the Maute group.70 The Mautes represent a new breed of extremists: young, charismatic, Arabic-speaking and Middle East-educated, social media savvy and with vast international links. The Mautes are also believed to be the chief architects of the attack and siege in Marawi City.71 Unlike Marcos, Duterte faced more constraints in the use of martial law. The 1987 Constitution enumerates the limitations on the government’s power when martial law is declared. Save for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (a safeguard from warrantless arrest and illegal detention), the charter does not provide a list of extra powers for the president or the military. Martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, the judiciary and legislative branches nor does it authorise the military to exercise jurisdiction over civilians.72 Accordingly, the rights provided in the Bill of Rights remain in force.73 The Constitution requires both houses of Congress to jointly review any declaration of martial law within a 48-hour period, but Congress waived its obligation to do so. Instead, the Senate and the Lower House issued separate resolutions expressing support for the proclamation without con- vening – therefore, without any discussion over the decision.74 Also, the Su- preme Court, in reviewing the factual basis for martial law, ruled in the government’s favour on 4 July 2017.75 Yet constitutional experts argued that the declaration of martial law in Mindanao gave broad, arbitrary and extraordinary powers to the Presi-

69. Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, pp. 94-96. 70. Sidney Jones, ‘(Opinion) How ISIS Got a Foothold in the Philippines’, The New York Times, 4 June 2017. 71. Michael Hart, ‘A Year after Marawi, What’s Left of ISIS in the Philippines?’, The Diplomat, 25 October 2018. 72. Article VII, Section 18, 1987 Constitution. 73. Article III, 1987 Constitution. 74. Lian Buan, ‘Congress Not Duty-Bound to Convene on Martial Law – Cali- da’, Rappler, 27 June 2017. 75. ‘SC Upholds Duterte’s Martial Law in Mindanao’, Rappler, 4 July 2017.

226 The Philippines 2019 dent.76 In a dissenting opinion on President Duterte’s martial law proclamation, Associate Justice Mario Victor Leonen made a pointed remark that arresting illegal drug syndicates and peace spoilers under martial law went beyond the powers of the law, aimed to repress a rebellion. As argued by Leonen: «The factual basis for the declaration of martial law as presented does not cover these illegal acts as rationale for its proclamation. They are not acts falling within “rebellion” and cannot serve as justification for arrests but are made possible because of a vague and overly broad Proclamation».77 The justice’s admonition spoke to the concern that responding to terrorist attacks in Marawi would be conflated with the President’s centrepiece campaign against drug crime.78 Designed as a constraint on emergency power, the Constitution provides that the imposition of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus may not exceed 60 days, giving Congress the power to either revoke or extend the measures. However, Congress chose not to wield its controlling powers on the imposition of martial law and approved the President’s requests to extend military rule in Mindanao each time it expired. It did so the first time, for five months until the end of 2017, then for 12 months until the end of 2018, and finally for another year until President Duterte lifted martial law on 31 December 2019. Overall, the impact of martial law in Mindanao has been mixed. The police and the military say that its imposition helped restore peace and order in the region, allowing the peaceful conduct of the 2019 mid-term polls. Police officials in Central Mindanao said there was a fall in crime in the region because of martial rule.79 An international peace-building group, International Alert, claims that incidents of documented violent conflicts in the Bangsamoro region in Mindanao have dropped 30% yearly since the imposition of martial law. They attribute this to the increase of both police visibility and number of military checkpoints which made carrying and using firearms more difficult than before.80 However, since the imposition of martial law in Mindanao, local human rights groups have reported 162 extrajudicial killings, 284 illegal arrests and detentions, over a thousand victims of aerial bombardments and forced evacuation of more than half a million people.81 Others contend that

76. Patricia Lourdes Viray, ‘Broad, Arbitrary: Duterte’s Powers under Martial Law’, The Philippine Star, 26 May 2017. 77. ‘SC on Martial Law, Justice Leonen’s Dissenting Opinion’, Interaksyon, 6 July 2017. 78. Lian Buan, ‘Leonen: Lone Dissenter in SC Martial Law Ruling’, Rappler, 5 July 2017. 79. Ryan Rosauro, ‘Martial Law in Mindanao: What Changed, What Didn’t – and at What Cost’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2 January 2020. 80. Liezl Bugtay, Nikki Philline de la Rosa & Judy Gulane (eds.), War Makes States, Davao City: International Alert Philippines, 2019. 81. Rosauro, ‘Martial Law in Mindanao’.

227 Sol Iglesias & Lala Ordenes martial law was used to influence the mid-term election locally, «red tagging» leftist candidates as communist rebels and intimidating voters.82 Even with martial law lifted, critics fear that military force will continue to be used to intimidate and restrict the freedom of activists and government critics under the State of National Emergency throughout the country.83

4.2. Normalising emergency rule Martial law had been a political taboo in the Philippines under Mar- cos, too intimately associated with dictatorship, the trampling of civil liberties and the egregious use of state violence. However, in the post-Marcos period, former president Arroyo (in office from 2001-2010) increasingly resorted to martial law and emergency powers during a tenure in office fraught with legitimacy challenges.84 She imposed a state of rebellion in 2001 for five days and again in 2003 for 15 days. This was followed in 2006 by a State of National Emergency for one week, and, in 2009, a State of Emergency in Maguindanao and two other provinces, as well as martial law in Maguindanao for eight days. Through these measures, Arroyo re-habit- uated the public to the use of martial law and emergency powers, breaking the post-Marcos norm against them. This trend was strengthened by the decision taken in 2012 by the Supreme Court, which declined to rule on seven suits challenging the constitutionality of Arroyo’s 2009 imposition of martial law in Maguindanao province, therefore forfeiting the opportunity to establish a clearer guideline for future presidents.85

Table 1. Comparison of Martial Law Duration and Scope in the Philippines, 1972 to 2019 President Duration Geographic Coverage 21 September 1972 to 17 January 1981 Note: Marcos retained Ferdinand Marcos Nationwide executive powers as under dictatorship until his ousting on 25 February 1986 Gloria Macapagal Arroyo 5 to 13 December 2009 Province of Maguindanao 23 May 2017 to 31 December Whole of Mindanao (22 Rodrigo Duterte 2019 provinces and 30 cities) Source: Authors’ compilation

82. Bulatlat Contributors, ‘800,000 Rights Abuses Recorded in 2 Years of Mar- tial Law in Mindanao – Rights Group’, Bulatlat, 25 May 2019. 83. Nick Aspinwall, ‘The Interpreter: Martial Law Is Lifted, but «State of Emer- gency» Persists in Mindanao’, The Lowy Institute, 7 January 2020. 84. ‘States of Rebellion, Emergency under Arroyo Administration’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 4 September 2016. 85. Vincent Cabreza, ‘Supreme Court Junks Suits vs Arroyo Maguindanao Mar- tial Law; Corona Dissents’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 17 April 2012.

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President Marcos held the Philippines under military rule for over 13 years (eight years and four months officially, see Table 1). However, martial law under dictatorship is qualitatively different from the use of martial law under democracy. Under dictatorship, martial law is precisely the coercive instrument of control, it is «normal» and the basis of how power is structured in politics and society. Under democracy, the use of instruments such as martial law is meant to be extraordinary, limited in time and geographic coverage, as well as subject to the checks and balances of both judiciary and legislature. Compared to Arroyo’s use of martial law, Duterte was willing to maintain it for much longer (953 days compared to a mere eight days) and over a broader geographic scope. As another measure, the Constitution provides that «whenever it becomes necessary», the president may call upon all the country’s armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.86 Since Septem- ber 2016, a State of National Emergency has remained in place and the government has not indicated a timeframe or process for lifting the proclamation. In fact, the President’s office noted in a press conference that there is no time limit to this emergency power and that the proclamation does not require the concurrence of Congress.87 The proclamation and its implementing guidelines allow military and police personnel to set up checkpoints and impose curfews. Current guidelines for the implementation of the State of Nation- al Emergency provide that warrantless arrests are allowed under circumstances such as the voluntary waiver of the person arrested of their rights against warrantless arrests.88 According to the Civil Code, these rights may be waived unless the waiver is inter alia contrary to law, public order, public policy, and morals. The waiving of rights might be prone to the abuse of power under emergency rule, if not carefully monitored. For instance, these emergency powers were targeted at hotbeds of communist armed rebellion. Such areas in the Visayas regions and Bicol were the subject of additional directives.89 The military has been involved in operations that – according to rights groups – included summary executions of alleged communist rebels and counter-insurgency violence that «bleeds into local struggles over land and power».90

86. Article VII, Section 18, 1987 Constitution. 87. Ratziel San Juan, ‘Spot the Difference: Mindanao Martial Law vs State of National Emergency’, The Philippine Star, 3 January 2020. 88. ‘Proclamation No. 55, S. 2016 Declaring a State of National Emergency on Account of Lawless Violence in Mindanao’, Official Gazette, 4 September 2016. ‘Memorandum Order No. 3, S. 2016 Providing Guidelines for the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police in the Implementations of Meas- ures to Suppress and Prevent Lawless Violence’, Official Gazette, 7 September 2016. 89. Philippine Human Rights Information Center, The Killing State: 2019 Phil- ippine Human Rights Situationer, Quezon City, 2020, pp. 20-21. 90. Nick Aspinwall, ‘Argument: Duterte Turns Death Squads on Political Activ- ists’, Foreign Policy, 10 June 2019.

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Duterte has been more motivated and adept at the manipulation of state violence than any of his predecessors after Marcos. He has shown himself to be particularly proficient at normalising the disproportionate use of state violence as a response to alleged threats to society.

5. Blunting external influence for democracy

External influence is an element of authoritarian consolidation that is of particular relevance to developing countries. Levitsky and Lucan Way observe that international influence to promote democracy – normally manifested in multilateral conditionality, communications technology and trans- national human rights networks – depends on factors of both leverage and linkage. Leverage is conceptualised as the degree to which governments are vulnerable to democratising pressure while linkages are the density of economic, diplomatic and social ties the country has with multilateral institutions and consolidated democracies.91 Since the mid-2000s however, the world has been in what Diamond terms a «democratic recession». The global experience of democratisation has reached a plateau, a trend that is concomitant with authoritarian resurgence and the decline of democracies, mainly in Europe and the United States.92 Marc Plattner likewise perceives that leading autocratic powers – such as China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia – are more assertive in seeking to influence developments in their own regions and in multilateral fora. While these powers are not united by a common ideology or geopolitical interests, they share a common hostility towards democracy as well as to international norms conducive to human rights protection.93

5.1. China and the weakening of pro-democracy leverage The Duterte government has shown a new and unprecedented openness towards China, notably in the Philippine reversal of the previous government’s assertiveness in pursuing its legal claims in the South China/West Philippine Sea,94 which had culminated in a successful court case before the

91. Steven Levitsky & Lucan Way, ‘Linkage Versus Leverage. Rethinking the In- ternational Dimension of Regime Change’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2006, p. 379, 82-83. 92. Larry Diamond, ‘Facing up to the Democratic Recession’, Journal of Democ- racy, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2015, p. 144; 51-53. 93. Marc Plattner, ‘The End of the Transitions Era?’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2014, p.14. 94. Under President Benigno Aquino in 2012, the Philippine government began officially referring to the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea as part of the dispute over the territory. Agence France-Press in Manila, ‘Philippines Renames Coast «West Philippine Sea»’, South China Morning Post, 12 September 2012.

230 The Philippines 2019

Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. As Ollie Suorsa and Mark Thompson observe, among the benefits of Duterte’s pro-China approach have been both the rapid rise of pledged Chinese investments and the utility of a defence against international criticism of his human rights record.95 Diplomatic symbols highlight the promotion of Philippine-Sino relations. For instance, Xi Jinping’s arrival in Manila on 20 November 2018 was in stark contrast to his first trip to the country in 2015 to attend the Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit. The visit occurred while the Aquino administration’s arbitration case against China, launched on 22 January 2013, was ongoing. This resulted in public awkwardness between Aquino and Xi.96 In 2018, the Chinese President was instead warmly welcomed by an ally who was not shy about expressing his «love» and «need» for the Chinese leader.97 The visit was an occasion for both countries to cement their partnership, and for the Philippines, to consummate its pivot to China from its erstwhile ally, the USA. In fact, the visit was part of a broader pattern of increasing closeness between Manila and Beijing, linked to the widening gulf between the Philippines and the «West». Duterte has already visited China five times in just three years of his six-year-presidency and conducted eight bilateral meetings with his Chinese counterpart.98 He has yet to visit the USA or any European country.99 Duterte’s cosying up to Beijing has consequently borne fruit in terms of investments and trade agreements. Pledges have flowed in from China, a result of the two countries’ «aligned infrastructure development agenda» in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Philippines’ public infrastructure ambitions.100 Soon after Duterte took office, the Philippines secured US$ 24 billion in investment and credit line pledges from China, with US$ 15 billion worth of projects that included railway and airports as well as US$ 9 billion financing facilities from China State and the Bank of China.101

95. Olli Suorsa & Mark Thompson, ‘Choosing Sides? Illiberalism and Hedging in the Philippines and Thailand’, Panorama, Vol. 2, 2017, p. 65. 96. Paterno Esmaquel II, ‘From Duets to Sea Disputes: When Chinese Presi- dents Visit Philippines’, Rappler, 17 November 2018. 97. Amita Legaspi, ‘Duterte: I Love Xi Jinping, Need China More Than Any- body Else’, GMA News Online, 9 April 2018. 98. Darryl John Esguerra, ‘Duterte Flies to China for 5th Visit’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 28 August 2019. 99. Richard Heydarian, ‘How Rodrigo Duterte’s Latest Beijing Visit Marks a Crossroads for China, the Philippines and Asia’, South China Morning Post, 1 Septem- ber 2019. 100. Katrina Baguisi, ‘Philippines and China Sign Six Agreements’, ASEAN Briefing, 9 December 2019. A comparison of China’s investments with other major investors and the role of the Duterte government’s «Build, Build, Build» in the economy are discussed further in the following section. 101. Amy Remo, ‘Itemized List of PH Projects Covered by China’s $15-B In- vestment Pledges to Duterte’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 23 October 2016.

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Net inflows of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) have surged to US$ 305.54 million in 2018 and 2019 as compared to US$ 570,000 in 2015 before Duterte took office.102 Just halfway through President Duterte’s term, his administration has already exceeded the combined Chinese FDI of the preceding Arroyo and Aquino administrations.103 Trade with China in 2018 almost doubled from the previous year, and China became the top trading partner of the Philippines, with volumes amounting to US$ 30.83 billion or 16.9% of total trade.104 Yet China remains deeply unpopular in the Philippines. China’s trust rating among Filipinos is rated as «bad», according to a poll conducted in September 2019 that showed 54% of Filipinos have «little trust» in China, while 21% said they have «much trust».105 The Filipino public’s low level of confidence in China stems from unhappiness over the disputed territories in the South China/West Philippine Sea. The issue remains a thorn in the side of Philippine-China relations, creating a sore point that President Du- terte has so far been unable to salve with his people.

5.2. Gaining leverage with economic growth External democratising pressure on the Philippines is also likely to be diminished by the relative strength of the domestic economy. Ac- cording to the World Bank, the country saw an average annual growth of 6.3% in the years 2010 to 2018, accompanied by a decline in poverty, inequality and unemployment rates. Poverty declined from 26.6% in 2006 to 21.6% in 2015 while the Gini coefficient of inequality declined from 42.9 to 40.1 over the same period.106 By 2018, the poverty rate was 16.6% of the population.107 The Duterte administration has pursued an aggressive public infrastructure «Build, Build, Build» strategy to drive growth. It entails deficit spending and financing from Official Development Assistance and invest-

102. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, ‘Net Foreign Direct Investment Flows (Bal- ance of Payment, 6th Edition)’, Philippine Central Bank Statistics. 103. Weslene Uy, ‘Rise of Chinese Investments in Duterte’s Philippines: Some Consequences’, The Philippine Star, 19 March 2019. 104. Total export receipts from China reached US$ 8.82 billion while payment for import commodities was US$ 22.01 billion, consequently posting a deficit of US$ 13.20 billion. Philippine Statistics Authority, ‘Highlights of the 2018 Annual Report on International Merchandise Trade Statistics of the Philippines (Preliminary)’, For- eign Trade, 2 May 2019. See also Cliff Venzon, ‘Duterte Struggles to Sell His China Pivot at Home’, Nikkei Asian Review, 9 October 2019. 105. Julie Aurelio, ‘SWS: Most Filipinos Don’t Trust China’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 November 2019. 106. The World Bank, The World Bank in the Philippines: Overview, 25 Novem- ber 2019. 107. Philippine Statistics Authority, ‘Proportion of Poor Filipinos Was Estimat- ed at 16.6 Percent in 2018’, Poverty, 6 December 2019.

232 The Philippines 2019 ment from governments like China and Japan.108 The International Monetary Fund noted that the overall deficit widened in 2018 mainly due to increased expenditure, including on infrastructure. It nonetheless pointed out that public debt in the country was on a gradual downward path and indicators of debt sustainability were within the bounds for emerging market economies.109 With regard to FDI, investments in special economic zones fell in 2018 to US$ 6,456 million from US$ 8,704 million the year before, but remained on an upward trajectory.110 While Japan, the USA and Singapore used to be the main investors in the country, China is now one of the biggest sources of FDI to the Philippines. From the first quarter in 2018 to the second quarter in 2019, total approved foreign investment in the Philippines was topped by Singapore (US$ 1,202 million), followed closely by China (US$ 1,030 million), and followed at a distance by Japan (US$ 660 million) and the USA (US$ 368 million).111 Nevertheless, despite being the fastest growing economy in Asia, the Philippines underperformed in 2018 and 2019. In 2018, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at 6.2%, falling from 6.9% in 2016 and 6.7% in 2017; GDP slowed down further the following year to 5.9%.112 In 2019, moreover, a delay in budget approval caused a contraction in government spending and a stall in public infrastructure projects.113 Overall, the growth momentum the Philippines had experienced since 2010 thus began to stall under Duterte’s leadership. Tax reform undertaken to finance the government’s infrastructure priorities unleashed an inflationary surge by raising taxes on fuel and sugar. 114 Inflation spiked at 6.7% in September and October 2018 and averaged at 5.2% that year, more than double the 2.5% in the same period the year before and four times the 1.3% inflation rate at the start of the Duterte presidency in June 2016.115

108. Benjamin Diokno, ‘The Fiscal Program in Recent Philippine History: Look- ing Back and Looking Forward’, The Philippine Review of Economics, Vol. LIV, No. 2 (2017). 109. International Monetary Fund, ‘Philippines: 2019 Article IV Consultation Staff Report’, IMF Country Report No. 20/36, 6 February 2020. 110. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Country Fact Sheet: Philippines’, World Investment Report 2019, 12 June 2019. 111. Philippine Statistics Authority, ‘Total Approved Foreign Investments by Country of Investor Q1 2018 - Q2 2019’, Foreign Investments, 5 September 2019. 112. Asian Development Bank, ‘Economic Indicators for the Philippines’, Philippines and ADB. IBON Media, ‘PH Economy Headed Towards 3rd Year of Slow Growth – Ibon,’ Kodao Productions, 9 November 2019. 113. World Bank, ‘Philippines Economic Update October 2019’, Philippines, 10 October 2019. 114. Richard Heydarian, ‘Dutertenomics - Less Than Meets the Eye,’ Nikkei Asian Review, 27 April 2018. 115. IBON Media, ‘PH Economy Duterteriorating’, Ibon Features, 29 August 2018. See also Asian Development Bank, Economic Indicators for the Philippines. See also Czeriza Valencia, ‘Philippine Economy Underperforms in 2018’, The Philippine Star, 25 January 2019.

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In addition, low official unemployment rates may have masked a serious problem. Sceptical at reported unemployment rates of 5.3% in 2018 and 5.2% in 2019, analysts have argued that a recently revised definition of unemployment, on which those figures are based, does not count millions of «discouraged workers».116 «Discouraged workers» are those who have dropped out of the labour force because they believe that no jobs are available to them, especially after a long illness or unsuccessful job-seeking. When asked if they are looking for jobs, «discouraged workers» usually answer in the negative. This, however, does not take into account that they would accept jobs, if offered. In fact, an alternative estimate based on the previously used government definition would push up the national unemployment rate to 9.1%.117 This virtually jobless economic boom, critics argue, is a result of the government’s prioritisation of domestic law-and-order issues over economic policy.118

5.3. Eroding linkages with the European Union Political conditionalities have been integrated into the EU’s trade relations, treaties and general relations with external parties. Consequently, the EU is often characterised as a normative power, particularly in univer- salising human rights standards and social norms.119 The EU, jointly with member states, is one of the largest grant donors to the Philippines and provides significant support to human rights and justice reform, among other programmes.120 Trade and aid have heretofore provided important linkages between the EU and the Philippines, promoting democratic practices in the latter. As such, relations between the EU and the Philippines have been fraught with complications since Duterte took office. In 2019, Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations between the Phil- ippines and the EU halted due to the Europeans’ concern over human rights and President Duterte’s lethal campaign against drugs. This was a blow to the Philippine government’s aim to expand access to the European

116. Rene Ofreneo, ‘Joblessness: Declining or Growing?’, Business Mirror, 16 May 2019. 117. IBON Media, ‘PH Economy Duterteriorating’. 118. Panos Mourdoukoutas, ‘Duterte’s Jobless Economic Boom,’ Business Mir- ror, 10 February 2019. 119. Clair Gammage, ‘A Critique of the Extraterritorial Obligations of the EU in Relation to Human Rights Clauses and Social Norms in EU Free Trade Agree- ments’, Europe and the World: A law review, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2018. 120. European External Action Service, ‘EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2018: Philippines Country Update’, Brussels: EEAS, 2019.

234 The Philippines 2019 market FTA.121 While it is in Europe’s strategic interest to construct its trading architecture with Japan and ASEAN markets, concern over the violence of the Philippine government’s «war on drugs» and the human rights situation overall compelled the EU to re-evaluate the necessity of an FTA with the Philippines.122 Another source of friction between the Philippines and the EU has been over the question of development aid. The Duterte administration rejected € 250 million in new EU grants, € 39 million in sustainable energy projects and € 6.1 million worth of trade-related technical assistance, refusing the imposition of conditionalities relating to human rights and the «war on drugs».123 After a Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the Phil- ippines and the EU was ratified in March 2019, the European Commission clarified that aid relations would proceed as normal without any objections from the Philippines’ side, contradicting earlier pronouncements on the matter.124 However, the 2019 aforementioned UN HRC resolution on the Philippines riled President Duterte, who announced that the government would cease to accept aid from the countries that supported the HRC – which included a number of EU members. This cast the status of EU aid in doubt once more.

5.4. Negotiating for trade over human rights The deterioration in Philippine-EU relations occurred against a backdrop of earlier diplomatic skirmishes over European Parliament resolutions. «I have read the condemnation of the European Union. I’m telling them, ‘F**k you’», President Duterte stated on 21 September 2016, about a week after the European Parliament issued a resolution on the Philippines. Later in his speech to local businessmen in his hometown of Davao City, he repeated the expletive and raised his middle finger for emphasis.125 The 2016 EU Parliamentary resolution had objected to President Duterte’s statements urging law enforcement agencies and the public to kill suspected drug traffickers, among other matters. Parliament thus called upon the EU to use «all available instruments to assist the Gov-

121. Roy Stephen Canivel, ‘Human Rights Concerns Stall PH Free Trade Talks with EU’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 July 2019. 122. Hanna Deringer & Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, ‘Europe and South-East Asia: An Exercise in Diplomatic Patience’, ECIPE Policy Brief, No. 5/2018, Brussels: Euro- pean Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), 2018. 123. Paterno Esmaquel II, ‘Philippines Formally Rejects P380 Million in EU Aid’, Rappler, 24 January 2018. 124. Jenny Lei Ravelo, ‘After a Tumultuous Year, EU Aid to Continue in the Philippines’, Devex, 5 March 2018. 125. Ted Regencia, ‘Philippines’ Duterte Unleashes More Profanity at the EU’, Al Jazeera, 21 September 2016.

235 Sol Iglesias & Lala Ordenes ernment of the Philippines in respecting its international human rights obligations».126 Subsequently, the European Parliament issued a 2017 resolution condemning the high number of extrajudicial killings related to the anti-drug campaign. The European Parliament viewed the summary killings, as well as other matters such as the reinstatement of the death penalty and lowering the minimum age for criminal responsibility, as violations of the country’s treaty obligations. Thus, the resolution asked the European Commission (EC) to use all means to persuade the Philippines to put an end to the violence including procedural steps, with a view to the possible removal of trading privileges under the Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance of the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP+).127 GSP+ status offers preferential access to the EU market, aimed at developing countries unable to fully utilise existing favoured access to Europe and lacking in export diversification and integration into global trade.128 GSP is one of the main instruments that the EU uses to link social and human rights issues to trade. The EU parliamentary resolution also sought the immediate release of Senator Leila de Lima, who had been arrested in 2017 and detained on charges that she accepted money from drug dealers when she was the Sec- retary of Justice of the previous administration. De Lima is a leading critic of President Duterte, whom she had investigated both in the Senate and the Commission on Human Rights. It is of no small significance that the resolution highlighted de Lima’s case in its title. In light of the possibility that the EU would snatch away trade privileges from the Philippines, the action shifted from President Duterte’s immediate ambit to that of technocracy and diplomacy. On 4 July 2017 in Manila, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs held the ninth senior officials’ meeting, previously held as far back as 2013. Talks included the GSP+ as well as a «candid exchange of views on the human rights situation in the Philippines and the EU».129 The GSP+ status of the Philippines was under review and a second biennial report due in early 2018.

126. European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 15 September 2016 on the Philippines. 127. European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 16 March 2017 on the Philippines - the Case of Senator Leila M. De Lima. 128. Currently, the Philippines is one of only eight countries with GSP+ status. European Commission, Mid-Term Evaluation of the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences: Final Interim Report, Brussels, 2017, pp. 26-30. 129. Mission of the European Union to ASEAN, Joint Press Statement on the 9th PH-EU Senior Officials’ Meeting, Manila 2017.

236 The Philippines 2019

Subsequently, the secretary of the Department of Trade and Indus- try, Ramon Lopez, and the late Edgardo Angara, who had been appointed special envoy to the EU, were dispatched to Brussels. They made a presentation to the European Parliament and conducted several meetings with EU officials «to ensure continuity of the GSP+ privilege».130 Other signs of rapprochement included the appointment of a Philippine ambassador to the EU after a long vacancy, and an unprecedented invitation to European Council President Donald Tusk as a guest of the Chair at the 12th East Asian Summit in Manila.131 Finally, the EU concluded the review process and affirmed that the Philippines would retain its GSP+ status in January 2018. The biennial report (2016 to 2017) of the EC and the European Council noted that the Philippines had increased its use of GSP+ preferences to 26% of its total exports, with a GSP+ utilisation rate of 71% in 2016. Moreover, Philippine exports have grown 51% since 2012, due in great part to enhanced access to the EU market.132 Conversely, the report carried the concerns of the Eu- ropean Parliament over the «war on drugs», systematic rights violations, as well as incitement to violence with impunity. The European Parliament continued to raise objections. Following the PCA ratification mentioned earlier, the Parliament released a resolution on the Philippines on 19 April 2018 remarking pointedly that the agreement affirmed the joint commitment of the Philippines and the EU to, inter alia, good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights.133 Building upon the previous parliamentary resolutions in 2016 and 2017, the 2018 statement furthermore welcomed the ICC investigation on crimes against humanity in the Philippines and advocated the removal of the Philippines from the HRC before its term expired. Furthermore, in other statements, the EU welcomed the HRC’s decision to investigate the Philippines as well as expressed concern over the removal of Chief Justice Sereno and judicial independence. These issues over human rights and democratic governance are likely to remain significant in future reviews of the EU’s trade and aid relations with the Philippines. Nonetheless, as Duterte shifts the country closer to China, international pro-democracy influence will continue to diminish.

130. A.G.A. Mogato, ‘PHL Moves to Assure EU on GSP+ Fitness’, Business World, 28 September 2017. 131. Paterno Esmaquel II, ‘Behind the Scenes, PH Scrambles to Mend EU Ties’, Rappler, 7 December 2017. 132. European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, The EU Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Develop- ment and Good Governance (GSP+) Assessment of the Philippines Covering the Period 2016 - 2017, Brussels, 2018. 133. The European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 19 April 2018 on the Philippines, (2018/2662(RSP)).

237 Sol Iglesias & Lala Ordenes

6. Conclusion

In 2019, President Duterte passed the midpoint of his six-year term. Promulgated in 1987 in the aftermath of the Marcos dictatorship, the Con- stitution prohibits an incumbent president from running for re-election. Its framers designed the measure as a guard against future autocrats, one among many measures meant to strengthen democracy and safeguard the country against future attempts at authoritarian rule. Over three decades later, Philippine democracy has evidently failed to consolidate. Moreover, the level of oppression and state-sponsored violence under President Duterte is unprecedented. Until Duterte’s «war on drugs», violent repression in the post-Marcos democratic period would have been considered an aberration to otherwise still meaningful democratic values.134 Concepts from the literature on democratic consolidation and erosion have been employed in this essay, including the role of external influence as being pertinent in a developing country such as the Philippines. Thus, several patterns of authoritarian consolidation may be discerned from observations of political events and economic conditions. First, the Duterte regime has marginalised and weakened political actors that have an important adversarial and balancing responsibility. The 2019 elections may have given President Duterte a fresh democratic mandate on the surface but the unusual shrinkage of the opposition has corre- spondingly diminished the legislature’s countervailing role. The President also eschewed the usual provision of a role in the administration for his Vice President (a norm, not a legal requirement), questioning Vice Presi- dent Robredo’s electoral mandate in particular. The President’s attacks on the media have been especially pernicious in a country where it is already dangerous to be a journalist. Secondly, President Duterte has enjoyed a rare opportunity to appoint a majority of Supreme Court justices early in his term. Moreover, he played a very public role in the ousting of former Chief Justice Sereno. The political capture of the judiciary is a key tactic of authoritarian consolidation in order to selectively enforce the law and use the powers of the institution against opponents. Thirdly, the deficiency of checks and balances from Congress and the Supreme Court paved the way for President Duterte to impose martial law in Mindanao over a prolonged period of time. Moreover, with the entire country under a state of national emergency, the President has circumvent- ed constitutional checks on executive power and exploited security crises to impose martial rule in all but name.

134. Vincent Boudreau, ‘Elections, Repression and Authoritarian Survival in Post-Transition Indonesia and the Philippines’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2009, p. 248.

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Furthermore, President Duterte has cultivated China as an ally and, leveraging on the continued economic growth of the Philippines, has weakened trade and development linkages with international pro-democracy actors such as the European Union. Finally, under a global «democratic recession», external influence to encourage democratic practices and the respect for human rights has been blunted significantly. The Duterte regime is reconfiguring democratic institutions for the purpose of securing immunity for its excesses, consolidating its dominance, and entrenching itself in power. This analysis has explained the main political and economic developments in the Philippines as a process of authoritarian consolidation under President Duterte. Democratic erosion and deconsolidation have intensified and peaked in the mid-term of Duterte’s presidency. Even without unmistakable signs such as a military takeover or dissolution of existing democratic institutions, the process of transition from a democratic to an authoritarian regime is underway.

239

Timor-Leste 1945-2019: From an almost forgotten colony to the first democratic nation of the 21st century*

Rui Feijó

Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra Institute for Contemporary History, NOVA University of Lisboa [email protected]

This article has two main aims: to give a comprehensive view of the transformation of Timor-Leste from an almost forgotten colony of Portugal to the first independent country of the 21st century, and to analyse its attempt, as an independent state, to create a nation based on democracy. This very long and winding road underwent four stages which are contemplated in turn: the late years of Portuguese colonialism, the quarter-century neo-colonial domination by the Republic of Indonesia, the two- and-a-half year transitional period under the auspices of the United Nations, and the period after the official restoration of independence on 20 May 2002.

1. Introduction

This article is divided into three sections. First, the historical background to the current situation of Timor-Leste1 as an independent country will be provided. Second, an overview of the domestic policies implemented since independence, followed by an assessment of the country’s economic performance during the same period, focusing on the opportunities granted by the exploitation of oil and gas resources in the Timor Sea. The third

A different format has been used from that usually adopted in the essays published in this journal. It was considered constructive to offer not only an analysis of the most recent political and economic developments in Timor-Leste, but a historical introduction as well. It is the editors’ view that more scholarly attention should be given to this extremely interesting and little-known small nation. * The research for this essay was made possible through the financial support received from the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), namely through grants SFRH/BPD/71238/2010 and PTDC/HAR-HIS/30670/2017, as well as from generous aid provided by the Orient Foundation in Lisbon and Dili. 1. The new country’s name, Timor-Leste, as chosen by its authorities, is used throughout this essay. In the colonial past, the country was known as «Timor Portu- guês», namely «Portuguese Timor». During Indonesian occupation, as that country’s 27th Province, it was known as Timor-Timur. Of course the name «East Timor» is widespread among English speakers and is in consonance with that prevailing in many languages (e.g. «Timor oriental» in French or «Timor Est» in Italian). The inhabitants are called East Timorese.

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Rui Feijó and final section will be devoted to a survey of the political and economic turbulent situation after the 2017 cycle of presidential and legislative elections, which continue to persist even after the early parliamentary election of 2018.

2. A long and winding road (1945-2002)

In little more than half a century, Timor-Leste experienced several dramatic upheavals. The Portuguese colony was invaded at the beginning of World War II by Dutch and Australian troops (1941), and later fell into the hands of the Japanese (1942-1945). After being returned to the Portu- guese overseas empire, there followed 30 years of near stagnation. It was offered the chance to start its self-determination process in 1974-1975. In December 1975, Indonesia invaded the territory and remained the administrative power de facto for 24 years. In 1999 a UN-supervised referendum revealed the East Timorese desire for independence, officially declared on 20 May 2002. This long interim period left deep marks in the fabric of Timorese society. The experience of suffering under brutal regimes is critical to an understanding of the way in which the new nation has been operating.

2.1. The emergence of decolonization The origins of Timor-Leste’s recent history began in August 1945 when its Japanese invaders were defeated in the Pacific War (1941-1945). For those Southeast Asia colonies occupied by the Japanese, war created «an opportune moment» making it difficult if not impossible for colonial powers to reassert their dominance over those countries.2 The most striking example came from the Dutch colony in the region which proclaimed independence on 17 August 1945 as the Republic of Indonesia. This declaration pioneered what became a tectonic shift, one of the most important in the second half of the 20th century, and would radically reshape relations between European colonial powers and their colonized subjects. Portu- guese Timor, as it was called at the time, would be involved in this sweeping process. It would nevertheless be almost 30 years before it gained a significant impetus. Portugal was able to return to the territory in 1945, as its authoritarian ruler António de Oliveira Salazar had secured the Allies’ support for this solution in 1944 when he authorized their use the Lajes air base in the archipelago of Azores, situated mid-Atlantic, and which was

2. Martin Shipway, Decolonization and its impact: a comparative approach to the end of the colonial empires, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008.

242 Timor-Leste 2019 strategically crucial for the USA and the UK during the war.3 Even though the Allies doubted the Portuguese capacity to administer a territory located so far away from its European base, Portugal secured formal support towards the integrity of its colonial possessions.4 The newly independent Indonesia, for its part, was primarily concerned with assuring control of the whole territory which comprised the Dutch East Indies, an ambition only fulfilled in the late 1960s with the integration of West Papua/Irian Jaya. Ac- cordingly, Indonesia’s Constituent Assembly did not venture to claim any territory outside the Dutch East Indies’ former borders. The returning colonial administration benefitted from the engagement of several Portuguese (many of whom were active opponents of the Salazar regime who had been deported to the island) in the attempt to organize some form of resistance to the brutal Japanese occupation, and was to a certain extent welcomed by the Timorese. A «development plan» was supposedly created to provide special relief to the population and to improve its living standards. However, 30 years later the former minister for the colonies Silva Cunha (1965-1973), acknowledged that the effort of rebuilding Portuguese Timor was still under way.5 A governor of Por- tuguese Timor, Filipe Themudo Barata (1959-1963), also recognized that «the success of economic development was very modest» as the colony «had no port, no roads, no agriculture».6 By 1970, if one disregards the military presence of several hundred who stayed in the territory for a maximum of two years, the presence of European colonizers was limited to no more than 300 individuals.7 Compared with other Portuguese colonies, the ratio of colonizers to the native population was by far the lowest, which resulted in poor education and health services. One may consider that Portugal exercised a feeble form of colonial presence in Timor-Leste. However, this presence – maybe precisely because it was so feeble – was accepted by most Timorese as a fact of life, and did not trigger the urge to put an end to it.

3. Luis Nuno Rodrigues, ‘Os Estados Unidos nos Açores: o acordo luso-ameri- cano de 1944’, in Luís Nuno Rodrigues, Iva Delgado & David Castaño (eds.),Portugal e o Atlântico: 60 Anos dos Acordos dos Açores , Lisboa: Centro de Estudos de Historia Contemporânea Portuguesa, 2005, pp. 75-100; Keneth Maxwell, ‘Os Estados Unidos e a Descolonização Portuguesa (1974-1976)’, Relações Internacionais, No. 8, Dezembro 2005, pp. 5-37. 4. Moisés Silva Fernandes, ‘O apaziguamento ocidental da Indonésia. Como o consenso político a partir de 1960 facilitou a invasão por Jakarta de Timor em 1974-1975’, in Rui Graça Feijó (ed), Timor-Leste: Colonialismo, Descolonização, Lusuto- pia, Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 2016, pp. 243-265. 5. Joaquim da Silva Cunha, ‘Entrevista’, Encontros de divulgação e debate em estudos sociais, Vol. 1, 1995, pp. 63-65. 6. Filipe Themudo Barata, ‘Depoimento’, Encontros de divulgação e debate em estudos sociais, Vol. 1, 1995, pp. 51-60. 7. Luis Filipe Thomaz, De Ceuta a Timor, Lisboa: Difel, 1994.

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In the period between the end of World War II and the Portuguese Revolution of 1974, one major uprising took place in 1959 in the mountainous district of Viqueque.8 Instigated by Indonesian refugees who were supposedly separatists fighting for the independence of part of eastern In- donesia, and thus not supported by the official regime of Jakarta, this revolt against the Portuguese administration had a limited impact, not only geographically, but also in the nascent East Timorese nationalism. In fact, prior to 1974 there were some erratic attempts at creating political organizations worthy of challenging Portuguese rule, none of which survived after the Carnations Revolution (25 April 1974).9 The fledgling nationalism only appeared in the early 1970s, together with a new generation of youths with a somewhat higher degree of schooling. In the meantime, some international players kept an attentive eye on developments in the region. In the early 1960s, representatives from the USA, the UK, Australia and New Zealand held secret talks on the future fate of Portuguese Timor. They deemed that changes would come sooner rather than later, as they doubted the Portuguese capacity to pursue its colonial policies for long. The result of those talks was a secret agreement that Portuguese Timor was in no conditions to survive as an independent nation and that, accordingly, the security of the region would benefit from the integration of this territory in the Republic of Indonesia, which, differently from what had happened in the case of Goa, Daman and Diu, which had been militarily invaded by India, should be peaceful.10 Curiously, at a time when the Cold War was at its height and the regime of Sukarno was a leading member of the so-called non-aligned countries, the Western powers preferred to see Indonesia annex Portuguese Timor rather than face the uncertainties of any possible attempt at independence on the part of the former Portuguese colony. In 1967, the fall of Sukarno and the rise of the authoritarian, highly anti-communist and pro-Western regime of Suharto made things easier for the Western powers when the Portuguese colonial era in Timor actually reached its end in 1974.

8. Ernest Chamberlain, Rebellion, defeat and exile. The 1959 uprising in East Timor, Point Londsdale: author’s own publication, 2009; Janet Gunter, Violence and «being in history» in East Timor, Lisbon: dissertation presented to the degree of Master of Arts, ISCTE, 2007; Valentim Alexandre, Contra o Vento. Portugal, o Império e a Maré Anticolonial (1945-1960), Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 2017, esp. pp. 728-746. 9. Moisés Silva Fernandes, ‘A Uniao da República de Timor: o atrofico mov- imento nacionalista islâmico-malaio timorense, 1960-1975’, in Armando Marques Guedes & Nuno Canas Mendes (eds.), Ensaios Sobre Nacionalismos em Timor-Leste, Lis- boa: Instituto Diplomático do Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, 2005, pp. 355- 431. Draft #2. 10. Moisés Silva Fernandes, ‘O apaziguamento ocidental da Indonésia’.

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2.2. An interlude: 1974-1975 The Carnations Revolution of 25 April 1974 was placed under the banner of three D’s – Democratize, Decolonize, Develop. After a stubborn resistance to grant the right of self-determination to the «non-autonomous territories under Portuguese administration» recognized by the United Nations and pursued by the regime of Salazar and Marcelo Caetano, Portugal took a leap forward and in the course of 18 months the old empire was gone (except for Macau, a special case due to the Chinese claims regarding its sovereignty). Timor-Leste then had the chance to prepare for self-determination. In May 1974 the governor made the new orders emanating from Lisbon known: political associations could then be formed to express the views of the East Timorese. That same month, three major political associations were formed. One was UDT – União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union), which stood for the continuation of close relations with Portugal in the framework of a federal solution. When this solution fell in Lisbon together with the first post-revolution president, General António de Spínola, UDT first chose as its political objective the attainment of independence in the medium to long term, but ended up supporting the Indonesian invasion. Another political association formed at the time was ASDT – Asso- ciação Social Democrática Timorense (Timorese Social Democratic Associa- tion), which stood for independence. ASDT first accepted a transition programme towards independence, to be implemented in the medium term. Subsequently, however, some radicalized students returning from Portugal joined forces with this group, and it became known as FRETILIN – Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Inde- pendent Timor-Leste). As a consequence, in September 1974 the former ASDT placed independence as a short-term goal. The third association created following the 1974 Lisbon orders was APODETI – Associação Popular Democrática de Timor-Leste (Popular Demo- cratic Association of Timor-Leste), which stood for the integration of the territory into the Republic of Indonesia. APODETI, however, never gained traction in the territory, despite the support of several traditional leaders (liurais) and wealthy settlers. Some individuals involved in the Viqueque uprising of 1959 also lent this organization their support. For its part, UDT had a strong base among the white administration together with some locals who had been co-opted to serve alongside them, and gained substantial popular support right after its creation. With regard to ASDT/FRETILIN, it inherited, to a large extent, the proto-nationalist ideas and personnel who had, from the late-1960s, begun to express dissenting views towards the status quo, and merged that line with a radical view espoused by a few students radicalized in Lisbon in far-left ideologies. Eventually, these students managed to gain ample support for FRETILIN, both in urban and rural areas, thanks to their own support towards co-oper-

245 Rui Feijó atives and literacy campaigns inspired by the progressive ideas of Brazilian educator and philosopher Paulo Freire (1921-1997). In early 1975, UDT and ASDT formed a coalition whose common goal was the prospect of a mid-term independence for the territory. Portugal, for its part, promoted a summit in Macau (June) meant to be attended by the leaders of those three movements. As the coalition had broken down in late May, FRETILIN declined to attend, and refused to accept the results of that meeting: elections for a Constituent Assembly in October 1976, followed by two years to decide on the best way to implement self-determination. A governor appointed by Lisbon would rule with two Portuguese secretaries and one from each of the East Timorese parties, starting in September 1975. By then, amid growing tension, FRETILIN was claiming – conforming to what happened to several other liberation movements around the world that tended to disregard pluralist forms of nationalist organization – to be the «sole legitimate representative of the Timorese people». Eventually, tension escalated to the point that UDT staged a coup d’état on the night of 10-11 August 1975, claiming the exclusion of FRETILIN and the expulsion of several Portuguese officers regarded as too close to that group. Five days later, FRETILIN responded by initiating a brief but bloody civil war that would leave deep scars on the East Timorese perception of party politics for years to come. The Portuguese governor, who disposed of the best force in the territory (some 70 paratroopers) decided not to intervene and withdrew with his troops to the tiny island of Ataúro, north of Dili, where they were to remain until their repatriation. FRETILIN took the upper hand in the military operations, and UDT (together with APODETI) were driven across the border to Indonesia. Governor Mário Lemos Pires refused to return to Dili and decided to remain equidistant from the local factions. Unable to secure Portuguese protection while it exercised effective military control, FRETILIN took the bold step, on 28 November 1975, of proclaiming the unilateral independence of the territory. This proclamation would have little or no international impact, except in Indonesia. The day after a visit by the US president Gerald Ford and his secretary of state Henry Kissinger, the Indonesian military launched an operation to occupy Portuguese Timor. Portugal finally brought the issue to the UN Security Council, which passed a resolution of condemnation. However, as the ambassador of the United States to the UN, Daniel Patrick Moynihan would later reveal: The United States wished things to turn out as they did and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsider- able success.11

11. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, A Dangerous Place, Boston: Little Brown & Com- pany, 1978.

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2.3. The Republic of Indonesia’s 27th Province (1975-1999) The Indonesian military operation was a success, mainly in the urban centres. However, in the countryside it took several years to complete thanks to the resistance organized by FRETILIN. The Indonesian military had boasted that they would have breakfast in Batugadé [a Timorese border town], lunch in Dili [Timor-Leste’s capital] and dinner in Lospalos [the east- ernmost town of the territory]. They were wrong: the Indonesian army took years to complete the military conquest of the territory, until the fall the last «liberated area» under FRETILIN control in Mount Matebian in late 1978. In mid-1976, the Indonesians organized a meeting to which they «invited» the East Timorese traditional leaders (liurais), who were persuaded to publicly take position in favour of Timor’s formal integration into the Republic of Indonesia. This replicated what had happened years before, to international approval, when Irian Jaya had been annexed to Indonesia. On 17 July 1976 the authorities in Jakarta declared Timor-Timur to be the country’s 27th province. The Indonesian occupation used a two-pronged strategy and combined accelerated economic and social development with brutal repression. Indonesia claimed to have brought development to a territory hitherto de- spised by the Portuguese, and to have broken the colonial yoke that had separated people who had once lived together for centuries. But while roads, schools and health facilities were built, Timor-Timur nevertheless remained among the poorest regions of Indonesia. Rod Nixon draws a critical balance of the material improvements which were counterweighted by the flux of Indonesian migrants, who were given fertile land where to settle, or by the intensive exploitation of natural resources (such as the forests) carried out by companies closely associated with Indonesian army officers.12 A quarter of a century after the invasion, Timor-Leste had become a more urbanized country, and the literacy of its population significantly increased – changes that were not necessarily appreciated by the occupiers who witnessed the rise of new classes of people highly dissatisfied with the brutality of the regime. Assessments of the Indonesian regime’s brutality point to the number of deaths by direct (military operations) and indirect means (starvation, forced displacement, lack of medical conditions, napalm bombings…), in the range of a minimum of 102,800 to a maximum of 183,000. The report of Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação (CAVR – Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation) from which these figures were taken also mentions that those estimates, based on sophisticated methods, are compatible with even higher estimates made by several other sources over

12. Rod Nixon, Justice and Governance in East Timor: Indigenous approaches to the ‘New Subsistence State’, London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 86-101.

247 Rui Feijó the years.13 If one accepts a median value of around 150,000 deaths out of a population of about 610,000 inhabitants in 1970, we conclude that close to a quarter of the population was exterminated. This compares with the much-trumpeted genocide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (about 2 million in a 8 million population). Benedict Anderson analysed the failure of the Indonesians to effectively incorporate Timor-Leste into the Indonesian nation. He claimed that their attitude of brutality had the consequence of accelerating the «imagination» of Timor-Leste as a separate polity. «Their relations are best regarded as those of colonizer and colonized, which produced in Timor- Leste the same effect that Dutch colonialism once produced Indonesian nationalism.»14 Resistance to Indonesian rule continued to the end of the occupation, but it underwent significant changes which still resonate in today’s Timor-Leste. At first, FRETILIN, which spearheaded the resistance, accentuated its radicalism, declaring itself the «Marxist-Leninist avant-garde» of the East Timorese people. This political move led to internal strife among those who were fighting the invaders. One significant episode was that involving Francisco Xavier do Amaral, a FRETILIN founding member, who had been sworn in as the country’s first president on 28 November 1975. When, ten days later, Indonesia invaded Timor Leste, Amaral fled into the mountains, where he led the resistance. However, in 1977, FRETILIN’s rad- icalization resulted in Amaral’s ousting and imprisonment, together with that of several of his followers. This strategic orientation was sectarian and ultimately led to the fall of the «liberated camps» to the Indonesian occupation forces and the death on 31 December 1978 of Nicolau Lobato, the new resistance leader. The «diplomatic front» of the liberation struggle was also witnessing growing difficulties, as support for Indonesia was growing in the UN General Assembly. The 1980s, however, brought a significant shift in positions. Xanana Gusmão, who had succeeded Lobato as head of the resistance, realized the way forward meant strategic change. He broke up with FRETILIN and declared that the group of guerrilla fighters he commanded – the FALINTIL (Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste – Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Timor-Leste) to be «nationalist soldiers», no longer obeying a single party (despite their origin as an armed wing of FRETI- LIN), but representing all those who rejected the occupation. He welcomed the political reorientation of the Catholic Church from that of supporter of the annexation to a force opposing occupation. He secretly met with the «apostolic administrator» of Dili, Dom Martinho da Costa Lopes, a gesture

13. CAVR, Chega! The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconcili- ation of Timor-Leste, Dili: CAVR, 2006. 14. Benedict Anderson, ‘Imagining East Timor’, Arena magazine, No. 4, April- May 1993.

248 Timor-Leste 2019 that would later bring about major positive developments in the liberation struggle. Gusmão also realized that the armed front should be supported by a much wider network of «clandestine» members. Consequently, he concluded that instead of antagonizing traditional leaders, as FRETILIN had done, claiming they represented «feudalism», an alliance with the existing social structures of power at all levels was critical in securing sound support for the resistance. Meanwhile, FRETILIN agreed to abandon the claim to be the East Timorese people’s sole legitimate representative and recognized the importance of the emerging forces of opposition to Indonesian rule. Following this transformation, the nationalist movement became more diverse. This was evidenced in April 1998 when the Conselho Nacional da Re- sistencia Timorense (CNRT – National Council of the Timorese Resistance) was finally created, bringing together former foes who now rallied to combat Indonesian oppression. The net result of this evolution was that the Timorese Resistance acquired the characteristics of a democratic, pluralistic movement, which gave it a position of strength at international level in the years ahead. Also important is the fact that from the early 1980s, the Resistance accepted that Timor-Leste would remain a «non-autonomous territory under Portuguese administration» (rather than a self-proclaimed independent nation). This allowed Portugal to include the case of Timor-Leste in its foreign policy, developing a significant strategy which eventually culminated in the UN- sponsored agreement between the Portuguese and the Indonesian governments. The agreement, which only became possible after the financial crisis in Indonesia and the fall of Suharto, was signed in New York on 5 May 1999. The Portugal-Indonesia agreement opened the doors for a self-determination referendum. It must also be added that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the end of the Cold War, the situation had started to move in favour of the East Timorese. This was aided by the broadcasting internationally of the shocking images of the Santa Cruz massacre (Novem- ber 1991), which caused justified furore.15 Moreover, the shifting of international public opinion in favour of the East Timorese was both highlighted and strengthened by the joint award of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize to the bishop of Dili, Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, and the mastermind of the Timorese Resistance diplomatic front, José Ramos-Horta.

15. On 12 November 1991, a demonstration that started at the Church of Mot- ael in central Dili, composed mainly of students, converged on the Cemetery of Santa Cruz to pay homage to a colleague who had been killed the previous week. There, the Indonesian army opened fire, killing a vast number of peaceful demonstrators. Many others were imprisoned, some tortured and killed in custody. The final number of deaths was estimated at between 250 and 300. The massacre was filmed by Max Stahl who managed to have the tape delivered to international media networks. The brutal images of the massacre were widely broadcast and generated outrage among international public opinion, marking a significant turn in the global understanding of the East Timorese case.

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The international community was itself moving from its previous position of complacency. Australia, for instance, was among the few countries to formally recognize the annexation of Timor-Leste, with its eyes on a lucrative treaty on the natural resources of the Timor Sea (notoriously celebrated by the foreign ministers of the two countries, sipping champagne on board an aircraft flying over those rich oil fields in December 1989). In 1999, however, Australia realized that the Indonesian position could not be sustained for good and became a «reluctant saviour».16 In the United States of America, President Clinton was also pressed to apply his principles of human rights to this case. Indonesia was becoming increasingly isolated and desperate for much needed help in a time of dire economic crisis.

2.4. The Self-determination Referendum of 30 August 1999 and the transitional administration of the United Nations (1999-2002) The referendum was held on 30 August 1999 and it returned a landslide victory for independence by 78.5% of the voters. However, with the announcement of results, denounced by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the Brit- ish ambassador to the UN who toured the country a few days later, «hell descend[ed] on earth».17 The Indonesians reacted to the announcement by running amok and devastating Timor Leste. Indonesian-backed militia burned to the ground most of the material infrastructures and closed down the public administration which was under its control, while the Timorese resistance showed unusual self-restraint. They refused to retaliate, and remained in their assigned cantonments away from Dili, the scene of the most brutal violence. The Indonesian migrants returned to their country of origin leaving the public administration completely abandoned (some of those Timorese who occupied positions in that administration had also fled). The exodus of fearful people may have seen as many as 250,000 leave their homes. The number of casualties from what was to go down in Timorese history as «Black September» was in excess of 2,000 in just two weeks.18 The state apparatus was utterly destroyed, and many observers referred to the situation as «tabula rasa», «terra nullius», «ground zero» or «empty shell».19

16. Clinton Fernandes, Reluctant Saviour, Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2004. 17. Quoted in Peter Carey, ‘The Security Council and the Question of East Timor’, in Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Walsh & Dominic Zaum (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War, Oxford: OUP, 2008, pp. 346-367. 18. Rui Graça Feijó, Dynamics of Democracy in Timor-Leste. The birth of a democratic nation, 1999-2012, Amsterdam: AUP, 2016. 19. Simon Chesterman, ‘East Timor in Transition: From conflict prevention to state building’, New York: International Peace Academy, 2001; Astri Suhrke. ‘Peace- keepers as National Builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor’, International Peace- keeping, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2001, pp 1-20; Joseph Nevins, ‘(Mis)representing East Timor’s Past: Structural-symbolic violence, international laws and the institutionalization of justice’, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2002, pp. 523-540; Nicolas Lemay-

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Even though these observations seem to disregard the fact that the political legitimacy of the new-born nation did not die, truth is that the machinery of a modern state had been so extensively damaged that it needed to be constructed from scratch. In October 1999 the United Nations took over the administration and felt compelled to assist the East Timorese lay the grounds for independence. A mission was established vested with the most extensive powers ever attributed to any similar venture. In the so-called «UN Kingdom of East Timor» the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), the Brazilian- born diplomat Sérgio Vieira de Mello, conferred on himself vast legislative, judicial and executive powers.20 The chosen method of intervention was seen as «benevolent», but also «autocratic», «despotic» or even «dictatorial»; Vieira de Mello was likened to a «pre-constitutional monarch in a sovereign state», and the whole operation was equated to a form of «benign colonialism».21 The role of the Timorese, namely the CNRT who had obtained a resounding victory in the referendum, was as consultants to the process. In fact, the Timor file, customarily attached to the UN Department of Political Affairs, which was knowledgeable on the intricacies of the players on the ground, became part of the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), known to have a template to apply in all circumstances. This template was based on a false premise in the case of Timor-Leste: there were no two war- ring factions, the pro-integration one having as good as disappeared from the scene. This conferred a strong legitimacy on CNRT, which, as noted above, had swept a democratic ballot, winning an overwhelming majority in the independence referendum. This was a situation which seldom exists in the contexts where the DPO and its military longa manus, the UN Depart- ment of Peace Keeping Operations, operate. Unfortunately Timor Leste’s different situation was not acknowledged by the UN. Being mere «consultants» in a National Consultative Council was frustrating for most East Timorese leaders. The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Vieira de Mello, pleaded on their behalf and eventually they were elevated to National Council. Still it remained under

Hébert, ‘The «Empty-Shell» Approach: The setup process of international administration in Timor-Leste and Kosovo: Its consequences and lessons’, International Stud- ies Perspective, No. 12, 2011, pp. 190-211. 20. Jarat Chopra. ‘The UN Kingdom of East Timor’, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2000, pp. 27-39. 21. Joel C. Beauvais, ‘Benevolent Despotism: A critique of UN state-building in East Timor’, International Law and Politics, Vol. 33, 2001, pp. 1101-1178; Simon Ches- terman, ‘Building Democracy through Benevolent Autocracy’, in Edward Newman & Roland Rich (eds.), The UN Role in Promoting Democracy, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004, pp. 86-112; Samantha Powell, Chasing the Flame: Sérgio Vieira de Mello and the fight to save the world, London: Allen Lane, 2008; Chopra, ‘The UN Kingdom of East Timor’; Damien Kingsbury, East Timor: The price of liberty, Basing- stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

251 Rui Feijó the executive prerogative of the SRSG. In this context – and somewhat favoured by both the UN Security Council’s refusal to commit itself for periods longer than six months at a time, and its anxiety to see a positive conclusion of an expensive mission – the East Timorese pressed for a short transitional period, claiming their right to independence without delay. The critical issue was the drafting of a constitution to the new country that would encompass the fundamental principles of political orientation. This was achieved by means of an elected Constituent Assembly (30 Au- gust 2001) entrusted with the task of approving a document within three months, later extended to six. But this democratic exercise represented a breach in the functioning of CNRT and what one could consider «consensus democracy». Rather, it required the formalization of political parties in a very short period of time, and the staging of free elections early in the process. Many voices – including Xanana Gusmão, the charismatic leader, José Ramos-Horta and the bishops of Timor-Leste – expressed serious reservations about the perils of introducing competitive mechanisms in lieu of sustaining some form of consensual democracy that had proved successful in the last years of the occupation. One may recall the idea put forward by Fareed Zakaria that «paper power» (i.e. a constitution) should be placed before «people power» (i.e., elections), saying: It’s crucial that before the first elections, before politicians gain enormous legitimacy through the polls, a system is put in place that limits governmental power and protects individual liberty and the rights of minorities. […] The focus should be more on constitutions, and less on elections.22 Timor-Leste did not follow this route. The formalization of political parties and the staging of competitive elections preceded the drafting of the constitution. The consequences were felt soon after the restoration of independence under the guise of political instability. Equipped with a constitution adopted by majority, and having organized presidential elections according to the constitutional prescriptions (14 April 2002) in which Xanana Gusmão easily beat Francisco Xavier do Am- aral (who had been nominated president on 28 November 1975) by a margin of 83.7% to 17.3%, Timor-Leste ventured to proclaim the restoration of independence on 20 May 2002. The ceremony was witnessed by UN Sec- retary-General Kofi Annan, the presidents of Portugal, Jorge Sampaio, and Indonesia, Megawati Soekarnoputri, and former US President Bill Clinton. This time, Timorese independence was rapidly accepted by most nations, and the country soon became the 202nd member of the Organization of the United Nations (which maintained a new support mission in the territory without a fixed term).

22. Fareed Zakaria, ‘Write a Constitution’, Time, 25 March 2013, p. 33.

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3. The first new nation of the 21st century (2002-2016)

3.1. State building and democracy Timor-Leste as an independent nation was confronted by a double challenge: building a modern state apparatus and simultaneously adopt- ing a democratic regime.23 Underlying this double task was the enormous process of nation-building, affecting the social fabric of Timor-Leste, and contributing to the more narrowly defined institutional level that will be the focus of the remainder of this essay.24 The first challenge derived from the extensive destruction brought about in the «Black September» of 1999, which the transition administration of the United Nations had but started to remedy. The second derived from the character of East Timorese nationalism as an organized movement, encompassing quite different political positions. Fortunately, the international environment was propitious to the building of a new democracy and impressed by the East Timorese leadership’s democratic credentials. These had already been highlighted by José Ramos-Horta, who, when accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo on 10 December 1996, had unambiguously stated We will endeavour to build a strong democratic state based on the rule of law which must emanate from the will of the people expressed through free and democratic elections.25 This double task was a very difficult one. For one, as Sonja Grimm and Julia Leininger aptly remarked, not all good things always go well together, given that each process has its own requirements, and there is a risk of existing conflictual priorities and predicaments.26 Also, the political science literature tends to assume that the existence of a functioning state administration is a prerequisite for the establishment of democratic rule, and thus state-building ought to take precedence over democracy-building. This has been expressed in a synthetic formula by Juan J. Linz when he uttered: «No state, no rechtsstaat, no democracy».27 Finally, even if one does

23. Oisin Tansey, Regime Building: Democratization and international administration, Oxford: OUP, 2009. 24. For a comprehensive view of the nation-building process and its implications, see Michael Leach, Nation-building and national identity in Timor-Leste, London: Routledge, 2017. 25. José Ramos-Horta, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, 10 December 1996 (http:// ramoshorta.com/president-jose-ramoshorta/nobel-peace-prize). 26. Sonja Grimm & Julia Leininger, ‘Do All Good Things Go Together? Con- flicting objectives in democracy promotion’, Democratization, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2012, pp. 391-414. 27. Juan J. Linz. ‘Democracy Today: An agenda for students of democracy’, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1997, pp. 115-134.

253 Rui Feijó not adhere to the formal view positing that there has to be a set of prereq- uisites for the establishment of a democratic polity, the power of initiative and human agency being factors militating against such determinism, one must nevertheless consider that Timor-Leste was facing formidable odds to secure success in the face of enormous challenges. Eighteen years after this endeavour began, Timor-Leste’s success in building a democratic state is clear, in spite of the many difficulties it had to overcome and the fact that, still at the time when these lines are written, its democracy is neither consolidated nor devoid of fragilities. In fact, most synthetic indices used in political literature (Polity IV, the Economist’s Intel- ligence Unit Democracy Index or Freedom House’s Freedom in the World) assess Timor-Leste to be a democratic polity. More sophisticated methods, inspired by Dahl’s methodology perfected by Schmitter and Karl, suggest that Timor-Leste is indeed a democratic polity, post-independence.28 That said, it is necessary to acknowledge that the process of state-building remains fragile.

3.2. The affirmation of a democratic polity Testimony to the relative stability of Timorese political life is the fact that its constitution, approved by a Constituent Assembly elected on 30 August 2001 – two years after the referendum – was ready on the day that independence was officially restored, 20 May 2002. It has been in force ever since. This is a remarkable feat in a region characterized by constitutional instability. The preparation of the Constituent Assembly required that political parties be formally constituted in order to run. This move was widely criticized at the time given that most movements which emerged under the Indonesian occupation had little time to prepare and formalize their existence, while it offered a comparative advantage to the historical FRE- TILIN, with its well organized structures throughout the country. The early emergence of party politics was also regarded as running against the chosen method of consensual decision-making adopted by the Resistance umbrella organization, CNRT, and reminiscent of the hasty creation of competing political organizations back in 1974-1975. One of the consequences of the UN mission’s decision to organize competitive elections at the onset of the democratic period was that key figures such as Xanana Gusmão or José Ramos-Horta declined to join or form any party at the time, and were thus excluded from the Constituent Assembly. This made it more difficult for its results to be widely accepted by all stakeholders.

28. E.g. Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, ‘What Democracy Is… and Is Not’, Journal of Democracy, 2, 3, January 1991, pp. 75-88. For an application of this methodology to Timor Leste, see Rui Graça Feijó, Democracia: linhagens e configurações de um conceito impuro, Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 2017.

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However, the resulting constitution has proved resilient and capable of framing political disputes. One of the reasons for the success of the East Timorese political system is its inclusive mechanisms for participation. It has also remained fairly open to actors who do not stand on partisan platforms, thus allowing «independent» personalities of high public profile to play important political roles. To be precise: Timor-Leste is the only country in Southeast Asia to have adopted a semi-presidential system, i.e., one that is defined by the con- jugation of a president of the Republic who is elected by universal and direct suffrage with a government headed by a prime minister who must enjoy the support, or at least the acquiescence, of a parliament which is itself elected by direct popular vote.29 This duality of powers is both a strength and a weakness of the system. It may be a weakness if it leads to a confrontation between the president and the prime minister, namely two political figures who are endowed of competing legitimacies and may be expression of different political majorities (we shall see, further on, that this is currently the case in Timor-Leste)30. But it may also be a strength if the president, thanks to its popular mandate, is able to act «above the party fray», conducting inclusive policies that go beyond the majority/minority divide that marks parliamentary life.31 This was indeed the case with the first three presidents – Xanana Gusmão (2002-2007), José Ramos-Horta (2007-2012) and José Maria Vas- concelos, generally known as Taur Matan Ruak, literally «Two Sharp Eyes» (2012-2017). The fact that two of them, rather than trying to be elected president a second time decided to form political parties to enter the parliamentary game, does not invalidate that they acted mostly as impartial political arbiters while in office, without systematically taking position either in favour or against the government of the day. Their overall attitude contributed to lowering the political heat that is normal in parliaments, and to offer minorities a voice (as in the case of their appointment to positions in the consultative Council of State). Some local actors disagree with this view. FRETILIN, for instance, is critical of Xanana Gusmão’s handling of the situation. However, while Mari Alkatiri was prime minister, the president only vetoed two legislative initiatives, both on the advice of the Constitutional Court because they infringed basic principles inscribed in the Constitution regarding guarantees of public liberties. Procedural neutrality must not be confused with accepting all the government’s wishes,

29. Robert Elgie, Semipresidentialism: Sub-types and democratic performance, Bas- ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 30. See Gianfranco Pasquino, ‘The Advantages and Disadvantages of Semi- presidentialism: a West European perspective’, in Robert Elgie & Sophia Moestrup (eds.), Semi-presidentialism outsider Europe, London: Palgrave 2007, pp 14-29. 31. This idea is further developed in my ‘Semi-presidentialism, moderating power and inclusive governance’, Democratization, Vol. 21, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 268-288.

255 Rui Feijó and the use of presidential competences should be always regarded as part of a complex system of checks and balances that characterize democratic polities. The early years after independence were, in this regard, critical, as FRETILIN possessed absolute majority in the National Parliament, and used it in ways that were regarded as prone to facilitate the emergence of authoritarian temptations. The first term of parliament was marked by the fact that the Constit- uent Assembly had become the legislative chamber without fresh elections, which, many argued, would be timely and might have returned a different composition. FRETILIN inherited thus an overall majority; this did not grant it the strength to pass the constitution without having to bargain with smaller parties, but, in the case of the legislative chamber that works on the principle of simple majority, put it in a position of strength. So Mari Alkatiri formed a single-party government, with the presence of two symbolic «independent» ministers. It was the first such experience after years of compromise with the other political forces which had been part of the CNRT, namely umbrella organization of the Resistance. Many expressed the idea that FRETILIN was intent on creating the conditions for «50 years of government» (as the historical party of the Resistance), and accused it of aggressive behaviour towards the opposition. FRETILIN’s «authoritarian temptation» was singled out as its main problem by many analysts.32 And it did have consequences. In 2006 a major crisis erupted between the Alkatiri government and President Xanana Gusmão regarding the armed forces. The president as commander-in-chief of the armed forces disagreed with the government’s policy towards dissatisfied military who had protested, and who were dismissed from the army by the chief of general staff, Major-General Taur Matan Ruak, with the backing of the prime minister. One third of the army was expelled from the ranks. The situation worsened to the point that the expelled military clashed with National Police, which caused several casualties and the collapse of the police forces. The violent clashes turned over 100,000 people into «internally displaced people». Eventually, the president threatened to resign, prompting the fall of the prime minister. Inter- national aid was requested to restore peace and order. A compromise was reached by which President Xanana Gusmão refused to dissolve parliament

32. E.g. Sven-Gunnar Simonsen, ‘The Authoritarian Temptation in East Timor: Nation building and the need for inclusive governance’, Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2006, pp. 575-596; Jacqueline Siapno, ‘Timor-Leste: On the path to authoritarianism?’, Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 1, 2006, pp. 325-342; Damien Kingsbury & Michael Leach (eds.), East Timor: Beyond Independence, Melbourne: Monash University Press, 2007; Pedro Bacelar de Vasconcelos & Ricardo Sousa da Cunha, ‘Semipresidencialis- mo em Timor: Um equilíbrio institucional dinâmico num contexto crítico’, in Marina Costa Lobo & Octavio Amorim Neto (eds.), O Semipresidencialismo nos Países de Língua Portuguesa, Lisboa: ICS, 2009, pp. 231-260.

256 Timor-Leste 2019 and remove the FRETILIN majority, but agreed to appoint another prime minister to carry on until the general elections scheduled for the following year. José Ramos-Horta took the reins of government for that one-year period, and most ministers retained their portfolios. In 2007, the first elections in Timor-Leste since the proclamation of independence returned Ramos-Horta as president. A few months later, the legislative election returned FRETILIN as the party with the highest number of seats but without the absolute majority or the allies to form one. Ramos- Horta took the bold decision to ask Xanana Gusmão, by then the leader of the party with the second highest number of seats, the Congresso Nacional para a Reconstrução Timorense – National Congress for Timorese Reconstruc- tion (CNRT)33 to form a government. FRETILIN raucously repudiated this decision. In the end, it had to accept it, as Xanana Gusmão managed to build a majority coalition which included his own CNRT plus the ASDT-PSD (namely the Coalition between the Timorese Social-Democratic Association of Timor and the Social Democratic Party) and the Democratic Party. Echoes of the military disquiet persisted into the following year, when Alfredo Reinado, the leader of the «petitioners» (the name under which the military discontent were known) ambushed and shot President Ramos- Horta. Ramos-Horta was flown to Darwin for urgent surgery, the speaker of the House acting as interim president. The same day, other «petitioners» ambushed Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, but he escaped unharmed. Re- inado was killed in the attack against Ramos-Horta, together with one of his men, while several other «petitioners» were later arrested. Two months later, President Ramos-Horta returned to the presidency. In 2012, a new president was elected, Taur Matan Ruak, who had previously served as chief of general staff of the armed forces. In the following legislative elections, the governing coalition obtained the majority of seats, and the CNRT, Xanana Gusmão’s party, became the largest in the House. However, soon after being returned to the premiership, Xanana Gusmão announced he would step down before the next elections, while his government entered negotiations with FRETILIN to have the 2013 budget approved unanimously. This was the first step in establishing a new relation with FRETILIN, which was followed by two other initiatives. One was the appointment in 2015 of FRETILIN’s leader, Mari Alkatiri, as President of the Authority for Special Administrative Region of Oecusse (RAEOA)

33. Although Xanana Gusmão’s party, formed in 2007, retrieved the acronym CNRT, it was an altogether different organization from the umbrella organization of the Timorese Resistance. The original CNRT was formally dissolved on 7 June 2001 after a three-day extraordinary conference in Dili. The idea behind the decision was «give the power to the people», namely leave the political field free for the creation of ideologically homogeneous new parties, which could democratically compete for power. See ‘East Timor: UN lauds move to dissolve CNRT resistance organization’, ReliefWeb, 11 June 2001.

257 Rui Feijó and Special Zones for Social Market Economy of Timor-Leste (ZEESM TL), which put him in charge of one of the major economic projects of the government (on this, see below). It was a position of high visibility that had the additional advantage to keep Alkatiri away from Dili. Second, Xanana Gusmão eventually stepped down to offer the premiership to a new figure. Instead of choosing among his party members, he selected Rui Maria de Araujo, who had served as «independent» minister in Alkatiri and Ramos- Horta’s cabinets but had joined FRETILIN and become a member of its central committee. This was prompted by two considerations: Rui Maria de Araujo was not a party leader, so he was expected to serve in a position that allowed him to negotiate with all parties on an equal footing. He was a member of the «Gerasaun Foun» (lit., the new generation, i.e., those who had come of age under the Indonesian occupation), and as such was distant from the historical controversies and personal feuds that still marred the «Generation of 75». Agio Pereira, Xanana Gusmão’s right-hand man, greet- ed this move as the transition from «belligerent to consensual democracy», as the new government could count on the de facto, even if not formal, support of all parties in parliament.34 A new chapter was being written.

3.3. The impetus for development Timor-Leste achieved independence with a very fragile economic structure, highly dependent on foreign aid. The first few state budgets reflected this weakness. They pointed to public spending below US$ 500 million per annum for a population of a little over one million. This changed in 2006 with the first instalments from the exploitation of mineral resources in the Timor Sea, allowing for rapid growth of the state budget. By 2012 this was in excess of US$ 1.5 billion and has since hovered around this figure. Trebling the amount of money to be injected into the economy helped the government to devise some important social policies with significant impact on the quality of life of the population. This is evidenced in a brief survey of the United Nations Human Development Index. Figures for 2002 place Timor-Leste as the 158th country in the world, among those with low development indices, and a Human Development In- dex (HDI) of 0.436. In 2016 the country had advanced to the group of «middle development» with an HDI of 0.625, and now placed 132nd in the world.35 This is, by any measure, a significant improvement in a relatively short period. That it was the result of socially-oriented policies was undisputed.

34. Rui Graça Feijó, ‘A Long and Winding Road: A Brief History of the Idea of a ‘Government of National Unity’ in Timor-Leste and Its Current Implica- tions’, Canberra: Australian National University SSGM Discussion papers 2016/3. Draft #2. 35. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports (http://hdr.undp.org).

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On the one hand, some measures had a major impact in reducing poverty, such as the «Bolsa da Mãe» (mothers grant), inspired by the Brazil- ian experience under Lula da Silva. This falls into the category of conditional cash transfers as it makes the transfer of funds contingent on the mothers taking specific actions, namely placing their children in school. More than 55,000 families were assisted in this way (as of 2014). This programme had, in that year, a budgeted expense of US$ 9 million. Another important public policy programme was the one initiated under the first Xanana Gusmão government designed to provide electric power to the population of Timor- Leste. It now covers the entire country. Even if these can be singled out as major positive policies, the overall budget for health and education remained fairly poor. In the budget for 2017, these two departments taken together received only 15% of expected public spending. Conversely, the programme to assist the «veterans of the liberation struggle» (which is a powerful tool to maintain peace among an important segment of the population, but whose effects on social development are far inferior to other alternative strategies), captures over half of that amount and yet touches only a fraction of the population. The strategic choices of the mid-term development programme, running up to 2030, aim to turn Timor-Leste into a «high middle-level development country» by the end of this period. They prioritize the development of heavy physical infrastructures, in particular by implementing two main projects. The first is the Tasi Mane (lit. the Sea Man) Project, designed to prepare the southern coast to host an industrial cluster of oil and gas infrastructures. The second is the «Social Market Economy» project in the exclave of Oecusse and the island of Ataúro, turned into a Special Administrative Area, and which is supposed to attract private investments and become a service provider for larger areas in Southeast Asia, for health and higher education. So far, however, private capital has been sceptical about the feasibility of the mid-term programme, and most works (airport, roads, new urban development, hotels) rely heavily on public financing. In fact the fundamental goals of the programme have been questioned with regard to their feasibility, modus operandi, and the political options they embody. Firmer support of social policies intended to alleviate and improve the quality of life of the present generation has been suggested as an alternative.36

36. On the projects of Oecusse, see the work of Laura S. Meitzner Yoder, namely her chapter ‘Reconceptualizing land and territory in Oecusse Ambeno’s enclave Special Economic Zone’, in Susana de Matos Viegas & Rui Graça Feijó, (eds.), Trans- formations in Independent Timor-Leste, London: Routledge, 2017, pp. 142-155. On the Tasi Mane projects, see the work of Judith Bovensiepen, namely her edited volume The Promise of Prosperity, Canberra: ANU Press, 2018.

259 Rui Feijó

4. Timor-Leste 2017-2019: one step backwards?

4.1. The return of «belligerent democracy» The beginning of 2017 promised to consolidate the transformations that had already occurred. President Taur Matan Ruak, who had been a supporter of the convergence between Xanana Gusmão and Mari Alkatiri, and had later distanced himself from the strategies of the government led by Rui Maria de Araujo, declined to seek a second term, preferring to create a new party. His new party, Partido Libertação Popular (People’s Liberation Par- ty – PLP) was the only one to openly challenge the fundamental options of public policy pursued by the government, namely the strategic decision to embark on mega-projects in Oecusse/Ataúro and on the south coast, with a consequential downgrading of investment in human capital. In the circumstances, Xanana Gusmão took the unprecedented step of supporting the candidacy of Francisco Guterres aka Lu-Olo, the chairman of FRETILIN, who presented himself for the third time in the presidential elections, and easily won on the first ballot. For the first time, Timor-Leste had a president who was a prominent member of an active political party – and this would be consequential. However, in spite of the changing circumstances, Xanana Gusmão was once again on the winning side of this election. In the run up to the legislative elections of July, the parties in government did not indicate whether they would propose changes to the current accommodation. The impression was that, under President Lu-Olo, the government formula of a broad coalition was to be maintained. Taur Matan Ruak’s PLP was the main voice advocating a change of that formula. The elections returned a sound victory for the parties in government, with a significant detail: FRETILIN maintained its position of largest party, having polled a little over a thousand more votes than Xanana Gusmão’s CNRT and obtained one more seat than his rival. This detail would prove critical. In the face of these results, Mari Alkatiri as leader of FRETILIN claimed the right to become prime minister again. This challenged the two assumptions under which the Government of National Union had been established in 2015, as Alkatiri was both a party leader and a relevant member of the «Generation of 75». Xanana Gusmão reacted by declaring he would rather sit in opposition, leading to presidential attempts to dissuade him, and to agree to a wide spectrum coalition. These efforts failed. President Lu-Olo decided to accept Alkatiri’s claim and appointed him prime minister before he secured a majority in the House. Negotiations took place that eventually led to FRETILIN joining hands with the Partido Democratico (Democratic Party – PD) and the newcomer Kmanek Haburas Unidade Nasion- al Timor Oan (Enrich the National Unity of the Sons of Timor – KHUNTO) to elect the speaker of parliament. Thus FRETILIN, with less than 30% of the popular vote, succeeded in controlling the elections of the three leading figures in the state hierarchy.

260 Timor-Leste 2019

In several quarters of East Timorese society, this concentration of powers evoked memories of the first experiment of FRETILIN in power, which had left visible scars, renewing fears of an emerging authoritarian «temptation». Reacting to this situation, Xanana Gusmão and Taur Matan Ruak were able to convince KHUNTO to join them in opposition, creating a new majority in parliament, alternative to Alkatiri. In the East Timorese system, having the confidence of the president is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a government to be installed, as it also requires parliamentary investiture. This can be achieved by winning a vote of confidence in the government’s programme, by defeating a rejection motion tabled by the opposition, or by mere parliamentary lack of initiative after the program is presented. In the case under examination, the opposition tabled a rejection motion that obtained the majority in parliament. Mari Alkatiri was faced with either the possibility to reconquer the majority in parliament, by presenting a second version of his programme within a month, or resigning. He did neither and was kept on as a caretaker prime minister. The opposition claimed the right to be offered a chance of forming a majority government without FRETILIN, but the president did not accept this challenge. A stalemate was created, and it was by then quite obvious that «belligerent democracy» had once again come to dominate the political scene. The president was constitutionally forbidden to dissolve parliament in the first six months after its election, which would happen only in January 2018. The government in a caretaker condition could not submit fundamental legislation, such as a state budget for 2018. The opposition submitted a new censure motion on the government, trying to bring it down; the speaker of the House, however, did not agree to put it to a vote and used delaying tactics. All indications were that the president would maintain the situation as it was for several months until such time as fresh elections could be called, and eventually the benefit of incumbency might advantage his own party. That situation lasted until January, when Lu-Olo dissolved parliament and called for fresh elections to be held in May 2018. The first ever early elections in Timor-Leste returned the three-party opposition coalition as the winners of the ballot (34 seats), securing an absolute majority. FRETILIN held on to its 23 seats, but PD, its ally in government, lost two. President Lu-Olo could not avoid appointing a political figure from the winning group to form the new government: Taur Matan Ruak was chosen by the three parties to hold the position, Xanana Gusmão (leader of the largest party in the coalition) preferring to stay as minister of state and councillor to the prime minister, holding also a portfolio related to strategic development. Following his appointment, in June 2018 the Prime Minister proposed a list of 42 members of government, including militants of PLP, CNRT and KHUNTO. The President, however, had the final word, and rejected 12 of those names – almost all CNRT members. Lu-Olo justified his move on the

261 Rui Feijó grounds that, with the exception of one member facing bureaucratic difficulties that were soon overcome, the remaining people lacked the necessary «moral standing» to be in power; some were suspected of being involved in corruption schemes. Even though the coalition protested that there were no pending cases in court or under judicial investigation, the president stood by his decision. In taking this stand, Lu-Olo had on his side the precedents set earlier both by Ramos-Horta and Taur Matan Ruak – now the appointed prime minister – who, as presidents, had rejected the names of some of the proposed members of the governments which they had sworn in. But he was taking this stance a step further, as it denied the largest party in the coalition its presence in the cabinet Xanana Gusmão reacted angrily and although he was not among the 12 rejected names, declined to serve in government. Some other CNRT appointees refused to be sworn in. Taur Matan Ruak agreed to substitute two the government members he had originally proposed with others, who were subsequently sworn in. Eighteen months into its term in office, the government had yet to appoint several key members, such as the ministers of finance, health or natural resources. Some hitherto rejected ministers are known to have been appointed as advisors to junior ministers. In this way they play an active role in the formulation of government policies in an unofficial capacity. However, as they do not sit in the cabinet, the CNRT, the largest party in the coalition, has a very small representation. In retaliation for the president’s refusal to accept those ministers, the parliamentary majority has systematically denied Lu-Olo official permission to travel abroad, arguing that the country is unstable and requires his constant presence. The President, for his part, delayed approval of the special budget for 2018 and also for 2019, which he first vetoed (January 2019), and then promulgated after it was modified in the House. Also, in 2018, he vetoed a set of amendments to the oil operations law focused on financing the purchase of two holdings in the Greater Sunrise field consortium. Those amendments aimed at favouring the state’s exploitation of the Timor Sea wealth, and, in vetoing them, Lu-Olo openly contradicting one of the key principles of the government’s new economic policy.37 Parliament voted a second time on this bill, forcing the President to enact it against his will. Lu- Olo also withheld the appointment of a significant number of ambassadors proposed by the government. The tug-of-war is set to continue. In any semi-presidential regimes the risk of conflict between a president and a prime minister representing different political forces is high, as shown by the well-known experience of France and many other countries having adopted this system. Each one of those political figures sits on a direct electoral legitimacy that sustains their claims to a fair share of

37. ‘President of Timor-Leste vetoes changes to the oil operation laws’, Ma- cauhub, 12 December 2018.

262 Timor-Leste 2019 power. In Timor-Leste, the conflict between President Lo-Olo and Prime Minister Taur Matan Ruak merely confirms this rule. However, it is worth stressing that the danger of institutional conflict between the president and the prime minister had been avoided before the Lu-Olo’s election in 2017, when the supreme office of the state had been held by personalities who had shown themselves able to act super partes.

4.2. Economic decline The East Timorese economy is dominated by two major factors: the income accruing to the government from the exploitation of natural resources in the Timor Sea, and public spending. According to Charlie Scheiner, of the NGO La’o Hamutuk, well over three-quarters of the country’s GDP derives from oil and gas, placing the country among the world’s leading nations in oil-dependency – after South Sudan, Libya and, maybe, Equatorial Guinea.38 For this reason, the continuation of oil and gas exploitation is of paramount importance to the country’s economy. Oil extraction peaked a few years ago and has since been in slow decline – although the impact of this decrease appears to have been mitigated by the rise in world market prices. The largest field under exploitation – Bayu-Undan – is expected to be exhausted by 2022. This situation calls for decisive action. The Petroleum Fund reached US$ 17.69 billion at the end of 2019. The government’s with- drawals to finance the state budget have been in excess of the estimated sustained revenue, so the growth of the fund is slower than that anticipated at the time of its inception.39 Apart from the revenues from mineral resources, the economy is also highly dependent on public spending. The political instability referred to above had a very detrimental effect on economic activity, as the positive economic atmosphere that marked the preceding years gave way to a period of slowdown and even contraction of production. Figures for economic performance in 2017 and 2018 are disputed. As for 2017, the Asia Development Bank estimated that GDP decreased by 5.3%; the International Monetary Fund calculated a fall by 4.6%; and the World Bank pointed to negative growth in the order of 1.8%. The government, in its presentation of the 2018 budget recognized that in 2017 the non-oil sector had fallen by 5.3%. In general, all agree that the contraction of the Timorese economy was driven by a reversal trend in governmental

38. Charles Scheiner, ‘Consequences of Timor-Leste’s Dependency on Oil and Gas’, Paper presented at the workshop Timor-Leste: Development Issues and Inter- national Relations, Flinders University, Adelaide, 19-20 April 2016 (www.laohamutuk. org/econ/briefing). 39. ‘Fundo Petrolífero timorense valia 15,96 mil ME no final de dezembro’, Porto Canal com Lusa, 3 February 2020.

263 Rui Feijó spending. However, the Central Bank of Timor-Leste disputes those figures and estimates that the country witnessed a positive growth of circa 3% (although it is not clear if the oil sector is included in the overall figure).40 As for 2018, in spite of early projections of a moderate growth, the continued political instability meant the contraction of the East Timorese economy was telling. The World Bank estimated it to be -8.0.41 This figure converges with other evidence which points to a high number of enterprises declaring the suspension of activity for fiscal purposes (about one thousand of them), or a sharp fall in the number of containers that passed through the port of Dili. Late in 2019, the World Bank suggested that this contraction of the East Timorese economy in 2017-2018 had provoked a loss of US$ 350 million in potential output. The year 2019 seems to have been fairer. Estimates by the World Bank suggest a return to positive growth, albeit on a modest scale (about 2% for the GDP per capita). Recovery in public spending (even though this may have been less significant than the budget allowed) is regarded as the key factor. This analysis places great significance on the political situation, because, as already noted, continued instability will prevent a more robust economic performance. In any case, it is evident that the political instability that engulfed the country in the wake of the electoral cycle of 2017 has had serious impact on the country’s economic performance. This has substantially declined, as shown by negative growth figures – something that had never happened after independence. It has put in relief the fact that Timor-Leste’s economic structure is still fragile and susceptible to fluctuate according to political events.

4.3. The diplomatic agreement with Australia over maritime borders On 6 March 2018 at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York, and in the presence of UN Secretary General António Guterres (who had been the prime minister of Portugal at the time of the 5 May 1999 agreements which paved the way for the referendum and the independence of then Portuguese Timor), representatives of Timor-Leste and Australia signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the maritime borders in the Timor Sea. This protocol brought the East Timorese authorities’ long quest, aimed at overcoming the agreement signed in 2006, to an end. The 2006 agreement stipulated a moratorium of 50 years before the final set-

40. Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2018 Update; Inter- national Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (2018); World Bank, ‘March 2018 Timor-Leste Economic Report: Lower Public Spending Leads to Slower Growth’; ‘Banco Central projeta crescimento negativo de 3% da economia timorense em 2018’, Global Media Group, 16 October 2018. 41. The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2018.

264 Timor-Leste 2019 tling of the Timor-Australia border in the Timor Sea, and offered a 50% share of the natural resources in the disputed area to each country. Xanana Gusmão had set in motion the attempt to arrive at a more equitable final solution of the Timor Sea dispute under the aegis of the United Nations and on the basis of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In pursuing this objective, Timor-Leste benefited from an international situation characterized by the growing importance of similar issues, in particular the South China Sea dispute. Given the analogy between on the one hand the international and China stands concerning the South China Sea, and the Timor-Leste and Australian stand concerning the Timor Sea, there was widespread international goodwill for Timor-Leste’s position. This factor limited Australia’s capacity to impose its will on the apparently much weaker neighbouring country. This Timor Sea question was the first compulsory conciliation process under a multilateral treaty, which accordingly received a great deal of international attention, as it would set the benchmark for future cases. The treaty was ratified by the exchange of diplomatic notes in Dili on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the self-determination Referendum, in the presence of the Australian Prime Minister and Timor-Leste’s high authorities. The newly ratified treaty was highly relevant for Timor-Leste, as it granted the island nation enhanced access to the wealth of the formerly disputed area. It is estimated that the Greater Sunrise field contains 5.13 trillion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas and 225.9 million barrels of oil. At current 2018 prices, this would generate a total wealth of more than US$ 65 billion and extend the life of the exploitation of resources in the Timor Sea for another 20 years or more.42 There are new ventures exploring the possibility of increasing untapped resources in the Timor-Leste side of the maritime border. The signing of the treaty did not signify the end of the process. Some pending questions remained. Above all, the share of revenues from the exploitation of this rich area was contingent on the decision of where to process the extracted resources. Timor-Leste has been battling for a pipeline bringing oil and gas to its southern shore (in which case, the split of the revenues would be 70/30 in favour of Timor-Leste), whereas Australia was keen on using the facilities already established in Darwin (so much so that Canberra, in exchange for the utilization of the Darwin facilities, was ready to accept a sharing of revenues equal to 80/20 in favour of Dili). In order to reinforce its bargaining position and maximize its benefits, Timor-Leste took the bold decision to buy a substantial part of the shares of the consortium in charge the exploitation of the Timor Sea gas and oil. First, Dili bought US$ 350 million worth shares from ConocoPhillips – significantly

42. Henning Gloystein & Sonali Paul, ‘How Australia-East Timor Treaty un- locks 65 billion gas field’, Reuters, 7 March 2018.

265 Rui Feijó the company which used to raise more questions regarding the East Timor- ese goal of processing the Timor Sea products on the country’s southern shore. Then Dili went on buying US$ 300 million worth shares from Shell. The end result of this acquisition strategy is that Timor-Leste, as the owner of 56.56% of the consortium shares, is now in a dominant position in the consortium, and at liberty to determine as it sees fit the way in which the Timor Sea natural resources are to be processed. Timor-Leste’s strategy aimed at developing an industrial cluster associated with oil and gas on national soil has been sustained by a narrative that see the successful completion of this strategy as the achievement of the last stage of self-determination, and the final building bloc in the construction of East Timorese independence. Curiously, the whole negotiation process has been conducted by Xa- nana Gusmão, who ceased to be a minister in July 2017, but who was confirmed in the role of key negotiator on Timor-Leste behalf by all major Timorese political stakeholders. This reveals the significant extent of the political power still commanded by this charismatic leader of the Resist- ance, regardless of the institutional framework within which he performs. It also reveals the high degree of informality which has presided over the functioning of the new state, since the realisation of national independence. A clear example of this informality is the weight that a small group of individuals locally referred to as the katuas (lit., the elders) still carries. This group comprises Xanana Gusmão, Mari Alkatiri, José Ramos-Horta, eventually the current president and Lere Anan Timur, the military commander – almost all of them were active in 1974-1975 when the process of self-determination was set in motion. Even though there is no constitutional role for such a group (many of whom sit in the Council of State), it is widely regarded as a group that commands high respect.

266 Malaysia 2019: The politics of fear and UMNO’s renewed relevance

Saleena Saleem

University of Liverpool [email protected]

The Barisan Nasional (BN) opposition coalition led by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) won four out of five by-election contests in 2019. The relatively short time frame between BN’s by-election wins and its historic electoral defeat in May 2018 convinced UMNO’s leadership that its party recovery strategy was fruitful. This strategy entailed the forging of a political cooperation around the theme of Malay unity with its long-time Islamist rival, the Parti Islam Se Malaysia, and the instrumentalisation of Malay fears over the loss of constitutional birth rights under the new Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition government. A number of ethno-religious controversies at the national level also contributed to a polarised social and political context that exacerbated inter-ethnic distrust and benefitted BN in the by-elections. Both Malays and ethnic minorities perceived the PH’s government’s disjointed responses to these controversies as ineffectual. Malaysians across the ethnic divide also experienced little improvement on their cost of living woes. The PH government’s attempts to boost the economy saw it re-establish large-scale projects with China. Yet the pragmatic realities of Malaysia’s economic interests constrained its new foreign policy approach of positioning itself as a leader in the Muslim world. This was evident in Malaysia’s muted response to China’s treatment of the Uyghurs at the inaugural Kuala Lumpur Summit on Muslim issues. This contrasted with the organised protests by Malay groups at the Chinese embassy in the nation’s capital as the year came to a close. These factors cumulatively contributed to an overall citizenry disillusionment with the PH government.

1. Introduction

The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) returned to the seat of power in March 2020 when it formed a new Malay-dominated alliance, Perikatan Nasional (National Alliance, PN), with break-away politicians from the multi-ethnic Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope, PH) coalition government and its long-time political rival, the Parti Islam Se Malaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia, PAS). UMNO’s return to government occurred less than two years after it suffered a historic general election defeat on 9 May 2018 after having governed Malaysia for 61 uninterrupted years.1

1. UMNO’s tenure as a dominant ruling party was previously interrupted by the National Operations Council (NOC), an emergency administrative body that was instituted after the May 13th racial rioting incident in 1969 and disbanded in

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Saleena Saleem

This article analyses the key developments in 2019 which had increasingly fuelled public disillusionment with the PH government, and which ultimately contributed to the stunning reversal in UMNO’s political for- tune in 2020. Section 2 examines UMNO’s political motivations in the cultivation of a cooperation with PAS on the basis of Malay unity. Section 3 looks at how the UMNO-PAS pact crafted and instrumentalised Malay fears about being marginalised under the PH government during the 2019 by- elections, which benefitted UMNO electorally. Section 4 shows how ethno- religious controversies and politicians’ responses contributed to a polarised socio-political context and exacerbated inter-ethnic distrust. Section 5 looks at the reasons for the persistence of economic insecurities. Section 6 examines the PH government’s unconvincing attempt to adopt a more central leadership role in the Muslim world as part of Malaysia’s new foreign policy approach and to regain Malay Muslim trust.

2. Malay unity in UMNO’s post-GE 14 political recovery strategy

The Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) multi-ethnic opposition coalition, led by UMNO, experienced a remarkable turnaround in its electoral viability, with four out of five by-election wins in 2019. This was a tremendous morale booster for UMNO. The UMNO by-election wins occurred in a context that was marked by a pronounced spike in ethnic politics. For much of 2019, ethno-religious issues were at forefront of domestic politics. This magnified both intra- Malay and inter-ethnic distrust in an already polarised political and social landscape. BN’s loss of reins to government to the PH coalition had exacerbated fears among some Malays that non-Malays would endanger their bumiputera (indigenous) birth rights enshrined in Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution. This perception gained ground as the year progressed, even though the PH coalition government was fronted by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed, who had a track record of protecting Malay rights as the UMNO head during his first tenure as prime minister (1981- 2003). Mahathir’s record made it easier for some Malays to switch support from BN to PH during the 14th General Election (GE-14). Furthermore, Mahathir who headed PH’s newest constituent party, Parti Pribumi Ber- satu Malaysia (Malaysian United Indigenous Party, Bersatu), professed to uphold Malay rights. The leadership from PH’s other constituent parties, the Malay-dominated parties, Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party, PKR) and Parti Amanah Negara (National Trust Party, Amanah), as well

1971. The NOC was headed by key UMNO Malay politicians. See Marvin L. Rog- ers, ‘Malaysia and Singapore: 1971 Developments’, Asian Survey, 12, 2, Feb. 1972, pp. 168-176.

268 Malaysia 2019 as the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP), also expressed a similar stance. Yet from previous election campaigns in 2008 and 2013, DAP and PKR, were known to advocate for equality for all Malaysians. Both parties had proposed dismantling the longstanding pro-Malay affirmative action policies that had become conflated with Malay birth rights in favour of needs-based assistance open to all races instead.2 In 2019, PKR and DAP held the largest and second-largest number of parliamentary seats respectively in the PH government. Conversely, UMNO had consistently branded itself as a defender of ketuanan Melayu (Malay dominance) and Malay special rights, which had structured the order of politics in Malaysia for decades. BN was organised as a coalition of ethnic parties, with UMNO as the dominant Malay party leading the minority ethnic parties: Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). Throughout 2019, UMMO chose to maintain its ketuanan Melayu positioning to differentiate itself from the PH government, as it leveraged on opportunities to magnify Malay fears. The key element in UMNO’s political recovery strategy in 2019 was the forging of a cooperation around the theme of Malay unity with its long- time political rival, PAS. This cooperation began in earnest in the aftermath of GE-14. With BN’s three consecutive by-election wins in January, March and April, the credibility of UMNO’s political cooperation with PAS was reinforced. By September 2019, UMNO and PAS formalised their political cooperation with the signing of a National Consensus Charter. With the formalised agreement, UMNO’s overtures to PAS to collaborate on Malay and Muslim causes, which had tentatively begun in 2016 appeared to come to full circle in 2019. The year came to a close with another significant by- election win for BN in November. The collaboration between UMNO and PAS in 2019 constituted a significant development in Malaysian politics. Notwithstanding short-lived alliances between the two ideologically different parties in the 1970s – UMNO, a Malay nationalist party, and PAS, an Islamist party – had historically competed for the same crucial Malay Muslim voter base, which comprised 61% of the total population in multicultural Malaysia. In recent times, faced with reputational deficit challenges over the highly publicised 1MDB financial scandal in 2015-16,3 UMNO helmed by then Prime Minister Najib Razak, made efforts to establish a tacit understanding with PAS.4 Najib went as far as to show support for a PAS parliamentary bill that would have paved the way for new provisions of hudud (Islamic criminal law) punishments in the

2. Kenneth Cheng, Eileen Ng & Faris Mokhtar, ‘Voters not swayed by racial politics in Malaysian GE, but how long will that last?’, Channel News Asia, 15 May 2018. 3. Stefano Caldirola, ‘Malaysia 2015: Najib Razak’s hardest year’, Asia Maior 2015, pp. 213 ff. 4. Eileen Ng & Elizabeth Zachariah, ‘The Big Read: After a year of living dan- gerously, Najib and Umno ride high’, Today, 30 July 2016.

269 Saleena Saleem

PAS-held state of Kelantan; prior to this, the UMNO-led government had consistently stymied all other attempts by PAS.5 Najib also shared the stage with PAS head Abdul Hadi Awang on Muslim solidarity events such as those for the Rohingya refugee crisis in late 2016.6 The warming of ties between UMNO and PAS in the lead up to the GE-14 did not result in tangible outcomes – the PAS hudud bill was eventually postponed and both parties never agreed on an electoral pact.7 Yet UMNO calculated that the overtures to PAS would reap other benefits. First, given that Malays increasingly identified themselves by religion rather than by ethnicity,8 the collaboration between UMNO and PAS on Muslim causes signalled to undecided Malay voters that both parties were willing to set aside political differences to work together and strengthen the Malay Mus- lim community. Hadi even encouraged Malay Muslims to vote for either UMNO or PAS because he claimed that in comparison to the other Malay parties in the opposition, both UMNO and PAS had shown to «accept Is- lam» by working in agreement on Muslim causes such as hudud implementation.9 Second, based on UMNO’s two massive by-election wins in 2016 and historical voting patterns, UMNO rationalised that a three-way split in the Malay Muslim vote (i.e. between UMNO, PAS and the opposition coalition) would benefit it electorally.10 Third, UMNO banked on possible swing votes by ethnic minorities, who were alarmed by PAS’ renewed right wing Islamic politics and the prospects of a fractured opposition coalition.11 As such, by facilitating PAS’ renewed focus on hudud as GE-14 approached, UMNO strategically magnified ideological differences between PAS and its former opposition coalition partners, which divided the opposition.12 As an opposition coalition partner, PAS drew in a significant proportion of the Malay vote in the rural heartlands during the 2008 and 2013 general elections, which contributed to the opposition’s electoral gains. The DAP, whose core supporters were mainly non-Malays, opposed PAS’

5. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, ‘The Hudud Controversy in Malaysia: Religious Probity or Political Expediency?’, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2015, pp. 205-219. 6. Sheridan Mahavera, ‘How one Islamist party could sway Malaysia’s election’, South China Morning Post, 18 February 2017. 7. Helen Ting, ‘UMNO’s hand in Malaysian Islamic law’, East Asia Forum, 6 June 2017. 8. Teo Cheng Wee, ‘More Malays say they are Muslim first: Malaysian poll’, The Straits Times, 12 August 2015; Norsharil Saat, ‘Johor Survey 2017: Attitudes Towards Islam, Governance and The Sultan’, ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute Perspective, No. 83, 10 November 2017. 9. ‘Hadi: Choose either PAS or Umno’, Malay Mail, 16 April 2017. 10. Rashaad Ali, ‘Malaysian By-Elections: Najib’s Winning Ways’, RSIS Com- mentary, 30 June 2016. 11. Saleena Saleem, ‘Malaysia’s Right Wing Push: Chinese Swing Benefitting BN?’, RSIS Commentary, 29 June 2016. 12. Helen Ting, ‘UMNO’s hand in Malaysian Islamic law’.

270 Malaysia 2019 renewed hudud agenda. This reinforced PAS’ stance to remain independent from the PH coalition in GE-14.13 BN’s stunning loss in GE-14 showed these calculations by UMNO to be a failed strategy. The multiple converging factors that led to UMNO’s loss included the electorate’s rejection of corrupt actions and abuses of power by Najib and other UMNO figures linked to the 1MDB financial scandal;14 the spread of news about Najib’s abuses and nepotism through the use of smart- phones15; former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed’s credible presence in the opposition coalition that appealed to Malay voters;16 youth concerns over economic vulnerabilities;17 ethnic minority voters’ abandonment of BN;18 and the changing Malay middle class expectations on socio-economic mobility that went beyond UMNO’s parochial racial and religious appeals.19 In particular, the latter analyses on changing voter expectations contributed to an internal dissent within UMNO over the need for party rebranding on the basis that its exclusively Malay nationalist outlook was no longer politically viable. Critical voices within UMNO such as the party’s former Youth Chief Khairy Jamaluddin argued that political survival neces- sitated a move away from identity politics of the past to one that was centred on inter-ethnic inclusivity.20 Khairy though could not muster enough support in his run for party president in June 2018, which indicated significant resistance to change within UMNO.21 UMNO’s claim to be able to meet ethnic minority needs through the political vehicle of BN’s ethnic minority parties was thoroughly demolished

13. Sheridan Mahavera, ‘How one Islamist party could sway Malaysia’s election’. 14. Muhamad M. N. Nadzri, ‘The 14th General Election, the Fall of Barisan Nasional, and Political Development in Malaysia, 1957-2018’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 37, 3, 2018, pp. 139-171. 15. Ross Tapsell, ‘The Smartphone as the «Weapon of the Weak»: Assessing the Role of Communication Technologies in Malaysia’s Regime Change’, Journal of Cur- rent Southeast Asian Affairs, 37, 3, 2018, pp. 9-29. 16. Walid Jumblatt Abdullah, ‘The Mahathir effect in Malaysia’s 2018 election: the role of credible personalities in regime transitions’, Democratization, 26, 3, 2019, pp. 521-536. 17. Bridget Welsh, ‘«Saviour» Politics and Malaysia’s 2018 Electoral Democratic Breakthrough: Rethinking Explanatory Narratives and Implications’, Journal of Cur- rent Southeast Asian Affairs, 37, 3, 2018, pp. 85-108. 18. James Chin, ‘From Ketuanan Melayu to Ketuanan Islam: UMNO and the Malaysian Chinese: Final Breakup: UMNO and the Chinese in GE14’, in Bridget Welsh (ed.), The End of UMNO? Essays on Malaysia’s Former Dominant Party New and Expanded Post GE-14 Edition, Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2018, pp. 255-304. 19. Dan Slater, ‘Malaysia’s Modernisation Tsunami’, East Asia Forum, 20 May 2018. 20. Tashny Sukumaran, ‘Malaysia’s reform-minded ‘young guns’, from Nurul Izzah to Khairy Jamaluddin, take aim at race-based politics’, South China Morning Post, 4 January 2019. 21. ‘Ahmad Zahid Hamidi elected UMNO party president’, Channel News Asia, 30 June 2018.

271 Saleena Saleem in GE-14. Having lost over 90% of the Chinese vote and 75% of the Indian vote to PH, the UMNO old guards, headed by its new party president Ah- mad Zahid Hamidi, turned its focus to the Malay electorate. The focus was unsurprising because PH was estimated to have garnered only around 23% of the Malay vote, with the bulk going to UMNO (45%) and PAS (32%).22 Instead of rebranding the party around a message of inter-ethnic inclusivity, UMNO leveraged its decades-long experience in capitalising ethno- religious issues to stoke inter-ethnic fears and de-legitimise its opponents for political gain – albeit with one significant difference. Where in previous decades UMNO lambasted PAS as a fundamentalist party with outdated ideas for a modern Muslim majority state like Malaysia,23 UMNO now concentrated on cultivating a cooperative relationship with PAS. This strategy was continued with UMNO’s Deputy President Moham- ad Hasan when Zahid was forced to take a leave from party duties over corruption charges on the 1MDB financial scandal. However, with each BN by-election win in 2019, scandal-ridden UMNO figures such Zahid and Najib took on increasingly more visible roles – Zahid returned to the party president post in June; Najib’s popularity during the by-election campaigns soared with the «malu apa, bossku» (what’s the shame, my boss) social media phenomenon that depicted him as an unyielding leader for marginalised Malays, even as he battled corruptions charges over 1MDB in court.24 The perceived successes of the UMNO-PAS emphasis on Malay unity undoubtedly first arose with the new PH coalition government’s reversal of its decision to ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Icerd) and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the close of 2018. UMNO and PAS had framed the PH government’s initial decision to ratify the international treaties as a threat to the Malay monarchy, Malay rights and to Islam. Crucially, both parties undermined the PH government’s credibility with Malays by accusing it of planning to abolish Malay rights.25 Along with pro-Islam activist groups, UMNO and PAS organised a massive street protest in the country’s capital that demonstrated their ability to rally Malay Muslims around fears of losing their birth rights and the primacy of Islam in Malaysia. The massive turnout was reflective of poll surveys conducted between October and December 2018 that indicated over 60% of Malays held the belief

22. Kenneth Tee, ‘Survey: Despite Pakatan win in GE14, rural voters still back BN, Umno’, Malay Mail, 16 September 2019. 23. Lee Hock Guan, ‘Malay Dominance and Opposition Politics in Malaysia’, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2002, p. 177-195. 24. Terence Tang, ‘The Najib «bossku» hype: Chance on speed or planned campaign?’, Malay Mail, 29 April 2019; Mazwan Nik Anis, ‘Time for me to come back and lead Umno, says Zahid’, The Star, 2 July 2019. 25. Norsharil Saat, ‘Malaysia’s anti-ICERD rally a reality check for Pakatan Harapan’, Channel News Asia, 16 December 2018.

272 Malaysia 2019 that non-Muslims, in particular those from DAP, were in control of the PH government.26 This instrumentalisation of race and religion, with PAS as a political ally rather than foe, then shaped UMNO’s political recovery strategy and set the tone for domestic politics in 2019. It also underlined the recurring theme in UMNO’s by-election campaigns during 2019 in which the PH government and its constituent parties were routinely portrayed as a threat to Malay unity – DAP was accused of Chinese chauvinism while the Malay parties, Bersatu, PKR and Amanah, a splinter of PAS, functioned as powerless «DAP spokesperson».27 The UMNO-PAS cooperation then was framed by the leadership of both parties as necessary to bolster Malay Muslim unity; Malay Muslim unity would counter attempts by the PH government, which was dominated by non-Malay minorities with a reform agenda shaped by secularist principles, to marginalise Malays.

3. UMNO’s renewed relevance in Malaysian politics

With Malay unity as the basis for political cooperation, UMNO and PAS agreed to avoid the three-cornered contests that had benefitted PH in GE-14. This strategy was put into play in the first four by-election contests held in 2018. Although neither party won, UMNO and PAS were able to effectively negotiate the seat allocations without overt signs of party infighting. This was notable because there was a significant level of enmity between hardcore UMNO and PAS grassroots members, who found it hard to reconcile the new UMNO-PAS «marriage» with the decades long history of being bitter rivals.28 For all of the 2019 by-elections, PAS chose not to contest the seats, which allowed BN to reap electoral rewards. The first by-election contest on January 26 was for the Cameron Highlands federal parliamentary seat in the state of Pahang. BN had marginally won the seat during GE-14, but the results were later nullified due to a court ruling that BN’s candidate had bribed voters.29 The seat was held by BN’s ethnic Indian constituent party, the MIC, since the seat’s creation in 2004. For the by-election though, BN opted to field Ramli Mohd Nor, who was from the indigenous Orang Asli ethnic group, a Muslim, and a member of UMNO. This was an astute move

26. ‘Majority of Malays unhappy with Pakatan but have hope, says study’, Today, 31 January 2019. 27. ‘Better to have PAS-Umno alliance than work with DAP, Dr M told’, Malay- sia Kini, 9 April 2019. 28. Azril Annuar & Jerry Choong, ‘Umno-PAS ‘marriage’ set to alienate hardcore grassroots, warn Pakatan leaders’, Malay Mail, 6 March 2019. 29. Nurbaiti Hamdan, ‘Court nullifies BN’s GE14 victory for Cameron High- lands seat’, The Star, 30 November 2018.

273 Saleena Saleem because the Orang Asli ethnic group constituted the third largest (21.56%) after the Malays (33.5%) and the Chinese (29.48%) in the region. The Orang Asli group had strongly supported BN in previous elections (up to 95% of the votes in Orang Asli majority districts), which UMNO sought to retain. The prospect of having the first Orang Asli MP in Parliament appealed to many within the Orang Asli group.30 UMNO’s choice to field an Orang Asli candidate also shaped the campaign agenda for PH, which similarly made attempts to position itself as the voice of marginalised Orang Asli.31 Yet PH had an uphill task. It fielded an ethnic Indian, Manogaran Marimuthu from DAP, who had contested the seat twice before and lost. Furthermore, the by-election was held only weeks after a Malay fireman, Muhammad Adib Mohd Kassim, died from critical injuries sustained after responding to a riot between two Indian factions at the Seafield Sri Maha Mariamman Devasthanam temple in Selangor in November 2018.32 In the months before Adib’s passing, tensions between Hindu Indians and Malays became fraught over accusations as to who or what actually caused his injuries. During the by-election campaign, Manogaran’s Indian ethnicity and his party affiliation with DAP became a turn-off for Malay voters as racist rhetoric reinforced the growing negative perceptions over the PH government’s failure to locate and prosecute those responsible for Adib’s death. Flyers that accused Manogaran and the DAP of «killing» Adib were also circulated days before the election.33 BN further benefited from strong grassroots support as Pahang was an UMNO stronghold, having retained the state during GE-14.34 It was supported by PAS, who campaigned for BN’s candidate. This combination of a straight contest between BN and PH, BN’s choice of the Orang Asli candidate and Malay voter suspicions about the PH candidate, enabled BN to convincingly win with a 3,238-vote majority compared to its slim margin win of 567 votes during GE-14. The second by-election of the year was held on 2 March for the Seme- nyih state-level urban seat in the state of Selangor, which is a PH stronghold. The by-election was called after Bakhtiar Mohd Nor from PH’s constituent party Bersatu passed away while in office. The Semenyih seat in the Malay- majority district was won by Bakhtiar during GE 14, with 50.8% of the votes compared to BN’s 31.3%. PAS once again made the decision not to contest the seat, but not before highly publicised news of a meeting between Bersatu’s

30. Scott Edwards, ‘What Does the Cameron Highland By-Election Mean for the Orang Asli?’, The Diplomat, 2 February 2019. 31. Ibid. 32. Norsharil Saat, ‘A Complicated Political Reality Awaits the Malays’, ISEAS Perspective, 21 May 2019. 33. ‘Fireman’s death turns Malays off Pakatan’s Indian candidate in Cameron Highlands by-election’, Today, 25 January 2019. 34. Norsharil Saat, ‘A Complicated Political Reality Awaits the Malays’.

274 Malaysia 2019

Mahathir and PAS’ Hadi emerged. Mahathir claimed that Hadi agreed not to support UMNO in the by-election because the candidate was not from DAP as had been in the Cameron Highlands by-election. PAS later accused Ma- hathir of playing mind games and asserted that the only agreement reached was to support Mahathir when it came to Malay Muslim causes; a reference to a brewing power struggle within the PH coalition about Mahathir’s now uncertain GE-14 promise to pass the reins of premiership to PKR’s head, Anwar Ibrahim, after two years.35 Mahathir inadvertently projected an image of a weakened PH that required PAS support; the choice of a young and inexperienced Bersatu candidate in Muhammad Aiman Zainali, the son-in-law of Bakhtiar, further reinforced this perception. UMNO, on the other hand, fielded Zakaria Hanafi a grassroots veteran party member from the Seme- nyih area, who was able to connect with the local ground. BN’s win over PH in the Semenyih by-election was aided by a swing in the Malay middle class vote and PAS voters who backed BN – an estimated 59% of Malays voted for BN, compared to 35% during GE-14.36 The Malay urban middle class swing was telling as these voters were known to prioritise good governance and economic concerns over identity concerns and formed PH’s core voter base. The swing indicated that some urban Malays had become sensitive to claims about Malay marginalisation under the new PH government. Similarly, BN’s third by-election win on 13 April was for the Rantau state-level seat in a Malay majority district (55% Malays; 26% Indians; 19% Chinese) in the state of Negeri Sembilan. The by-election contest was between UMNO’s then acting head, Mohamad Hasan, who held the seat for three terms and PKR’s Streram Sinnansamy. The PH campaign was noted for the absence of key PH leaders such as Mahathir, which appeared to confirm speculations on the unravelling of PH’s cohesiveness due to in-fighting in the constituent parties. Within PKR, a power struggle appeared to ensue between PKR’s head Anwar Ibrahim and deputy head Azmin Ali, with thin- ly veiled accusations aired out in the media between pro-Azmin and pro- Anwar factions. Then there were the on-going suspicions about Mahathir’s purportedly favourable relationship with Azmin and the possible formation of a pact to prevent Anwar’s ascension to premiership.37 The BN campaign, on the other hand, led by UMNO presented a united front, and was once again solidly backed by PAS.38 PH was able to break BN’s by-election winning streak on May 11 when it retained the Sandakan federal parliamentary seat in the state of Sabah.

35. ‘PAS: We didn’t say we won’t work with Umno in Semenyih’, Free Malaysia Today, 17 February 2019. 36. ‘BN wins Semenyih with 50.44pct vote share’, Malaysia Kini, 2 March 2019. 37. Faris Mokhtar, ‘Nurul Izzah’s «dictator» comment - what it means for Paka- tan Harapan, her father and her political career’, Today, 26 March 2019. 38. Trinna Leong, ‘By-election in Rantau: Pakatan Harapan loses third straight fight at polls’, Straits Times, 14 April 2019.

275 Saleena Saleem

The seat was in a Chinese-majority district (51%) and the DAP incumbent candidate won 75% of the votes. The win was also facilitated by PH’s partner, Parti Warisan Sabah (PWS). Shafie Apdal, the PWS head and the Chief Minister of Sabah, was a former UMNO member, who held much influence among Malay voters in Sabah. Yet this PH win was also widely expected. However, the magnitude of BN’s final by-election win of the year for the federal parliamentary seat of Tanjung Piai in the state of Johor held on 16 November was surprising to political observers. The by-election was called after the death of the Bersatu MP, Md Farid Md Rafik. BN’s candidate Wee Jeck Seng was from the MCA, BN’s Chinese constituent party that was decimated during GE 14 (MCA managed to retain only one parliamentary seat). Wee won 65.6% of the vote compared to the 26.7% managed by the Karmaine Sardini from PH’s Bersatu.39 During GE-14, Wee only narrowly lost to Md Farid by a 1% margin. The by-election results indicated that Wee, who had served as MP for the district since 2008, maintained his clout there. The results also showed a significant shift to BN by both Malay (13.2%) and Chinese voters (34.5%). The Malay shift was contributed in part by PAS supporters, who voted for the PAS candidate (6.6%) during GE 14, but now backed BN.40 Although PH attempted to scare Chinese voters about the UMNO-PAS alliance’s emphasis on Malay unity, UMNO’s backing of Wee, an ethnic Chinese, allowed it to claim it was pluralistic in its practice. At the close of 2018, UMNO’s political viability was severely questioned, with some UMNO members even contemplating shifting to Ma- hathir’s Bersatu.41 However, the four by-election wins in 2019 indicated that UMNO was still a relevant force in Malaysian politics. There were three main factors that contributed to UMNO’s reversal in electoral fortunes. Firstly, UMNO was able to capitalise on growing Malay fears of marginalisation under the PH government as the year progressed and emphasised the necessity of Malay unity. PH had won GE-14 largely on a campaign that promised changes rooted in principles of good governance. For most Malay voters, the desired change was an end to the large-scale corruption in politics epitomised by Najib’s misuse of state funds from 1MBD, and a diminution of the cost of living.42 Yet, according to UMNO and PAS, the purported change by the PH government boiled down to the probable dismantling of pro-Malay affirmative-action policies in business, education

39. ‘BN crushes Harapan with 15,086-vote majority in Tg Piai’, Malaysia Kini, 16 November 2019. 40. R. Loheswar, ‘Tanjung Piai Chinese vote swung massively against Pakatan, says think tank’, Malay Mail, 22 November 2019. 41. Rachel Genevieve Chia, ‘As many as 40 Umno MPs are supposedly trying to join Mahathir’s Bersatu – here’s what we know so far’, Business Insider Singapore, 31 October 2018. 42. Serina Rahman, ‘Was It a Malay Tsunami? Deconstructing the Malay Vote in Malaysia’s 2018 Election’, The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 107, 2018, pp. 669-682.

276 Malaysia 2019 and housing, which, of course, was not what Malay voters desired. Further- more, there was little progress made on the economic front, even as ethnic minority politicians appeared to take on a more visible role in governance under the PH government. As such, the narrative of Malay marginalisation was unsuccessfully countered by PH, which led to the discernible Malay swing to UMNO. Secondly, although ethnic minorities similarly voted for good governance and economic reasons, they also looked forward to fundamental changes toward fair treatment of non-Malays in a more inclusive and pluralist «new Malaysia». Chinese and Indian ethnic minority voters, fed up with years of being side-lined over the UMNO-led government’s emphasis on ketuanan Melayu and increasingly concerned over Islamisation policies in Malaysia, had abandoned BN in droves for PH.43 Yet for some ethnic minorities, the PH government helmed by Mahathir appeared to accede to various Malay demands over ethnic minority concerns in 2019, which meant it was no different from the UMNO-led government. In this sense, the shift of Chinese voters to BN in the Tanjung Piai by-election was a protest against the perceived ineffectiveness of PH’s Chinese-dominated DAP to look after Chinese concerns. Thirdly, BN’s candidate choices in the by-elections, particularly in Cameron Highlands, Semenyih and Tanjung Piai seats, showed that it was able to shift the focus from national to local considerations. In this way, BN demonstrated to voters that it was attuned and receptive to local level considerations. Conversely, while PH attempted to focus on local considerations in its electoral campaign, it was also forced to respond to national issues. For instance, PH had to justify the slow pace of its promised reforms to critics, which only increased voter disgruntlement. PH candidates were also not always adequately supported by the constituent parties. This conveyed to voters that the internal politicking within PH’s ideologically different parties had diminished the GE-14 unity that brought the UMNO-led government down; fundamental reforms from a disunited government were deemed unlikely.

4. The politics of fear

While local level considerations were certainly a key factor in the by- election outcomes that benefitted BN, a number of ethno-religious controversies at the national level and the disjointed responses from the PH government were also contributing factors. Two controversies, in particu-

43. James Chin, ‘From Ketuanan Melayu to Ketuanan Islam: UMNO and the Malaysian Chinese: Final Breakup: UMNO and the Chinese in GE14’, in Bridget Welsh (ed.), The End of UMNO? Essays on Malaysia’s Former Dominant Party New and Expanded Post GE-14 Edition, Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2018, pp. 255-304.

277 Saleena Saleem lar, contributed to a polarised social and political context that exacerbated inter-ethnic distrust and an overall citizenry dissatisfaction with the performance of the PH government. The first controversy arose in August over divisive public comments made by Zakir Naik, a controversial Muslim televangelist from India. Zakir, who was charged by the Indian government for money laundering and was banned from several countries, had lived in exile in Malaysia since 2017. The UMNO-led government attempted to bolster its religious credentials by granting him permanent residency, an act that was viewed positively by Zakir’s large Malay following. However, Zakir’s presence in Malaysia was not acceptable to some non-Malays and liberal Malay Muslims. Attempts by Hindraf, an ethnic Indian rights organisation in Malaysia, and liberal Malay Muslim lawyers, to contest the legality of Zakir’s permanent residency in court failed.44 While the calls to deport Zakir continued to arise periodically after GE-14, the issue remained largely out of national attention until Zakir’s comments in August. In his attempt to deflect the continued calls for his deportation, Zakir referred to the Chinese in Malaysia as pendatang (guest).45 The meaning of the term in the Malaysian context was derogatory; it served to differentiate non-Malay citizens, who were seen as «sojourners» from the Malay citizens, who were loyal to the land.46 Zakir also accused Hindu Indians in Malaysia of being more loyal to the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi than to Malaysia’s Mahathir. The public backlash was polarising. Petitions calling for Zakir’s deportation received national coverage. Several ethnic Indian ministers within the PH government also called for Zakir’s deportation, including Syed Saddiq, a Malay minister from Bersatu. Zakir was investigated by the police for breaching the peace. Yet the rival petitions that were organised by PAS and Muslim organisations such as the Malaysian Islamic Organisation of Consultative Council (Mapim) to support Zakir collected far more signatures than those calling for his deportation.47 The police issued a public speaking ban on Zakir to defuse tensions; and Zakir later issued an apology. Within a week, Syed Saddiq back tracked from his calls for Zakir’s deportation, and posted pictures of himself having dinner with Zakir.48 Ma- hathir appeared to toe a middle line claiming that Zakir had gone too far,

44. Ho Kit Yen, ‘Court throws out Hindraf ’s suit on Zakir Naik’, Free Malaysia Today, 18 February 2018. 45. ‘Zakir Naik plays «pendatang» card, says Chinese should go back before he does’, The Star, 14 August 2019. 46. Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Ketuanan Melayu: What’s in a Name?’, RSIS Com- mentary, 6 January 2015. 47. ‘Pro-Naik campaign touches 100,000 signatures as it races to overtake rival petition’, Free Malaysia Today, 22 August 2019. 48. ‘Syed Saddiq hosts dinner for Zakir, says «let’s move on»,’ Malaysia Kini, 24 August 2019.

278 Malaysia 2019 but Malaysia was duty-bound not to extradite him to India because his life was at risk there.49 The second controversy that also arose in August was equally polarising. The Education Ministry’s plan to introduce khat calligraphy – a form of brushwork calligraphy in jawi (Malay writings using the Arabic language script) was opposed by Chinese and Tamil vernacular school associations. This plan was in the pipeline since 2014 under the UMNO-led government and continued with the PH Education Minister, Maszlee Malik, from Ma- hathir’s Bersatu party. Despite protests from the ethnic minority school associations, the education ministry maintained its position. With the backing of Mahathir, the ministry’s stated rationale for the initiative was to familiar- ise students with the basics of khat, which was deemed a national heritage.50 Historically, changes in educational policy in Malaysia, especially about language, have always been a sensitive topic. At the country’s independence, ethnic minorities retained the right to continue to autonomously run their vernacular language schools (and later government funded vernacular schools too), but periodic calls to abolish vernacular schools for a single national system had existed. In this light, the ethnic minority school associations, such as the Chinese association Dong Jiao Zong (DJZ), have often scrutinised educational policy changes for perceived threats to the maintenance of their ethnic identities.51 During the 1980s, DJZ and Ma- hathir during his previous premiership had clashed over education policies. This time, DJZ claimed that the khat plan was yet another form of Islamisation in Malaysia that would erode Chinese identity. In recent years, ethnic minority fears over Islamisation increased, which Malays in turn perceived as a form of Islamophobia. These ethnic minority fears were rooted in the decades of political rivalry between UMNO and PAS around their respective Islamic credentials; Islamist grassroots pressures for more forms of Islamic influence in governance; rationalisation of pro-Malay policies under the political rhetoric of ketuanan Melayu (Malay dominance); and state Islamisation policies.52 This affected some freedoms of religious practice and expression of non-Muslim minorities in the public sphere. Amid protests spearheaded by DJZ about khat, the education ministry decided to make the subject optional and to reduce the number of pages devoted to khat in the planned syllabus. Yet DJZ was not appeased, and Mahathir labelled the association as «racist» for not agreeing to the

49. ‘Zakir Naik has crossed the line, says Dr Mahathir’, Today, 18 August 2019. 50. ‘Malaysia’s educationists against teaching of jawi calligraphy in vernacular schools as controversy rages’, Channel News Asia, 5 August 2019. 51. Alan Collins, ‘Securitization, Frankenstein’s Monster and Malaysian education’, Pacific Review, Vol.18, No. 4, 2005, pp. 567-588. 52. Bob Olivier, Islamic Revivalism and Politics in Malaysia, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.

279 Saleena Saleem education ministry’s changes.53 Notably the responses by some DAP MPs indicated that they were in a tight spot – at one level, aware of how ethnic minorities looked to them to mediate minority concerns, they were critical of Mahathir’s and the education ministry’s stance; at another level, they had to show a united front to de-escalate inter-ethnic tensions by showing disapproval to DJZ’s claim that the introduction of khat was another form of Islamisation in Malaysia. Hadi, the PAS head further inflamed tensions when he told DJZ to remember that Malaysia was a «Malay world».54 By year’s end, a planned anti-jawi rally by DJZ was cancelled by the police as a safety precaution while the education ministry remained firm on its stance to introduce khat. These two major controversies characterised the increasing nature of inter-ethnic polarisation in Malaysia that fed into negative societal perceptions about the performance of the PH government. Polls in 2019 showed that Malays expressed concerns over PH’s commitment to preserving Malay rights even as fair treatment of ethnic minority groups remained a concern for others.55 Ethnic minority disillusionment with the PH government was again fuelled in October, with the Malay Dignity Conference that was organised by four Malaysian public universities and officiated by Mahathir. The conference was widely perceived to be driven by Mahathir as an attempt to address PH’s waning Malay support, as well as to shift the attention of Malays from the UMNO-PAS political alliance formalised in September. For ethnic minorities, the UMNO-PAS alliance was blatantly aimed at garnering a simple majority of Malay votes to unseat PH at the next general election. Yet Ma- hathir’s conference’s theme of Malay unity, with UMNO and PAS leadership in attendance, signalled to ethnic minorities that the PH government had wilfully taken a regressive step for political gain. Furthermore, the absence of Anwar at the conference, ostensibly due to a late invitation, fuelled suspicions that Mahathir’s concerns on Malay unity was in reality more about the cultivation of UMNO and PAS support to subvert Anwar’s ascension to premiership; even at the cost of side-lining the ethnic minorities who had overwhelmingly backed the PH coalition, and inflaming inter-ethnic distrust. Tellingly, the resolutions presented to Mahathir at the end of the conference centred on the polarising ethno-religious issues that became pronounced in the post-GE 14 context – for example, the abolishment of vernacular schools within six years; the reservation of top government positions for Malays (under the PH government, the finance minister post went

53. ‘Dr M labels Dong Zong as racist for not agreeing with anything’, New Straits Times, 12 August 2019. 54. Zurairi AR, ‘Remember you’re living in a ‘Malay world’, Hadi warns Dong Zong ahead of congress’, Malay Mail, 27 December 2019. 55. Hazlin Hassan, ‘Approval ratings down for Mahathir, Pakatan Harapan govt in Merdeka Center poll’, Today, 27 April 2019.

280 Malaysia 2019 to an ethnic Chinese and the attorney-general post went to an ethnic In- dian, which rankled some Malay groups); the safeguard of the economic interests of Malays; and the prevention of individuals or groups’ interference with issues involving the Islamic religion.56 Even though, Mahathir made no promises to the attendees and likely meant the conference to be symbolic rather than geared toward substantive change, the conference magnified the different interests and motivations of the PH constituent parties. Ra- masamy Palanisamy, a DAP Penang state legislative assemblyman, criticised Mahathir as irresponsible for taking «Malays on the path of no-return» by normalising racism.57 This polarised context then allowed PH’s political opponents, UNMO and PAS, to instrumentalise ethno-religious issues under the rhetoric of Ma- lay unity to capitalise on Malay fears. Conversely, the disjointed responses of the different constituent parties in the PH coalition fostered disillusionment of non-Malays over PH infighting and broken promises of fundamental reforms.

5. Persistence of economic insecurities

On top of an increasingly polarised socio-political context that magnified the inter-ethnic distrust, Malaysians across ethnic divides perceived little improvement on their cost of living woes.58 The PH government had made a multitude of promises in its 2018 election manifesto to improve the economy, but it struggled to follow through on many of its promised changes. The PH government’s ability to tackle substantive structural economic reforms to address cost of living concerns required generating new sources of revenue, identifying the necessary growth drivers for the Malay- sian economy, and forging a consensus between the constituent parties on a common direction. However, party differences led to the different government ministries working on their own, without either co-operating or sharing information, which made PH’s economic reform ambitions a struggle.59 By 2019, the PH government had scrapped the unpopular Goods and Services tax that was introduced by Najib in 2016. It also allocated resources to support small and medium-sized enterprises so as to encourage technological adoption; sought to improve governmental transparency on state

56. Adib Povera & Arfa Yunos, ‘Five resolutions presented at Malay Dignity Congress’, New Straits Times, 6 October 2019. 57. Ramasamy Palanisamy, ‘When a Malay Dignity Congress in Malaysia is not really one’, Today, 6 October 2019. 58. Nurafifah Suhaimi, ‘Dissecting the rising cost of living in Malaysia’, Emir Research, 24 December 2019. 59. Joseph Sipalan & Rozanna Latiff, ‘Malaysia’s hopes of economic revival under Mahathir fade’, Reuters, 10 May 2019.

281 Saleena Saleem finances; and initiated reforms in the public procurement system to curb corruption.60 Yet these measures were short-term and did not alleviate the economic insecurities of Malaysians. Malaysians in the urban areas believed that their incomes were insufficient to meet the cost of living. In particular, there were concerns over the Malaysian currency’s decline in purchasing power that directly raised the cost of living; income growth stagnation despite educational attainment; inadequate financial savings; and a lack of affordable housing.61 All of these concerns were present under the UMNO-led government as well, which exacerbated perceptions of non-progress with the PH government. The PH government’s attempt to address the economic insecurity concerns through the Shared Prosperity Vision 2030 (SPV) national economic plan in October was criticised for its emphasis on race-based policies rather than needs-based policies. The SPV plan appeared to be modelled upon similar pro-Malay and race-based policies implemented by the UM- NO-led government of the past. The plan’s stated aim was to reduce income and wealth inequalities across different dimensions such as race, ethnicity, income groups, and region; however it was race and ethnic dimensions that took precedence.62 Furthermore, the plan was launched just one day before the Mahathir-driven Malay Dignity Conference, which suggested that it was geared at allaying Malay fears rather than charting economic reforms. A number of external factors also hampered the PH government’s progress on the economic front. Firstly, the China-USA trade protectionist conflict resulted in a global exports slowdown. Malaysia’s export-oriented economy was dependent on its largest trading partner, China. Inevita- bly, the Malaysian exports suffered from the disruptions to China’s supply chains as a consequence of the US-China trade conflict. While analysts initially suggested that Malaysia would benefit as US companies looked for non-Chinese substitutes, this did not materialise. In 2019, Malaysian total exports to the United States fell by US$90 million per month on average.63 Secondly, investor confidence in the Malaysian economy waned. Al- though the PH government replaced the GST with the Sales and Services (SST) tax that targeted local businesses and manufacturers, the move was not viewed positively by credit rating agencies. Given the government’s dependence on state oil dividends and the SST, Moody’s Investor’s Services viewed Malaysia’s economic resilience and its debt funding capabilities as

60. Syahirah Syed Jaafar, ‘Nearly a third of PH govt’s economic promises on track’, The Edge Markets, 9 April 2019. 61. ‘Malaysia Economic Monitor: Making Ends Meet’, The World Bank, 9 De- cember 2019. 62. Hwok-Aun Lee, ‘Can Mahathir’s government get Malaysians to believe in shared prosperity – regardless of race?’, South China Morning Post, 27 November 2019. 63. Calvin Cheng, ‘Is Malaysia benefitting from the US–China trade war?’, East Asia Forum, 5 August 2019.

282 Malaysia 2019 fragile. The oil dividends that the government relied on for revenue were subjected to oil price fluctuations while the annual revenue generated by the SST was approximately US$ 4.7 billion less than the GST.64 As a consequence, the Malaysian stock market lagged behind compared to other regional countries as investor confidence remained low in 2019. Thirdly, the Malaysian ringgit currency was subjected to the China- US trade tensions for much of 2019. The US imposition of trade tariffs on Chinese products led to China’s devaluing of its currency to stay competitive. Given the Malaysian economy’s dependence on Chinese trade, this in turn depreciated the Malaysian ringgit currency in relation to the US dollar. The depreciation of the ringgit resulted in an increase in the cost of imported goods, which included food items such as vegetables and fruits. Ad- ditionally, domestic manufacturers that imported foreign materials for use in their manufacturing were forced to raise the prices of their end products. These inflationary pressures then reduced the overall purchasing power of Malaysians, which contributed to the perception of economic insecurity. The PH government made efforts to foster investor confidence and promote foreign investments by reversing its previous decisions to cancel large-scale railway infrastructure projects with Singapore and China that had been negotiated under the Najib-led government. The PH government previously stressed that the cancellations were necessary given the prohibi- tive high costs of the deals when Malaysia was overburdened by debts incurred from the corrupt mismanagement of 1MDB under Najib. However, by late 2019, the PH government had not only re-established commitments to the deals, but it also revived the Najib-initiated and China-backed Bandar Malaysia plan to create a major transportation hub in the nation’s capital. The external economic factors, the PH government’s inability to chart a clear direction for substantive economic reforms, and the reversals to Najib-era initiatives contributed to a perception among some Malaysians that life had been more prosperous under Najib’s leadership.65

6. A disconcerted Muslim solidarity foreign policy approach

In September, Mahathir announced a new guiding framework for Ma- laysia’s foreign policy. While Malaysia’s emphasis on a non-aligned stance with major powers was still maintained, the new framework entailed taking a more proactive approach in handling issues that affected domestic interests, as well as taking a lead in fostering solidarity and cooperation in the Muslim world. This included the right of Malaysia to express its opinions,

64. ‘Reintroduction of GST poses a challenge to changing people’s perception, says Fomca deputy chief, Malay Mail, 2 October 2019. 65. Amir Yusof, ‘Progress in Pakatan Harapan’s «new Malaysia» plagued by same old issues’, Channel News Asia, 8 May 2019.

283 Saleena Saleem when necessary taking a stand against «injustices, oppressions and other crimes against humanity that are committed by any nations».66 Under Mahathir, the PH government scored two key foreign policy successes in 2019 that were geared toward procuring investments in Malay- sia. The first was the re-negotiations of the large-scale railway infrastructure deals with China. Mahathir secured a US$ 11 billion reduction in costs for the East Coast Rail Link with the state-backed China Communication Con- struction Company. As such, Mahathir was able to portray the cost reduction as further evidence that the Najib-led government had indeed mismanaged the country’s finances when it had agreed to the previously inflated costs. Contrary to his previous reservations over Chinese investments in Malaysia, Mahathir now stated that Chinese investments were beneficial, and criticised the US sanctions imposed on Chinese companies for spying.67 The second foreign policy success was a US$ 1.83 billion bond issuance for Ma- laysia by Japan in March. This was a direct consequence of Mahathir’s efforts at fostering closer ties with the Japan soon after the GE 14 win.68 To a certain extent, both of these foreign policy initiatives were reminiscent of Mahathir’s «Look East» policy aimed at reducing dependence on the West that was a central feature during his previous premiership.69 Mahathir’s attempt to take a more central leadership role in the Mus- lim world as part of Malaysia’s new foreign policy approach, though, was not as successful as his China and Japan policies. The first indication of Mahathir’s focus on the Muslim world came during the 74th United Na- tions (UN) General Assembly in September. Mahathir announced plans to combat Islamophobia through a jointly run English television initiative with Turkey and Pakistan. This was later followed by plans to convene a summit of Muslim-majority countries in Malaysia’s capital of Kuala Lumpur (KL) in December. The stated aim of the KL summit was the forging of a global Muslim solidarity to address issues of conflict, extremism and oppression in Mus- lim countries. However, the summit became controversial because it was interpreted as a largely non-Arab initiative to counter the leadership of the Saudi Arabian dominated Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on Muslim issues, even though this was denied by Mahathir.70 This perception was reinforced by the fact that the leaders of Iran, Turkey and Qatar, who

66. Tashny Sukumaran, ‘Mahathir to update Malaysia’s foreign policy, including on South China Sea and international Muslim cooperation’, South China Morning Post, 18 September 2019. 67. Ibid. 68. Bhavan Jaipragas, ‘Malaysia’s Mahathir hits foreign policy speed bump after controversial Kuala Lumpur Summit’, South China Morning Post, 31 December 2019. 69. Karminder Singh Dhillon, Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era, 1981- 2003: Dilemmas of Development, Singapore: NUS Press, 2009, pp. 160-194. 70. Julia Roknifard, ‘At Malaysia’s KL Summit, the Muslim world’s most pressing concerns got no mention’, South China Morning Post, 24 December 2019.

284 Malaysia 2019 were all regarded as regional rivals to Saudi Arabia, were invited to give keynote speeches. As such, Saudi Arabia regarded the summit as an affront to its leadership; it stressed that the KL summit’s agenda should have been discussed under the OIC platform instead. Along with its allies of Egypt, UAE and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia shunned the summit. Saudi Arabia was instrumental too in getting Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan to drop out from the summit. The Indonesian premier also was notably absent. During Mahathir’s previous premiership, positive relations with the OIC was regarded as integral to Mahathir’s agenda of boosting Malaysia’s Islamic identity with the wider Muslim world, as well as to counter domestic criticism from Malay Muslim opponents.71 Mahathir also took up various causes such as the Palestine cause on behalf of the global ummah (Muslim community), at times in direct opposition to the West. The growing Mus- lim ummah consciousness coupled with Mahathir’s uncompromising stance on Muslim causes gained him favour among Muslims worldwide. However, since the Arab Spring conflicts in 2011, Muslims perceived the OIC as ineffective while Saudi Arabia was seen as acting against Muslim interests.72 In this light, Mahathir’s move to host the KL Summit was reflective of Malay- sia’s awareness of the spreading in the wider Muslim world of the conviction of the declining relevance of Saudi Arabia’s role as leader of the global ummah. The move also served to differentiate Mahathir’s Muslim policy that was aligned with the ummah’s perceived sentiments, from Najib’s, which had been aligned with an increasingly unpopular Saudi Arabia.73 Yet Malaysia was remarkably muted on pressing issues that affected Muslims. At the KL summit, the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, the conflict in Kashmir, and the Chinese treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang province were all unaddressed. Instead, Mahathir stressed on China’s value as a trade partner to Muslim countries.74 Malaysia had good reason to be cautious. In October, India threatened to restrict Malaysian palm oil imports after Mahathir criticised India over its revocation of constitutional autonomy over the disputed state Jammu and Kashmir in October; as India was the top purchaser of Ma- laysia’s palm oil, the threat led to a drop in Malaysian palm oil futures.75 Malaysia’s positioning as a leader in the Muslim world and an advocate for Muslim causes then was constrained by the pragmatic realities of

71. Khadijah Md Khalid, Malaysian Foreign Policy Orientation and Relations in the Post-Mahathir Years, University of Malaya, 2009. 72. Mustafa Salama, ‘Why did Saudi Arabia shun the Kuala Lumpur summit?’, Middle East Eye, 23 December 2019. 73. Scott Edwards & Asmiati Malik, ‘Saudi Arabian Relations Under Strain in Southeast Asia’, The Diplomat, 7 November 2018. 74. Julia Roknifard, ‘At Malaysia’s KL Summit, the Muslim world’s most pressing concerns got no mention’. 75. Ravi Agrawal & Kathryn Salam, ‘Is India Becoming More Like China?’, Foreign Policy, 22 October 2019.

285 Saleena Saleem its own national economic interests. This was in stark contrast to domestic Malay Muslim sentiments, evidenced by a series of street protests in Kuala Lumpur over the Chinese treatment of the Uyghurs as the year came to a close.76 For these reasons, Mahathir’s attempt to position Malaysia as a Muslim leader with an uncompromising stance was largely a disconcerted effort in 2019 compared to the experiences during his first tenure as prime minister.

7. Concluding remarks

The key developments in 2019 discussed in this article contributed to an overall sense of citizenry disillusionment with the PH government. In particular, a sizeable number of Malay Muslims lost trust in the Mahathir- led government amid the polarising fear-mongering rhetoric by UMNO and PAS. This was also driven by the ineffectual and disunited responses by PH politicians to the ethno-religious controversies that only served to exacerbate the inter-ethnic distrust. These factors, on top of the persistence of cost of living woes, shaped Malay Muslim negative perceptions about the reform-oriented PH government. The main beneficiary of this politically volatile situation in 2019 was undoubtedly UMNO. The developments of 2019 set the stage for the collapse of the PH government in 2020. The takeover by the new Malay-dominated PN government, in which the largest constituent party was UMNO, was a devastating blow to the Malaysians, who had hoped that GE-14 marked a new beginning for Malaysia. Yet it was also welcomed by many. In sum, ethno-religious considerations still remained a significant force in Malaysian politics, yet to be overcome.

76. Azril Annuar, Jerry Choong & Soo Wern Jun, ‘In KL, hundreds of Muslims protest against China’s treatment of Uighurs’, Malay Mail, 27 December 2019.

286 Vietnam 2019: Pursuing harmonious labour relations and consolidating its reliable international role*

Nicola Mocci

University of Sassari [email protected]

During 2019, the political debate focused on identifying the most effective tools to realise «harmonious labour relations». This resulted in the ratification of some fundamental conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the adoption of the new labour code. Among the different stakeholders involved in this debate, the Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL), the sole national trade union centre in Vietnam, played an unprecedented key role, achieving some important success on the workers’ side. At international level, the party-state strived to increase its international prestige, trying to strike a balance between relations with the US and China.

1. Introduction

From the early Nineties, Vietnam has created a manufacturing platform for low value-added and high labour-intensive products (namely garment, footware and more recently electronics), driven by foreign direct investment (FDI) and progressively encapsulated in the global value chain, almost entirely export-oriented.1 Making the country more FDI attractive, i.e. keeping labour costs low, providing a young and fairly educated labour force, strengthening the international trade agreements became part of Hanoi’s national strategic plan. In 2016 this approach was ratified through a Post-Washington Consensus manifesto – «Vietnam 2035: Toward Prosperity, Creativity, Equity,

* I would like to thank Simona Raffo for helping and supporting my work and Michela Cerimele and Pietro Masina for sharing their analysis on Vietnam’s development model and for their advice. Moreover, I would like to thank all the Vietnamese who, during my fieldwork in Vietnam, with their advice and suggestions helped me to formulate the theses set out in this article. I am grateful to my dearest mentor, friend, and colleague, Michelgugliemo Torri for his patient and consistent support. Last but not least, thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of my manuscript and their many insightful comments and suggestions. 1. Since 1988, FDI flows in Vietnam increased from zero to US$ 189.7 million in 1990 and decreased to US$ 8.6 billion in 1996, making Vietnam the second biggest recipient of FDI in the world, calculated as a percentage of the Gross National Product. World Bank, Vietnam - Deepening reform for growth, Hanoi, 1997. More precisely, to a first phase (1988-1996) characterized by a progressive growth of FDI, followed a second phase (1996-2006) of de facto stalemate. Finally, in the third phase (2007-2018) there was a recovery with an exponential FDI growth, which jumped from US$ 6.7 bn to 15.5 bn. World Bank, Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) – Vietnam.

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Nicola Mocci and Democracy»,2 and by «The five year Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP) 2016–2020». In particular, according to Deprez, the Vietnamese Vi- sion aims to place its economic system at the end of the global-value chain production, strengthening the «outward-looking» trade integration and, consequently, achieving the status of a high-income economy.3 In other terms, the ambitions of this Vision is to create conditions to reach fully integrated industrialisation where high value-added products may be realised along with the low value added. Moreover, engaging at the end of the global-value chain production is not a process that naturally springs only from the strengthening of market integration. The analysis of what happened in Vietnam and, more generally, in Southeast Asian countries in the last 30 years, in fact, shows that the transition towards high value-added production rarely happened, notwithstanding regional or international market integration.4 FDI constantly aims to replicate high labour-intensive and low value-added productions; consequently, the domestic companies are unable to insert themselves as suppliers within the FDI value chains, thus reducing the knowledge and technology transfer to local industries. At best, the involvement of national companies is limited to productions of low technological complexity and low added value. In this context, however, the service sector has grown faster than industry (on this more below), providing a fast GDP growth. As much as this transition has been the target of all Southeast Asian countries since the1990s, it has not yet been achieved (except by Singapore), and, as a consequence, full-scale industrialisation has not been reached. Con- versely, the integration has consolidated the hierarchies between states and firms «strengthening the dependence on foreign capital and foreign technology in the export-oriented sectors».5 FDI in the ASEAN 3 (namely, Indone- sia, Malaysia and Thailand) produced limited spillover effects and industrial upgrading to the extent that those economies remained dependent on foreign technology and management. The World Bank’s analysts who, until the 1997-98 financial crisis had presented the ASEAN 3 industrialisation model as part of a regional economic miracle,6 after the crisis had to explain why the

2. The Vision was signed by the Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and the World Bank President Jim Yong Kim on 23 February 2016. World Bank and Ministry of Planning and Investment of Vietnam, Vietnam 2035: Toward Prosperity, Creativity, Equity, and Democracy, Hanoi: World Bank, 2016. 3. Deprez showed recently, Vietnam preferred to boost an international integration to a regional one. Sophie Deprez, ‘The Strategic Vision behind Vietnam’s Interna- tional Trade Integration’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, vol. 2, 2018, pp. 3-38. 4. Greg B. Felker, ‘Southeast Asian industrialisation and the changing global production system’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, n. 2, 2003, p. 260. 5. Pietro Masina & Michela Cerimele, ‘Patterns of Industrialisation and the State of Industrial Labour in Post-WTO-Accession Vietnam’, European Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 17, 2018, pp. 289-323. 6. World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

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Southeast Asian countries’ economic growth never returned to the pre-crisis level. Their answer was that this disconcerting result was the outcome of a «middle-income trap», produced by the lack of pro-market reforms.7 According to scholars critical of this explanation and, more generally, the Washington consensus, the main problem, however, was not related to the «middle-income trap».8 Rather, the transformation of a country into a manufacturing hub – as Masina and Cerimele have argued – «implies neither an expansion of national industry – whose growth can be limited to the foreign-invested, export-oriented sector – nor a substantial change in the composition of national labour force through an expansion of industrial employment able to absorb redundant labour from rural areas.»9

Table 1, Employment by sector in Vietnam based on a scale of million employees.

Source: International Labour Organisation, wesodata.

7. Indermit Gill & Homi Kharas, An East Asian Renaissance – Ideas for Economic Growth, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007. For an update of the debate from the same perspective see Indermit Gill & Homi Kharas, ‘The Middle-Income Trap Turns Ten’, Policy Research Working Paper No. 7403, World Bank, 2015. The debate on the «middle-income trap» was introduced in Vietnam by Prof. Kenichi Ohno. The perspective of the research he promoted – that involved a wider group of colleagues at the Japanese JETRO and the Vietnamese National Economic University – tried to combine the «middle-income trap» approach with policy proposals more in line with the developmental state East Asian tradition. See Kenichi Ohno, ‘Avoiding the Middle-Income Trap: Renovating Industrial Policy Formulation in Vietnam’, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 26, No 1, 2009, pp. 25-43. 8. For a critical review of the World Bank narrative see Pietro P. Masina, ‘An Uneven Development Trap in Southeast Asia and Its Implications for Labor’, in Silvia Vignato & Matteo C. Alcano (eds.), Searching for Work: Small-Scale Mobility and Un- skilled Labor in Southeast Asia, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2019. 9. Pietro Masina & Michela Cerimele, ‘Patterns of Industrialisation and the State of Industrial Labour in Post-WTO-Accession Vietnam’, p. 1.

289 Nicola Mocci

Table 1 shows the gradual increase of employment in Vietnamese industry coupled with a notable decrease of labour force in agriculture of around 20 % (5 million) in the last five years.10 Nonetheless, what is really worth stressing is the employment rise in the services. In several articles, Adam Fforde reported this phenomenon, showing that the Vietnamese development model failed a full-scale industrialisation and determined a fast growth in the services sector (servicisation).11 Consequently, according to Fforde, the export-oriented industrialisation model is not a «core active development driver».12 According to World Bank data, in 2018 manufacture value added was 16% of GDP, while services value added reached 41.1%, and employed 34.7% of the total workforce.13 Moreover, as Fforde has shown, it should be taken into account that not only in Vetnam but in many developing countries servicization is a strong development driver.14 Limiting the focus on labour issues, the Vietnamese manufacturing hub has provoked different structural social changes like the semi-pro- letarianisation and circulatory migration in transition from agriculture to industry,15 and the progressively precariousness and informalisation of workers.16 Research on industrial parks has underlined a series of critical-

10. According to ILO statistics wesodata in 2009 industrial workers were 10.8 million and 15.5 million in 2019. 11. Adam Fforde, ‘Vietnam: Economic Strategy and Economic Reality’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 2, 2016, pp. 3-30. 12. Adam Fforde, ‘Yes, but what about services: is development doctrine changing?’, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2018, pp. 550-568. 13. Main services include tourism and telecommunications. World Bank, national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files on value added (% of GDP). 14. See Adam Fforde, ‘Yes, but what about services: is development doctrine changing?’, especially Table 1, p. 551. 15. Jonathan Rigg, Southeast Asia: The Human Landscape of Modernization and Development, London: Routledge, 1997. 16. Workers’ precariousness refers both to precarious work (low pay and lack of institutional support and representation at the workplace) and to social precarity (difficulties in housing, access to health care, social support networks). On the informalising labour approach see Dae-Oup Chang, ‘Informalising Labour in Asia’s Global Factory’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 39, 2, 2009, pp. 161-79. As regard to the Vietnamese migrant workers’ living conditions, see Amy Y.C. Liu & Xin Meng (eds.), Rural-Urban Migration in Vietnam, Cham: Springer 2019; Michela Cerimele, ‘Infor- malizing the Formal: Work and the Dual Dormitory Labor Regime in Hanoi’s Thang Long Industrial Park’, in Silvia Vignato & Matteo C. Alcano (eds.), Searching for Work: Small-Scale Mobility and Unskilled Labor in Southeast Asia, Silkworm Books: Chiang Mai 2019. In this case, fieldwork research was conducted between December 2013 and June 2014 in workers’ living areas around the Park under the EU-funded SWORR and SEATIDE projects. On the same subject, see also Do Ta Khanh, SWORR Fieldwork Research: Synthesis Report, Hanoi SWORR Project, 2015. A recent report on working conditions in Samsung factories in two provinces of the Red River Delta provides data consistent with these analyses: IPEN and COFED, ‘Stories of Women Workers in Vietnam’s Electronics Industry’, Hanoi: IPEN and COFED, 2017.

290 Vietnam 2019 ities related to stressful working conditions: widespread use of short-term contracts (unlawfully used even for long-term workers), permanent positions systematically turned into «short-term» ones, high degree of self-exploitation to keep the job (and have access to permanent positions), job and decent wage granted only to the physically strongest/most disciplined workers.17 In 2019, these aspects were subject matters for discussion in Vietnam, following the long process of ratification of the fundamental conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the issuing of the new labour code. In the first part of this article I will initially investigate the reasons that led the party-state to ratify the ILO’s conventions and to reform the labour code. Additional space will be given for an examination of the role of the main stakeholders involved and, in particular, on the arm wrestling between the main industrial representatives and the Vietnam General Con- federation of Labour (VGCL) state union. In the second part of the article, the major developments in Vietnam international politics will be analysed. Hanoi published a new Defense White Paper, confirming the «three noes policy» (NO military alliance, NO alignments, NO foreign military basis), adding one more NO, namely the rejection of use or threat of use of violence. This addition aims to clarify its diplomatic stance and position on regional disputes in the South China Sea. It is evident that the Vietnamese party-state, in this perspective, has strived for increasing its international trustworthiness. In 2020, indeed, Hanoi will hold two prestigious mandates: first, the presidency of ASEAN, in a context in which member states are searching for the unity of intent within the framework of territorial disputes, and, second, the non-permanent seat at the UN. Consequently, some important events of 2019, such as the meeting in Hanoi in February between Trump and Kim Yong Un, or the long debate on social legislation, must be interpreted in this perspective. The VCP’s internal affairs have always been distinguished by a high level of secrecy and the consequent difficulty in getting hold of primary sources. As a consequence, from a methodological point of view, the analyst’s work must be based on three classes of sources. The first is represented by the few available official documents and reports in the press of the party. The second includes the analysis of statistical data, interviews with key stakeholders and a large review of literature both on history, current affairs, and development studies. The third class of sources, concerning social legislation, consists of interviews conducted by the author in 2018

17. These aspects emerged also from author’s qualitative interviews with 38 workers (garment and electronics) in Tan Thuan Industrial Zone, District 7, Ho Chi Minh City in September 2018, within the framework of ECOW project. For more details on this project see fn. 19.

291 Nicola Mocci in the context of two research projects (still in progress): ECOW18 and CRISEA.19

2. Building «harmonious labor relations» (quan hệ lao động hài hoà)

2.1 Maintaining social order, and defusing conflict at the workplace Confronted with critical employment conditions, Vietnamese workers historically made use of different forms of protest. More recently, wildcat strikes were the most common and probably the most effective form of struggle to obtain better salaries and, generally speaking, better working conditions.20 Between 1995 and 2012 there were 5,000 strikes across the nation.21 However, after the Labour Code took effect in 2012, there has been a de-

18. Empowering Civil Society and Workers (ECOW) is a project co-financed by the European Union (EuropeAid/150453/DD/ACT/VN), in cooperation with the Vietnam- ese Academy of Social Sciences, the Center for Social Work &Community Development Research and Consultancy (SDRC), the Institute for Research and Consultancy on De- velopment (RCD), and the University of Naples «L’Orientale». It is based on 3,000 Viet- namese workers’ qualitative and quantitative interviews of garment and electronics FDI companies, equally distributed in the industrial zones in the North, Centre and South. 19. Competing Regional Integrations in Southeast Asia: the Search for Legiti- macy (CRISEA) is a project financed by the European Commission Horizon 2020 in cooperation with the École Française d’Extrême-Orient (EFEO) (coordinator); the University of Naples L’Orientale; the University of Hamburg; the University of Cam- bridge; University of Lisbon; University of Lodz; University of Oslo; Chiang Mai Uni- versity (CMU); the Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences (VASS), Ateneo de Manila University (Philippines); Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia); University of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur); University of Mandalay. In work on this project as a member of the Work Package «Competing Capitalist Models and Practices». 20. Concerning worker’s strikes organization occurred in the period 1995-2008 see Angie Ngoc Tran, ‘Alternatives to the «Race to the Bottom» in Vietnam’, La- bour Studies Journal, 32, 4, 2007, pp. 430-451; Angie Ngoc Tran, ‘The Third Sleeve: Emerging Labor Newspapers and the Response of the Labor Unions and the State to Workers’ Resistance in Vietnam’, Labor Studies Journal 32, 3, 2007, pp. 257-279; Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, ‘Workers’ Protests in Contemporary Vietnam (with Some Comparisons to Those in the Pre-1975 South)’, Journal of Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter 2010, pp. 162-204, and, still by the same author ‘Workers’ Protests in Contemporary Vietnam’, in Anita Chan (ed.), Labour in Vietnam, pp. 170 ff. On post-2008 strikes see Angie Ngoc Tran, Ties That Bind: Cultural Identity, Class and Law in Flexible Labor Resistance in Vietnam, Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program (SEAP), Cornell University Press, 2013; Kaxton Siu & Anita Chan, ‘Strike Wave in Vietnam, 2006–2011’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2015, pp. 71-91. 21. ‘Vì sao hơn 5.000 cuộc dì̵nh công không do công do̵ àn lãnh d̵ạo’ (Why more than 5,000 strikes are not led by unions?), Lao Động, 26 July 2013. On wild strikes in Vietnam see the recent book by Tria Kerkvliet, Speaking Out in Vietnam: Public Political Criticism in a Communist Party–Ruled Nation, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2019, in partic. pp. 21 ff.

292 Vietnam 2019 crease in the number of strikes and participants over the past few years. The reason for this reduction is attributable to several elements. In this regard, it is necessary to distinguish the state’s perspective from the workers’ perspective. From the state perspective, there have been several legislative interventions that have changed the rules of strikes in order to prevent them. According to Pringle and Clarke, «Wildcat strikes have become institutionalized».22 For example, the revision of the 2012 Labor Code made illegal most strikes, limiting their possibility to those issues that are not defined in the Labor Code. Accordingly, from the prohibitions inserted in the Labour Code (article 209 onward) only a few cases escape, such as those related to health and social insurance benefits. Even in these cases, however, a strike can only be carried out under the VGCL leadership or the control of the local authority. Strikes are forbidden on issues that are defined in the law (i.e., ‘rights’); as such, these conflicts are to be settled in the labour courts. Moreover, in 2013, Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng adopted the «Democratic Dialogue at factory level», through which it was decided that all workers’ requests would immediately be dealt with by «action teams». Made up of upper-level union, officials from the Industrial Zone Authority and mediators from the labour bureau within the administrative area, the action team has the task of offering workers immediate solutions in order to avert a strike.23 Finally, the activation of the action teams is accompanied by a vast and widespread training of workers on the rules of strikes.24 From the workers’ perspective, the decrease in strikes is not attributable to suddenly improved working conditions. On the contrary, research, including this author’s qualitative interviews with workers, has shown that the decrease in strikes (or at least the obstacles to go on strike) is a result of workers’ precariousness.25 In fact the workers’ weakness is such that protests or strikes are likely to aggravate their working conditions. There- fore strikes are resorted to only after receiving a sort of authorization from

22. Tim Pringle & Simon Clarke, The Challenge of Transition: Trade Unions in Russia, China and Vietnam, Basingstoke: Palgrave 2011, p. 72. 23. Angie Ngoc Tran, Jennifer Bair & Marion Werner, ‘Forcing change from the outside? the role of trade labour linkages in Vietnam’s labour regime’, Competition & Change, Vol. 21, 5, 2017, pp. 397-416. 24. The Actions Teams’s persuasive tactics are described by Nguyen Tu Phuong, Workplace Justice Rights and Labour Resistance in Vietnam, Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac- Millan 2019, pp. 32-34, and 38-39. 25. Author’s qualitative interviews with 38 workers (garment and electronics) in Tan Thuan Industrial Zone, District 7, Ho Chi Minh City in September 2018. See also Pietro Masina & Michela Cerimele, ‘Patterns of Industrialisation and the State of Industrial Labour in Post-WTO-Accession Vietnam’; Michela Cerimele, ‘Informaliz- ing the Formal: Work and the Dual Dormitory Labor Regime in Hanoi’s Thang Long Industrial Park’.

293 Nicola Mocci local authorities, and when workers are confident that they can achieve concrete results.26 Indeed, over the past few years, news of the decrease in strikes has taken on great political value, especially for the VCP ruling class at local level. The decrease in strikes in a province or an industrial district is considered an undeniable virtue of local authorities, since it is a particularly evident sign of their organisational and mediation skills, facilitating the relation between workers and companies. As a result, the most skilled members of the local political power structure could have the opportunity to progress in their career, aspiring to prestigious positions.27 Furthermore, the positive results achieved by local authorities inevitably favourably reflect on workers, especially at the end of the year, when collective bargaining is in full swing and the so-called Tet bonuses are decided. The Tet bonus is the equivalent of a 13th-month salary that Vietnamese workers are entitled to. The government leaves employers and workers to bargain its size, with the mediation of the local authority. Workers’ discipline is rewarded with wage adjustments and greater bonuses.28 In this context, between the end of 2018 and the beginning of 2019, the data on strikes became an important political matter, since the new La- bor Code was under discussion at the national assembly. The announced drop in the number of strikes (despite the fact that there was no real decrease) was exploited by employers’ associations in the long debate to define the measures under discussion. In particular, the most controversial aspects concerned the increases in minimum wages, the retirement age and the maximum number of overtime hours. The powerful association of employers and part of the government argued that the fall in strikes was linked to an improvement in working conditions and, therefore, the number of overtime hours could be increased or doubled. We will return to this subject at section 1.3.

26. It is worth noting that in the 2012 Labour Code, sanctions on strikers are a strong deterrent power in the employers’ hands. Article 35 on «Handling of labor strikes that do not follow the regulatory procedures» aims to deter workers from collective action: they will not be paid salary and benefits whenever they participate in strikes. Article 36 on «Compensation for damage caused by illegal strikes» dis- courages union leadership from being involved in strikes because the employer can calculate damages and costs incurred in strikes and request the organising unions to pay compensation. 27. The issue of career opportunities within the VCP is the subject of a long debate. For a description of how provincial leaders benefit from increased economic activity in their province see Thomas Jandl, ‘State versus State: The Principal-Agent Problem in Vietnam’s Decentralizing Economic Reforms’, in Jonathan D. London (ed.), Politics in Contemporary Vietnam Party, State, and Authority Relations, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014. 28. Nguyen Tu Phuong, Workplace Justice Rights and Labour Resistance in Viet- nam, p. 53.

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All the main local offices rushed to publish data relating to the decrease in strikes in their territories. For example, in Hanoi, from 2015 to 2019, there were 31 strikes and collective work stoppages (2015: 7 times; 2016: 9; 2017: 9; 2018: 5; Quarter I / 2019: 1).29 The average participation in each strike was from 300 to 400 workers directly involved, the maximum 3,049, the lowest 50; the length was from half a day to 12 days; most strikes occurred in FDI enterprises. The most affected sectors were textile and electronics.30 The Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) also highlighted the drop in the number of strikes across the country, despite, also in this case, the absence of any real decrease. During the first six months of 2019, there were 67 strikes, one less than in the same period of the previous year. They mostly occurred in the southern provinces of Long An, Dong Nai, and Binh Duong and 80% affected foreign companies. South Korean and Taiwanese companies accounted for 16 strikes each, Chinese firms for 10 and Japanese companies for four. Most strikes took place in the garment sector (28.4%), leather and footwear (19.4%), plastic (16.42%) and wood 14.93%. The cause of the strikes was mainly disputes of interests, accounting for 55.22% of the cases; rights disputes accounted for 11.94%; finally both rights and interests disputes accounted for 32.84%. According to MOLISA, the causes of the strikes were: difficulty in the adjustment of wages and allowances in enterprises lacking a mechanism of consultation with workers and union organisations; failure to timely adjust employees’ basic wages; low mid-shift meal quality. Also, dialogue at the workplace, negotiation, and signing of collective labour agreements were limited and lacking in substance.31 The strike data provided by the government, however, do not offer a complete picture of the phenomenon of protests, since they do not indicate how many workers were involved and for how many days. Government data, in fact, appear to be geared to only highlight the desired effect of the

29. ‘Hà Nội: Số cuộc đình công, ngừng việc tập thể có xu hướng giảm Hanoi’ (Hanoi: The number of strikes and collective work stoppages has decreased’, Lao Động Thủ đô, 24 March 2019. 30. Ibid. Of course, the question is open if the official data are credible. Here, however, the question is not if to believe or not the data. Rather, the aim is to highlight how the different local and central offices are eagerly implementing the policy of publishing (dubious) data signalling a reduction in strikes. As explained below, this is in consonance with the government’s rhetoric, in particular during 2019, aimed at painting an «armonious» portrait of industrial relations (namely one in consonance with the interests and policies of the industrialists). 31. ‘80 percent of strikes in Vietnam occurs at foreign companies’, VnExpress, 4 August 2019; ‘Tình trạng công nhân đình công chủ yếu xảy ra ở doanh nghiệp FDI’ (The strikes mainly occur in FDI enterprises), Cuộc Sống An Toàn, 18 September 2019; ‘Trên 82% vụ đình công xảy ra tại doanh nghiệp FDI’ (Over 82% of strikes occurred in FDI enterprises), VnEconomy, 8 August 2019.

295 Nicola Mocci drop in the number of strikes. In this way, a distorted idea of the general conditions of industrial work is offered. Just to give an example, the strike in Quang Nam Industrial Zone in September 2019 – which involved 6,200 workers skipping meals and stopping work – would not be included in the statistics, because it only lasted a few hours. Furthermore, the motivation of the strike – the meal did not guarantee food safety and hygiene – was categorised as an accident, and not as a structural element of the difficult working conditions.32 In this context characterised by widespread discontent among the working masses and by social tension, a large debate took place on the ratification of international labour conventions which overlapped the development of the new labour code.

2.2. The ratification of ILO’s conventions and the proactive role of the VGCL On 5 July 2019, after a long debate, the National Assembly ratified the ILO’s Convention n. 98 (henceforth C98) that will enter into force on 5 July 2020.33 This ratification process started in 2013 when the US government earmarked US$ 4.2 million to the ILO in Vietnam to assist MOLISA, a transition to be accomplished within ﬁve years.34 US support was linked to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), requiring Vietnam’s ratification of the fundamental ILO’s conventions. The C98, adopted by the ILO in 1949, assures, in particular, fundamental principles of freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour, the effective abolition of child labour and the elimination of discrimination with respect to employment and occupation. Ratifying this convention, the party-state must provide adequate protection against discrimination by employers or union officials. It also must guarantee collective bargaining as a voluntary process between independent and autonomous parties. A few months after ratification, the approval of the new labour code on 20 November 2019, decreed the freedom of association of workers. It will take effect from 1 January 2021, but regulations are still awaited).35 Reactions to the adoption of the freedom of association were very positive. The VGCL, for example, not only did not create resistance but

32. ‘Bức xúc vì thức ăn không đảm bảo vệ sinh hàng loạt công nhân ngưng việc’ (Frustrated because food does not guarantee a series of workers stop working), Cuộc Sống An Toàn, 17 September 2019. 33. ILO, ILO welcomes Viet Nam’s vote to ratify ILO fundamental convention on collective bargaining, 14 June 2019; ILO, Rules of the Game: an introduction to standards- related work of the ILO, International Labour Office, Geneva, Centenary Edition 2019. 34. U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Vietnam, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Vietnam Comprehen- sive Partnership, 16 December 2013. 35. The New Labour code was adopted by the National Assembly, Decision No. 45/2019/QH14, and will take effect from 1 January 2021.

296 Vietnam 2019 played a proactive role. Its leaders’ statements and the attitudes adopted showed that the VGCL seems to have accepted the challenge of freedom of association, taking the opportunity to further strengthen its advocacy role on behalf of workers. The reformist action of the VGCL did not end even on the occasion of the crisis of the TPP, caused by the US’ withdrawal in 2017. Instead, it continued to support the need to reform the organisation of the grassroots regardless of the negotiations of TFA agreements.36 The long ratification process of the ILO’s fundamental conventions has resulted in an opportunity for the VGCL to reform itself in various ways. Firstly, it has strengthened its political and administrative presence in the territory, recruiting new members, especially in the districts with the greatest concentrations of industries, and ensuring continuous training for them.37 In addition to traditional activities – fundraising for workers’ trips and New Year gifts, organisation of counselling centres for female workers, periodic meetings to reward model workers – in recent years the VGCL has increased training activities aimed at both middle-ranking managers and grassroots. In particular, in 2019 training focused on the opportunities offered by the new FTAs to trade unionists and on the innovations introduced by the new Labour Code.38 In this case, training was geared towards strengthening the trade unionists’ skills, especially in the assistance of collective bargaining.39 For example, in Bac Giang province, about 45 kilometers from Hanoi, where new industrial parks have recently been built, training activities have multiplied exponentially since 2017.40 Also, coordination between the City People’s

36. Anita Chan, ‘Vietnam’s and China’s Diverging Industrial Relations Sys- tems: Cases of Path Dependency’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 2019, p. 1. 37. In a context characterised by an increase in the number of companies, in 2008 the VGCL launched a five-year programme with the objective, among others, of increasing membership to 1.5 million. Angie Ngoc Tran, ‘Contesting «Flexibility»: Networks of Place, Gender, and Class in Vietnamese Workers’ Resistance’, in J. Nevins & N.L. Peluso (eds.), Taking Southeast Asia to Market: Commodities, Nature, and People in the Neoliberal Age, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008, p. 67. Available also at https://digitalcommons.csumb.edu/sbgs_fac/18/. 38. During 2018-2019, the on-line newspaper of VGCL «Lao Động Thủ đô» (labour) gave an account of daily training scheduled at all levels, in all sectors and in all the territories where industrial parks are located. Just to give an example, it is possible to read the intensive scheduled training involving representatives of the construction sector, regarding CPTPP, the new FTA entered into force in 2019: ‘Công đoàn ngành Xây dựng Hà Nội: Tập huấn về CPTPP và vai trò của tổ chức Công đoàn’ (Trade Union of Hanoi Construction Industry: Training on CPTPP and the role of trade union organization), Lao Động Thủ đô, 23 November 2019. 39. The training activity of cadres and grassroots was codified in August 2019, by the VGCL, through a specific tutorial: Evaluation, Assessment of Quality of Basic Trade Union Activities General Labor Union of Vietnam. VGCL, n. 1294 / HD-TLĐ, 14 August 2019. 40. In the Bac Giang province, the calendar of meetings up to 2023 was defined in 2019. ‘Further communication to effectively implement cooperation agreement for trade unionist welfare’, Bac Giang On line, 6 November 2019.

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Committee and the Labor Federation has reinforced, with a twofold objective: to monitor the main critical issues concerning workers’ conditions and to identify solutions, both at trade union and local political level.41 Although the reforms constitute a step towards the acquisition of rights by workers, the risks arising from opening up to free bargaining cannot be underestimated. As noted by some analysts, the multiplication of union representatives signals the intrinsic weakness of the new unions, due either to lack of experience or, simply, lack of sufficient critical mass to support their requests.42

2.3. The new labour code and the strengthening of the VGCL’s bottom-up approach The Labour Code was last amended in 2012 and initially scheduled to be next revised in 2022. But the Vietnamese legislator started a new comprehensive revision process in 2017 to cope with the requests of the employers’ associations, and to adapt national legislation to international rules imposed by the new generation of FTAs.43 The most controversial parts concern minimum wage, maximum overtime hours and retirement age. It is no coincidence that the National Assembly’s Committee on Social Affairs held up to 14 meetings nationwide and made many field trips to collect comments related to the revision of the new Labour Code,44 the passing of which was postponed several times.

41. ‘Phối hợp xây dựng quan hệ lao động hài hòa’ (Coordinate to build harmonious labor relations), Lao Động Thủ đô, 12 May 2019; ‘Xứng đáng là chỗ dựa tin cậy của đoàn viên, người lao động’ (Labor Union of Ba Dinh District: Worthy is the reliable prop of union members and workers), Lao Động Thủ đô, 30 December 2019. 42. On the global weakness of the unions see Marcel van der Linden, ‘Global Labour: A Not-so-grand Finale and Perhaps a new Beginning’, Global Labour Journal, Vol. 7, No 2, 2016, Special Issue (May), Politics of Precarity - Critical Engagements with Guy Standing. On incumbent risks in Vietnam see Joe Buckley, ‘Vietnam Gambles on Workers’ Rights’, Jacobin, 7 July 2019. 43. We refer, in particular to the Europe-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) (entered into force on 14 January 2019) that both contain specific chapters on labour rules. The EVFTA’s labour provisions are included – along with provisions concerning the environment – in Chapter 13 «Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD)», and the CPTPP include requirements on «well established standards on labour» in Chapter 19. Although Chapters on labour are formulated on different legal culture approaches, both use non-binding language in formulating the request to equalise national legislation to the ILO’s Core Labour Standards. I.e. EVFTA uses a soft language of «continued and sustained effort toward ratifying […]». On this, see James Harrison & Mirela Bar- bu, Liam Campling, Ben Richardson, & Adrian Smith, ‘Governing Labour Standards through Free Trade Agreements: Limits of the European Union’s Trade and Sustaina- ble Development Chapters’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2018, pp. 1-18. 44. ‘Sửa bộ Luật Lao động: Tăng giờ làm thêm là bước lùi!’ (Revising the Labor Code: Increasing overtime is a step back!), VNEconomy, 6 August 2019.

298 Vietnam 2019

An agreement has been reached on minimum wage, which, starting in 2020, will increase on average by 5.5% on a regional basis (in 2017 the increase was 7.3%, in 2018 6.5%, and in 2019 5.3%).45 In this way, the highest wages (of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City) are aligned with Cambodia’s minimum wages (US$ 190).46 The most controversial part, however, was related to overtime, since companies and Minister of Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs Đào Ngọc Dung pressed to raise its limit to 400 hours per year.47 Conversely, most of the National Assembly members were in favour of the VGCL position, which wanted a restriction of overtime hours.48 The representatives of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) and Vietnam Textile and Apparel Association (VITAS), two of the most powerful employers’ associations, supported by foreign lobbies, such as the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI) and Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI), have been denouncing the alleged risks of overtime limits for the Vietnamese economy for years. Thanks to their influence on the media, they have managed to monopolise the debate, conveying the idea that the Vietnamese model is inadequate and non-competitive in comparison to other ASEAN countries.49 The greatest threat, according to these groups, is related to the loss of appeal among investors and to a consequent flight of capital to other countries.50 Their mantra, «employees and employers are in the same boat» proposes inclusive rhetoric and aims to create a tripartite system in which the government, the trade union and representatives of employers

45. Region I, Urban areas of Hanoi and HCMC, VND 4.42 mil. (US$ 190.57); Region II, Rural areas of Hanoi and HCMC, VND 3.92 mil. (US$ 169); Region III, Cities and districts of Northern Bac Ninh, Bac Giang and Hai Duong provinces, is poised to climb up to VND 3.43 mil. (US$ 148); Region IV, the rest of Vietnam, is poised to rise to VND 3.07 mil. (US$ 132). ‘Minimum wage set to increase by 5.5% in 2020: National Wage Council’, Viet Nam News, 12 July 2019. 46. ‘Minimum wage set at $190 for 2020’, Phnom Penh Post, 22 September 2019. 47. The Ministry of Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs already in 2018 insisted on raising overtime work up to 400 hours per year. See for example: ‘Over- time regulations need careful thought. Update’, 6 September 2018. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs, Meeting looks into amendments to Labour Code 2012, 3 May 2019. 48. ‘Đại biểu Quốc hội khóc khi đề nghị giảm giờ làm cho công nhân’ (National Assembly deputies cried at the request of reducing working hours for workers), Thư Ký Luật, 25 October 2019. 49. ‘Businesses renew request to double Vietnam’s overtime limit: commerce chamber’, VNExpress, 28 December 2017. 50. ‘Working hour reduction to create more difficulties: expert’, Vietnamnet Global, 3 September 2019.

299 Nicola Mocci are equal partners.51 Once all this has been pointed out, it is worth stressing that a tripartite system appears to be both unlikely and, given the weakness of the workers and their representatives, not desirable. In spite of the support given by the media to the position of the employers’ associations, the VGCL and the National Assembly won the arm wrestling. The new code confirmed, first of all, that overtime could be introduced only with the workers’ consent; also it could not exceed 50% of the normal working daily hours. In any case, the total number of normal working and overtime hours could not exceed 12 hours per day (VGCL proposed a 10-hour limit per day and 48 hours per week),52 no more than 40 hours a month, and no more than 200 hours in one year were permitted. However, this limit could be raised to 300 hours per year for a very long list of companies, covering most of the FDI-driven production sectors (textile, garment, footware, eletronics, electrics, agricultural processing, forestry, and aquatic products for export). The second topic under debate was the increase in the retirement age. The synthesis between different opinions was as follows: starting in 2021, retirement age in «normal working conditions» is 60 years and 3 months for men, and 55 years and 4 months for women. After 2021, retirement age will increase by 3 months for male employees and 4 months for female workers each successive year.53 By 2028 retirement age will reach 62 for male workers and in 2035 will reach 60 for women.54 Some exceptions to the above rule are provided for workers suffering from reduced working capacity, for those doing extremely heavy, toxic and dangerous jobs, and, finally, for those working in areas with exceptionally difficult socio-economic conditions. In these cases, workers may retire at a younger age, but the diminution in the retirement age cannot excede five years in respect of the approved limit, unless otherwise prescribed by law. Workers with high professional and technical qualifications and other special cases may retire at a higher age but without exceeding five years from the prescribed level.55

51. ‘Balancing Benefits between Employees and Employers’, Vietnam Business Forum, 23 August 2019; ‘Working hour reduction to create more difficulties for textile and garment in Vietnam’, Asian News Network, 4 September 2019. 52. ‘Working time and overtime regulations remain controversial’, Vietnam Law and Legal Forum, 7 September 2019. 53. Before the new Labour Code, the retirement ages were 60 years old for males and 55 for females. Employees could retire early and access their pension benefits when they had worked for 25 years for men or 20 years for women, providing that there had been five year of continuous work, or when they were in poor health and no longer able to work, after at least 15 years of continuous service. ‘Retirement age to rise as from 2021’, Vietnam Global Net, 20 November 2019. 54. ‘Quốc hội chính thức thông qua đề xuất tăng tuổi nghỉ hưu’ (The National Assembly officially passed a proposal to increase the retirement age), BizLIVE, 20 November 2019. 55. Ibid.

300 Vietnam 2019

Throughout the debate the VGCL played a decisive role in many choices. After a long period when it was nothing more than the transmission belt of government decisions to the workers, in recent years the VGCL aimed at representing the rights and interests of workers.56 However, it is reasonable to think that a deal between the VGCL, the VCP’s leadership and, in particular, the National Assembly has been reached in recent years, to anticipate the effects of unavoidable reforms of workers’ representations.

3. International relations: The multilateral diplomacy

The Vietnamese government hosting in Hanoi of the summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korea President Kim Jong-Un (27- 28 February 2019) was a high profile event both nationally and internationally. Although the summit was unsuccessful, Vietnam’s role in hosting it demonstrated that the VCP and the Vietnamese government are reliable partners for the international community in trade and diplomacy and that Hanoi can act as a facilitator in difficult international negotiations. In this perspective, what was also clear was Hanoi’s intention to play a unifying part as ASEAN’s chairman in 2019 and a trustworthy non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2020. In 2019 Vietnam was also completing its mandates as 2015-2019 member of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and 2017-2021 member of the UNESCO Executive Council.57 Thanks to these achievements, the Vietnamese government strived to strengthen its multilateral diplomacy, based on the political line indicated by the VCP in 1991 as well as repeating it in subsequent national congresses.58 Indeed, in the national defence policy area, Vietnam has built a network of bilateral and multilateral relations aimed both at the creation of a confidence environment in the region and addressing its own main security issues. From this perspective, Vietnam’s most urgent problems are the protection of the export system, ensuring the circulation of goods in the region,

56. Vincent Edwards & Anh Phan, ‘Employer’s associations in Vietnam: inch- ing towards tripartite engagement’, in John Benson, Ying Zhu & Howard Gospel (Eds.), Employers’ Associations in Asia: Employer Collective Action, New York: Routledge 2017, p. 155. 57. ‘Vietnam elected non-permanent UN Security Council member for 2020- 2021 term’, VNExpress, 7 June 2019. 58. During the VII Congress, in 1991, the VCP decided to expand international relations with different countries not necessarily belonging to the communist sphere and, since then, this political diplomacy has always been confirmed. See i.e. Communist Party of Viet Nam, Documents of the XIIth Party Congress, National Political Publishing House, Ha Noi, 2016, p. 313 and the official web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the page «Chính sách đối ngoại của Đảng và Nhà nước Việt Nam» (Foreign policy of the Party and State of Vietnam) http://www.mofa.gov.vn/vi/cs_doingoai/ ns140217213857.

301 Nicola Mocci and the assertiveness of China in the long dispute in the South China Sea. The publication of the new Defence White Paper (DWP) in November shed light on how Hanoi intends to tackle these problems. In the next paragraphs, first the characteristics of the new Defence White Paper and, then, the complicated relations with China and the US are analysed.

3.1. The new Defence White Paper and the complicated relationship with China In a ceremony led by Deputy Defence Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh, on 25 November 2019, the government released its 4th Defence White Paper.59 Since 1998, when the first DWP was released (the second in 2004 and the third in 2009), Vietnam’s defence priorities have profoundly changed. In the late Nineties, following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR, Vietnam had to necessarily avoid isolation. Its process of regional and international integration was successful. As a consequence, Vietnam’s security perspective and the list of threats also changed. Accord- ing to Nguyen Tung Vu, as soon as external threats ceased, poverty and economic backwardness, as well as corruption, inefficiency, and red-tape, directly challenged the legitimacy of the VCP leadership.60 In the first decade of the century, when economic progress made it possible to alleviate poverty and backwardness, the VCP initiated a new policy in the international arena, aimed at strengthening its legitimacy through proactive multilateralism. This approach allowed the VCP to achieve several goals, which among others included the internationalisation of the Spratlys and Paracels conflict with China. Still within this framework, Hanoi has strengthened relations with Washington, becoming a reliable partner of the US Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. It is probable that through its 2019 DWP, Vietnam wanted to highlight its strengthened autonomy within the FOIP, although without renouncing the benefits of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and India’s Act East policy. Its strategic doctrine is based on the core pillars of self-reliance and resilience (epitomised by the «three noes»: NO military alliance, NO alignments with one country against another, NO foreign military basis), and emphasises the peaceful settlement of all disputes as a main national goal. Moreover, in the 2019 DWP there appears both a fourth no (NO using force or threatening to use force in international relations) and a further, «depending-on-circumstaces» policy. This latest policy – which is enunciated in the statement: «depending on circumstances and specific conditions, Viet-

59. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Ministry of National Defence, 2019 Defence National Defence, ST National Political Publishing House. The full document is available on the Ministry of Defence website: http://www.mod.gov.vn. 60. Nguyen Tung Vu, ‘Vietnam’s Security Challenges: Hanoi’s New Approach to National Security and Implications to Defense and Foreign Policies’, Asia Pacific Countries’ Security Outlook and Its Implications for the Defense Sector, (NIDS Joint Re- search Series No. 5), Tokyo: The National Institute of Defense Studies, 2010.

302 Vietnam 2019 nam will consider developing necessary, appropriate defence and military relations with other countries»61 – does not allow an easy and clear interpretation. In fact, the «depending on circumstances» principle appears enigmatic enough to prompt different interpretations. Derek Grossman (RAND Corporation), Christopher Sharman (Stanford University), Bill Hayton (Chatham House) have maintained that it can be interpreted uni- vocally as a clear «warning to China».62 This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the DWP quotes China eight times and, in three cases, it does so negatively, in relation to Beijing’s destabilising behaviour in the South China Sea, as when the DWP states: «Divergences between Viet Nam and China regarding sovereignty in the East Sea [sic] are of historical existence, which needs to be settled with precaution, avoiding negative impacts on general peace, friendship, and cooperation for development between the two countries».63 Within these interpretations, some important elements are not taken into consideration and, therefore, defining the new DWP as a «warning to China» seems inappropriate. The two countries are well aware of each other’s national strategies and of the real capacities to implement them beyond their respective DWPs. Beijing remembers that, historically, Vietnam has always strongly opposed any expansionist attempts towards the south.64 For its part, Vietnam is aware of China’s national strategy, aimed at strengthening its role of hegemonic superpower, and knows the weight which the Exclu- sive Economic Zones (EEZ) carry for China. Hanoi’s China strategy, which takes all the above elements into consideration, has always been the continuance of appeasement towards China, even after the 2014 crisis,65 aimed at strengthening diplomatic ties with Beijing. At the same time, Vietnam has involved the international community in the South China Sea, while avoiding recourse to an arbitral tribunal, as The Philippines did in 2013. Finally, at regional level, Hanoi has urged ASEAN to amend the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea. Throughout 2019, China and the ASEAN countries actively advanced consultations on the COC, forecasting that the code will be completed by 2021. During the 22nd ASEAN – China Summit in Bangkok, Li Keqiang, the

61. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Ministry of National Defence, 2019 Viet Nam National Defence, ST National Political Publishing House, p. 24. 62. ‘Sách trắng Quốc phòng 2019 của VN «cảnh báo Trung Quốc»’ (Vietnam’s Defence White Paper 2019 «warns China»), BBC News Tiếng Việt, 29 November 2019. 63. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Ministry of National Defence, 2019 Defence National Defence, ST National Political Publishing House, p. 24. 64. Hong-Kong T. Nguyen, Quan-Hoang Vuong, Manh-Tung Ho & Thu-Trang Vuong, ‘The «same bed, different dreams» of Vietnam and China: How (mis)trust could make or break it’, TTU-ISR, Working Paper 1802, Version #1: 26, May 2018. 65. In 2014 China decided to plant a giant oil rig in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, sparking a major crisis in bilateral relations.

303 Nicola Mocci premier of the Chinese State Council stated: «We stand ready to work with Asean countries building on the existing foundation and basis to strive for new progress in the [code of conduct], according to the three-year time frame, so as to maintain and uphold long term peace in the South China Sea.»66 It is worth noting that Hanoi published its DWP on 25 November, four months after Beijing. Therefore, it is easy to think that each word has been weighted in order not to affect the diplomatic results that have been pursued for years. In particular, concerning the seas policy, the Chinese DWP stated that: China’s armed forces defend important waters, islands and reefs in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea, acquire full situation awareness of adjacent waters, conduct joint rights protection and law enforcement operations, properly handle maritime and air situations, and resolutely respond to security threats, infringements, and provocations on the sea.67 Although the Chinese objective to defend itself from any sort of threat is much more explicit than the enigmatic Vietnamese DWP («depending on circumstances»), Beijing did not dedicate more than a few lines to this matter. Secondly, the Vietnamese national strategy is preserving and promoting pacificist and humanist values. The recent social reforms, in compliance with international principles, or the peacekeeping intervention in South Sudan, are clear signs of the VCP’s international political line. A warning to China, at that moment, would have been an obvious contradiction, having repeatedly pronounced on the refusal to use or threaten the use of force in order to settle disputes. Thirdly, the Hanoi multilateral policy has made it possible to build strong relations with the US and the constellation of US allies in the Pacific, including India, Japan, and Australia. Although Vietnam and the US are not formal allies, military cooperation has also been further confirmed by the three-day visit of US Defense Secretary Mark Esper (19-21 November 2019). Esper told the audience at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam: «We will not accept attempts to assert unlawful maritime claims at the expense of law-abiding nations».68 It is relevant that, in this constellation of good relations, Russia is also present. In 2018, a military cooperation roadmap between Russia and Viet-

66. ‘Beijing pledges «long term peace» in the South China Sea where its Asean neighbours also stake claims’, South China Morning Post, 3 November 2019. 67. The People’s Republic of China, The State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in the New Era, July 2019, p. 11. Full text is available in Chi- nese and English on Chinese Government web site www.english.gov.cn 68. ‘US Defense Secretary Highlights Vietnam as Partner Against Chinese In- fluence’, The Diplomat, 21 November 2019.

304 Vietnam 2019 nam covering the period of 2018-2020 was signed, and in 2019 both agreed to accelerate the signing of documents to enhance cooperation, comprising the joint vision on defence cooperation during 2019-2023.69 In this regard, it is important to note that a Russian-state company has been working with Hanoi since 2018, to expand gas development projects in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, including drilling two new wells in the area falling within China’s self-proclaimed nine-dash line.70 This does not mean that behind the cooperation between Vietnamese and Russian oil companies there is an attempt to directly involve Russia in the South China Sea controversy, as Bennett Murray claimed.71 Bearing in mind that Moscow does not appear to have any interest in being involved in controversies in this region, it is more likely – as argued by Alexander Korolev – that Putin, by supporting China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, aims to act as a facilitator among the contenders.72 Based on these elements, Vietnam’s goal seems once again to refer to international law to resolve conflicts. According to the Vietnamese DWP: ASEAN and China have adopted a framework for a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea and are actively working on COC contents with a view to institutionalising commitments of parties to peace and stability in the East Sea, facilitating the management and resolution of disputes through peaceful means based on international law […].73 The document clearly distinguishes between countries that observe international codes and those that (the reference is to China) do not. Nguyen The Phuong, a researcher at Vietnam National University Ho Chi Minh City, proposed a further different and interesting interpretation of the enigmatic phrase in the DWP. One-depend, argued this analyst, «officially and significantly expands the spectrum of strategic choices by giving the military more room to maneuver, especially in handling its relationships with Western militaries.»74 However, the lack of sources shedding light on

69. ‘Vietnam, Russia foster defence cooperation’, Nhân Dân, 16 August 2019. 70. Huong Le Thu & Sunny Cao, ‘Russia’s growing interests in the South China Sea’, The Strategist, 18 December 2019. 71. Bennett Murray, ‘Vietnam’s Strange Ally in Its Fight With China’, Foreign Policy, 1 August 2019. 72. Alexander Korolev, ‘Russia in the South China Sea: Balancing and Hedg- ing’, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 15 (2), April 2019. 73. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Ministry of National Defence, 2019 Viet Nam National Defence, ST National Political Publishing House, p. 12. Also available at http://news.chinhphu.vn/Uploaded_VGP/phamvanthua/20191220/2019VietnamNa- tionalDefence.pdf. 74. Nguyen The Phuong, ‘Vietnam’s 2019 Defense White Paper: Preparing for a Fragile Future’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 17 December 2019.

305 Nicola Mocci the internal dynamics inside the Vietnamese armed forces makes any conclusion tentative.

3.2. The ignited South China Sea controversy If relations between Vietnam and China during 2019 were to be assessed only with reference to the tensions in the South China Sea, they could not but appear difficult. Nonetheless, the increasing interdependence between the two countries, especially in economic terms, sheds a different and more positive light on them. For almost ten years, China has been among the top ten sources of foreign investment in Vietnam. From January to No- vember 2019, FDI from China increased 1.65-fold reaching US$ 2.28 billion.75 Moreover, Hong Kong ranked second among FDI investors in Viet- nam, with a total registered investment capital of US$ 7.87 bn.76 Perceptibly, the controversy surrounding the South China Sea puts the two countries in an ambiguous position. On the one hand the Vietnam- ese are alarmed by China’s expansionist activities; on the other, Beijing aims at strengthening the «comprehensive strategic partnership» signed in 2013 with Hanoi and is sending positive messages for the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute.77 In 2018, during the 21st China-ASEAN Summit in Commemoration of the 15th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Stra- tegic Partnership, China’s Prime Minister Li Keqiang stated: China is ready to work with ASEAN countries toward concluding the Code of Conduct (COC) consultations in three years based on consensus. Greater stability in the South China Sea will be conducive to the peace and development of East Asia as a whole.78 In spite of Li’s conciliatory statement, in 2019 the South China Sea situation became more tense. In July, a Chinese Geological Survey ship accompanied by several escorts including China Coast Guard (CCG) ships, entered Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for seismic surveying in waters near Vanguard Bank (bãi ngầm Tư Chính).79 Hanoi responded by sending a small number of Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG) ships and other vessels to monitor the situation, demanding that China immediately cease

75. ‘Chinese investment in Vietnam surges’, VnExpress, 3 December 2019. 76. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Planning & Investment, Brief on foreign direct investment of 2019. 77. See i.e. the report of the last meeting held in Vietnam in December 2019 between the Vietnamese Foreign Minister and the large Chinese diplomatic group released by the Vietnamese Army newspaper: ‘Vietnam, China continue boosting comprehensive strategic partnership’, People’s Army Newspaper, 29 December 2019. 78. ‘Full text of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s speech at China-ASEAN Sum- mit’, Xinhua, 15 November 2018. 79. Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘A Difficult Summer in the South China Sea’, The Diplo- mat, 1 November 2019.

306 Vietnam 2019 its serious violations, withdraw all its vessels from Vietnam’s maritime zones and desist from repeating similar violations.80 The Vietnamese government tried to involve the international community, but the solidarity it received was very limited. Concern was raised by Japan81 and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, during his first visit in Vietnam, who, however, did not explicitly condemn Beijing’s actions.82 The United States did not go beyond complaining that China was using «bullying tactics» towards Vietnam.83 Nonetheless, the gift of a second US Coast Guard’s old patrol cutter was clearly aimed at boosting Vietnam’s ability to withstand the pressure of the Chinese Coast Guard.84 But it certainly does not resolve the issue. Hanoi’s reactions to the latest Chinese exhibition of arrogance have been firm but never threatening. The Vietnamese line has always been one of firmly referencing international law, while maintaining, in all circumstances, a low profile. As pointed out by Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyễn Xuân Phúc, in a speech delivered to the National Assembly: «What happened in the East Sea recently was getting very complicated, including serious violations in Vietnam’s sea recognized by international law […]. We will keep fighting in means in line [sic] with international law».85 For his part, Vietnamese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lê Thị Thu Hằng reiterated «that the Vanguard Bank lies completely within Vietnam’s EEZ and continental shelf, as delineated from the Vietnamese shore in accordance with the United Conventions on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) 1982, and that the Vanguard Bank is not a disputed area or with overlap- ping claims.»86

3.3. The ambiguous relationship with the US The trade war between the US and China, started in 2018, led many foreign companies operating in China, including the US ones, to move

80. ‘Biển Đông: VN yêu cầu TQ rút tàu và «không đe dọa hòa bình»’ (South China Sea: Vietnam requires China to withdraw ships and «not threaten peace»), BBC News Tiếng Việt, 22 August 2019. 81. ‘Japanese FM stresses need of upholding law in East Sea’, Việt Nam News, 28 August 2019. 82. ‘Lãnh đạo Việt Nam và Úc nêu quan ngại về căng thẳng Biển Đông’ (Viet- namese and Australian leaders raised concerns about East Sea tensions), BBC News Tiếng Việt, 23 August 2019. 83. ‘Pentagon accuses China of «bullying tactics» in waters off Vietnam’, Reuters, 26 August 2019. 84. ‘U.S. to provide ship to Vietnam to boost South China Sea patrols’, Reuters, 20 November 2019. 85. ‘Việt Nam never concedes in sovereignty matters: PM’, Việt Nam News, 22 October 2019. 86. ‘Việt Nam’s Vanguard Bank is not a disputed zone: foreign ministry’, Việt Nam News, 4 October 2019.

307 Nicola Mocci their manufacturing to other Southeast Asian countries, comprising Viet- nam.87 This process had direct repercussions during 2019, and two in particular were the most conspicuous. The first was the increase in exports from Vietnam to the US, mainly owing to the re-export of many Chinese products that receive «made in Vietnam» labelling and the replacement of Chinese products with Vietnamese ones. According to the US Census Bureau (Jan- Apr), US Imports from Vietnam have surged by 38% with a total of US$ 20.7 billion products compared to the same period in 2018. At the same time, US imports from China decreased by 12.8%.88 The second repercussion of the US-China trade war was the relocation of Chinese companies and Chinese FDI to Vietnam.89 Both these elements led to a trade surplus with the US – on track to reach US$ 50 billion in 2019.90 Nonetheless, the commercial maneuvers of Southeast Asia countries to bypass higher US tariffs did not pass unnoticed by the Trump administration. In June, the President himself described Vi- etnam as «almost the single-worst abuser of everybody».91 Words were soon followed by deeds. The US Commerce Department imposed duties of more than 400% on steel imports from Vietnam.92 Through the imposition of trade sanctions and threat of further commercial retaliation aimed at Hanoi, Trump achieved two results: Increasing imports of goods from the US to Vietnam;93 Obtaining Hanoi’s consent to ban Huawei, the giant Chinese multinational technology company, from supplying 5G telecoms equipment to Vietnam.94 The rise in the import of goods from the US did not create as much clamour as the Huawei ban. In August, state-run Vietnam National

87. ‘Apple assembler Foxconn considering iPhone factory in Vietnam – state media’, Reuters, 4 December 2018; ‘Apple weighs 15%-30% capacity shift out of China amid trade war’, Nikkei Asian Review, 19 Juin 2019. 88. See the figures at US Trade Census Bureau website: https://www.census.gov/ foreign-trade/balance/c5520.html. 89. ‘Vietnam seems to pick up more windfalls from US-China trade war’, Global Times, 7 July 2019; ‘Vietnam can hardly be «winner» of trade war’, Global Times, 31 July 2019; ‘Manufacturers Want to Quit China for Vietnam. They’re Finding It Im- possible’, The Wall Street Journal, 21 August 2019; ‘Vietnam gains ground in shift from China’, Financial Times, 17 September 2019. 90. ‘Trump’s targeting of Vietnam is misguided’, Financial Times, 16 September 2019. 91. ‘Vietnam Moves to Ease U.S. Tension With Trade, FX Monitoring’, Bloomb- erg.com, 7 May 2019. 92. ‘US slaps import duties of more than 400 per cent on Vietnamese steel to prevent companies exploiting loophole’, South China Morning Post, 3 July 2019. 93. ‘Vietnam’s US$5b plan to neutralise Trump’s tariff threats’, The Business Times, 25 September 2019. 94. ‘Trump’s targeting of Vietnam is misguided’, The Financial Times, 16 Sep- tember 2019.

308 Vietnam 2019

Coal-Mineral Industries announced it was negotiating to buy US coal, for the first time, from Xcoal Energy & Resources LLC. This is a company based in Pennsylvania, namely a state expected to play a pivotal role in the 2020 presidential election and where Trump won in 2016.95 In Sep- tember, news circulated of the fast-tracking by the Vietnamese government of a US$ 5 billion liquefied natural gas project in the southern Binh Thu- an province, aimed at building an import terminal gas-fired power plant, which would eventually import billions of dollars of US fuel into the country.96 Moreover, during Trump’s visit to Hanoi to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, Vietnam’s Bamboo Airways and VietJet Aviation JSC signed agreements to purchase 110 Boeing jets. State-owned Vietnam Airlines JSC said it was considering an order for 50-100 Boeing 737 Maxs.97 Last but not least, the Ho Chi Minh City municipality worked with US meat suppliers to help fill an estimated 500,000-tonne pork shortage – valued at US$ 1.29 billion – caused by a swine fever epidemic that had reduced Vietnam’s pig population.98 With regards to the 5G technology in Vietnam and the supposed ban on Huawei, there has been a great deal of emphasis from the Western press, used by the Trump administration to discredit China and Huawei. The Western press highlighted that the Hanoi government shunned Hua- wei in order to align with Trump’s wishes or, in different interpretations, as retaliation by Vietnam against China.99 Actually, according to the CEO of Viettel (Viettel Group, Vietnam’s largest mobile carrier owned by the defence ministry), Vietnam has been working for years on the autonomous development of 5G technologies, using Nokia and Ericsson equipment.100 Viettel’s CEO said: «We decided not to use Huawei, not because of the US ban on Huawei – we just made our own decision. Many other countries, including the US, have found evidence that showed using Hua- wei is not safe for the security of the national network. So we need to be more cautious.»101 With this project, Viettel is the sixth manufacturer in the world to develop 5G.

95. ‘Vietnam’s US$5b plan to neutralise Trump’s tariff threats’, The Business Times, 25 September 2019. 96. Ibid. 97. Ibid. 98. ‘Big pork shortage looms over Việt Nam’, Việt Nam News, 1 July 2019. 99. ‘Is Huawei a Security Threat? Vietnam Isn’t Taking Any Chances’, The New York Times, 18 July 2019. ‘Vietnam can’t cut China industry links over 5G issue’, Global Times, 28 August 2019. 100. ‘Vietnam shuns Huawei as it seeks to build Southeast Asia’s first 5G network’, South China Morning Post, 28 August 2019. 101. ‘Huawei might be excluded from Vietnam’s mobile networks’, International Finance, 27 August 2019.

309 Nicola Mocci

4. The economic resilience

During 2019, the macroeconomic data were extremely positive, above all thanks to the consequences of the commercial war between the US and China, which contributed to increasing exports and FDI. According to Gen- eral Statistics Office of Vietnam, the country’s exports amounted to more than US$ 217 billion in the first 10 months of 2019, with a year-on-year increase of 7.4%, and, during the same period, imports neared US$ 210 billion, a year-on-year increase of 7.8%.102 At the end of 2019, Vietnam’s trade surplus was US$ 11.12 billion, compared to a US$ 6.8 billion surplus in 2018. In the first five months of the year, Vietnam also drew FDI worth $16.74 bn, the highest in the period since 2015.103 Throughout the entire year of 2019, FDI into Vietnam reached US$ 20.38 billion, a 6.7% rise compared to US$ 19.10 billion in 2018.104 While the FDI offers the possibility of supporting GDP growth (in 2019 estimated by 6.8%, after the record 7.1% in 2018) and strengthening the export-led model, at the same time it contributes to the persistence of some critical issues concerning labour and the educational system. FDI is mainly oriented towards labour-intensive sectors, requiring unskilled or low skilled workers. The textile and garment industry, just to give an example, is striving to achieve an export turnover of more than US$ 40 billion in 2019, a year-on-year increase of 14-15%. According to Lam Thanh Ha, Chinese FDI still had either low technology content or used outdated technology, at the same Vietnamese level. In this way, rising competition between Chinese and Vietnamese companies produced a huge negative impact on the latter.105 For these reasons, replication of this development model stalled the government’s desire to invest in Industrial Revolution 4.0.106 Vietnam failed to attract foreign investment in high-tech, advanced technologies, environ- mentally-friendly practices, clean and renewable energy, advanced medical equipment, and health care services.

102. ‘Vietnam’s export rises 7.4 pct in 10 months’, Xinhua, 29 October 2019. 103. ‘Vietnam attracts record FDI’, VNExpress, 27 May 2019. 104. Ibid. 105. Lam Thanh Ha, ‘Chinese FDI in Vietnam: Trends, Status and Challenges’, Perspective, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 24 April 2019. 106. The debates on Industry 4.0 in recent years have multiplied and deepened, thanks to the stimuli of various stakeholders, public and private. Among other documents, the Summary of Viet Nam Industry White Paper 2019, Manufacturing and Sub- sector Competitiveness, edited by Vietnamese Ministry of trade and industry and United Nations Development Organisation in partnership with The Republic of Korea.

310 Myanmar 2019: «The Lady and the generals» redux?

Matteo Fumagalli*

University of St Andrews, Scotland [email protected]

The year 2019 has been extremely eventful for Myanmar, at home and abroad. Nearly three years have passed since the Myanmar military’s ‘clearance operations’ in northern Rakhine state, which led to the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees to neighbouring Bangladesh, where they are still temporarily settled in refugee camps south of Cox’s Bazar. Despite several aborted repatriation attempts, there is still no sign of a process that would not only see Rohingya refugees return to Rakhine state, but also of a system that would force the Myanmar authorities to regularise their status, let alone kick-start a reconciliation process. Politics in the country remains in flux, with State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi («the Lady», as she is commonly known in the country) and the military (the «Generals») at times agreeing and coordinating their actions, whilst at others competing with each other. Throughout the year, this has taken the form of a multi-cornered struggle over constitutional reform, with the political conflict set to intensify as the campaign for the 2020 parliamentary elections gets underway. Overall, three issues defined the year: first was the outbreak of a new insurgency in Rakhine state led by the Arakan Army, which later spread across the country’s northern and eastern borderlands. Next was the start of pre-election manoeuvring, with different parties vying for popular support. Last but not least, was the hearing at the International Court of Justice in The Hague in December, where State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi represented Myanmar, accused of genocide and failure to prevent genocide against the Rohingya in August 2017.

1. Introduction

As the country gears up for the 2020 parliamentary elections, the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD), the military and its surrogate party the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), ethnic parties and newly-established political formations are jockeying for influence and popular support. As always, politics in Myanmar eschews easy binary categorizations. Constitutional reform debate is an arena where civilian actors are in a struggle against military power1 and where the Lady and the Generals sit

* The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewers of the paper for their valuable comments. He would also like to express his gratitude to the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research Council (Research Networking Grant AH/S00405X/1) for its support to research in Myanmar. 1. Khin Zaw Win, ‘Twin authoritarianisms in Myanmar’, New Mandala, 13 September 2019.

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Matteo Fumagalli on opposite sides of the political divide. So is economic reform. Unlike the simple narrative articulated in «The Lady and the Generals»,2 though, this won’t be a «morality play» in which a single «good» player fights against the «evil» seemingly all-powerful system. Rather, Myanmar is home to a competition between two illiberal versions of «reform», one promoted by the military and the other by the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi.3 This is what is being offered ahead of the 2020 parliamentary elections. Beyond parliamentary politics, a new insurgency is engulfing Rakhine state and the country’s borderlands, this time sparked by the Arakan Army (AA) and the Northern Alliance, a loose grouping formed in December 2016 that alongside the AA includes the Kachin Independence Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. Here the civilian government and the military are cooperating as they seek to reduce violence and curb the influence and capability of the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). Internationally, with international actors split over their assessment of the 2017 events, the key event of the year was the State Counsellor’s appearance at the hearings in The Hague in December 2019, following the case brought by The Gambia to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN body of which Myanmar – as a member state – is part, and therefore has to abide by its rules and attend the hearings.4 Here, again Daw Suu5 and the military share an interest in countering what they perceive to be mis- understandings and mis-characterisations of the domestic situation in the country. In other words, what emerges is a complex tension which is neither permanent nor immutable. It is very much context-dependent. The article is structured as follows. First, I review the outbreak of a new insurgency in the western part of the country, led by the Rakhine state- based Arakan Army, from January onwards. Next I discuss the deepening conflict over constitutional reform which reignited in February through the summer. I subsequently turn to issues of economic reform, where progress has been slow and patchy despite some new and important government initiatives. I conclude the article with an expanded section on foreign policy,

2. Peter Popham, The Lady and the Generals: Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s struggle for freedom, London: Rider, 2016. 3. Melissa Crouch, ‘Illiberalism and democratic illusions in Myanmar, New Mandala, 20 November 2019. For a broader context of Myanmar’s transition and its challenges see Roman David & Ian Holliday, Liberalism and Democracy in Myanmar, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, and Thant Myint-U, Race, capitalism, and the crisis of democracy in the 21st century, New York: W.W. Norton, 2019. 4. Other countries, including Argentina, have tried to take Myanmar to other courts, national or international (such as the ICC), but Myanmar has refused to comply as it was not legally bound to do so. 5. In this article I use the names Aung San Suu Kyi, Suu Kyi and Daw Suu in- terchangeably, as the latter two expressions are widely used in the country to refer to the State Counsellor.

312 Myanmar 2019 where I discuss the lead up and the unfolding of the proceedings of the ICJ trial in The Hague, before concluding.

2. Domestic policy

2.1. A new insurgency erupts Violence in restive Rakhine state shows no sign of abating.6 On 4 Jan- uary 2019, militants of the Arakan Army launched attacks on four remote police outposts in northern Rakhine state, leaving 13 officers dead and nine injured, leading to an escalation of the conflict with the central authorities. Such clashes followed months of low-grade violence in the restive southwestern state.7 In recent years the domestic and international spotlight on the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the 2017 exodus have obscured the three-way nature of the conflict in Rakhine, which includes the government and the military (in this case acting as one as a result of the 2008 Constitution in which the Tatmadaw’s dominant role in security matters is enshrined), the local Rakhines and the Rohingyas.8 Far from being local pawns of the central government, the local ethnic Rakhines are at the same time the oppressors (from the Rohingyas’ perspective), but are themselves victims of neglect by the Bamars and the central government in Nay Pyi Taw. The immediate trigger for the January attacks was not immediately clear.9 Back on 21 December 2018, the Tatmadaw had declared a unilateral ceasefire in the country covering five military commands, with the notable exception of Rakhine state. The AA felt that the Myanmar military was re-directing resources from Kachin and Shan states to crack down on the group. The attacks signified a shift away from politics to insurgency as the primary means of addressing the grievances of local Rakhines. The insurgency did not exhaust the nature of the conflict in Rakh- ine state, though, which is multi-dimensional. Historical grievances date back to the wars between the Arakan Kingdom and the Burmese kingdom, with the latter annexing the former in 1785.10 The Anglo-Burmese wars that followed (1824–1826; 1852–1853; 1885) – which ultimately brought

6. For a brief background see International Crisis Group (ICG), A new dimension of violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine state, Asia Briefing 154, 24 January 2019. 7. ICG, A new dimension, p. 1. 8. Ibid., p. 2. This simplification conceals a much more complicated local dynamic resulting from the complex ethnic tapestry and contested history of the region. Other Muslim communities were affected by the violence, such as the Kaman, which unlike the Rohingya are citizens of Myanmar. There are other minority groups, such as the Mro and the Maramagyi that were also affected. 9. Ibid., p. 4. 10. Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps--Histories of Burma, New York: Farrar, 2006.

313 Matteo Fumagalli

Burma under British control – changed the spatial geographies of the region. Migration was encouraged and was common, and identities were neither fixed nor built around notions of ethnicity. World War II brought to the fore contrasting local loyalties, with groups in the borderlands typically siding with the British, whereas the Bamars initially stuck with the Japanese Imperial Army. The collapse of the British Empire and the fragmentation of the Indian sub-continent, with the creation of East Pakistan, the emergence of independent Burma first and finally the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan also super-imposed and crystallised Western concepts (nations, states, ethnicity, fixed borders) on a much more fluid reality. Ethnic Rakhines and Rohingyas could be found on either side of the Burma–Bangladesh border. Buddhist and Muslim communities straddled a recently-constructed state boundary. Historically, the Rakhines had very few organisations that would represent and pursue their interests. The Arakan Liberation Party and its armed wing the Arakan Liberation Army never managed to win much support among the local population. Until recently, Rakhine state, whose territory only constitutes 5% of Myanmar’s overall size and is home to 5% of its population, had not witnessed a powerful ethnic Rakhine insurgency group to give expression to their political aspirations, but since 2014 the Arakan Army (AA) has emerged as a powerful force to fill this void. The Arakan Army was formed in 2009 under the patronage of the Kachin Independ- ence Organisation (KIO)11 in Laiza, the location of the latter’s headquarters on China’s border. More than a decade after it was established in Laiza by 26 Rakhine youths in 2009, the AA has grown to about 7,000 militants.12 In recent years, the AA has grown in capability and has enjoyed rising popular support in the state.13 Initially mostly confined to KIA (Kachin Independ- ence Army)-controlled territory in 2014, the AA – with funding from the KIA and the United Wa State Army (UWSA), topped up with drug smuggling – tried to infiltrate southern China, and then far northern Rakhine state, engaging in sporadic clashes with state forces. AA militants then moved south towards Buthidaung, Ponnagyun, Ratherdaung and Kyauktaw townships in northern Rakhine state and Chin state’s Paletwa township.14 The ascent of the NLD and its sweeping electoral victories in 2015 have aggravated the underlying grievances in Rakhine. Oblivious to the support of local ethnic Rakhine parties, the NLD appointed a state chief minister from within its own ranks. Later on, it arrested Dr Aye Maung, a

11. On Myanmar’s rebel politics see David Renner, Rebel Politics. A political sociology of armed struggle in Myanmar’s borderlands, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019. 12. ‘Analysis: Arakan Army – a powerful new threat to the Tatmadaw’, The Ir- rawaddy, 8 January 2019. 13. ICG, A new dimension, p. 5. 14. Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships have traditionally had a strong Rohingya presence.

314 Myanmar 2019 popular Rakhine politician and opened fire on protesters in Mrauk-U on 16 January 2019.15 With local politicians targeted by the central government, the leadership vacuum among the Rakhine was successfully filled by the AA. Despite the victory of the Arakan National Party (ANP) in the state elections in 2015, the NLD government installed a minority NLD government. Violence continued throughout the year. On 15 August, an alliance of ethnic armed groups staged coordinated attacks against strategic targets in northern Myanmar. With the three groups behind the attacks being largely excluded from the peace process over the past five years, the government has proposed unilateral ceasefires. However, as the situation escalated beyond the confines of Rakhine state (such as in Shan state), the Northern Al- liance’s three ethnic armed organisations involved rejected the terms of the proposed bilateral ceasefire terms. The Northern Alliance staged attacks in the Mandalay region and Shan state on 15 August.16 The attacks hit a Myan- mar military training academy, a bridge, a police post, a military battalion, and a narcotics control checkpoint. There was limited retaliation at first, as the Tatmadaw considered this to be a retribution for a recent raid on a drug production lab in northern Shan state and primarily focused on securing infrastructure. The military also extended the temporary ceasefire. The immediate goal of the attacks consisted in relieving pressure on the AA in Rakhine state, an area not covered by the ceasefire, but home to significant fighting since January 2019. The AA’s attacks were deliberately provocative: they were notable for their intent, scale and impact. They were not aimed at acquiring new territory, but rather at inflicting maximum economic and strategic damage, with minimum use of force. Actually the issue fits into the broader long-standing tensions among the Northern Alliance members in the national peace process. Only signatories to the nationwide ceasefire agreement of 2015 can take part in political negotiations with the government.17 The Tatmadaw excluded these three groups by setting preconditions. The three EAOs recently shifted their position, signalling their openness to signing bilateral ceasefires. Over the past five years, the status of the AA, TNLA and MNDAA has been an important faultline in the peace process. The Tatmadaw tried to isolate the groups and exclude them from the national peace process. However, AA and TNLA have responded by strengthening their forces and expanding the territory under their control, whilst the MNDAA suffered a disabling defeat in 2009 and re-emerged in 2015. Rakhine, Kachin and Shan states were far from the only parts of My- anmar where the government and the Tatmadaw’s authority was visibly chal-

15. International Crisis Group, Myanmar: A violent push to shape up ceasefire negotiations, Asia Briefing 158, Yangon/Brussels, 24 September 2019. 16. Pauye Sone Win, ‘Myanmar Ethnic Rebel Alliance stages coordinated attacks’, The Diplomat, 16 August 2019. 17. International Crisis Group, Myanmar: A Violent Push.

315 Matteo Fumagalli lenged. In Wa state, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Myanmar’s largest non-state army of 30,000 troops, celebrated, on 17 April, the 30th anniver- sary18 of the insurgency against the Myanmar government and the coup by the Wa against the Communist Party of Burma. The three-day celebrations were a colossal display of military might, Wa cultural identity, autonomy and even the rapid influx of Chinese political, economic and cultural influence. The UWSA’s demands, also revolving around a confederal status, put the EAO at odds with the national ceasefire agreement.

2.2. The battle for constitutional reform: The country gears up for the 2020 elections Beyond rebel politics and the protracted conflicts in the borderlands between the EAOs and the armed forces, political posturing and positioning has begun in the year leading up to the parliamentary elections scheduled for late 2020. The protracted pre-election period of political contestation is likely to exacerbate ethnic tensions and heighten conflict risks. The NLD- led government has very few accomplishments to present to the electorate, which is quite possibly the reason behind its surprise decision of 29 Janu- ary 2019 to push forward with constitutional amendments. Constitutional change was a 2015 election campaign promise of the NLD.19 The peace process has been particularly difficult to deal with. All political actors want some kind of constitutional change and want to take the credit for achieving it. In contemporary Myanmar, Crouch notes, «the struggle is not between liberal visions or liberal versus illiberal»,20 rather, she contends, it is «between different versions of illiberal visions», all of which tend to favour exclusionary rule which excludes the Rohingya, but also a wide range of different «others».

Among the actors are the military, the USDP, ethnic political parties, and the NLD. The National League for Democracy was the first party to challenge the constitutional status quo in January, putting forward a motion to form a committee to consider constitutional amendments. The military- affiliated USDP responded by mounting opposition in the legislature and in the streets, emphasising how important it was (to them) to «retain the essence of the 2008 constitution», namely to keep a (veto) role for the military. NLD launched a process of constitutional amendment in February 2019, without the support of the unelected military representatives (who hold 25%

18. Dominique Dillabough-Lefebvre, ‘The Wa art of not being governed’, The Diplomat, 28 May 2019. 19. Melissa Crouch, ‘Renewed calls for constitutional change in Myanmar’s military-state’, East Asia Forum, 13 March 2019. 20. Melissa Crouch, ‘Illiberalism and democratic illusions in Myanmar’, New Mandala, 20 November 2019.

316 Myanmar 2019 of the seats). Taken as a whole, the politicking of each of these three groups made it clear that they will go their own way to capitalise on the rift ahead of the 2020 elections. According to the 2008 constitution, amendments must start in the legislature.21 The required steps are the following: one, 20% of sitting MPs submit a bill, two 75% of MPS approve the bill, and lastly 50% of eligible voters approve it in a referendum in the case of more substantial reforms. As the government had set up the constitutional amendments committee in parliament, the military’s representatives refused to vote in defiance. Protests broke out in Yangon in February, first by supporters of the military, followed by counter-rallies by pro-democracy protesters.22 In July, the committee completed its review; 3,765 recommendations – in a 353-page report – were submitted to the Union of Myanmar 2008 Constitution Amendment Joint Committee, 1,112 by the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, 114 from the National League for Democracy, 858 from the Arakan National Party, 641 from the Mon National Party, none from the military, and ten from the Union Solidarity and Development Par- ty. 23 It is worth recalling that no single bloc possesses sufficient votes to push through its own version of constitutional reform.24 In its political conflict with the ruling NLD, the USDP and the military focused their attention on Article 261, which regulates the appointment of chief ministers of states and regions. According to the 2008 constitution, the sub-national governments’ powers are limited. The USDP’s proposal was thus designed to allow the legislature and state and region level to appoint the chief minister. A measure towards decentralisation, this would have gone some way to alleviate one of the grievances in Rakhine, where the NLD appointed a chief minister from within its own ranks, despite the electoral victory of the Arakan National Party in state and national elections. It is clear that the USDP, like other domestic players, wants to boost its credentials for constitutional reform. The military proposed a new provision preventing Suu Kyi or anyone who has foreign citizenship or whose immediate family do to become a union minister, thereby seeking to broaden the scope of article 59(f) of the 2008 Constitution which bars the Lady from running for president. The same provision already exists in relation to the president, which is why Daw Suu has been unable to serve as president. In brief, the military’s position on the constitution revolves around three key

21. Nyi Nyi Kyaw, ‘Democracy first, federalism next? The constitutional reform process in Myanmar’, ISEAS Perspective, Issue 93, 8 November 2019. 22. Nyi Nyi Kyaw, ‘The constitutional protest cycle in Myanmar’, ISEAS Com- mentaries, 29 July 2019. International Crisis Group, Peace and electoral democracy in Myanmar, Asia Brief- ing 157, 6 August 2019. 23. San Yamin Aung, ‘Constitution amendment committee returns nearly 4,000 recommendations’, The Irrawaddy, 15 July 2019. 24. ICG, Peace and electoral democracy, p. 5

317 Matteo Fumagalli elements. First, is its ideology centred around three «national causes»: the non-disintegration of the union [the state of Myanmar], the non-disintegration of national solidarity, and the perpetuation of sovereignty, which the Tatmadaw regards as threatened by the ethnic insurgencies in the periphery. These three elements are the core of the military-state in Myanmar and the coexistence of the military and civilian authorities The NLD seeks to demilitarise the constitution by reducing the Mili- tary’s proportion of seats from 25% to 15%, then 10% and 5%, after 2020, 2025 and 2030 as well as to reduce the threshold for constitutional reform from 75% to 33%, de facto depriving the military bloc of its veto. Other proposals include that political leadership of the military will require a popular mandate, civilians will play a decisive role in the National Defense and Security Council (NSDC), and the commander in chief will lose his power over the executive, legislature and judiciary in emergencies, to be assumed by the president. And, unsurprisingly, the NLD proposed to remove 59(f) of the constitution. The smaller ethnic parties were similarly active. In a blunt challenge to the military, the Arakan National Party called for amendments allowing the legislature to be made up of only civilians, including – crucially – the removal of section 6f of the constitution which accords the military the leadership role in politics.25 Ethnic parties also sought a genuine restructuring of Myanmar into a federal state. The whole process did not result in constitutional change. Instead, the parties sought to capitalise on their proposals, and being perceived as playing a role in constitutional reform is a considerable source of political capital.

2.3. Gearing up for the 2020 elections: Party politics, radical ethno-religious organisations and the role of media in Myanmar society Electoral politics has become more active and competitive since 2018, when the NLD – after the 2015 landslide – lost some by-elections.26 The ruling NLD enjoys the dual advantage of being the incumbent party and the domestically unchallenged star power of Suu Kyi. That said, the party faces more competition than before,27 although the NLD faces no real opposition that can challenge its hegemonic position.28 The extent of the opposition, and its electoral strength, varies greatly depending on location. In central Myanmar, broadly speaking predominantly populated by Buddhist Bamar, the opposition is represented by the USDP. The party has fundamentally

25. ICG, Peace and electoral democracy, pp. 7-8. 26. Youngmi Kim, ‘The 2015 parliamentary and 2016 presidential elections in Myanmar’, Electoral Studies, 44, 2016, pp. 419-422. 27. Mary Callahan & Myo Zaw Oo, Myanmar’s 2020 elections and conflict dynamics, Washington, DC: USIP, Peaceworks, 146, April 2019. 28. Aung Aung, ‘Emerging political configurations in the run-up to the 2020 Myanmar elections’, Trends in Southeast Asia, ISEAS, 1, 2019.

318 Myanmar 2019 objected to anything the NLD has tried to do in policy terms.29 Although it has tried to portray itself as not immediately equivalent to the Tatmadaw, the party poses no real threat to the NLD at the polls.30 In recent months some new parties have been established, including the minor People’s Ci- vilian Party, but perhaps the most interesting of which is the Union Better- ment Party,31 founded by former general and Tatmadaw heavyweight and now «Lady-loyalist» Thura Shwe Mann, once ranked among the top three leading members of the junta, before being expelled in 2016. Designed to split the USDP vote, with its explicit focus on federalism and reform, it may instead end up competing with the NLD. The NLD’s refusal to consider a coalition government and its increasing reliance on the Lady – more than it already has! – or the iconography of her father, General Aung San, serve as stark reminders of how fractious politics still is in the country and how short of successors the NLD really is. What is not in short supply in Myanmar society is religious and ethnic nationalism. Political parties do not operate in a vacuum. Myanmar’s society is impregnated with religious and ethnic nationalism, of which the «Organi- sation for the Protection of Race and Religion», or Ma Ba Tha as it is commonly known, is the most vivid representation.32 Although the group has experienced a number of set-backs in recent years since the NLD came to power in 2016,33 including an actual ban, Buddhist nationalism has become much more mainstream, with little – if any – open political contestation in parliament or across society. A ruling by the official monkhood organisation State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee in July 2016 clarified that the Ma Ba Tha was not formed as an official Sangha (monkhood) organisation. An- other ruling in May 2017 that outlawed the group’s use of the name, and a similar order against new branding, Buddha Dhamma Parahita, followed in July 2018, after the Ma Ba Tha’s renaming of itself. Overall, though, it has taken quite some time for the NLD government to distance itself from the Ma Ba Tha and what the group represents in society. Even then, the group staged an anniversary event on 17 June 2019 with 4,000 monks, nuns and laypeople in attendance, and releasing a two-page statement depicting the Rohingya issue as a matter of security.34

29. Nyi Nyi Kyaw, ‘Old and new competition in Myanmar’s electoral politics’, ISEAS Perspective, Issue 104, 17 December 2019, pp. 4-5 30. International Crisis Group, Peace and electoral democracy in Myanmar, Asia Briefing 157, 6 August 2019. 31. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 32. The Ma Ba Tha emerged on the political scene in 2013, officially to defend Buddhist Myanmar against alleged islamisation. By 2015 it had promoted the drafting and passage of four antimuslim laws on race and religion in parliament. 33. Matthew J. Walton & Ma Kin Mar Mar Kyi, ‘Is this the end of Ma Ba Tha?’, Tea Circle, 2 December 2019. 34. Nyi Nyi Kyaw, ‘The return of Ma Ba Tha to the political scene in Myanmar’, ISEAS Commentaries, 20 June 2019.

319 Matteo Fumagalli

Alongside a poisonous and fraught political atmosphere, media freedom continued to be under siege.35 As Nyi Kyaw notes, the NLD is not directly cracking down on the press, but is softly repressing it while stig- matising the media outlets which it thinks are unfairly critical of the government.36 Two issues stand out as disturbing in this regard. First is the government’s widespread reliance on the criminal defamation law and the defamation clause in Section 66(d) of the 2013 Telecommunications Act. Citizens have been jailed for defaming Aung San Suu Kyi on Facebook. Another infamous case is that of the two Reuters journalists Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, detained in December 2017 and jailed in September 2018 under Section 3.1c of the 1924 Official Secrets Act (and later pardoned). The second is the emergence of an «anti-media populist narrative», foment- ed by Buddhist nationalists (including from the ranks of the former Ma Ba Tha), essentially accusing the media of pro-Muslim and pro-Rohingya bias. Myanmar’s troubled record on free speech continues as a court sentenced five members of a traditional theatrical troupe, the Peacock Generation, to a year in prison for satire against the military. Members of the Peacock Gen- eration were arrested and imprisoned in April.37 In August, another court found a film-maker guilty of «defaming» the military with his postings on Facebook and he was sentenced to a year in prison. Film-maker Min Htin Ko Ko Gyi has also been jailed since April.38 Facebook, long criticised for being lenient on online hate speech and the spread of fake news, especially in the run-up and during the 2017 atrocities in Rakhine state, has finally – slowly – begun to respond. «Facebook is the internet in Myanmar», notes Nyi Nyi Kyaw, and has served as a platform for hate speech in recent years.39 Belatedly, Facebook has removed hundreds of accounts and pages and has also hired more Burmese speakers to monitor local language pages and accounts.40 Lastly, in line with the broad-

35. Nyi Nyi Kyaw, ‘The hardening grip of Myanmar’s soft media repression’, East Asia Forum, 2 February 2019. 36. Ibid. 37. ‘Myanmar court gives actors 1-year jail term for satire’, The Diplomat, 31 October 2019. 38. ‘Myanmar: filmmaker jailing highlights rising rights concerns’, The Diplo- mat, 29 August 2019. 39. Nyi Nyi Kyaw, ‘Facebooking in Myanmar: from hate speech to fake news to partisan political communication’, ISEAS Perspective, 9 May 2019. Nyi Nyi Kyaw, ‘Even Facebook gears up for the 2020 general elections in Myanmar’, ISEAS Commentaries, 23 August 2019. 40. In August 2018, Facebook closed 18 Facebook accounts, one Instagram account and 52 Facebook pages, including that of the country’s Commander in Chief Ming Aung Hlaing (Matteo Fumagalli, ‘Myanmar in 2018: Botched transition and repatriation plan’, Asia Maior, XXIX, 2019). Further 13 pages and 10 accounts were closed on 15 October that year, and additional 425 pages, 17 groups and 135 accounts and 15 Instagram accounts on 18 December.

320 Myanmar 2019 er tendencies, the Myanmar Press Council (a quasi-governmental media adjudication and ethics body) defended the practice of using the term Bengali to refer to the Rohingya.41

3. Economy

High hopes, post the NLD victory in 2015, that the economy would take off have been dampened by a chronic economic slow-down, marked by a three-year consecutive decline in FDI, a weakening currency, high inflation, unstable government policies and, of course, armed conflict in Rakh- ine state and beyond.42 Talks of «Suukyinomics» aside,43 the NLD government has suffered from a lack of economic vision. Throughout 2019, the authorities have sought to rid themselves of this reputation by launching two landmark initiatives: the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP), aimed to achieve a «peaceful, prosperous and democratic country», and the Myanmar Investment Promotion Plan (MIPP), designed to transition Myanmar to a middle income country status and also persuade foreign investors to invest US$ 200bn over the next 20 years. The MSDP is structured around three pillars, five goals, 28 strategies and 251 action plans and is aligned to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. Besides these two initiatives, the government has also focused on its anti-corruption efforts,44 and it has modernised the Central Bank of Myan- mar, allowing the exchange rate to float. Crucially for the economy and the country’s competitiveness and attractiveness to foreign investors and its role

41. Shafiur Rahman, ‘Myanmar’s «Rohingya» vs «Bengali» hate speech debate’, The Diplomat, 21 December 2019. As discussed earlier in this article and also elsewhere (Fumagalli, ‘Myanmar in 2018’), the use of the ethnonym Rohingya is extremely contentious inside the country, and its legitimacy questioned by many, in politics and within society. Although this is the term used by members of the group to refer to themselves, Myanmar’s political actors, and many social and religious movements have sought, with success, to impose the use of the term Bengali, implying that the Rohingya are, in fact, ethnically Bengali and therefore originally from neighbouring Bangladesh. I find this a non-sequitur as shared ethnicity does not tantamount to a shared place of origin. In addition, even if one accepted this argument, one would run into the problem that the languages spoken by the Rohingyas and the residents of the Chittagong Division in eastern Bangladesh are not mutually intelligible with Bangla/Bengali as they belong to different language groups, suggesting therefore that the Rohingya could well be many things, but not Bengali. 42. Nan Lwin, ‘Myanmar’s 10 key economic moments of 2019’, The Irrawaddy, 18 December 2019. 43. Naing Ko Ko, ‘The emergence of Suukyinomics’, East Asia Forum, 1 March 2019. 44. Nyi Nyi Kyaw, ‘Frying just a few new «big fish»? Combating corruption in Myanmar’, ISEAS Perspective, 71, 9 September 2019.

321 Matteo Fumagalli on global supply chains, roads are being built and rail tracks upgraded. To this end, the NLD government has established an agency which acts as the backbone of public administration as part of its reform of PA.45 The agency has been removed from under the control of the (military-controlled) Min- istry of Home Affairs and has been placed into the Ministry of the Office of the Union Government, thus placing it in civilian hands and with civilian oversight. The move, already announced in December 2018, was important as it contributes to demilitarising the state apparatus. Fundamental structural problems persist though, primarily the role of the military in the economy, a phenomenon referred to in the literature as «khaki capitalism».46 Military enterprises were first established in the 1950s, the two most important of which are UMEHL (Union of Myanmar Economic Holding) and MEC (Myanmar Economic Corporation). These are profit-seeking military enterprises, constituting a major source of off- budget revenues, and are important employers of retired soldiers.47 His- torically, military capitalism has shaped Myanmar’s political and economy development since independence.48 Despite some timid government attempts to curb its economic influence, khaki capitalism is likely to remain a central feature of MMR political and economic systems as the off-budget revenues financially underpin the autonomous role that the military has crafted for itself. Nay Pyi Taw has actively pursued foreign investment. A first-ever international investment summit was held in January 2019 in Nay Pyi Taw, showcasing 120 projects worth US$ 3bn in ten states and regions, from city development to ecotourism, economic zones, industrial parks, power plants, mines and airport upgrades. Singapore is currently the largest investor in the country (US$ 20bn), having overtaken China over the past five years.49 About 305 Singaporean firms operate in the country, mostly in the ICT sector (73%), the remainder in manufacturing (14%) and real estate (4.6%).50 China and Singapore account for about half of FDI flowing into Myanmar, with the next biggest players being Thailand and Hong Kong (14% and 10% respectively).51 Northeast Asian countries are

45. Matthew B. Arnold, ‘Why GAS reform matters to Myanmar’, East Asia Fo- rum, 24 August 2019. 46. Gerard McCarthy, ‘Military capitalism in Myanmar: Examining the origins, continuities and evolution of ‘khaki capital’, Trends in Southeast Asia, 6, ISEAS 2019. 47. ‘Military capitalism’, p. 37 48. Marco Bünte, ‘The NLD Military coalition in Myanmar: Military guardi- anship and its economic foundations’ in Paul Chambers & Napisa Witoolkiat (eds.) Khaki capital. The political economy of the military in Southeast Asia, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, pp. 93-129. 49. Su-ann Oh, ‘Singapore is currently the biggest foreign investor in Myan- mar’, ISEAS Commentaries, 16 May 2019. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid.

322 Myanmar 2019 similarly active. Seoul’s Southbound Policy has paid particular attention to Myanmar.52 President Moon Jae-in has focused on boosting bilateral economic ties between the two countries. He has visited Myanmar, launched a new southern policy and boosted trade and investment, offering US$ 100m during 2018–2022 to support economic development. A Myanmar- Korean Business Forum has been established, alongside a Korean Myan- mar industrial complex in Hlegu, north of Yangon, where some 200 companies are expected to invest. Japan is playing a leading role in assisting financial reforms and attempts to achieve industrialisation and in order to defend its pre-eminent position as key donor and investor, cemented by the successful Thilawa Special Economic Zone (US$ 1.6bn), it has resorted to domestically welcome, but frankly uncalled for, expressions of support for the government’s official denial of charges of genocide for its handling of the 2017 events in Rakhine.53

4. Foreign policy

Although international criticism of Suu Kyi’s handling of the Rohing- ya issue predates the 2017 crisis, this was significantly compounded by the 2017 events and the lack of government action that followed.54 Addressing the Rohingya crisis remains visibly in a «state of deadlock».55 Two heavily- publicised repatriation efforts by the Bangladesh and Myanmar authorities, most recently on 22 August 2019, did not result in the return of any significant number of refugees. The 22 August date came and went, despite earlier announcements that 3,450 verified refugees were ready to return to Myanmar.56 Radically different expectations between the relevant parties remain unbridged. While the Rohingyas demand legal visibility as citizens

52. Chaw Chaw Sein, ‘A Memorable Train Journey to Celebrate Thirty Years of ASEAN-Korea Friendship’, Global New Light of Myanmar, 30 October 2019. For background, see Matteo Fumagalli, ‘The Making of a Global Economic Player? An Ap- praisal of South Korea’s Role in Myanmar’, Academic Paper Series, Korea Economic Institute of America, Washington DC, 16 February 2017 and Matteo Fumagalli ‘South Korea in Myanmar: Missing the train to Nay Pyi Taw?’, The Diplomat, 17 March 2017. 53. Tomoko Kikuchi & Takehiro Masutomo, ‘Japan goes long on Myanmar’, East Asia Forum, 21 June 2019. 54. Hnin Wint Nyunt Hman, ‘Why foreign policy matters to Myanmar’s democratic transition’, The Diplomat, 22 October 2019. 55. Su-ann Oh, ‘The Rohingya crisis, two years after: Impasses and deadlocks’, ISEAS Perspective, Issue 65, 25 August 2019. 56. Moe Thuzar, ‘Myanmar at the ICJ: Intent and implications’, ISEAS Com- mentaries, 22 November 2019. A first batch of refugees was supposed to return in January 2018, but was postponed amid safety concerns. In June 2018, UNHCR, UNDP and Myanmar signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the return of the refugees, which lacked guarantees on citizenship. A second attempt at repatriation took place in mid-November 2018, but this also fell through.

323 Matteo Fumagalli of Myanmar and recognition of their ethnicity, the Myanmar authorities would only concede naturalisation as citizens on its terms (as «Bengalis», that is). The alternative of course, from Nayi Pyi Taw’s point of view, is for the Rohingyas to stay in limbo in the camps. A third repatriation attempt took place in August and, again, issues of citizenship and recognition as a separate group hindered progress. It appears increasingly likely that they will remain in Bangladesh, where their status is also disputed, with the government refusing to grant them refugee status, regarding them as temporarily resettled Myanmar nationals. Overall, prospects for repatriation are bleak.57 As the Bangladeshi authorities struggle with security challenges near the refugee camps, they are also confronted with domestic political pressure as the local population, especially in and around Cox’s Bazar, are irritated by both the de- pressing effects of the Rohingyas’ protracted presence on the local job markets and the lack of progress in their repatriation. Dhaka insisted on construing and dealing with this as a displacement crisis and as a short- term challenge.

4.1. Aung San Suu Kyi in The Hague The key event of the year was the hearing at the International Court of Justice headquarters in The Hague in the Netherlands. The case was filed by The Gambia on 11 November.58 The ICJ is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations and, since Myanmar is a UN member, it has to abide by this and take part in the proceedings. The significance of the hearings, however, was primarily symbolic, as the Court cannot enforce its rulings and its decisions are not legally binding. The Gambia, relying on the provision that the ICJ can adjudicate disputes over such charges, brought this case on behalf of the 57-member Or- ganisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The allegations against Myanmar include «responsibility for genocidal acts and failure to prevent and punish genocide».59 In its case, The Gambia asked the Court to order provisional measures. The charges «stem from atrocities committed by the military forces in northern Rakhine state which have forced over 700,000 Rohingyas to flee to Bangladesh from August 2017».60

57. International Crisis Group, A sustainable policy for Rohingya refugees in Bang- ladesh, 27 December 2019. 58. The Gambia’s filing of the case on 11 November 2019 was merely the latest in a series of legal proceedings (attempts) against Myanmar. The International Crimi- nal Court, which also sits in The Hague, had earlier authorised a full probe into the 2017 events; however, the Myanmar authorities rejected the ICC probe and ignored a lawsuit filed in Argentina. 59. Richard Horsey, ‘Myanmar at the International Court of Justice’, Interna- tional Crisis Group, Q&A Asia, 10 December 2019. 60. ‘Myanmar at the International Court of Justice’.

324 Myanmar 2019

On 20 November, Myanmar announced that it would be represented by its State Counsellor, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. She would head the team and formally take on the role of «agent» of Myanmar. This was an unusually senior appointment for this type of circumstance, as typically this role would be taken up by a country’s legal team or less senior figures. However, Daw Suu’s English fluency and her being used to being in the international spotlight, combined, arguably, with her feeling that she should represent the country in such a problematic circumstance led to such decision. Hearings were held on 10-12 December. It is useful to revisit some excerpts of Suu Kyi’s statement in The Hague:

Regrettably, the Gambia has placed before the court an incomplete and misleading factual picture of the situation in Rakhine state in Myanmar. […] The troubles of Rakhine state and its population, whatever their background, go back past centuries. It cannot be ruled out that disproportionate forced was used by the members of the Defence Services. Please bear in mind the complete situation and the challenge to sovereignty and security in our country. Surely, genocidal intent cannot be the only hypothesis. Can there be genocidal intent on the part of a state that actively investigates, prosecutes and punishes soldiers and officers who are accused of wrong-doing?61

On the whole there was nothing new in Suu Kyi’s statement. She repeated the mantra that the outside world fails to understand Myanmar and its complex history and inter-group relations. Failing to mention the ethnonym Rohingya apart from when she referred to ARSA was also in line with past practices and silences. The claim that a country that is conducting an investigation on its armed forces’ actions cannot be charged of genocide, genocidal intent or failing to prevent genocide reached a new low in Suu Kyi’s long record of denial and callousness. Genocide denials were not restricted to Myanmar politicians. In unsolicited remarks, Japan’s ambassador Ichiro Maruyama to the country also alleged that no such thing had occurred in Rakhine state in 2017,62 adding that he hoped «the ICJ [would] reject the Gambia’s request that provisional measures be taken against Myanmar». At the same time, Maruyama did not rule out «human rights violations». The ICJ issued an order on 23 January 2020, in which it indicated four key measures in the dispute between the two parties. The decision was

61. ‘Transcript: Aung San Suu Kyi’s speech at the ICJ in full’, Al Jazeera, 12 December 2019. 62. Nan Lwin, ‘Japan backs Myanmar’s claim that no genocide occurred in Rakhine state’, The Irrawaddy, 27 December 2019.

325 Matteo Fumagalli taken unanimously, with all seventeen judges in favour of the operative part of the order.63 In paragraphs 79-82 the Court ordered Myanmar a) to take all measures to prevent the commission, against members of the Rohingya, of all acts listed in the Genocide Convention; b) to ensure that its military, irregular armed units, or any organisations or persons subject to its control, do not commit genocidal acts; c) to take effective measures to prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence related to the allegations of acts of genocide; d) to submit a report to the court on all measures taken to give effect to the Order within four months, and thereafter every six months until the final decision of the case.64 On the whole, the case and hearing’s international impact was broadly in line with earlier interpretations and framing of events. The views inside Myanmar remain diametrically opposed to those of much of the outside world. The predominant narrative inside Myanmar, once again articulated by Suu Kyi, is that «the world fundamentally misunderstands the country».

5. Conclusion

Although parliamentary elections are not going to be held until late 2020, government and political parties already started jockeying for positions. In fact, the main reason Aung San Suu Kyi elected to appear at the ICJ in The Hague in December 2019 had more to do with domestic political reasons than anything else, including any concern for the country’s tarnished international image. A number of challenges remain, from tackling economic issues to mismanaging the peace process and confronting the ethnic armed insurgencies. While ethnic parties and EAOs are vocal and important players, the main plot is an uneasy co-existence of a dual authority system between the civilian government de facto led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the Tatmadaw. On matters of national security, such as confronting the ethnic armed organizations and on the «Rohingya issue» the NLD-led government and the military share common goals and thus coordinate their actions, with the former oftentimes delegating the initiative to the latter. With regard to constitutional and economic reform and parliamentary politics more generally, however, relations were more competitive, bordering on the confrontational.

63. Mauro Politi, ‘Preventing the Rohingya Genocide in Rahkine: The ICJ Pro- visional Measure in the Gambia v. Myanmar’, T.note 83, Torino, twai (Torino World Affairs Institute), 2 March 2020. 64. Ibid., p. 1.

326 India 2019: The general election and the new Modi wave

Diego Maiorano

National University of Singapore ISAS (Institute of South Asian Studies) [email protected]

In the first part of 2019 India was shaken by two major political events. In February, a major terrorist strike hit Pulwama, in Jammu and Kashmir, which was followed by airstrikes by the Indian Air Force into Pakistani territory. This episode set the tone for the 2019 general elections, which were held in April-May. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which focused its campaign on national security issues in the wake of the Pulwama attack, won a resounding victory, improving both its vote and seat share. This article argues that the main factor that contributed to the exceptional performance of the BJP was the popularity of the Prime Minister, Narendra Modi. His image as the strong leader that the country needed to both protect it from external and internal enemies as well as promoting development was crucial for many voters, who decided not to punish the ruling party for a far from spectacular economic performance over its term in office.

1. Introduction

At the end of 2018, an observer of Indian politics could have easily predicted what would be the major political event of 2019: the general elections in which Prime Minister Narendra Modi sought a second mandate. At the end of the year, however, it is clear that the general elections were only one – and perhaps not the most consequential one, in a longer term perspective – of the crucial political developments of the year. In fact, after Modi’s resounding victory in May 2019, when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) obtained an even larger majority in the Lok Sabha, the newly elected government took a series of important decisions that will shape In- dia’s future trajectory for years. In particular, the decision taken in August 2019 to revoke the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, the amendment to the Citizenship Act of December 2019 and the decision, in the wake of a controversial decision of the Supreme Court in the Ayodhya dispute in November 2019, to build a temple dedicated to Ram where once stood the Babri Masjid, will likely have fundamental repercussions on India’s politics and society for decades to come. This article will deal with the political and economic developments of the first part of the year, focusing in particular on the general elections. A separate article in this issue of Asia Maior will cover the events in the second part of the year.

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Diego Maiorano

2. The background to the general elections

Twelve months before the general elections, most analysts predicted that the BJP was not going for a «cakewalk»:1 while the saffron party and its leader remained highly popular, especially in the ten crucial Hindi-belt states, a number of factors pointed towards an uphill battle for the BJP. First, the economy had not performed well, particularly in rural areas, where the majority of the voters live (as we will see below). Second, some coalition partners, like the Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh and the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, quit the governing coalition. Third, some opposition parties seemed to be coming to terms with the idea that, to defeat the BJP, they had to bury the hatchet and strike a deal. In particular, the two historical enemies of Uttar Pradesh (UP), the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), held extensive talks during 2018 and the first months of 2019 that resulted in what looked like a formidable political alliance in India’s most populous state.2 Furthermore, in late 2018, the results of the state elections in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, where the Congress took over from the BJP in all three states, reinforced the belief that the 2019 general elections would indeed not be a cakewalk for Modi and the BJP.3 The economic situation seemed to be particularly problematic for the BJP. First, by the time Indian voters went to cast their vote, India’s GDP growth had been slowing down for five consecutive quarters to 5% (Table 1). Considering the serious questions raised by economists about the reliability of India’s GDP figures – which have been revised repeatedly during Modi’s term4 – the slowdown was likely to be even more severe than what official data portrayed. Former Economic advisor to the Prime Minister, Arvind Subramaniam, for instance, estimates that growth between 2011/12 and 2016/17 has been inflated by 2.5%.5 In fact, as Subramaniam notes, most economic indicators point towards a significant contraction of economic activity over the last few years, which are not reflected in the still relatively healthy GDP growth figures. In any case, even if one was to take the official figures at face value, there is little doubt that the economy has performed poorly during the year preceding the general election.

1. Milan Vaishnav, ‘From Cakewalk to Contest: India’s 2019 General Election’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2019. 2. Neelanjan Sircar, ‘What UP tie-ups portend for BJP in Lok Sabha polls’, Hindustan Times, 20 March 2019. 3. Michelguglielmo Torri & Diego Maiorano, ‘India 2018: political uncertainty and economic difficulties’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 266-273. 4. Ibid. 5. Arvind Subramanian, ‘India’s GDP Mis-estimation: Likelihood, Magnitudes, Mechanisms, and Implications’, CID Faculty Working Paper No. 354, 2019 (https:// www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/cid/publications/faculty-working-papers/india-gdp- overestimate).

328 India 2019 (1)

Table 1 – quarterly GDP Growth Financial years (FY) 2018/19 and 2019/20. Quarter GDP Growth Q1 8 Q2 7 FY 2018/19 Q3 6.6 Q4 5.8 FY 2019/20 Q1 5 Source: CEIC. (https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/india/real-gdp-growth)

Second, as shown by a series of articles by the reputed newspaper Business Standard,6 data collected by the National Statistical Office (NSO) in 2017/18 – and never released by the government, citing «quality data issues» – show that real monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE) declined by 3.7% between 2011/12 and 2017/18. This had never happened before over the previous 40 years. The aggregated data mask a sharp divergence between rural and urban areas: whereas the real MPCE grew by 2% in cities, in declined by 8.8% in rural areas. An even sharper decline was recorded in rural food expenditure (9.8% over the same six years). This might have caused an increase of the proportion of people below the poverty line from 31.15% to 35.10%.7 Third, job creation during Modi’s term was exceptionally low. As shown by another Business Standard report, based on leaked NSO data – also not released by the government because of «data quality issues» – unemployment reached 6.1% in 2017/18, the highest figure ever recorded and three times as high the figure recorded in 2011/12.8 It should be noted that unemployment figures do not capture disguised unemployment or underemployment, thus underestimating the scale of the job problem. However, the jump in unemployment rates is at least partly due to the fact that a higher percentage of the youth receives an education that make them aspire to blue- or white-collar, formal jobs. Given the high growth rates seen in India over the last few decades, it is reasonable to conclude that at least part of the formally unemployed come from families that can support them through unemployment, so that they are not forced to take

6. Somesh Jha, ‘Consumer spend sees first fall in 4 decades on weak rural demand: NSO data’, Business Standard, 15 November 2019. 7. This calculation is based on the Rangarajan Committee Poverty line, which has been criticised as being unrealistically low. See S. Subramanian, ‘What is Happening to Rural Welfare, Poverty, and Inequality in India?’, India Forum, 12 December 2019. 8. Somesh Jha, ‘Unemployment rate at four-decade high of 6.1% in 2017-18: NSSO survey’, Business Standard, 6 February 2019.

329 Diego Maiorano up agricultural or other informal jobs. On the other hand, the inability of many educated youth to find a job that meets their expectations also resulted in a sharp decline of the Labour Force Participation Rate, signalling that a growing number of youths are not even looking for a job anymore. While these trends reflect medium-term dynamics that started before Modi came to power, it is clear the Modi’s promised to create 25 million jobs per year did not materialise.9 Fourth, the economy performed particularly bad in rural areas. The agricultural crisis is not of BJP government’s creation. Its roots lie in decades of declining public and private investments; the side-effects of climate change, resulting in a growing unpredictability of the monsoon; fragmentation of landholdings across generations; international price volatility and lack of reform.10 However, especially when compared with the terms in office of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) (2004-14), agrarian distress certainly deepened, as shown by three crucial macroeconomic indicators.11 First, nominal Gross Value Added (GVA) of agriculture – which is a good proxy for living standards of those who directly depend on agriculture for their livelihoods (about 44% of the population) – declined sharply during Modi’s term, while the non-agricultural nominal GVA increased.12 This has two implications: the first one is that the terms of trade for farmers and agricultural labourers worsened; the second is that, since nominal agricultural GVA has grown in single digit since 2014 and has grown less than real GVA (indicating deflation of agricultural prices), farmers’ income has grown very slowly and, presumably, unequally.13 Second, and relatedly, food inflation collapsed. Over the five years of the Modi-led government, the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) for food articles increased by 15.7%. In the months preceding the elections, the WPI turned negative.14 This, of course, benefited urban consumers as well as agricultural labourers, but also hurt farmers who sell their surplus. As a comparison, between 2005 and 2012, the WPI for food articles had increased by over 120%, creating the opposite problem of hurting consumers of food and benefiting producers, while benefiting surplus-producing

9. Santosh Mehrotra, ‘The shape of the jobs crisis’, The Hindu, 11 February 2019. 10. Himanshu, ‘India’s Farm Crisis: Decades Old and with Deep Roots’, India Forum, 5 April 2019; Michelguglielmo Torri, The Agrarian Crisis in India, typescript, 2019. 11. This section relies heavily on Diego Maiorano, ‘The 2019 Indian Elections and the Ruralization of the BJP’, Studies in Indian Politics, 7, 2, 2019, pp. 176-190. 12. R. Kishore, ‘Farm policy’s 3 dilemmas’, Hindustan Times, 2 June 2019. 13. Harish Damodaran, ‘Farm income growth slumps to a 14-year-low in Oct- December 2018’, The Indian Express, 3 March 2019. 14. Himanshu, ‘India’s Farm Crisis’.

330 India 2019 (1) farmers.15 Agricultural markets were also negatively impacted by the shock of demonetisation, which, according to a World Bank study, had a severe impact on rural areas (albeit a short term one).16 Third, also as a consequence of slow food inflation, which contributed to keep wage pressures low, real wages of agricultural labourers did not grew much. Between October 2007 and October 2013, real rural wages grew on average by about 7% per year. After November 2014 (until October 2018), the rate of growth dropped below 2% per year.17 For large farmers who employ substantial labour, low pressures on wages certainly helped mitigating the effects of low prices for their agricultural products, while labourers did not see their purchasing power being eroded excessively. To sum up, at the beginning of the year under review, the BJP’s prospects did not look good. On the one hand, the party had lost three important state elections and the degree of opposition unity – a crucial determinant of electoral results given India’s First-Past-The-Post electoral system – was certainly greater than in 2014, particularly in UP. On the other hand, the performance of the economy had been far from spectacular and had certainly failed to bring about the acche din (good days) that Modi had promised five years earlier.

3. The Pulwama terrorist attack and the electoral campaign

On 14 February 2019, a suicide bomber attacked a convoy of paramilitary forces in Pulwama district in Jammu & Kashmir, killing 40 – the deadliest attack in Jammu & Kashmir in over three decades. The attacker, Adil Ahmad Dar, a resident of Pulwama, belonged to the Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), which claimed responsibility for the attack.18 Modi immediately blamed Pakistan for the strike, threatening that those responsible for the attack «will pay a heavy price».19 The Prime Min-

15. Author’s calculations based on data taken from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. It should be noted that the data for 2014-19 are based on the new WPI series (2011-12 prices), whereas the 2005-12 data are based on the old series (2004- 05 prices). Therefore the two are not strictly comparable. 16. Robert C. M. Beyer, Esha Chhabra, Virgilio Galdo, & Martin Rama, Measur- ing Districts’ Monthly Economic Activity from Outer Space (Policy Research Working Paper 8523), World Bank Group, South Asia Region, Office of the Chief Economist, July 2018. 17. Sujata Kundu, ‘Rural Wage Dynamics in India: What Role does Inflation Play?’, Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers, 40, 1, 2019. 18. ‘Kashmir attack: Tracing the path that led to Pulwama’, BBC News, 1 May 2019. 19. ‘PM Modi warns Pakistan, says terrorists will pay heavy price for Pulwama attack’, The Times of India, 15 February 2019.

331 Diego Maiorano ister faced a major political challenge at that point. The attack represented a major security breach, which could have been exploited by opposition parties. In fact, the government had claimed, just a few weeks before the Pulwama attack, that there had not been any major terrorist strike since Modi came to power.20 However, Modi orchestrated a major military-cum- PR operation aiming at presenting himself as the strong leader that the nation needed against its external and internal enemies. The cornerstone of that operation was the bombing, by the Indian Air Force, of a JeM training camp in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province on 26 February 2019. It was the first time that the Indian armed forces crossed the Line of Control since the 1971 war. India’s retaliation should be (also) seen as a PR operation for at least two reasons. First, it is not clear whether the targeted terrorist camp was still operational. According to documents disclosed by Wikileaks, it seems that a JeM training camp was in fact located near Balakot, where the strike occurred.21 However, it is likely that most training camps in the area were relocated after the 2005 Earthquake.22 Second, India’s claims to have killed «a large number» of terrorists23 could not be verified by independent sources. A series of analyses by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute,24 which used high-resolution satellite data to assess the damage inflicted by the airstrikes, suggest that Indian jets might have missed the target, as no visible damage was caused to the buildings of the camp.25 European Space Imaging, a private company based in Germany, also provided satellite images that show no damage in the wake of the air strike.26 The magazine India Today, on the other hand, accessed satellite images provided by the Indian government, showing holes in the roofs of the targeted buildings.27

20. This was a questionable statement, given that two attacks (in Pathakot and Uri) were defined as «major» by the government itself. ‘Has there been no major terror attack in India since 2014?’, BBC News, 23 January 2019. 21. Asad Hashim, ‘At raid site, no casualties and a mysterious school’, Al Jazeera, 28 February 2019. 22. Maria Abi-Habib, After India’s Strike on Pakistan, Both Sides Leave Room for De-escalation, New York Times, 26 February 2019. 23. ‘India destroyed JeM camp, killed «very large number» of terrorists and trainers: Foreign secretary’, The Times of India, 26 February 2019; ‘Pak says India committed «aggression», Islamabad has «right to respond»’, The Times of India, 26 Febru- ary 2019. 24. This is an Australian government-funded think tank based in Canberra. 25. Marcus Hellyer, Nathan Ruser & Aakriti Bachhawat, ‘India’s strike on Bala- kot: a very precise miss?’, The Strategist, 27 March 2019. 26. ‘PAKISTAN: Satellite Imagery confirms India missed target in Pakistan airstrike’, European Space Imaging, 8 March 2019. 27. ‘The inside story of IAF’s Balakot strike’, India Today, 16 March 2019.

332 India 2019 (1)

On the basis of this evidence, it seems reasonable to assume that India wanted to react firmly to the attack by conducting an airstrike inside Pakistan territory, but, on the other hand, did not want to cause damage on such a scale that could provoke a war. The choice of the target – apparently to minimise civilian and army causalities – seems to confirm this view. The Pakistani Air Force retaliated the following day, conducting an airstrike in India’s Jammu & Kashmir, causing no damage. However, an Indian jet which involved in the subsequent dogfight, was shot down in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir and the pilot captured. He was released by the Pakistani government on 1st March as, in the words of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan, a «peace gesture» towards India.28 The safe return of the pilot effectively put an end to the military confrontation between India and Pakistan. The political consequences were significant. A survey conducted immediately after the Balakot air strike, showed a remarkable jump in Modi’s popularity – from 32% at the beginning of the year, to 62%. At the same time, national security suddenly became a major electoral issue – while only 4% of the voters had mentioned it as a key electoral issue in early 2019, 26% did so after the strikes.29 The importance of «national security» as a key electoral issue waned in the weeks preceding the start of the polling operations on 11 April 2019, but it clearly had an impact on the BJP’s strategy, which focused predominantly on the issue. In a marked contrast with the 2014 electoral campaign, when Modi presented himself as the «development man» who would bring achhe din («good days») to India, in 2019 Modi’s (and the BJP’s) campaign centred around national security. This can be seen from an analysis of Modi’s speeches during the month of March, when the word «defence» was mentioned significantly more than «bread and butter» issues such as «infrastructure», «farmers» or «development» (Figure 1).

28. ‘Abhinandan: Captured Indian pilot handed back by Pakistan’, BBC News, 1 March 2019. 29. Ronojoy Sen, ‘Can BJP sustain the bounce from Pulwama and Balakot?’, ISAS Brief No. 646, 9 April 2019.

333 Diego Maiorano

Figure 1 - Most and least mentioned topics in Modi’s speeches in March 2019

Source: Diego Maiorano & Ronojoy Sen, The 2019 Indian General Election and its Implications, South Asia Scan, Issue No. 6 (February 2020, in print), Institute of South Asian Studies, NUS.

There is some evidence that the airstrikes helped the BJP. According to post-poll data collected by the Centre for the Study of Developing Socie- ties (CSDS), those who had heard about the strikes were much more likely to vote for the BJP, compared to those who were not aware of the strikes. Considering that as many as 76% of the voters had heard about India’s attack, this might have contributed to the BJP’s victory.30

30. Pranav Gupta & Dishil Shirmankar, ‘How Nationalism Helped the BJP’, Seminar, Vol. 720, August 2019.

334 India 2019 (1)

The aftermath of the Pulwama attack might have benefited the BJP also in a more indirect way because of what political scientist call «issue ownerships». Different political parties are seen by the voters as more or less competent in dealing with certain issues. This reputation is the result of long-term strategies by political parties and their leaders. Not only has the BJP made «nationalism» a central element of the party’s identity since its foundation in 1980. But Narendra Modi has constructed an image of himself as a strong, hyper-nationalist leader over the course of his terms in office as Gujarat Chief Minister first and Prime Minister later. It is likely that most voters saw Modi (and the BJP) as more «competent» than any other opposition leader in dealing with terrorism and ensure national security, contributing to expanding the party’s voter base.31 To sum up, it is likely that the Pulwama attack and the subsequent airstrikes contributed to moderating the impact of a poor economic performance in determining the BJP’s electoral performance. They definitely shaped the electoral campaign, which was dominated by national security issues. According to the CSDS post-poll data, those who were dissatisfied with their own economic condition (31% of the respondents), but had heard about the Balakot strikes, were 6% more likely to vote for the BJP that those who had not.32

4. The electoral results

While most analysts and polls had predicted that the BJP would emerge as the single largest party in the Lok Sabha, the scale of the party’s victory took most by surprise. Table 2 summarises the results.

Table 2 – 2019 General election results

Alliance Alliance Seat Vote share Alliance Vote seat vote share Party Seats difference difference (seats) share difference difference 2014-19 2014-19 2014-19 2014-19 BJP 303 +21 37.4 +6 Shiv 18 0 2.1 +0.2 NDA Sena +17 +5.42 (353) JD(U) 16 +14 1.5 +0.4 LJP 6 0 0.5 0 Others 10 - - -

31. Ibid. 32. Cross tabulation of raw data provided by the CSDS’s National Election Study (NES) 2019 to the author.

335 Diego Maiorano

INC 52 +8 19.5 0 UPA DMK 24 +24 2.3 +0.5 +32 -1.59 (92) NCP 5 -1 1.4 +0.1 Others 11 - - - MGB BSP 10 +10 3.3 -0.5 NA NA (15) SP 5 0 2.5 -0.8 Left CPM 3 -6 1.7 -1.5 Front -5 -1.7 (5) CPI 2 +1 0.6 -0.2 Others Others 78 - - - - - (78) Source: Election Commission of India. Legend: CPI: Communist Party of India CPM: Communist Party of India (Marxist) DMK: Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam INC: Indian National Congress JD(U): Janata Dal (United) LJSP: Lok Jan Shakti Party MGB: Mahagathbandhan NCP: Nationalist Congress Party NDA: National Democratic Alliance UPA: United Progressive Alliance

Using post-poll data by the CSDS it is possible to appreciate in more detail the scale of the BJP’s victory. The party not only managed to increase substantially its seat and vote shares as compared to the 2014 elections – which, at that time, were deemed «historical» because of the surprisingly good performance of the BJP – but attracted more voters from all segments of society. Table 3 provides a breakdown of the BJP’s support across classes.

Table 3 – BJP’s support by class (percentages of respondents)

Rural Urban Total 2014 2019 2014 2019 2014 2019 Poor 23 35.8 26.4 37.8 24.2 36.2 Lower 29.6 36.5 34.9 32.9 31.2 35.5 Middle 31.9 38.7 32.9 34.6 32.3 37.7 Rich 38.6 42.8 36.7 46.5 37.9 43.9 Total 30.1 37.6 32.7 36.7 31 37.4 Source: Cross tabulation of raw data provided by the CSDS’s National Election Study (NES) 2014 and 2019 to the author.

The table clearly shows the remarkable increase of support for the BJP across classes. However, it is the truly spectacular increase of support

336 India 2019 (1) among the poor and the lower classes – both in rural and urban areas – that is striking, especially considering that the BJP has usually been associated with a predominantly upper caste/class, urban constituency. Table 4 rein- forces this point by showing the support of the BJP across caste categories.

Table 4 – BJP’s support by caste category (percentage of respondents)

2014 2019 Scheduled Classes 22.2 31.6 Scheduled Tribes 34.7 39.9 Other Backward Classes 31.1 37.7 Upper castes 35.9 40 Total 31 37.4 Source: Cross tabulation of raw data provided by the CSDS’s National Election Study (NES) 2014 and 2019 to the author.

In short, the BJP was able to expand its support base across classes and castes, but the greatest gains were amongst the lower sections of the society (whether in class or caste terms). The only two social categories that did not increase their support for the BJP are Muslims (stable at 8% of the community) and other minorities, whose support for the BJP actually declined.33 The expansion of the BJP’s support base was not limited to social categories, but it also had a geographical dimension. Before the elections, several factors suggested that the BJP would not be able to replicate its 2014 performance in the ten Hindi-belt states, from where the party had won the great majority of its seats. These factors included the formation of the Grand Alliance in UP (Mahagathbandhan, a seat-sharing agreement between the BSP and the SP), which should have cut significantly the proportion of seats of the BJP in the state; and the results of the state elections in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, where the BJP had lost to the Congress party barely six months before the General elections. Howev- er, the Mahagathbandhan managed to win only 15 seats in UP, which contributed to bring down the BJP’s tally in the state from 71 in 2014 to 62 (out of 80). On the other hand, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh voted massively in favour of the BJP, which pocketed 62 out of 65 seats in the three states. Overall, the BJP won 58% of its seats (or 177 out of 303) from the ten Hindi belt states, thus substantially maintaining a firm dominance over the area. In 2014, the party had won 68% of its seats from these ten states (or 193 out of 282).

33. Christophe Jaffrelot, ‘Class and Caste in the 2019 Indian Election–Why Have So Many Poor Started Voting for Modi?’, Studies in Indian Politics, 7, 2, 2019, pp. 149-60.

337 Diego Maiorano

The (minor) losses of the BJP in the Hindi belt were compensated by gains in two states, where the party had hitherto been a marginal force. In West Bengal, the BJP increased its seat share from 2 to 18 and its vote share from 18 to 40.2% (mainly at the expenses of the CPM, whose vote and seat share collapsed). In Odisha, the BJP won 8 seats (up from 1 in 2014) with a vote share of 38.4% (over 16% higher than in 2014), effectively dislodging the Congress as the main opposition party in the state. Finally, the BJP’s victory was remarkable for another reason, namely the significant expansion of the party in rural India.34 Figure 2 is constructed using a dataset compiled by Mohit Kumar from the Trivedi Centre for Politi- cal Data at Ashoka University. It maps 2011 Census data onto constituencies’ borders and includes data on the proportion of residents who are engaged in agricultural activities (farmers and agricultural labourers). The dataset has the advantage of letting us classify all of India’s constituencies on the basis of the proportion of residents whose livelihoods directly depend on agriculture. The figure shows the BJP’s strike rate (SR), (i.e. proportion of seats that the party won out of those that it contested) and vote share (VS) in three types of constituencies: urban (defined as those where the proportion of people engaged in agricultural activities is lower than 10%), «rurban» (where the proportion is between 10 and 30%) and rural (above 30%).

Figure 2 – BJP’s vote share in urban, «rurban» and rural constituencies 2009-19.

Source: Author’s calculations.

As the figure shows, the BJP’s performance improved substantially in all types of constituencies. However, it is significant that the party managed

34. Diego Maiorano, ‘The 2019 Indian Elections and the Ruralization of the BJP’, Studies in Indian Politics, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 2019, pp. 176-90.

338 India 2019 (1) to retain its support in rural constituencies, notwithstanding the ongoing agricultural crisis. The greater gains, however, were in semi-urban constituencies, where a substantial proportion of what Jaffrelot35 calls «neo-middle class» live. This refers to a social group of people who have recently escaped poverty, have some form of education and aspire to join the ranks of the middle class and have been a key element of Modi’s constituency since the time he was chief minister of Gujarat. The expansion of the BJP in rural India is now a medium-term phenomenon, which accelerated remarkably in 2014, but whose origins can be traced back to the 1990s.Nti. That the BJP is consolidating and expanding its support base in rural areas is also confirmed by CSDS data (Table 5).

Table 5 – Support for Main Parties among «farmers» and «non-farmers»

Difference 2014 2019 2014-19 Congress 19 20 +1 Farmers BJP 29 39 +10 Others 37 27 -10 Congress 20 19 -1 Non-farmers BJP 32 37 +5 Others 39 30 -9 Source: Cross tabulation of raw data provided by the CSDS’s National Election Study (NES) 2014 and 2019 to the author.

The table shows how «farmers» (a category that includes both land- owners and agricultural labourers) were more likely to support the BJP than other voters. Additionally, the BJP’s support among «farmers» increased dramatically between 2014 and 2019 and it is now higher that among non- farmers. This seems to be driven by the sharp decline of support by «other» parties, which in many cases are regional parties that built their support base among the farming community, especially in North India.

5. Explaining the BJP’s victory

While complex political phenomena like elections never have a single underlying cause, the 2019 Indian general elections approximate that extreme. In fact, Narendra Modi’s popularity looms large in any explanation of the electoral outcomes. The Indian case seems to be an almost

35. Christophe Jaffrelot, ‘Gujarat elections: The sub-text of Modi’s «hattrick»– High tech populism and the «neo-middle class»’, Studies in Indian Politics, 1, 1, 2013, pp. 79-95.

339 Diego Maiorano perfect example of what recent scholarship has called the «prime ministerialisation» of parliamentary elections, a terms that underscores the importance of political leaders in driving electoral results in Parliamentary democracies.36 The importance of Narendra Modi’s leadership in determining electoral outcomes is both a consequence as well as a cause of the process of marked centralisation that occurred in recent years both within the BJP and within the government. Modi and Amit Shah are firmly in control of the party apparatus, having side-lined effectively the party’s «old guard» over the course of Modi’s first term in office. In fact, not only was the BJP’s electoral campaign extremely Modi-centric – the main slogan was Bar, Modi Sarkar («Once again, a Modi government») – but most candidates explicitly campaigned in the name of Modi.37 On the other hand, the Prime Minister not only micro-manages the work of several ministries, but also successfully linked himself to the government’s most visible policy initiatives. For instance, the government introduced (or re-branded) several welfare schemes after 2014, most of which had the «Pradhan Mantri» («Prime Minister») pre- fix attached to the policy’s name. This, coupled with the enormous amount of resources spent by the government on advertising its policies on the media – which invariably include a picture of the Prime Minister,38 – contributed to establish a link between government action and Modi. In fact, analysis of CSDS data shows that the Modi government was able to take credit for welfare policies much more than its predecessor, even for policies (like the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, MGNREGA) that were introduced by the UPA government.39 The centrality of Modi is also reflected in the media coverage that the Prime Minister received. Not only did Modi receive more coverage than all other national political leaders put together during the electoral campaign, but the kind of coverage tended to be generally favourable to him and the party.40 This is at least partly due to Indian media’s business model, that heavily relies on government’s advertising for their profitability and viability. A report by Reuters41 claimed that the govern-

36. Keith Dowding, ‘The prime ministerialisation of the British Prime Minis- ter’, Parliamentary Affairs, 66, 3, 2013, pp. 617-35. 37. Sandeep Shastri, ‘The Modi Factor in the 2019 Lok Sabha Election: How critical was it to the BJP Victory?’, Studies in Indian Politics, 7, 2, 2019, pp. 206-18. 38. Akshay Deshmane, ‘How Much Did Modi Govt’s Advertising Blitzkrieg Cost Taxpayers?’, Huffington Post (India), 8 July 2019. 39. Rajeshwari Deshpande, Louise Tillin & K.K. Kailash, ‘The BJP’s Welfare Schemes: Did They Make a Difference in the 2019 Elections?’, Studies in Indian Poli- tics, 7, 2, 2019, pp. 219-33. 40. Raksha Kumar, ‘India’s Media Can’t Speak Truth to Power’, Foreign Policy, 2 August 2019. 41. Devjyot Ghoshal, ‘Modi government freezes ads placed in three Indian newspaper groups’, Reuters, 28 June 2019.

340 India 2019 (1) ment banned advertisement on at least three news groups (which publish, among others, The Times of India, The Hindu and The Telegraph), allegedly as a retaliatory measure against unfavourable reporting. To give an idea of how significant the ban could be for a news group, an executive of the Times Group (which publishes newspapers like The Times of India and The Economic Times) told journalists that government advertisement constitutes about 15% of the total. Many newspapers – which are sold for a fraction of their production cost – are so desperate to get additional revenues that a sting operation by Cobrapost even claimed that some of the country’s leading media houses were willing to accept cash in exchange for helping the BJP remain in power.42 Modi’s personal popularity is also directly linked to two of the major assets of the BJP, namely financial resources and party organisation. Modi’s BJP is incommensurably richer than all other political parties. Even taking into account only the self-declared income of the political parties – which is a gross underestimation of the actual financial resources available – the difference between the BJP and the second-richest political party, the Con- gress, is huge and widening. Before the 2014 elections, the two parties had a similar amount of (self-reported) resources at their disposal. However, in 2017-18, the Congress’s income was merely a fifth of that of the BJP43 and corporate donations were twenty times as high for the BJP than for the Con- gress in 2018.44 In an even more staggering figure, the BJP collected 95% of the donations collected through the newly introduced electoral bonds.45 Clearly that Modi’s popularity increases the incentives of corporations to fund the BJP. Party organisation has also been influenced by Modi’s popularity, as it galvanised the BJP’s party workers and attracted many into the party’s fold. Under the leadership of Amit Shah, the BJP has been able to build up a sophisticated and capillary party machine. The BJP allocated every single page of the electoral rolls to party workers, with the objective of reaching out to them to canvass support.46 The party has also created an army of party workers that bombard voters through hundreds of thousands of social

42. As is the case with all sting operations, even the findings of this one should be taken with a pinch of salt. However, it is a fact that they were important enough to deserve to be discussed by the Indian media, which hardly happened. See Justin Rowlatt, ‘The story barely reported by Indian media’, BBC News, 28 May 2018. 43. Niranjan Sahoo & Niraj Tiwari, ‘Political funding: How BJP and Congress compete for every piece of the pie’, ORF – Observer Research Foundation, 25 April 2019. 44. Milan Vaishnav & Jamie Hintson, ‘The Dawn of India’s Fourth Party Sys- tem’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5 September 2019. 45. Ruling BJP got 95% of funds: Why there’s an uproar over electoral bonds, Business Standard, 5 April 2019. 46. Ibid.

341 Diego Maiorano media pages and Whatsapp groups.47 This unparalleled machine has contributed significantly to spreading the BJP’s message. The importance of Modi’s leadership can also be assessed comparing electoral results at the state level, where elections were held just a few months before or after the general elections (Figure 3).

Figure 3 – BJP’s vote share in state and national elections 2018-19

Source: Election Commission of India

The major differences in the BJP’s vote share between state and national elections show, first, that Indian voters vote very differently for different levels of the polity, even when the two elections are held at the same time (Odisha). Second, they suggest that Modi’s popularity does make a substantial difference to orient voting behaviour. This is also confirmed by CSDS data. Sardeep Shastri48 shows that Modi’s popularity was a crucial element In the 2019 elections. Two points are worth noting. First, Modi was the preferred Prime Minister candidate by 46% of the respondents, up from 35% in 2014. Rahul Gandhi came at a distant second at 22%. Modi’s lead was even higher among younger and more educated voters. Second, among those who voted for the BJP, about one third (32%) said that they would have voted differently, had Modi not

47. Prashant Jha, How the BJP wins: inside India’s greatest election machine, New Delhi: Juggernaut, 2017. 48. Sandeep Shastri, ‘The Modi Factor in the 2019 Lok Sabha Election’.

342 India 2019 (1) been the Prime Ministerial candidate. Among BJP-allies voters, one fourth responded likewise.

6. Conclusion

The first half of 2019 was dominated by the general elections that brought Narendra Modi’s BJP back to power with an even larger majority. While the party’s prospects at the beginning of the year did not look very promising, the BJP was able to impose an electoral narrative based on national security, in the wake of the Pulwama attack and India’s response. This reinforced the image of the Prime Minister as the strong leader that the country needs to both protect it from threats and to bring about «development for all». In fact, the Prime Minister’s popularity rests on both elements: nationalism and development. As argued by Suhas Palshikar, Modi was able to bring the two ideas together to form a formidable ideological narrative that underpins the BJP’s electoral hegemony.49 In fact, the twin idea of nationalism and development is at the centre of the Modi «brand». This is much more than «image». A political brand, like a commercial one, tries to associate itself with certain values with which voters (customers) want to identify.50 Modi has been able to associate his brand with values such as pride (to be Indian) and hope (for a better future). Political branding of leaders is an effective way to broaden a party’s electoral support and to cut across classes and ethnic divisions, by appealing to voters’ emotions, rather than canvassing support solely on the basis of the government’s record.51 This might well explain why the BJP was able to draw support from virtually all social groups in India, thus overcoming one of the party’s «structural weaknesses», namely its association with the urban, upper castes and classes. It also helps explaining why the BJP performed so well despite a disappointing record in the economy. Political branding also relies on the continuous emergence of policy initiatives that resonates with the brand values. Modi’s government did exactly that over its first term. The government launched innumerable initiatives like the Make in India Campaign, Swachh Bharat,52 Beti Bachao Beti Padhao,53 Skill India, demonetisation, ‘Surgical Strikes’, the widely

49. Suhas Palshikar, ‘Toward Hegemony’, Economic and Political Weekly, 53, 33, 18 August 2018. 50. Eleonora Pasotti, Political branding in cities: The decline of machine politics in Bogotá, Naples, and Chicago, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 51. Ibid. 52. Clean India Campaign. This is a sanitation programme. 53. Save the daughter, educate the daughters. This is a programme targeted at young girls.

343 Diego Maiorano publicised meetings with the diaspora in New York, London and other foreign cities, Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana,54 bullet trains, the Interna- tional Yoga day, various space missions to name just a few. Each of these initiates (also) aimed at reinforcing Modi’s brand as the man who could make Indians proud and who could fulfil their hopes and aspirations. It matters little that most of these initiatives did not result in any tangible achievement. The important point, politically, is that the grand announcements, the omnipresent publicity, the innumerable social media pages and an army of party workers bombarded the electorate with a constant flow of information about what the government was doing for the greater good of the country. As a growing body of evidence from across the world shows, voters’ policy preferences or the actual performance in office matter much less than emotions in determine electoral outcomes.55 Modi’s brand struck a chord in the heart of enough Indians to bring him back firmly at the helm of India’s political system. On the other hand, the importance of Modi in determining the BJP’s electoral performance also means that the party’s dominance might be more fragile than what it appears. As the results of numerous state elections over the last five years show, the BJP, despite its incomparable financial and organisational power, is far from unstoppable, even in the Hindi belt, where the party is much more firmly rooted.

54. This is a financial inclusion programme, aiming at providing every household with a bank account. 55. Drew Westen, The political brain: The role of emotion in deciding the fate of the nation, New York: Public Affairs, 2008.

344 India 2019: Assaulting the world’s largest democracy; building a kingdom of cruelty and fear*

Michelguglielmo Torri

University of Turin [email protected]

The seven months starting with the formation of the second Modi’s government in May 2019 and the end of the year were characterised by the systematic and massive assault on democracy launched by the incumbent government. The highpoints of this assault were basically two. The first was the hollowing out of two key articles of the Constitution, which had guaranteed the autonomy of Jammu & Kashmir, the only Union state with a Muslim majority, followed by its dismantling as a state and its transformation into an internal colony brutally ruled through military force. The second highpoint was the attempt to modify the concept of Indian citizenship by introducing a religious criterion aimed at excluding persons of Muslim religion. Both moves appeared to be in contrast with the Indian Constitution; however, the Supreme Court studiously avoided contrasting the Modi government’s policies. The most important Supreme Court’s sentence in the period under review, far from being related to the possibly unconstitutional activities of the government, dealt with the Ayodhya question and de facto justified the destruction of the Babri Masjid by Hindu extremists in 1992. Eventually a reaction to the country’s slide towards authoritarianism set in at the beginning of December, when a mass movement against the modification of the secular concept of citizenship spread in large parts of India and was harshly repressed in the Union states governed by Modi’s party, the BJP. Modi and his closest aides, while focussing their efforts on the assault on democracy, seemed to be disinterested in the disappointing economic situation, possibly as a consequence of their inability, during the previous term, to manage it properly. Hence, the real dimensions of the slowdown, resulting from the first Modi government’s mismanagement of the economy became increasingly evident. As evident became the inability of the new finance minister to redress the situation. Ominously, by the end of the period the GDP appeared to be sliding back to the infamous «Hindu rate of growth», namely the slow growth characterising the years from 1950 to 1980.

1. Introduction: The health of India’s democracy in the morrow of Narendra Modi’s victory

What was the state of the world’s largest democracy in the morrow of Narendra Modi’s smashing victory in the 2019 general election was pointed

* The title has been borrowed from an article of Prem Shankar Jha (‘This Inde- pendence Day Was a Grim Reminder of a Nation Running on Empty Promises’, The Wire, 19 August 2019), where Jha decries «the kingdom of lies and fear» that India has become.

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Michelguglielmo Torri out with great clarity of mind by Trinamool Congress’s newly elected MP Ma- hua Moitra on 25 June 2019. In her maiden parliamentary speech, Moitra, while «humbly accepting the resounding mandate» that the BJP had obtained, denounced the fact that there were «signs everywhere» that India was «being torn apart». She listed seven of them: a «nationalism that is searing into our national fabric», and which was both «superficial» and «xenophobic»; a «resounding disdain for human rights», which was «permeating every level of the government» and causing «a 10-fold increase in the number of hate crimes between 2014 and 2019»; «an unimaginable subjugation and controlling of mass media»; «an obsession with national security and the identification of enemies»; a situation in which religion and government had become «intertwined»; «a complete disdain for intellectuals and the arts», which included both «a suppression of all dissent» and the cut of funding «for liberal education»; and, lastly, «an erosion of independence in [India’s] electoral system». All the above seven signs – pointed out Moitra – were included in a 2017 poster, put up in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and listing the signs of early fascism. Her conclusion was straightforward: «There is a danger of fascism rising in India. It is incumbent upon all of us to stand up to it».1 If Mahua Moira erred, it was on the side of caution, rather than on that of exaggeration. As detailed by several sources – including articles published in this journal – since Narendra Modi’s victory at the 2014 general election, the democratic situation in India had continuously deteriorated. In the words of a Human Rights Watch report, Indian authorities had «failed to protect religious minorities, used draconian sedition and counterterrorism laws to silence peaceful dissent, and invoked foreign funding regulations and other laws to discredit and muzzle nongovernmental organizations critical of government actions or policies».2 As noted by Moitra herself in her maiden speech, lynching, mainly for religious reasons, had continued unabated, without any serious effort by the Modi government to put an end to it. In fact, according to Human Rights Watch: «Instead of promptly investigating cow-protection attacks and prosecuting perpetrators, the police, in at least a third of the reported cases, have filed complaints against victims’ family members and associates under laws banning cow slaughter. Coun- ter complaints against witnesses and family members have often served to make them afraid to pursue justice. In some cases, witnesses turned hostile because of intimidation both by the authorities and the accused».3 The situation of the journalists critical of the national government and the BJP state governments was hardly more favourable. According to a

1. ‘Full text of Mahua Moitra’s Lok Sabha speech that landed her in plagiarism row’, The Print, 5 July 2019. 2. Human Rights Watch, India: Mounting Human Rights Abuses, 14 January 2020. 3. Human Rights Watch, Violent Cow Protection in India. Vigilante Groups Attack Minorities, 18 February 2019.

346 India 2019 (2) research funded by the Thakur Family Foundation, published in December 2019 and focused on the 2014-19 period, in those years there were 198 serious attacks on journalists, including 36 in 2019 alone. In fact, journalists had been «fired upon, blinded by pellet guns, forced to drink liquor laced with urine or urinated upon, kicked, beaten and chased». They had had «petrol bombs thrown at their homes and the fuel pipes of their bikes cut». These attacks had resulted in «40 killings of journalists between 2014-19».4 The police’s and judiciary’s response to these attacks had been luke- warm at best: in a majority of cases the police had not even started an investigation; while, in most remaining cases, the investigation had gone nowhere.5 Of course, this stood for the journalists who had not been killed as a result of the attacks on them. But killing a journalist did not involve much risk of retribution. Significantly, chapter II of the Thakur Foundation report was entitled: ‘Deaths: Near-Zero Rate of Conviction’.6 Lynching of members of the religious minorities, attacks on and murders of journalists, the apathy of the police or their hardly disguised complicity when dealing with these crimes were worrying by themselves. However, they simply were the end product of the government’s increasingly brazen tendency to silencing dissenting voices. This could affect ordinary citizens – as the «popular Manipuri video vlogger» who was remanded to judicial custody on 17 December 2019 for posts critical of the Manipur chief minister and the BJP7 – as well as opposition politicians (on this more later). While jailing opposition politicians was not a practice unheard of in pre-2014 India, it had always been presented as something exceptional, justified by extraordinary circumstances. What changed after 2014 – and even more starkly following the 2019 general election – was the fact that what had hitherto been presented as an exceptional practice was now justified as the norm: as unambiguously stated by BJP National General Secretary Ram Madhav, «preventive arrest is part of political activity».8 Sadly, already in the morrow of the 2019 general election, India increasingly appeared as a case study fully supporting Harvard Profes- sors Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s thesis on how democracies may die. According to the two scholars, democracies nowadays may die «at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders – presidents or prime minis-

4. Geeta Seshu & Urvashi Sarkar, Getting away with Murder. A Study on the Kill- ings of and Attacks on Journalists in India, 2014-2019, and Justice Delivery in These Cases, Thakur Foundation, December 2019. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. ‘Vlogger in Manipur jailed for posts critical of chief minister and BJP’, Scroll. in, 22 December 2019. 8. Liz Mathew, ‘Ram Madhav: «Preventive arrest part of political act… Sheikh Abdullah was in jail for decades»’, The Indian Express, 11 September2019; Ipsita Chakravarty, ‘The Daily Fix: Under the BJP, detaining opposition leaders has become politics as usual’, Scroll.in, 12 September 2019.

347 Michelguglielmo Torri ters who subvert the very process that brought them to power». As highlighted by Levitsky and Ziblatt, «Some of these leaders dismantle democracy quickly … More often, though, democracies erode slowly, in barely visible steps».9 The slow erosion of democracy, «in barely visible steps» was, indeed, what had happened during Modi’s first term as prime minister. But, beginning with his victory at the 2019 general election, the «barely visible steps» became highly discernible, very bold and destructively long strides. It is on the Narendra Modi’s government increasingly bold and brazen assault on democracy that most of the remainder of this article is focused. Additional space will be given for an examination of the economic evolution of the country, if not for any other motive because it is clear that the first Modi government’s abject failure in promoting economic development was one of the reasons behind his second government’s shift of emphasis to the edification of an authoritarian Hindu Rashtra.

2. Narendra Modi’s new government

Before moving on to the main theme of this article, some words on the composition of Narendra Modi’s second government are in order. After the landslide victory at the 2019 general election, Narendra Modi and his new 58 member government were sworn in on 30 May, while the portfolios allocation was made known the following day. The portfolio allocation reflected the overwhelming power of the BJP in relation to the sum of the other members of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), supporting the new government, as all portfolio ministers but two went to the BJP.10 The new government’s most noteworthy members, apart from the Prime Minister himself, were Amit Shah, who became home minister, and Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, who became foreign minister. The former was Narendra Modi’s right hand man, who during the previous legislature had been handpicked by Modi to become president of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); the latter was a career diplomat, turned politician, who had played a key role first in brokering the Indo-US nuclear agreement of 2008 and then in reaching the settlement putting an end to the 2017 Doklam standoff. Other changes worth noting were the shifting of former Defence Minister Nirmala Sithara-

9. Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, New York: Broadway Books, 2019 (1st edn. 2018), p. 3. 10. The two exceptions were Ram Vilas Paswan of the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), who was put in charge of the Ministry of Food, and Arvind Sawant, of the Shiv Sena, who was put in charge of the Ministry of Heavy Industry. However, Sawant resigned on 11 November 2019, as the result of the break-up between the BJP and the Shiv Sena following the state elections in Maharashtra. The ministry was transferred to a BJP party member.

348 India 2019 (2) man to the ministry of Finance, taking the place of Arun Jaitley, and that of former Home Minister Rajnath Singh to the ministry of Defence.11 On the whole the new government, not differently from the previous one, was characterized by the paucity of women (only three) and representatives of the southern states (again only three). The new government also boasted the presence of a Muslim cabinet minister, Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi, a long-time member of the BJP and a Rajya Sabha member, put in charge of minority affairs.12 However, if the presence of women, southerners and Muslims was quite limited, those of rich people – or crorepatis, as they are called by the Indian press – and persons with criminal cases still pending was respectively overabundant and «fair». In fact, 52 out of the 58 ministers were crorepatis and 22 (namely 31% of the government members) had cases still pending, some of a very serious nature.13 Rather ironically, pride of place among those with scores to settle with justice went to the new home minister, Amit Shah. Shah had four cases still pending against him: criminal intimidation; mischief with fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy house, etc.; promoting enmity between different groups; and imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration.14

3. The legislative activity in its first 66 days after Modi’s second government swearing in

During the first 66 days following the second Modi government swearing in, legislative activity was intense. Three main bills were passed, two of them aimed at making the Indian state more authoritarian; the remaining one, although disguised as a pro-women progressive act – and as such accepted even by some feminist organizations – was criticized as really aimed at criminalizing the Muslim community. Let us start by this last one, although it was the second of the three to be finally passed.

3.1. The «Triple Talaq» bill The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill 2019 (generally referred to as Triple Talaq Bill) was finally passed in the Rajya Sabha

11. Arun Jaitley, the former finance minister, and Sushma Swaraj, the former foreign minister, were not inducted in the new cabinet for health reasons. Sadly, both of them passed away a few months later, Jaitley on 24 August 2019 and Swaraj two days later. 12. Naqvi had been minister in the previous government, but, differently from before, he now had a cabinet post. 13. V. Muraleedharan from Maharashtra had an attempt to murder case still pending. 14. Karan Dhingra, ‘India’s New Cabinet is Old and Wealthy, and Many Minis- ters Stand Accused of Violence’, The Wire, 3 June 2019.

349 Michelguglielmo Torri on 30 July. The legislation outlawed the rule – included in the Indian Mus- lim civil code and based on Islamic law – which allowed Muslim men to divorce their wives simply by uttering the word «talaq» (from the Arabic term for «divorce» or «repudiation») three times. The passing of the Triple Talaq Bill – which was an electoral manifesto promise of the BJP – was, at least in part, the result of decades of campaigning by women’s groups against the practice. A turning point in the struggle against this regressive practice had come on 22 August 2017; on that day, as the closing of a case filed in 2016 by Shayara Bano, a Muslim woman victim to triple talaq, the Supreme Court had sentenced that triple talaq went against articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, had suspended the validity of the norm, and had directed the Union of India to pass appropriate new legislation aimed at abolishing it.15 The first Modi government had tried to implement the Supreme Court’s directive by tabling two bills in 2017 and 2018, followed by two ordinances in 2018 and 2019, without being able to transform any of them into law before the 2019 general election. Eventually, the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill 2019 was passed on 30 July 2019, making the practice of triple talaq «void and illegal» and punishing it «with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years», and the imposition of a fine of unspecified amount.16 In this author’s opinion, there is no doubt that triple talaq has no place in a civilized society. This makes Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s claim that its abolition could not but be considered as a «victory of gender justice» credible.17 The new act, however, triggered strongly adverse criticisms. Some of these criticisms frankly appeared biased and groundless. However, it is a fact that the new law was neither without blemishes nor such to prevent the suspicion that it aimed less at protecting Muslim women than targeting the Muslim community. The critics of the act pointed out that, rather than limiting itself to confirm that the Triple Talaq divorce was invalid, it included a criminal clause, namely «imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years», which had not been mandated by the Supreme Court. As argued by the Bebaak Collective, a feminist group led by Hasina Khan, imprisonment of the erring husband «could prevent him from paying post-divorce main-

15. ‘Supreme Court suspends «triple talaq» divorce law’, 22 August 2017. 16. Ministry of Law and Justice (Legislative Department), The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. No. 20 of 2019, The Gazette of India, 31 July 2019 (http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/209473.pdf), chr. II. 17. ‘Triple talaq bill passed by Parliament: BJP calls it victory of gender justice, Congress says historic mistake’, India Today, 31 July 2019. On Shayara Bano and her struggle against triple talaq, see Omar Rashid, ‘Who is Shayara Bano, the triple talaq crusader’, The Hindu, 2 September 2017.

350 India 2019 (2) tenance and divest wives and children of financial security».18 Critics also highlighted that the government, while concerning itself with the plight of Muslim women, remained totally unconcerned about that of Indian women at large. While Muslim husbands had abandoned their wives by uttering – or sending through SMS – the triple talaq, Hindu men not only freely walked away from their wives, but did that in a much higher absolute number and a somewhat higher rate than Muslim men.19 As abandoning wives was widely practiced by the majority community and did not carry with itself any legal sanction, this opened the distinct possibility that, after the notification of the Triple Talaq Act, Muslim men would simply walk away from their wives, without pronouncing the triple talaq.20

3.2. The amendments to the Right of Information Act and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act In the case of the Triple Talaq Act, although the general context makes it more than legitimate to doubt the true purpose of the measure, one can be undecided about its real political goal. In the case of the other two important pieces of legislation enacted in the period up to 5 August 2019, no doubt is possible: both the Right of Information Act Amendment and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act unambiguously aimed at promoting the authoritarian involution of Indian democracy. The Right to Information (RTI) Act, which had become law in 2005, had been one of the most progressive pieces of legislation enacted by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government.21 It empowered every citizen to seek information regarding not only the government and its officials, but also privatised public utility companies, and NGOs that receive 95% of their infrastructure funds from the government. The requested information had to be provided within 30 days. While the act contemplated a few exceptions, in cases considered sensitive to the national security, it had powerfully contributed to make the governments of the day – both at central and state levels – accountable, as shown by the fact that «in the first 10 years of the enactment of the law, around 17,500,000 applications were filed of which one fourth were requests to the Centre».22

18. Justin Jones, ‘India: why a new law criminalising «instant divorce» has divided feminists’, The Conversation, 3 September 2019. 19. Abusaleh Shariff & Syed Khalid, ‘Abandoned women vastly outnumber victims of Triple Talaq; it’s time Modi spoke up for them’, Business Standard, 13 Decem- ber 2016. 20. Anand Neelakantan, ‘Triple talaq: A discrimination that will be a hindrance’, The New Indian Express, 25 August 2019. 21. Namely the coalition government including the Congress Party and its allies, headed by Manmohan Singh, which was in power from 2004 to 2014. 22. Satish Misra, ‘Amended RTI Act: What is at stake?’, Observer Research Foun- dation, 29 July 2019.

351 Michelguglielmo Torri

Ironically enough, the RTI Act had been extensively used by the BJP, when in opposition, against the Congress-led UPA government. Once in power, however, the BJP enthusiasm for the RTI Act had suddenly evapo- rated. This had resulted in the decision to amend it in such a way to make the tenures, stipends and allowances of the information commissioners – previously fixed in the RTI Act – dependent upon the whims of the central government. Of course, the consequences of this change on the independence of the information commissioners are easy to understand. The Right to Information (Amendment) Bill, 2019, was finally passed by the Rajya Sabha on 22 July. On 2 August it was followed by the final passing, again at the Rajya Sabha, of the bill amending the Unlawful Activi- ties (Prevention) Act (UAPA).The new act, which was not motivated by any recent outbreak in domestic terrorism, expanded the powers of the Na- tional Investigation Agency (NIA) and, more importantly, gave the Centre the power to designate an individual as terrorist, imprisoning him/her and seizing his/her properties, without any need to try and convict the person so accused.23 The rationale for designating an individual as terrorist was indicated by Home Minister Amit Shah, during the parliamentary debate, by saying that: «declaring individuals as terrorists is required as they “float different organisations once an institution is banned”».24 Once again the radical limitation of democratic rights and the potentiality for abuse inherent in the act are so evident that they need not to detain us.25

4. The constitutional coup against Kashmir

Much more important than the previously listed legislative changes were those brought about by the Modi government on 5-7 August 2019. They effectively abolished the special status conferred by the Indian Consti- tution to Jammu & Kashmir [hereafter J&K], the only Muslim majority state of the Indian Union; also, they cancelled J&K as a state and split it into the two union territories of J&K and the scarcely inhabited but geopolitically important Ladakh. While the former was to be endowed with a legislative assembly, the latter was to do without it. In both cases, however, the downgrading from state to union territory was bound to reduce the democratic liberties exercised locally, giving overriding powers to the central government.

23. The Wire Staff, ‘Rajya Sabha Passes UAPA Amendment Bill; Amit Shah Rejects Charges of «Misuse»’, The Wire, 2 August 2019. 24. Ibid. 25. However, for a discussion of this problem, see Sarim Naved, ‘Between the NIA Amendment and Now UAPA, the Squeeze on Human Rights is On’, The Wire, 24 July 2019; Siddharth Varadarajan, ‘Allowing the State to Designate Someone as a «Terrorist» Without Trial is Dangerous’, The Wire, 2 August 2019.

352 India 2019 (2)

Two concurrent factors made the downgrading of J&K from state to territory an extremely serious challenge to Indian democracy. The first was that it was made possible by circumventing a series of constitutional norms. The second was that it was done not only without consulting the political class of the state, but against the will of its population. Let us start from the first factor.

4.1. Manipulating and hollowing out the constitution The special status hitherto enjoyed by J&K, based on Articles 370 and 35a of the constitution, was cancelled not by abolishing those two articles, as that was not legally possible without a two third majority in both Houses, but by making them inoperative. It was a goal that was reached by making use of highly dubious constitutional means. The process started with the passing, on 5 August 2019, of the Consti- tution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019, by the president of India, Ram Nath Kovind. The order stated that: «All the provisions of the Constitution, as amended from time to time, shall apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir». By itself this did away with the special provisions which – through articles 370 and 35a of the Indian Constitution – had given a special regime of autonomy to J&K. The order then continued by closing the possible loopholes which could have prevented the full application of the order.26 Although the considerable autonomy granted to J&K by Article 370 had been progressively whittled away in the decades after Kashmir’s accession to India and reduced to almost naught, Article 370 still remained symbolically powerful, highlighting the special status of the only Muslim majority state of the Indian Union. It is not a case that the abolition of Ar- ticle 370 had been continuously searched by the Hindu right and reiterated in the BJP election manifesto of 2019 as one of the objectives of the party. On its part, Article 35a – which had been inserted in the constitution on the basis of Article 370 (see below) – empowered the state legislature to define the permanent residents of the state, and to regulate their rights and privileges. The same article imposed restrictions upon other persons, particularly in relation to employment under the state government, acquisition of immovable property in J&K, and settlement in the state.27 Article 35a was clearly aimed at preventing demographic change in the state. It had been added to the constitution through the Constitution

26. A photographic reproduction of the text of the Order is available in ‘Kash- mir Explainer: From Article 370 to Article 3, Modi-Shah Upend the Constitution’, The Wire, 5 August 2019. 27. The full text of the Presidential Order 1954 is available on the internet. See, e.g., http://jklaw.nic.in/constitution_jk.pdf.

353 Michelguglielmo Torri

(Application to Jammu and Kashmir) order, 1954, issued by the President of India on the basis of provisions included in Article 370. The Presidential Order of 1954 was explicitly cancelled by the Presidential Order of 2019. Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019, became known on the same date of its issuing, namely on 5 August, when it was presented to the Rajya Sabha by Home Minister Amit Shah. Shah claimed that President Ram Nath Kovind, in issuing the Order, had exercised the power conferred upon him under Clause 1 of that same Article 370 which Kovind’s presidential order was now emptying of any relevance. President Kovind’s move, however, was highly dubious from a constitutional standpoint. In fact, according to Article 370, any change in its provisions by the president of India needed the concurrence of the Constituent Assembly of J&K. The Constituent Assembly, however, had been dissolved in 1956. It is true that the Presidential Order of 2019 stated that «the expression “Constituent Assembly of the State” […] shall read “Legislative Assem- bly of the state”», creating an identity between the two institutions, which would allow the Legislative Assembly to act in place of the disappeared Constitutional Assembly. This, however, was nothing different from a legal sleight of hand, as the President brought back to life, so to speak, an institution long death and gone, by arbitrarily identifying it with a different institution. Also, in doing this, the President went against two sentences by the Supreme Court in 2017 and 2018. In them, the apex court of India had unambiguously stated that, because the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir had been dissolved, no change could be made to Article 370 anymore.28 When announcing the issuing of the presidential order, Home Min- ister Amit Shah tabled two resolutions and a bill, all three related to J&K. The first resolution made the presidential order operative, removing the provisions under Article 370 which provided a special status to J&K. The second resolution and the bill – the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill – aimed at abolishing the state of J&K and split its former area into two union territories. Confronted by a disorganised and divided opposition (on this more later), the resolutions and the bill were passed, the bill on 7 August. The passing of the bill, however, rested once again on dubious constitutional grounds. In fact, according to Article 3 of the Indian Constitution, which empowered the parliament to create new states and change the «areas, boundaries or names of existing States», the related bills, before being discussed and approved by parliament, had to be «referred by the President to the Legislature of that State for expressing its views thereon». When Amit Shah moved the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, there had been

28. BS Web Team, ‘Article 370 in J&K not temporary provision, say SC: What does that mean?’, Business Standard, 4 April 2018. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, their decisions, «despite the headnote of Article 370», transformed it from a temporary provision into a permanent one.

354 India 2019 (2) no consultation with the J&K legislative assembly, for the simple reason that it had been dissolved and the State had been under President’s Rule since 20 December 2018. Hence the Governor of J&K had assumed to himself the functions of the government and legislature of the State. In this situation the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill was moved after referring it not to the elected representatives of the J&K people, but to a centrally appointed figure – the governor – who was nothing different from the long arm of the central government in the state. In doing this, the Modi government wilfully and disingenuously nullified a main purpose of Article 3 of the Constitution, namely providing the states a shield against unwarranted interference by the central government.

4.2. Acting without the concurrence of the people of Kashmir In «reading down» the J&K-related articles of the constitution and downgrading J&K from State to Union Territory, the Modi government grossly disregarded the will of both the political representatives of the people of Kashmir and the Kashmiri people at large. What was nothing different from a constitutional coup had been prepared in the utmost secrecy, and there is reason to believe that only Modi, Amit Shah, the President and a certain number of top bureaucrats in J&K and high military officers were abreast of what was about to happen. On the eve of the constitutional coup, the Modi government had deployed tens of thousands of additional troops to the Kashmir Valley – already one of the most militarized areas in the world.29 At the same time, the central government had cancelled the annual Hindu pilgrimage to the Amarnath cave shrine. While doing this, J&K Governor Satya Pal Malik, namely the long arm of the Modi government in Kashmir, stated that there was no intention to change the constitutional statute of J&K and that the deployment of additional troops and the cancellation of the Amarnath pilgrimage were related to the threat of attacks on the part of Pakistan-sponsored terrorist groups.30 As soon as the constitutional coup was carried out, the central government went out of its way to nullify any possible resistance in the Kashmir Valley. The connections inside the Valley and between the Valley and the outside world were cut, both physically, by recourse to road blocks, and im- materially, by putting an end to internet connectivity and cellular, landline and cable TV services. Residents were not allowed outside their neighbour-

29. According to a later report, the number of additional troops deployed in J&K on the eve of the coup was not 20,000 or 30,000, as claimed by most newspapers at the time, but 75,000. See Neeraj Chauhan, ‘Long lockdown may spur fresh Valley anger: CRPF’, Hindustan Times, 12 December 2019. 30. Mudasir Ahmad, ‘As Govt Tells Amarnath Yatris, Tourists to Leave Kashmir, Valley Struck by Fear of the Unknown’, The Wire, 2 August 2019. See also Manjeet Singh Negi, ‘Threat of major terror attack in Kashmir reason behind deploying 10,000 troops: Govt’, India Today, 28 July 2019.

355 Michelguglielmo Torri hoods without special passes given by the state administration; checkpoints manned by police and paramilitary personnel crisscrossed Srinagar and the remaining territory of the Valley; most government buildings, schools, colleges, courts were closed down and were occupied by the military personnel brought in from outside the state; people suspected to be potential opponents were rounded up, jailed and usually transferred to gaols in Uttar Pradesh. As noted by three journalists of the Indian Express, present in the Kashmir Valley soon after the military clamp down on its inhabitants, although strikes and curfews were nothing new in the Vale, «this time there’s no escaping the difference».31

4.3. Why the constitutional coup against Kashmir was condoned by most opposition forces In this author’s opinion, what had happened at the beginning of Au- gust was not so much the downgrading of J&K from State to Union Terri- tory as its demotion from a State endowed of particular constitutional privileges to an internal colony under military occupation. The features of this military occupation will be discussed below. Here it is important to dwell on the reaction of the opposition forces to the August constitutional coup. Although the new Kashmir policy had come as a surprise, it is a fact that the action of the Modi government, led in parliament by Amit Shah, immediately gathered a wide consensus. It was supported not only by all the NDA parties, with the exception of the Janata Dal (United), but many opposition parties as well.32 On the top of it, the parties opposing the move appeared to be intimidated: Rahul Gandhi, the leader of the Congress, and Mamata Banerjea, the leader of the Trinamool Congress, hesitated before making a public stand against the abolition of Article 370. Moreover, the Trinamool Congress Party, while opposing the BJP resolutions and bill on J&K, rather than voting against them, abstained by walking out.33 The Congress Party, which spearheaded the opposition to the new legislation in parliament, appeared to be crisscrossed with internal divisions, as a group of young leaders, among whom Jyotiraditya Scindia, opposed their party position claiming that «the people outside are all for this [the government’s

31. Muzamil Jaleel, Bashaarat Masood & Adil Akhzer, ‘Kashmir Valley has seen many lockdown but this time it is so different’, The Indian Express, 7 August 2019. 32. The BJP’s move was supported by the Bahujan Samaj Party, the Aadmi Party, the YSR Congress, the Biju Janata Dal, the Telugu Desam Party, the AIADMK and the Shiv Sena. It was opposed, together with the Congress, by the two Kashmiri parties represented in parliament – the PDP and the National Conference – plus the JN(U), the DMK, the Rashtriya Janata Dal, the Trinamool Congress, the Nationalist Congress Party and the Communist parties. 33. Shoaib Daniyal, ‘As BJP powers ahead on Kashmir, the Opposition cowers, shrinks and retreats’, Scroll.in, 6 August 2019.

356 India 2019 (2) decision on J&K]».34 Quite sensational was the position taken by Bhubanes war Kalita, the Congress’s chief whip in the Rajya Sabha, who, rather than issuing a whip on the Kashmir question in line with his party’s official position, resigned from both the Congress and the Rajya Sabha on 5 August.35 The disarray of the Opposition was coupled by the stand taken by many non-BJP Indian commentators who, while admitting that the BJP, in dismantling the constitution-guaranteed J&K autonomy might have had «its own political reasons», justified its action as «defending the interests of the Indian state».36 No doubt, the easy success of the BJP’s constitutional coup against J&K was also made possible by the fact that, as claimed by Jyotiraditya Scin- dia and other young Congress leaders, «the people outside» were if not all in favour, at least mostly in favour of the government’s decision.37 Only this explains the pro-government position taken by parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party, the Aadmi Party, the YSR Congress, the Biju Janata Dal, the Telugu Desam Party, and the AIADMK. They were all parties which, in taking this pro-government position on the Kashmir question, went against their own political raison d’être. In fact, all of them were regional parties, namely parties whose power was grounded in a single State of the Union, and which, therefore, had a clear convenience to defend the autonomy of any State against the interference of the central government. They were also parties which did not espouse a rightist Hindu ideology, and, being in the opposition, were not bound by ties of political loyalty to the BJP. In spite of all this, these parties countenanced a highly dubious constitutional process which dismantled the autonomy of a Union State by making use of a strategy which could easily be replicated against any other Union State. The conclusion is inescapable that the regional parties which supported the BJP Kashmir policy were convinced that J&K was a case apart with respect to all other Indian states because it was the only Muslim majority state in the Indian Union. Differently put, the idea that J&K could or should be dismantled as a state was made acceptable by the spread of Is- lamophobia both at mass level and in the Indian political class at large. This was a process which had been made possible not only by the ruinous decline

34. Deeksha Bhardwaj, ‘«Rebellion» in Congress over Article 370, young leaders say seniors can’t sense public mood’, The Print, 7 August 2019. 35. ‘Article 370: Congress divided over abrogation of special status to Jammu and Kashmir’, India Today, 6 August 2019. Kalita joined the BJP a few days later, on 9 August. 36. Sanjaya Baru, ‘The state has its reasons’, The Indian Express, 7 August 2019. Sanjaya Baru is a former secretary general of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and a distinguished fellow, Institute of Defence Studies & Analysis, New Delhi. 37. Deeksha Bhardwaj, ‘«Rebellion» in Congress over Article 370, young leaders say seniors can’t sense public mood’.

357 Michelguglielmo Torri of secularism – actually ongoing since the 1980s38 – but by the continuous whipping up of passions against Pakistan. The Central Government’s interference in J&K not only had increased at least since the 1980s, but had been carried out with growing brutality, both in the early 1990s and, again, under Modi.39 This brutality had been justified in the name of national security and white-washed by the bulk of India’s traditional and new media. This had powerfully contributed to the mutation of the collective mentality and the acceptance of the legitimacy to identify all Kashmiri Muslims as anti-national terrorists, who could not but be legitimately repressed by the use of maximum force. The fact that the parties which were not wedded to the Hindutva ideology had not struggled against the unjustifiably harsh repression in Kashmir, going on since the 1990s, and the spread of the noxious anti-Muslim and anti-Kashmiri ideology had greatly favoured the transformation of this ideology into «common wisdom», which, while consonant with the Hindutva ideology adhered to by the BJP, was accepted by the public at large. All this explains how, in August 2019, a set of parties which still thought of themselves as secular did not have either the will or the capacity, or both, to challenge this «common wisdom», making a stand against the BJP’s noxious Kashmir policy.

4.4. Building a kingdom of cruelty and fear: The repression in Kashmir (5 August - 31 December 2019) 4.4.1. Silencing the voices of J&K and only partly succeeding The de facto military occupation of J&K, in concomitance with the 5 August constitutional coup, was so well-planned and carried out with such an overwhelming force to paralyze any mass resistance. Mass demonstrations against the constitutional coup were not absent, but they were few and

38. The beginning of the decline of Indian secularism in the 1980s has been noted and discussed by so many authors that no satisfactory bibliography can be supplied in a footnote. As an example among many, see Diego Maiorano, Autumn of the Matriarch. Indira Gandhi’s Final Term in Office, London: Hurst & Co., 2015, in particular pp. 138 ff. A very recent monograph on the subject is: Sumantra Bose, Secular States, Religious Politics: India, Turkey and the Future of Secularism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 39. Two indispensable introductions to the Kashmir question are: Victoria Scho- field, Kashmir in Conflict. India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War, London: I.B. Tauris, 2000, and A.G. Noorani, Article 370: a constitutional history of Jammu and Kashmir, Ox- ford: Oxford University Press, 2011. For a bibliography on the Kashmir question, see the one available in Marco Valerio Corvino, ‘A brutal and violent year in the Kashmir Valley’, Asia Maior 2016, pp. 369-384. Among the relevant books related to the Kashmir question, published after Corvino’s article, see Chitralekha Zutshi (ed.), Kashmir: His- tory, Politics, Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, and Haley Duschinski, Mona Bhan, Ather Zia & Cynthia Mahmood (eds.), Resisting Occupation in Kashmir, Philadelphia (Pennsylvania): University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018.

358 India 2019 (2) far between. They were brutally repressed, among other methods by making use of pellet guns which, aimed at the faces of the protesters, often caused the victims’ partial or total blindness.40 As time went by, mass demonstrations rapidly petered out and, soon enough, completely stopped. The central government took advantage of it to try to describe the situation in J&K as either «normal» or rapidly approaching «normality». However, the situation was far from being normal. The government’s attempt to describe it as such was made possible by two factors: the first was the authorities’ repression of the work of the local journalists; the second was the pro-government line blindly followed by most Indian media, when reporting on the situation in Kashmir. A first main hindrance not only to the work of the local journalists, but to the normal life of the Kashmiri at large was the shutdown of both the internet and the landline and mobile phone services. While the shutdown of phone services was partially relaxed in October, suspension of the internet remained firmly in place. This, by itself, was bound to make the work of the local journalist community difficult. But the situation was made much more problematic by the fact that Kashmiri journalists were routinely stopped or harassed when moving around in search of news, even if in possession of ad hoc passes. They were intimidated, threatened, asked to reveal their sources, beaten up and sometimes arrested and kept in detention without charges. Newspapers could not update their websites and social media pages, even though some were still able to maintain a limited circulation of their print editions. Advertising from the J&K government dried up, which resulted in some local newspapers being forced out of business.41 The second factor favouring the government attempt to describe the situation in J&K as normal or rapidly approaching normality was the fawning attitude of the majority of the Indian media, which either espoused the government line uncritically or enthusiastically defended it. However, a minority

40. Siddharth Varadarajan, ‘Ground Report - Pellet Blindings Back as Protes- tors Challenge Centre’s Kashmir Move’, The Wire, 9 August 2019. According to Reu- ters, between 5 and 21 August 152 people reported to Srinagar’s two main hospitals, with injuries from pellet shots and tear gas fire. See ‘Key hospitals in Indian Kashmir treat more than 150 tear gas, pellet injuries’, Reuters, 23 August 2019. Mass blinding as a result of the security forces’ usage of pellet guns was nothing new in Kashmir. See. E.g., Marco Valerio Corvino, ‘A brutal and violent year in the Kashmir Valley’, Asia Maior 2016, pp. 369-384. 41. Aakash Hassan, ‘Kashmir Dispatch 8/100 Journalists, 4 Computers, 1 Mobile Phone and Lousy Internet: Reporting Live-Ish from Lockdown’, News18, 17 August 2019; Scroll Staff, ‘In 21 days, 21 reasons to believe «Kashmir is normal»’, Scroll.in, 26 August 2019; Mudasir Ahmad, ‘Stopped, Beaten, Prevented From Working: Everyday Troubles of the J&K Journalist’, The Wire, 18 September 2019; Kunal Majumder, ‘Kash- mir’s news media faces existential crisis amid restrictions, arrests’, CPJ – Committee to Protect Journalists, 24 September 2019; Avi Asher-Schapiro & Ahmed Zidan, ‘India uses opaque legal process to suppress Kashmiri journalism, commentary on Twitter’, CPJ - Committee to Protect Journalists, 24 October 2019.

359 Michelguglielmo Torri of the Indian media took a more principled stand, publishing news smuggled out by Kashmiri journalists or brought back by these media’s special envoys to J&K.42 Moreover, following a quintessential Indian habit, some groups of concerned citizens visited J&K and wrote reports based on their first-hand experience. These reports were posted on the internet and their contents summed up by the few Indian media willing to challenge the Modi government.43 Also, some main international newspapers sent their envoys to J&K and published their reports.44 It is on all these sources that the next three sections are based.

4.4.2. The politics of cruelty in Kashmir Repression in Kashmir was not something new, suddenly starting on 5 August 2019. However, as above noted, this time a difference was immediately visible in its scale and depth. This was promptly highlighted by the roundup of practically all prominent Kashmiri political leaders and a great number of well-known politicians and political activists. Significantly, to be caught in the repressive net were not only those hostile to the continuation of Indian rule in Kashmir, but representatives of the so called mainstream parties. These were those political forces which had never disputed Kash- mir’s accession to India, and included parties that, up to a few months before, had actively collaborated with the BJP. As a rule, political leaders and well-known politicians were either detained in hotels and guest houses turned into detention centres or put under house arrest. The fate of lesser known activists and people at large, who were caught in the repressive net cast by the Modi government, was, however, much harsher. The security forces went after all those who were considered as possible opponents or, in Indian Newspeak, «stone-pelters», arresting them on the basis of the Public Safety Act (PSA). This was a controversial state law, which allowed authorities to imprison someone for up to two years without charge or trial. Potential «stone-pelters» were rounded up, jailed and, very often transferred to gaols in Uttar Pradesh. According to Vikrant Dubey of The

42. As it is clear by looking at the footnotes of this article, in particular two Indian dailies online reported on the Kashmiri question with continuity and courage: Scroll.in and The Wire. Among printed papers, The Telegraph of Calcutta stands out. 43. E.g. Jean Drèze, Kavita Krishnan, Maimoona Mollah & Vimal Bhai, Kash- mir Caged: Fact Finding Report, 14 August 2019 [hereafter Kashmir Caged]; Anirudh Kala, Brinelle D’Souza, Revati Laul & Shabnam Hashmi, #KashmirCivilDisobedience. Trauma, Resistance, Resilience. Two Months On. A citizens’ report, 12 October 2019 [hereafter quoted as Trauma, Resistance, Resilience]; Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP), 120 Days: 5th August to 5th December (without date, but December 2019). Another important report, not by a group of concerned citizens but by the Kashmir Chamber of Commerce, is Preliminary Economic Loss Assessment Report: 5th of August 2019 to 3rd of December, 2019. URLs are not given here, as all these reports are easily accessed on the web, usually in more than one site, by entering their titles. 44. Among them Al Jazeera, The New York Times, The Washington Post.

360 India 2019 (2)

Quint, sending «stone-pelters» to UP jails was part of the government’s strategy aimed at instilling fear in the Kashmiris. As pointed out by Dubey: «That mafias have immense influence in these jails [in UP] is hidden from no one. People have been murdered and assaults are commonplace. This would mean that Kashmiris are likely to have a tough time in these jails».45 Among those jailed there were minors. According to official data, at the beginning of October the minors arrested by the J&K police were 144, and included children as young as nine and 11. According to media reports, however, the number was possibly much higher.46 Mass arrests continued for the whole period under review. By 18 Au- gust, according to an anonymous police official, «around 6,000 people were medically examined at a couple of places in Srinagar after they were detained». According to the same source, these people were «later flown out of here [the Kashmir Valley] in military aircraft».47 Journalists were not the only category to be singled out as a privileged target by the security forces. Another such category was that of the Muslim clerics. Many of them were summoned by the security forces for «counselling» sessions on the benefits of scrapping J&K’s special status, the corruption of Kashmiri politicians and the advisability not to hold large congregational prayers during the main Muslim religious festivities. Clerics were also told to coach and counsel youth against taking part in any protests and advised against «raking up» the issue of Article 370 in their sermons. They were warned that they would be considered responsible for any demonstration in concomitance with the Friday prayer and religious festivities. Finally, they were threatened with deportation (to Jodhpur, in Rajasthan) if they did not complain with the security forces’ requests. In fact, according to an enquiry by Scroll.in, at least six Muslim clerics were detained. Also, in some mosques, Friday prayers and religious celebrations were forbidden, something that had never happened before, not even in 1990, when the whole Kashmir Valley was in the grip of a major anti-Indian insurrection.48 Mass arrests were accompanied by nocturnal raids, during which the security forces entered houses, arrested people, sometimes beat up even

45. Vikrant Dubey, ‘Why Were Yogi’s Jails in UP Chosen for Kashmiri Stone Pelters?’, The Quint (India), 14 August 2019. 46. Scroll Staff, ‘This is what Kashmir looks like after 61 days of «normalcy»’, Scroll.in, 4 October 2019. 47. Parvaiz Bukhari, ‘«4,000 detained» in Kashmir since autonomy stripped’, Asia Times, 18 August 2019 (emphasis added). The number of 4,000, instead of 6,000, given in the title is based on the figure given by an anonymous magistrate, according to whom «at least 4,000 people» had been held under the PSA. The figure of 6,000, given by the anonymous police officer, seems to me to be more trustworthy as the source was obviously closer to the ground. Both the magistrate and the police officer agreed on the fact that the detained had been flown out of the Valley. 48. Safwat Zargar, ‘In Kashmir, a quiet crackdown – on mosques and clerics’, Scroll.in, 6 September 2019.

361 Michelguglielmo Torri women,49 ransacked the houses and deliberately destroyed food. The nocturnal raids were finalized, apart from terrorising the civilian population, at arresting potential dissidents. If the person who was wanted was not found, other members of his family were arrested, including minors.50 According to several reports, arrested people were often tortured.51 Jammu and Kashmir People’s Movement leader and former JNU student leader Shehla Rashid claimed that four men, after being called into an Army camp, were tortured while a mic was being kept close to them, so that the entire area could hear them scream, and be terrorised.52 After Rashid’s denunciation, other reports of torture emerged, given in video-recorded interviews by persons who alleged that the Indian army had subjected them to both massive physical pain and psychological pressure.53 What made these denunciations credible was not only the documentary evidence supporting them, but the fact that the employment of torture against the inhabitants of J&K on the part of the security forces was nothing new and well-documented.54 On 27 Augusts, the central government decided to reopen the more than 190 schools that had been closed since 5 August. However, at the moment they remained empty, as parents were afraid of sending their children back to school, judging it too risky. In fact, in the previous two weeks, the security forces had arrested or beaten up many minors, including very young children.55 The situation of siege imposed on Kashmir could not but adversely affect public health. Even before 5 August 2019, Kashmir, being a conflict- torn region, was already characterized by widespread presence of mental

49. Safwat Zargar, ‘A CRPF raid in Kashmir didn’t spare women – even though the force denies this’, Scroll.in, 7 September 2019. 50. Muzaffar Raina, ‘«Iron fist» in rural Kashmir’, The Telegraph, 19 August 2019. 51. E.g., Niha Masih, Joanna Slater & Shams Irfan, ‘The night the soldiers came: Allegations of abuse surface in Kashmir’, The Washington Post, 1 October 2019. 52. ‘India’s Kashmir doctrine: Claims of torture, night raids, mass detentions’, TRT World, 9 August 2019. On 6 September 2019, the New Delhi police filed two cases against Shehla Rashid, one for «Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony»; the other for «wontedly giving provocation with intent to cause riot». Mohammad Haziq, ‘Q&A with Kashmiri politician, Shehla Rashid, charged with sedition in India’, TRT World, 6 September 2019. 53. Hilal Mir & Muhammad Raafi, ‘India’s torture methods: new claims emerge from disputed Kashmir’, TRT World, 17 September 2019. 54. Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP) and Jammu Kash- mir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS), Torture: Indian State’s Instrument of Control in Indian-administered Jammu & Kashmir, February 2019. The report is available on the internet at several sites (e.g. http://jkccs.net/torture-indian-states-instrument-of-control-jammu-kashmir). 55. ‘Kashmir, riaprono le scuole, ma gli alunni restano a casa’, AsiaNews.it, 20 August 2019; Kaisar Andrabi, ‘Ground Report: Why Most Kashmiri Children Are Keeping Off School’, The Wire, 21 August 2019.

362 India 2019 (2) health problems among the local population.56 After that date, the situation worsened: not only the ongoing blockade enhanced the levels of stress and anxiety, but also resulted in fewer people accessing mental health care. This was the end-product of two dovetailing developments: one was the difficulty for the potential patients to move unimpeded, both because of the checkpoints by security forces criss-crossing Kashmir and the difficulty in finding ambulances when needed; the other was the decision by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), which took charge of many of the mental health needs in Kashmir, to shut down mental health services in four districts, as the prevailing restrictions on movements and communications made MSF unable to reach the local staff.57 More generally, the ongoing blockade paralysed the national health protection scheme, started in September 2018 and providing free health services to over 100 million Indian families who live below the official poverty line. Until the August coup, the scheme had worked at its best precisely in J&K. With the shutdown of internet connections, however, it became impossible for the hospitals in J&K to fill in the online forms which were necessary to have the cost of the free treatments reimbursed. After waiting for a return to normality for two or three weeks and after accumulating huge debts, the Kashmiri hospitals discontinued free treatments, putting a large number of poor people in the impossibility to access the medical services they needed.58 The suspension of courier services between the Valley of Kashmir and the remainder of India caused a scarcity of drugs and forced those who could afford it to journey to Jammu, Chandigarh or Delhi to fetch medicines.59 The hardship to move on the territory because of the presence of a plethora of security checkpoints and the difficulty in securing an ambulance then needed did affect not only mental patients, as noted above, but any kind of people trying to reach a hospital because in need of urgent care.60

56. According to survey carried out in 2015 by Médecins Sans Frontières in the Kashmir Valley «a serious mental health situation, with highly prevalent common mental disorders and distress» had continued to increase, reaching «epidemic levels among the traumatised population of Kashmir, with 37% of adult males and 50% of females suffering from probable depression; 21% of males and 36% of females from a probable anxiety related disorder and 18% men and 22% women suffering from probable PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms]». See Mé- decins Sans Frontières, Muntazar: Kashmir Mental Health Survey Report 2015, New Delhi: MSF, 2015. 57. Swagata Yadavar, Athar Parvaiz, ‘Communications Blockade Creates New Mental Health Challenges In Kashmir’, IndiaSpend, 14 September 2019. 58. Swagata Yadavar, Athar Parvaiz, ‘In J&K Shutdown, PM’s Health Scheme Grinds To Halt, Healthcare Crisis Grows’, IndiaSpend, 6 September 2019. 59. Ibid. 60. Safwat Zargar, ‘Kashmir ground report: A cancer patient struggles to reach hospital for chemo, others can’t get home’, Scroll.in, 10 August 2019; Fayaz Wani, ‘Communication curbs in Kashmir valley affects patients’, The New Indian Express, 25 August 2019.

363 Michelguglielmo Torri

The blockade heavily damaged the economy of the Kashmir Valley. This had already been staggering well before 5 August 2019 because of the difficulties caused by the sum of problems specific to Kashmir and those affecting the whole of India. To the first category belonged the «disturbed» political conditions of the Valley since the 1990s, the chronical difficulties related to the connectivity between J&K and the remainder of India, and the devastating floods that had hit the Valley in September 2014. To the second category belonged demonetisation and the sub-standard implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST).61 What happened following the «reading down» of article 370 literally devastated an economy that already was «at the verge of a breakdown».62 The Kashmir Valley is one of the world’s largest apple growing regions, and the apple industry involves some 3.5 million people, around half the population of the Valley. But, after the 5 August coup, apple production went waste, rotting on the trees, as transport links with buyers in India and abroad were cut. In this instance, however, the central government tried to remedy the situation and, as private buyers had given up attempting to get the Kashmir apples, it put the state-owned National Agricultural Marketing Federation of India (NAFED) in charge of buying apples directly from the major fruit markets in Kashmir. Procurement was to be completed by mid- December.63 Things, however, went wrong because of attacks on the part of anti-India militants against apple growers prepared to sell to NAFED.64 In October, four truck drivers from outside the Valley, who were willing to transport apples in the remainder of India, were killed and their vehicles burned, causing the flight of their colleagues. This also accelerated the moving out of the Valley of those migrant workers who were the orchards’ main source of labour.65 The still flourishing tourist sector was as badly hit as the apple growing industry. After 5 August the presence of tourists plummeted, and hotels and restaurants went empty. The handicraft sector, heavily dependent on tourism, suffered major losses.66 But, of course, the J&K industry which suf-

61. The Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Preliminary Economic Loss Assessment Report. On demonetisation and GST implementation see Michelguglielmo Torri & Diego Maiorano, ‘India 2016: Reforming the economy and tightening the connection with the US’, Asia Maior 2016, pp. 320-328; Michelguglielmo Torri, ‘India 2017: Still no achhe din (good days) for the economy’, Asia Maior 2017, pp. 291- 308. 62. Ibid. 63. Harish Damodaran, ‘First time in 30 years, why NAFED faces challenge’, The Indian Express, 11 September 2019. 64. Safwat Zargar, ‘In Kashmir’s apple town, fruit growers are caught between government and gunmen’, Scroll.in, 14 September 2019. 65. Ipsita Chakravarty & Safwat Zargar, ‘Shutters down: How Kashmir has kept up a slow-burning protest since Article 370 was revoked’, Scroll.in, 29 November 2019. 66. Devjyot Ghoshal & Fayaz Bukhari, ‘Apples rot in Kashmir orchards as lockdown puts economy in tailspin’, Reuters, 19 September 2019.

364 India 2019 (2) fered the most could not but be the IT sector. For software companies that needed continuous connectivity, the shutdown of the internet brought in its wake the impossibility to stay in contact with customers outside Kash- mir. The companies tried to save the day by sending employees to Delhi to contact customers, but this was both expensive and hardly efficient. The Kashmiri software companies got in touch with the representatives of the central government, asking them to relax some of the internet restrictions. They pointed out that the leased lines with which they worked and which provided high speed internet through fibre connections were easy to monitor. But – as referred by a Kashmiri software entrepreneur – «after meetings with bureaucrats at all levels – from deputy district commissioner to coun- cilman – it became clear that the Internet would not be restored anytime soon». According to the same entrepreneur, the government had promised to compensate for the Kashmiri IT industry losses, but, in his opinion, any future help would come «too late». The IT sector in Kashmir was, to all effects, «dead».67

4.4.3. The resistance in the Kashmir Valley Those who visited the Kashmir Valley after the 5 August coup noted the «intense and virtually unanimous anger»68 of the Kashmiris and their persistent resentment for what had happened.69 However, because of the overwhelming presence of security forces, this resentment, as already noted, could not find an outlet in mass demonstrations, contrary to what had happened in 2008, 2010 and 2016. For the Kashmiris, the only effective way to express their anger became the voluntary suspension of civil activities, the self-segregation in their homes, not sending children to school, and the closure of shops during most of the day. However, this form of civil disobedience could not last long and, by the end of November, was mainly over: cars were back on the streets, public transports were picking up passengers, students were finally back into school and government offices were up and running. The only form of civil resistance, «apart from the ubiquitous graffiti asking India to “go back”», were the shuttered shops, which, as a rule, «opened for about an hour or two in the morning so that people could buy supplies».70 Even this form of resistance, however, was difficult to sustain and, to the extent it continued, it was not on purely voluntary bases. Some shops and shopkeepers that had stopped

67. Swagata Yadavar & Athar Parvaiz, ‘We Will Not Survive This Disaster: Kash- miri Entrepreneurs As Lockdown Continues’, IndiaSpend, 12 September 2019. 68. Kashmir Caged. 69. Shakir Mir, ‘A «Normalcy» of Compulsion in Kashmir’, The Wire, 29 October 2019. 70. Ipsita Chakravarty & Safwat Zargar, ‘Shutters down: How Kashmir has kept up a slow-burning protest since Article 370 was revoked’, Scroll.in, 29 November 2019.

365 Michelguglielmo Torri observing the shutdown became target of arson and, in at least one case, of armed aggression. Indian authorities put the blame for this on the anti-Indian militants active in the Valley; Kashmiri merchants, on their part, usually put the blame for this on «government agencies», bent on defaming the militants, carrying out the armed struggle against the In- dian state.71 The latter thesis, nonetheless, is difficult to accept, as a main goal of the central government was the attempt to present the situation in Kashmir as normal or approaching normality. From this viewpoint, it is clear the government’s interest in the shops being open during their normal working hours. This brings us to examine the role of the anti-India armed militants after 5 August. One of the justifications for the August coup was the necessity to put an end, once and for all, to armed resistance against Indian rule in the Kashmir Valley. Armed militants had been active in the Valley since the late 1980s, but, by 2019, they had been whittled down to a minuscule force of some two hundred people.72 As such they were totally unable to be a credible threat to the massive number of Indian military and military police deployed in J&K. The militants, nevertheless, were a nuisance that could hardly be tolerated by the Indian state. During the period after 5 August encounters between Kashmiri militants and security forces took place, but only in a very limited number.73 The bottom line is that Kashmiri militants were militarily so weak to be unable to directly confront the overwhelming repressive apparatus fielded by the Indian state. Therefore, their strategy became attacking or brow- beating both those elements of the Kashmiri population who appeared ready to collaborate with the Indian state and Indian civilians present in the Valley. As already noted, militants attacked those apple producers willing to collaborate with NAFED and truck drivers who wanted to transport Kashmir’s apples outside the Valley; they put under pressure shopkeepers unwilling to continue with the closure of their shops, and, last but not least, they appear to have been responsible for a series of deadly attacks on migrant workers.74 All the above can lead to conclude that the civilian population in the Kashmir Valley was caught between Scylla and Charybdis, in other words between two equally distasteful choices. The situation, however, was more

71. Ibid. 72. Shakir Mir, ‘The Kashmiris are Still Waiting to Speak. This Time, Their Voice Will Carry Far’, The Wire, 5 September 2019. 73. For two examples see ‘Indian forces exchange fire with armed rebels in Kashmir: Police’, Al Jazeera, 16 October 2019; and ‘Kashmir terror attacks kill two, injure seven’, Asia Times, 27 November 2019. 74. Safwat Zargar, ‘«Kashmir has changed»: Deadly attacks have sent migrant workers fleeing the Valley’, Scroll.in, 1 November 2019. However, many people in the Valley pointed out that no militant group had taken responsibility for the killings and suspected the hand of Indian «agencies» in the murders.

366 India 2019 (2) complicated than that. The arrest of basically the whole Kashmiri political leadership – from the leaders of the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference, who had been pursuing separatism but through non-violent means, to politicians who had collaborated with the BJP up to the eve of the constitutional coup – had made all of them impotent and, more importantly, had discredited them in the eyes of most of their fellow Kashmiris. In this situation, as noted by an anonymous commentator, resident in the Valley: «The rag- tag bands of anti-India militants have suddenly become the only respected leaders, and in the new arrangement their acceptability […] has not just become nearly absolute, but also necessary in the minds of a mass of Kash- miris». According to the same commentator, «with nothing in between the masses and the State that is seen as a marching enemy, many imagine an expanding alliance between the militants and the common people as the only axis with potential to bend the arc of history towards long-term political justice and survival».75

4.4.4. The climate of fear in Jammu The brunt of the repression in J&K was mainly on the Valley of Kash- mir and its Muslim inhabitants. In Jammu – the part of the former state mainly inhabited by Hindus – things appeared to be different. A majority of the local political forces and a sizeable part of the inhabitants gave the impression to be in favour of the new government policy, even if the majority opinion was against the downgrading of J&K to Union Territory. What many expected to happen was that the new political situation would result in diverting the central funds which had been going to J&K from the Kash- mir Valley to Jammu.76 Whereas several politicians belonging to opposition parties were arrested, this did not seem to unduly worry the majority public opinion in Jammu.77 A fact-finding team of concerned citizens who visited Jammu on 6 and 7 October 2019 discovered that, unlike the Kashmir Valley, Jammu was not under lockdown. Landlines, mobile networks, shops, restaurants and malls were functioning. Even the internet was available, although it was dreadfully slow.78 However the team soon realized that a conspicuous part of the population was riddled with «abominably high levels of fear».79 Freedom of expression was severely curtailed and anybody lived in dread of being arrested if he/she dared to criticize the government. Moreover, by

75. Anonymous, ‘View from Kashmir: The Valley has gone into deep medita- tion. Don’t mistake this for a coma’, Scroll.in, 24 August 2019. 76. Vijayta Lalwani & Ipsita Chakravarty, ‘Though Jammu welcomes Modi’s move on J&K, Congress and Dogra leaders are under house arrest’, Scroll.in, 20 Au- gust 2019. 77. Ibid. 78. Trauma, Resistance, Resilience, p. 30. 79. Ibid., p. 47.

367 Michelguglielmo Torri then, the heavy economic drawbacks caused by the government coup had become clear. As stated in the report by the fact-finding team: «After the initial euphoria, businessmen realized that their main artery – located in the symbiotic relationship with [the Valley of] Kashmir – had been cut off».80 In other words, the collapse of the Kashmir Valley’s economy was negatively impacting on that of Jammu, since the two economies were closely interconnected. As stated by an anonymous businessman: «Trade is hampered, work is not happening. Banks are not functioning». This was the consequence of the fact that: «60% of Jammu’s trade is with Kashmir».81 According to another anonymous businessman, «Initially we were very happy with the abrogation because we had no idea how it was going to affect us. Then a curfew was imposed. Now there is no clarity about anything. I’ve had to sack most of my workers».82 The prevailing climate of fear was particularly distressing in the case of students from various minorities at Jammu University. «They told us – states the report – they have resigned themselves to being second class citizens. They said they fear for their lives. They are being called terrorists on campus for being Muslim and live in the constant fear of being lynched».83

5. How to make Indian citizens stateless

5.1. Updating the National Register of Citizens While the repression in Kashmir was in full swing, another problem manifested itself at the other geographical side of India, in Assam. This problem was related to the local updating of the National Register of Citi- zens (NRC). The original NRC, listing all Indian citizens, had been finalized in 1951, soon after the partition-caused massive movement of peoples from and to Pakistan. Things had rested there for some three decades, up to a major crisis in Assam. Here, at least since the late colonial period, the indigenous Assamese had been afraid to be swamped and overwhelmed by outsiders, in particular Bengalis. This fear had periodically caused political backlashes against non-Assamese residents in the state. A particularly prolonged and violent one had been the movement against illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, led by the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU), which took place in the years 1979-1985. That agitation ended with the signing of an agreement in 1985 between the AASU and the central government, then headed by Rajiv Gandhi. A key part of the Assam Accord was the promise

80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid., p. 31. 83. Ibid., p. 32.

368 India 2019 (2) to update the NRC in Assam, in order to document who was a legitimate Indian citizen and expel those who were not.84 However, in the next years the Assam government, then formed by the Congress, did very little to implement the agreement, very possibly because afraid that carrying it out could reawaken communal tension. It was only in 2010 that the updating of the NRC started in two pilot blocks of the state. The exercise, however, produced violence in Barpeta district, causing four deaths and convincing the Assam government to shelve the NRC updating. In 2013, however, the Supreme Court, responding to a petition made by an Assamese NGO (Assam Public Works) in 2009, directed the central and Assam governments to implement the updating of the NRC in Assam. Eventually the process went underway in February 2015 and reached a first turning point on 31 July 2018, when a draft of the updated version of the NRC for Assam was published.85 The draft – which left some 4 million people without Indian citizenship – was not final, as it left the possibility both to appeal against exclusion and object, by third parties, against inclusion up to 28 September 2018.86 According to Registrar General of India Sailesh,87 namely the high official put in charge by the Government of India of supervising the whole process, the NRC updating had been «completely transparent, fair, objective and meticulously carried out».88 However, even admitting that Sailesh’s

84. The Assam Agreement classified immigrants coming to Assam from neighbouring countries in three categories. The first was made up by those who had arrived prior to 1 January 1966, who were to be regularized as Indian citizens. The second category was made up by immigrants who came in from 1 January 1966 up to 24 March 1971, who were to be deprived of their voting rights for 10 years, but allowed to remain in Assam and to be regularized after 10 years. The third category was made up of immigrants who had arrived after 24 March 1971, who were to be detected and expelled. For an introduction to the Assam question see: Sanjib Baruah, ‘Immigration, Ethnic Conflict, and Political Turmoil–Assam, 1979-1985’, Asian Survey, 26, 11, 1986; Sandhya Goswami, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Assam’, The Indian Journal of Political Science, 62, 1, 2001; Uddipana Goswami, ‘Internal Displacement, Migration, and Policy in Northeastern India’, East-West Center (Washington), Working Paper No. 8, April 2007; Navine Murshid, ‘Assam and the Foreigner Within’, Asian Survey, 56, 3, 2016; Ahsan I. Butt, Secession and Security. Explaining State Strategy against Separatists, Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 2017, chapter 3; Rajat Sethi & Angshuman Choudhury, Citizenship Determination Processes in Assam: The National Register of Citizens (NRC) and Beyond, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Special Report # 200, October 2018. 85. K.V. Thomas, ‘The Politics of Citizenship: The National Register for Citi- zens (NRC) in Assam’, The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, 6 October 2018; India Today Web Desk, ‘Assam final NRC list released: 19,06,657 people excluded, 3.11 crore make it to citizenship list’, India Today, 31 August 2019; ‘Assam NRC timeline through the years’, Gulf News, 31 August 2019. 86. TT Bureau, ‘Everything you want to know about NRC’, The Telegraph, 30 July 2018; Rahul Karmaker, ‘Over 40 lakh left out of draft NRC in Assam’, The Hindu, 31 July 2018. 87. Mr. Sailesh is one of those Indians who make use of one name only. 88. Rahul Karmaker, ‘Over 40 lakh left out of draft NRC in Assam’.

369 Michelguglielmo Torri claims were true, the problem was that the process itself was an extremely difficult one to carry out fairly and properly. A main difficulty was related to the legal definition of citizenship. Al- ready when India became independent there had been heated exchanges related to citizenship, mainly focussed on a central question: should citizenship be defined on the basis of the jus soli, namely the individual’s birth on the soil of India, or the jus sanguinis, namely the individual’s descent or the citizenship of one’s parents? In Solomonic style, the Citizenship Act 1955, which eventually settled the question, acknowledged five ways to acquire Indian citizenship, including both the jus soli and the jus sanguinis.89 However, as noted by Professor Niraja Gopal Jayal of Jawaharlal Nehru University: «From the 1980s onwards, the legal and constitutional conception of the Indian citizen started to undergo a subtle transformation, through amendments to the Citizenship Act, in response to political developments».90 In a nutshell, this transformation gave increasing importance to the jus sanguinis to the detriment of the jus soli. As above noted, the 1985 amendment to the Citizenship Act that followed the Assam Ac- cord created categories of eligibility for citizenship based on the year in which a person had migrated to India. The Citizenship Act was amended once again in 2004, with the provision that, «even if born on Indian soil, a person who had one parent who was an illegal migrant at the time of their birth would not be eligible for citizenship by birth».91 The 1985 and 2004 amendments to the Citizenship Act put the persons going through the NRC bureaucratic evaluation under the obligation to prove that none of their parents or their grandparents was an illegal immigrant. Ipso facto this made a series of identification documents, commonly employed by the public, irrelevant,92 forcing everyone to get hold of very old and indifferently preserved legal documents. This process, difficult by itself, was made even more so by the poverty and lack of literacy of the bulk of the people needing this documentation, in particular women. The objective difficulty of the process, maybe united to «the authorities’ communal malevolence and incompetence»,93 goes a long way in ex-

89. The other three were registration, naturalisation; incorporation of territory. For the text of the Citizenship Act 1955, see India: Act No. 57 of 1955, Citi- zenship Act, 1955, Refworld (https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain), which also incorporates the amendments up to the one entered into force on 10 December 1992. Refworld is operated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 90. Niraja Gopal Jaylal, ‘Reconfiguring Citizenship in Contemporary India’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 42, 1, 2019, p. 34. 91. Ibid., p. 35. 92. Shoaib Daniyal, ‘Will NRC only target Muslims? A government clarification directly contradicts Amit Shah’, Scroll.in, 21 December 2019. 93. Wasantha Rupasinghe, ‘India labels 1.9 million Assam residents «foreigners» as prelude to their mass expulsion’, World Socialist Web Site, 5 September 2019.

370 India 2019 (2) plaining a series of exclusions that, to say the least, were disconcerting. Here, it suffices to remember the exclusion of the family of India’s fifth president, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed,94 and that of Mohammed Sanaullah, a decorated army veteran with 30-year service, who, ironically enough, when excluded from the NRC, was working as an officer with the border police, engaged in intercepting and deporting illegal immigrants.95 Equally or more upsetting was the fact that many families were split by the publication of the NRC final list, with some members being acknowledged as Indian citizens and others being excluded. A category particularly hit appears to have been that of married Muslim women, as they were often unable to establish blood links with their paternal families through relevant documents. As explained by the deputy editor of a well-known on-line daily: «Even though some of them had had their father or grandfather’s names mentioned in the 1951 NRC or in the electoral rolls before March 24, 1971 (the exclusive citizenship cut-off date for Assam), they had nothing in terms of documents to officially establish their links.»96 As already reminded, in theory people excluded from the NRC could appeal against their own exclusion. However, every step of this process involved spending money that most persons involved did not have.97 Although the harshness and unfairness of the methodology employed in updating the NRC were clear for all to see already when the July 2018 draft was published, nothing changed. It is true that, in the final NRC list, published on 31 August 2019, the number of those excluded from Indian citizenship was brought down to 1.9 million. However, the number still remained mind-boggling. It is worth to stress that practically all the people made stateless had resided in India since they were born or anyway for most of their life. What to do with the almost 2 million people made stateless by the NRC updating? Most of these people were Bengalis, but this does not necessarily means that they were Bangladeshis and, even less, that it was possible to furnish legal proof of them having emigrated from Bangladesh. Bangla- desh – one of the most overcrowded states world-wide – was already dealing with the massive influx of the Rohingya, pushed away from Myanmar. It had neither the inclination nor the possibility to accept the almost two million people made stateless by India. Accordingly, although the idea of deporting the people made stateless by the NRC updating to Bangladesh was hinted at by some BJP politicians, it immediately appeared to be outside the realm of

94. Arunabh Saikia, ‘Why relatives of former president Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed are not on Assam’s final NRC draft’, Scroll.in, 31 July 2018. 95. ‘India court releases army veteran detained as foreigner’, BBC News, 7 June 2019. 96. Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, ‘Women Without Parents: An NRC Ground Re- port’, The Wire, 13 September 2019. 97. Ibid.

371 Michelguglielmo Torri concrete possibilities. The solution, accordingly, became the construction of concentration camps where to detain stateless people.98 This practice – which had begun before the publication of the final NRC version – continued in earnest after it. Concentration camps were being built not only in Assam but in other Indian states and, «according to a written response from the Home Ministry in Parliament on July 24 [2019] … a “Detention Center Manual” has been “circulated to all state governments on 9 January” this year».99

5.2. The Citizenship Amendment Bill as necessary complement to the NRC The updating of the NRC in Assam, although restarted by a verdict of the Supreme Court, had been eagerly carried out by the Assam coalition government in power since 2016. This was made up by the BJP – to which party, the chief minister, Sarbananda Sonowal, belonged – and the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), namely the regional Assamese party which had been born in 1985 from the AASU. However, the political goals of the two parties were not identical: the AGP was interested in getting rid of the non Assa- mese, quite independently from their religion; the BJP, on its part, aimed at getting rid of the «illegal immigrants» as they were thought to be mostly Muslim. When the final NRC Assam list was published, the AGP did not conceal its unhappiness because, in its opinion, too few non-Assamese had been deprived of the Indian citizenship.100 On its part, the BJP was unhappy because it gradually became clear that a conspicuous part of those made stateless by the NRC were of course Bengalis, but, unfortunately, Hindu Bengalis.101 Already in 1971, at the time of the genocidal repression in what was then East Pakistan, which triggered the Indo-Pakistan war and the naissance of Bangladesh in that same year, most members of the massive wave of refugees who fled to India were indeed Hindu.102 After the creation of Bang-

98. Ruhi Tewari, ‘Held as «foreigners», languishing in jail, Assam’s nowhere people cling to Indian identity, The Print, 13 April 2019; Jeffrey Gettleman & Hari Kumar, ‘India Plans Big Detention Camps for Migrants. Muslims Are Afraid’, The New York Times, 17 August 2019. 99. Saikat Datta, ‘India’s Modi pulls a Trump on citizenship law’, Asia Times, 23 December 2019. 100. E.g. ‘Number of exclusions appear «ridiculously small», says Asom Gana Parishad chief Atul Bora on NRC’, and ‘NRC: Unhappy Assam students’ body to move Supreme Court over «less» number of foreigners detected’, both in The New Indian Express, 31 August 2019. 101. E.g. ‘NRC final list: BJP worried over exclusion of Hindus, inclusion of illegal Bangladeshi Muslims’, India Today, 31 August 2019; ‘Stung by final NRC outcome, BJP readies new on-ground strategy for Assam’, The Print, 8 September, 2019. 102. Sonia Cordera, India’s Foreign Policy during Indira Gandhi’s Second Govern- ment (1971-1977): The rise of a regional power, PhD Dissertation, University of Flor- ence, 2012; Sonia Cordera, ‘India’s response to the 1971 East Pakistan crisis: hidden and open reasons for intervention’, Journal of Genocide Research, 17, 1, 2015.

372 India 2019 (2) ladesh, most Bangladeshi migrants to India were once again Hindus, who were leaving Bangladesh not because of economic reasons – as Bangladesh outstripped India in most rankings «for indicators of social development, such as literacy rates, gender parity and life expectancy»103 – but because they were fleeing religious-based discrimination.104 In this situation, it does not come as a complete surprise that, already on the eve of publication of the 2018 draft NRC list, the available information pointed to the fact that a large number of those excluded would be Hin- du.105 This was confirmed by the publication of the 2019 final list. Although no official figures were made available to the general public, the news made the round that «as many as 10 lakh Bengali Hindus, some of Nepali origin and indigenous tribes», had been excluded from the NRC final list.106 In other words, to the BJP’s alarm, more than half of those made stateless were Hindus.107

5.3. Complementing the NRC with the Citizen Amendment Act 2019 That the NRC anti-immigrant net would catch a large number of Hin- dus had become clear well before the Assamese draft and final lists were published. This had not changed the BJP leadership’s conviction that updating and implementing the NRC – not only in Assam, but nation-wide – was a «must» for national security, as repeatedly and publicly stated by Amit Shah.108 However, the need to limit the NRC excluding effects to the Muslims translated into the decision to modify the Citizenship Act 1951, in such a way to provide the Hindus excluded from the NRC with the legal way to acquire or re-acquire Indian citizenship. Accordingly, the first Modi government had already tabled a Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB) with this aim already in 2016. After a difficult process, and after being passed in

103. K. Anis Ahmed, ‘Why Is India Making Its Own People Stateless?’. 104. Arafatul Islam, ‘Bangladeshi Hindus seeking safety in India’, Deutsche Welle, 7 June 2016; Shoaib Daniyal, ‘Why Hindu immigrants from Bangladesh are a key component of the BJP’s West Bengal expansion strategy’, Scroll.in, 10 August 2017; Rizwana Shamshad, Bangladeshi Migrants in India: Foreigners, Refugees, or Infil- trators?, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2017. 105. Zamser Ali, ‘EXCLUSIVE: NRC update derails Saffron Agenda as lakhs of Hindus excluded from final draft. Higher Rate of Exclusion from NRC in Bengali Hindu dominated Districts of Assam’, Citizens For Justice And Peace (CJP), 8 August 2018. 106. ‘Stung by final NRC outcome, BJP readies new on-ground strategy for Assam’, The Print, 8 September 2019. 107. ‘NRC list has errors, claims RSS as majority excluded are Hindus’, The Print, 9 September 2019. 108. E.g. ‘BJP Will Scrap Article 370, Introduce NRC Across the Country: Amit Shah’, The Wire, 11 April 2019; ‘Will identify and deport every illegal immigrant: Amit Shah’, India Today, 17 July 2019; ‘NRC must for national security; will be implemented: Amit Shah’, Business Line, 1 October 2019; ‘India to implement nationwide citizenship count’, Al Jazeera, 20 November 2019.

373 Michelguglielmo Torri the Lok Sabha on 9 January 2019, the CAB 2016 could not be passed in the Rajya Sabha before the parliamentary term came to its natural end, determining the expiry of the Bill.109 The enacting of a new CAB became part of the BJP programme during the 2019 electoral campaign. This promise was redeemed in December 2019, when the Bill was passed in both chambers of parliament.110 The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) 2019 – which, by and large, reiterated the norms already present in the CAB 2016 – fast-tracked citizenship for Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, Parsis and Christians immi- grating from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, on the ground that they were subject to religious persecution. Accordingly, persons belonging to these communities, coming from these countries would not be considered «illegal» and would be eligible for Indian citizenship within five years of residence in India. In addition, the CAA made possible the cancellation of registration of Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) cardholders who were accused of violating Indian laws.111 What made the CAA politically worrying was that it basically reformu- lated the criteria on which Indian citizenship was based, introducing religion as a defining parameter. In doing so, the CAA went specifically against articles 14 and 15 of the Indian Constitution112 and, more generally, against its basic structure. In the Indian Constitution, religion is never assumed as a criterion on which to allocate rights and duties. In piloting the CAB 2019 through the two Chambers, Amit Shah justified its necessity by two non-coincidental explanations. He summed up one of the two with the following words: «Let me tell you why this bill is needed. It is needed because the Congress partitioned this country on the ground of religion… Who did it? The Congress divided the country on the basis of religion. That was done by the Congress… This is the history.»113

109. Anupama Roy, ‘Why the Proposed Citizenship Amendment Runs Foul of Constitutional Provisions’, The Wire, 8 October 2019. 110. On 10 December by the Lok Sabha and the following day by the Rajya Sabha. 111. For the contents of the CAA 2019 and a comparison with those of the CAB 2016, see PRS Legislative Research, The Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2019. Also Yamini Aiyar, ‘The citizenship bill must be opposed’, Hindustan Times, 31 October 2019. The cancellation of the citizenship of OCI cardholders could be employed as a weapon against critics of the government who lived abroad. 112. Article 14 states that: «The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India». Article 15 states in its first comma: «The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them». In the following commas it specifies that the article does not prevent the State from making any special provision for women, children, socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. 113. Quoted in Rohan Venkataramakrishnan, ‘The falsehood at the heart of Amit Shah’s defence of the Citizenship Amendment Bill’, Scroll.in, 9 December 2019.

374 India 2019 (2)

The second justification was provided by Shah in the following words: «If minorities are getting persecuted in neighbouring countries, we cannot be mute spectators. We have to ensure their safety and dignity».114 The problem with both justifications was that both of them were disingenuous and mendacious. Although, according to some historians, the Congress’s role in making partition inevitable is far from being beyond reproach,115 it is a fact that the Congress had never accepted either the idea that Hindus and Muslims formed two distinct nations or the notion that India was the motherland of an ethnic group, or ethnic groups, defined on the basis of religion. Therefore the India that, after independence, the Congress had consciously built under Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership was a secular country, where all citizens were equal in front of the law, and where religion had no place in allocating either citizenship or rights and duties. As a consequence, the introduction of a religious criterion in defining Indian citizenship was something new, for which the Congress had no responsibility at all. As far as the explanation referring to persecuted minorities in neighbouring countries is concerned, the problems with it were equally conspicuous. The CAA excluded all Muslims, even those belonging to heterodox sects and subjected to persecution for religious motives, such as the Ah- madis in Pakistan and the Hazaras in Afghanistan, from the purview of the law. Moreover, from the neighbouring countries, from which religiously persecuted people were on the run, Myanmar was omitted. Of course, the problem with Myanmar was that the people pushed out of it, the Rohingya, were Muslim. As such they had never been welcome by the Modi government, who considered them a «public threat» and had gone so far to deport some of them back to Myanmar.116 As far as Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, Parsis and Christians, hailing from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, were concerned, the Hindutva ideology espoused by the BJP considered Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists as Hindus to all effects. On the other hand, potential Parsi and Christian refugees were in such minuscule numbers to be at all effects irrelevant.117 In conclusion, there was no doubt that the CAA aimed at giving Hindus a legal way to escape from the NRC net, while denying the same possibility to Muslims.

114. Quoted in Shamsul Islam, ‘Amit Shah’s Defence of Citizenship Amend- ment Bill 2019 Shames Even Goebbels’, Clarionindia.net, 10 December 2019. 115. E.g. Asim Roy, ‘The High Politics of India’s Partition: The Revisionist Perspective’, Modern Asian Studies, 24, 2, 1990. 116. Suchitra Mohanty& Rupam Jain, ‘India calls Rohingya refugees «threat to national security»’, Reuters, 14 September 2017; Ashley Starr Kinseth, ‘India’s Roh- ingya shame’, Al Jazeera, 29 January 2019. 117. One can doubt that there are Parsis who live in Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. As far as persecuted Christians are concerned, they wisely prefer to find a haven in the West rather than in India, where, unfortunately, they are only marginally safer than in the neighbouring Islamic countries.

375 Michelguglielmo Torri

Once all the above is taken into account, and once one bears in mind that the CAA had been conceived by the BJP leadership as complementary to the updating of the NRC in the whole of India, it is clear that, notwithstanding Amit Shah’s untruths, what was steadily and energetically implemented was a strategy aimed at transforming India into a Hindu Rashtra. When the modification of the Citizenship Act 1951 was enacted, it became finally clear that Indian democracy, as it had hitherto existed, was in danger. Differently from what had been the cases with Article 370 of the Con- stitution, the repression in the Kashmir Valley and the updating of the NRC in Assam, this time the government’s policy triggered a massive reaction, which extended to large swathes of India. But before discussing it, an examination of the role played by the Supreme Court in the period under review is in order.

6. The Supreme Court at work

The dubious constitutionality of the Modi government’s strategies concerning the «reading down» of Article 370, the repression in J&K and the CAA was so evident to trigger a spate of petitions to the Supreme Court and some to the Delhi High Court by concerned citizens, challenging the government’s actions. No doubt, at least some Indian intellectuals and senior journalists expected the apex courts to make a stand in favour of democracy. Their expectations, however, were sorely disappointed. It soon became evident that, as pointed out by constitutional expert Gautam Bhatia, the policy of the apex courts, when requested to pass their judgement on the government’s actions, was dodging, ducking, evading, and adjourning.118 Both the Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court took time and delayed the passing of any judgement, even in cases whose urgency was clear. In the rare instances in which the Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court were forced to abandon their tactics of «constitutional evasion», their sentences favoured the government. This was the case, for example, of the ruling, made on 16 September 2019 by a three-judge Supreme Court bench, headed by Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, on the repressive measures imposed in J&K. In its verdict, the Supreme Court, while ordering the government to «make every effort to make sure normal life is restored», set no deadline for it and turned down the request to end the current suspension of cell phone and internet services in J&K. In its verdict the Court claimed that the government had «formidable reasons» for its actions and that the restoration of normal liberties in Kashmir was subordinate to considerations of «national

118. Gautam Bhatia, ‘The absentee constitutional court’, The Hindu, 12 Sep- tember 2019.

376 India 2019 (2) security» and «national interest».119 As these considerations were left to the government, the Supreme Court’s ruling basically allowed the government to behave as it thought more convenient. Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi explained away the Supreme Court’s delaying tactics as motivated by the necessity to focus the Court’s energy on the final resolution the Babri Masjid case.120 This was the case related to the ownership of the area in Ayodhya on which the Babri Masjid, a 16th century mosque, had stood for little less than half a millennium, before being destroyed on 6 December 1992 by a mob of Hindu extremists, headed by some of the main leaders of the BJP. The destruction had been motivated by the double claim that the Babri Masjid had been built on the site of a pre-existing Hindu temple honouring God Ram (or Rama), which had been destroyed to make space for the mosque, and that the destroyed Hindu temple had been built exactly on the spot where the God was born.121 The destruction of the Babri Masjid and the building in its stead of a mega temple to Ram had been the aim of a long campaign led by the Sangh Parivar, namely the cluster of rightist Hindu organisations originating from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and including the BJP. The campaign for the «removal» of the Babri Masjid and its final destruction on 6 December 1992 had been accompanied by massive and murderous communal riots around the country, with the Muslim community at the receiving end. The Muslims had been the victims of wholesale massacres or single murders, both often committed with revulsive cruelty. This was accompanied by extensive destruction of the Muslims’ economic activities. After the Babri Masjid 1992 «removal», however, the final aim of the movement, namely the construction of the Ram temple encompassing the area where the Babri Masjid once stood, had been prevented by the action of both the central government and the judiciary. The latter was already involved in judging a series of legal disputes, related to the ownership of both the ground on which the Babri Masjid had stood and the contiguous areas. The orders of the Allahabad High Court, dealing with the cases, had pro-

119. Wasantha Rupasinghe, ‘India’s top court greenlights New Delhi prolong- ing Kashmir state-of-siege indefinitely’, World Socialist Web Site, 21 September 2019. More generally, on the Supreme Court’s policy, see Gautam Bhatia, ‘The 16th Sep- tember Order and the Supreme Court of Convenience (or why separation of powers is like love)’, Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 18 Sep 2019; and ‘India’s judges are ignoring the government’s abuses in Kashmir’, The Economist, 5 October 2019. 120. Sruthisagar Yamunan, ‘The Daily Fix: SC could indeed have found time to hear Kashmir cases – if it had been inclined to’, Scroll.in, 1 October 2019. 121. The number of monographs, scholarly articles and newspaper analyses focussed on the Babri Masjid question is so huge to make impossible to quote them with any completeness in a footnote. The articles published in this same journal, dealing with the political evolution of India in the relevant years deal at length with the question. A good introduction to it is available in the first part of the massive Supreme Court verdict of 2 November 2019 (for whose references see below).

377 Michelguglielmo Torri hibited any change in the disputed area before the pending judicial cases were settled, while the intervention of the central government had made the Court’s orders effective. Eventually, the ongoing legal disputes had been unified and, in Sep- tember 2010, the Allahabad High Court, with a Solomonic decision (taken by a majority of 2 to 1 by the three judge bench in charge of the case), split the contested ground in equal parts to be given to each of the three main contestants. These were: (a) the «friend» of the God, namely the person who, as allowed by Indian law, represents a God in a judicial case and who, in this dispute, was the de facto representative of the Sangh Parivar; (b) the Nirmohi Akhara, namely a powerful and wealthy Hindu sect, owner of many temples and monasteries in North and Central India; and, finally, (3) the Uttar Pradesh Sunni Central Waqf Board, de facto representing the position of the Indian Muslims. All three parties, however, appealed against the 2010 judgement in the Supreme Court. At long last, on 2 November 2019, a five-judge constitutional bench led by Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi delivered their unanimous final judgment on the case. According to their verdict, the whole 2.77-acre disputed land belonged to the government. The Supreme Court directed the government to transfer its ownership to a trust, to be appointed by the government of India, in charge of building the Ram temple; at the same time the Court directed the government to allot «a suitable plot of land admeasuring 5 acres» to the UP Sunni Central Waqf Board, which «would be at liberty, on the allotment of the land, to take all necessary steps for the construction of a mosque».122 Although the Supreme Court, in its verdict, highlighted that the 1992 destruction of the Babri Masjid was against the law, the verdict itself was a de facto ex-post justification of the action of the Hindu extremists who had razed the mosque to the ground. Once that has been said, it is also necessary to point out that the 2 No- vember verdict – which tackled with an extremely divisive question, which had been festering for decades – was not without merit. At long last, it put an end to the dispute, and, while basically accepting the claims of the Hindu right, allotted some form of compensation to the Muslims – which could offer a face-saving way-out to the representatives of the Muslim community. It comes as no surprise that, whereas Hindu politicians and members of the Hindu right welcomed the verdict with joy, most Muslim politicians and

122. The official name of the Ayodhya case, adjudicated by the Supreme Court on 9 November 2019, is: M Siddiq (D) Thr Lrs v/s Mahant Suresh Das & Ors (2019). The verdict, a massive 1045 page document is available on several websites (e.g. https://www.sci.gov.in/pdf/JUD_2.pdf; https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/arti- cle29929717.ece/Binary/JUD_2.pdf). The summing up of the Court’s conclusions is available in most Indian dailies. A particular good one is given by the legal service portal LawBriefs. See ‘[Case Summary] Ayodhya Verdict – M Siddiq (D) Thr Lrs v/s Mahant Suresh Das & Ors (2019)’, LawBriefs, 10 November 2019.

378 India 2019 (2) basically the whole Muslim community also accepted it, although with «a feeling of resignation».123 However, the verdict had a wider political meaning, which was given less by its content, than its context. More than a quarter of century after the Masjid’s destruction, those responsible for it – whose names and roles were universally known – had not been brought to book. Also, as noted above, in the months preceding the Ayodhya verdict, the Supreme Court had evaded its responsibility to judge the constitutionality of the government actions related to the downgrading of the J&K state and the repression there. As far as the NRC upgrading in Assam was concerned, it has been noted how the Supreme Court had a crucial role in restarting it in 2015. Also, reversing the normal legal approach, the Court had squarely put the onus to prove their Indian citizenship on those accused of being illegal immigrants. Finally, the Court had taken upon itself the supervision of the NRC updating, without finding anything wrong with the irrational and persecutory way in which the process had been implemented.124 With respect to the CAA, it was passed too late in the year for allowing a possible Supreme Court intervention in response to the petitions by concerned citizens before the year end (the cut-off date of this article). But, certainly, what was happening in relation to Kashmir and had happened in connection with the NRC updating in Assam was not such to encourage hopes that the Supreme Court would make a stand against the government’s authoritarian policies. Significantly, criticism had started to appear in the Indian press, comparing the Supreme Court’s behaviour in the period under review to its shameful acquiescence to the authoritarian emergency regime imposed by Indira Gandhi in the years 1975-77.125 Summing up, the Supreme Court’s adjudication of the Ayodhya dispute, quite independently from the evaluation that can be made of its equity and legal soundness, when considered in its political context, could not but appear the expression of a policy of appeasement vis-à-vis the executive power. Far from acting independently, the Supreme Court appeared to operate as a junior partner of the executive power, as such engaged in abetting and justifying the government’s decisions. As noted by Levitsky and Ziblatt, in their How Democracies Die, the controlling role of the judicial system is indispensable in maintaining a democracy vital. So much so that democratically elected autocrats, willing to transform democracy into an authoritarian regime, usually implement various strategies aimed at nullifying the judicial system’s controlling role,

123. Akash Bisht, ‘As Hindus rejoice, Muslim reaction mixed over Ayodhya verdict’, Al Jazeera, 9 November 2019. 124. Mohsin Alam Bhat, ‘On the NRC, Even the Supreme Court is Helpless’, The Wire, 7 January 2019; V. Venkatesan, ‘The NRC case: The Supreme Court’s role’, Frontline, 11 October 2019. 125. E.g. Sruthisagar Yamunan, ‘The Daily Fix: By delaying Kashmir petitions, courts are behaving like they did during Emergency’, Scroll.in, 26 August 2019.

379 Michelguglielmo Torri bringing it in line with the executive’s wishes.126 In the case of India, however, Narendra Modi had no need to recourse to strategies such as «court- packing» or other even more unsavoury methods. The Supreme Court, in fact, at least during the period under review, showed itself to be more than willing to bend to the prevailing political wind, abdicating its watchdog role of protector of the Indian Constitution.

7. The struggle against NRC and CAA

7.1. The anti NRC-CAA movement up to the assault on the Jamia Millia Islamia and Aligarh Muslim University Even before the CAB was finally passed by the Rajya Sabha on 11 De- cember 2019, protests against it had been ongoing.127 Mass demonstrations took place both in the North-Eastern states – in particular Assam and Tripu- ra – and in many parts of North India – in particular West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi. The motivations behind the mass demonstrations in the North-Eastern states and in the remainder of India were starkly different. In Assam they were motivated by the perception that the CAA would allow the Centre to open the floodgates to a potentially massive wave of non-As- samese Hindu immigrants, upsetting the local demographic balance. The remaining North-Eastern states, although exempted from the implementation of the CAA, feared a domino effect, which would cause people fleeing the implementation of the NRC and the CAA in Assam to move en masse to the small states bordering it. In the remainder of India, the CAA, particularly when coupled with the updating of the NRC at the national level – something that had been vowed by Amit Shah and other BJP leaders in several occasions128 – was perceived as a clear and present danger to India’s constitutionally guaranteed status as a secular polity. There, the anti NRC/CAA movement was spearheaded by Muslims, particularly young, urban, middle-class members of the community, who, in the words of one of them, after having been «silent about a lot of things for the sake of peace», now realized that fighting against the NRC/CAA was «a question of our very existence in this

126. Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, pp. 78-81. 127. For example, peaceful demonstrations had been ongoing at Aligarh Mus- lim University since 8 December. See ‘At least 60 injured in police crackdown at Ali- garh Muslim University’, The Hindu, 16 December 2019 128. At the end of the year, when the anti-NRC/CAA movement was vigorously spreading, the government’s official position became that of denying that there was any connection between the national updating of the NRC and the CAA. This connection, however, had been highlighted not once but several times by Amit Shah and other BJP leaders. See, e.g., Rohan Venkataramakrishnan, ‘Who is linking Citizenship Act to NRC? Here are five times Amit Shah did so’, Scroll.in, 20 December 2019.

380 India 2019 (2) country».129 However, it must be stressed that the protest was soon joined by an extended cross-section of the wider society: civil society groups, members of several professional communities (in particular scientists and film- makers) and university students.130 A particularly important presence, was that of women, both Muslim and non-Muslim.131 On their part, Mahua Moitra, the Trinamool Congress’s parliamentarian who has been quoted at the beginning of this article, and senior Congress leader Jairam Ramesh, neither one nor the other a Muslim, separately petitioned the Supreme Court against the CAA.132 Summing up, since its beginning the anti NRC/CAA movement was cross-communal, with Muslims being joined by «many of their fellow Indi- ans of other faiths, or no faith at all».133 Up to 15 December, the protests, with the conspicuous exceptions of the North-eastern states and Bengal,134 were basically peaceful. Things changed, however, when, on that day, three events took place. The first was Narendra Modi’s speech at an election rally in Jharkhand. In it the Prime Minister, in a crystal-clear reference to the Muslim community, said: «People who are setting fire (to property) can be seen on TV... They can be identified by the clothes they are wearing».135 This was a somewhat strange statement, given that, up to that point, violent manifestations had been widespread not only in West Bengal, where Muslim Bengalis had indeed played a key role, but even more so in the North-eastern states, where the manifestations – whose repression had already led to loss of lives – had certainly not been the work of Muslims. As noticed by senior journalist Prem Shankar Jha, Modi’s statement at the Jharkhand election rally was «probably the first time the head of

129. Aarefa Johari, ‘«It’s now or never»: Why young, urban Muslims plunged into the anti-Citizenship Act protests’, Scroll.in, 20 December 2019. 130. Ajoy Ashirwad Mahaprashasta, ‘In Clamour Against CAB, the Hint of a Resolute Opposition’, The Wire, 13 December 2019. 131. It suffices to read the newspaper articles giving an account of the demonstrations and have a look at the photos accompanying them to realize the importance of the role of women. For two articles specifically focussed on it see Neha Dixit, ‘The women at the front lines of India’s citizenship law protests’, Al Jazeera, 23 December 2019, and ‘Women vow to fight on against citizenship law’, Matters India, 11 January 2020. 132. ‘Mahua Moitra, Jairam Ramesh File Petitions Challenging Citizenship Act in SC’, The Wire, 13 December 2019. 133. Mihir Swarup Sharma, ‘4 ways the CAA protests have already been a success’, ORF – Observer Research Foundation, 20 December 2019. 134. Indrajit Kundu, ‘Bengal anti-CAA protest: Demonstration against Citizen- ship law continues, roads blocked at several places’, India Today, 15 December 2019; Munish Chandra Pandey, ‘Assam CAA protest: 4 dead in police firing, 175 arrested, more than 1400 detained’, India Today, 16 December 2019. 135. ‘Those indulging in arson «can be identified by their clothes»: PM Naren- dra Modi on anti-CAA protest’, Livemint, 15 December 2019.

381 Michelguglielmo Torri government in a democratic country has painted a target on a single community’s back».136 Certainly, it was the green light – or appears to have been considered as such by law and order agencies in several parts of India – to the launching of a massive repression against the Muslim community. The same day of Modi’s Jharkhand speech (15 December 2019), first in New Delhi, at the Jamia Millia Islamia, and, later in the day, at the Aligarh Muslim University – namely the two key Muslim institutions of higher learning in India, with a student body made prevalently, even if not exclusively, of Muslims – the police invaded the University precincts. In both Universities, as revealed not only by witnesses but also by videos and CCTV footage, the police made a massive use of violence, lathi-charged the students, made use of stun grenades and tear gas, smashed through libraries and dormitories, damaged the buildings and equipment, and happily beat up whomever they put their hands on, including female students. They pursued the students even inside closed toilets, forcefully opening their way, dragging the students out and beating them. While on it, the police also invaded the nearby hostels, where they made use of the same methods employed in the campuses, and, in the process, did not overlook the opportunity to vandalize bikes and other vehicles belonging to students. Many students were arrested and many of them were badly beaten while in custody. This was accompanied by the police hurling insults and abuses of a communal nature and chanting «Jai Shri Ram» and «Bharat Mata Ki Jai».137 Some students were still unac- counted for at the time of the closing of this article (31 December 2019).138

136. Prem Shankar Jha, ‘Modi Must Change Course and Scrap the Citizenship Amendment Act’, The Wire, 17 December 2019. 137. Apparently «Jai Shri Ram (Hail Lord Ram)» and «Bharat Mata Ki Jai (Hail Mother India)» are inoffensive enough phrases, the former, in particular, traditionally used as a greeting in many parts of rural India. However, in recent years, both phrases have become distinctive political slogans of Hindu extremists, some of them involved in the lynching of Muslims. See, e.g., Geeta Pandey, ‘Jai Shri Ram: The Hindu chant that became a murder cry’, BBC News, 10 July 2019. 138. A far from exhaustive list of the sources available on police brutality at Jamia Millia Islamia and Aligarh Muslim University is as follows: Sankalp Phartiyal, Aftab Ahmed, Devjyot Ghoshal, ‘«Night of horrors»: Inside the Indian university stormed by police’, Reuters, 17 December 2019; Sruthisagar Yamunan, ‘Aligarh Muslim University students allege they were tortured in police custody after Sunday protests’, Scroll.in, 18 December 2019; Harsh Mander et al., The Siege of Aligarh Muslim University. 15th Decem- ber: How the UP police reduced a university to a battleground. A Fact Finding Report. Made available by the Indian Cultural Forum on 24 December 2019 (https://indianculturalfo- rum.in/2019/12/24/the-siege-of-aligarh-muslim-university-a-fact-finding-report); Sam- reen, ‘«Pakistan Chale Jao Na»: A First-Person Account of the Horror at Jamia’, The Wire, 24 December 2019; The Wire Staff, ‘«More Brutal Than Even Jamia»: AMU Fact Finding Report Accuses UP Police of Violence, Islamophobia’, The Wire, 24 December 2019; Bilal Kuchay, ‘Student’s hand amputated as violence grips citizenship protests’, Al Jazeera, 25 December 2019; Nileena MS, ‘«They are shutting down the campus to quell the protests»: AMUSU president Salman Imtiaz’, The Caravan, 31 December 2019.

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7.2. The anti NRC-CAA movement after the assault on the Jamia Millia Islamia and Aligarh Muslim University It is possible that, in the intentions of those who ordered or actuated the brutal repression against the two key Muslim institutions of higher learning, the massive use of force would strike terror into Muslim students – who were evidently perceived as the spearhead of the ongoing protest – and, at the same time, intimidate the whole student body nation-wide. However, if this was the goal of the attacks, the result was dramatically different: far from being stopped, student protest spread like wildfire throughout the whole country (see map 1) and brought in its wake a wider social and political mobilization.

MAP 1 - Student protests in India as on 19 December 2019

Source: Rohan Ven- kataramakrishnan, ‘The Daily Fix: BJP is blaming Congress for CAA-NRC protests – but its own allies oppose the new law’, Scroll.in, 19 Decem- ber 2019

383 Michelguglielmo Torri

After 15 December and up to the end of the year (the cut-off point of this article) the anti NRC-CAA movement impetuously spread not only geographically but also socially. Massive demonstrations took place throughout India, with protesters sometimes carrying the national flag and copies of the constitution.139 Wherever the BJP was in power at the state level or, anyway, was in control of the security apparatus – as in the Delhi Territory – the movement was met with massive force, triggering increasing violence; in the states which were not controlled by the BJP, violent confrontations between demonstrators and the police were, as a rule, avoided and demonstrations mainly peaceful.140 In the BJP-controlled states there was wide recourse to Section 144 of the Criminal Code, a de facto left-over of colonial times.141 Its imposition made any kind of public protest unlawful, while legitimizing police repression. Also, the police made extensive use of preventive detention, another legacy of colonial rule, which allows detaining people for up to three months without any court order.142 The repression was particularly tough in UP, the most populous In- dian state, governed by the BJP and whose chief minister was Yogi Adi- tyanath, «a notorious Hindu supremacist under criminal indictment for inciting attacks on Muslims».143 Here, on 20 December, «six people died and dozens were injured […] as Indian police clashed with thousands of protesters».144

139. Aftab Ahmed, Devjyot Ghoshal & Saurabh Sharma, ‘Six dead in deadliest day of Indian citizenship law protests’, Reuters, 20 December 2019. 140. E.g. the Mumbai police «received a standing ovation at August Kranti Maidan during the agitation against CAA and NRC for Handling it peacefully». See Gautam S. Mengle, ‘Anti-CAA protests: Social media warriors worked tirelessly behind the scenes’, The Hindu, 20 December 2019. 141. According to Section 144, a magistrate «specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf» could «direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate considers that such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent, obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity, or a riot, or an affray». In practice, Section 144 was made use of to make illegal the public gathering of more than three or four persons. For the text of Section 144 in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 see Indian Kanoon (https://indiankanoon.org/doc/930621). On section 144 see also Mimansa Pujari, ‘Section 144 IPC – The Code of Criminal Procedure’, Legodesk, 31 January 2020, and ‘What Is Section 144’, Business Standard, without date (https://www.business-standard.com/about/what-is-section-144). 142. On preventive detention see Pundrikaksh Sharma, Preventive Detention, National Law University, Delhi, 2015 (https://www.academia.edu/25990305/Preven- tive_Detention_in_India), and the bibliography there included. 143. Deepal Jayasekera, ‘Indian state intensifies repression of mass protest against anti-Muslim citizenship law’, World Socialist Web Site, 23 December 2019. 144. Aftab Ahmed, Devjyot Ghoshal & Saurabh Sharma, ‘Six dead in deadliest day of Indian citizenship law protests’.

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A rod of iron was made use of also in Delhi – where, being Delhi a Territory, the local police was under the direct control of the central government – and in Karnataka, where two people were killed by police fire on 19 December, in Mangaluru.145 Also in Mangaluru police personnel, «in full riot gear», forced their way into the local Highlands Hospital, «purportedly in search of protesters», and, according to a hospital official, made use of teargas shells. This happened, as shown by CCTV footage, «much after announcements of curfew had been made and stone pelting across the city had subsided».146 By 22 December, at least 25 people had lost their lives under police fire, most of them in UP.147 According to Director General of UP Police Om Prakash Singh, speaking on 21 December, all the deaths had been «in crossfire», as firing had come from the protesters. O.P. Singh also claimed that «women and children» had been used as «shields by the protestors».148 No proof supporting O.P. Singh’s claims ever surfaced.149 Also, fun- nily enough, Singh claimed that, on the two days before the one in which he made his statement (21 December), the police had not opened fire any- where.150 As, according to news report, on 20 December six people had been killed in UP,151 O.P. Singh’s statement beg the question on how deadly crossfire could happen between two sides, the police and the protestors, where one of the two sides (the police) had not fired a single shot? Preventive detention was also widely implemented. On 19 Decem- ber, well-known historian Ramachandra Guha, while being interviewed by

145. Deepal Jayasekera, ‘Tens of thousands defy Indian government threats and demonstrate against Hindu-supremacist laws’, World Socialist Web Site, 20 Decem- ber 2019. 146. The Wire Newsletter, 22 December 2019. 147. India Today Web Desk, ‘CAA protests deadlier than months-long Hong Kong protests: 25 killed in India, 2 deaths reported in Hong Kong’, India Today, 22 December 2019. For a more detailed analysis, showing the number of deaths per geographical areas, see The Wire Staff, ‘These Are the 25 People Killed During Anti- Citizenship Amendment Act Protests’, The Wire, 23 December 2019. 18 of the 25 deaths had occurred in UP between 19 and 23 December. 148. Manish Sahu, Avaneesh Mishra, Asad Rehman, Kaunain Sheriff M, ‘CAA protests spread across UP, toll now 15, CM Adityanath issues appeal for peace’, The Indian Express, 22 December 2019; ‘Death toll touches 16 in U.P. as protests continue’, The Hindu, 22 December 2019. 149. On the contrary, what surfaced soon after O.P. Singh’s interview was a video showing a policeman shooting with a revolver at the protesters. The Wire Staff, ‘Video Contradicts UP Police’s Claim of Not a «Single Bullet» Fired at Anti-CAA Pro- testers’, The Wire, 22 December 2019. 150. Ibid. 151. ‘Citizenship Act Protests LIVE: 7 Dead in 24 Hours in UP as Western Re- gion Sees Violence; Protesters Surround Daryaganj Police Station to Demand Release of Detainees’, News18, 20 December 2019.

385 Michelguglielmo Torri

NDTV in Bengaluru, «even before he could finish the sentence» was «pulled away bodily by a group of policemen». Interestingly the final part of Guha’s sentence had been: «Look here, everyone is protesting peacefully. Have you seen any violence?»152 According to official data, in UP only, by 22 December 5,400 people were under preventive detention and more than 700 had been formally arrested.153 A troubling aspect of the anti NRC-CAA movement and its repression was the possible presence of gangs of agents provocateurs, connected to Sangh Parivar’s outfits. These gangs either deliberately turned peaceful demonstrations into violent disorders, providing the pretext for even more violent repression by the police, or tried to transform the anti-NRC/ CAA demonstrations into communal riots. In one case, on 20 December, in Muzaffarnagar (western UP), one of such gangs opened fire on Muslim anti-CAA protesters, looted shops, broke into houses in the Khalapar area, smashing, looting and taking people away. According to a witness, this happened with the connivance of the police.154 Reports surfaced that in different parts of UP, «police attention was concentrated on the minority [e.g. the Muslims], even in places where the community showed no signs of protesting».155 As had happened at Jamia Millia Islamia and Aligarh Muslim University, women were not spared.156 Unfortunately, a sizeable part of the Indian media, in particular most local media, «stuck to reporting only the police version». This happened even when «the videos of the police indiscriminately attacking the protesters made rounds».157

7.3. Who was behind the anti NRC-CAA movement? At the closing of this article (31 December 2019) both the anti-NRC/ CAA movement and the BJP-backed repression against it were in full swing. Therefore, any final assessment of the success of either cannot be made here. However, before passing to discuss the remaining topic tackled in this article, an evaluation of the political forces fuelling the movement is in order.

152. Nehal Kidwai, ‘Watch: Historian Ramachandra Guha, Mid-Interview, De- tained By Police’, NDTV, 19 December 2019. 153. Deepal Jayasekera, ‘Indian state intensifies repression’. 154. Scroll Staff, ‘Watch: Scenes of destruction in Muzaffarnagar as mob attacks Muslim neighbourhood’, Scroll.in, 21 December 2019. 155. Ipsita Chakravarty, ‘The Daily Fix: In UP, the police is no longer behaving like the arm of a democratic government’, Scroll.in, 25 December 2019. 156. «In both Bijnor and Lucknow [UP], women spoke of policemen barging into their homes, beating them up and vandalising property, even when the men they had come looking for were away». Ibid. 157. Sukanya Shantha, ‘Ground Report: In Mangaluru, a Police Which «Fires, Storms Hospitals, Shouts Anti-Muslim Slurs»’, The Wire, 26 December 2019.

386 India 2019 (2)

According to Modi and Amit Shah, behind the protests there was the Congress.158 According to the pro-BJP Swarajya magazine, not only the Congress but the Communists «and a few other opposition parties», in particular the Trinamool Congress, were stirring up the waters.159 As the time went by, the explanations offered by pro-government sources became increasingly sinister. According to senior broadcast journalist Krishna Kumar, apart from the usual suspects – «mainly the Congress, TMC [Trinamool Congress], the left parties and AIMIM [All India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Mus- limeen, an Islamic party based in Telangana]» – at work in promoting the anti-NRC/CAA protest was «a clutch of few organized groups with avowedly anti-India agenda». These included not only «various leftist outfits and activist groups», but «Islamist-Jihadist organizations that carry a long record of working against nationalistic interests». Particularly threatening among the latter was, according to Krishna Kumar, the Popular Front of India (PFI), «an Islamic extremist organization known for strong links with the banned SIMI [Students’ Islamic Movement of India]». Finally, in this infernal brew could not be absent the Maoists, whose involvement – according to Krishna Kumar – was shown by the arrest of Akhil Gogoi, «known for Maoist links in Assam».160 This thesis was fully endorsed by «Organiser», the RSS official mouthpiece, which accused the «Jihadist-Communist alliance» of «effectively using the entire debate on Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and National Register for Citizenship (NRC) for spreading falsehood and insti- gating violence».161 To this author, however, the anti-NRC/CAA movement seems to have all the features of other similar movements, which have become active in various parts of the world in recent years. All these movements, from the pro-democracy one in Hong Kong to the anti-Salvini «sardines» in Italy,

158. Rohan Venkataramakrishnan, ‘The Daily Fix: BJP is blaming Congress for CAA-NRC protests – but its own allies oppose the new law’, Scroll.in, 19 December 2019 159. Venu Gopal Narayanan, ‘As The Truth Behind Violent Protests Against CAA Unravels, India Won’t Be Fooled Anymore’, Swarajya, 17 December 2019. 160. Krishna Kumar, ‘Anti-CAA protests: A ticking ignorance bomb and a sheer vandalism with truth’, WION – World Is One News, 21 December 2019. Akh- il Gogoi is an Indian peasant leader from Assam, who has distinguished himself as leader of anti-corruption and pro-RTI (Right to Information) movements in the state. He is the recipient of the Shanmugam Manjunath Integrity Award for his fight against corruption (2008) and the national Right to Information Award (2010), granted by the Public Cause Research Foundation to encourage the proper use of the RTI Act. In April 2010, a secret report of the Assam government alleging that Akhil Gogoi had close connections with the Maoists was leaked to the press. Gogoi challenged the Assam government to prove what stated in the report; the Assam government – unable to do it – was forced to drop the matter. Gogoi’s arrest on 21 December 2019 was a «preventive measure», of which Gogoi was the victim together with scores of other intellectuals and left-wing activists all over India. 161. Prafulla Ketkar, ‘Fix the Instigators, not Just Rioters’, Organiser, 31 De- cember 2019.

387 Michelguglielmo Torri are demonstrably spontaneous and self-organized, in particular by young people making extensive use of the social media.162 If there are few doubts that the anti-NRC/CAA movement was spontaneous and that «no clever organisers» were «pulling the strings» and «no single figurehead» was «sitting on stage and fasting»,163 it is equally true that several political parties, once the demonstrations were underway and becoming noticeable for their dimensions and resilience, either joined in or offered their political support. A demonstration as clear as any of the depth of the social and political support for the anti-NRC/CAA movement was the announcement by several state governments that they did not intend to implement either the NRC updating, or the CAA, or both. By 25 December, these states were 10 plus a Union Territory. They included states ruled by the Congress (Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Punjab and the Territory of Puducherry), other opposition parties (Kerala, West Bengal), and a Shiv Sena-Congress coalition (Maharashtra). But, interestingly, also two states ruled by parties which, although formally in the opposition, supported the BJP most of the times in the central parliament (Odisha and Andhra Pradesh), plus even a state ruled by a BJP ally (Bihar), took position against the updating of the NRC at the national level.164 That the opposition to the NRC and the CAA was taking shape even among the BJP’s own allies became increasingly clear before the end of the year. The AGP, after voting for the CAA in parliament, completely changed its position and went as far as to challenge the law in the Supreme Court; the Shiromani Akali Dal, the BJP’s chief ally in the Punjab, called for the Muslims to be added on to the categories of refugees listed in the CAA (which, of course, would make the law completely meaningless from the standpoint of the BJP); the All-India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, the BJP’s senior partner in Tamil Nadu, after voting for the Act in parliament, appeared internally divided on the wisdom of that choice.165 Although at the closing of this article it is difficult to judge if the political support to the anti-NRC/CAA movement will solidify, there is no doubt that it was proof of the fact that the opposition to the BJP strategy aimed at

162. Indeed, social media were widely used by the anti-NRC/CAA demonstrators. See Gautam S. Mengle, ‘Anti-CAA protests: Social media warriors worked tirelessly behind the scenes’, The Hindu, 20 December 2019. It is not by chance that Indian and BJP-run state governments tried to contain the movement by shutting down internet connections for extended periods. 163. Mihir Swarup Sharma, ‘4 ways the CAA protests have already been a success’. 164. Prem Shankar Jha, ‘Modi Must Change Course and Scrap the Citizenship Amendment Act’; ‘Nine states have refused to implement NRC and CAA’, CNBC- TV18, 25 December 2019. 165. Rohan Venkataramakrishnan, ‘The Daily Fix: BJP is blaming Congress for CAA-NRC protests’.

388 India 2019 (2) transforming India into a Hindu Rashtra was widespread. Trying to describe the anti-NRC/CAA movement as the handiwork of shady jihadist groups – possibly supported by left extremists – was both fatuous and disingenuous.

8. An economy in crisis

While the political landscape was witnessing the coming into being of the most dangerous crisis since the imposition of the internal emergency regime by Indira Gandhi in 1975, black clouds had started to obscure the sky of the Indian economy even before the 2019 general election. However, how in- depth was the crisis affecting the Indian economy and how relevant had been the role played by the first Modi government in worsening it were successfully concealed to the general public. This was an objective that was obtained by the withholding or manipulation of the official data up to the 2019 general election and beyond.166 In fact, the Modi government propaganda effort was so convincing that some analysts started to suspect that even a part of the members of the government believed it.167 No doubt, however, not only those analysts and economists who had been denouncing the unreliability of the official data, but also Indian entrepreneurs at large were aware of the real state of the economy. Indian entrepreneurs, however, still considered Modi as the only politician capable to relaunch the Indian economy. Modi’s extraordinary victory at the polls was seen by them as offering the Prime Minister a golden opportunity to launch a new phase of radical reforms, restarting economic growth. By 5 July 2019, however, with the presentation of the first budget of the new Modi government, those hopes were disappointed. New Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s presentation speech of the budget was packed with claims related to the impressive economic results achieved by the previous Modi government, and – as it is usually the case with budget presentation speeches – full of fair promises concerning the future.168

166. On the state of the Indian economy in the months preceding the 2019 general election see Diego Maiorano, ‘India 2019: The general election and the new Modi wave’, in this same Asia Maior issue. On the same topic, see also Jayati Ghosh, ‘While India was busy celebrating its “ease of doing business” ranking, its real economy tanked’, Quartz India, 5 August 2019. On the manipulation of the official data by the Modi government see: Michelguglielmo Torri & Diego Maiorano, ‘India 2018: Political uncertainty and economic difficulties’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 281-284; Diego Maiorano, ‘Politicisation of Data Under the Modi Regime’, ISAS Insights, No. 550, 18 March 2019; Pramit Bhattacharya, ‘How India’s statistical system was crippled’, Livemint, 7 May 2019. On 14 March 2019, 108 economists published a joint statement calling for the restoration of institutional independence and integrity to India’s statistical organisations. See ‘108 Economists, Social Scientists Raise Red Flags Over Interference in Data Estima- tion’, The Wire, 14 March 2019, which includes the full text of the statement. 167. E.g. Rohan Venkataramakrishnan, ‘The Political Fix: India finally admitted to an economic crisis, but what is it doing about it?’, Scroll.in, 9 September 2019. 168. Budget 2019-2020, Speech of Nirmala Sitharaman, Minister of Finance, 5 July 2019 (https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/doc/bspeech/bs201920.pd).

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However, it immediately became apparent that the new budget did not include any credible major project aimed at accelerating growth, particularly agricultural growth, tackling unemployment, and promoting investment.169 Not surprisingly, the disappointment of the business community was reflected in the nosedive of the Indian markets, which went down for two consecutive days, losing 800 points and registering the second-biggest fall in 11 years.170 In the following months two things became increasingly clear: the first was that, in spite of further attempts at obfuscation on the part of the government,171 it became impossible to conceal how worrying the real state of the Indian economy was; the second was the Modi government’s inability to tackle the economic slowdown. Bad economic news started to pile up: sales in the crucially important automobile sector declined;172 so did fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG), namely products that are sold quickly and at a relatively low cost and that, as a rule, are the last to undergo a decline in case of crisis;173 the value of the rail freight traffic dipped in comparison to the previous financial year;174 capacity utilisation in all manufacturing segments appeared to be below 70% on average, even as inventories piled up;175 the real estate sector was weighted down by over seven years’ stock of unsold buildings;176 last but not least, as a consequence of the unsatisfactory working of the GST, the government’s own tax collection was well short of expectations.177

169. E.g. Babu Das Augustine, ‘India budget 2019-2020 scores high on clarity, lacks the big boost’, Gulf News, 5 July 2019; Jayati Ghosh, ‘«Investment» was mentioned over 30 times in India’s budget speech – but where will it come from?’, Quartz India, 8 July 2019. 170. ‘Sensex slumps nearly 800 points, Bajaj Finance falls 8%: 5 things to know’, Livemint, 8 July 2019; Saikat Datta, ‘India’s 2020 budget paints unrealistic targets’, Asia Times, 12 July 2019. 171. E.g. ‘Too much of reforms led to slowdown: NITI Aayog CEO’, The Hindu, 3 August 2019. 172. Varun Singh, ‘Indian automobile industry under intense pressure, major companies witness sales decline in July 2019’, India Today, 1 August 2019. 173. Pranav Mukul & Anil Sasi, ‘FMCG companies red-flag gathering rural slowdown’, The Indian Express, 15 August 2019. 174. Statista Research Department, ‘Value of earnings from rail freight traffic in India from FY 2010 to FY 2019’, Statista, 23 September 2019. 175. Jayati Ghosh, ‘While India was busy celebrating its «ease of doing business» ranking, its real economy tanked’, Quartz India, 5 August 2019. 176. Rashmi Pratap, ‘Unsold houses at all-time high of 12.76 lakhs in India’s top 30 cities’, Business Today, 12 June 2019. 177. Jayati Ghosh ‘While India was busy celebrating its «ease of doing business» ranking, its real economy tanked’; Shoaib Daniyal, ‘In charts: The Modi government is facing a serious cash crunch – thanks to GST’, Scroll.in, 21 August 2019; Rohan Venkataramakrishnan, ‘The Political Fix: India finally admitted to an economic crisis, but what is it doing about it?’.

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Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, «after months of insisting everything was alright»,178 finally appeared to take notice of the situation and tried to tackle the economic slowdown through a series of decisions which significantly changed the setup of the budget.179 The most important of these decisions, announced by Sitharaman on 20 September, was the diminution of the top corporate tax rate from 30% to 22% plus the introduction of an effective tax rate of 17% on all manufacturing companies registering from 1 October 2019. Other decisions aimed at coping with the difficult economic situation, taken by the government during the same period, were a rollback of a tax surcharge on foreign investors, merging 10 public sector banks into four, making use of government funds to buy automobiles; and setting up a task force to identify technically and economically viable infrastructure projects to be kick-started in the 2019-20 financial year.180 However, all these measures were either bound to produce positive results (if any) only in the medium or long term, or unable to achieve the desired results. An example of the former case was the consolidation of the state-owned bank sector, whose benefits, if ever achieved, would become visible only after a few years.181 An example of the latter case was the roll back of the top corporate tax rate. It aimed at making India a more attractive destination for foreign investments and encouraging national companies to invest more. Nevertheless, two main hurdles stood on the path to the fulfilment of those rosy hopes. The first was that, in a situation characterized by weak consumer demand, as that then prevailing in India, there was no reason to expect private companies to employ the gains accruing from tax reduction in further investment.182 The second was that, although «a welcome measure», the cut did not «not fully compensate for deeper problems afflicting India Inc: poor basic infrastructure, difficulties in enforcing contracts, uncertainties related to investment protection and taxes as well as cumbersome land and labor regulations.»183 If, however, the future benefits of the cut of corporate tax rate were less than certain, the short-term cost

178. Rohan Venkataramakrishnan, ‘The Political Fix: India finally admitted to an economic crisis, but what is it doing about it?’. 179. Remya Nair, ‘In 3 months, Nirmala Sitharaman’s budget has come un- done, one press conference at a time’, The Print, 3 October 2019. 180. ‘Super-rich tax surcharge on FPIs rolled back, announces Nirmala Sithar- aman’, Hindustan Times, 23 August 2019; ‘Nirmala Sitharaman announces major Budget rollbacks, withdraws enhanced surcharge on capital gains’, Scroll.in, 23 Au- gust 2019; ‘Finance ministry sets up task force to identify infrastructure projects worth ₨100 trillion’, Livemint, 7 September 2019. 181. Andy Mukherjee, ‘Modi’s bank mergers have come too late to avoid an economic crisis’, The Print, 2 September, 2019. 182. Rahul Menon, ‘Despite the tax cut, India’s corporates won’t invest. Then what’s the point, finance minister?’, Quartz India, 23 September 2019. 183. Ritesh Kumar Singh, ‘India’s corporate tax cut does not address country’s deeper problems’, Nikkei Asian Review, 8 October 2019.

391 Michelguglielmo Torri was evident and high. According to official estimates, the tax cut was going to cost the Indian exchequer «1.45 trillion rupees ($21 billion), equivalent to 0.7% of GDP, and adversely affect the government’s ability to support growth through spending».184 Some three weeks before the corporate tax cut, on 26 August, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) agreed to transfer US$ 25 billion of its own surplus capital to the government’s coffers. It was a truly huge sum, amounting to about 1% of GDP.185 Most analysts saw this decision as the end result of the struggle that, the previous year, had pit the Modi government against the RBI, culminating in the resignation of then RBI Gover- nor Urjit Patel.186 The crux of the struggle was the question of the central bank’s autonomy and powers; hence, the decision of the RBI new gover- nor, Shaktikanta Das, could easily be interpreted as the central bank giving in to the government’s desires. This interpretation must be qualified in the light of two elements. The first is that, although the RBI did not have any legal obligation to transfer its earning to its only shareholder, namely the Indian government, this was what many other central banks do.187 The second is that the initial government’s request was twice as big as the sum eventually transferred. This, coupled with the fact that the RBI is one of the world’s best-capitalised central banks, means that it was able to absorb the transfer without endangering its own financial stability.188 Hence the problem was less the transfer than how the Modi government intended to use the funds received from the RBI. In an economy characterised by declining investments and in dire need to relaunch them, making use of the RBI-provided windfall to that end would have been a wise choice. But given the shortfall in tax revenues, due in particular to the disappointing results of the GST returns, that choice had appeared problematic since the beginning. The prospect of the opening of a further hole in the expected tax revenue, due to the September cut on corporate taxation, made any choice different from making use of the RBI-provided fund to plug that hole even more improbable. How bad the economic situation was turning was highlighted by the fact that during the period under analysis, even official GDP estimates started to steadily decline. Eventually, on 29 November 2019, came the announcement that GDP growth had gone down from 8.2% in the April-June

184. Ibid. 185. Amy Kazmin, ‘India central bank’s payout to Modi government sparks warnings’, Financial Times, 27 August 2019. 186. On the RBI-Narendra Modi government see Michelguglielmo Torri & Diego Maiorano, ‘India 2018: Political uncertainty and economic difficulties’, pp. 277-78. 187. This is the case, for example, of the central banks of the EU countries. European Central Bank, Does the ECB make a profit?, 16 February 2017. 188. Amy Kazmin, ‘India central bank’s payout to Modi government sparks warnings’.

392 India 2019 (2)

2018 quarter to 4.5% in the July-September 2019 quarter. Even more worrying was that the July-September 2019 quarter was the fifth in a row of slower growth (see table 1).

Table 1 - India Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Quarterly YoY Release date Quarter Actual Forecast 31 Aug 2018 Q1 (April-June 2018) 8.2% 7.6% 30 Nov 2018 Q2 (July-September 2018) 7.1% 7.4% 28 Feb 2019 Q3 (October-December 2018) 6.6% 6.9% 31 May 2019 Q4 (January-March 2019) 5.8% 6.3% 30 Aug 2019 Q1 (April-June 2019) 5.0% 5.7% 29 Nov 2019 Q2 (July-September 2019) 4.5% 4.7% Source: Investing.com (https://www.investing.com/economic-calendar/indian-gdp-quarterly-434)

The sum of the disappointing official data and the worrying news concerning several key economic sectors brought about the downward revision of the projections concerning India’s expected yearly GDP rate of growth. Whereas at the beginning of 2019, the Indian government was predicting a GDP rate of growth of 7.4% and most international financial institutions and credit rating agencies were forecasting it as equal to numbers included between 6 and 7%, during the second half of 2019 all indicators turned downwards, pointing at numbers oscillating around 5%.189 If one bears in minds that according to some economists the official data overestimate the GDP rate of growth of 2.5%,190 the suspicion is legitimate that, under the leadership of Hindu nationalist leader and «development man» Narendra Modi, the Indian economy was heading back towards the «Hindu rate of growth», namely the slow rate of growth, averaging 3.5% per year, typical of the years from 1950 to 1980. Or, rather, as argued by the well-known intellectual and Congress politician Mani Shankar Aiyar, the Indian economy under Modi was heading towards a «Hindutva rate of growth».191

189. Vijayata Lalwani, ‘One chart shows how dramatically India’s GDP growth rate projections have fallen this year’, Scroll.in, 16 October 2019; ‘Crisil Cuts India’s Growth Outlook To 5.1% From 6.3%’, NDTV, 2 December 2019; K.S. Kumar, ‘IMF paints grim picture of India’s economy’, Asia Times, 26 December 2019; Vikas Dhoot, ‘Explained/Is the economy in really bad shape?’, The Hindu, 29 December 2019. 190. ‘India’s GDP growth overestimated by 2.5%, says former CEA Arvind Subramanian’, Business Line, 11 June 2019. 191. Mani Shankar Aiyar, ‘From the Hindu rate of growth to the Hindutva rate of growth’, The Telegraph, 16 June 2019.

393 Michelguglielmo Torri

9. Conclusion

A brilliant young Italian scholar, writing a few months after Narendra Modi’s massive victory at the 2014 general election, noted how Modi’s election campaign had generated tremendous expectations in the electorate, especially among the young people. On the one hand, Modi had presented himself as «the ‘development man’ who could put India back on the path of high growth, create millions of jobs, and ensure ‘acche din [good days]’ to its citizens». On the other hand, Modi’s victory had raised another kind of expectation, «especially among the ranks of rightwing Hindu nationalists, who believe that a more aggressive policy aiming at ‘hinduising’ the Indian state will be pursued under his prime ministership». According to this scholar, «the first of these expectations – reviving India’s economy and creating millions of new jobs» was very difficult to fulfil. Therefore, the «second expectation – Modi’s “plan B” – is more likely to be translated into practice, especially if the first one is not».192 That forecast resulted to be incorrect as far as Modi’s first term as premier is concerned. Looking back at it, it is clear that Modi, while leaving a free hand to Hindu radicals – as shown by the spread and persistence of religious-motivated violence – privileged the attempt at fulfilling his economic programme. He pursued that objective by focussing on three main policies: «Make in India», demonetization, implementation of the GST. After much fanfare, the first policy came down to nothing; the second, demonetization, was an abject economic failure, whose cost continued to be felt by the Indian economy in the following years; the third policy was so rashly and incom- petently applied that it caused a decline in tax revenues, disadvantaged the Indian producer, and forced the government to continuous changes in its application. It is legitimate to think that by the end of his first term, Modi had become aware of the difficulty to play the role of «development man». No doubt, after the 2016 fiascos of demonetization and GST implementation, Modi gradually deemphasised his role as supreme decision-maker in the economic field. Once he successfully weathered the 2019 general election, in spite of the mess he had done with the Indian economy, he must have arrived at the conclusion that he could best apply his undoubted political talents in fields different from the technically difficult to manage economic area. It was at that point that he turned to «plan B», bringing to the foreground a political strategy aimed at transforming India into a Hindu religion-based illiberal democracy.193 His hollowing out of two key articles of the Indian institution, the transformation of J&K into an internal col-

192. Diego Maiorano, ‘Early Trends and Prospects for Modi’s Prime Minister- ship’, The International Spectator, 50, 2, 2015, pp. 75-76. 193. On the concept of «illiberal democracy», see Fareed Zakaria, ‘The rise of illiberal democracy’, Foreign Affairs, 76, 6, November-December 1997.

394 India 2019 (2) ony under military occupation, and the policy behind the NRC and CAA were all moves aimed at the fulfilment of «plan B», namely the building of the Hindu Rashtra. Accordingly Modi and his closest political associates, in particular Amit Shah, focussed their energy in building what, in the title of this article, is defined as a kingdom of cruelty and fear. This was so important a task to prevent Modi from taking care of the faltering Indian economy, whose management was left in Nirmala Sitharaman’s (not so) capable hands. The building of the kingdom of cruelty and fear at the political level was accordingly accompanied by the increasingly evident undoing of the economy, which, suddenly, appeared heading back to the infamous «Hindu rate of growth». Unfortunately for India, at the closing of 2019, acche din, «good days» – both in the political and economic fields – appeared all the time increasingly distant.

395

India 2019: Foreign policy dilemmas and their domestic roots

Yogesh Joshi

Institute of South Asian Studies National University of Singapore [email protected]

If the shifting balance of power and the triangular strategic competition between the US, China and Russia were not troubling enough, in 2019 Indian foreign policy had to also contend with the global ramifications of Narendra Modi’s polarising domestic politics. Dwindling power resources – both material and ideational –severely hampered India’s foreign policy. Modi’s «Neighbourhood First» policy faced the full brunt of Bharatiya Janata Party’s agenda of Hindutva. Revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy and introduction of the Citizenship Amendment Act created both anxiety and fear among India’s neighbours. On the other hand Modi successfully cultivated the middle power across three important regions: the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific and Europe. This was the only success story of Indian foreign policy in 2019. Support from these middle powers helped India tide through a difficult period characterised by both economic underperformance and domestic unrest. However, sustaining these relations would ultimately hinge upon Modi addressing India’s economic and domestic fault lines. Lastly, India’s policy vis-à-vis the great powers was characterised by a gradual but increasingly closer strategic embrace of the US. In spite of President Trump’s reconfiguration of the American approach towards India from one of «benign hegemony» to a strictly reciprocal relationship, Modi continued to base his approach to the US on his firm belief that his own personal diplomacy would overcome Trump’s transactionalism. Modi’s attempt for a détente with China, which began with the Wu- han informal Modi-Xi summit, continued without much success, as the growing Sino- Russian entente was narrowing India’s options considerably. Overall, the year 2019 made evident the correlation between domestic instability and foreign policy troubles. How Modi will resuscitate India’s ailing economy, recuperate its injured and polarised body-politic, and reclaim its moral leadership in the region and the world would fundamentally determine the success and failures of India’s foreign policy.

1. Introduction

In a seminal lecture in November 2019, India’s newly appointed For- eign Minister S. Jaishankar laid down the fundamental objectives of Indian foreign policy.1 For Jaishankar, rather than being an end in itself, foreign policy is a strategy to obtain three primary goals for the Indian republic: se-

1. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, External Affairs Minister’s speech at the 4th Ramnath Goenka Lecture, 2019, 14 November 2019.

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Yogesh Joshi curity, welfare, and prestige. Security translates into «peace on the borders» and «protection» of Indian people.2 Stability in India’s neighbourhood, therefore, is an essential goal of Indian foreign policy. The second aim of India’s foreign policy is welfare: to bring «greater prosperity at home» through increased economic engagement with the world. Status is the final goal of Indian foreign policy, i.e., whether India can be a player in the great power game of international politics. Both India’s relations with existing great powers and its own ability to be a great power would determine its status in international politics.3 As argued by senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Ashley Tellis, the success and failures of India’s foreign policy are predicated upon how India’s foreign policy creates favourable «external circumstances» for realising these «fundamental goals».4 However, if foreign policy is a strategy to achieve goals, the success and failure of such a strategy ultimately depend upon the resources – material and ideational – which the Indian state can mobilise in attaining such objectives. Without an objective appreciation of India’s foreign policy resources and its external constraints, national aspirations, howsoever defined, can seldom be achieved. Indian foreign policy in 2019 is a story of how Prime Minister Modi tried to reconcile India’s foreign policy goals to the availability of resources within and the external constraints without, imposed by the international political structure.5 Irrespective of the impressive victory registered by Nar- endra Modi in the general elections of May 2019, winning him a second term in office, the year was particularly troublesome for the Modi government because of dwindling power resources, both hard and soft, of the In- dian state. India’s economy has suffered a steady and conspicuous decline since Modi came to power in May 2014, epitomised by the decrease of the GDP growth rate from 8 to 5% per annum.6 Historically speaking, this is the worst the Indian economy has performed in the last 42 years. If India’s rise in the post-Cold War global order strongly correlated with its economic

2. Ibid. 3. I define Great Powers as states that possess expansive military capabilities to induce change beyond their immediate sphere of influence. For the purpose of this study, the US, Russia and China are Great Powers in the current international system. Regional powers such as Japan, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Indonesia along with France and Britain who possess fair amount of economic and military resources are deemed as Middle Powers. 4. Ashley Tellis, ‘Troubles Aplenty: Foreign Policy Challenges for the Next In- dian Government’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 20 May 2019. 5. Arvind Gupta, ‘2019 was a Challenging Year for Indian Foreign Policy, 2020 will be even more so’, Vivekanand International Foundation, 31 December 2019. 6. For a discussion of the economic slowdown in India, see Diego Maiorano, ‘India 2019: The general election and the new Modi wave’, § 2, and Michelguglielmo Torri, ‘India 2019: Assaulting the world’s largest democracy; building a kingdom of cruelty and fear’, § 8, both in this same Asia Maior issue.

398 India 2019 (3) boom; today, India inspires far less confidence globally.7 The sliding growth has also unleashed some autarchic tendencies in India’s economic outlook, most evident in New Delhi’s decision not to sign the Regional Comprehen- sive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement.8 But it also affects the overall strength of the Indian state, particularly its military preparedness. The slowing economy has hit the Indian military hard, with minimal resources to modernise its antiquated armed forces.9 Modi’s domestic politics, on the other hand, has diminished another source of India’s global influence: its soft power, function of its inclusive, democratic ethos.10 The revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomy through the abrogation of constitutional provisions provided under article 370, mass incarceration of Kashmiri leadership and the controversial legislation on Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) which stipulates religion as a criterion for Indian citizenship has created instability within and invited massive criticism world over.11 In 2019, internal resource constraints and upheavals in domestic politics had overshadowed foreign policy gains made during Modi’s first term in office. If domestic volatility rose because of economic mismanagement and political polarisation, the global landscape was equally punitive.12 First, the rise of China as a great power, although inevitable, was most disconcerting for New Delhi. India must reckon with a hostile great power in its immediate neighbourhood, with which it has profound differences, primarily the territorial dispute along the Himalayan border.13 China’s expanding influence in South Asia also endangers India’s regional supremacy. Second, notwithstanding the rhetoric on the desirability of the multipolar world order, India’s rise in the international system occurred in a period of US hegemony, and was intertwined with it.14 China’s challenge to the US primacy com- plicates India’s foreign policy for several reasons.15 First, New Delhi cannot

7. ‘A Downturn in India reveals the desperate need for deeper reform’, The Economist, 24 October 2019. 8. Mihir Sharma, ‘India can’t afford to turn its back on free trade’, The Economic Times, 14 August 2018. 9. Promit Mukherjee & Aftab Ahmed, ‘Modest rise in Indian Military Spending likely, Modernisation on hold’, Reuters, 3 July 2019. 10. Sumit Ganguly, ‘India under Modi: Threats to Pluralism’, Journal of Democ- racy, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 2019, pp. 83-90. 11. Suhasini Haider, ‘The new worry of depleting diplomatic capital’, The Hin- du, 2 January 2020; Jyoti Malhotra, ‘Kashmir and CAA protests forcing foreign leaders to take a second look at PM Modi’s India’, The Print, 14 January 2020. 12. Michelguglielmo Torri, ‘India 2018: The Resetting of New Delhi’s Foreign Policy’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 295-96. 13. Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘Did India Lose China’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2019, pp. 71-87. 14. Manjeet S. Pardesi, ‘American Global Primacy and The Rise of India’, Asia- Pacific Issues, No. 129, March 2017, pp. 1-8. 15. Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘India’s Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia’, Carnegie India, 14 September 2017.

399 Yogesh Joshi continue to bandwagon on US power to realise its global ambitions. Today, China enjoys far more sway in global politics, as is evident in its foreign policy behaviour in the UNSC concerning both the Kashmir question and India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Even if Western democracies remain benevolent to India’s rise, they do not wield similar influence in global politics as they did a decade back. Second, as the Cold War between the US and China intensifies, India would be forced to actively align with Washington. President Trump has underlined that US support for India necessitates reciprocity on India’s part, through preferential trade agreements favouring US imports and the purchase of US military equipment. The last complicating factor is the burgeoning alliance between Rus- sia and China.16 For long, India considered Russia as an independent pole in the international system; under pressure from Washington, Moscow has now become a junior partner to Beijing. As a consequence, India’s relationship with Russia is under duress both because Moscow’s desire to embrace Beijing and as a result of Washington pressure upon New Delhi to forfeit its cooperation with Moscow. Given these constraints from both within and outside, how did In- dia manage its foreign policy landscape in the year 2019? The following analysis locates the success and failures of Indian foreign policy by concen- trating on three levels of analysis: India’s immediate neighbourhood; New Delhi’s interaction with middle powers, and finally, its management of great power politics.17 Such a structured analysis also corresponds with the three primary objectives of Indian foreign policy outlined earlier. The immediate neighbourhood, including its maritime sector, is essential for India’s physical protection. Middle powers, on the other hand, are consequential for India’s economic prosperity. Finally, the relation with great powers is bound to profoundly condition the status of India and its overall influence in global politics.

2. The (un)making of «Neighbourhood First» policy

A recent survey of India’s strategic community by Brookings Institu- tion made clear that the neighbourhood remains the most important avenue of India’s foreign policy.18 83% of the respondents, on average, considered South Asia, including the Indian Ocean, of vital importance to India’s national interests. India’s security challenges in the region primarily emanate from China’s growing influence in South Asia. 73% of the Indian strategic community considers the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a

16. Torri, ‘India 2018’, pp. 308-09. 17. Ashley Tellis, ‘Foreign Policy Challenges Lie Ahead’, CEIP, 23 May 2019. 18. Dhruva Jaishanker, ‘Survey of India’s Strategic Community’, Brookings In- dia, 1 March 2019.

400 India 2019 (3) significant security challenge; 63% are worried about China’s forays into the Indian Ocean. Cross-border connectivity and building India’s maritime capabilities rank among the top two priorities for Indian decision-makers, clearly outlining the lack of India’s penetration into its neighbourhood. If the neighbourhood is India’s strategic priority, New Delhi has not been able to make any serious headway in economically integrating the region: India’s trade with its neighbours constitutes only 3% of its total trade.19 In contrast, the most likely avenues where India might resort to the use of force are again in the neighbourhood: 44% of India’s strategic community believes that India should resort to military interventions in South Asia, and 43% favour use of military force against Pakistan. The survey underlines several undertones of India’s foreign policy in its immediate neighbourhood. First, India’s strategic eminence is increasingly getting compromised by the rise of China and its expanding influence in India’s neighbourhood.20 From Pakistan to Myanmar and from Nepal to Sri Lanka, for the first time in its post-colonial history, New Delhi is directly competing with a hostile great power for influence in its immediate neighbourhood. Second, except for military instruments of hard power, India has hardly developed any other tools of influence over its immediate neighbours. South Asia remains the most under-integrated regions in the world. India economic underperformance provides her with minimal resources to create meaningful dependencies among its South Asian neighbours. Third, China’s rise and its economic penetration also translate into the fact that often India’s bilateral relations with South Asian nations depend upon the tone and tenor of the domestic politics within its smaller neighbours.21 Ide- ological orientations of local political groups have played a critical role in the success and failures of India’s outreach to its immediate neighbours. Rather than New Delhi’s policies, who comes to power in India’s neighbourhood, therefore, becomes the critical variable affecting the efficacy of India’s foreign policy. These structural factors continued to shape the trajectory of India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis its neighbours in the year 2019. Modi’s «neighbourhood policy» has been unable to thwart China’s march in South Asia. Un- like the bilateral equation between India and China, which is dominated by territorial conflict over the contested Himalayan border, the fight for South Asia is one of relative influence. China’s economic wherewithal, rather than its military hardware, is New Delhi’s primary concern.22 Today, the trade volume between China and India’s South Asian neighboursis approximately

19. ‘South Asia should Remove Trade Barriers for Mutual Economic Gains: New World Bank Report’, The World Bank, 24 September 2018. 20. Shyam Saran, ‘A Tough Neighbourhood’, India Today, 25 May 2019. 21. Tellis, Troubles Aplenty. 22. Nilanthi Samaranayake, ‘China’s Engagement with Smaller South Asian Countries’, United States Institute of Peace, Special report, No. 446, 10 April 2019.

401 Yogesh Joshi five times the trade between India and its South Asian neighbours.23 China’s share in foreign direct investments in South Asian economies has expanded drastically. If Nepal receives 90% of its FDI from China, China is also largest source of FDI into Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.24 Except for Bhutan, all of India’s South Asian neighbours have now climbed on the bandwagon of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).25 If on India’s western border, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has now entered its second phase, the culmination of the China-My- anmar Economic Corridor on the eastern seaboard will allow Beijing entry into the Bay of Bengal. The Trans Himalayan Economic Corridor will further erode India’s influence in Nepal: China and Nepal agreed on a rail link connecting Kathmandu with the Tibetan town of Gyirong in October 2019.26 Connectivity and infrastructure projects under the BRI provide China with unprecedented influence in South Asian countries, evident in growing military and diplomatic relations between South Asian countries and China.27 Beijing is helping Bangladesh build a submarine base in Cox Bazaar and selling military equipment to the Nepalese army. Beijing’s growing diplomatic clout has ensured that none of South Asia’s Muslim majority countries condemned its treatment of Uighurs in Xinjian. China has also pressed upon Nepal not to provide refuge to Tibetan dissidents, and the communist government in Kathmandu has readily obliged to such demand.28 As was expected, the Modi government declined to participate in the second BRI summit held in Beijing in April 2019. Though Modi’s «neighbourhood first» aimed to create «mutually beneficial, people-oriented, regional frameworks for stability and prosperity» principally through «infrastructure and connectivity» projects across South Asia, the results have been less than optimal.29 Foreign Minister Jaishankar accepted the failure of In- dian diplomacy in South Asia in these words, «regionalism has taken root in every corner of the world... [if] we have lagged behind, it is because South Asia does not have the normal trade and connectivity that other regions do.»30

23. Constantino Xavier, ‘Sambandh as Strategy: India’s New Approach to Re- gional Connectivity’, Brookings India, January 2020. 24. Ibid. 25. Bhumitra Chakma, ‘The BRI and India’s Neighbourhood’, Strategic Analy- sis, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2019, pp. 183-186. 26. Bansari Kamdar, ‘What to make of India’s Absence from the Second Belt and Road Forum?’, The Diplomat, 9 May 2019. 27. National Institute of Defense Studies, Tokyo, ‘China’s Strategy for Reshap- ing the Asian Order and Its Ramifications’, China Security Report 2019, February 2019. 28. Christopher Finnigan, ‘Between Giants: China, India and the Security Sec- tor Reforms in Nepal’, LSE South Asia Centre, 15 February 2019. 29. Suhasini Haider, ‘Neighbourhood First?’, The Hindu, 1 December 2018. 30. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Statement by external affairs minister at the informal meeting of SAARC Council of Ministers (CoM) on the sidelines of 74th UNGA, 27 September 2019.

402 India 2019 (3)

Though, 2019 saw some progress in India’s relations with Sri Lanka and the Maldives, mainly on account of the favourable domestic disposi- tions in these countries. Narendra Modi paid his first state visit to the Mal- dives and Sri Lanka, on 8-9 June 2019, soon after he won the second term; a clear demonstration of the strategic significance of the two island nations for India. Also, the Indian Prime Minister was the first international leader to visit Sri Lanka after the 2019 Easter bombings.31 As a more feasible alternative to Chinese deals, India and Japan signed a joint initiative to develop the East Container terminal at the Colombo Port. To help the island nation, Modi also announced several lines of credit: US$ 400 million for infrastructure, US$100 million for solar projects, and US$ 50 million for counter-terrorism.32 The Indian Prime Minister stressed the need for a joint action to combat terrorism and called for a cooperative response by pro- posing bilateral as well as trilateral intelligence training between India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.33 The Maldives under its new president, Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, has put India on the priority list through Solih’s «India First» policy. India was also striving to bolster the Indo-Maldives relationship through SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) in the Indo-Pacific, whose goal is to maintain trust and transparency and respect for maritime rules.34 The Government of Male signed its first-ever Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with India to cooperate and facilitate active investigation on criminal matters. Yet, additional factors have complicated India’s foreign policy. Some of them are external, such as the Afghan peace talks, which may once again bring the Taliban to power in Kabul. However, what is most disturbing from New Delhi’s perspective is how Modi’s domestic politics has further alienated its neighbours.35 If the revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomy has pushed relations with Pakistan to the brink, the recent changes in In- dia’s citizenship laws have created significant anxiety in Bangladesh.36 The domestic upheaval within India has undercut Modi’s claims for regional leadership but has also made South Asia a new focal point for external intervention. From a purely bilateral India-Pakistan problem, the Kashmir question has again become an international concern with foreign actors making a beeline for intervention in the protracted dispute.

31. Chulanee Attanayake, ‘Modi’s Visit to Sri Lanka’, ISAS Brief No. 671. 32. C Raja Mohan, ‘India wants to woo Sri Lanka. But China stands in the way,’ CNA, 1 December 2019. 33. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, ‘India, Maldives, Lanka to restart NSA-level talks’, The Economic Times, 12 June 2019. 34. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, India-Maldives Joint Statement during the State Visit of Prime Minister to Maldives, 8 June 2019. 35. Manasi Pritam, ‘India’s Domestic Troubles Are the Greatest Problem for its Foreign Policy’, The Diplomat, 8 January 2020. 36. Pinak Ranjan Chakravarthy, ‘Does India stand to lose Bangladesh’s friendship over CAA and NRC’, ORF, 21 December 2019.

403 Yogesh Joshi

Similarly, the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which for the first time makes religion a benchmark for Indian citizenship, has left India’s neighbours wondering about its commitments to liberal and democratic principles. The most debilitating impact of India’s domestic politics has been on the Indo-Bangladeshi relationship. Even though problems of borders and water sharing continue to dodge any amicable solution, India and Bangladesh relations have witnessed an upward trajectory, especially under the Sheikh Hasina government. In 2019, Sheikh Hasina was invited to In- dia by Modi as the chief guest at the India Economic Summit organised by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in October 2019.37 The two leaders also signed several bilateral agreements. However, two ministers of Bangladesh cancelled their respective visits to India following the passage of the Citizen- ship Amendment Bill. Even though India has maintained in its statements that the CAA is an internal matter and that it would not cause trouble to its neighbours, Bangladesh fears that the act will let loose a refugee wave involving Muslims from Assam.38 This is all the more worrying for Bangla- desh, as it is already coping with the severe difficulties due to the wave of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. A more aggressive policy towards its neighbours appeared to be already in the cards on the eve of the Indian general election, in case of a new victory by Modi39 After it, New Delhi adopted an unrelenting attitude towards its neighbours particularly in relation to its core concerns, such as terrorism and territorial integrity. This attitude was most evident in In- dia’s relations with Pakistan. Modi has finally overcome India’s hesitancy in changing the status quo on Kashmir. Modi not only revoked Kashmir’s autonomy, but there was also a renewed focus on India’s claim to the whole territory of the former princely state of Kashmir, including Pakistan-held Kashmir. By focusing on the entire disputed territory of Kashmir, the intention was to put Pakistan on the defensive.40 This belligerent approach to the territorial dispute is complemented by an equally aggressive attitude towards Pakistani sponsored terrorism. Modi’s use of airstrikes against terror camps in Pakistan as a response to the terrorist strike against Indian forces in Kashmir in February last year was perhaps the biggest escalation

37. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, India-Bangladesh Joint Statement during Official Visit of Prime Minister of Bangladesh to India, 5 October 2019. 38. Haroon Habib, ‘Bangladesh’s Concern: Neighbour’s worries over CAA and NRC’, Frontline, 3 January 2020. 39. Sanjeev Miglani, ‘If Modi wins Elections, neighbours can expect a more muscular India’, Reuters, 30 March 2014. 40. Khivvraj Jangid, ‘Under Modi, the «New» India Prioritizes Aggression – and Prizes Israel’s Example’, Haaertz, 3 March 2019; Sreeram Chaulia, ‘How Modi government is using aggressive diplomacy to its advantage’, The Economic Times, 27 October 2019.

404 India 2019 (3) in Indo-Pakistani low-intensity conflict by any Indian leader in history.41 It also served to remind the Pakistani leadership that India does not believe in Pakistan’s nuclear braggadocio and is willing to climb the escalation ladder in pursuit of its national security interests. Such aggressiveness is not limited to Pakistan. Territorial assertiveness has also marred Indo-Nepal diplomatic relations.42 In November 2019, New Delhi released new political maps which included certain territories claimed by Nepal. The bone of contention is the 35 km stretch of land along the Kali River, which Kathmandu claims to be its territory. However, India’s Ministry of External Affairs has rejected Nepal’s claims. Already frayed by Nepal’s growing closeness with Beijing, India-Nepal relationship is going to be even more adversely affected by India’s territorial assertiveness. The second major trend in India’s neighbourhood policy is New Del- hi’s abandonment of the traditional focus on the South Asian region and its progressive eastward shifting in the pursuit of regional integration and cooperation.43 Modi’s embrace of BIMSTEC over SAARC engenders out of a belief that the latter is more of a hindrance than an asset in India’s neighbourhood policy. The contrast was on display during Modi’s inauguration ceremony in 2019; unlike 2014, when Modi invited the leaders of SAARC nations, 2019 saw Modi prioritising BIMSTEC countries. This eastward orientation of India’s neighbourhood policy is the end product of several factors.44 First, Modi has finally given up on any effort to recalibrate India’s Pakistan policy. It considers Islamabad as the perennial problem child in any effort toward regional integration in South Asia. Rather than repeating what it sees as the same mistakes, the Modi government is trying to focus on relationships which it considers have productive potential. The eastward focus within South Asia also feeds into India’s Act East Policy, as it aims to use the Bay of Bengal as a conduit to the South East Asian region. The Bay of Bengal has, therefore, gained immense traction in India’s foreign policy.45 The third major trend is India’s embrace of extra-regional powers as partners in its efforts to develop infrastructure and connectivity projects in South Asia.46 For a long time, New Delhi considered extra-regional influence as necessarily counterproductive to India’s interests in the region. China’s

41. Sachin Parashar, ‘We’ll have Physical jurisdiction over PoK one day: Jais- hankar’, The Economic Times, 18 September 2019. 42. C Raja Mohan, ‘How Balakot Changed the familiar script of India-Pakistan military crises’, Indian Express, 4 March 2019. 43. Sudha Ramachandran, ‘India’s BIMSTEC Gambit’, The Diplomat, 31 May 2019. 44. Kriti Shah, ‘South Asia’, in Harsh Pant & Kabir M. Taneja (eds.), Looking Back, Looking Ahead: Foreign Policy in Transition under Modi, New Delhi: Observer Re- search Foundation, 2019, pp. 42-48. 45. C Raja Mohan, ‘Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Eastward Tilt Remaps India’s Neighbourhood’, ISAS Brief No. 695, 29 May 2019. 46. Harsh Pant, ‘Cornered by the Quad?’, The Hindu, 28 February 2018.

405 Yogesh Joshi penetration, both economic and military, has finally made New Delhi realise that it too needs allies to boost up its influence in the region. India cannot compete with Chinese investments and dwindling economic performance at home has only exacerbated resource problems evident in the reduction of foreign aid in India’s annual budget. Partnering with friendly nations, such as the US, Japan, and Australia, in South Asia allows New Delhi not only to increase its diplomatic leverage but also to undertake new commitments in South Asia’s economic development.47

3. Increasing engagement with middle powers

Sandwiched between a hostile neighbourhood and the increasing unpredictability of the contemporary great power politics, Prime Minister Modi has put a lot of emphasis on India’s interaction with middle powers in the international system.48 Most of them wield significant influence across different regions of the world, primarily because of their economic power. Under this policy of multi alignment, New Delhi has actively pursued middle power New Delhi not only aims to secure vital economic and security interests but also to hedge against an increasingly uncertain world, where a fundamental redistribution of power from the US to China appears to be underway.49 First, middle powers share similar concerns vis-à-vis China’s growing assertiveness as well as the USA’s increasing inclination towards isolationism. In terms of structural international politics constraints, middle powers find themselves similarly positioned: they all seek a more significant voice in global affairs. Rather than accepting a bipolar world order dominated by the US and China, middle powers wish to operate in a multipolar world order, which can provide them with both greater flexibility of choices and enhanced relative importance in international politics. From the very beginning, Modi has devoted a great deal of attention to building three middle-power coalitions across three major regions of the world. The first of these coalitions concerns India’s relations with major powers in the Mid- dle East, namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Israel. The second middle power coalition focusses on the Indo-Pacific, and it is charecterized by New Delhi’s relations in particular with Japan, Australia,

47. ‘Japan, US, Australia and India look to establish alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative’, Reuters, 19 February 2018; Tara Kartha, ‘Counter to BRI? Why India-US’ thrust on Blue Dot Network will make China see red’, The Print, 28 Febru- ary 2020. 48. Tellis, Troubles Aplenty; Constantino Xavier, ‘Modi’s Middle Way’, The ASAN Forum, 28 August 2019; C. Raja Mohan, ‘Modi and the Middle Powers’, The Indian Express, 9 April 2015. 49. Ali Wyne & Bonnie S Glaser, ‘A New Phase in Middle-Power Adjustment to US-China Competition?’, The National Interest, 5 November 2019.

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Singapore, and Indonesia. The last coalition is the one focussed on Europe and including the UK, France, and Germany. Since 2014, the Modi government has reoriented India’s foreign policy towards developing a «deeper relationship» with critical states in the Mid- dle East, especially the oil-rich monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.50 Modi has transformed India’s bilateral relationship with these states from one primarily characterised by New Delhi’s dependence on Middle East- ern Oil and remittances from the Indian diaspora working in the region to a comprehensive economic and security partnership. It entails significant capital investments by oil-rich West Asian states into the Indian economy as well as greater cooperation in anti-terrorism, intelligence sharing and maritime domain awareness. Modi’s «biggest success story» in foreign policy, as some have argued, has been facilitated by the emerging fault lines and new alliances within the region.51 If the growing rift between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has elevated India’s importance, the newfound strategic closeness between Saudi Arabia and Israel has also helped New Delhi’s cause. In the past, India struggled hard to maintain a sense of balance in its relationship with the Muslim countries on the one hand and its growing security partnership with Israel on the other. The Iranian threat has created a new synergy between Israel and Gulf monarchies. 2019 saw India further consolidating its foreign policy gains in the Middle East. Since coming to power in 2014, Modi has visited eight states in the Middle East, the maximum visits made by any Indian prime minister in a single tenure. Such high-level diplomatic engagements have continued unabated, an evident example of them being the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman to New Delhi in February 2019.52 Modi also visited the UAE in August 2019, where he was bestowed with the country’s highest civilian award – the Order of Zayed. Second, India’s economic engagement with the Gulf countries expanded significantly. Gulf countries increasingly view India as a possible investment destination.53 Following the visit of Saudi Crown Prince, the Saudi oil giant Aramco declared its intention to invest in India’s Reliance Industries Limited to the tune of US$ 75 billion. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also decided to spend US$ 60 billion in building a brand-new mega oil refinery in India to process crude oil from the Gulf. These growing economic linkages have been a blessing for the Modi government, especially in a period when the Indian economy has stagnated. Modi’s unique diplomatic style, which privileges personal connections with

50. PR Kumaraswamy, ‘Modi Transforms India’s approach to the Middle East’, East Asia Forum, 11 October 2019. 51. Kabir Taneja, ‘How Modi turned the Gulf to his favour’, ORF, 2 July 2019. 52. Zeenat Saberin, ‘Saudi Crown Prince in India as «trade, investment» top agenda, Aljazeera, 19 February 2019. 53. Sanjay Pulpika & Mohit Musaddi, ‘Power Shifts and re-calibrations: India and the Gulf ’, The Economic Times, 14 February 2020.

407 Yogesh Joshi foreign leaders, along with growing economic interdependence, has also allowed India to initiate new security cooperation with the Gulf countries while strengthening the substantial security relationship it already has with Israel. During Modi’s visit to Saudi Arabia in October 2019, several agreements on cooperation in the field of anti-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and defence manufacturing were signed.54 In March 2019, India and the UAE conducted their first-ever joint naval exercise. Meanwhile India-Israel defence relationship has continued to deepen.55 Indian Airforce used Is- raeli SPICE-2000 precision-guided bombs to target the terrorist hideouts in Pakistani Kashmir during the February crisis. As the crisis exposed glaring gaps in India’s military inventory, New Delhi once again turned to Tel Aviv to make up for its defence deficiencies. In July 2019, Israel defence manufacturer Raphael Advanced Defence Systems signed a US$ 100 million deal to supply missiles for the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force. The success of Indian foreign policy approach to the Gulf countries has also been highlighted by their muted reaction to Modi’s divisive domestic politics. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have maintained absolute silence over the CAA and the revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy. The support of Gulf Monarchies has also helped India to blunt the criticism emanating out of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). As claimed by the BJP, Modi appears to have finally untangled the Gordian knot of India’s diplomatic troubles in the Middle East. India has been able to separate its relationship with the Gulf countries from the domestic politics around the treatment of Indian Muslims as well as neutralise Pakistan’s influence over the OIC. How long this will continue without some realignment in Modi’s domestic politics is however open to question. If the Middle East is one of the most pivotal regions for India’s economic and security interests, so is the region of the Indo-Pacific, which hosts some significant middle powers such as Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and the ASEAN bloc of countries. The rationale behind India’s Indo-Pacific strategy is to foster New Delhi’s engagement with South-East Asia, East Asia, and Oceania primarily to counter China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean.56 States in the Indo-Pacific not only share common concerns associated with an increasingly assertive China and a decreasingly effective US- led security order in the region, but also believe that hedging towards a local balance of power in the Indo-Pacific is in their long-term national interests. These motivations are the fundamental driving force behind the growing momentum of India’s bilateral, trilateral and multilateral relationships in

54. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Joint Statement on Visit of Prime Minister of India to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 29 October 2019. 55. Harsh V. Pant & Ambuj Sahu, ‘Israel’s Arms Sales to India: Bedrock of a Strategic Partnership’, ORF, Issue Brief No. 311, September 2019. 56. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue, 1 June 2018.

408 India 2019 (3) the Indo-Pacific region. Though the trajectory of India’s security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific has been evident for the last few years, New Delhi has yet not been able to resolve its balancing strategy in the region. On the one hand, it wants to challenge China’s growing diplomatic, economic and military penetration of the region; on the other, New Delhi also seeks to reassure Beijing that India’s Indo-Pacific strategy does not intend to contain China.57 Such ambiguity in India’s Indo-Pacific policy is most evident in its approach towards the Quadrilateral Security Initiative (Quad). A security initiative of Asia’s maritime democracies – India, Japan, Australia and the US – the Quad aims to balance China’s growing maritime power in the Indo-Pacific and to preserve the liberal order in the region. Nonetheless, New Delhi has appeared to be hesitant in pursuing the full development of the Quad, as shown by its unwillingness, even after repeated appeals by the US and Japan, to inviting Australia to join the Malabar series of naval exercises.58 2019 also saw India using the Quad platform to synergise a concerted Indo-Pacific response to China’s BRI.59 Rather than creating a multilateral response, India feels more comfortable in pursuing bilateral approaches. The logic of this strategy is evident in India’s burgeoning security relationships with Japan and Australia. India and Japan have been conducting joint naval exercises for almost a decade now; moreover, in 2018, India Army and Japanese Ground Self-Defence Forces conducted their first land exercises. On the top of it, during the 2+2 dialogue (putting together the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the two countries), held in November 2019, both sides agreed to coordinate fighter aircraft exercises in 2020. On their part, Indian and Australian Navies also conducted their second naval exercise in April 2019. India and Australia have also agreed to sign a military logistics agreement that would facilitate interoperability in the Indian Ocean.60 New Delhi has also increased its security engagement with smaller states in the region, mainly the ASEAN countries. Following the announcement made by Prime Minister Modi in the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, In- dia, Thailand, and Singapore performed their first-ever trilateral naval ex-

57. Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘Evasive Balancing: India’s Unviable Indo-Pacific Strategy’, International Affairs, Vol. 96, No. 1, 2020, pp. 76-77. 58. On India, the Quad and the significance of Australia’s non invitation to join the Malabar Exercise see Michelguglielmo Torri, ‘India 2018: The Resetting of New Delhi’s Foreign Policy’, pp. 296-97, 300, 313. 59. Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Press Information Bureau, Joint Statement: First India-Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting, 30 No- vember 2019. 60. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, ‘India, Australia to sign logistics sharing pact during PM Morrison’s high-profile visit’, The Economic Times, 3 January 2020.

409 Yogesh Joshi ercise in the Andaman Sea in October 2019.61 Shortly after that, the three countries decided to make these trilateral exercises an annual affair. Apart from increasing maritime cooperation, there has been some political movement related to the Quad. In September 2019, for the first time, the foreign ministers of the Quad countries met along the side-lines of the UN General Assembly.62 India’s economic engagement with the region, however, was much less successful. It witnessed a significant reversal when India’s refused to sign the Regional Economic Cooperation Agreement (RCEP), a free trade agreement between 16 major economics of the Indo-Pacific region. This decision was particularly disappointing for the ASEAN countries, such as Singapore and Indonesia, who support India’s membership as a bulwark against future domination of the trading bloc by China.63 India’s economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific has also come under the scanner due to Modi’s domestic economic policies. The slowing down of the Indian economy has not only called into question India’s attractiveness as an investment destination but has also revealed autarchic tendencies within. In the year under review New Delhi appeared to have come to the conclusion that its free trade agreements with ASEAN countries had been detrimental; hence New Delhi’s attempt to revision them. The situation has been worsened by Modi’s domestic politics, which have created some heartburn among Muslim-majority ASEAN states. Malaysia and Indonesia have criticised both the hollowing out of Article 370 and the introduction of the CAA. Compared to its «Act West» policy, India’s «Act East» policy delivered only modest results in 2019. Within India’s foreign policy framework of multi alignment, the role played by the European Union as a body and some major European countries – Germany, France and Great Britain – appears to be increasingly important. Three factors have contributed to strengthening these relation. First, both sides feel that the growing tensions in the Sino-US relationship will result in a new Cold War, marginalising their interests and influence in global politics.64 Second, the rise of protectionism in the US, along with President Trump’s war against multilateralism, has reinforced the need for a new strategic relationship between India and Europe. For New Delhi, a new trade relationship with the European Union can help off-set some of the problems accruing out of Trump’s protectionist trade policies. Lastly, Many

61. Yogesh Joshi, ‘Singapore, India and Thailand Trilateral Naval Exercise and Maritime Security in the Bay of Bengal’, ISAS Brief No. 700, 20 September 2019. 62. Yogesh Joshi, ‘Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Sends a Clear Signal to Beijing’, ISAS Briefs, 3 October 2019. 63. Rezaul H. Laskar, ‘Disappointed but understand India’s move, say Asean states’, The Hindustan Times, 6 November 2019. 64. Rajnish Singh, ‘The Future of EU-India Relations’, The Parliament Magazine, 27 January 2020.

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European states are becoming increasingly concerned that, given China’s massive and growing economic weight, the relationship with the Asian giant could limit their freedom of action sometime in the future. Accordingly, the development of the economic connection with India – which is seen as the other rapidly growing Asian economy – is considered by the EU and the major European states as introducing another main player on a chessboard that, otherwise, would be dominated by China. For Brussels, India presents the «best bet to stay relevant in Asia».65 Confirming these perceptions, In- dia and the European states have focussed on strengthening their bilateral relationship along three main dimensions: defence and foreign policy, cooperation on global challenges, and finally, the trade relationship between India and the EU. Aware of this situation, Prime Minister Modi has actively pursued a closer cooperation with some European states. In August 2019, Modi visited France for the annual bilateral summit and held extensive consultations with President Emmanuel Macron. The two sides signed agreements on the Joint Maritime Domain Awareness Mission and Roadmap of Cybersecurity and Digital Technology.66 Both during Modi’s official visit and also in the UN Security Council France offered its steadfast support to Modi’s decision to revoke Kashmir’s autonomy. France also views India as a preferred security partner for its own Indo-Pacific strategy.67 The two sides had already signed a logistics sharing agreement in 2018. The growing maritime engagement was visible in the enlarged scope of their annual naval exercise in May 2019, when French and Indian aircraft carriers, along with Indian and French nuclear submarines, participated in the training. If India’s relations with France progressed smoothly and positively in 2019, those with the UK were more uneven. In early 2019, India rejected London’s constant appeal not to support the Mauritian claim over the islands of Diego Garcia in the United Nations. The revocation of Article 370 and the introduction of CAA have also created blowback in the UK’s domestic politics, especially on the part of the Liberal Party. Yet, the conservative victory in the British general elections has brought a more supportive government to power at the Westminster. Prime Minister Boris Johnson views India as a significant strategic and economic partner and has expressed his willingness to work with Prime Minister Modi to further India-UK commercial relationships.

65. Britta Patterson, ‘Growing beyond the Bilateral’, ORF, 26 August 2019. 66. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, India-France Joint State- ment on Visit of Prime Minister to France, 22 August 2019. 67. Britta Patterson, ‘Growing beyond the Bilateral’.

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4. India and the «great game» between the US, China and Russia

Perhaps for the first time after the end of the Cold War, the world is witnessing a fundamental change in the global political order. After almost two decades of US unipolarity, the 2008 financial crisis allowed China to increasingly assert its rising power in the international system. China’s rise in the past decade has not only eroded the US unipolarity, but most political pundits agree that the world has already entered a bipolar phase characterized by the contraposition between a declining US and a rising China.68 The current shift in global politics is enormously consequential for India’s position in the world. Today, New Delhi confronts a hostile great power in its immediate neighbourhood: China. Even during the Cold War, India was not only geographically distant from, but also held no fundamental clash of interests with the great powers. China’s rise has brought great power politics at India’s doorsteps. As already noted, India’s growth in the global system occurred during the period of US unipolarity. The American policy of «benign altruism» not only favoured India’s integration in the global economic order, but, after resisting it for a long time, under President George W. Bush, it decided to accept it as a legitimate Nuclear Weapons Power, helping its assimilation in the global nuclear order.69 The rise of China, however, has not only weakened American hegemony; it has also called into question the liberal global order supporting India’s growth. Domestic disarray in American politics provides the impression that America has lost both the capacity and resolve to lead the world precisely when China’s rising power is challenging it. Under Trump, America has become much more inward looking and seeks specific reciprocity in its engagements with other states. This has become evident in the US relations with Western Europe and East Asia, as well as India.Recently, the current strategic flux is creating new fault lines in the international system and engendering new networks of alliances.70 The downturn in Sino-American and US-Russian relations has invig- orated unique power balances such as the Sino-Russian entente. Russia’s growing strategic closeness with China has created an alignment of interests between the world’s revisionist powers who seek to challenge the present US-centred global order.71 Particularly relevant from the viewpoint of this analysis, the entente between Russia and China has created significant challenges for Indian foreign policy. New Delhi had always treated Russia

68. Rajesh Rajagopalan, ‘India’s Strategic Choices; China and the Balance of Power in Asia’, Carnegie India, 14 September 2017. 69. Robert D. Blackwill & Ashley Tellis, ‘The India Dividend: New Delhi Re- mains Washington’s Best Hope in Asia’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 5, 2019. 70. Torri, ‘India 2018’, pp. 308-09. 71. Angela Stent, ‘Russia and China: Axis of Revisionists?’, Brookings Institution, February 2020.

412 India 2019 (3) as an independent pole in the global system and a reliable partner in its quest for strategic autonomy. If Russia’s growing closeness with China has left its independence suspect, its hostile relationship with the US has complicated India’s relations with Moscow.72 Managing these global shifts of power and the triangular relationship between the US, China, and Russia has become a real headache for Indian foreign policy. Though it has always been difficult for New Delhi to walk the diplomatic tightrope between the US, China, and Russia, how did Indian foreign policy manage this triangular competition in 2019? Modi’s policy vis-à-vis China has elements of both conflict and cooperation. The main contention between the two countries remains their unresolved border dispute along the Himalayan frontier. The two sides have frequently reiterated their allegedly genuine desire to negotiate a solution, while maintaining calm on the border through various «confidence building measures». Nonetheless, New Delhi appears convinced that Beijing uses the border dispute as leverage and has little interest in resolving the conflict.73 China’s growing military power across the border – with major amass- ment of firepower and improvement in military logistics – has made New Delhi extremely jittery.74 The Sino-Indian security dilemma is further intensified by India’s growing strategic partnership with the US and China’s «all-weather» friendship with Pakistan. For New Delhi, the biggest obstacle in improving the bilateral relationship remains China’s unwavering diplomatic, economic and military support to Islamabad. India’s revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy and Modi’s aggressive policies towards Pakistan have further strengthened the Sino-Pakistani alliance. In 2019, these fault lines accentuated, as shown by Beijing’s diplomatic initiative against India’s Kashmir policy in the UNSC as well as its support for Islamabad during the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) deliberations in Paris.75 China, too, is increasingly feeling anxious about the growing momentum in Indo-US relationship. Weaning India, away from an explicit alliance with the US, is Beijing’s primary objective.76 The resurgence of Quad has once again intensified the Sino-Indian competition in the Indo-Pacific.77

72. Tanvi Madan, ‘Between a Cold War Ally and an India-Pacific Partner: In- dia’s US-Russia Balancing Act’, War on the Rocks, 16 October 2019. 73. Tom Hussain, ‘Is China turning up heat on India through Pakistan flank amid Doklam standoff?’, SCMP, 21 July 2017. 74. Yogesh Joshi & Anit Mukherjee, ‘From Denial to Punishment: The Security Dilemma and changes in India’s Military Strategy towards China’, Asian Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2019, pp. 25-43. 75. Ivan Lidarev, ‘2019: Reviewing a Passable Year in India-China Relation- ship’, The Diplomat, 4 January 2020. 76. Yun Sun, ‘China’s Strategic Assessment of India’, War on the Rocks, 25 March 2020. 77. ‘«The Quad» will meet in Singapore – can it balance China’s influence or is it «stoking a new cold war»?’, SCMP, 15 November 2018.

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Despite such continuing tensions, as has been the trend in yester- years, Modi has continued to engage Beijing for a rapprochement in the Sino-Indian relationship.78 On 11 and 12 October 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met for their second informal summit in India’s coastal town of Mamallapuram (also known as Mahabalipuram). Modi and Xi not only represent Asia’s biggest economic and military powers but are also perceived as influential nationalist leaders by their domestic constituencies. The series of such informal summits began in April 2018, when Modi and Xi met in Wuhan in Central China.79 The backdrop was a two-month-long stand-off between the Indian and the Chinese military in the summer of 2017 at Doklam, their worst military crisis in recent memory. The expectation was that Modi and Xi, by conducting these informal summits, could bring to bear the influence of their strong personalities on the trajectory of Sino-Indian relations.80 The October 2019 meeting came in the wake of rising diplomatic tensions between the two countries over India’s revocation of the Kash- mir’s autonomy and China’s support to Pakistan’s position in the UN Security Council. Modi’s controversial move rattled both China and its long-time all-weather ally, Pakistan.81 Beijing’s initial reaction was to ensure that India’s actions would not alter the status quo of the Sino-Indian border. However, China’s position quickly became one supporting Paki- stan’s claims that Modi’s decision was both illegal and illegitimate. China forced the UNSC to discuss Kashmir in a closed-door meeting; UNSC last discussed Kashmir in 1964-65.82 When Pakistani Prime minister Imran Khan visited Beijing, just before the Modi-Xi summit, President Xi reiterated China’s support to Pakistan on Kashmir, casting a shadow on the October summit.83 China is India’s biggest trading partner; the total trade between the two countries stands at US$ 90 billion. However, India suffers from a large trade deficit as Chinese goods constitute almost 70% of the total trade. In- dia has often complained about China’s protectionist trade policies; Indi- an companies have usually found it challenging to penetrate the Chinese markets. President Trump’s trade wars have given both China and India new reasons to resolve differences. America’s protectionist trade policies in-

78. Torri, ‘India 2018’, pp. 300-301. 79. Ibid., 297-298. 80. Yogesh Joshi, ‘Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi met again this month. Here are the four things to know about Sino-Indian relationship’, The Washington Post, 22 October 2019. 81. Asfandyar Mir, ‘Here’s how India’s Decision to cut Kashmir’s autonomy will affect South Asia- and the world’, The Washington Post, 9 August 2019. 82. ‘UN Security Council discusses Kashmir, China urges India and Pakistan to ease tensions’, UN News, 16 August 2019. 83. ‘China paying close attention to situation in Kashmir: Xi Jinping tells Im- ran Khan’, Press Trust of India, 10 October 2019.

414 India 2019 (3) centivise robust trade between the two countries as both India and China want to off-set losses accruing from Trump’s trade wars. However, politically sensitive issues such as Huawei’s investment interest in India and India’s reluctance to join China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) continues to be a bone of contention.84 In this situation, the Modi-Xi October summit once again failed to make any breakthrough concerning the border problem. Mamallapuram, as Wuhan before it, may help India and China to keep their rivalry manage- able. However, the Modi-Xi dialogue cannot be an end in itself; conversation without substantive results may only accentuate the prevalent distrust in Sino-Indian relations. The emerging fault lines between India and China are further accentuated by the gradual shift in Russian grand strategy. The growing rift between the US and Russia on the one hand and the emerging Sino-Russian entente, on the other, has fundamentally altered India’s geopolitical landscape for a couple of reasons.85 The first reason is that, for long, India considered Moscow an independent pole in international politics. Russia’s embrace of China will fundamentally alter the regional balance of power in Asia. The signs of this embrace are conspicuous and its implications for India ominous. Moscow has supported Beijing’s BRI and asked India to withdraw its reservations. It has also started supplying top-end military equipment to China. Mos- cow has also expressed serious reservations on India’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific strategy, which it considers as an American construct to contain China and continue US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. If historically Moscow has unequivocally supported India on Kashmir, in recent times Russia stand has been more ambiguous. The second reason behind the Russia-caused alteration of India’s geopolitical landscape, is that, if the Sino-Russian entente continues to strengthen, India’s policy of multi alignment will come under severe strain. India’s «diversification strategy» aims to reduce its overdependence upon any one of the great powers. However, China’s rise, coupled with Moscow’s tilt towards Beijing, will force India into a tighter embrace with the US. Modi’s overall strategy vis-à-vis Moscow has been to try to slow the intensification of Sino-Russian entente on the one hand and to mediate between US and Russia on the other.86 While doing this, and irrespective of the growing closeness of Indo-US strategic partnership, Indian foreign policy has worked hard to maintain the special relationship with Russia.

84. Amitendu Palit, ‘RCEP and India: High Stakes and Costs’, ISAS, Issue Brief No. 711, 14 October 2019. 85. Aleksie Zhakarov, ‘Friends in need: Whither the Russia-India Strategic Part- nership’, IFRI, October 2019. 86. Manoj Joshi, ‘India’s strategy in the China-Russia-USA Triangle’, ORF, 20 December 2019.

415 Yogesh Joshi

Keeping these objectives in mind, Modi has continued its outreach to Moscow. In September 2019, Modi travelled to Vladivostok for the 20th Indo-Russia bilateral summit.87 During the summit, the two sides signed 15 bilateral agreements in areas such as Trade and Investment, Defence Co- operation, Road Transport, and Cooperation in Oil and Gas exploration. Though Modi’s visit to Vladivostok coincided with the 5th Eastern Economic Forum, where he was invited as the chief guest, India-Russia relationship remained highly skewed with defence cooperation informing the bulk of their bilateral transactions. In 2014-2018, 58% of India’s defence needs were supplied by Russia. India’s overall military dependence on Russia has decreased in the last decade, primarily because of New Delhi’s diversification strategy. However, Russia remains the primary supplier of both legacy platforms and cutting-edge defence equipment such as S-400 Missile De- fence System and nuclear submarines which are hard to procure from any other source. However, such overdependence on the defence relationship has proved detrimental for the overall strategic partnership. Both India and Russia are slowly realising the need to correct this one-sided nature of their bilateral relationship by strengthening by diver- sifying their economic collaboration. During Modi’s visit to Vladivostok, the two sides agreed on a revised economic roadmap which would help the two countries to increase the bilateral trade to US$ 30 billion by 2025. If India and Russia seek to sustain their strategic partnership, developing meaningful economic cooperation beyond the buyer-seller defence relationship is a must. Under Modi, India has made its strategic choice quite apparent. Modi has been unequivocal in its embrace of the United States as India’s preferred strategic partner. Though no government in New Delhi will ever accept a relationship of alliance with the US, Modi has been unapologetic about the centrality of the US in India’s foreign policy. Modi has also made a strategic calculation that, irrespective of Trump’s idiosyncrasies, his penchant for protectionism, and his increasingly irresponsible treatment of allies and strategic partners, the US remains the best bet for realising India’s security and economic goals. He has purposefully massaged Trump’s ego, as evident in the «Howdy Modi» event (22 September 2019), where he openly rallied in favour of Trump’s re-election campaign among the fifty thousand odd Indian-American audiences in a football stadium in Houston, Texas. Modi’s unabashed embrace of Trump was particularly surprising in the light of some severe setbacks in the Indo-US relationship in the first half of 2019. A few days into Modi’s re-election, the US announced the termination of preferential tariffs of almost US$ 6 billion to Indian exports. The announcement came in the wake of an executive decision taken in

87. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, India - Russia Joint State- ment during visit of Prime Minister to Vladivostok, 5 September 2019.

416 India 2019 (3)

March 2019, withdrawing the special duty benefits allowed to India under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP).88 This decision briefly led to a trade war between the two countries, with India retaliating by imposing tariff duties on 28 US products, primarily in the agriculture sector. The trade deal between the two countries remained elusive even after extensive negotiations. Trump’s impulsive declaration to mediate the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan also created some severe heartburn in New Delhi. US decision to withdraw from Afghanistan without extensive consultations with New Delhi was a sore point in the bilateral relationship.89 Irrespective of these setbacks, the trajectory of US-India relations remained ascendant. As Ashley Tellis has argued, «Modi’s courtship of Trump» has been aided by the American penchant to confront China and its «Free and Open Indo-Pacific» strategy.90 2019 saw the two sides further cementing their strategic relationship. In December 2019, the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, involving the Foreign and Defence ministers of the two nations, took place in Washington. The dialogue resulted in expanded cooperation between the Indian Navy and the US Indo-Pacific Command, Central Command, and the Africa Command. The exchange also formalised the first-ever US- India tri-service amphibious exercise, codenamed «Tiger Triumph», to be repeated annually. Both sides also agreed to emplace liaison officers in the US Central Command and the Information Fusion Center for the Indian Ocean Region. Lastly, India and the US signed an industrial exchange Annexe, which will further intensify their cooperation in the joint manufacturing of defence products. Modi has also used India’s expanding military imports to satisfy Trump’s desire to help the US economy grow. The purchase of defence equipment from the US not only allows India to beef up its military preparedness but also caters to Trump’s domestic political agenda. In 2019 alone, India agreed to buy or negotiated the purchase of over US$ 7 billion worth of military equipment from the US, including combat drones, maritime surveillance aircraft, transport and combat helicopters, and limited missile defence systems.91 Against a backdrop of trade disputes, defence partnership has become the engine driving Indo- US relationship.

88. Kritika Suneja, ‘Donald Trump terminates preferential trade status for In- dia under GSP’, The Economic Times, 1 June 2019. 89. Harsh V. Pant, ‘India’s dilemmas in Afghanistan’, ORF- Observer Research Foundation, 2 August 2019. 90. Ashley Tellis, ‘The Surprising Success of the US-Indian Partnership’, For- eign Affairs, 20 February 2020. 91. Manjeet Singh Negi, ‘India to sign over $7 billion defence deal with US to procure combat drones, spy aircraft’, India Today, 17 November 2019.

417 Yogesh Joshi

5. Conclusion

If in 2018, the Indian foreign policy was focussed entirely on managing the emerging triangular strategic competition between the US, China and Russia, Modi’s mismanagement of Indian economy and his domestic agenda of political polarisation grievously injured India’s foreign policy in 2019. As this article illustrated, Modi’s divisive politics has not only undermined India’s national unity but also negatively impacted its relationship with its neighbours. India’s economic underperformance, coupled with the rise of Hindutva, has fundamentally questioned India’s leadership claims in the region. Its foreign policy lacks both hard and soft power resources. India is neither wealthy enough like China to lead South Asia’s economic integration nor is it sufficiently principled to claim moral leadership in the region. Modi has been successful in consolidating India’s relationship with three major middle power regions – the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific and Europe. However, a divided domestic polity and internal fissures have not only raised serious question marks over the future of liberal democracy in India but also forced the Ministry of External Affairs to expend its already overstretched resources in fire-fighting the international criticisms of the Modi government. From the UNSC to the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), Modi’s divisive domestic agenda has made New Delhi a target of several multilateral institutions. At the end of the day, the most significant fallout of India’s internal troubles is the weakening of its national security strategy. At a time when global politics is going through a significant strategic realignment, New Delhi appears to be highly distracted. Rather than preparing India for the ensuing economic and security challenges, Modi has put the ideology of Hindutva in charge of India’s future. Though India’s strategic partners have bailed her out in the short term, the material and normative losses are tremendous. How Modi will resuscitate India’s ailing economy, recuperate its injured and polarised body-politic, and reclaim its moral leadership in the region and the world would fundamentally determine New Delhi’s rise in the global system. It will also be Modi’s most important legacy for Indian foreign policy.

418 Nepal 2019: Attempts at mediation in domestic and foreign policies

Matteo Miele

Center for Southeast Asian Studies CSEAS – Kyoto University [email protected]

The article outlines the key issues related to international relations, domestic politics and the economic situation of Nepal in 2019. In the first section, particular emphasis is given to Xi Jinping’s visit in October 2019. A separate paragraph is dedicated to the non-signature of the extradition treaty between China and Nepal and the issue of Tibetans in the Himalayan country. Furthermore, the Indo-Nepalese crisis relating to the territory of Kalapani is outlined. In terms of domestic politics, the paper addresses the issue of internal balances of power in the Communist Party of Nepal, resulting from the fusion of Marxist-Leninists and Maoists in 2018. In addition, the analysis focuses on the birth of a new political party, the Samajbadi Party-Nepal, from the union of the Madhesi FSFN party with the Naya Shakti Party. This new party therefore stands as the second subject, together with the Rastriya Janata Party-Nepal, within a unification process aimed at forming a great unitary force in support of the Madhesi demands. Finally, Nepal’s economic scenario is outlined. From the data provided, the known critical issues of the Himalayan country are reiterated, in particular the heavy trade deficit. The numbers of the first eight months of the fiscal year 2018/2019 show a strong growth in imports from China, without, however, a similar growth in Nepalese exports to the north. Quite the contrary, there is a clear drop. The volume is certainly revealing considering the recent role of Nepal within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

1. Introduction

This article seeks to define the political and economic framework of Nepal in 2019. In terms of foreign affairs, the close relationship of the Nep- alese government with the People’s Republic of China became even more evident following the visit of Chinese president Xi Jinping in October and the consequent signing of a long list of documents concerning various political, cultural and economic matters. Among these, however, the extradition treaty coveted by the Chinese and feared by Tibetans, humanitarian organisations and even Washington, was not included. As regards relations with India, an ancient border issue was reopened by the publication of the new official map by the Indian government in November. The crisis further deepens the political divide between Kathmandu and New Delhi. At the domestic level, internal tensions in the National Communist Party (NCP) were accompanied by Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s health

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Matteo Miele concerns. The divisions within the main Nepalese party were partially remedied by an agreement that gives Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the former prime minister and historical Maoist leader, greater powers, while guar- anteeing that Oli remain at the helm of the government until the 2023 elections. At the same time, new political developments have involved the two main Madhesi parliamentary forces on the longer and jagged path aimed at unification. The drafting of this article was mainly based on official reports and press releases published by the government of Nepal or by other domestic, foreign or international institutions. Nepalese newspapers were consulted in order to define the domestic political situation.

2. Foreign policy

2.1. China: Xi Jinping’s visit The main event regarding Nepalese foreign policy in 2019 was represented by the visit of the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, which took place on 12 and 13 October.1 This was the first visit of a Chinese head of state since Jiang Zemin’s journey in 1996,2 the same year in which the conflict between the monarchist government and the Maoists began. A conflict which, as is well known, then led to the end of the dynasty and the birth of the Republic. In 1996, King Birendra had welcomed Jiang, along with the then prime minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba,3 today the main leader of the Nepali Congress (NC). At the airport, Xi was received by the current Nepalese president, Bidya Devi Bhandari and, after a guard of honour, he was welcomed, inter alia, by the Nepalese vice-president and the prime minister, KP Sharma Oli.4 The visit certainly represented a further step in the path of rapprochement which the two countries have been pursuing for several years. It is a path that moves within China’s strategy of alliances in Asia, but at the same time in the Nepalese attempt to emancipate itself from the historical political and commercial dependence on India. Indeed, despite being formally a tributary of the Qing Empire, Nepal is without doubt within the Indian cultural and economic sphere. This Indo-Nepalese link, which has shaped

1. Government of Nepal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Statement Between Nepal and the People’s Republic of China, 13 October 2019 (https://mofa.gov.np/joint- statement-between-nepal-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china-2). 2. ‘Xi stresses importance of integrity, good governance in communist party’, República, 14 October 2019. Writing this paper, I have mainly consulted the paper edition of the Nepalese newspaper República. The online edition has been used to a lesser extent and is indicated as myRepública. 3. ‘Xi receives a warm welcome’, República, 13 October 2019. 4. Ibid.

420 Nepal 2019 the Nepalese linguistic and religious identity, has likewise made the country – also for obvious geographical reasons – exposed to the political obstacles that have emerged several times throughout history. These obstacles which then reappeared even more strongly after the birth of the Republic and in particular in the choice of the Marxist-Leninist and Maoist prime ministers, determined an ever greater autonomy in foreign policy and international trade. This is a position which inevitably corresponds with a stronger relationship with Beijing. The Joint Statement Between Nepal and the People’s Republic of China reads that «[t]he bilateral relationship between Nepal and China has entered a new phase. Both sides decided to, on the basis of the Five Princi- ples of Peaceful Coexistence, Charter of the United Nations and principles of good neighbourliness, elevate Nepal-China Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation Featuring Ever-lasting Friendship to Strategic Partnership of Cooperation Featuring Ever-lasting Friendship for Development and Prosperity».5 The Belt and Road Initiative, which Nepal formally joined in 2017,6 was defined «as an important opportunity to deepen mutually-beneficial cooperation in all fields in a comprehensive manner, jointly pursue common prosperity and dedicate themselves to maintaining peace, stability and development in the region». As many as 20 documents were signed between the two sides.7 Among them there is no extradition treaty, but there is a treaty «on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters». These 20 documents outline a level of cooperation that far exceeds the commercial and infrastructural space. They include agreements on the opening of a Confucius Institute at Tribhuvan University (the main university in the country), on new twinning between Nepalese and Chinese cities (including a twinning between Kathmandu and Nanjing), cooperation on health, environmental and legal, as well as security, border control, and agriculture. An Exchange of Note provides for the opening of a Nepalese

5. Government of Nepal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Statement Between Nepal and the People’s Republic of China, 13 October 2019 (https://mofa.gov.np/joint- statement-between-nepal-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china-2). 6. Government of Nepal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release on signing ceremony of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, 12 May 2017 (https://mofa.gov.np/press-release-signing-ceremony-memorandum-understanding-mou-cooperation-belt-road-initiative). It should be noted that in 2016, however, it was Oli who had guaranteed Nepalese adherence to the Chinese project. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 习近平会见尼泊尔总理奥利 (Xi Jinping meets Nepali Prime Minister Oli), 21 March 2016 (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1349371.shtml). 7. Government of Nepal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, List of Instruments Signed and Exchanged between Nepal and China, 13 October 2019 (https://mofa.gov.np/list-of- instruments-singed-and-exchanged-between-nepal-and-china).

421 Matteo Miele consulate general in Chengdu,8 the capital of Sichuan, a Chinese province with a substantial Tibetan presence.9 In addition to institutional meetings, Xi Jinping also met with former prime minister Deuba10 and the leaders of the Nepal Communist Party.11 The latter included the NCP co-chair Dahal.12

2.1.1. The extradition treaty and the issue of Tibetans in Nepal According to the October Joint Statement between Nepal and the People’s Republic of China, the Nepalese government «reiterated its firm commitment to One China policy, acknowledging that Taiwan is an inal- ienable part of the Chinese territory and Tibet affairs are China’s internal affairs, and the determination on not allowing any anti-China activities on its soil».13 As already mentioned, among the 20 instruments signed by Nepal and China, there was also a treaty «on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters».14 At the same time, in the aforementioned Joint State- ment, precisely underlining the signing of this treaty, explicit reference is made to the «hope for an early conclusion of the Treaty on Extradition».15 In fact, a Joint Statement of June 2019 had already foreseen the signing of the two treaties «in order to strengthen cooperation on the administration of border areas and fight against illegal border crossing and transnational crimes»,16 but during the October visit, the Chinese obtained the Nepalese signature only on one of the two. The more delicate one on extradition was postponed. An extradition treaty is indeed viewed with great concern

8. At the moment, in addition to the embassy in Beijing, Nepal is the only country to have a consulate general in Lhasa, as well as one in Guangzhou and another in Hong Kong. Information is taken from the website of the Nepalese Embassy in China (https://cn.nepalembassy.gov.np). 9. Sichuan encompasses a part of Kham (Khams), a Tibetan historical region. The Nepal-China Non-Governmental Cooperation Forum of 2020 is also planned in the province. ‘Nepali, Chinese private sectors to hold cooperation forum in China’s Sichuan next year’, Xinhua, 27 November 2019. 10. ‘Xi meets Nepali Congress Party chief ’, Xinhuanet, 13 October 2019. 11. ‘Xi stresses importance of integrity, good governance in communist party’. 12. Ibid. 13. Government of Nepal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Statement Between Nepal and the People’s Republic of China, 13 October 2019 (https://mofa.gov.np/joint- statement-between-nepal-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china-2). 14. Government of Nepal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, List of Instruments Signed and Exchanged between Nepal and China, 13 October 2019 (https://mofa.gov.np/list-of- instruments-singed-and-exchanged-between-nepal-and-china). 15. Government of Nepal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Statement Between Nepal and the People’s Republic of China, 13 October 2019 (https://mofa.gov.np/joint- statement-between-nepal-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china-2). 16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and Nepal, 22 June 2019 (https://www.fmprc.gov. cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1570977.shtml).

422 Nepal 2019 by support groups for Tibetan communities in exile.17 Furthermore, the simple idea of an extradition treaty inevitably evokes the extradition bill of Hong Kong and its protests. On 8 November 2019, the two co-chairs of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission of the US Congress sent a letter, also signed by six other members of Congress and addressed to the Nepalese ambassador to the United States, «to encourage» the Nepalese government «to fully protect the human rights of Tibetans under Nepalese jurisdiction».18 The letter was extremely critical of the likelihood of an extradition treaty and cited the case of six Tibetans who arrived in Nepal on foot in early September, arrested by the Nepalese police and then returned to the authorities of the People’s Re- public of China after several hours. The Congressmen stressed the similar- ity of this event with the case of the 18 Tibetan refugees sent back to China in 2003. At the time, it was recalled in the text, «a trade bill regarding the Nepalese garment industry was withdrawn in the Senate». Mention was also made of the preventive arrests and the closure of monasteries in the days preceding Xi’s arrival. It must be said that the precariousness of Tibetans in Nepal does not begin with the new government, nor the Republican period. The members’ letter underlined the difference in treatment reserved for Tibetans who arrived in Nepal after 1989. Since then, Tibetans are no longer registered as refugees by the Nepalese authorities, although an unofficial agreement between the Nepalese government and the UNHCR guarantees the passage of exiles to India.19 Undoubtedly, however, the rapprochement between Ne- pal and China puts the status of Tibetans in the country in an even more difficult position. Nonetheless, it is clear that on the Tibetan issue, Nepal cannot risk a crisis with the United States. As regards relations with Washington in 2019, the Nepalese government also faced the question of the political implications of an important American funding concerning Sino-Nepalese relations. 20 Indeed, the government of Nepal is seeking clarification with the United States with respect to the US$ 500 million of the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s Nepal

17. Meenakshi Ganguly, Fears Over a Nepal-China Extradition Treaty, Human Rights Watch, 11 October 2019 (https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/11/fears-over- nepal-china-extradition-treaty). 18. The text of the letter is available on the Commission’s website: https:// humanrightscommission.house.gov/sites/humanrightscommission.house.gov/files/ documents/20191108_AmbNepal_TibetanIssues_signed.pdf 19. Human Rights Watch, Under China’s Shadow: Mistreatment of Tibetans in Ne- pal, 2014, p. 4. 20. ‘Nepal Communist Party standing committee meet shelves issues for central committee’, The Kathmandu Post, 23 December 2019; ‘Ruling party members ask leadership to seek clarity on MCC compact from the US’, The Kathmandu Post, 22 December 2019.

423 Matteo Miele

Compact.21 The Compact was signed in September 2017.22 The concern of some senior representatives of the NCP is that this funding could be granted to an anti-Chinese function and within the Indo-Pacific Strategy,23 an alliance conceived by the Japanese prime minister, Shinzō Abe, and led by the United States as a response to the Chinese BRI.24 In December 2018, the foreign minister, Pradeep Kumar Gyawali, declared Nepal’s unwillingness to join the alliance.25

2.2. The Kalapani crisis While border issues with the People’s Republic of China were resolved by a 1961 agreement,26 the borders with India have often been a source of tension between the two countries.27 The border between India and Nepal is defined by the Treaty of Sugauli signed in December 1815 following the Anglo-Nepalese War.28 While maintaining its independence, it meant that Nepal was forced to cede a huge part of its territory. Following the redefinition of the status of Jammu, Kashmir and Lada- kh, the Survey of India published a new official map of the entire country on 2 November 2019.29 The map has become an opportunity to publicly reo-

21. Ibid. 22. Millennium Challenge Corporation, ‘U.S. and Nepal Sign $500 Million Compact’, 14 September 2017 (https://www.mcc.gov/news-and-events/release/release- 091417-nepal-signing-event). 23. ‘Nepal Communist Party standing committee meet shelves issues for central committee’; ‘Ruling party members ask leadership to seek clarity on MCC compact from the US’. 24. On the Indo-Pacific Strategy, see: Brahma Chellaney, ‘Building a «free and open» Indo-Pacific’, The Japan Times, 21 November 2018 and Humphrey Hawksley, ‘A US-led Indo-Pacific alliance against China is an outdated idea’, Nikkei Asian Review, 3 September 2018. 25. ‘Nepal won’t join US-led Indo-Pacific alliance: Gyawali’, República, 22 De- cember 2018. 26. 中华人民共和国和尼泊尔王国边界条约 (Border Treaty between the Peo- ple’s Republic of China and the Kingdom of Nepal), 中华人民共和国国务院公报 (Ga- zette of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China), 14 October 1961, n. 14 (total number 244), pp. 262-267. 27. See, inter alia, Gyanendra Paudyal, ‘Border Dispute between Nepal and In- dia’, Researcher: A Research Journal of Culture and Society, Vol. I, No. II, July-December 2013, pp. 35-48. 28. Text of the ‘Treaty of peace between the Honorauble East-India Company and Maharajah Bikram Sah, Rajah of Nepaul’, in Papers relating to East India affairs. Origin, continuance, and termination of the late war with the state of Nepaul, 19th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers, vol. 11, 31 January 1817, n. 6, pp. XI.397- XI.398 (pp. 9-10). 29. Government of India, Survey of India, Political Map Of India, Published under the direction of Lt General Girish Kumar, VSM, English 8th Edition/2019; ‘India issues new political map yet again, this time removing Kali’, OnlineKhabar, 21 November 2019.

424 Nepal 2019 pen the issue of territorial dispute regarding Kalapani,30 an area of 35 sq km on the border between the two countries, specifically between the Nepalese state of Karnali and the Indian state of Uttarakhand. According to article III of the Treaty of Sugauli, «[t]he Rajah of Nepaul hereby cedes to the Hon- ourable the East-India Company, in perpetuity, all the under-mentioned territories; namely, First, The whole of the lowlands between the rivers Kali and Rapti». A few days after publication, however, the map was replaced again by another (corresponding to the 9th edition).31 Indeed, the first map indicated the Kali river, while the new one, although tracing the course of the river, did not identify its name.32 Between the end of December 2019 and the beginning of January 2020, it was denounced by both chambers of the Nepalese parliament,33 while the Indian ministry of External Affairs reiterated the correctness of the map.34 It should also be borne in mind that the Indo-Nepalese dispute over Kalapani territory has been a topic of serious discussion in Nepalese domestic politics ever since the late 1990s.35 It is clearly of some concern as Kala- pani is also a neighboring area with Tibet. The discussions that have been going on since 199836 have obviously not yet found a solution in this regard.

3. Domestic policy

Tension has defined relations between Marxist-Leninists and Mao- ists for many years. In recent months, some of those critical issues have been reproduced, albeit in a muffled form, within the organisational framework of the new communist party established in 2018. As will be seen in the next pages, this has had repercussions not only internally, but also on those choices relating to the political alliances of the party.

30. ‘Unilateral move to alter border demarcation not acceptable: Nepal’, República, 7 November 2019; ‘Amid growing protest over Kalapani map PM calls all- party meet’, República, 9 November 2019; ‘Govt working to retrieve encroached territories: PM Oli’, República, 12 November 2019; ‘India reiterates its stance on border issue’, República, 3 January 2020. 31. Government of India, Survey of India, Political Map Of India, Published under the direction of Lt General Girish Kumar, VSM, English 9th Edition/2019 (http:// www.surveyofindia.gov.in/pages/display/235-political-map-of-india). 32. ‘India issues new political map yet again, this time removing Kali’. 33. ‘Upper House endorses resolution to reclaim Nepali territory’, República, 3 January 2020; ‘Lawmakers seek govt reply on Gokarna resort, Kalapani’, The Himala- yan Times, 24 December 2019. 34. ‘India reiterates its stance on border issue’. 35. Leo E. Rose, ‘Nepal and Bhutan in 1998: Two Himalayan Kingdoms’, Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 1998, Jan. - Feb. 1999, p. 157. 36. Ibid.

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3.1. The tensions of the NCP The domestic political season of 2019 was characterised by internal tensions in the NCP.37 The party was the result of the merger of the Commu- nist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Center) in May 2018,38 following a previous electoral agreement.39 With the merger of the two political groups, the new party had 213 MPs out of the 344 of the two chambers, approaching two-thirds of the parliamentary seats.40 On 1 June 2018, the NCP formed an alliance with the Federal Socialist Forum-Nepal (FSFN), one of the two main Madhesi parties, with the entry into the cabinet of two new ministers.41 The coalition thus came to control two-thirds of parliament.42 In May 2018, it was decided to assign 55% of the members of the party organs to members from the CPN-UML and 45% to members from the CPN- MC, with the party leadership being entrusted to Oli and Pushpa Kamal Da- hal.43 In relative terms, these internal balances would clearly favour former CPN-MC members: the Maoists had obtained less than half the votes and seats of the Marxist-Leninists in the 2017 elections.44 To better balance the internal situation of the NCP, the elderly Marxist-Leninist leader, Oli, had been appointed prime minister and continued to lead the government.45 Accord- ing to sources close to Dahal, however, there had been a «gentlemen’s understanding», an informal agreement to take turns leading the government after two and a half years.46 Oli denied the existence of this agreement,47 which evidently would have further unbalanced the power relations with respect to the real electoral and parliamentary weight in favour of the Maoist component. By mid-August 2019, Oli had explicitly guaranteed to the Nepalese parliament his term of office until the elections scheduled for 2023.48

37. See Ashok K Mehta, ‘An unstable Nepal’, The Pioneer, 20 December 2019. 38. ‘UML, Maoist Center merge to form Nepal Communist Party’, República, 18 May 2018. 39. ‘UML, MC, Naya Shakti announce poll alliance’, The Rising Nepal, 4 Oc- tober 2017. 40. ‘UML, Maoist Center merge to form Nepal Communist Party’. 41. ‘With FSFN on board, Oli govt has two-thirds majority’, República, 2 June 2018. 42. Ibid. 43. ‘UML, Maoist Center merge to form Nepal Communist Party’. 44. For election results see Matteo Miele, ‘Nepal 2018: The Communist search for new political and trade routes’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 322-325. 45. Meanwhile, on 1 June 2018, the government enjoyed the entrance of members of the FSFN, one of the two Madhesi parties. ‘With FSFN on board, Oli govt has two-thirds majority’. 46. ‘Oli seals five years full, Dahal gets face-saver under revised deal’, República, 21 November 2019. 47. Ibid. 48. ‘Will Run Government For Full Term: Nepal PM KP Sharma Oli’, NDTV, 18 August 2019.

426 Nepal 2019

The statement came a few days after Oli’s return from Singapore where the prime minister had undergone medical checks.49 In fact, Oli’s health was the other thread that went to intertwine with the internal dynamics of the NCP. A few days after said declaration to parliament, Oli in fact returned to Singapore where he underwent a plasmapheresis treatment.50 However, the treatment did not achieve the desired results.51 At the time that Oli was undergoing treatment, the two NCP co-chairs had meanwhile reached a new internal agreement.52 As defined by the two leaders, Oli should remain in office as prime minister, with the promise that he be supported as head of government until 2023.53 Dahal instead gained more power within the party, assuming the role of executive chairman.54 Co- inciding with the new deal, Oli also changed his cabinet extensively.55 The president of the Republic mediated between the two leaders in this period of uncertainty.56 The internal problems of the NCP continued with the failure to choose a new speaker for the House of Representatives, following the resignation and arrest of Krishna Bahadur Mahara in October, accused of rape.57 In late December 2019, the party had still not reached agreement on a name.58

3.2. The birth of the Samajwadi Party – Nepal and the long attempt to unify Madhesi parties At the beginning of May 2019, the Federal Socialist Forum-Nepal (FSFN) joined the Naya Shakti Party thus forming the Samajbadi Party –

49. Ibid. 50. ‘Prime Minister’s health condition under wraps’, Nepali Times, 3 September 2019. 51. ‘PM recovering from surgery, needs regular dialysis’, myRepública, 5 De- cember 2019. About 12 years earlier, Oli had undergone a kidney transplant, subsequently followed by four dialysis treatments. On 26 November 2019, he was then operated for appendicitis at the Tribhuvan University Teaching Hospital. Although Uttam Krishna Shrestha, executive director of the Manmohan Cardiothoracic, Vascu- lar and Transplant Center, did not officially speak on the dialysis issue, other doctors informed the press of Oli’s need to undergo regular dialysis sessions. Ibid. 52. ‘Oli seals five years full, Dahal gets face-saver under revised deal’. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid.; ‘Dahal to command party while Oli will remain prime minister for the full term’, The Kathmandu Post, 21 November 2019. 55. ‘PM inducts 9 new faces to cabinet’, República, 21 November 2019. 56. ‘Oli seals five years full, Dahal gets face-saver under revised deal’. 57. ‘Speaker Mahara resigns amid rape allegation’, República, 2 October 2019; ‘Mahara arrested’, Nepali Times, 6 October 2019; ‘House held hostage to NCP indecision’, The Himalayan Times, 31 December 2019. 58. ‘House held hostage to NCP indecision’.

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Nepal (SPN).59 The FSFN had been led by Upendra Yadav, and the Naya Shakti Party by Baburam Bhattarai, a former prime minister.60 In October 2017, the latter joined the Left Alliance of Maoists and Marxist-Leninists,61 but then he left the agreement and gained his seat in parliament thanks to the support of the NC.62 As mentioned earlier, the FSFN, one of the two Madhesi parties, had instead joined the government majority in June 2018 with the entry of Upendra Yadav into the cabinet as deputy prime minister and minister for Health and Population, together with Moham- mad Istiyak Rai, as head of the ministry of Urban Development.63 The other Madhesi party, the Rastriya Janata Party-Nepal (RJPN), did not join the cabinet, despite having already declared its support for the government in March 2018.64 With the FSFN-NCP agreement, also based on the promise of an amendment to the Constitution in favour of the Madhesi population,65 the coalition thus came to control two-thirds of parliament, that is, a qualified majority that would allow it to modify the Constitu- tion (art. 274, section 8).66 During 2019, however, the Constitution was not changed. With the new party, Yadav chairs the central committee and Bhattarai the federal council.67 The agreement of May 2019 did not directly involve the RJPN.68At the end of 2017, the RJPN and the FSFN announced the possibility of unification, after the two parties had won state elections in State no. 2.69 The alliance between the NCP and the FSFN created some discontent, fearing a local FSFN-NCP agreement in State no. 2.70 Furthermore, in March 2019

59. ‘Madhesi party merges with former Nepal PM’s party to form new political outfit’, Business Standard, 7 May 2019. 60. Ibid. 61. ‘UML, MC, Naya Shakti announce poll alliance’. 62. ‘Key architects of left alliance Bamdev, Shrestha suffer loss’, The Kathmandu Post, 11 December 2017. 63. ‘With FSFN on board, Oli govt has two-thirds majority’. 64. ‘RJPN decides to support govt’, myRepública, 10 March 2018. 65. ‘With FSFN on board, Oli govt has two-thirds majority’. 66. Ibid.; In 2017, the Deuba government failed to amend the Constitution by getting only 347 votes instead of the 395 needed. ‘Year-long efforts at amendment fail’, República, 22 August 2017. 67. ‘Political outfits of Nepal’s deputy PM, form «Samajwadi Party Nepal»’, The Times of India, 7 May 2019. 68. The RJPN was the result of the unification of six Madhesi parties in 2017. ‘Six Madhes-based parties unite to form Rastriya Janata Party (Update)’, The Kath- mandu Post, 20 April 2017. 69. ‘RJP-N, FSF-N to hold unity talks soon’, The Himalayan Times, 22 December 2017. 70. ‘With FSFN on board, Oli govt has two-thirds majority’.

428 Nepal 2019 the RJPN withdrew its parliamentary support for the Oli government.71 In any case, in November 2019, the new SPN party and the RJPN drafted an agreement for unification.72 According to Keshav Jha, general secretary of the RJPN, unification would take place following Upendra Yadav’s resignation from his government post.73 On 25 November, Upendra Yadav was confirmed deputy prime minister and appointed minister of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs by Oli during the changes of the ministers that followed the aforementioned redefinition of the internal balance in the government and the NCP.74 Surendra Yadav, who had been state minister, was excluded by the new cabinet.75 The new assignment, which arrived a few days after the approach aimed at unification between RJPN and SPN, was defined by Oli without consulting the SPN.76 On 24 December 2019, however, the SPN left the government.77

3.3. The electoral agreement between RJPN and NCP of December 2019 To further complicate the picture of the formation process of the new Madhesi unitary force, there was the electoral agreement between RJPN and NCP of 18 December 2019.78 As mentioned, the RJPN had withdrawn its parliamentary support to the government in early March 2019.79 The agreement concerns the elections for the National Assembly, the upper

71. ‘Rastriya Janata Party-Nepal withdraws support to government’, The Kath- mandu Post, 6 March 2019. The decision came immediately after the life sentence of a party member and member of parliament involved in the so-called «Kailali carnage», when nine people died in the protests that preceded the approval of the 2015 Con- stitution. The victims included a child and a policeman. Ibid.; ‘What caused Kailali carnage’, The Kathmandu Post, 26 August 2015; ‘Kailali District Court hands down life sentence to Resham Chaudhary’, The Kathmandu Post, 6 March 2015. 72. ‘Madhesi party unity gaining momentum’, The Annapurna Express, 22 No- vember 2019. 73. Ibid.; It should be noted that at the time of the alliance between the NCP and the FSFN, the RJPN had nevertheless also proposed itself as a possible ally in the Oli government, but did not obtain the opening from the communists. ‘With FSFN on board, Oli govt has two-thirds majority’. In any case, the NCP had also proposed the possibility of a future entry of the RJPN into the government. ‘FSFN to join govt with three ministers’, República, 29 May 2018. 74. ‘Yadav takes charge of new ministry’, The Himalayan Times, 25 November 2019. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid. 77. ‘Upendra Yadav’s party quits govt’, The Himalayan Times, 24 December 2019. 78. ‘With a new deal, NCP and RJPN set to sweep upper house poll’, República, 19 December 2019. 79. ‘Rastriya Janata Party-Nepal withdraws support to government’.

429 Matteo Miele house of the Nepalese parliament,80 of 23 January 2020.81 The issue of the alliance – in addition to entering the debate between the SPN and RJPN, as well as in the dynamics internal to the current majority of government – has opened up further difficulties in the NCP itself.82 Oli was in fact accused by several leading figures of the NCP of having managed the electoral alliance without consulting Dahal and the general secretary, Bishnu Poudel, putting in crisis the November agreement which provided, as seen, the assignment of greater power within the NCP for Dahal.83 Just a few days earlier, during the first Standing Committee meeting of 2019, Dahal had presented a document – written by Oli and himself – in which the divisions within the party were openly recognised.84 It is evident, as mentioned above, that these choices of Oli, which go beyond his role as prime minister, have in turn become a source of internal fracture. At the same time, those actions help to clarify the specific weight of the two historical leaders in terms of the analysis of internal power relations. Still on the often complex relations between Kathmandu and the Te- rai region, the signing of an agreement between the government and the

80. According to the Constitution of Nepal approved in 2015, the parliament of Nepal (Federal Parliament) consists of a House of Representatives and a National Assembly (article 83 of the Nepalese Constitution). The House of Representatives is elected every five years (article 85, clause 1) and is composed of 275 members: 165 members are elected with the first-past-the-post electoral system (one for each constituency), while the remaining 110 members are elected with a proportional system (the current electoral law has a 3% threshold) on national basis (article 84, clause 1). According to an amendment to the Constitution approved in 2016, the electoral constituencies are drawn in a way that the population criterion prevails over the geographic criterion: this guarantees a larger representativeness to the Southern (Terai) populations. The National Assembly has 59 members: 56 members are elected by the federated states, while the remaining three members are «nominated by the President on recommendation of the Government of Nepal» (art. 86, clause 2). According to the Constitution, the upper house is a «permanent House» (article 86, clause 1): the members have a six-year term and are renewed by a third every two years (article 86, clause 3). For the text of the Constitution of Nepal, I have relied on the official Eng- lish translation of the Constitution by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs of Nepal. The text is available on the website of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/ files/2017-07/Constitution-of-Nepal-_English_-with-1st-Amendment_2_0.pdf). For a general view of the main political institutions under the new Constitution, see: Mat- teo Miele, ‘Nepal 2015-2017: A Post-Earthquake Constitution and the Political Strug- gle’, Asia Maior 2017, pp. 313-316. 81. ‘With a new deal, NCP and RJPN set to sweep upper house poll’. 82. ‘Co-chairs’ introspective document fails to allay leaders’ concerns’, The Kathmandu Post, 20 December 2019. 83. Ibid. 84. ‘NCP leadership admits weakness on their part and points out a host of issues that are plaguing the party’, The Kathmandu Post, 16 December 2019.

430 Nepal 2019 leader of the Alliance for Independent Madhesh, Chandra Kant Raut, must be reported.85 In signing the agreement on 8 March 2019, the Alliance re- nounced its secessionist goal and entered the institutional political arena.86 On 18 March, the Alliance took a new name, the Janamat Party.87

4. The economic scenario

After a serious drop in 2016 – the year following the devastating earthquakes which hit the Himalayan country – the Nepalese GDP stood at just over US$ 29 billion in 2018, exceeding approximately US$ 24.47 billion in 2017.88 The International Monetary Fund estimates calculate growth at 7.1% and at 6.3% for the Nepalese GDP in 2019 and 2020 respectively (calculated in October 2019), while for 2018 growth had been 6.7%.89 The Nepalese government has instead estimated 7% growth for fiscal year (FY) 2018/2019 (May 2019).90 Again, according to the Nepalese Central Bureau of Statistics, the agriculture and forestry sector contributed 26.50% to Nepa- lese GDP in FY 2018/19, against 27.58% in FY 2017/18.91 The «Manufactur- ing» sector would instead represent just 5.59%.92 The inflation rate for FY 2018/19 was calculated at 4.2% in mid- March 2019, only slightly higher than the figure for the same period of FY 2017/18, when it was 4.0%.93

85. ‘CK Raut renounces demand for separate Madhes’, The Himalayan Times, 8 March 2019. 86. Ibid. 87. ‘CK Raut changes party’s name, to be registered as Janamat Party’, On- lineKhabar, 18 March 2019. 88. The World Bank, ‘Nepal’. In 2015, GDP had been around US$ 21.4 billion and in 2016 US$ 21.13 billion. Ibid.; The economic damage due to the earthquake was calculated at around US$ 7 billion. See Arun Bhakta Shrestha, Samjwal Ratna Bajracharya, Jeffrey S. Kargel & Narendra Raj Khanal, The Impact of Nepal’s 2015 Gorkha Earthquake-Induced Geohazards, ICIMOD Research Report 2016/1, Interna- tional Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, 2016, p. 2. To this must be added the damage created by the Indian border blockade between September 2015 and February 2016. 89. International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook, Asia and Pacific: Caught in Prolonged Uncertainty: Challenges and Opportunities for Asia, October 2019, p. 5. 90. Government of Nepal, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2018/19, 2019, p. 2. 91. Government of Nepal, National Planning Commission, Central Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts of Nepal 2018/19 (https://cbs.gov.np/national-accounts-of- nepal-2018-19). The data goes back to 26 April 2019. 92. Government of Nepal, National Planning Commission, Central Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts of Nepal 2018/19 (https://cbs.gov.np/national-accounts-of- nepal-2018-19). 93. Government of Nepal, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2018/19, 2019, p. 32, Annexes-p. 36 (Annex 4.2: Annual Point-to-Point Consumer Price Inflation).

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In terms of foreign trade, one of the recurring and most significant difficulties of the Nepalese economy is highlighted: in the period between mid-August 2018 and mid-March 2019, when exports represented approximately NPR (Nepalese rupees) 61.224 billion, while imports slightly exceeded NPR 949 billion.94 Exports and imports in the first eight months of the previous FY corresponded to NPR 53.424 billion and NPR 766.533 billion respectively.95 Comparing the two figures, the widening of the difference between exports and imports in favour of the latter is underlined: the trade deficit in mid-March 2018 increased by 24.5%, while it rose by 22.9% in the first eight months of the previous FY.96 Considering the entire FY 2017/18, exports amounted to about NPR 81.6 billion, with imports calculated at NPR 1,242.827 billion.97 Ten years earlier, in FY 2007/08, exports were about NPR 59.3 billion and imports NPR 221.938 billion.98 The FY 2007/08 year statistics show a more balanced import/export ratio, highlighting the weakness of the current Nepalese foreign trade. This is a trend that clearly exposes Nepal to further conditioning, not only economic, but also on foreign policy. Indeed, despite political divergences, India undoubtedly remains Nepal’s main trading partner, far outperforming all the other trading partners of the Himalayan country.99 In the first eight months of FY 2018/19, exports to the south represented slightly less than two-thirds of the total, exceeding NPR 38 billion.100 In the same period, exports to the People’s Republic of China stopped at just over NPR 1.35 billion.101 The figure indicates a sharp drop compared to exports to the north in the first eight months of FY 2017/18 (NPR 1.856 billion)102. In terms of imports, goods for NPR 612.596 billion arrived from India in the first eight months of FY 2018/19, against products for NPR 139.038 billion from China.103 The period from mid-August 2017 to mid-March 2018 instead recorded imports from India for NPR 502.231 billion and NPR 100.897 billion from Chi- na.104 In percentage terms, exports to its Indian neighbour grew by 26.3%, while to the People’s Republic of China there was a drop of 27.6%.105 Indian imports grew by 22.8%, as the share of Chinese goods that arrived on the Nepalese market rose by 37.8%.106 Although Nepal entered the BRI only in

94. Ibid., Annexes-p. 65 (Annex 6.1: Status of Foreign Trade). 95. Ibid. 96. Ibid., p. 42, Annexes-p. 65 (Annex 6.1: Status of Foreign Trade). 97. Ibid., Annexes-p. 65 (Annex 6.1: Status of Foreign Trade). 98. Ibid. 99. Ibid. 100. Ibid. 101. Ibid. 102. Ibid. 103. Ibid. 104. Ibid. 105. Ibid., p. 41. 106. Ibid., p. 42.

432 Nepal 2019

2017, these data may be relevant in the context of a broader understanding of the role of Nepal within the BRI. Statistics show even more relevance when compared with the increase in imports recorded in the first eight months of the previous fiscal year, when there was a more balanced picture between India and China: imports from India had increased by 22.3%, and by 22.2% for those from China.107 Exports to India, on the other hand, had risen by 9.8%, while exports to China by 62%.108 On 1 January 2019, one US dollar was traded at around 111 Nepalese rupees, about 10% more than a year earlier.109 Unlike the previous year, in 2019 the variations were fewer.110 Indeed, on 20 December 2019, one US dollar was traded at around 113 Nepalese rupees.111 In 2018, it must be remembered, the devaluation of the Indian rupee, linked to the Nepalese currency, had also heavily weakened the latter against the dollar.112 For that reason alone, the currency exchange between Kathmandu and New Delhi is one of the most evident manifestations of India’s political and economic predomi- nance.113 The entire macroeconomic framework outlined in this paragraph is testimony to the Nepalese government’s complex foreign policy choices. A Chinese promise is contrasted by the reality of the physical and human geographical space which is the basis for the Indo-Nepalese economic relationship. The data undoubtedly demonstrate India’s stronger position in the Nepalese area and, therefore, the direct link between the two economies.114

5. Conclusions

Xi Jinping’s visit is therefore the clearest proof of the further rapprochement of Nepal with the People’s Republic of China, despite the serious obstacle of the extradition treaty that exposes its government to the attention of human rights organisations and directly involves the influential sensitivities of the US Congress, historically close to the Tibetan cause. The counterpart of Xi Jinping’s visit was the border crisis with India.

107. Government of Nepal, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2017/18 (Un- official Translation), July 2018, p. 47. 108. Ibid., p. 46. 109. Source: Nepal Rastra Bank - Central Bank of Nepal. 110. Ibid. 111. Ibid. 112. ‘Nepali rupee drops to over 18-month low’, The Himalayan Times, 28 June 2018; ‘Nepali rupee depreciates to all-time low’, The Himalayan Times, 29 June 2018; Paban Raj Pandey, ‘Should Nepal remain pegged to Indian rupee?’, The Statesman, 24 November 2018; ‘Rupee tumbles to record low’, The Kathmandu Post, 29 June 2018. 113. Achyut Wagle, ‘Nepal feels the heat of the cooling Indian economy’, The Kathmandu Post, 3 September 2019. 114. On this, see in particular the analysis by Achyut Wagle, ‘Nepal feels the heat of the cooling Indian economy’.

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Internally, the birth of the SPN and the process of approaching the RJPN expose the unresolved Madhesi question and specifically, the still not approved – despite the promises – change to the Constitution. A change that rests on clarification relating to the internal balance of the majority which, until 24 December 2019, counted on two-thirds of the votes, would have been sufficient for a constitutional change in autonomy, without the need for an intervention by the opposition. The tensions within the NCP had been formally resolved by the November agreement that had provided for greater powers within the party for Dahal in the face of Oli remaining at the helm of government. However, the choice of the electoral alliance with the RJPN, managed exclusively by Oli, was read by many as evidence of the weakness, if not the inconsistency, of that agreement. On the other hand, it is not difficult to imagine that, beyond the party structures and agreements between the communist leaders, relations between the Marxist-Leninists and the Maoists continue to weigh, especially given the weakness of the latter considering the results of the elections in 2017. The question of the prime minister’s health, meanwhile, remains. From the analysis of the economic data, recurring critical issues of the Nepalese economy emerge, exposed to the limits imposed by geography, but also to the weakness of the industrial sector. These two factors contributed significantly to the weight of imports, particularly from India. As shown, however, exports to India saw a considerable increase. The same cannot be said for exports to the People’s Republic of China which declined considerably, against a significant increase of Chinese imports. Imports which, in percentage terms, far exceeded those from India. This figure is indeed relevant in terms of these early years of the Himalayan country’s membership of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Abbreviations:

BRI = Belt and Road Initiative CPN-MC = Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) CPN-UML = Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) FY = Fiscal Year FSFN = Federal Socialist Forum-Nepal NC = Nepali Congress NCP = Nepal Communist Party NPR = Nepalese Rupee RJPN = Rastriya Janata Party-Nepal SPN = Samajbadi Party-Nepal

434 Afghanistan 2019: Between peace talks and presidential elections, another year of uncertainty

Filippo Boni

The Open University [email protected]

Afghanistan in 2019 was characterised by the Presidential elections, held on 28 September, and whose results were announced at the end of December 2019, and by the peace talks between the US and the Taliban. Against such backdrop, the analysis presented in this article traces the evolution of peace talks between the US and the Taliban during the year under examination, and accounts for the developments that characterised the peace process. The latter had also an important intra-Afghan dimension, with the Consultative Loya-Jirga, which was held between 29 April and 3 May 2019. The socio-economic situation of Afghanistan is also analysed, with a specific focus on the role of women in the country’s political and economic life. With regards to Afghanistan’s international relations, this study dissects the geopolitical alignments taking place in 2019, with an assessment of the role that Russia, India, Pakistan and China played in the country during 2019.

1. Introduction

During the year 2019, Afghanistan’s political developments were characterised primarily by three major processes. The first was peace negotiations between the US and the Taliban, which saw an acceleration and then an abrupt halt in early September, only to be restarted towards the end of the year. The second was the Consultative Loya Jirga, an intra-Afghan process aimed at providing a framework for negotiations with the Taliban, which saw the participation of 3,200 delegates from across the country, and a relatively fair representation of women. Third was the Presidential election, held on 28th September after repeated postponements, whose results were announced on 22 December 2019, and from which Ashraf Ghani emerged with a thin majority of votes. While on the domestic front «uncertainty» was a key word in defining the country’s political landscape, as far as the geopolitics of Afghanistan are concerned, the year 2019 registered the continued involvement of key regional partners, Russia, India, China and Pakistan above all, in trying to shape the political trajectory in Kabul for the years to come. In order to analyse these developments in greater depth, section 2 of the article dissects the dynamics characterising the Presidential elections, both in the run-up and in the immediate aftermath, as well as the main controversies surrounding the announcement of results. The ensuing section 3

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Filippo Boni provides an assessment of the US-Taliban peace talks, tracing the evolution of the latter during 2019, as well as of the Consultative Loya Jirga. Section 4 of the article outlines the economic situation in Afghanistan, and also provides an overview of the role of women in the country’s political life during the year under examination. Finally, section 5 focuses on the positioning of Russia, India, Pakistan and China about the future of Afghanistan.

2. The 2019 Presidential Elections: Ghani’s victory, amid delays and low turnout

Presidential elections were held on 28 September 2019 for the fourth time since the Taliban were ousted in 2001 (the previous ones were in 2004, 2009 and 2014). The results, originally to be announced in their preliminary form on 18 October, and then officially on 7 November, were postponed to 14 November and then eventually made public on 22 December 2019. This was somewhat in line with the unfolding of post-election dynamics in 2018, with the official results of the Parliamentary elections only announced 7 months later, on 14 May 2019, after the counting of the votes in Kabul were finally released and confirmed.1 Fifteen Candidates contested the Presiden- tial elections, including the incumbent President, Ashraf Ghani, and the incumbent Chief Executive, Abdullah Abdullah, but there were no women candidates to the Presidency. However, as each candidate entered the race on tickets that included first and second running mates, three women were included in the tickets of three different candidates.2 According to the preliminary results announced by the Independent Elections Commission (IEC), with 50.64% (934,868 votes) of the total votes casted, President Ashraf Ghani was the one who emerged as the leading candidate after this electoral round. Abdullah Abdullah followed with 39.52% (720,099 votes) and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar with 3.85% (70,243 votes).3 In celebrating the results, President Ghani praised the Afghan Republic and its citizens: «The republic is firm in its place. The republic (government) will continue and citizens will be its center. Today is the citizens’ celebration.

1. ‘Final Results Of Last Year’s General Elections In Kabul Announced’, Radi- oFreeEurope, 15 May 2019. For the full elections results, see: Independent Election Commission, ‘2018 Afghanistan Wolesi Jirga Elections’ (http://www.iec.org.af/results/ en/home). 2. These were: Massuda Jalal, running mate of Rahmatullah Nabil; Farida Mohmand, running mate of Ahmad Wali Massud; and Khadija Ghaznawi, included in Mohammad Ibrahim Alekozai’s ticket. Frud Bezhan, ‘Who’s Who Among The Afghan Presidential Candidates’, RadioFreeEurope, 27 September 2019. In 2004, 2009, and 2014 there was at least one woman candidate in the Presidential elections, although in 2014 she was disqualified before the poll. See: Ali Yawar Adili, ‘Afghanistan’s 2019 elections (2): Who is running to become the next president?’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 11 February 2019. 3. ‘Ghani Tops Preliminary Election Results: IEC’, Tolo News, 22 December 2019.

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The people of Afghanistan made this success happen.»4 On its part, the run- ner up Abdullah Abdullah, did not concede and claimed that «no doubt, we are the winning team based on the people’s clean votes. The Stability and Convergence is the winning team in this election», also adding that some «fraudulent» votes «were added» to the total number in Ghani’s favour.5 Be- fore results were announced, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) had conducted a partial vote recount to address concerns from the election teams about frauds in the electoral process, but this did not stop Abdullah to file an appeal against the results. It is important to bear in mind that, according to the Afghan constitution, if no candidate achieves a majority (and this could happen if enough complaints are validated), a second round is required between the two most voted candidates in the first round, which is what happened in 2014 with Ghani and Abdullah. However, winter weather conditions make large parts of the country difficult to reach, and this may lead to a delay in the Presidential runoff until spring 2020, which is likely to exacerbate political uncertainty.6 Turnout for this Presidential election was at historic low, with the IEC revising its figure downwards from the initial 2.7 million voters to 1.8 million towards the end of November, out of a total of more than 9 million registered voters.7 If this latter figure was to be confirmed, this would amount to nearly 20% of registered voters, and it would have clear implications on the legitimacy of the results, given that only 1 in 5 Afghans casted their ballot.

Table 1 – Turnout in Afghanistan Presidential Election 2004-2019 Year Registered Voters Votes casted Turnout (%) 2004 10,567,834 8,128,940 69 % 2009 ~ 16,000,000 4,823,090 ~ 30% 2014 20,845,988 6,604,546 31.6 % 2019 9,665,745 1,823,948 18.8 % Source: author’s own calculations of data from multiple sources.8

4. ‘Ghani: «Today a Republic Was Ensured»’, Tolo News, 22 December 2019. 5. ‘Abdullah Says His Team is the «Winner» Based on «Clean» Votes’, Tolo News, 22 December 2019. The Stability and Convergence team was the campaign team led by Chief Executive and Presidential Candidate Abdullah Abdullah. 6. Clayton Thomas, ‘Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief ’, Con- gressional Research Service, R45122, Updated 5 December 2019. 7. ‘Abdullah Blasts IEC for «Ignoring» Candidates’ Demands’, Tolo News, 17 November 2019. 8. See: Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Presi- dential Election Result – 2004, ‘Turnout by Province’; European Union Democracy And Election Support Mission, ‘Afghanistan. Presidential Election 9 October 2004’, Final Report. Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, ‘Final Certified Presi- dential Results by Vote Order’. There are no exact figures on registered voters in 2009, hence the rough estimates based on reported turnout by UNAMA. Independent Elec- tion Commission of Afghanistan, ‘Presidential Elections Final Results’, 15 May 2014.

437 Filippo Boni

Some observers noted that three main factors, namely uncertainty, election fatigue, and threat from the Taliban, may explain the low turnout: first, uncertainty has dominated the run-up to the elections, since up until the week before 28 September, it was unclear when the elections were going to be held; second, election fatigue, with these elections coming a little more than one year after the 2018 parliamentary ones and whose final results were announced only four months before the Presidential elections; third, the threat from the Taliban who, as they have made clear over the years, considered the elections a farce.9 The latter point is of particular importance, especially if put in comparison with the dynamics preceding the 2018 Parliamentary elections. According to data from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), civilian casualties «were significantly lower in 2019 as compared to the 2018 parliamentary elections – both in the lead up to election day and on polling day.»10 At the same time, it is important to note how the Taliban were able to carry out two symbolic attacks, one in Charikar and one at the Massud roundabout in Kabul, in the weeks preceding the 2019 elections. The aim was to continue the Taliban’s fight against the government in Kabul as well as to send a signal to the US, given that the Massud Roundabout is very close to the US Embassy in Ka- bul.11 This episode of pre-election violence, considerably worsened the situation concerning the peace negotiations between the US and the Taliban, that are analysed in the ensuing section.

3. Peace talks: The Consultative Loya Jirga and the US-Taliban negotiations

Low turnout and uncertainty, with the resulting lack of trust in elected representatives, besides hindering the prospects of democratic governance in Afghanistan, have eroded public trust in constitutional and democratic processes, at a time in which the Afghan government needed to be seen as a credible interlocutor in the ongoing peace talks between the United States and the Taliban. 2019 was a year which saw a great acceleration in the negotiation between March and early September, an abrupt stall between September and November, and the resumption of talks in December. In March 2019, after almost one year of constant interactions with the Afghan Taliban delegation, the Afghan government and regional part-

9. Srinjoy Bose & Nishank Motwani, ‘Afghan elections: Impressions from polling day’, The Interpreter, 10 October 2019. 10. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Afghanistan. Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict. Special Report: 2019 Election-Related Violence, Kabul, Oc- tober 2019. 11. ‘Taliban suicide attacks kill at least 48 before Afghan elections’, Al Jazeera, 17 Sept 2019

438 Afghanistan 2019 ners, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Ambas- sador Zalmay Khalilzad, announced that the two sides had agreed on a draft agreement and that once the agreement was going to be finalised, «the Tali- ban and other Afghans, including the government, will begin intra-Afghan negotiations on a political settlement and comprehensive ceasefire».12 As the eyes of the world were on the talks between the Taliban and the US government, an important intra-Afghan process began in parallel in the spring of 2019. Between 29 April and 3 May of the same year, President Ghani convened a consultative Loya Jirga – the sixth since 2001 – aimed at seeking views on, and discussing a framework for, peace negotiations with the Taliban.13 The Jirga consisted of 3,200 delegates, out of which 30% were women, who featured well also in the administrative boards of the Jirga, where four out of ten members were women, as well as in the various committees in which the Jirga was divided, with 13 heads and 28 secretaries of the fifty committees being women.14 The delegates taking part in this Jirga were asked to consider four questions: 1) how can we convince the Taliban to participate in [an intra-Afghan] negotiation? 2) What are the values and achievements that the Afghan government should not compromise on? 3) What are your views on the make-up of the Afghan delegation for peace? 4) How should the Afghan government deal with the neighbouring countries, especially the country which is financially supporting the Taliban and providing them weapons?15 Each of these groups reported back and the results were condensed into a 23-point communiqué, which reflected the road map of the government on the peace process with the Taliban.16 Analysts observed that the communiqué reflected some of the views from the Palace, but most of the participants agreed that the final result was also a fair representation of the views expressed during the days of discussion.17 In a nutshell, some of the main recommendations included placing the government at the centre

12. Clayton Thomas, ‘Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief ’, Con- gressional Research Service, R45122, Updated 5 December. 13. Jelena Bjelica & Thomas Ruttig, ‘AAN Q&A: Between «Peace Talks» and Elections – The 2019 Consultative Peace Loya Jirga’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 26 April 2019. 14. Kate Clark, Ehsan Qaane & Ali Yawar Adili, ‘The End of the Jirga: Strong Words and Not Much Controversy’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 3 May 2019. 15. Ibid. 16. Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Canberra, Australia, ‘Communique - The Consultative Peace Loya Jirga 2019’, 14 May 2019. 17. Scott Smith, ‘Loya Jirgas and Political Crisis Management in Afghanistan: Drawing on the Bank of Tradition’, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report N. 457, September 2019.

439 Filippo Boni of any peace talks, calling for a ceasefire, the need for an end to interference by (unspecified) neighbours, the prospect of the withdrawal of foreign troops, as well as the protection of women’s rights, a theme which is discussed in greater detail in Section 4 of this article.18 While the Loya-Jirga had set a framework for the intra-Afghan component of the process, towards the end of August 2019, the negotiations between the US and the Taliban were on course for being concluded after nine rounds of talks, with a number of media outlets reporting some of the details of the agreement. In particular, in an interview with «TOLO News», the US Special Representative said that the two sides had «reached an agreement in principle» for a phased out deal, which would include the following points: a) the US would withdraw 5,000 troops in 135 days, provided the Taliban were going to scale down violence in Kabul and Parwan; b) the US would withdraw the rest of its troops by the end of 2020.19 In exchange, the Taliban would «bar al-Qaeda from activities such as fundraising, recruiting, training and operational planning in areas under Taliban control».20 In addition, US officials were expecting that the ensuing step would have been the Taliban-Afghan government direct negotiations.21 Critics of the agreement in Washington had warned against a withdrawal, invoking President’s Obama decision to withdraw troops from Iraq as one of the reasons behind the emergence of the Islamic State.22 In a similar fashion, nine former US diplomatic officials wrote an article for «The Atlantic», in which they argued that «a major withdrawal of US forces should follow, not come in advance of real peace agreement» and that «a fundamental mistake of the Obama administration was the constant repetition of dates for departure. This encouraged the Taliban to fight on and undercut confidence among friendly Afghans».23 They concluded that «it is critical that the United States make clear that full withdrawal will not occur on fixed dates but will, on the contrary, require conclusion of a real and clearly defined peace».24

18. Clark, Qaane & Adili, ‘The End of the Jirga’, 3 May 2019. 19. ‘US And Taliban Reach Agreement In Principle: Khalilzad’, Tolo News, 2 September 2019. 20. Karen DeYoung, Missy Ryan, Anne Gearan & Philip Rucker, ‘Trump and senior aides discuss withdrawal from Afghanistan as talks with Taliban advance’, The Washington Post, 16 August 2019. 21. Ibid. 22. Michael Crowley, Lara Jakes & Mujib Mashal, ‘Trump Says He’s Called Off Negotiations With Taliban After Afghanistan Bombing’, New York Times, 8 Sep- tember 2019. 23. James Dobbins, Robert P. Finn, Ronald E. Neumann, William Wood, John Negroponte, Earl Anthony Wayne, Ryan Crocker, James Cunningham, & Hugo Llo- rens, ‘US-Taliban Negotiations: How to Avoid Rushing to Failure’, Atlantic Council, 3 September 2019. 24. Ibid.

440 Afghanistan 2019

This process was ended by President Trump himself following an attack by the Taliban in Kabul, which killed a number of people including a US soldier. The announcement came in a series of tweets, in which the US President disclosed that he had arranged to meet both the Taliban leaders and the Afghan President Ghani at Camp David, but that he called off the meeting as a result of this attack, questioning the Taliban’s willingness to enter the ceasefire.25 After nearly three months, in another coup-de-theatre, Trump visited Afghanistan on Thanksgiving day, ostensibly to support American troops on that day, but clearly with an eye to re-opening negotiations with the Taliban. In what was Trump’s first visit to the country since he became president, not only he declared that peace talks with the Taliban were reopened, but he also invited Afghan President Ghani to officially visit Washington.26 The visit was important since it came at a time when President Trump was looking for a foreign policy achievement, to be presented as a success story in the election campaign for the 2020 Presidential elections.27 On 18 December 2019, while on a two-day visit to Afghanistan, US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad stated that peace talks have reached an «important stage», after meeting among others, with President Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah.28

4. The socio-economic conditions

The domestic dynamics discussed in the previous sections of this article are inextricably intertwined also with Afghanistan’s 2019 economic outlook. According to the World Bank, «without […] an improved security situation, growth is likely to remain slow with limited progress in reducing poverty from current very high levels.» The World Bank has also mentioned the uncertain outcome of the presidential elections and peace negotiations with the Taliban as reasons behind low business and investor confidence.29 According to the Asian Development Outlook 2019, Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate is set at 2.7% in 2019, up from the 2.5% projection in April of the same year.30 According to the report, favourable weather conditions allowed agriculture to recover from last year’s

25. Donald J. Trump, Tweet, 7 September 2019, 11:51pm. 26. Zachary Cohen, ‘President Trump announces Taliban talks have restarted on surprise Afghanistan visit’, CNN, 28 November 2019. 27. Michael Crowley, ‘Trump Visits Afghanistan and Says He Reopened Talks With Taliban’, The New York Times, 28 November 2019. 28. ‘US-Taliban Afghan peace talks at «important stage»: Khalilzad’, Al-Jazeera, 19 December 2019. 29. The World Bank, Afghanistan Overview, 13 October 2019. 30. Asian Development Bank, Afghanistan’s Economic Growth Improves Slightly in 2019 Amid Challenges, 26 September 2019.

441 Filippo Boni drought stronger than expected. As a result, with a rising agricultural production, the forecast predicts an upturn in household income which will eventually support growth in private consumption.31 Alongside an increased agricultural production, exports also increased by 2.1% in the first half of the year, and imports have declined by 7.7%, compared with the same period in 2018. Finally, inflation in 2019 is now expected to be 2.0%, lower than the earlier forecasted 3.0%.32 In addition to these economic indicators, it is important to assess women’s participation in the economic and political life of Afghanistan during the year under examination. One of the national development priorities that the Afghan government has set since 2016, in collaboration with the World Bank, has been the economic empowerment of women. By establishing the Women’s Economic Empowerment National Priority Program (WEE-NPP), the Afghan government aims at removing obstacles and constraints to women’s active participation in the economy. The WEE-NPP is part of the Afghan government’s Gender Strategy, which is included in the wider Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF), the country’s five-year development plan for the period 2017-2021. A look at the role of women in Afghanistan’s political landscape, provides some important insights into the way in which a proactive role of women in the Afghan society is being encouraged. As previously noted, there were no women candidates in the 2019 Presidential elections. However, the 2018 parliamentary elections registered an important milestone with regards to the role of women in the Afghan Parliament. 68 women were elected out of 244 seats available, and nearly one third of the available seats is now occupied by women.33 With Afghani- stan ranking 57th in world for number of women in parliament, ahead for instance of the United States, it is not just the number of women in Par- liament which has improved, but also the fact that women have been appointed to key positions. Ambassador Adela Raz is a case in point. She is Afghanistan’s first female permanent representative to the United Nations, and she has started a U.N. group to protect the rights Afghan women have gained since 2001.34 Similarly, Roya Rahmani was appointed in December 2018 as the first female ambassador to the United States, and in an interview with «France 24» in August 2019, she argued that «women inclusion is a matter of national security for us […]; peace will not be possible if women are not included in a meaningful way.»35

31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Percentage of women in national parliaments’ (https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=9&year=2019). 34. ‘Afghan Woman Ambassador Forms Group to Help Afghan Women’, The Associated Press, 19 November 2019. 35. ‘Taliban «must accept the Afghanistan of 2019», says Afghan ambassador to US’, France 24, 28 August 2019.

442 Afghanistan 2019

Besides the above data, concerning top level appointments, others must be quoted. Roughly 3.5 million girls out of 9 million children are now enrolled in schools.36 However, according to data released in 2019 by Af- ghanistan’s newly formed National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA) about the number of female students and teachers in Government Higher Education Universities, there are only 816 female teachers, out of a total number of 5,876. In terms of students, the figure is slightly more positive, with 49,071 female students out of 186,025 students in total. Over- all, the number of universities increased from 19 in 2002 to 38 in 2018.37 If we turn to the number of governmental employees, 86,919 are women out of 404,151 in total, recording the lowest number of women employed by the government since 2013, although the overall number of employees increased of 16,000 units during the 2013-2018 period.38 A final aspect that it is important to discuss in this cursory survey of Afghanistan’s economic situation is the state of narcotics in the country. As of December 2019, the annual report produced by the United Nations Of- fice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Ministry of Counter Narcotics has not yet been published.39 However, the chief of UNODC, Yury Fedotov, reported that opium poppy cultivation is expected to show a decrease from the record high levels in 2017 and 2018.40

5. Afghanistan’s international relations

While the United States were certainly the most prominent actor in Afghanistan’s peace process, a number of other regional countries have continued being involved, to varying extents, in having a say on the country’s future. Bearing in mind the fluid nature of the regional alignments that took place regarding the future of Afghanistan, this section provides a survey of the geopolitical positioning that each of the major players took in 2019. These include Russia, India, Pakistan and China, which all have a stake in having a politically stable and economically thriving Afghanistan in the years to come. However, all these countries have positioned themselves

36. USAID, Afghanistan (https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/education). 37. National Statistics and Information Authority, ‘Number of Government Higher Education Universities, Students and Teachers by Sex 2002 – 2018’ (https:// nsia.gov.af/services). 38. National Statistics and Information Authority, ‘No. of Governmental Em- ,’ployees by Ministry، Independent Organizations and Sex in the Year 2004 – 2018 (https://nsia.gov.af/services). 39. From 2019, the report will be produced by Afghanistan’s National Statistics and Information Authority in collaboration with UNDOC. 40. United Nations Information Centre, ‘Un Afghanistan Envoy Briefs Security Council’, 10 September 2019.

443 Filippo Boni by throwing their weight behind different actors, who are all competing for a stake in the future political settlement of Afghanistan.

5.1. Russia and India in Afghanistan Russia has been cultivating its ties with the Taliban over the past few years, in particular since 2016, under the strategic steering of Zamir Kabu- lov, President Vladimir Putin’s special envoy to Afghanistan. As Ankit Panda and Srinjoy Bose have noted, Kabulov has been at the centre of two important shifts in Russia’s policy towards Afghanistan, the first being a greater engagement between Moscow and the Taliban, and the second represented by Russia supporting a strong Pakistani role in Afghanistan.41 The events of 2019, which marks the 30th anniversary of the Red Army’s withdrawal from Kabul, were in line with the two trends just outlined. In early February 2019, Russia hosted peace talks between the Taliban and Senior Afghan politicians, a meeting which excluded the US-backed Afghan government, and which was thereby criticised by Afghan foreign ministry spokesman Sebghat Ahmadi, who defined the negotiations backed by Moscow as unhelpful to the peace process, also adding that they were «little more than a political drama».42 According to the Afghan government, the Kremlin-supported gathering was aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the government in Kabul, as the delegates present there were not representative of Afghani- stan’s institutions.43 This instance demonstrates Russia’s approach to the peace talks in Afghanistan. Moscow’s concerns that a deteriorating relationship with the Afghan government could lead to its (Moscow’s) diplomatic isolation, have translated into an attempt at subverting President Ghani’s authority «by throwing its weight behind opposition figures and strengthening its relationship with the Taliban».44 On the opposite end of the spectrum to Russia, India has advocated for giving centre stage to the elected government in Afghanistan, when it comes to deciding the country’s future. Soon after US President Trump called off talks with the Taliban, Raveesh Kumar, the spokesperson for the Ministry of External Affairs, said that India believes «that all the section of the Afghan society including the legitimately elected government should be

41. Ankit Panda & Srinjoy Bose, ‘The Conflict in Afghanistan: Interlocking Strategic Challenges as a Barrier to Regional Solution’, in Takashi Inoguchi (ed.), The SAGE Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy, London: SAGE Publication, November 2019, pp. 361-368. 42. Mujib Mashal, ‘Taliban to Meet Afghan Politicians (but Not Ghani) in Mos- cow’, The New York Times, 2 February 2019. 43. Andrew Higgins & Mujib Mashal, ‘In Moscow, Afghan Peace Talks Without the Afghan Government’, The New York Times, 4 February 2019. 44. Samuel Ramani, ‘In the Demise of the Taliban Peace Talks, Russia Is the Winner’, Foreign Policy, 11 September 2019.

444 Afghanistan 2019 part of the process».45 While India’s position has been relatively consistent, throughout 2019, there have been calls from within India to engage with the Taliban. In particular, during his annual press conference in January 2019, the then Chief of the Army Staff, General Bipin Rawat, advocated for an engagement with the Taliban. In his words, «a number of countries are talking to this group [the Taliban], do we have interest in Afghanistan is the first issue. Does India have interest in Afghanistan. If the answer is yes then you cannot be out of the bandwagon».46 However, New Delhi has reiterated his position in support of elected representatives in Kabul and for an «inclusive» Afghan peace process. The main driver of India’s policy in Af- ghanistan «is to ensure a continuing strategic balance between Afghanistan and Pakistan; […] this means that India wants to ensure that Pakistan does not manipulate the terms of peace talks and undermine Indian interests in Afghanistan».47 The way in which Pakistan has sought a role in Afghanistan during 2019, is discussed in the ensuing section of the article.

5.2. Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2019: charting a new course? There are two aspects concerning Pakistan’s role in the international relations of Afghanistan that are key to understand developments occurred in 2019: first, the evolution of the relations between Islamabad and Kabul, characterised by tensions in the first part of year and by the potential for a fresh start from June onwards; second, Pakistan’s centrality in the US- Taliban peace negotiations. With regards to the bilateral ties between the two countries, in March 2019, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, reportedly said that the Afghan government was «a hurdle in [the] peace process that was insisting that Taliban should talk to it» and that establishing an interim government would have made the peace efforts easier.48 The push back from Afghanistan was strong, with foreign affairs ministry spokesman Sibghatullah Ahmadi, claiming that the statement was «an obvious example of Pakistan’s interven- tional policy and disrespect to the national sovereignty and determination of the people of Afghanistan».49 In addition, the Afghan government recalled its Ambassador to Pakistan. Tensions somewhat diffused in early May, when Prime Minister Imran Khan invited President Ashraf Ghani to visit Paki- stan. Interestingly, especially to understand where the locus of power lies

45. ‘India closely following developments in Afghanistan: MEA’, Business Stand- ard, 12 September 2019. 46. ‘No change in India’s position on Afghanistan, it supports «inclusive» peace process: MEA’, The Economic Times, 11 January 2019. 47. Avinash Paliwal, ‘The «India Question» in Afghanistan’, Lawfare Blog, 6 October 2019. 48. ‘Afghanistan recalls ambassador in row over Pakistan PM remarks’, Reuters, 26 March 2019. 49. Ibid.

445 Filippo Boni within Pakistan when it comes to Afghanistan, the groundwork for the visit was laid by a meeting in Rawalpindi, at the end of May, between, on the one hand, a high-powered Afghan delegation, including the Afghan Interior Minister and Hamdullah Mohib, the Afghan national security adviser, and, on the other, senior Pakistani military and intelligence officials, including the Army Chief, General Bajwa, and Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, Mr. So- hail Mahmood.50 President Ghani’s visit to Pakistan occurred on 27-28 June 2019, and it came after a hiatus of 5 years. During the visit, the two sides agreed to «open a new chapter of friendship and cooperation between Paki- stan and Afghanistan» and the Pakistani Prime Minister reiterated his country’s commitment «to bring about a qualitative transformation in Pakistan- Afghanistan relations as part of his vision of a ‘peaceful neighbourhood’».51 While the visit certainly represented a positive development in the often tense bilateral relations between the two countries, a similar enthusiasm accompanied President Ghani’s first visit to Pakistan in November 2014. According to a Pakistani diplomat interviewed by «The Guardian» at the time of the first visit, «there is a real desire among both the military and civilians to start a new chapter with Ghani».52 The history of the past five years, characterised more by tensions than cooperation, demonstrates how claims of new beginnings should be treated with caution. The second dimension around which Afghanistan’s relations with Pa- kistan have evolved in 2019 is the role that Islamabad has had as a key interlocutor and mediator in the peace talks between the US and the Taliban. During Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to the US in July 2019, President Trump was hopeful that Pakistan was «going to help us [the US] out to ex- tricate ourselves [from Afghanistan]». The American President also said «I think Pakistan will save millions of lives in Afghanistan. As of this moment, they are working very hard».53 Earlier that month, the US had designated the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as a terrorist organisation, a long- standing request from Pakistan and, as observers noted, it may have come in exchange for Pakistan’s support in the Afghan peace process.54 The substantiation of Pakistan’s role in the latter came in October 2019, following the abrupt halt to the talks in early September 2019, and it enabled the parties to return to the negotiating table. Two rounds of talks

50. ‘Afghan security czar visits Pakistan to remove irritants in ties’, The Express Tribune, 29 May 2019; Tahir Khan, ‘Afghan NSA, interior minister hold talks with senior Pakistani officials’, Daily Times, 29 May 2019. 51. ‘PM Imran, Afghan President Ghani look to «opening new chapter of friendship»’, Dawn, 27 June 2019. 52. Jonathan Boone, ‘Ashraf Ghani visit may mark new chapter in Afghan- Pakistan relations’, The Guardian, 14 November 2014. 53. Michael D. Shear & Salman Masood, ‘Trump Tries Cooling Tensions With Pakistan to Speed Afghan Peace Talks’, The New York Times, 22 July 2019. 54. ‘U.S. Designates Pakistan’s Balochistan Liberation Army As Terrorist Group’, RadioFreeEurope, 3 July 2019.

446 Afghanistan 2019 were held in Islamabad between the Afghan Taliban delegation, led by Mul- lah Baradar, co-founder of the Taliban movement and Chief of the group’s diplomatic office in Doha, and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. As reported by «The Express Tribune», a senior Pakistani official observed that Pakistan «has been pressing the Taliban to agree to a ceasefire or at least give a commitment for reducing the level of violence.»55 With the talks resuming in December 2019, as the previous parts of the article already discussed, it becomes clear how Pakistan’s role in the peace process was a key one.

5.3. China in Afghanistan: multilateralism and mediation Another key player in the international relations of Afghanistan during the year under examination is China. Beijing’s interest in Afghanistan has primarily revolved around security considerations as well as economic engagement with the country. The statement released after the meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Afghan counterpart Ashraf Ghani in June 2019, during the SCO meeting in Bishkek, epitomises the security-economy nexus driving Beijing’s engagement with Kabul. Accord- ing to a Xinhua report, Xi Jinping «called on the Afghan side to continue to firmly support China in its fight against the terrorist force of East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)» while simultaneously reaffirming China’s commitment to strengthen and deepen cooperation with Afghanistan within the BRI framework, and to «steadily promote practical cooperation in economy and trade».56 With these drivers in mind, and similarly to what we have seen in 2018, China’s policy in Afghanistan has been characterised by two directives. On the one hand, there is a multilateral approach, aimed at discussing about present and future Afghan dynamics in a number of multilateral fora.57 On the other hand, there is the willingness to act as a mediator in the Afghan peace process. On the first aspect, throughout 2019, Afghanistan has been increasingly involved in a number of China-sponsored multilateral organisations and consultation mechanisms. As the Chinese Ambassador to Afghani- stan, Wang Yu, stated in November 2019, «China admittedly has limited strength. We have therefore actively increased cooperation with other members of the world community to jointly help Afghanistan.»58 The year

55. Kamran Yousaf, ‘Pakistan in push to revive Afghan peace process’, The Ex- press Tribune, 20 October 2019. 56. ‘Chinese, Afghan presidents pledge joint efforts to promote ties’, Xinhua News, 14 June 2019. 57. For a discussion of China’s Afghan policy in 2018, see: Filippo Boni, ‘Af- ghanistan 2018: Parliamentary elections and regional power shifts’, Asia Maior, Vol. XXIX, pp. 377-392. 58. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, H.E. Wang Yu, Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Afghanistan, Chinese Contribution to Afghanistan Obvious to All, 28 November 2019.

447 Filippo Boni

2019 was a case in point. In April, Afghanistan chaired for the first time a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization-Afghanistan Contact Group, which was held in Bishkek.59 Participants discussed about progress on the Afghan peace process and reviewed the Contact Group’s draft road map for further action.60 In September, Afghanistan participated in the third Afghanistan-China-Pakistan Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue, in Islama- bad.61 During the meeting, the three sides «agreed on a list of initial projects of enhancing counterterrorism cooperation» as well as to continue to build political mutual trust and support reconciliation efforts.62 They also agreed to explore «China-Afghanistan-Pakistan plus» cooperation. Finally, at the beginning of November, Afghanistan participated as an observer in the 18th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Heads of Governments, in Uzbekistan. With regards to China’s role in the Afghan peace process, according to Raffaello Pantucci «Beijing has clearly concluded that the road to resolution in Afghanistan includes bringing the Taliban to the table».63 This trend was set in motion in previous years, during which China reportedly met several times with Taliban representatives, to discuss about the peace process in Afghanistan.64 The developments in 2019 confirm this wider trend of engaging directly with the Taliban. In June 2019, the «South China Morning Post» reported about a meeting between Taliban representatives and Chinese authorities which had occurred in an unspecified date earlier that month, and in which the two sides discussed the US withdrawal «in exchange for guarantees that Afghanistan will not be used as a base for militant attacks».65 In September 2019, after US President Trump had called off the peace negotiations, Suhail Shaheen, a spokesman for the Afghan Taliban, said that a nine-member Taliban delegation travelled to Beijing and met with Deng Xijun, China’s special representative for Afghanistan, to

59. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Shanghai Co- operation Organization’s Contact Group Meeting on Afghanistan Kicks Off’, 19 April 2019. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization-Afghanistan Contact Group, was originally established in 2005, but it only started operating in 2017, with the first meeting held in Moscow during the same year. 60. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, ‘SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group held its third meeting with SCO participation in Вishkek’, 19 April 2019. 61. ‘Trilateral dialogue: Pakistan, China, Afghanistan agree on enhancing counterterrorism cooperation’, Dawn, 7 September 2019. 62. Ibid. 63. Raffaello Pantucci, ‘Does Beijing grasp the portent of embracing Afghani- stan and the Taliban?’, South China Morning Post, 10 February 2019. 64. Farhan Bokhari, Kiran Stacey & Emily Feng, ‘China courted Afghan Tali- ban in secret meetings’, Financial Times, 6 August 2018. 65. ‘China hosts Taliban delegation to discuss Afghan peace process, counterterrorism issues’, South China Morning Post, 20 June 2019.

448 Afghanistan 2019 discuss about the suspension of peace talks with the US.66 Finally, on 28 Oc- tober 2019, a Taliban delegation met in China for two days with representatives of the Afghan government, for two days of intra-Afghan peace talks.67 This final meeting came in the wake of another meeting held in Moscow a few days earlier, on 25 October, in which the US, Russia, China and Pakistan issued a joint statement, calling for a ceasefire, for the release of prisoners (both from the Afghan government and the Taliban), and for the start of intra-Afghan dialogue.68

6. Conclusion

As the analysis presented above demonstrated, Afghanistan in 2019 was a country in flux, with a high degree of political and economic uncertainty looming large on the country’s future. On the domestic front, while the announcement of preliminary results, even if delayed, strengthened the credibility of the electoral process, allegations of voting frauds, coupled with low voter turnout, may undermine the legitimacy of the new president, at a time in which peace talks would require unity among political forces. You- suf Rasheed, the executive director of the Free and Fair Election forum for Afghanistan, noted how «there is a great lack of public confidence in the political environment. If the opponents start putting on pressure and more protests now, it will not be helpful or improve the process.»69 Internationally, very much like in previous years, 2019 was dominated by the US and their peace negotiations with the Taliban. At the same time, an array of actors, including Russia, Pakistan, China and India, vied to position themselves in the international relations of Afghanistan, by supporting key political actors, who were likely to have a stake in the future political framework of the country. Interestingly, China, Russia and Pakistan, all three have engaged to varying degrees with the Taliban and are trying to accommodate them as legitimate interlocutors in the intra-Afghan equilibrium that will emerge in the coming years.

66. ‘Afghan Taliban meet with Chinese officials after talks with US collapse’, Deutsche Welle, 22 September 2019. 67. ‘Report: Taliban Delegation Touches Down In China For Peace Talks’, Gan- dhara, 28 October 2019. 68. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, ‘U.S., Russia, China and Pakistan Joint Statement on Peace in Afghanistan’, 28 October 2019. 69. Pamela Constable, ‘Afghanistan’s Ghani wins slim majority in presidential vote, preliminary results show’, Washington Post, 22 December 2019.

449

Pakistan 2019: The challenges of the first PTI government

Marco Corsi

Asia Maior - An Italian think tank on Asia [email protected]

The 2018 electoral success of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party was based on its commitment to improve economic conditions in Pakistan and the lives of the less advantaged sections of society, and to combat the endemic corruption and cronyism of Pakistan’s political and institutional establishments. Once in power, the government of Prime Minister Imran Khan was forced to go back on its campaign pledges in an attempt to rescue the country from the macroeconomic emergency triggered by the inherited pressing debt and by both a budgetary and a balance of payments crisis. The Khan administration tried to mobilise support from friendly countries, to curb imports, to depreciate the currency, and to reduce non-developmental expenditures. The PTI, when it was in opposition, had firmly rejected the idea that further agreements should be reached with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, the dire economic conditions forced the new administration to negotiate Pakistan’s thirteenth loan with the IMF since the 1980s. The bailout was accompanied by an agenda of reforms and austerity measures aimed at reducing the fiscal and account deficits, bolstering international reserves, and improving social protection and governance. The approval of the loan was subject to the implementation of preparatory actions, including a national budget aimed at meeting required targets. The regional context of changing power scenarios has offered Pakistan the opportunity to pursue a nonaligned approach in its relations with the major powers, and to aim at establishing friendly relations with its neighbours in furtherance of its national interest. Pakistan is playing a strategic role in the peace talks and in shaping Afghan- istan’s future to gain influence in the potentially promising geopolitical and economic environment that will follow the withdrawal of the American troops. Although tensions with India remained high in 2019 and the two neighbouring countries engaged in military clashes following a terrorist attack on Indian troops on 14 February 2019, Islamabad made efforts to revive a dialogue with New Delhi and to de-escalate bilateral tensions. Nevertheless, bilateral relations deteriorated significantly, and a new crisis was ignited following the decision by the government of India on 5 August 2019 to revoke the special status accorded to its state of Jammu and Kashmir.

1. Introduction

In August 2018, Imran Khan became prime minister of Pakistan by winning the election, although this was overshadowed by the alleged help

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Marco Corsi provided to him by the military.1 Khan presented himself and his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), as an alternative to the family dynasties who had ruled the country for many years, and built his election campaign on a broadly defined message of «transformational change», on an anti- corruption narrative and on a commitment to deliver services primarily for the poor.2 After winning the election, Khan succeeded in creating a hetero- geneous coalition of provincial forces, which has allowed the PTI to form governments in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and to be part of the coalition government in Balochistan. During the 2018 electoral campaign, the current opposition parties alleged that there were ties between the PTI and the military establishment, and that this falsified the results in favour of Imran Khan.3 The allegations continued in 2019 in relation to violations of the press’s freedom of expression, the prominent role of the military establishment in the country’s affairs, and political motivations behind the arrests of members of the opposition parties. Also, following his electoral success, Khan faced public criticism because of commitments made during the 2018 electoral campaign that had been considered unrealistic by the opposition; the opposition kept monitoring the alleged unfulfilled promises.4 In 2019, Pakistan faced a severe macroeconomic crisis that was inherited from the previous Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government, which had left the economy with imbalances.5 A substantial fiscal deficit, significant foreign debt, and bulky debt service charges have reduced Pakistan’s capacity fully to implement projects related to the China–Paki- stan Economic Corridor (CPEC),6 and have prevented Pakistan from turn-

1. Marco Corsi, ‘Pakistan 2018: General Elections and the Government of Im- ran Khan’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 357-369. 2. ‘Pakistan Premier: ‘No Use for Armed Militias Anymore’, The New York Times, 9 April 2019; ‘Imran Khan’s Failing Revolution, The Pakistani Populist Is Yet to De- liver’, Foreign Affairs, 13 February 2019. 3. Marco Corsi, ‘Pakistan 2018: General Elections and the Government of Im- ran Khan’, pp. 362-370; ‘What Army Chief General Bajwa’s Term Extension Means for Pakistan’, The Diplomat, 20 August 2019. 4. ‘A list of promises: Will Imran’s «Naya Pakistan» formula work?’, The Express Tribune, 20 August 2018. 5. ‘Pakistan’s Economic Woes: The Way Forward’, The Diplomat, 18 April 2019. 6. The US$ 62 billion CPEC is a one of the first projects launched as part of China’s foreign development economic initiative ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR), then renamed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The aim of this initiative is to recreate the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and its overseas version, the ‘Maritime Silk Road’. The BRI initiative encompasses a series of projects that aim to connect the east Asian nations to Central Asia and Europe over the long run. The CPEC is an economic corridor connecting the Pakistani port of Gwadar in Balochistan to Kashgar in the Xinjiang region of China, via land routes and special economic zones, and includes energy and infrastructure projects that are currently under construction throughout Pakistan and are attracting Chinese investment. The multimillion dollar initiative was launched

452 Pakistan 2019 ing the Chinese investment into sustainable economic growth. In the period under analysis (January-December 2019), Mr. Khan mostly focussed on stabilising the national economy and attracting foreign investment, mainly from China, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar, to delay a balance of payments crisis. However, all these measures fell short of the comprehensive policy actions and reforms that were needed to address structural weaknesses. Even though Khan had campaigned against accepting loans from the Bretton Woods institutions, the debt crisis eventually forced his government to reach a new deal with the IMF. This decision required the government to embrace a package of reforms, which triggered increases in the prices of daily commodities and further criticism from the opposition. The efforts to tackle the economic crisis have been accompanied by the strategic positioning of Pakistan in the broader regional context of changing power scenarios, namely the significant withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan announced in December 2018 by the president of the United States, Donald Trump, and the polarisation of the global economic dominance between China and the USA.7 Pakistan has been pursuing balance and a nonaligned approach in its relations with the major powers, and protecting its national interest by aiming to establish friendly relations with its neighbours and to play a proactive role to contribute to regional stability. Khan has been trying to align the scope of the Pakistan-China cooperation to his government’s agenda, and to alleviate the balance of payments crisis. In parallel, Islamabad has been seeking a normalisation in its relations with Washington, as shown by the outcomes of Mr. Khan’s state visit to the US in July 2019. Pakistan’s reaction to the Indian army strikes in February 2019 reflected Islamabad’s willingness to play a pivotal and constructive role in the peace-making process in South Asia and to establish friendlier relations with all its neighbours, which is necessary in order to ease the tensions with New Delhi and to create a conducive environment for an economic recovery. However, Islamabad’s efforts to resume dialogue with India were interrupted by the bilateral crisis that followed the Indian constitutional amendment revoking the special status granted to Jammu and Kashmir.8 Islamabad has shown its willingness to improve its security and trade relations with Afghanistan, which has direct repercussions for the national in Pakistan in 2013, and represents an unprecedented opportunity for economic development in Pakistan, with strategic political importance as a result of the strengthening of the bilateral relations between Islamabad and Beijing. On this subject, see Marco Corsi, ‘Pakistan 2016: Economic features’, Asia Maior 2016, pp. 396-398. 7. ‘Trump Orders Big Troop Reduction in Afghanistan’, The Wall Street Journal, 20 December 2018; ‘Trump plans «significant withdrawal» of US troops from Af- ghanistan’, The Defense Post, 21 December 2018; ‘Is Imran Khan pulling off a foreign policy coup?’, The Express Tribune, 27 January 2019. 8. ‘Pakistan Leader Vents Frustration at India: No Point in Talking to Them’, The New York Times, 21 August 2019.

453 Marco Corsi economy after a significant loss of the share of trade in the Afghan market due to a deficit of trust.9

2. The PTI government

After it took power, the PTI administration launched various initiatives to enact its programme. Pledges for significant investment in low-income housing, and commitments to reduce poverty and provide healthcare for the deprived sections of the Pakistani society, were among the steps taken.10 Prime Minister Imran Khan has no political rivals and does not face any real challenge from the opposition.11 On the one hand, the main opposition parties have been weakened by the latest elections and the capacity of the PTI to build alliances in the provinces. On the other hand, the current government has been pursuing corruption cases, and several leaders of the political opposition are facing prison terms on corruption charges.12 The leadership of the Pakistan’s People Party (PPP, the party that ruled the country from 2008 to 2013 and that still controls the only provincial government in Sindh that is independent of the national PTI) has been involved in corruption scandals in Sindh, and in judicial cases.13 Pakistan’s former president, who is a member of the national parliament and Benazir Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, was arrested in June 2019 in a money laundering case, with an allegation being made that at least US$ 400 million had been transferred out of the country. Zardari was accused of using false bank accounts to transfer kickbacks.14 The allegations that put the former president in jail are believed by PPP supporters to be politically moti-

9. ‘What Pakistan Will Gain from Peace in Afghanistan’, The National Interest, 10 February 2019. 10. ‘PTI’s healthcare reforms set in motion’, Pakistan Today, 2 March 2019; ‘Pa- kistan prime minister Imran launches low cost housing finance scheme’, Gulf News, 12 March 2019; ‘Imran Khan Calls for Vast Anti-Poverty Plan, but Money Is Tight’, The New York Times, 28 March 2019; ‘Reforms in health sector top priority of PTI govt: Minister’, Associated Press of Pakistan Corporation, 31 March 2019; ‘The housing promise’, The News, 17 July, 2019; ‘Pakistan: PTI government’s first year praised’, Gulf News, 18 August 2019; ‘After a year of Imran Khan, Pakistan is finally stepping into its role as a world player’, The Independent, 26 September 2019. 11. ‘Is Pakistan’s Opposition Capable of Mass Mobilization When Necessary?’, The Diplomat, 30 May 2019. 12. ‘What Does Imran Khan’s Accountability Campaign Mean For Pakistan?’, The Diplomat, 12 June 2019. 13. ‘NAB issues Asif Zardari’s arrest warrants’, Dunyanews, 31 May 2019; ‘Asif Zardari’s arrest: PPP to observe ‘Black Day’ on Tuesday’, The News, 10 June 2019; ‘Asif Ali Zardari arrested as IHC rejects bail application’, The News, 10 June 2019. 14. ‘Pakistani former president Asif Ali Zardari arrested in money laundering case’, The Telegraph, 10 June 2019.

454 Pakistan 2019 vated.15 The 2018 election results confirmed the inability of the party and of the young dynast leader Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, son of Zardari and Benazir Bhutto, to govern, other than in its stronghold province of Sindh. In 2019, the party has, overall, remained quiet and has criticised Imran Khan who, according to the PPP, has not been delivering on his electoral promises.16 The Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz dominated national politics from the 2013 elections17 to the end of the parliamentary term in 2018. Nawaz Sharif, the then elected premier, was disqualified as a result of the Panama Papers18 case on 28 July 2017. After having spent a period in jail, Nawaz Sharif was released on bail for six weeks, under a decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, because of his deteriorating health, but was then jailed again.19 The PML-N is facing a leadership vacuum, and no leader has been identified as Nawaz’s successor.20 Notably, Sharif also made enemies in Pakistan when he focused his 2018 general election campaign on targeting the country’s courts and the army21 which, according to him, conspired against the PML-N. After the elections, the PML-N lost its tradi-

15. ‘What’s Behind the Pakistani Prime Minister’s Public Address in Washing- ton DC?’, The Diplomat, 23 July 2019. 16. ‘Bilawal demands joint parliamentary body for NAP implementation’, The Dawn, 17 March 2019; ‘Should Pakistan PM Imran Khan Expect a Major Opposition Party Challenge Soon?’, The Diplomat, 27 March 2019. 17. Marco Corsi, ‘Pakistan: Il terzo governo di Nawaz Sharif ’, Asia Maior 2013, pp.88-93. 18. The Panama Papers scandal, or ‘Panamagate’, involved the leak of files from a Panama-based provider of offshore services in 2016. Mr. Sharif ’s name does not appear in the Panama Papers, but three of his six children – Maryam, Hasan and Hussain – were found to have purchased luxury properties in London using controlled offshore shell companies. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) filed three cases against the Sharif family. The first was in relation to the purchase of luxury London flats, the Avenfield apartments, which were purchased using money obtained through corruption, according to the prosecutors. The two other cases involved the Al-Azizia Steel Mills, the Hill Metal Establishment and offshore companies, in relation to which Sharif ’s family was accused of money laundering, tax evasion and hiding foreign assets. On 6 July 2018, the Anti-Graft Court in Islamabad sentenced Nawaz Sharif and his daughter Maryam, respectively, to eleven and eight years in jail, and they were then arrested. Two months later, the Islamabad High Court granted Mr. Sharif bail after suspending the sentences. The NAB subsequently filed an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Islamabad, which was rejected by the Supreme Court as the anti-corruption body could not provide grounds for the cancellation of bail. Later, Nawaz Sharif was also convicted by the NAB in the Al-Azizia Steel Mills case on 24 December 2018, awarded a seven-year jail sentence and disqualified for ten years from any public office. On this subject, see Marco Corsi, ‘Pakistan 2018: General Elections and the Government of Imran Khan’, pp. 359-362. 19. Ibid., pp. 362-65. 20. ‘SC rejects NAB appeal against Nawaz, Maryam bail’, The News, 14 Janu- ary 2019. 21. Marco Corsi, ‘Pakistan 2018: General Elections and the Government of Imran Khan’, pp. 359-365.

455 Marco Corsi tional stronghold in Punjab as a result of Imran Khan’s ability to forge political alliances and, since then, corruption scandals have emerged in which PML-N members are involved.22 The PML-N leader Shehbaz Sharif, who succeeded his brother Nawaz as party leader after the latter was convicted and jailed, was also arrested, but was later released, on corruption charges dating back to his tenure as Chief Minister of Punjab. Several other party members, including Shehbaz’s son, Hamza Shehbaz, were also arrested. In 2019, Nawaz’s daughter, Maryam Nawaz, the vice president of the PML-N and a leading opposition figure who has voiced criticism of the government of Imran Khan, circulated a secretly recorded video showing an accountability court judge admitting that the jail sentence for the former premier Nawaz Sharif was passed under duress. TV stations that broadcast the live news conference in which Maryam presented the video were shut down, and the judge was subsequently removed from his position. In August 2019, Maryam was arrested in a money laundering inquiry while visiting her jailed father in Lahore.23 Crowds gathered in major cities across Pakistan on 25 July 2019, marking the first anniversary of the parliamentary elections won by Khan – with the help of Pakistan’s military, according to the protesters.24 Although Mr. Khan has always rejected the allegations that his party is in league with the generals, several of Khan’s cabinet members are former members of General Pervez Musharraf ’s administration. Also, the PTI receives support from the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), the party that was formed by Musharraf.25 The numerous corruption cases pursued by the PTI administration against several opposition leaders have led to accusations by the PTI’s opponents that they are making an instrumental use of justice for political ends. In addition to that, a quiet but systematic deterioration in the climate for press freedom in Pakistan is also said to be occurring, with restrictions on reporting, the barring of access, encouragement of self-censorship through intimidation, a crackdown on the media and measures taken against several journalists.26 Many journalists have been charged with treason for having criticised the government, and this is considered to be evidence of a con-

22. ‘SC rejects NAB appeal against Nawaz, Maryam bail’. 23. The Sharif family was accused by the government of using Chaudhry Sugar Mills for money laundering, and availing themselves of national subsidies without exporting sugar. ‘Daughter of Ex-Prime Minister Is Arrested in Pakistan Graft Inquiry’, The New York Times, 8 August 2019; ‘Maryam Nawaz arrested in Chaudhry Sugar Mills case’, The News, 8 August 2019; ‘Maryam nabbed in sugar mill case’, The Express Tribune, 8 August 2019. 24. ‘Pakistani opposition holds rallies to demand PM step down’, APN News, 25 July 2019. 25. ‘Imran Khan’s First Year at Bat’, The Diplomat, 1 August 2019. 26. Committee to Protect Journalists, Acts of Intimidation: In Pakistan, journalists’ fear and censorship grow even as fatal violence declines, New York, 12 September 2018.

456 Pakistan 2019 vergence of the views of the PTI government and the military according to which the media have to be supportive of the Pakistani state.27 Protesting against this situation, an anti-government rally and march from Karachi to Islamabad (the «Azadi March») was organised to begin on 27 October 2019 by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the chief of the Jamiat Ule- ma-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) party, with demands for the resignations of the PTI government and its leader, and new elections. The JUI-F is an Islamist political party with a stronghold in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and has been marginalised since the elections in 2018 by the victory of the PTI. The main opposition parties, the PML-N and the PPP, although they showed support for the march, did not participate in the protests.28 Once the protesters reached Islamabad, they launched a sit-in, which was then eventually interrupted on 13 November 2019 when it was called off by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, who requested his followers to continue their protests around the country.29 Talks held by the government with the opposition did not reach tangible results, and the march did not achieve its demands, yet its actual significance was that, for the first time, protesters challenged the PTI government and Prime Minister Imran Khan.30

3. Economic scenario

The achievements of the CPEC have mostly been related to the benefits triggered by the cooperation between Islamabad and Beijing. From 2013 to 2018, interest-free or low-interest loans provided by China to Pa- kistan and increased foreign investment (foreign direct investment grew from US$ 650 million to US$ 2.2 billion)31 have generated an improvement in the national macroeconomic conditions. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew (with the highest rate being 5.8% in the 2017-2018 fiscal year, as set out in an analysis by Standard & Poor’s),32 as did foreign reserves and

27. ‘Imran Khan’s «New Pakistan» Is as Good as the Old’, The New York Times, 17 July 2019; ‘Why Pakistan’s crackdown on the press is getting worse by the day’, The Washington Post, 22 July 2019; ‘DRM Investigates: Twitter Accounts Behind the Hashtag #ArrestAntiPakJournalists’, Digital Rights Monitor, 5 July 2019; Marco Corsi, ‘Pakistan 2018: General Elections and the Government of Imran Khan’, pp. 362-363. 28. ‘How Dangerous Is the Pakistani Opposition’s Long March Against Imran Khan’s Government?’, The Diplomat, 23 October 2019. 29. ‘Fazl announces Azadi March Plan B: Spread protests across Pakistan’, The News, 13 November 2019. 30. ‘Explained: What does the Azadi March in Pakistan signal?’, The Indian Express, 5 November 2019; ‘Conclusion of Azadi March sit-in: What Fazlur Rehman achieved’, The News, 14 November 2019. 31. ‘Past five years of CPEC in review’, The Express Tribune, 6 May 2019. 32. ‘China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative Puts a Squeeze on Pakistan’, The Wall Street Journal, 3 April 2019.

457 Marco Corsi job opportunities.33 The CPEC-related power generation projects have also addressed the shortage of energy in Pakistan, where the capacity has been enhanced. Similarly, national connectivity and infrastructure have been improved.34 Pakistan’s national economy has been characterised by high inflation, high unemployment, low rates of tax collection, dwindling foreign reserves and poorly performing exports.35 Since the early 1980s, Pakistan’s economic growth has been sustained by borrowing and incentivised consumption, and the mobilisation of internal resources has mostly been the result of increased fiscal pressure and a broadening of the tax base. From the fiscal year 2014-15 to the fiscal year 2017-18, GDP growth accelerated from 4.1% to 5.5%.36 The agriculture and large-scale manufacturing sectors did not expand at the same pace, and the share of large-scale manufacturing in GDP declined from 10.9% to 10.3%, while the share of consumption increased from 90.7% to 94.5% of GDP in 2017-18.37 Domestic savings declined from 9.3% to 5.5% of GDP, and national savings from 15.4% of GDP to 10.8%.38 The account deficit grew from 1% to 6.1% of GDP, or by US$ 18.2 billion, from 2015 to 2018.39 The trade deficit when Khan took office, US$ 37.7 billion,40 was primarily driven by rising imports and low exports. In 2018, the depreciation of the rupee caused an increase in the public external debt, which, with the liabilities, stood at 82% of GDP as of the middle of the fiscal year 2019.41 Nawaz Sharif ’s PML-N administration had adopted an import-led growth strategy to finance large-scale projects under the CPEC initiative, which provided an economic stimulus to Pakistan. According to Standard &

33. ‘Past five years of CPEC in review’; ‘Pakistan, other BRI countries reject China’s «debt trap» theory: report’, Profit, 7 June 2019. 34. Like the underway upgradation of the Karakorum Highway, connecting China and Pakistan, and the Peshawar-Karachi Motorway (Multan-Sukkur Section, M5), connecting Karachi and Gwadar, which was inaugurated in November 2019. Also, the Cross Border Optical Fiber Cable project, encompassing 820 km fiber optical cable laid in Gilgit Baltistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab, was completed and inaugurated in July 2018 (http://cpec.gov.pk). 35. Marco Corsi, ‘Pakistan 2016: Economic features’, pp. 386-391. 36. Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Pakistan Economic Survey 2018- 19, Islamabad 2019. 37. Ibid; The World Bank, Pakistan@100 Structural Transformation, Washing- ton, 2019. 38. ‘Past five years of CPEC in review’. 39. The International Monetary Fund, Data Mapper (https://www.imf.org). 40. ‘Pakistan’s trade deficit skyrockets to historic high’, The Express Tribune, 12 July 2018. 41. State Bank of Pakistan, Pakistan’s Debt and Liabilities Profile (http://www.sbp. org.pk); Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Debt Policy Coordination Of- fice, Debt Policy Statement 2018-19 (http://www.finance.gov.pk); ‘Pakistan’s current account in a cross-country perspective’, The Dawn, 7 December 2018.

458 Pakistan 2019

Poor’s, CPEC-related growth will average 3.6% until 2022.42 The fiscal deficit, budget and balance of payments crisis, and heavy foreign debt service burden that the PTI government inherited have prevented it from turning the CPEC investment into sustainable economic growth. Only roughly half of the total value of the Chinese initiative has been achieved, because of the inability of the Pakistani government to guarantee repayments to Beijing, and many of the remaining CPEC projects have been put on hold by the government of Islamabad. The World Bank argues that weak governance is responsible for the fiscal deficit, and Pakistan has not been able to rely on consistent foreign investment either.43 Pakistan ranks 136th out of the 190 world economies,44 and structural interventions advised by the Bretton Woods organisations to improve the situation include easing customs laws and regulations, enhancing the tourism industry, improving security, and strengthening Pakistan’s position in the international markets. The 2018 Global Competitiveness Index, which measures the factors that stimulate economic growth and provide a conducive business environment, ranked Pakistan 107th out of 140 countries.45

4. Financial assistance pledged by friendly countries

The PTI government has been trying to recalibrate the relationship with China and to align it with the new administration’s priorities. Khan has requested more cooperation and development aid grants (that do not need to be repaid), and has had talks about focusing the scope of the Pakistan- China cooperation more prominently on the social and industrial sectors and on loans to alleviate the balance of payments crisis. An agreement was also signed with China covering aid projects worth US$ 1 billion for socio- economic development in Pakistan in the education, health, water, poverty alleviation and other sectors.46 Gwadar, the capital city of Balochistan, is the linchpin of the CPEC and provides China with access to the Arabian Sea, linking the Xinjiang region to Gwadar. The threats to the CPEC caused by the long-running insurgency in Balochistan, where nationalistic militants

42. ‘China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative Puts a Squeeze on Pakistan’. 43. The World Bank, Pakistan @100: Shaping the Future, Washington, 2019. 44. Ibidem, Doing Business, Washington, 2019. 45. The World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2019, Co- logne/Geneva 2019; ‘Prime Minister Imran Khan promises sweeping reforms in inaugural address’, The News, 19 August 2018; ‘Why Imran Khan is unlikely to make life much better for Pakistanis’, The Economist, 12 January 2019; ‘Pakistan unveils tax cuts, incentives to boost growth’, Reuters, 23 January 2019. 46. ‘China to provide $1bn grant for Pakistan’s socio-economic development’, Profit, 21 June, 2019.

459 Marco Corsi are fighting for independence, has been concerning China and Islamabad as, over the years, Chinese investments in Balochistan have repeatedly been targeted. Pakistan has been stepping up security, and yet the Chinese are concerned about Pakistan’s efforts to secure a stable environment, which is a necessary condition for the mega project to deliver its expectations.47 Pakistan is a close ally of Saudi Arabia. The two countries have trade, investment and military links, with Islamabad providing military support to the Saudi armed forces. Over 2.5 million migrant Pakistani workers work in the kingdom, about one-third of all Pakistani expatriates, and Saudi Arabia is the largest source of remittances to Pakistan.48 The first official overseas trip made by Imran Khan in 2018 was to Saudi Arabia and, in the same year, the kingdom deposited US$ 3 billion in Pakistan’s central bank, the State Bank of Pakistan, to inflate the forex reserves.49 The Pakistani premier secured substantial aid from Riyadh. On 17 February 2019, the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman visited Pakistan, and later India and China, on a two-day official visit at the invitation of Prime Minister Khan. Dur- ing this visit, several memoranda of understanding were signed, pledging investment in multiple sectors (finance, power, renewable energy, internal security, media, culture, sports etc.)50 worth up to US$ 21 billion in the period to 2025. Of these packages of investment, US$ 10 billion was dedicated to an oil refinery in Gwadar port. Saudi Arabia’s interest in investing in Gwadar – a strategic location for the CPEC – discloses the Saudi interest in expanding its presence in Pakistan as part of the trade route between Saudi Arabia and China, and reflects Ryad’s wider regional rivalry with Iran.51 In 2019, Pakistan received a US$ 2 billion loan from the UAE through the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. This has temporarily increased Pa- kistan’s foreign reserves from US$ 14.956 billion at the start of February 2019 to US$ 17.398 billion in March 2019.52 Islamabad also succeeded in

47. On 12 May 2019, armed militants of the Balochistan Liberation Army (a militant group with a base in Afghanistan and designated as a global terrorist organisation by Pakistan) attacked the Pearl Continental Hotel in Gwadar and killed four people, before themselves being killed. ‘Terrorists storm Gwadar Pearl Continental hotel’, Paki- stan Today, 11 May 2019. China has been trying, in vain, to negotiate with some of the Baloch separatist leaders. However, those attempts have triggered reactions from the militants, further attacks and even an assault on the Chinese consulate in Karachi in November 2018. ‘Can Pakistan Protect CPEC?’, The Diplomat, 20 May 2019. 48. ‘Pakistan forges closer ties with Saudi Arabia – and Iran isn’t happy’, The Conversation, 7 March 2019. 49. Marco Corsi, ‘Pakistan 2018: General Elections and the Government of Imran Khan’, p. 373. 50. ‘Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman arrives in Pakistan’, The News, 17 February 2019. 51. Chaitanya Giri, Gwadar 2.0: Pakistan’s Saudi vs. China play, Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, 7 march 2019; ‘Pakistan’s Approach to Navigat- ing Saudi-Iran Tensions: Solidarity With Riyadh’, The Diplomat, 24 September 2019. 52. State Bank of Pakistan, Foreign Exchange Reserves (http://www.sbp.org.pk).

460 Pakistan 2019 securing US$ 3 billion worth of investments and deposits following a visit of the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, to Pakistan in June 2019.53 All these measures provided some temporary relief for Pakistan’s foreign reserves, but did not address the policy actions and reforms that are needed to tackle the systemic structural weaknesses. As we have seen, these include monetary and other structural measures associated with loans provided in the past by the international monetary institutions to Pakistan, together with, as in the case of the CPEC and China, foreign investors’ confidence in internal and regional security and stability. Both aspects were priorities of the PTI administration.

5. The new IMF loan and the first budget of the PTI government

In 2019, the IMF predicted that Pakistan’s growth would slow to 4% and fall to 2.7% in the medium term.54 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) predicted 3.9%55 and the World Bank 3.4%.56 In March 2019, the State Bank of Pakistan revised its GDP growth target down to 3.5% from the target of approximately 6% set in 2018. Despite the success in attracting foreign investment, Pakistan’s economic situation, with 30.7% of its expenditure earmarked for debt servicing,57 forced Imran Khan’s administration to negotiate Pakistan’s thirteenth loan with the IMF since the 1980s.58 Even before the bailout was agreed, it was understood that it would be accompanied by an agenda of structural reforms and austerity measures aimed at reducing the fiscal and account deficits, bolstering international reserves, and improving social protection and governance.59 The IMF wanted Islamabad to enact structural reforms to rebalance the economy and to control the spending that had accelerated growth at the expense of the national budget. While the exact terms and conditions were unfolded after the

53. ‘Qatar says it will invest $3 billion in Pakistan’, The News, 24 June 2019; ‘Pakistan, Qatar to boost cooperation in energy, tourism, hospitality industry’, Ibid.; ‘Qatar announces $3bn investment in Pakistan’, Profit, 24 June 2019. 54. The International Monetary Fund, Pakistan (https://www.imf.org); ‘Pakistan, IMF extend bailout talks after failing to reach agreement’, Reuters, 20 November 2018; ‘World powers blackmailing Pakistan on IMF bailout’, The News, 15 April 2019; ‘Aus- terity to Hit Pakistani Military Budget, PM Announces’, The Diplomat, 6 June 2019. 55. The Asian Development Bank, Pakistan: Economy (https://www.adb.org). 56. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, Washington D.C., June 2019. 57. ‘Defence, debt to eat up half of proposed Rs5.237 trillion budget for 2018- 19’, The Express Tribune, 18 April 2019. 58. ‘Pakistan’s 60-year history with the IMF in one chart’, Sama TV, 16 May 2019. 59. ‘Pakistan bracing for austere budget under IMF, finance chief says’, Reu- ters, 25 May 2019; ‘IMF bailout is suicidal for Pakistan’, First Post, 31 May 2019; ‘Asad Umar discloses IMF demands for loan package’, The Express Tribune, 21 June 2019.

461 Marco Corsi financial commitment to the programme was given by the IMF, the IMF’s approval was subject to the implementation of ex-ante preparatory and classified actions, including the national budget, to meet required targets.60 In June 2019, the then Minister of State for Revenue, Hammad Azhar (who later became Minister of Economic Affairs) presented the PTI government’s first budget to the National Assembly.61 The total outlay for the 2019-20 budget is US$ 4.5 billion, a growth of 30% against the budget of the previous fiscal year. The budget is part of a series of reforms undertaken by Khan’s government to contain the balance of payments crisis and to qualify Pakistan for and secure the IMF stabilisation programme, which is conditional on the implementation of austerity-driven measures. It is an austerity-focused budget, which cuts the salaries of ministers and other civil servants by 10% and increases the minimum wage of civilian employees. The budget left many commentators and experts puzzled by the ambitious and unprecedented target for tax revenue, which was to tackle Pakistan’s total debt (US$ 97 billion) and total deficit (US$ 32 billion). The revenue target was increased by 35%, mostly through indirect taxes on utilities such as power, gas, oil and mobile communications. Therefore, it was considered to be not just too optimistic, but also to reduce the consumption capacity of low- and middle-income groups, who have already been suffering from the 7% inflation rate (in comparison with the 3.8% rate of the previous year), which had led to increased costs for essential goods, consumer items and interest rates.62 Ultimately, it was thought that the budget would depress the economic situation of Pakistan even further.63 During the budget presentation speech, GDP was reported to have grown by 3.3%, well below the initial target exceeding 6%, and inflation was confirmed to be above 7%. At the same time, the budget foresaw increased allocations for social security and social protection programmes.64 The IMF recognised the budget for the fiscal year 2020 as a crucial initial step towards a decisive fiscal consolidation and a reduction of the

60. ‘The Reluctant Fund-amentalist’, Newsline, June 2019. 61. ‘PTI’s first federal budget’, Pakistan Today, 11 June 2019. 62. ‘The Economic Tsunami’, Newsline, June 2019. 63. ‘Budget 2019-20: Is PTI’s budget for the people, the IMF or the country?’, The Express Tribune, 12 June 2019. 64. Ministry of Finance, State Bank of Pakistan, Federal Budget 2019-2020; Fed- eral Budget Speech 2019-20 (English Version); Budget in Brief 2019-20; Annual Budget Statement 2019-20; Estimates of Foreign Assistance 2019-20; Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts 2019-20 (http://www.finance.gov.pk); ‘Pakistan budget: Imran Khan’s government presents its first budget with no new general sales taxes’, Gulf News, 11 June 2019; ‘Pakistan unveils austerity budget in bid to secure IMF loan’, Financial Times, 11 June 2019; ‘PTI government presents Rs 7,022 billion budget for 2019-20’, The News, 11 June 2019.

462 Pakistan 2019 public debt.65 On 3 July 2019, the executive board of the IMF approved a 39-month programme for Pakistan under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) worth US$ 6 billion, with an immediate disbursement of US$ 1 billion and the remaining amount phased in instalments subject to quarterly and four semi-annual reviews.66 The EFF was approved with a package of structural reforms that must be undertaken by Islamabad.67 The new EFF envisages support for revenue- based fiscal consolidation aimed at reducing public debt and building resilience, supported by efforts to increase revenue mobilisation by 4 to 5% of GDP. Pakistan is required to almost double its foreign exchange reserves in one year and to pay almost US$ 38 billion in external debt (of which about US$ 15 billion is owed to China and is related to the CPEC).68 Tax policy reforms include removing exemptions and preferential treatment and broadening the tax base. Tax administration reforms are also envisaged, to strengthen the authorities’ capacity to collect revenues. The second pillar of policy support entails a monetary policy to contain inflation and to rebuild the national reserves, with the aim of ensuring a market-determined and flexible exchange rate to contribute to restoring competitiveness, and a stronger central bank to achieve price stability. Reforms addressing the energy sector, and structural reforms of institutions to enhance governance and transparency and promote an investment-friendly environment, are also included in the EFF.69 Overall, the programme is expected to coalesce significant support from both bilateral and multilateral creditors in the coming years.70 The new EFF also targets social protection. It encompasses policy support for strengthening the social safety net to protect the most vulnerable sections of society by expanding the coverage and budget allocation of welfare programmes. The IMF programme provided the PTI government with an international endorsement that has unlocked additional lending, including from

65. The International Monetary Fund, Pakistan: Request for an Extended Arrange- ment Under the Extended Fund Facility-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Pakistan, Washington, 8 July 2019. 66. Ibidem, Executive Board Approves US$6 billion 39-Month Extended Fund Facil- ity Arrangement for Pakistan, International Monetary Fund Press Release No. 19/264, 3 July 2019; IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement with Pakistan on the First Review under the Extended Fund Facility, International Monetary Fund Press Release No. 19/402, 8 November 2019. 67. ‘The IMF Repeats Old Mistakes in Its New Loan Program for Pakistan’, The Diplomat, 3 August 2019. 68. ‘The IMF Takeover of Pakistan’, The Diplomat, 13 July 2019. 69. The EFF requires Pakistan to, for example: strengthen the capacities of the anti-corruption bodies; privatise selected state-owned enterprises; conduct new au- dits; reduce customs-related processing and streamline the required documentation; review its tariff policy; simplify procedures to start a business; eliminate unnecessary regulations; etc. See The International Monetary Fund, ‘Pakistan: Request for an Ex- tended Arrangement’. 70. Ibid.

463 Marco Corsi the World Bank and the ADB. In June 2019, Pakistan approached the ADB to obtain a US$ 3.4 billion loan to help with the balance of payments crisis.71

6. Pakistan – USA: a romance of convenience on Afghanistan

Washington has for years blamed Pakistan for providing support and a haven to the insurgency, and has granted significant military and economic aid to Islamabad. The absence of tangible results and ineffective support from Islamabad for the United States in combating the militants in Afghanistan72 led to a substantial reduction in military aid in the financial year 2019-20, and President Trump has also called for sanctions against Pakistan. In July 2019, Imran Khan met Donald Trump at the White House.73 The visit was a diplomatic success for Mr. Khan, and Islamabad had significant rewards. Islamabad’s and Washington’s interests converge primarily on Afghanistan and on the role that Pakistan should have in the negotiations conducted by the United States, China, and Russia to encourage the Taliban to participate in peace talks. Islamabad and Washington agree that only a political resolution can bring the protracted conflict to an end.74 The Trump administration has been trying assertively to conclude a peace deal that would result in the smooth US pullout from Afghanistan with a possible share of political power in Kabul for the Taliban following talks with the Afghan government facilitated by Islamabad.75 Islamabad’s efforts to facilitate the Afghan reconciliation process are part of a confidence-building approach aimed at reducing the deficit of trust with the government of Kabul that has mainly been caused by Islama- bad’s support for the Taliban. Islamabad is keen on pursuing friendly ties with Kabul, beyond facilitating the peace process, as the stabilisation of bilateral relations is a necessary step in improving Pakistan’s trade relations

71. ‘Pakistan to receive $3.4 billion loan from ADB in budgetary support’, Such TV, 16 June 2019; ‘Pakistan to receive $3.4 billion from ADB in budgetary support’, The News, 16 June 2019. ‘ADB Says Loan Talks Ongoing After Pakistan Claims $3.4 Billion Agreed’, The New York Times, 17 June 2019. 72. Marco Corsi, ‘Pakistan 2018: General Elections and the Government of Imran Khan’, p. 374. 73. ‘PM Imran’s US visit diplomatic setback for New Delhi: Indian expert’, The Express Tribune, 13 July 2019. 74. ‘Pakistan, Taliban agree to resume talks amid renewed peace push’, The Express Tribune, 3 October 2019. 75. ‘Pakistan Works With Trump to Prod Taliban in Afghan Peace Talks’, The Wall Street Journal, 20 July 2019; ‘Trump Tries Cooling Tensions With Pakistan to Speed Afghan Peace Talks’, The New York Times, 22 July 2019; ‘Why Trump is flat- tering Pakistan - and threatening to annihilate Afghanistan’, The Washington Post, 23 July 2019.

464 Pakistan 2019 with Afghanistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a transit trade agreement (the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement, APTTA) in 2010, to allow Afghanistan to trade externally through Pakistan. The APTTA expired in 2015 and, since then, Islamabad has been seeking to renegotiate it to scale down smuggling with the help of Kabul. Afghanistan wants to import from India through the Wagah border, but Pakistan refuses to allow access to Indian goods destined for Afghanistan on the basis of the APTTA Agreement that allowed Kabul to export to India via Pakistan but didn’t give Afghanistan the right to import Indian goods across Pakistani territory.76 The decline in Pakistan-Afghanistan trade due to the tensions of Is- lamabad with India has been having substantial financial repercussions.77 Pakistan’s exports to Afghanistan have dwindled from US$ 2.6 billion in 2010-11 to US$ 1.4 billion in 2018-19 because of the shift in Indian-Afghan trade that now travels through Iran. At the same time, Iran’s exports to Afghanistan and Afghanistan’s exports to Iran have increased significantly. Currently, Iran holds a 22% share of Afghanistan’s consumer market.78 Islamabad has other (geopolitical) reasons for encouraging Trump’s plans and playing a crucial role in the peace talks to shape Afghanistan’s future. The withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan and the installation of a friendly government in Kabul would constitute a favourable scenario that allowed Islamabad to gain influence and traction in Afghanistan’s political space and in an environment that offered significant opportunities. In particular, beyond security-related matters, Afghanistan is critical for Is- lamabad because of its economic potential when it comes to transit routes, development projects and other investment, and this is attracting other countries too, such as China, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and more.79

7. Relationships between Pakistan and India

The issue of terrorism was not a specific point on the agendas for the bilateral meetings of Imran Khan in Washington, and the visit opened with the revamping of the bilateral security cooperation that had been suspended by Trump in 2018.80

76. ‘Suspension of bilateral trade to hurt India more, says expert’, The Busi- ness Standard, 7 August 2019; ‘Carrying Indian goods: Pakistan rules out access to Afghanistan via Wagah border’, The News, 8 August 2019. 77. ‘What Pakistan Will Gain from Peace in Afghanistan’. 78. ‘Pakistan seeks upgrading of Afghan Transit Trade Agreement’, The News, 28 June 2019. 79. ‘World set to pay high price for US president Donald Trump’s sordid romance with Pakistan PM Imran Khan’, Firstpost, 25 July 2019. 80. ‘5 Reasons Imran Khan’s US Visit Was a Win for Pakistan’, The Diplomat, 25 July 2019; Marco Corsi, ‘Pakistan 2018: General Elections and the Government of Imran Khan’, pp. 374-375.

465 Marco Corsi

The prospective scenarios following the American disengagement from Afghanistan concern New Delhi. The newfound closeness between the USA and Pakistan, and Pakistan’s role in the talks with the Taliban, are threatening elements of India’s internal security. The possible return to power of the Taliban in Kabul and questions about the anti-terrorist efforts of Islamabad underscore the increased dangers for India of terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and suggest possible scenarios of an escalation of tension in Kashmir. At the beginning of 2019, India alleged that there was increased cross- border infiltration of militants in Kashmir, while more serious outbreaks of violence along the de facto border with Pakistan, the Line of Control, brought the two neighbouring countries to the verge of conflict. Islama- bad and New Delhi engaged in military clashes following a terrorist attack on Indian troops on 14 February 2019. A suicide bomber belonging to the Pakistan-based armed group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) crashed a car carrying explosives into a convoy of trucks carrying security personnel of the Central Reserve Police Force, an Indian government paramilitary force.81 The attack took place at Lethapora, a village near Awantipur, which is a town in the Pulwama district of the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir, and it killed more than 40 soldiers. It was the deadliest attack in the region in 30 years.82 In retaliation, on 26 February 2019 India carried out airstrikes. The Indian Air Force crossed the Line of Control and claimed to have bombarded Pakistan-based terrorist bases in Balakot in Pakistan’s Khyber Pa- khtunkhwa province, which borders Azad Kashmir, in undisputed Pakistani territory. India dubbed the operation a «non-military pre-emptive» action to repel a perceived imminent offensive.83 The attacks ignited the worst military crisis between the two countries since the tensions that had followed the attack perpetrated on the Indian

81. ‘What Happened at Pulwama and Balakot’, The Diplomat, March 2019. 82. Later, Islamabad challenged the Indian investigations, which had produced a dossier that failed to prove a link with JeM in the Pulwama incident, and offered to continue to extend cooperation in relation to the provision of ‘actionable evidence’. See ‘Indian dossier failed to prove Masood Azhar’s link with Pulwama attack: Paki- stan’, The News, 28 March 2019. 83. On 18 April 2019, the Indian Minister for External Affairs Sushma Swaraj confirmed that Pakistan had suffered no casualties during the 26 February 2019 air strike. Also, the Indian claim that it had shot down a Pakistan Air Force F-16 fighter jet on 27 February 2019 was not confirmed. On this subject see ‘Truth Prevails: In- dian War Hysteria against Pakistan’, Modern Diplomacy, 28 April 2019. Satellite images from several international institutes could not confirm that India had hit targets of significance. See ‘Satellite images show buildings still standing at Indian bombing site’, Reuters, 6 March 2019; ‘Pakistan: Satellite Imagery confirms India missed target in Pakistan airstrike’, European Space Imaging, 8 March 2019; ‘India’s strike on Balakot: a very precise miss?’, The Strategist, 27 March 2019; ‘Did India shoot down a Pakistani F-16 in February?’, The Washington Post, 17 April 2019.

466 Pakistan 2019

Parliament on 13 December 2001.84 Pakistan reacted militarily by air on 26 and 27 February 2019 and by sea on 4 March 2019 when its navy claimed to have detected and blocked an Indian Scorpene-AIP SSK submarine from entering Pakistani waters.85 On 27 February 2019, the Pakistan Air Force launched retaliatory strikes at six places across the Line of Control in Indian Kashmir. In the air battle, the Pakistan Air Force shot down an Indian Mig- 21 and took the pilot into custody. Two Indian helicopters were reportedly shot down in friendly fire.86 Reconciliation with India is essential for Islamabad’s plans for economic development and, since his election, Imran Khan has repeatedly issued statements with the aim of improving the relationship with New Delhi.87 Overall, many analysts agreed that the military crisis had strong media-related echoes and that Pakistan used communications tools more effectively than India.88 Islamabad’s diplomatic method of handling the crisis seemed to prevent further escalation.89 The captured Indian pilot was later released as a unilateral gesture of peace, easing the diplomatic tensions.90 Pakistan also took action against the JeM, although New Delhi was left sceptical of the impact of the measures taken and reiterated that Pakistan would foment terror in Jammu and Kashmir if it did not take decisive action against the armed group.91 The attack happened at the time of the high-level visit by the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammad Bin Salman, to both India and Pakistan to sign significant investment deals in Pakistan, as mentioned above. The

84. Marco Corsi, ‘Il «Nuovo» Pakistan di Musharraf ’, Asia Maior 2002, pp. 75-78. 85. ‘Pakistan’s Navy Spotted, Warned Indian Submarine in Arabian Sea’, The Diplomat, 5 March 2019. 86. ‘India blew up its own helicopter while trying to target Pakistani jets, killing 7 – report’, Russia Today, 29 March 2019; ‘Budgam: Indian missile fired before Mi17 V5 chopper crash’, Economic Times, 1 April 2019; ‘IAF chopper that crashed in Bud- gam on February 27 was hit by Indian missile, finds inquiry’, Scroll.in, 23 August 2019. 87. ‘Imran Khan: The World Can’t Ignore Kashmir. We Are All in Danger’, The New York Times, 30 August 2019. 88. ‘Ending the India–Pakistan Crisis Requires a Courageous Narendra Modi’, The Atlantic, 28 February 2019; ‘Were India’s airstrikes in Pakistan a strategy for public approval?’, The Strategist, 1 March 2019; ‘Surgical Strike in Pakistan a Botched Op- eration?’, The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, 1 March 2019; ‘Satellite images show buildings still standing at Indian bombing site’; ‘A War of Words? Con- flicting Media Narratives Between India and Pakistan’, The Diplomat, 8 March 2019. 89. ‘India and Pakistan’s Crisis Means a New Arms Race’, The National Interest, 2 April 2019; ‘Can India or Pakistan Break Deterrence?’, The National Interest, 22 April 2019. 90. ‘Pulwama, Balakot – What Next? Escalation Risks and the India–Pakistan Crisis’, The Diplomat, 27 February 2019. 91. ‘Pakistan launches major crackdown on extremist groups’, The Guardian, 8 March 2019; ‘Pakistan Arrests 44 Suspected of Involvement in Pulwama Attack’, The Diplomat, 6 March 2019.

467 Marco Corsi escalation with India had threatened to have financial consequences for Is- lamabad, as the support provided by Saudi Arabia and by other friendly governments was likely to be interrupted if there was a standoff. India’s military strikes came just before India’s general elections in May,92 and Pakistan’s perception was that the intervention of the Indian Air Force in Pakistan was intended to impress domestic political constituencies ahead of the voting. According to Pakistan, the airstrikes were expected to have an impact on the elections, which were being contested with national security as a core issue, and both Islamabad and the Indian opposition accused the government in Delhi of politicising the army by responding militarily to the Pulwama attack.93 After the Pulwama attack, Washington initially approved the Indian airstrikes as a counter-terrorism measure driven by India’s right to self-defence, then urged New Delhi and Islamabad to cease the escalations after the intervention of the Pakistan Air Force. The USA was not the primary mediator during the crisis, with Russia, China, the UAE and Saudi Arabia being seen to be more active in diffusing the cross-border tensions, reflecting the presence of new players and interests in the regional security scenario.94 After what appeared to be a short de-escalation of the bilateral tensions, on Monday 5 August 2019, the President of India, Ram Nath Kovind, issued a presidential order (the Constitution Application to Jammu and Kashmir Order, Presidential Order 2019 C.O. 272).95 The order amended Article 367 of the Constitution, which provides guidelines for interpreting the Constitution, and added one clause making the Constitution applicable to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. On the same day, the Indian upper chamber of the bicameral legislature (the Rajya Sabha) approved a resolution, which was approved by the lower chamber (the Lok Sabha) the following day, recommending that the President of India should abrogate Article 370 of the Constitution. Article 370 gives the President the authority to

92. ‘Understanding the Origins of the Pulwama Attack Inside Pakistan’, The Diplomat, 16 February 2019. 93. ‘Pakistan Is Ensuring Modi’s Victory By Using JeM, Its «Sword Arm»’, The Quint, 16 February 2019; ‘India’s foreign policy for the next 5 years: Imran Khan’s offer for talks needs profound backing from China, Russia for serious consideration’, First Post, 13 June 2019. 94. ‘Pulwama attack comes at a crucial time in history for Pakistan and India’, Gulf News, 19 February 2019; ‘Amid India–Pakistan crisis, India won the diplomacy round’, The Economic Times, 3 March 2019; ‘Trump Doesn’t Want to Play Peacemaker’, Foreign Policy, 5 March 2019; ‘India–Pakistan: where do we go from here?’, Internation- al Politics and Society, 15 March 2019; ‘Gulf mediation during Pulwama crisis: jumping on the bandwagon’, South Asian Voices, 19 April 2019. 95. Government of India, Directorate of Printing, Department of Publica- tion, M/o Housing and Urban Affairs, The Gazette of India: Constitution Application to Jammu and Kashmir Order, Presidential Order 2019 C.O. 272, New Delhi 2019 (http:// egazette.nic.in).

468 Pakistan 2019 apply constitutional provisions to Jammu and Kashmir in concurrence with the state government. Article 370, with presidential orders, had given special status to Jammu and Kashmir, autonomy over its internal administration, separate laws, and special rights and privileges for its residents. On 6 August 2019, another presidential order (Declaration Under Article 370(3) of the Constitution, Presidential Order C.O. 273)96 applied all the provisions of the Indian Constitution to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, thus revoking its special status. The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 201997 was also approved by the Parliament of India, and provided (from 31 October 2019) for a bifurcation of the state into two union territories under the direct control of the central government.98 The union territories are Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh which are, respectively, with and without an assembly.99 The decision was anticipated by an intensified military presence in Jammu and Kashmir for days by the government of New Delhi, and restrictions on both movement and communications were imposed in the state. The tension rose in India-administered Kashmir following the constitutional amendment, with paramilitary personnel deployed as a deterrent to possible unrest, and Kashmiri politicians put under arrest.100 Pakistan was extremely vocal in rejecting India’s moves and in condemning human rights violations in the state. Mr. Khan exhorted the international community to intervene, reaffirming Islamabad’s readiness to exercise all possible options in support of the cause of Kashmir and the right to the self-determination of its people. Imran Khan called on Presi- dent Trump to follow through on an offer he had made during their meeting in Washington to mediate in the Kashmir dispute, and had a briefing with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. Pakistani’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, announced a formal appeal to the United Nations and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Islamabad downgraded its diplomatic relations with India by expelling the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan and recalling the Pakistani one to India. Bilateral trade with India was also suspended.101 The political reaction condemning India was cohe-

96. Ibid., The Gazette of India: Declaration Under Article 370(3) of the Constitution, Presidential Order C.O. 273, New Delhi 2019. 97. Ibid., The Gazette of India: Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, New Delhi 2019. 98. ‘What Is Article 370, and Why Does It Matter in Kashmir?’, The New York Times, 5 August 2019. 99. ‘How the Indian Government Changed the Legal Status of Jammu and Kashmir’, lawfareblog.com, 12 August 2019. 100. ‘Modi-fying Kashmir: Unpacking India’s Historic Decision to Revoke Kashmir’s Autonomy’, The Diplomat, 6 August 2019. 101. ‘Pakistan reacts to Article 370 abrogation by downgrading diplomatic ties with India, suspending bilateral trade, partially shutting airspace’, Firepost, 8 August 2019.

469 Marco Corsi sive. The main opposition parties, the PML-N and the PPP, spoke against New Delhi’s actions. The government and the army warned India of their readiness to respond to any aggression by the Indian forces.102 Pakistan could not take any measures against the constitutional and administrative changes made by New Delhi in Jammu and Kashmir, other than objecting to them and internationalising the issue. The attempt to rally international support against New Delhi’s moves was required, according to Pakistan, because of India’s continual refusal to respond to all open- ings and offers of peace and talks, and to engage bilaterally with Islamabad, so creating the conditions to request international mediation, particularly from the US.103 China expressed concern about the situation, and, at Pakistan’s request, a closed-door meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was called by Beijing.104 The meeting, held on 16 August 2019, was the first one that had been convened over the Kashmir issue in over 50 years. The members expressed concern over violations of human rights in the northwestern Indian state. The UNSC endorsed the fact that the dispute was internationally recognised, hence distancing itself from Indian’s position that it was an internal matter, reaffirmed the validity of the resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir, and called upon New Delhi and Islamabad to refrain from taking unilateral action.105 The UNSC’s deliberations and resolutions were then reaffirmed by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.106

8. Conclusions

2019 was a challenging year for the newly elected PTI government. Political criticisms to Prime Minister Imran Khan’s handling of domestic affairs counterbalanced his foreign policy successes. Internally, Pakistan is facing a structural macroeconomic crisis which has forced Mr. Khan to reach a new deal with the IMF. The PTI focus on

102. ‘Article 370 revoked: Roundup of Pakistan media, political and military reactions to Indian govt’s move’, Ibid., 6 August 2019. 103. ‘Pakistan’s Anguish on Kashmir Elicits An Extremely Hollow International Response’, The Diplomat, 5 September 2019. 104. ‘UNSC meeting proved Kashmir not India’s internal matter: Maleeha Lo- dhi’, The News, 17 August 2019; ‘China says India responsible for tension in occupied Kashmir’, The News, 19 August 2019. 105. ‘Kashmir is not India’s «internal issue», UNSC moot affirms’, Pakistan To- day, 16 August 2019; ‘India takes U-turn, admits Kashmir is disputed territory’, The Express Tribune, 17 August 2019; ‘«Entirely internal matter», says India after China raises Kashmir in United Nations Security Council’, Scroll.in, 19 August 2019. 106. ‘Kashmir issue is internationally recognised dispute: OIC’, The Express Tribune, 31 August 2019; ‘«Diplomatic triumph» as OIC urges India to restore Kash- mir’s special status’, The Express Tribune, 25 September 2019.

470 Pakistan 2019 stabilising the national economy forced the new administration to leave un- attended reforms and electoral commitments. Pakistan’s national politics became increasingly confrontational, yet internal criticisms remained weak due to a disjointed, however fierce, opposition. Pakistan showed a political maturity in handling relations with the neighbouring countries, in particular, escalated tensions with India, and in pursuing a nonaligned approach with the major global powers. China remains a primary partner of Pakistan, both economically and diplomatically, and the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries have confirmed to be strong Islamabad’s allies. Relations with the United States revamped after a successful visit of Imran Khan to Washington and with prospects of a more prominent role to be played by Islamabad in the USA-Taliban negotiations.

471

Kazakhstan 2018-2019: Change and continuity amid economic stagnation

Paolo Sorbello

University of Glasgow / Ca’ Foscari University of Venice [email protected]

Stability has been Kazakhstan’s political mantra since the early years of independence from the Soviet Union. Despite an unexpected transition of power in early 2019, the outgoing president continued to play an important role in the institutional structure of the country. Nursultan Nazarbayev, who ruled for three decades and curtailed opposition forces, ceded his post to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Speaker of the Senate and seasoned diplomat. Yet, Nazarbayev continued to have an authoritative voice both at home and abroad, as he participated in meetings of heads of state even after his resignation. Another word that entered the vocabulary of Kazakhstan’s recent history is «crisis». Whether their origin was domestic or global, several crises and tragedies conditioned the behaviour of the people and government of Kazakhstan. A fire that killed five children in the capital city at the beginning of 2019 became a trigger for protests and showed how fragile the connection between resource wealth and socioeconomic welfare could be in an economy that failed to diversify. Internationally, Kazakhstan reduced its PR effort, perhaps in response to c GDP growth. In addition, however, human rights watchdogs have condemned the continued repression of opposition forces and journalists, tainting the pristine image of harmonious stability that Kazakhstan has tried to publicise for years.

1. Introduction

Kazakhstan underwent major changes in early 2019, when its long- time president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, voluntarily resigned. Since independence in 1991, this is only the second fully peaceful transition of power after Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev stepped down in 2017 as his term ended.1 While the succession grabbed all headlines both within the country and internationally, the permanence of Nazarbayev as the «Leader of the Na- tion», overlooking the fate of the country, became synonymous with stability. Opposition forces, naturally, felt impotent before an orchestrated transition of power and decided to earn a badge of legitimacy through street protests, against the old regime and for a much-awaited change. Interest-

1. This account does not include the voluntary handover of power by Roza Otunbayeva, interim president of Kyrgyzstan, to Atambayev in December 2011 following presidential elections, because it took place in extraordinary conditions, namely the aftermath of the 2010 revolution.

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Paolo Sorbello ingly, as highlighted in the next sections, several opposition forces emerged both in the capital and in Almaty. While some of these forces have traditionally been active in Kazakhstan’s politics, new groups have appeared as well, shaping up a vibrant political environment for the upcoming decade. The 2010s, in fact, had largely been characterised by a systematic and almost complete annihilation of any dissenting voice. In terms of internal shifts, Kazakhstan witnessed a few other tumultuous events. The capital city was first shocked by a tragic fire that killed five children and then was renamed in honour of the outgoing president. La- bour inequality, as well as gruesome criminal incidents and environmental disaster, sparked more protests. Throughout the 2018-2019 period, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy became more prudent and less ambitious. Kazakhstan continued its effort to reach out to an international audience of investors and diplomacies. These attempts, however, were tainted by legal retaliations and backlash from human rights advocates. The drive to curry favour with the world by creating a new Latin script for the Kazakh language also failed to succeed.

2. The orchestrated transition of power

When on the evening of 19 March 2019 Nazarbayev told his fellow countrymen that he had decided to step down after almost thirty years in power, the population and international observers were shocked. Most citizens had not known another leader in their lifetime. Nazarbayev’s blessing of Senate speaker Kassym-Jomart Tokayev as the successor, however, confirmed that, at least for an initial period, the leader of the nation would still be at the helm. In retrospect, several changes in the previous years had paved the road to 19 March. Nazarbayev had already dodged constitutional limits by bestowing on himself the title of «Leader of the Nation» in 2010. The epithet of Elbasy granted Nazarbayev and his family immunity from prosecution, and protected his name from personal insults, punishable by law. Unrestricted by the laws applicable to all other citizens in Kazakhstan, Naz- arbayev ran for re-election in 2011 and – «for the last time» as he declared – in 2015.2 In 2018, he became the chairman-for-life of the National Security Council, an oversight body that simultaneously gained constitutional powers. These measures were consistently classified under the rubric of power transition by most analysts and scholars.3

2. Paolo Sorbello, ‘Kazakhstan: One Last Time for Nazarbayev’, The Diplomat, 16 March 2015. 3. Dosym Satpayev, et al., The Twilight Zone: Traps of the Transition Era, Almaty: Alliance of Analytical Organizations, 2013; Annette Bohr, et al., Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition, London: Chatham House, 2019.

474 Kazakhstan 2019

Before the transition, Nazarbayev had significantly tweaked the composition of the government, carefully appointing loyal members in February 2019.4 Outgoing Prime Minister Bakhytzhan Sagintayev later became the mayor of Almaty, substituted by the powerful ex-vice Prime Minister Askar Mamin. Several among those initially snubbed from ministerial posts in the February reshuffle, were appointed to staff positions around Nazarbayev after he left office, in an effort to keep a balance of loyalists and young rampant figures between the government and his new office. In essence, ageing Nazarbayev had lived through a handful transitions in neighbouring countries and wanted to ensure that his legacy could be kept whole, while his position within the power structures would not suffer a demotion. In Russia, in 1999, Boris Yeltsin handed over power to Vladimir Putin, who changed dramatically the style of government. Yeltsin quickly became redundant and powerless in Putin’s Russia. In Kyrgyzstan, both Askar Akayev in 2005 and Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2010 were ousted by popular uprisings. Two all-powerful leaders, Turkmenistan’s Saparmurat Niyazov and Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, died in office in 2007 and 2016 respectively. Nazarbayev sought for himself a unique way out, during which he could enjoy a few more years of ruling over his country. Despite a feeble «opening up» of the political arena, the presidential elections of June 2019 were predictably won by Tokayev, against six other candidates who ran without fundamentally contesting Nazarbayev’s preference for succession. While Amirzhan Kossanov was mildly vocal about the need for change and despite the presence of the first and only woman candidate, most other candidates professed loyalty to the Leader of the Nation. Tokayev, a seasoned diplomat and a trusted member of Nazarbayev’s closest circle, ran a campaign with the full support of the former president and the ruling party, the Nur Otan. While some personnel in the government changed, the fundamental core of the elite remained untouched by the transition.

2.1. Two days that shook Kazakhstan: Nursultan leaves, Nur-Sultan appears Once Nazarbayev stepped down, in accordance with Kazakhstan’s Constitution, Tokayev became the interim president. On 20 March, his first day on the job, Tokayev proposed the renaming of Astana, the capital city, into Nur-Sultan, in honour of the first president. In 1997, Nazarbayev had moved the capital there from Almaty, the country’s largest city. For the next two decades, the First President progressively shaped the new capital as his own personality cult project. The Nazarbayev airport, Nazarbayev Univer- sity, and the Library of the First President are just a few examples of urban landmarks named after him.

4. Paolo Sorbello, ‘Kazakhstan Appoints a New-Old Government’, The Diplo- mat, 26 February 2019.

475 Paolo Sorbello

The Akmola settlement from the 1800s became Tselinograd in 1961, regained its Akmola toponym in 1992 and changed again in 1998, becoming Astana, the capital city. A proposal to rename Astana in honour of Nazarbayev circulated for at least a decade before becoming reality the day after his resignation. The personality cult came full circle once Nur-Sultan was announced. After accepting the interim role upon Nazarbayev’s resignation, To- kayev soon set a date for presidential elections, in an effort to cement his legitimacy. Amid a strong wave of popular protests, initiated by both traditional opposition groups and young civic activists, a snap election took place on 9 June. Tokayev ran virtually unopposed and won nearly 71% of the votes. Amirzhan Kossanov, a veteran opponent of the Nazarbayev regime, mobilised a wave of support, finishing second with 16% of the votes.5 Kossanov’s immediate concession of defeat and acceptance of Tokayev as the legitimate president, despite evident violations in the election process, angered his supporters and led him to abandon politics. Nazarbayev publicly stated that he would take a back seat, but still observe and provide advice on the management of the country. Yet, in October 2019, Tokayev signed a decree effectively reducing his powers: new ministerial and regional appointments would have to be approved by Nazarbayev.6 The decree can be regarded as a paragon for the unbalanced relationship between the old and the new president. Residents joked that while taking a back seat, Nazarbayev also took the metaphorical steering wheel with him, leaving Tokayev as a front-seat passenger. At the end of November 2019, at a summit of leaders of Central Asian countries in Tashkent, Kazakhstan sent Nazarbayev, rather than Tokayev, to meet with the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uz- bekistan. While the government cited a schedule clash and lauded the fact that having two leaders could allow them to be more active on several fronts, many both in Kazakhstan and in neighbouring countries believed the presence of Nazarbayev qualified the unbalanced relationship with Tokayev in favour of the former.

2.2. Opposition resurfaces in Kazakhstan In 2001, Mukhtar Ablyazov, a rampant banker and former minister, co-founded the party Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK), in open opposition to Nazarbayev.7 After falling from grace with the president, Ablyazov served time in prison. Nazarbayev pardoned him after Ablyazov promised to cease his political activity. Yet, as his banking business became

5. ‘Nazarbayev protégé wins Kazakhstan elections marred by protests’, France24-AFP, 10 June 2019. 6. Kate Mallinson, «Governance», in Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition, Chatham House Report, 2019, p. 10. 7. Sally Cummings, Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite, London: IB Tauris, 2005, p. 29.

476 Kazakhstan 2019 affected by a mortgage bubble, Ablyazov fled the country and decided to revive the DVK from exile, finding thousands of supporters ready to take the streets on his behalf. Released from a French prison in 2016 after serving a three-year sentence, Ablyazov began a daily campaign against Nazarbayev via livestreaming interventions, which the Kazakh government rudimentary countered by lowering internet speeds throughout the country at the times of the streaming.8 The acrimony between Ablyazov and Nazarbayev translated into a personal struggle that excludes political principles. Most of the thousands of supporters of Ablyazov judge him as a better leader, without much consideration for its scant political programme for change. Calls for a parliamentary republic and an end to corruption have found little traction among the population and several observers and critics of Ablyazov’s movement alleged that some of his supporters who took the streets to protest were paid to do so. Several other opposition groups mushroomed besides Ablyazov’s DVK in 2018-2019. A small, eclectic group of long-time opposition figures funded by ex-Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, now based in London, formed the Zhana Kazakhstan movement in April 2018.9 One of the participants to the handful of meetings organised by Zhana Kazakhstan outside of the country, was Kossanov, the most outspoken opposition candidate to run in the presidential elections described above. In 2019, a new movement led by former journalist and civic activist Zhanbolat Mamay coalesced into the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, promoting liberal values and vocally condemning the persistence of the Nazarbayev rule. During the Almaty Marathon in April 2019, a handful of young activist displayed a banner stating: «You can’t run away from the truth; I have a choice».10 Asya Tulesova and Beibarys Tolymbekov, who held the banner, and a few more activists were arrested for hooliganism. Both Tulesova and Tolymbekov were sentenced to 15 days in jail. Scores of young activists and human rights defenders attended the trials and highlighted how the repressive state was punishing those who dared speak their mind. In a wave of protest, young people protested by hanging banners with quotes from Kazakhstan’s Constitution («The people shall be the only source of governmental power», art. 3) or by standing on a square with a blank poster. Aslan Sagutdinov, symbolically showing that his banner was empty to the police in Uralsk in early May 2019, was briefly detained, effectively showing that Kazakhstan’s authorities had lost their direction. It was in the midst of this transition that the «Oyan, Qazaqstan!» movement appeared. Founded by a handful of young activists from Almaty,

8. Dina Baidildayeva, ‘Internet censorship in Kazakhstan: more pervasive than you may think’, openDemocracy, 26 March 2018. 9. Paolo Sorbello, ‘Kazakhstan’s Elderly Opposition Tries Something New’, The Diplomat, 18 April 2018. 10. ‘In Asya’s Own Words’, Adamdar.CA, 21 April 2019.

477 Paolo Sorbello the group aimed to form a network that would have monitored independently the upcoming presidential elections, scheduled for 9 June. The spark of the marathon protest, in which Tulesova and Tolymbekov also called for «fair and honest elections», ignited the youth. Since its formation, Oyan – which is the imperative form of the verb «to wake up» in Kazakh – has showed creativity and, at times, lack of coordination. The organisation of walk-and-talk meetings across the city in order to defy the strict rules on freedom of assembly garnered significant success throughout the summer of 2019, preparing the ground for a few demonstrations that were spared from arrests. The most significant one, on 9 November, saw the few dozens of Oyan members rally from Abai Square to the New Square. Oyan purposefully ignored the need to receive administrative authorisation to conduct the rally, thus testing the reaction from the authorities. Yet, the government seemed to have learned a lesson after the ap- palling numbers of arrests before and after the presidential elections (see below, 5.1.). If not specifically called by Ablyazov and centred around their personal spat with Nazarbayev, the police would not intervene. Around 60 demonstrators, most of those attending, were arrested on 21 September during a DVK protest contained by around one thousand security forces. Police presence at public protests waned progressively until the Independ- ence Day demonstrations of 16 December in Almaty. There, four different groups rallied peacefully, observed by a wealth of members of the security forces. The police refrained from arresting the activists until a small number of activists decided to march down Zheltoksan (December) street. Those arrested were released within a few hours, another sign of the changing attitude towards civic activism.

3. Tragedies, accomplishments, and the eternal «crisis mode»

Internal politics and economics have not escaped the framework of «the crisis», which could be theorised as a mode of government in the case of Kazakhstan. Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, Kazakhstan has struggled with ups and downs in GDP growth, financial stability, oil production, and, importantly, domestic accidents. Almost every incident that scarred the recent history of Kazakhstan has been filtered through the lens of a crisis, something that reflects the selective calls for «emergency measures» as a response. This could be encapsulated within the securitisation framework developed by the Copenhagen School of International Relations.11 According to them, security is a «speech act», and as soon as a topic is voiced as a matter of security by a relevant ac-

11. Barry Buzan & Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Society, Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

478 Kazakhstan 2019 tor, it becomes such. Similarly, this article argues that in Kazakhstan «crisis» is a speech act, and both the word and the type of governance affiliated with it were artificially constructed. In authoritarian Kazakhstan, authorities have used securitisation measures to define several events and act with emergency measures often also targeted to dispel any opposition. In 2018-2019, whether natural dis- asters or accidental tragedies, these events were labelled crises by either the government or its opponents. The following paragraphs focus on the ways specific occurrences were moulded into crises and «external threats».

3.1. Dead fish and plane crash: Bringing the country together Tens of thousands of saiga antelopes died over the span of one week in the summer of 2017; countless fish appeared dead on the riverbanks of the Ural river near Atyrau in western Kazakhstan in the spring of 2019. In July 2018, Olympian figure-skater Denis Ten was murdered by thieves in central Almaty. In February 2019, five sisters were killed in an accidental fire in the capital city, while their parents were working a night shift; just before the 2020 New Year holidays, a plane crashed at take-off in Almaty, killing 12. These tragedies, while disconnected from each other, epitomise the enduring risks in Kazakhstan, which the population blames on poor government management: environmental damage, socioeconomic inequality, and negligence in safety controls. While the government pointed the finger towards external causes for most violence and tragedies until 2017, the population clearly defined the most recent events as domestic mishaps. The death of Ten sparked a movement for the reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which aimed to improve and increase police presence in an effort to control criminality. In a clear securitisation move, the government soon ordered to dispatch a constant police patrol of the crossroads where Ten was killed, as police both in uniform and plain clothes observed the behaviour of those who gathered near the monument erected in his memory. Societal pressure also impacted a project for the construction of a mountain resort near Almaty, which the new president suspended indefinitely on environmental grounds. In January 2018, the snow falling over Temirtau, a monotown in central Kazakhstan hosting a large steel factory, landed black on the ground, covering the city in a dystopic dark layer.12 Industrial pollution has plagued several regions in Kazakhstan since a sudden drive to industrialisation moved Soviet production facilities to the Kazakh SSR in the 1960s. Both the deaths of the saiga antelopes and of the fish in the Ural river could also be caused by industrial pollution, be it oil and gas production or other industrial activity in the steppe.

12. Abdujalil Abdurasulov, ‘Black snow troubles pollution-weary Kazakhs in Temirtau’, BBC, 11 January 2018.

479 Paolo Sorbello

Oil production and its inherent tendency to foster inequality were at the core of an inter-ethnic incident that involved Kazakh and Arab expatriate workers in the Tengiz enclave, a temporary camp hosting the operations for oil extraction at the largest field in Kazakhstan. A post on social media angered local workers, who initiated a brawl with Arab workers, with dozens injured and several expatriate employees quickly repatriated. By liquidating the incident as an ethnic clash, however, the authorities and the oil companies performed the securitisation speech act that would allow them to take exceptional measures – firing those responsible for the brawl, repatriating several foreign workers, restricting freedoms within the camps – to restore peace at the field. By doing so, they swept under the rug a much more fragile fault line: workers’ rights. Yessenova described in detail the frictions between local and expatriate workers at Tengiz and how they hinge on the coalition between the government and the companies in restricting labour rights and working conditions.13 While some of these tragedies sparked popular anger, the government tried to use them as bonding moments for the country, at a time when economic stagnation had hit people’s purchasing power. Failed attempts to diversify the economy made responses to the crises rigid, rather than flexible, transforming the moments of crisis into a permanent crisis. Heteronomous, unavoidable, and long-lasting, crises have become the new normal in Ka- zakhstan’s political and social life.

3.2. Vanity projects, international PR, and repression Amid the crises, Kazakhstan’s government tried to self-advertise as a burgeoning economy, with excellent potential for investors. In this light, it organised the international exhibition EXPO 2017,14 a costly nation brand- ing15 exercise that received praise and criticism in equal measure. Upon the closing of the mega event, the government decided to use the glitzy, futuristic spaces it had built for EXPO as the new grounds for the Astana International Financial Center (AIFC), a new stock exchange that would complement the one already operating in Almaty in an effort to attract foreign investment. The AIFC, headed by former Central Bank chief Kairat Kelimbetov, operates with principles of English Common Law and hired British judges for its arbitrage courts. Designed as a one-stop-shop for foreign investors, the AIFC underperformed in its first two years of existence since its official

13. Saulesh Yessenova, ‘The Tengiz Oil Enclave: Labor, Business, and the State’, PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review, 35 (1), 2012. 14. Adele Del Sordi, ‘Kazakhstan 2017: Institutional stabilisation, nation-building, International engagement’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 424-ff. 15. Adrien Fauve, ‘Global Astana: nation branding as a legitimization tool for authoritarian regimes’, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 34, n. 1, 2015.

480 Kazakhstan 2019 foundation in July 2018. The only notable listing was the sale of a minority stake of state-owned KazAtomProm, earmarked for partial privatisation for years prior. In a continuous effort to appeal to global capital, Kazakhstan’s government also renewed its push to finalise a transition to the Latin alphabet for the Kazakh language, a policy that the First President vehemently advocated for around a decade. Written using Cyrillic characters, with the addition of several unique characters for the missing sounds, the Kazakh language is written through a complex set of orthographic rules. Transitioning into a script that structurally holds fewer phonemes risked the excessive inclusion of modifiers such as apostrophes and accents to distinguish different sounds. After the initial approval of a script that heavily used apostrophes,16 a public outcry caused a revision only one month later.17 The government’s objective with the new script was to ensure a full emancipation from cyrillic and an attempt to become less alien to English- speaking peoples, used to read latin. The latinisation of Turkic languages has occurred in several instances, from Azerbaijan and Turkey in the 1920s18 to post-Soviet transitions in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan among others. Yet, the top-down decision to change the script of a language should be accompanied by a thorough reform of education and a capillary operation to acquaint with the change those adults who have seldom read the latin script. Diplomatically, the move away from Cyrillic could not sit well with Russia, especially because Kazakhstan still hosts a substantial minority of ethnic Russians, especially in its northern regions. Kazakhstan’s attempts to boost its international profile and bridge its distance with the globalised world were repeatedly tainted by an ongoing repressive strategy against press freedom. In 2018 and 2019, authorities raided the offices of two newspapers in Almaty,19 fined and detained an accredited French journalist20 filming a documentary in Aktau, on the Caspian shore, as well as several local journalists on fabricated charges.21 Furthermore, in the summer of 2019, the government requested the installation of a security certificate to filter telecommunications, effectively a spy-

16. Andrew Higgins, ‘Kazakhstan Cheers New Alphabet, Except for All Those Apostrophes’, The New York Times, 15 January 2018. 17. ‘No Apostrophe: Nazarbaev Decree Spells Out Changes In New Latin Al- phabet For Kazakhstan’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 20 February 2018. 18. Attempts to write Kazakh language with Latin script were timidly initiated in the 1920s and 1930s. Cfr.: Okan Bahtiyar, ‘Latinisation of the Kazakh alphabet’, New Eastern Europe, 3 December 2019. 19. ‘Kazakhstan police raid newsrooms, detain journalists, seize equipment’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 13 April 2018. 20. ‘Kazakhstan detains French journalist and bans him from filming’, Commit- tee to Protect Journalists, 18 September 2018. 21. ‘Kazakhstan journalist fined after covering protests’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 14 March 2019.

481 Paolo Sorbello ware on the domestic transfer of internet data. Condemned by international internet freedom watchdogs,22 the government soon retracted, calling the certificate «an experiment». The use of libel charges to silence investigative journalists continued to be practised selectively. After being handed an 18-month suspended sentence in 2017, Amangeldy Batyrbekov was charged again with libel in 2018 and only finally pardoned in January 2020. Muzzled, blocked, and temporarily detained ahead of public demonstrations, journalists in Kazakhstan remain a target for state-led censorship.

4. Failed diversification from oil exports and financial stagnation

Oil revenues continue to be the cornerstone of Kazakhstan’s economy, despite attempts to diversify income. Hydrocarbons produce around one quarter of Kazakhstan’s GDP and account for more than half of the country’s exports, according to official statistics.23 At times of lower commodity prices, the local economy suffered, with the financial sector suffering due to lower productivity across industrial sectors and diminishing investments. An ambitious government programme to invest several billion dollars into the country’s infrastructure, the Nurly Zhol, was slashed. With the economy in crisis mode, however, the government reached into the coffers of its sovereign wealth fund and its international reserves. In 2018-2019, Samruk-Kazyna, the government-owned wealth and investment fund, increased its revenues, mostly by selling assets in a drive towards privatisation. The authorities, however, progressively reshaped the privatisation programme, making it less ambitious and placing on the market fewer companies than initially announced. Plans for a privatisation of Kazmun- aigas, the state oil and gas enterprise, have yet to materialise.

4.1. The oil boom in times of low commodity prices After oil prices plummeted in 2016, reaching the lowest prices in more than a decade, the global oil industry was forced to reorganise in light of diminishing profits. Large trans-national companies cut expenses, laid off personnel, and slashed investment plans. Oil exporting countries, especially those organised in the OPEC group, devised a cut in output that would restore prices to a sustainable level. Kazakhstan, however, followed a different pattern: although slower than initially expected, investment plans advanced, and oil production increased. The expansion of the most promising projects at Tengiz and Kashagan, in fact, offset the production slump of

22. Paolo Sorbello, ‘Web Giants Counter Kazakhstan’s Spying Tool’, The Diplo- mat, 27 August 2019. 23. Deloitte, ‘Business Outlook in Kazakhstan’, 2019.

482 Kazakhstan 2019 brownfields in the rest of the country. At one point, Kazakhstan was named the «biggest over-producer», essentially breaking the pact underwritten by OPEC countries together with other crude exporters.24 Kazakhstan’s oil production grew to 90.5 million tons in 2019, a figure that should stay stable for the foreseeable future, according to the ministry of energy. The increased share of oil production and export from fields owned by international consortia, however, implies smaller revenues for the state company, Kazmunaigas. At Tengiz, the state owns a 20% share in the Tengizchevroil consortium (TCO), while at Kashagan (NCOC), the state owns 16.88% equity.25 At the gas and condensate project in Karachaganak (KPO), Kazmunaigas owns 10% and has shown appetite for increasing the stake. The abovementioned production sharing agreements collectively amount to more than half of Kazakhstan’s oil production and trans-national companies accumulate most of the earnings from oil exports. Kashagan, an offshore field in the Caspian, steadily increased production since it resumed operations in October 2016.26 In the last quarter of 2019, however, unscheduled maintenance curbed production and reminded the industry of the technological challenges inherent to a field discovered in shallow waters that partially freeze during the winter and pumping oil with high hydrogen sulphide content. These obstacles created delays and cost overruns through the years, leading ConocoPhillips to leave the consortium in 2013 and Total to weigh an exit option in mid 2019.27 The sharing of profits from oil and gas extraction has continued to plague relations between the Kazakhstani government and the trans-national companies developing the Karachaganak field in the north of the country. In October 2018, the parties seemed to have reached an agreement by which the companies would have paid a US$ 1.1 billion compensation for an alleged unfair distribution of earnings. By the end of 2019, however, the government said that the proposed sum would no longer suffice to resolve the dispute.28

24. Elena Mazneva, Jack Farchy & Nariman Gizitdinov, ‘Kazakhstan Overtakes Iraq as OPEC Pact’s Biggest Over-Producer’, Bloomberg, 11 January 2018. 25. Tengizchevroil website: http://www.tengizchevroil.com and NCOC website: https://www.ncoc.kz. 26. Paolo Sorbello, ‘Kashagan Restart Gives Kazakhstan Hope’, The Diplomat, 17 October 2016. 27. For ConocoPhillips’s exit see: Paolo Sorbello, ‘Pipelines and Hegemonies in the Caspian: a Gramscian Appraisal’, in Andreas Heinrich & Heiko Pleines (eds.), Export Pipelines from the CIS Region Geopolitics, Securitization, and Political Decision-Mak- ing, Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2014, pp. 175-200. Concerning Total’s intentions to reduce its stake, see: ‘Exclusive: Total seeks to reduce stake in giant Kashagan oilfield – sources’, Reuters, 24 May 2019. 28. ‘Kazakhstan says $1.1 billion Karachaganak settlement offer insufficient’, Reuters, 25 November 2019.

483 Paolo Sorbello

Revenues from oil and gas sales remained the foundation of Kazakh- stan’s economy. As such, the government continued to push for increased energy production, despite lower prices and outstanding legal controversies. Decreasing revenues, however, meant that the largesse in public spending that higher commodity prices previously granted to the Kazakhstani government could no longer be sustainable. While government workers’ salaries were raised to match inflation, private sector workers suffered the crisis and saw their purchasing power decrease, as prices grew faster than in other Central Asian countries. Individual financial trouble, together with slower public and private investment, hit the banking sector, which underwent a reorganisation period.

4.2. A permanent banking crisis In 2014, after the planned devaluation of the tenge currency, then- President Nazarbayev said the number of banks in the country should decrease significantly in order to maintain competition among financial institutions. Then, there were over thirty banks in Kazakhstan. A wave of mergers and acquisitions led to the disappearance of Alliance Bank and Temirbank, which were absorbed by Forte Bank already in 2014. As the banking crisis accelerated in 2016-2017, Halyk Bank, the largest lender, took over the second-largest, Kazkommertsbank. Finally, in 2018-2019, a range of banks, among which Qazaq Banki, Bank Astany, and Tsesnabank, collapsed under the weight of their toxic assets. In 2019, Tsesnabank was «saved» by First Heartland Securities, a little-known investment company tied to Nazarbayev, and was renamed Jysan Bank.29 The enduring instability in the banking sector showed that the crisis became the new baseline scenario. Banks have failed to recover from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, which hit Kazakhstan a few years later. The percentage of toxic assets on their books prevented them from improve their financial health throughout the years and only the banks close to the presidential circle could grow. Now, Halyk Bank, the largest lender, controlled by Nazarbayev’s daughter Dinara and her husband Timur Kulibayev, represents over one-third of the whole sector. Person- alism remained crucial to the survival of certain banks, slowing their healthy recovery. In some cases, certain banks received help from the sovereign funds, namely the Nonperforming Loans Fund, controlled by the Ministry of Fi- nance. At the end of 2017, however, Kazakhstan’s state assets suffered a legal blow that threatened their stability. Through a complex network of lawsuits in several jurisdictions, a Moldovan investor managed to freeze the sovereign funds that Kazakhstan held at the Bank of New York Mellon,

29. Paolo Sorbello, ‘Banks in Kazakhstan Give Mergers a Go, Again’, The Dip- lomat, 7 May 2019.

484 Kazakhstan 2019 pending the payment of a penalty awarded by an arbitration court over a failed business deal.30 Anatolie Stati invested in two oil fields in the western Mangystau region in the 1990s. Upon political pressure on the one hand and a sluggish production plan, however, Kazakhstan’s authorities seized the fields in 2009. Stati and his partners then sued Kazakhstan for violating the Energy Charter Trea- ty and unlawfully expropriating the business. The arbitration court awarded Stati’s side a compensation of around US$ 500 million, which the Kazakh government refused to pay, arguing the Stati side obtained information about Kazakhstan’s assets fraudulently.31 While the Stati case is still under litigation, it is important to note that Kazakhstan has had to battle several arbitrations of a similar scale, often worsening the country’s business environment. Since December 2017, the offensive of the Stati party was acknowledged to have a legal foundation by several courts in the US, in the Neth- erlands, and Luxembourg, among others, which drew a direct link between funds and assets owned by the Kazakh government abroad and the US$ 500 million it owed as compensation for the oil fields it confiscated. Trials and hearings have continued throughout 2018 and 2019, and the case is likely to continue to haunt Kazakhstan’s assets until the government decides to compensate Stati, or the claim is fully dismissed in all jurisdictions.

5. The waning international outreach

The last years of Nazarbayev’s rule on Kazakhstan showed a decreased international activity. The 2017 EXPO (see above) was the culmination of years of attempts to polish Kazakhstan’s image abroad. Until then, Kazakh- stan had placed itself at the crux of several diplomatic talks, involving Syria and Ukraine, as well as China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Seen from abroad, however, Kazakhstan had changed little since the early 2000s. Still known to the world as an authoritarian country, well-endowed with oil and a range of underground resources, the Central Asian country failed to clean up its international profile and remained under severe scrutiny from human rights watchdogs and activists.

5.1. Syria talks, Ukraine talks, international pressure on crackdown The enduring conflict in Syria offered an occasion to ex-President Nazarbayev to showcase Kazakhstan’s role as a neutral platform for negotiations. Since 2017, several rounds of meetings between the parties involved

30. Paolo Sorbello, ‘Lawsuits Threaten Kazakhstan’s Oil Money’, The Diplomat, 12 January 2018. 31. The Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Benelux Courts Weigh in On Impact of KPMG Correspondence on Statis’ Fraud, 24 December 2019.

485 Paolo Sorbello in the conflict, which include Russia, Turkey, and Iran, took place in the capital city, in what became known as the Astana Peace Talks. The activity of the forum, however, waned in recent years, with only a handful meetings between 2018 and 2019. After yet another short-lived cease fire in 2018, the United Nations said the Astana Talks were a «missed opportunity» that failed to show progress.32 Similarly, the initial drive towards a brokerage for the conflict in Ukraine translated into an exercise in diplomatic wishful thinking. Despite his repeated attempts, Nazarbayev could not become the peace mediator he envisioned for his international legacy. In addition, Nazarbayev’s successor, took a dismissive stance towards the ongoing conflict between Kiev and the separatist forces. «We do not call what happened in Crimea annexation. What happened, happened. Annexation is too heavy a word to apply to Crimea», Tokayev said in an interview.33 Instead of being remembered as a peacebuilding statesman, as shown in the sections above, Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan obtained fame for its repression of political dissidents.34 In particular, the drive to silence arch-enemy Ablyazov and his followers took a farcical turn, when online users were visited by the police for their «likes» and other activities on social media channels controlled by Ablyazov. In addition, Ablyazov’s lawyer Botagoz Jardemaile, who lives in exile in Belgium, denounced pressure on her family as her brother, Iskander Yerimbetov was arrested in November 2017 in Kazakhstan.35 In his first months in power, Tokayev’s approach to repression has led to thousands of arrests, both among Ablyazov supporters and newly-formed opposition groups. According to the Ministry of Interior, in the period around the presidential election, approximately 4,000 people were arrested for participating in unsanctioned protest rallies.36 The Human Rights Charter and the Bureau for Human Rights, both headquartered in Almaty, issued an official statement of complaint about the treatment of detainees of 9 June, who were «kept for ten hours or longer in police stations without water or food [and] without access to lawyers», in clear violation of the rule of law.37 Amnesty International echoed these reports, saying: «the Kazakh-

32. ‘U.N. says Astana meeting on Syria a missed opportunity, no progress’, Reuters, 29 November 2018. 33. Zhanna Nemtsova, ‘Prezident Kazakhstana: My ne nazyvayem to, chto proizoshlo v Krymu, anneksei’, Deutsche Welle, 4 December 2019. 34. Paolo Sorbello, ‘What is Nazarbayev’s Legacy in Kazakhstan?’, The Diplo- mat, 5 June 2019. 35. Yerimbetov was freed from prison due to worsening health conditions on 30 December 2019. 36. ‘Kazakhstan updates tally of protest arrests to nearly 4,000’, The Associated Press, 19 June 2019. 37. Zhemis Turmagambetova and Yevgeni Zhovtis, ‘Sovmestnoye obrash- cheniye kasatel’no massovykh narushenii prav grazhdan 9 I 10 iyuniya 2019’, Human Rights Charter and Bureau for Human Rights, 10 June 2019.

486 Kazakhstan 2019 stani authorities again demonstrated their disregard for human rights by arbitrarily detaining hundreds of peaceful protestors.»38 In an effort to placate the population, Tokayev established the Na- tional Council of Public Trust, a consultative body grouping several long- time civic activists and public figures. The Council met a few times in 2019, but failed to propose policy recommendations that would change the political playing field. Instead, by the end of 2019, the authorities’ attitude towards public gatherings seemed to have shifted, with fewer arrests and a more discreet police presence. A major exception was a protest that DVK organised in September 2019 (see the next section). While trying to tame the protest mood in the country, Tokayev’s new paternalistic approach seemed to appease some international observers, after a summer of arrests. Still, human rights groups remain sceptical: «Despite a rhetoric of change, Kazakhstan’s political transition looks like a human rights stagnation», Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch, said presenting the organisation’s 2020 report.39 Whether the population’s thirst for reform and the government’s promises will eventually match or clash remains to be seen.

5.2. The China problem Days before Nazarbayev left office, the authorities arrested Serikzhan Bilash, a lawyer and human rights activist. Bilash served six months in pre- trial detention, a mix of house arrest and jail, before reaching an agreement with the court to drop his activities aimed to uncover the existence of a mass incarceration system in China. Bilash had denounced Chinese authorities for sending over one million people, chiefly ethnic Uygurs and Kazakhs, to so-called re-education camps, in an effort to eradicate any separatist or extremist sentiments in the Xinjiang region. The Turkic and Mongol populations in Xinjiang have sought independence from China for decades, but the central government has strongly repressed any attempt. The establishment of re-education camps affected also ethnic Kazakhs and Kazakhstani citizens, who were effectively imprisoned while visiting their families across the border. Several months after the emergence of the first news and accounts from the Chinese detention camps, China became a hot political topic that the Kazakh government refused to face. Riding the wave of discontent that sparked the protests against proposed amendments to the Land Code in

38. ‘Kazakhstan: Thousands detained across the country following disputed presidential elections’, Amnesty International, 11 June 2019. 39. Human Rights Watch, Central Asia: Reform Pledges Yet to Materialize, 14 Janu- ary 2020.

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2016,40 bringing to the streets several hundred Kazakhs in cities across the country, DVK and other opposition movements continued to publicly attack the Kazakh government for its deference towards China in terms of land and business. In September 2019, DVK organised a protest against the alleged relocation of 55 factories from China to western regions of Kazakh- stan. Arguably, emphasising traditional values of Kazakh society such as the «sacred motherland» could be an effective strategy to mobilise people, but the violence against Kazakhs across the Chinese border should have been higher on the priority list, according to other opposition movements.41 Instead, the government focused on keeping well-balanced international relations with China. Kazakhstan heralded the role of China in funding infrastructure projects for Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, despite metaphorical and literal roadblocks for some of its investments. The dry port at Khorgos, at the border between Kazakhstan and China, mostly served as a channel for goods to reach other Central Asian countries: reportedly,42 the final destination for around 40% of the goods is Uzbekistan and only around 1% of the shipments are directed towards Europe, the proclaimed goal of the project. Additionally, Chinese investors pulled out of a light rail transit project that would have linked the centre of Kazakhstan’s capital with its airport. The US$ 1.5 billion project was funded with government funds alongside a loan by the China Development Bank. In April 2019, a disagreement of the terms of the loan led to a sudden suspension of construction works.43 While the government investigates alleged malfea- sance by local bureaucrats and negotiates new terms with the Chinese bank, giant concrete columns built to support prospective urban trains were left unfinished along the main roads of Nur-Sultan.

6. Conclusion

A coal stove-heated house in the outskirts of the capital city became the theatre of a national tragedy for Kazakhstan on 4 February 2019, as five sisters aged one-to-twelve, died after a fire burned down their home. While some blamed the parents, especially the mother, for leaving their children

40. Adele Del Sordi, ‘Kazakhstan 2015-2016: balancing regime stability amidst local and global challenges’, Asia Maior 2017, vol. XXVII, p. 447-ff. 41. «Oyan, Qazaqstan!», for example, published a few statements during 2019 about the fate of a couple of ethnic Kazakhs on trial for having illegally crossed the border into Kazakhstan. The court threatened to extradite them back to China in December 2019. 42. Henry Ruehl, ‘The Khorgos Hype on the Belt and Road’, The Diplomat, 27 September 2019. 43. Darkhan Umirbekov, ‘Kazakhstan: Anti-graft agents spring into action over LRT scandal’, Eurasianet, 11 October 2019

488 Kazakhstan 2019 alone, most pointed the finger to the government, which failed to provide the appropriate help to large families, essentially forcing both parents to work two jobs and work overtime to make ends meet. Mothers from different cities united and rallied together demanding government support. The government responded by doubling the meagre monthly allowance for women with four or more children.44 In August 2019, months after leaving office, Nazarbayev minimised the controversy by saying that families should not rely on government handouts, but «go out and buy two cows and provide for yourself». The «two cows» statement was as de- spised as it was mocked by the population, which dismissed it as ramblings from the ageing leader.45 The fire and the «two cows» incident, however, properly summarises the past two years in Kazakhstan’s history. In the face of ongoing crises, structural problems, and growing inequality, the government answered with piecemeal policies that only offered short term solutions. The same can be said about the business environment, plagued with legal battles and adverse market conditions. Internationally, once the «two cows» effect of the EXPO in 2017 waned, the government resorted to place itself as the friendly neighbour of the more powerful industrial engines of Russia and China and its rampant Central Asian competitor, Uzbekistan. The pursuit of stability, embodied in Nazarbayev’s carefully-engi- neered resignation, continued to be the thread of Kazakhstan’s history. The crackdown on old rivals and the more recent clemency towards youth movements seem to suggest that the post-Nazarbayev twilight46 will last for years to come.

44. Laura Tourtellotte, ‘Laboring Women in Kazakhstan: Precarity, Protest, and Pronatalism’, presentation at the Central Eurasian Studies conference, Washington DC, 11 October 2019 45. Chris Rickleton, ‘Kazakhstan: Castles, cows and a grumpy old man’, Eura- sianet, 23 August 2019. 46. Dosym Satpayev, et al., The Twilight Zone: Traps of the Transition Era, Almaty: Alliance of Analytical Organizations, 2013.

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REVIEWS

Exploring the «underground» of China’s modernity: Coal, science, imperialism and State-making between the end of the Qing dynasty and the early Republic

Laura De Giorgi Ca’ Foscari University of Venice [email protected]

Shellen Xiao Wu, Empires of Coal: Fueling China’s Entry into the Modern World Order, 1860-1920, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015. xii + 266 pp. (paperback) (ISBN: 978-0-8047-9284-4).

The history of coal has seldom received the attention it deserves beyond the scholarly circle focused on the economic and industrial history of China. Certainly, some studies have looked at the role of coal in the context of the differences between European and Chinese paths towards the industrial age, as Kenneth Pomeranz’s insightful The Great Divergence has shown.1 Nevertheless, thinking of coal as the subject of a cultural history of global modernity in China is something altogether different and a very welcome addition to our understanding of modern China. This is what Shellen Xiao Wu does in her book. She makes the reader aware that coal has a lot to tell us about the making of modern China. As the book’s title says, from the second half of the Nineteenth century, coal was in fact an important engine of China’s entry in the international order, as its extraction and deployment were increasingly being conceived of as criteria to measure the country’s status in terms of wealth and status. Wu brings to light the «underground» world of coal mines and mineral resources with its «multiplicity of meanings and connotations» (p. 189). She illuminates the complex interweaving of science, imperialism, industrialization and State-building which was hidden deep under the surface of the Earth. In this way, Wu offers a narrative of the changing worldview of the elites from the last decade of the Qing dynasty until the

1. Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy, Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000 (Italian translation Il Mulino, 2012).

ISSN 2385-2526 Asia Maior, XXX / 2019 © Viella Editrice & Associazione Asia Maior Asia Maior 2019 early Republic with particular reference to the significance they attributed to natural resources in the process of industrialization, and the station of China in the global order. Wu’s postulation is that, from the second part of the Nineteenth Century there was a convergence between Western and Chinese attitudes towards mineral resources as an effect of the global world created by imperialism. In this perspective, the book aims explicitly at illustrating the interplay between local and global factors in the making of Chinese modernity. She explores several actors who produced a new discourse about coal – and mineral resources in general –, from the beginnings of geological exploration to the acknowledgement of geology as a modern science and the introduction of modern extractive technology under the Qing in the context of new legal and administrative structure affirming Chinese sovereignty on underground wealth against imperialist pressures. The book tells this story in six chapters, developing a narrative from a chronological perspective and unfolding the multiple layers of this process in a global framework. As a premise, Wu describes how mining had been long an interest of Chinese officials and literati, as mineral extraction, usually privately pursued, was an important source of revenue for the imperial State since ancient times. The most well known examples were iron and salt, not to mention the relevance of copper and silver for market transactions and tax payment in late imperial times. Coal was used for heating in North China. Its price was monitored since it was basically considered a necessity for daily life even if it was regarded as an inexhaustible resource. This view began to change following the work of the German geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen, whose current fame is due to his being the «inventor» of the «Silk Road». Von Richthofen gave a fundamental impulse to the development of modern geology in China. He explored inland regions during several journeys to China from 1868 to 1872. His work was to map China from a geological point of view – a task whose outcome was a two volumes treatise in German published after his return. Its impact on Chinese public opinion was especially due to his comments in the English language Press about the wealth of mineral resources of the Qing Empire, and especially of coal in Shanxi province. Von Richthofen’s experience must be considered as a sign of «the importance of energy concerns to both colonizers and the colonized as the world industrialized» (p. 35). He carefully built an image of China as a country rich of primary resources of strategic relevance for foreign investors and Qing officials alike. The book’s narrative then shifts to an investigation of the origins of modern geology, studying Western missionaries’ translation enterprise in introducing a modern knowledge of rocks and minerals within a broader discourse of the scientific approach to nature as a modern State’s concern. Enriching her work of a new perspective, in chapter 4 Wu discusses the role played by German mining engineers hired by the Qing provincial

492 Reviews leaders Zhang Zhidong and Li Hongzhang, who were the main supporters of the process of industrialization. These experts were, at one and the same time, considered a strategic resource to advance their homeland’s interests in China by the German Government, and a fundamental aid to build a modern energy industry by Qing officials. Wu offers a balanced and detailed portrait of these cultural intermediaries, showing how, from 1880s to the end of the century, they supported the making of the German colonial empire in China but also promoted the technical modernization of Chinese mines. Actually, in this period, within the framework of Sino-German relations, an «underground empire» (p. 115) centred on the famous Hanyeping mines emerged from the global elites’ shared faith in the pivotal role of science and industry as the pillars of modernity, in spite of competing foreign imperialisms and the practical limitations imposed by cultural and financial circumstances. The core of the book is constituted by this chapter and chapter 5 that deals with the scramble for mining concessions in the high age of foreign imperialism in China – from the late Nineteenth Century to the First World War – and the Chinese national and provincial governments’ struggle to affirm its sovereignty on mines on legal terms. Alongside railways rights, the fight for a recovery of national rights of exploitation of mineral resources was an important feature of the Chinese nationalist movement in the first decade of the last century. Wu argues that it is necessary to consider Chinese activism in this field as a consequence of «the global aspects of changes in the theory and exploitation of mineral resources in the nineteenth century» (p. 159), which had emphasized the role of the State in their management. In the two final chapters, Wu looks at the connections between the emergence of modern geology as a scientific discipline and nationalist concerns generated by this global trend. Geology in China was not born out of intellectual interests, but as a form of knowledge practically tied to the needs of mining technology, and consequently subordinated to the goal of making China wealthy and strong. This feature did not fade in the course of time, but its legacy continues in the Twentieth-Century. It is one face of the significance assumed by science in the Chinese experience of modernity and of the role attributed to systematic knowledge and exploitation of nature as an expression of State power. Wu’s analysis is detailed, and based on a wide use of archival and other primary sources. Though not all the chapters are comparable in analytical depth and there are occasional redundancies, the author succeeds in putting together global and local perspectives on her chosen topic. She moves effectively between different layers of analysis. On the whole, the book is an interesting contribution to the reassessment of Qing China’s capacity to be positively engaged with technological innovation. Focusing on the specific role played by German scientists and engineers, it also enriches our understanding of the complexity of the cooperative and competing

493 Asia Maior 2019 relations between China and the Western nations in the age of European imperialism. Finally, as the author herself suggests, it gives the reader the opportunity to reflect on the cultural roots of an attitude towards nature that still makes the intensive extraction and use of coal dramatically affect Chinese and world environment to this day.

494 Reviews

«Children of a lesser God»: A narration of southern Chinese minority nationalities

Barbara Onnis University of Cagliari [email protected]

Guo Wu, Narrating Southern Chinese Minority Nationalities. Politics, Disciplines, and Public History, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, 229 pp. (ISBN 978-981-13-6021-3).

The issue of national minorities – their classification, their recognition and the definition of their relationship with the central government – is one of the crucial issues of 20th-century Chinese history, being an integral part of the discourse of the national construction and a founding element of contemporary Chinese nationalism. Zhao Suisheng identifies «ethnic nationalism» as one of the earliest forms of nationalism in the XX century. According to Zhao, Chinese nationalism started, in fact, as an ethnic state-seeking movement led by the Han majority to overthrow the minority Manchu dynasty. After the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, both the Guomindang (GMD) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) defined the Chinese nation as «a multi-ethnic political community and endorsed only ‘state nationalism’». As a result, ethnic nationalism has remained alive only among ethnic minorities along China’s frontiers, such as Tibetans and Mon- gols, who were denied the right to establish separate states, and therefore posed a serious threat to the unity of the multi-ethnic Chinese state.1 To a large extent, ethnic groups are the product of the PRC’s Eth- nic Classification Project undertaken in the first years of the Fifties with the assumption that «backward» (luohou 落后) non-Han peoples required the CCP’s leadership and «advanced» (xianjin 先进) Han socialist culture. As a result of the Project, a total of 38 ethnic groups were recognized in 1954 (even if the names reported were more than 400). The number increased to 53 after the second PRC census in 1964. Finally, two more groups were recognized in the following years.2 In 1990, it was officially declared that PRC had 56 nationalities (minzu 民族), the majority Han (hanzu 汉族) and 55 minority nationalities (shaoshu minzu 少数民族). In the 2010 census the minority na-

1. Zhao Suisheng, Chinese Pragmatic Nationalism and Its Foreign Policy Implications, paper prepared for delivery at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28-31, 2008, p. 6, available at https://sites01.lsu.edu/ faculty/voegelin/wp-content/uploads/sites/80/2015/09/Suisheng-Zhao.pdf (last access: 21 November 2019). 2. Lhoba and Jino in Yunnan were recognized as the 54th and the 55th ethnic group in 1965 and 1979 respectively. See Zang Xiaowei (ed.), Handbook of Ethnic minorities in China, Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar Pub, 2016, p. 3.

495 Asia Maior 2019 tionalities accounted for 8.5% of the population but were distributed in vast areas, covering some 60% of the national territory, much of which in China’s border regions, and strategically important for Beijing’s relations with its neighbors. Of all China’s province-level administrative units, Yunnan province has the highest number of state-recognized minorities (25). Another relevant aspect is that among the 55 minorities surveyed, there were some primi inter pares, due to historical and political factors. It is no coincidence that in the 1950s and 1960s the Chinese Communist government established five autonomous regions – Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang Uyghur, Guangxi Zhuang, Ningxia Hui, and Tibet – home to Mongols (mengzu 蒙族), Hui (huizu 回族), Zhuang (zhuangzu 壮族), Uyghur (weiwuerzu 维吾尔族), and Tibetan (zangzu 藏族) ethnic minorities respectively. Actually, even if the Chinese constitution defines China «as a unitary multi-ethnic State created jointly by the people of all its ethnicities» and promotes the values of equality, unity and harmony, in practice some of them, such as the Hui Muslims, but especially the Uy- ghurs in Xinjiang and the Tibetans in Tibet, are subject to discriminatory and repressive policies by the central government. Despite the long process of sinicization (zhongguohua 中国化), in fact they continue to represent a thorn in PRC’s central government side.3 On the other hand, there are some «Children of a lesser God», away from the spotlight and mainly unknown, except for their colorful festivals, clothing and handicraft, being increasingly inserted in the state-sponsored ethnic tourism circuit. One of the biggest contributions of Narrating Southern Chinese Minority Nationalities. Politics, Disciplines, and Public History is its specific focus on some of these «Children of a lesser God», namely non-Han Southwestern minorities, which had been for a long time unrecognized and unclassified. The late Qing and early Republican Chinese governments recognized in fact only five nationalities: the Han, Manchu (manzu 满族), Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans.4 Another important contribution of Guo Wu’s monograph is related to the fact that it introduces readers to some key, but mostly unknown, aspects of the history of contemporary China.5 Guo Wu’s monograph offers a critic examination of «the building of modern Chinese discourse on a unified yet diverse Chinese nation on various sites of knowledge production». It deals with the complex relationship between the State and modern Chinese knowledge elites (from political

3. In particular, Uyghurs have always been animated by independence impulses and, in the 1930s and 1940s declared twice independence from the central government, establishing the First and the Second East Turkistan Republic. 4. With few exceptions, these nationalities coincide with the ones that deserved an autonomous region in the 1950s and 1960s and, in recent times, have asserted their cultural and political differences and started to rewrite their history more vigorously (p. 2). 5. In the last few decades there has been an overabundance of publications on China, mostly focused on the economic and geopolitical dimension of China’s rise.

496 Reviews scientists, to national-level scientists, to grass-roots level leaders) in col- laborating to build authority and determine the correct approaches to the minority issue (p. 2). According to the author, Chinese ideology in minorities nationalities is rooted in modern China’s quest for national integration and political authority, being political order a recurring theme of modern China after the disintegration of the traditional imperial Confucian political order (ibidem). As emerges clearly in the author’s analysis, the process of conceptualizing, investigating, classifying, and writing minority history is a very complex one, characterized by disputes and contradictions (one for all the tensions between the scholars’ non-Han Chinese identity and the Han-dominated mainstream nationalist discourse). This complexity is epitomized by the purges suffered by the scholars with more or less dissenting tendencies (Fei Xiaotong, Wu Zelin, Cen Jianwu, and Huang Xianfan) during the An- ti-Rightist campaign in 1957. The monograph is articulated in seven chapters (followed by a conclusion, a substantial epilogue and an extensive bibliography) which examine the construction of the nationalist ideology in modern China, the research and investigation of southern Chinese minority nationalities, the debates among concerned intellectuals and the resulting political tensions, and, finally, the public representation of minority culture, in the form of public museums. The first chapter defines the scopes of the analysis; the sources, methodology and producers of modern Chinese knowledge of nationalities; the geographical realm of the investigation; and the main layers of the Chinese knowledge production mechanisms. The second chapter analyses the different approaches of the Nation- alist and Communist governments in dealing with the national issue, with a special reference to the CPC’s national discourse, which was influenced by both the Marxist ideology and the Confucian tradition of Great Unity. In particular, the chapter underlines how the Communist’s approach changed over time, eventually distancing itself from the Soviet experience, which had initially influenced it. The third chapter deals with the diffusion of social sciences in China, from sociology (shehuixue 社会学), to anthropology (renleixue 人类学) and ethnology (minzuxue 民族学). The chapter highlights the contribution of Chinese social scientists to the state-building and nation-building processes, stressing the fact that «what was at work was ‘an inexperienced Chinese state that was able to orient itself only by observing the world through the eyes of its social scientific advisors’» (p. 43). The author focuses on the rise of modern Chinese anthropology and ethnology as autonomous disciplines and shows Chinese social scientists’ search for indigenization, i.e. their attempts to reconcile their Euro-American training with Marxist theories and their Chinese identity.

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The fourth chapter investigates the collaboration between historians and anthropologists in inventing «primitive society» in classical Marxist sense in Chinese history. According to Cen Jiawu (a renowned ethnologist and historian of primitive society), this served a dual agenda: a Marxist one, that tried to incorporate China into the grand narrative of historical materialism; and a highly nationalistic one, that insisted on the historicity of China High Antiquity and the presumed long and glorious history of the Chinese civilization (p. 87). Chapter five scrutinizes minority nationalities’ society and history before and after 1949, as an important practice of social engagement and disciplinary knowledge in the PRC. Chapter six sheds light on the disputes and contradictions that characterized the complex process of conceptualizing, investigating, classifying, and writing minority history, exemplified by the experience of the Gui- lin-based Zhuang nationality scholar Huang Xianfan (p. 139). Author of the first general history of the Zhuang nationality, Huang was a tenacious critic of the Nationalist government’s assimilationist policy and an advocate for the subjectivity of the Zhuang nationality, and its equal recognition under the PRC government. (p. 140). He was also a staunch advocate of the theory that there were no slave society as a stage of social development in Chinese history, strongly opposing leading Marxist scholars, such as Guo Muoruo, and the entire Chinese Marxist academic discourse after 1949. The last chapter deals with the instruments through which knowledge about minority nationalities’ history, culture and lifestyle are transmitted to the public, i.e. mainly by museums of nationalities (p. 161). Their narratives, according to the author, «still show certain traits of instrumental- ization when promoting multiculturalism and a tendency of Han-centric primitivizing of non-Han cultures» (p. 180). The chapter includes the result of the author’s fieldwork in 2017 in four Chinese provinces and five museums with nationality and ethnology as their main themes, as well as his visit to Taiwan’s museum of aborigines in 2018. The chapter also reports the results of the Sino-Norwegian collaboration for the realization of the Buyi Ecomuseum, inaugurated in 2000 in the mountainous Zhenshan village, in Guiyang, that the author considers as a half failure. «Due to the lack of substantial collection of artifacts and the vagueness of the idea of ecomuseum, e.g., there is virtually no way to demonstrate “heritage” and “cultural memory” as the museum promised» (p. 173). In the epilogue, the author shifts his focus to the village-level minority communal life and power relations to illustrate the persistence of Shamanism in the context of Chinese cultural tradition and the limits of the Chinese central state in actual life. Aside from the complexity of the topic, the book is clearly written, well researched and documented (based on fieldwork, archival research and interviews). This makes Guo Wu’s study a fundamental contribution

498 Reviews to historiography on its subject and an enriching reading for both scholars and advanced students of Asian Politics, China Politics and International Relations, in general. Although it presents a historical study with a specific focus on Southern Chinese minority nationalities, the work is timely in light of some recent events. Here it suffices to refer to the so-called Xinjiang Pa- pers, a 400-page report, possibly leaked from a high level source within the Chinese Communist Party, which became public in November 2019. The Xinjiang Papers contributed to confirm the persisting tensions in the relations between the Han-dominated central State and the national minorities, and the topicality of the themes of political order and political authority in today’s China.6

6. Austin Ramzy & Chris Buckley, ‘The Xinjiang Papers. «Absolutely No Mer- cy»: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims’, The New York Times, 16 November 2019.

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Rethinking think tanks in contemporary China

Bettina Mottura

University of Milan [email protected]

Silvia Menegazzi, Rethinking Think Tanks in Contemporary China. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 207 pages (ISBN 978-3-319-57299-4).

If you study the Chinese political system, whichever methodological perspective you adopt, you will inevitably come across two long-term crucial issues: one is the complex relation between the State, the Chinese Commu- nist Party and civil society; the other is the debate on the contribution given by experts to improve government quality and effectiveness. In both cases the situation has experienced profound changes in the last forty years, as a direct consequence of an ongoing ambitious reform process. The study of think tanks in the Chinese context places itself in an ideal intersection between these two substantial issues. On the one hand, these knowledge producing organisations are traditionally conceived as an expression of the civil society’s will and as instruments for its participation in the policy making process. Examining their role could shed light on previously unsuspected involvements of social actors in the decision-making practices. On the other hand, think tank’s contribution in constructing meaning and shared understanding of policy issues, and in problem formulation and agenda-setting, primarily depends on the intellectual resources of experts. Selected data on the think tanks personnel could better define the profile of the experts and widen our understanding of who is entitled to a consultative role in the People’s Republic of China apparatus. Due to China’s national political context, where decision making is deeply controlled and highly centralised, think tanks have often raised scholarship interest, mainly with the aim of tracking similarities and differences with their international counterparts in terms of organisation features, research activities, political participation strategies and social roles. The purpose of this volume, as stated by its author, is to analyse think tanks in contemporary China (2007-17) and their contribution to policy making processes, especially in the field of foreign policy. The book consists of six chapters, but it can roughly be divided into two thematic sections: a first section establishes the theoretical framework adopted for the study (chapter 2) and reviews the international studies on think tanks in China (chapter 3); the second section presents two case studies concretely defining the role, functions and scope of activity of a range of Chinese think tanks (chapter 4 and 5).

500 Reviews

Applying the theoretical narrative of knowledge regimes – thus considering think tanks as knowledge producing organisations established in a specific national context – is deem useful by the author to emancipate her analysis from the independence dilemma issue. The question of think tanks independence from governmental bodies has been a key concern in previous literature on think tanks in China. In it, the analysis revolved around the degree of autonomy claimed by think tanks not fully separated from the government sector, in performing policy research. The monograph under review focusses on the political environment characterized by the above-mentioned constraints. By applying the category of knowledge regimes as an analytical framework, the author considers think tanks as institutional and organisational tools by which ideas are generated in a process highly influenced by the national context. This method takes into account local peculiarities as an important factor in shaping the phenomenon under examination, but at the same time it frees the author’ analysis on think thanks’ functions and roles from the tight boundaries often associated with an alleged Chinese political uniqueness. The most innovative contribution of this book lays in the two case studies, namely the discussion of the role of Chinese think tanks in the realms of economic diplomacy and environmental diplomacy at home and abroad. The two case studies are based on a number of selected examples. Given China’s growing commitment to global governance and multilateral talks, in the last decades the country think tanks have often been involved in worldwide activities pertaining to negotiations and policy making, thus developing a new profile. Hence the book concentrates on the «new generation think tanks», founded after 2007, characterised by their participation in international networks and forums, by personnel stemming from different professional backgrounds and by the common attention to international themes. The members of these think tanks are either Chinese with a national academic research background or previous roles as government or party officials, or Chinese Western returnees. The author speculates on the effects that the long-term exposure of the Chinese think tank personnel to international networks cooperation might have in the future. Possibly, it could result in changes in Chinese think tank working modes, research practices, theories, strategies and social roles. The first case study draws from the field of economic diplomacy, defined as the arena where non-state actors contribute (at the local and global level) to the decision making and negotiation processes in connection to international economic relations. This is a very important field of political action as China, in its continuing efforts aimed at the realisation of economic goals, now stands in favour of free-trade liberalisation, both in the internal and international markets. This strategy is associated with the promotion in multilateral contexts of a different understanding of the liberal world order (p.110). The author presents a general overview of some outstanding

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Chinese think tanks working on economic issues and discusses their role in China’s economic diplomacy. The second case study is centred on environmental diplomacy, defined as the instrument to promote the building of an international climate change regime, encompassing national standards and interests. The peculiarity of China’s position with respect to this issue, affirms the author, is that at present the country is not considered a responsible actor by its international counterparts yet, despite China’s efforts to lower emissions and reduce pollution (p.131). The chapter highlights that the role of think tanks in the existing knowledge regime will probably develop in parallel to the historical changes in this field and the political environment in which the decision mechanisms are rooted. The analysis of the action of the Chinese think tanks in the field of environmental diplomacy is aimed at challenging the assumption depicting China as a country where sustainability is mainly enforced through top-down decisions and policies promoted by central government organs, leaving virtually no space for public participation. Nonetheless, the author acknowledges the existing obstacles to the actions and strategies of environmental policy research organisations, ranging from a complex and multi-layered context of action, to the fragmentation of governance and the selection of cooperation or confrontation attitudes by different actors. Based on these preliminary observations, the study depicts a quite composite and uneven panorama where the number of non-governmental think tanks is rising. The new actors in the analysis of the environmental challenges are quite independent from individual sponsorship and committed to research policy advocacy. Though they still lack any institutionalised role in policy making and a clear legal status. To conclude, according to the author, nowadays think tanks working on economic or environmental policies are still subordinated to the government through bureaucratic organization, personal connections and funding mechanisms. Nonetheless, the relationship between the government and policy research organisations is now more balanced and mutually beneficial than in the past (p. 124). The book, embedded in a rich international scholarly bibliographic background, offers an original contribution to the study of Chinese think tanks (2007-17) and leads the reader in the discovery of this realm, fostering her/his curiosity. The overall development of the text is consistent with the declared study’s design and objectives. Besides, the polyphony deployed in the exam of most of the main themes of the research testifies to the wide variety of sources examined. The book displays rich and up-to-date bibliographic references, partly in the Chinese language, which testifies to its origin, rooted in the author doctoral thesis, confirming its academic credentials. The cited Chinese sources, – either in the English or Chinese languages – are examples of official discourse, academic discourse, media discourse

502 Reviews and practitioners’ points of view. Often, they mention themes which are directly linked to broader trends or well-known narratives of the national past. In a few occasions, the author fails in highlighting these long-term mechanisms or representations, missing an occasion to locate her research work in dialectical relation to the literature of other fields in the social sciences, recontextualising it in a broader perspective. This is the case, for example, with regards to the process of internationalisation of think tanks or their mission to improve China’s image at the international level. Notwithstanding these minor flaws, one of the qualities of the book is the commitment to a critical representation of the Chinese political context in its complexity. This is accomplished by the author while preserving clarity in selecting the analytical framework, building her argumentation paths and illustrating the knowledge organisations’ role in policy making. While the author manages to offer a clear vision of the intricacies characterizing the overall picture, she sometimes indulges in reporting too many details, particularly when she describes a given think tank’s profile or activities. The book could be a good read for different kinds of audiences as it can be read at different levels. Specialists would probably appreciate the variety of the sources, the consistency of the author’s arguments and the constant ideal dialogue with previous international scholarly literature. Stu- dents in the field of social sciences would value the linear structure and the clarity of the text and could use it as a tool to explore a peculiar aspect of Chinese political context, discovering its complexity. Moreover, as the subject of think tanks attracts the attention of a wide variety of stakeholders, the book could also be of interest to practitioners or civil society activists, both as a source of knowledge and information and as food for thought.

503 Asia Maior 2019

Contested legacies of Chinese communism: Words, concepts and practices from Mao to Xi

Emma Lupano University of Cagliari [email protected]

Christian Sorace, Ivan Franceschini, Nicholas Loubere (eds.), Afterlives of Chinese Communism. Political Concepts from Mao to Xi, Acton: ANU Press and Verso Books, 404 pages, (ISBN 9781788734769).

Well before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the communist leadership was aware of the great importance of propaganda as a tool for educating and mobilising the masses1. It considered language and rhetoric as fundamental assets to mould the people’s thinking, and when it took power it initiated and consolidated a rewriting of public discourse which also quickly permeated the private discourse. Michael Schoenals was one of the first few scholars to analyse how «things were done with words» in Chinese politics, and to stress the «remarkable consensus»2 within the Chinese Communist Party about the central role played by perlocution in building, consolidating and maintaining state power. The simple, repetitive and formalised language that «help[s] constitute the structure of power within China’s political system»3 has later fascinated and attracted the attention of other scholars, who have focused particularly on the Mao era (1949-1976). At that time, and especially during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), keywords and slogans were ubiquitous and people were required to repeat them on the most varied occasions and contexts. Ji Fengyuan has written about the «extensive, systematic and bureaucratically controlled program of linguistic engineering» put into practice by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to «make the population use those verbal formulas that seemed most suited to produce a correct thought»,4 while Lu Xing has worked on the formalised language, charac-

1. In 1943, in his essay Some questions concerning leadership methods, Mao referred to the traditional belief that education and persuasion are more effective in maintaining social stability than the use of force and coercion, and that, once the «right» thinking conveyed by the models is absorbed, each person tends to put it into practice with appropriate behaviour. Mao Zedong, Selected works of Mao Tse-tung, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967; Stefan Landsberger, Chinese propaganda posters. From revolution to modernization, Amsterdam and Singapore: The Pepin Press, 1995. 2. Michael Schoenals, Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, p. 5. 3. Ibid., p. 1. 4. Ji Fengyuan, Linguistic Engeneering. Language and Politics in Mao’s China, Hon- olulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004, p. 54.

504 Reviews terised by particularly acute rhetorical violence, and has argued that it was partially responsible for the violence of political action during the Cultural Revolution.5 Finally, Perry Link has reconstructed the principles of musical- ity and rhythm that made the formulations beautiful and easy to remember, in a volume where he also emphasised how the language of the private sphere was substantially replaced by official political language, particularly in the years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).6 Keywords and formulations that were relevant in the Mao era are also the core subject of Afterlives of Chinese Communism. Even if Raymond Wil- liams’ seminal work Keywords is not mentioned by the editors of the volume, it is an obvious reference that comes to mind when reading Afterlives.7 In fact, Williams’ definition of what is a keyword, his admission to the «difficult relations between words and concepts»8 and his approach belonging to historical semantics are implicit to the book’s project and to many contributions that are part of it. Readers should be familiar with Williams’ ideas to fully grasp the ambition of the project of Afterlives. The book, that the editors describe as a study of «concepts» and «practices» of the Mao period, is presented as the result of a collective endeavour to identify and engage with the «main concepts underpinning Chinese communist thought» (p. 7), each one explored in order to trace their «origins, lives, and afterlives» (p. 6). As detailed in the Introduction, the undertaking began as a special issue of Made in China, an open-access quarterly edited by the same editors of the book. With more and more authors from different disciplines and continents being involved, the project developed into the 404-pages volume that can be purchased in hard copy or retrieved online, in accordance with the open-access policy characterising the journal that started it off. Each of the 53 chapters is dedicated to a concept or a practice in order to describe what it meant at the time and what it has become in present Chinese politics. In doing so, the book offers both a recognition of the use of those formulations in China’s political discourse, as well as an evaluation of their meaningfulness and usefulness in a critical rediscovery of Maoism that «take[s] it seriously as a revolutionary project» (p. 3). Concepts, however, can hardly be separated from the words used to express them – and that is especially true in the People’s Republic of China.

5. Lu Xing. Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Columbia: South Carolina University Press, 2004. 6. Perry Link, An Anatomy of Chinese. Rhythm, Metaphor, Politics, Cambridge, Mas- sachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013. 7. Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Rev. ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. See also Alan Durant, ‘The Significance Is in the Selection: Identifying Contemporary Keywords’, Critical Quarterly, 50, 2008, pp. 122-46. 8. Williams, p. 21.

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The editors very briefly stress the relevance of language in the life of the Chinese Communist Party and in the construction and dissemination of the concepts studied in the book, showing that the volume does not aim to focus on linguistic phenomena. References to the so-called «Mao-speak»9 and to the lexicon that composed Mao’s language are mostly indirect across the contributions, however a few authors do dwell on the words they analyse. Thornton, for instance, traces the history of the term «Cultural Revolution» and its substitution by «Cultural construction»; Yang Long describes the trajectory of the term «Self-reliance» from its historical origins to its descent in the 1990s, to its resurgence (and adaptation of meaning) in Xi Jinping’s speeches; and Yoshihiro Ishikawa and Craig A. Smith describe the genealo- gy and recent oblivion of «Line struggle». In a separate contribution, Smith also elaborates on the Confucian origin and the later development of two terms that retain great relevance in the present political discourse, Datong and Xiaokang.10 These studies, based on tracking the terms in classical, modern and contemporary texts from the philosophical and political realms, allow non- specialists to appreciate the cultural stratification and philosophical depth of the CCP language and the density of its political discourse. For specialists, they are an effective reminder about the complexity and richness of China in the ancient past as well as in modern times. Other contributions do not elaborate on the very words they study, but only on the concepts that the formulations entail, investigating their often ancient origins and their appropriation by Maoism. In many cases they discuss their legacies, assessing their survival, evolution or disappearance in contemporary China. In doing so, they analyse how a concept has been implemented in practice, highlighting relevant connections between events, periods and disciplines. Christian Sorace’s chapter on «Aesthetics» is one such example, where he appraises the legacy of the Maoist political and aesthetic criteria on Xi Jinping’s guidelines on art. The criteria are also illustrated in the case of Michelangelo Antonioni’s 1974 documentary Chung Kuo. In a similar fashion, Covel Meyskens looks at the photographic representations of «Labour» from the Mao era to postsocialist China; while Laura De Giorgi analyses the origins and development of «United front» and its use as a strategy to absorb potential opponents into the established structure of the state. Gloria Davies’ reflection on the concept of «Immor- tality» underlines the fundamental betrayal of Mao’s thought produced by the crystallisation of his own thought, suggesting an interesting perspective through which to look at the project of Afterlives itself.

9. Geremie R. Barmé, ‘New China Newspeak’, China Heritage Quarterly, No. 29, March 2012. 10. While not providing a conclusive definition for the two classical Chinese concepts, the author of the contribution refers to «grand unity» and to «moderate prosperity» as the most used translations for Datong and Xiaokang respectively.

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An original aspect of the volume is the «political» approach and aim that the editors openly state. Far from trying to present their project as neutral, they propose their belief that the «revival of the communist perspective, freed from any dogmatism, is necessary» (p. 7) to transform and improve our world. In light of «the urgent need to reinvent egalitarian organisations of political and economic life» (p. 5), they seek to allow new in- terpretative possibilities on the Communist experience in China by offering a critical study of the concepts that were at the core of «one of the twentieth century’s most radical, and fraught, undertakings to transform and emancipate humanity» (p. 7). The publication’s goal emerges clearly in contributions that aim to dismantle assumptions and misconceptions about key Maoist ideas or practices. A clear example of this is Gao Mobo’s study on «Collectivism». It looks at the theoretical and factual application of collectivism in the Mao era, arguing that collective farming was a rational answer to China’s problem and goals of the time, and that it should not be discredited on the basis of negative and extreme manifestations such as the Great Leap Forward. On a similar note, Dai Jinhua’s chapter analyses the attempt to create a new culture in the Mao era and stresses the centrality of culture in the PCC-led process of creating a new «person», wondering if the legacies of the socialist cultural experiment of the time could be the basis of alternative society or alternative cultural practice in the future. William J. Hurst’s contribution is also in line with this attitude when showing that a legal system did exist and function in the Mao era, unlike widespread misconceptions and the CCP’s own narrative of China’s past tell. The book is a very valuable resource that can be read at different levels. Since the contributions are titled with the keyword or expression they analyse and are organised in alphabetical order, the book can be searched as a glossary, where the reader can seek for the individual concepts they are interested in. They will find a general understanding of each one of them, as well as their history as far as the authors were able to trace it. In covering this content, many contributions also analyse whether the term studied is part of the vocabulary of Xi Jinping’s «New Era» (xin shidai) and how it is used at present, offering a critical reconstruction of the contemporary CCP language and of its consistency or transformation through the decades. The plurality of authors with different backgrounds and varied stand- points generates a diversity of approaches and trajectories that enriches the volume. It also produces an indirect dialogue among a wide range of opinions on the success and future of China’s communist project. At the same time, plenty are the inter-connections between contributions, and a number of key concepts clearly emerge from the body of the volume, standing out as independent threads that run throughout the book. Jodi Dean points at some of these relations in the Afterword, stressing concepts such as «revolution», «class struggle», «the people», and «mass line». Dean also

507 Asia Maior 2019 underlines the role of the language of communism, since «language is the weapon in the arsenal of struggle» (p. 336). Similarly, every reader should find, according to their own interests and needs, their own connections and paths to follow. For these reasons, the volume is a useful reference for understanding contemporary Chinese society and politics. For sinologists, it is also a stimulus for more engaged ways to study contemporary China; and a general call for trying to look at Maoism with new, unbiased eyes.

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The Italian effort to gain the Chinese market: Reconstructing the history of Italy-China trade relations

Stefano Pelaggi Sapienza University of Roma & Centro Studi Geopolitica.info [email protected]

Donatella Strangio, Italy-China Trade Relations: A Historical Perspective, Cham: Springer, 2020, 131 pp. (ISBN: 978-3-030-39083-9).

The year 2020 marks an important landmark in relations between Italy and China. It’s the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which aligns with the Italy-China Year of Culture and Tourism. An anniversary that comes at a particular moment in Sino-Italian relations, marked by crucial events such as the visit of Presi- dent Xi Jinping in Rome and Palermo in May 2019. In particular the event that changed the course of relations between Rome and Beijing saw Italy become the first G7 country to officially endorse the Belt and Road Initia- tive (BRI) through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding that stipulates the Italian-Chinese partnership for the Economic and Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century. The signing of the Memorandum put Italy in the spotlight and world public opinion analysed Sino-Italian relations. Do- natella Strangio Italy-China Trade Relations: A Historical Perspective is a comprehensive scholarly account of the political penetration and trade relations that Italy established with China, with particular reference to the period from the second half of the 19th century to the birth of the Fascist empire. It is published at a turning point in Sino-Italian relations, analysing the subject from an economic history and international economics perspective. The author has used sources of the Historical Diplomatic Archives of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as from other archives such as the Bank of Italy’s Historical Archive and the Italian National Library. In particular, the Political Affairs Series Inventory was consulted in the His- torical Diplomatic Archives, and the commercial exchanges between Italy and China are reconstructed starting from the various politically- oriented inventories’ documents. Donatella Strangio analyses the economic context of both China and Italy, and the various commercial agreements between Italy and China are exhaustively reconstructed. The nature of archival sources limits the research to the only Italian projection towards China. Several studies have been completed on relations between Italy and China and many of these are based on the same archival sources of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The book La Memoria della Cina. Fonti archivistiche italiane sulla Storia della Cina

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(The Memory of China. Italian archival sources on the history of China) edited by Alessandro Vagnini and Sung Gyun Cho, accurately describes the contents of the same archive. Until the early 20th century – Strangio reports – in Italian institutions there were no adequate analyses of the complexity of China and the balance of power that the European powers had initiated. The hope of the then-Minister of Agriculture and Commerce of the Kingdom of Sardinia, Luigi Torelli, convinced that the opening of the Suez Canal would guarantee the access of Italian goods to the Chinese market, is exemplary of this approach. Given the purely political nature of archival sources, a substantial part of the volume focuses mainly on the administration of the concession of Tientsin. The documents available in the archives for the period from 1919 to 1930 are significantly more ample and the author manages to draw an exhaustive picture of the commercial relations between the two countries. These are based on the sale of arms, establishing national banks, possible mining authorisations, conferences and the reforms of treaties and customs tariffs. All practices describe the colonial approach of foreign powers present in China which was to exploit the territory even further and to increase their influence there. However, even in the maximum period of Italian projection towards China, the efforts of the institutions seemed not to be sufficient. They failed to set up trade organisations which all other European nations, including small powers, had initiated. According to the author, the essential categories in which to be incisive and make commercial headway in China were: banks, shipping lines and trade organisations. The Italo-Chinese Bank was founded in 1919 and, in the same year, an intense trade between Italy and China began. Strangio lists in detail the reasons for the Italian commercial failure in China, elements which characterised the projection of Italy in the Asian country until recent times. These ranged from poor knowledge of both culture and customs and the commercial dynamics of the Chinese merchants, to the lack of institutional support in the form of advertising and communication. Furthermore, there was no connection between commercial agents and Italian banks and no setting up of consortiums and trusts. The author stresses how the Italian presence in China always had to contend with a chronic lack of capital, with the reluctance of Italian entrepreneurs to finance risky activities, and in particular, disorganisation at both diplomatic and commercial level. The author underlines how Italian institutions have always tried to distinguish themselves from other western powers, trying to maintain an approach away from the colonial imprint. A dynamic which did not generate empathy in Chinese institutions. The book closes with a description of commercial relations in the 70s and 80s with the kind of ideal landing place for commercial relations between Italy and the People’s Republic of China: the Agreement with

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Jiangsu Province and the Agreement with the Guangdong Province, both in the 2000s. Overall Donatella Strangio’s reconstruction represents a relevant addition to the discipline of Economic History. The book is essentially aimed at scholars and advanced students of International Economics and Econom- ic History who wish to approach the study of Sino-Italian relations. At the same time, it is an excellent compendium for Chinese scholars who seek a reconstruction of the economic exchange between China and a medium power of the time like Italy.

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The Eu–Japan partnership in the shadow of China: Natural allies or untapped potential?

Matteo Dian University of Bologna [email protected]

Axel Berkofsky, Christopher W. Hughes, Paul Midford & Marie Sӧ- derberg, The EU–Japan Partnership in the Shadow of China. The Crisis of Liberalism, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2019, 266 pp. (ISBN 9780367895013).

The EU–Japan Partnership in the Shadow of China represents a very timely and very significant contribution to the literature on EU-Japan cooperation. The volume is one of the most relevant research outputs of a the EJARN (The European Japan Advanced Research Network), a network of scholars that since 2007 has promoted policy relevant research on Japanese politics, economics and security as well as explored possible avenues for cooperation between the European Union and Japan. This edited volume is a detailed and informative yet accessible collection of essays analysing the current state of EU-Japan cooperation. Moreover, the volume explores policies promoted by Tokyo and Brussels to face the current crisis of the liberal international order and the key challenges stemming from it, from the rise of China, to the Trump presidency, to Brexit. The volume adopts a multidisciplinary approach, looking at political, strategic and economic issues, gathering an impressive group of senior Eu- ropean experts of Japan foreign, security and economic policies as well as several Japanese experts on European affairs. The central argument of the volume is that despite the EU and Ja- pan present themselves as natural allies, the real potential for bilateral cooperation still has to be unlocked. The volume underlines Tokyo’s and Brussels’ role as normative powers and as key supporters of the liberal international order, as well as the last barriers against the mounting illiberal challenge. In the face of Trump’s «America First» policies and the Chinese challenge, they have continued to voice their support for the key pillars of the liberal rules-based order, such as the centrality of human rights, integrity of borders, freedom of navigation, free trade and free market capitalism. As underlined by Berkosfky (ch.2), the Economic Partnership Agree- ment and the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in 2018 and entered into force on 1 February 2019 signal that Tokyo and Brussels intend to foster their cooperation to consolidate the current international order and to exercise their normative power.

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Substantially every contribution underline that, despite the good intentions, the road towards a more mature and more consequential EU-Ja- pan partnership is still obstructed by several stumbling blocks. The first problem is represented by what we can define as «China gap». As underlined by Okano- Heijmans, Lilei Song and Liang Cai, while for Japan China represents the most fundamental challenge to the current order, many EU member states have responded with enthusiasm to recent Chinese initiatives such as the Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, as stressed by Berkofsky, many European capitals don’t see developing a deeper economic relationship with Beijing as contradicting the antithetical to the rhetoric of seeing in Tokyo a natural ally for the consolidation of the rules-based international order. The diverging perception of the challenge posed by China leads to a second significant problem, that we can define as «Trump gap». Several contributors underlined the stark difference in terms of relationship with President Trump and its administration. While several European leaders have not made efforts to hide their differences of style and substance with the 45th US President, Abe has tried to develop a personal and political relationship with Trump. The urgency of the Chinese challenge, and the consequent perception of indispensability of the alliance with the US, has led Abe to ignore significant setbacks in the economic realm to preserve the bilateral relation with Washington. The fact that bilateral cooperation between Japan and EU is still very conditioned by the American role emerges in different contributions to this volume. In the realm of the defence industry for instance, as stated by Christopher W. Hughes, it appears clear that the possibilities for bilateral cooperation between Tokyo and its European counterparts are somehow limited by the enduring American will to maintain its own central role as well as by the need to promote interoperability. While the reform of the three principles of arms export had raised high expectations, both Tokyo and key EU capitals ended up choosing platforms and systems produced by US-led consortia rather than other alternatives. The examples of the Japanese choice to procure the F-35 over the Euro-fighter, that could possibly represent a more cost-effective solution for the needs of the ASDF. Moreover, Japanese and European firms increasingly find themselves to compete against each other, rather than cooperate, as testified by the case of the Australian procurement of French attack submarines, selected over the Japanese Soryu-class. The third problem is the lack of capabilities in terms of hard power. Neither Japan nor the EU or any member state can present itself as substitute, even momentarily, of the US in terms of provision of security and deterrence. The proposals of a French or British naval presence in the South China Sea appear more a manifestation of nostalgia for a long-gone imperial

513 Asia Maior 2019 past, rather than viable security policy proposals. As a matter of fact, the EU is still far away from having any role in the South China Sea. Currently it maintains a position of neutrality on the maritime and territorial disputes, while it has called for a peaceful resolution of the controversies based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). A third significant gap is represented by the perception of the threat posed by Russia. As reminded by Midford, the EU considers Russia as the main security threat at the horizon and was keen to promote and implement economic sanctions after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Japan, particularly under Abe, has a very different position. Seen from Tokyo, the sanctions risk pushing Moscow closer to Beijing, accelerating the formation of a partnership that would not just promote an alternative to the current normative foundations of the international order, but an existential threat to the Japanese. The volume rightly underlines that the emphasis that both EU and Japan have put in the recent past on values and norms is both the product of their own identity as well as a process of othering, namely shaping an identity building on differences with a significant rival or enemy. When it comes to Japan, the process of «othering of China», is surely a key factor that led the Abe government to underline the necessity to overcome many of the self-binding limits of the post war period, to embrace concept of «pro-active contribution to peace», as well as Security Diamond, or Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The opinions of the contributors tend to diverge on this issue. On the one hand Midford and Asplund tend to consider Abe’s policies not as a genuine effort to consolidate the international liberal order, but rather an effort to justify a more «realist» approach to foreign affairs, with the twin objective of overcoming the post-war pacifism and balancing China. On the other hand, Bacon and Nakamura invite Japan not to follow the path of the European Union, somehow unfairly judged as «hybristic», self- righteous and «messianic». They invite Tokyo to balance the ordinary and the normative elements of its security identity, finding a fine turning between the will to promote liberal values and the need to have maintain a working relationship with non-liberal actors such as China and Russia. The volume underlines the centrality of trade and economics both for the EU-Japan relationship and for their effort to face the threats faced by the international order. Both EU and Japan face similar structural economic problems. They are both mature economies, with harsh demographic problems, lack of growth, fiscal imbalances. As underlined by Okano-Hei- jmas and Terada, Nelson and Heckel this has prompted them to enact a number of similar policy responses. EU and Japan appear to be the last bastion of free market capitalism and multilateralism. They have opposed protectionism working to promote new generation trade agreements as the

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EPA, but also the TPP-11 spearheaded by Japan1 or the EU-Australia and EU-Canada, currently under negotiation. Both the EU and Japan have promoted also very expansionary monetary policies, while they embraced very different approaches to fiscal policies. Tokyo under the rubric of the Abe- nomics, promoted also a protracted fiscal expansion, while the EU, under the German leadership adopted a much more conservative fiscal approach. Finally, The EU–Japan Partnership in the Shadow of China is highly recommended to those scholars, analysts, practitioners, and graduate students who want to grasp the fundamental features of the EU-Japan relationship as well as the complexity the challenges the two currently face.

1. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), also known as TPP-11, has been signed by the original signatories of the TPP, with the exception of the US.

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Federalism in India: Questions about State capacity and national policy

RFI Smith Formerly RMIT University, Melbourne [email protected]

Louise Tillin, Indian Federalism, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2019, 184 pp. (ISBN 978-0-19-949561-0).

This is an indispensable introduction to the phenomenon of Indian federalism. The drafters of the constitution made no mention of federalism; in the tragic circumstances of partition they preferred an explicitly strong Union. But trends in subsequent practice have been visibly federal. As the author makes clear, they have also been anything but linear. A description in the book from a serving Union minister is apt: «Comprehensive, Cooper- ative, Collaborative, Competitive, Consensual and Compassionate Federal- ism». Readers will find that even such a wide ranging characterisation is by no means exhaustive. The book has four main strands: India’s federal model and constitutional design; federalism and diversity; centre-state relations; and federalism and the economy. Examination of these strands raises significant questions about state capacity and approaches to the development and implementation of authoritative national policy. The book starts with an insightful account of the impacts of the extensive concurrent central and state responsibilities set out in the constitution. The sharing of responsibilities was intended to encourage both levels to work together. Measures such as the design of the all India civil service cadres, in which officials are allocated to particular states but also available to be called to the centre, were intended to reinforce links between levels of government. The approach is described as «cooperative federalism». But as other federations have also found, cooperation depends on more than constitutional design. A second dimension of «cooperative federalism» includes measures to complement constitutional design by regulating vertical and horizontal interaction between units of government. The book’s exploration of this dimension includes the roles of the former Planning Commis- sion in setting national goals, approaches of the periodic Finance Commis- sions in managing fiscal federalism, and the management of linguistic and other diversity by adjusting state borders. However, readers familiar with intergovernmental relations in other federations will notice an absence. The Inter-State Council, GST Council and NITI Aayog, each with heavy-weight representatives from both levels of government, flit through the narrative like wraiths. The reason is that

516 Reviews the latter two are still feeling their way and the Inter-State Council, set up pursuant to the constitution by a short lived non-Congress government, has rarely had sustained political support. It is argued persuasively that for much of the time the most influential agent of coordination has been the party system. When the governing party in the centre holds sway also in many of the states, as Congress did for many years, intergovernmental relations has tended to be handled as an internal party matter. But as the book shows, too firm a hand at the centre can promote defection in the regions. This was a factor in the decline of the Congress Party. The prominence of central control in the BJP together with its patchy performance in recent state elections make questions about the efficacy of the party system in federal coordination of continuing relevance. In these circumstances a trend to watch out for will be the emergence of one or more of the bodies mentioned above as authoritative forums for intergovernmental negotiation. The chapter on federalism and the economy brings into sharp relief the sheer variety of trends and tensions in federal practice. In contrast to the rest of the book it is unruly. However this reflects no discredit on the author. The subject matter is hard to pin down. Instances of centralisation, devolution, liberalisation, bureaucratic regulation, incentives, standard setting, evaluation, rankings, coercion, competition, negotiation, rent seeking, bypassing, backflips and recourse to the courts are prominent in patterns that do not stand still. Liberalisation of industrial licensing by the centre in the 1990s has not been followed by policy directions in which both levels of government have a stake. Nor have experiments in which states go their own way proved sustainable. Although the states have responsibilities for topics critical for social and economic development, the centre continues to promulgate schemes which the states are supposed to implement. However, as the author tellingly demonstrates, while states have limited opportunities and capability to influence central schemes they retain the ability to «interpret» how they go about implementation. Issues of diversity and asymmetry elid- ed in New Delhi tend to re-emerge in how officials apply and citizens experience centrally mandated policy in the regions. Two approaches to the gap between formulation and implementation stand out. One, is to redouble efforts to specify, control and evaluate what state administrations do. This is often visible in the initiatives of central ministries and authorities. Another is to bypass state administrations by using digital technology to deliver benefits direct to citizens. The Modi government has made extensive use of this approach. However other conclusions are also possible. They include rethinking policy making so that the people in the states who have to implement decisions have a say in expected results and how they are to be achieved. They include also providing opportunities for citizens and stakeholders to contribute to how policy is made.

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The analysis in the book suggests that for such conclusions to be drawn there would have to be radical departures from existing federal practice. However the book’s probing of questions of state capacity and approaches to national policy suggests also that the case for such departures cannot be ignored.

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A colonial monument de-constructed: Majeed on Grierson’s linguistic survey of India

Silvia Tieri King’s College London [email protected]

Javed Majeed, Nation and Region in Grierson’s Linguistic Survey of India, London: Routledge, 2018, 230 pp., (ISBN 9780429439223).

Javed Majeed, Colonialism and Knowledge in Grierson’s Linguistic Survey of India, London: Routledge, 2018, 266 pp., (ISBN 9780429439230).

Dubbed by its contemporaries «monumental», G.A. Grierson’s Lin- guistic Survey of India (LSI) was published between 1903 and 1928. It soon became one of the symbols of British colonialism in India, of its knowledge production endeavour, and of its supposed scientific modernity. It possibly remains the most comprehensive study of India’s linguistic landscape ever undertaken till date. In the two volumes under review – Nation and Region in Grierson’s Linguistic Survey of India and Colonialism and Knowledge in Grierson’s Linguistic Survey of India – Javed Majeed proposes an analysis of the LSI with a view to unpack its underlying historical, epistemological and philosophical underpinnings. Majeed analyses the content of the LSI, the methods and processes that brought it to light, and the aim his author(s), commissioning authorities, and myriad recipients attached to it. In this way, the LSI unravels and turns into a historical archive; a linguistics manifesto; a field where power relations between its British author, his Indians interlocutors, and the government are negotiated; and the portrait of a man – G.A. Grierson – and his multiple identities. Through his analysis of Grierson’s opus magnum Majeed lies in front of the reader a LSI deconstructed according to the categories of «region», «nation», and «power», thus highlighting the frictions, contradictions and self-aware limitations concealed under its «monumentality». Colonialism and Knowledge demonstrates that, as the master of a colonial project of knowledge production, Grierson was highly indebted to the contributions of his Indian collaborators. His deep engagement with Indi- ans and India’s languages brought him to believe in his ability to see things through Indian eyes. To understand the ways Grierson related to India and Indians, Majeed integrates the data provided by the Survey and the wide mail correspondence attached to it with a fine analysis of Grierson’s «tri- ply hyphenated identity»1 that intersected his profession of linguist and his experience of physical illness. He demonstrates that Grierson came to oc-

1. Colonialism and Knowledge, p. 94.

519 Asia Maior 2019 cupy an in-between space, where his Britishness and Indianness contradicted and integrated each other and challenged colonial clear-cut notions of race, privilege, and power relations. Majeed also reveals Grierson’s awareness of the existence of ambiguities and limitations in his Survey, thus complicating the LSI’s positioning vis-à-vis colonial stereotypes of scientific certainty. In Nation and Region we find Grierson engaged in a network of connections with the advocates of various linguistic groups, thus playing an important role in influencing the regionalization of many of India’s linguistic identities. At the same time, Majeed points out that this «regionalising strand»2 of the LSI appears to be clashing with Grierson’s rejection of neat linguistic boundaries as envisioned by colonial and Indian nationalist map- pings. In fact, Grierson believed that «Indian languages gradually merge into each other».3 Against other European linguists, he also resisted the imperative to force Indian languages into Western paradigms which had been moulded based on European languages alone. Majeed’s discussion of Grierson’s ideas of Aryanism and Semitism as they surface through the LSI provides a compelling section of the book. Grierson, who as a linguist focused on Indo-European languages, identified «Aryan» India with the zenith of Indian civilization; this, Majeed argues, brought him to conceive «Hindu», «Aryan», and «Indian» as almost synonyms, and to conceptualize Islam as a degenerative graft onto India’s authentic essence. In this way, Majeed uncovers remarkable similarities between Grierson’s language and that of Hindu nationalism. At the same time, he highlights that in Grierson’s discourse Christianity aligns with Ar- yanism, while Hindutva conceives Christianity and Islam as equally foreign and polluting. Throughout the volume, Majeed exposes these and more frictions internal to the LSI, inviting the reader «to think of the LSI as a project with many different strands and narratives, some of which were in tension with each other».4 Because the LSI soon established itself as a landmark study of India’s languages, and because language has been a critical category in the politics of the subcontinent till date, the relevance and influence of the LSI extends well beyond the colonial period. For example, Majeed demonstrates that the Census provided a major trait d’union between the LSI and post-coloniality. Grierson’s study had considerable influence on the Census’s understanding of India as a sum of linguistic regions. And, in turn, the institution of the Census cast a long shadow on Indian domestic politics: the internal reorganization of India on linguistic basis, and contemporary electoral and caste politics provide clear examples.

2. Nation and Region, p. 45. 3. Ibid., p. 56. 4. Ibid., p. 6.

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Even in contemporary South Asia, Grierson’s colonial exploration has remained a source of authority linguistic movements kept having recourse to, with a view to support their linguistic pleas and political goals. This is, for example, the case of Siraiki. Majeed reconstructs how Grierson single-mindedly sought to establish Siraiki’s differentiation from Punjabi as «a separate and distinct language»,5 consequently influencing the census authority’s approach to the two languages. As a result, in contemporary Pa- kistan, the Saraiki movement has invoked Grierson’s LSI to back its claim of Siraiki’s separateness from Punjabi language, a claim instrumental to the achievement of political and economic separation of Siraikistan from the province of Punjab, based on allegations of internal colonialism. Thus, the LSI and Majeed’s study of the same are important references for understanding not only colonial but also contemporary South Asian affairs. As Majeed’s analysis unfolds, the LSI gets contextualised within Brit- ish and Indian events of its time, the then ongoing trends in colonial administration and linguistics research, as well as Grierson’s personality and life. In this way, from the monolithic monument that it initially appeared to be, the LSI progressively acquires in the eyes of the reader the semblance of a labyrinth; but Majeed unpacks its complexity, making even the hardest passages accessible to the reader through a consistently structured and clear prose. Because of the myriad angles through which they approach the LSI and Grierson’s scholarship, Nation and Region and Colonialism and Knowledge are recommended readings for advanced students and researchers across disciplines. In particular, the two volumes are a must-read for those focusing on the history and politics of language and of the British Empire in South Asia, and their connected notions of race, civilization, and nationalism. Those studying and researching the institution of the Census and the role of language in the post-colonial politics of the subcontinent will find Majeed’s multi-layered analysis of Grierson’s «monumental» LSI equally beneficial and fascinating.

5. Ibid., p. 22.

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APPENDIX LIST OF THE ASIA MAIOR’S ISSUES

Followed by the recommended shortened style of quotation

Vol. I Giorgio Borsa e Paolo Beonio-Brocchieri (a cura di), Asia Major. Un mondo che cambia, Ispi/il Mulino, Bologna 1990 (Asia Major 1990);

Vol. II Giorgio Borsa e Paolo Beonio-Brocchieri (a cura di), L’Altra Asia ai margini della bufera. Asia Major 1991, Ispi/il Mulino, Bologna 1991 (Asia Maior 1991);

Vol. III Giorgio Borsa (a cura di), Le ultime trincee del comunismo nel mondo. Asia Major 1992, Ispi/il Mulino, Bologna 1992 (Asia Major 1992);

Vol. IV Giorgio Borsa (a cura di), La fine dell’era coloniale in Asia Orientale. Asia Major 1993, Ispi/il Mulino, Bologna 1993 (Asia Major 1993);

Vol. V Giorgio Borsa e Enrica Collotti Pischel (a cura di), Luci e ombre sullo sviluppo in Asia Orientale. Asia Major 1994, CSPEE/il Mulino, Bolo- gna 1994 (Asia Major 1994);

Vol. VI Giorgio Borsa e Giovanna Mastrocchio (a cura di), Tra Demo- crazia e neoautoritarismo. Asia Major 1995, CSPEE/il Mulino, Bologna 1995 (Asia Major 1995);

Vol. VII Giorgio Borsa e Giovanna Mastrocchio (a cura di), Integrazio- ne regionale e ascesa internazionale. Asia Major 1996, CSPEE/il Mulino, Bologna 1996 (Asia Major 1996);

Vol. VIII Giorgio Borsa (a cura di), Continua il miracolo asiatico? Asia Major 1997, CSPEE/il Mulino, Bologna 1997 (Asia Major 1997);

Vol. IX Giorgio Borsa (a cura di), L’Asia tra recessione economica e minaccia nucleare. Asia Major 1998, CSPEE/il Mulino, Bologna 1998 (Asia Major 1998);

Vol. X Giorgio Borsa e Michelguglielmo Torri (a cura di), L’incerta vi- gilia del nuovo secolo in Asia. Asia Major 1999, CSPEE/il Mulino, Bologna 1999 (Asia Major 1999);

523 Asia Maior

Vol. XI Giorgio Borsa, Corrado Molteni e Francesco Montessoro (a cura di) Crescita economica e tensioni politiche in Asia all’alba del nuovo millennio. Asia Major 2000, CSPEE/il Mulino, Bologna 2000 (Asia Major 2000);

Vol. XII Giorgio Borsa, Corrado Molteni e Francesco Montessoro (a cura di), Trasformazioni politico-istituzionali nell’Asia nell’era di Bush. Asia Major 2001, CSPEE/il Mulino, Bologna 2001 (Asia Major 2001);

Vol. XIII Elisa Giunchi, Corrado Molteni e Michelguglielmo Torri (a cura di), L’Asia prima e dopo l’11 settembre. Asia Major 2002, CSPEE/il Mulino, Bologna 2003 (Asia Major 2002);

Vol. XIV Corrado Molteni, Francesco Montessoro e Michelguglielmo Torri (a cura di) Le risposte dell’Asia alla sfida americana. Asia Major 2003, CSPEE/Bruno Mondadori, Milano 2004 (Asia Major 2003);

Vol. XV Corrado Molteni, Francesco Montessoro e Michelguglielmo Torri (a cura di), Multilateralismo e democrazia in Asia. Asia Major 2004, Bruno Mondadori, Milano 2005 (Asia Major 2004);

Vols. XVI & XVII Michelguglielmo Torri (a cura di), L’Asia negli anni del drago e dell’elefante 2005-2006. L’ascesa di Cina e India, le tensioni nel continente e il mutamento degli equilibri globali, Guerini e Associati, Milano 2007 (Asia Maior 2005-2006);

Vol. XVIII Michelguglielmo Torri (a cura di), L’Asia nel «grande gio- co». Il consolidamento dei protagonisti asiatici nello scacchiere globale, Guerini e Associati, Milano 2008 (Asia Maior 2007);

Vol. XIX Michelguglielmo Torri e Nicola Mocci (a cura di), Crisi locali, crisi globali e nuovi equilibri in Asia, Guerini e Associati, Milano 2009 (Asia Maior 2008);

Vol. XX Michelguglielmo Torri e Nicola Mocci (a cura di), L’Asia di Obama e della crisi economica globale, Guerini e Associati, Milano 2010 (Asia Maior 2009);

Vol. XXI Michelguglielmo Torri e Nicola Mocci (a cura di), Ripresa economica, conflitti sociali e tensioni geopolitiche in Asia, Emil di Odoya, Bologna 2011 (Asia Maior 2010);

Vol. XXII Michelguglielmo Torri e Nicola Mocci (a cura di), L’Asia nel triangolo delle crisi giapponese, araba ed europea, Emil di Odoya, Bologna 2012 (Asia Maior 2011);

524 Appendix

Vol. XXIII Michelguglielmo Torri e Nicola Mocci (a cura di), Rallenta- mento economico e debolezza della politica in Asia, Emil di Odoya, Bolo- gna 2013 (Asia Maior 2012);

Vol. XXIV Michelguglielmo Torri e Nicola Mocci (a cura di), Il drago- cinese e l’aquila americana sullo scacchiere asiatico, Emil di Odoya, Bolo- gna 2014 (Asia Maior 2013);

Vol. XXV Michelguglielmo Torri and Nicola Mocci (eds.), Engaging China, Containing China, Emil di Odoya, Bologna 2015 (Asia Maior 2014).

Vol. XXVI Michelguglielmo Torri and Nicola Mocci (eds.), The Chi- nese-American Race for Hegemony in Asia, Viella, Roma 2016 (Asia Maior 2015).

Vol. XXVII Michelguglielmo Torri and Nicola Mocci (eds.), The End of The Obama Era in Asia, Viella, Roma 2017 (Asia Maior 2016).

Vol. XXVIII Michelguglielmo Torri, Elisabetta Basile and Nicola Mocci (eds.), Asia in the Waning Shadow of American Hegemony, Viella, Roma 2018 (Asia Maior 2017).

Vol. XXIX Michelguglielmo Torri and Nicola Mocci (eds.), Reacting to Donald Trump’s Challenge, Viella, Roma 2019 (Asia Maior 2018)

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Asia Maior think tank owes a debt of gratitude both to the Centro Studi Vietnamiti of Turin, which hosts the think tank official seat, and, in particular, to its Director, Mrs. Sandra Scagliotti, for her continuous and generous support. This debt is here gratefully acknowledged. Finito di stampare. nel mese di luglio 2020 da The Factory s.r.l. Roma