INQUIRY INTO THE DEATHS RESULTING FROM THE BOMBING ON 22 MAY 2017

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OPENING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF SMG EUROPE HOLDINGS LTD ______

A. Preliminary

1. We wish at the very start of this document to renew SMG’s condolences to the families of the deceased and to the survivors, and also assure the Chairman and everyone else involved with the Inquiry of SMG’s desire to continue to assist the Inquiry in its work.

2. In his first witness statement in these proceedings, James Allen, the General Manager of the Arena, expressed SMG’s sincere sympathies to the families and friends of the 22 people who died in the Attack, and to those who were seriously injured.1 We repeat that expression of sympathy now, in a public manner.

3. In his second statement, 2 James Allen emphasised SMG’s commitment to analysing and acting upon any lessons that can be learned from the terrible events of 22 May 2017. As he said, that process commenced internally immediately after the Attack. That exercise is still ongoing, and SMG regards this Inquiry as an important part of it. SMG has cooperated and will continue to cooperate with this Inquiry not only to respect the process and to help the families obtain the answers that they seek, but also to ensure that the Inquiry’s analysis of what went wrong, and the recommendations that it makes, are as well-informed and as thorough as possible. And if the Inquiry does highlight further changes that SMG can make for the better, it will of course look urgently at implementing those changes, not only at the Arena, but, as appropriate, across all its venues.

4. The Arena is not only physically located at the centre of the City of Manchester. It also occupies a place at the heart of the cultural life of the City, and in the lives of many of those who live and work in Manchester and the North West. SMG values the special regard that so many people have for its flagship venue, and is determined to respect and to honour that regard. It is also true, of course, that the Manchester Arena will now always be linked with the terrible events of the night of 22 May 2017. SMG is committed to working with the families of the deceased and indeed all those affected by the events of that night. The latter category includes SMG’s staff, many of whom were deeply affected by what

1 James Allen first witness statement, paragraph 167 [INQ025577] 2 James Allen second witness statement paragraphs 1.3 and 5.1 [INQ032858]

1 they experienced that night, and all of whom now work in a place that holds painful memories.

B. Introduction

5. SMG Europe Holdings Ltd (‘SMG’) is the company that operates the Manchester Arena (‘the Arena’). SMG is a venue and event management company, which specialises in managing Arenas, theatres, stadiums and conference and exhibition centres. SMG currently operates a total of 11arenas and other venues in Europe. The company also works on projects in the Middle East and in Asia.

6. The Arena is the largest of SMG’s arenas. Indeed, with a maximum capacity of 21,000 visitors, it is one of the largest indoor arenas in Europe. The Arena hosts music, comedy, family, sports and other events, and since it opened in 1995, has welcomed over 30 million visitors.3

7. The Arena is a city centre venue, forming part of the Victoria Exchange complex in central Manchester. Its design is highly unusual for a large indoor arena in that it sits directly on top of Manchester Victoria station.

8. In recent years the Arena has hosted well over 100 shows and in excess of 1 million visitors per year. This year, the Arena closed in mid-March as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and has yet to re-open.

9. It is proposed that the Inquiry will hear oral evidence from four of SMG’s command and control witnesses, who were involved in operations at the Arena in May 2017.

a. Miriam Stone has been at the Arena since 2006 and has held the post of Head of Events since 2016. She runs the Events Team (in 2017 comprising her and two others), which (in non-COVID times) is responsible for organising some 130-140 events per year.4 She also took the lead in the period before the Attack in liaising with the Counter Terrorism Security Adviser and in arranging counter-terrorism training. She was the Duty Manager on the night of 22 May 2017. She is due to give oral evidence in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 9.

b. James Allen has worked at the Arena since 2003, and has been the General Manager of the Arena since January 2013. As such, he has overall responsibility for the operation of the Arena. He was not on duty on the night of the Attack, but was called in and arrived about half an hour after the explosion. He is due to give oral evidence in Chapter 7 and some of his evidence is to be read in Chapter 9.

3 James Allen first witness statement, paragraph 10-14 [INQ025577] 4 Miriam Stone first witness statement, paragraphs 2-5 [INQ025576]

2 c. Mike Cowley was the SMG Facilities Services Director in May 2017. He was based at the Arena, although his responsibilities at that time also took him to SMG’s other UK venues and SMG’s new developments across Europe, the Middle East and Asia. At the time of the Attack he was in China. He is now employed by SMG China and is based in Hong Kong. He is due to give oral evidence in Chapter 7.

d. Paul Johnson has been the Security and Cleaning Supervisor at the Arena since approximately 2005. He was on duty on the night of 22 May 2017 in the role of Fire Safety Officer. He is due to give oral evidence in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 9.

10. Our intention in drafting this opening statement has been to assist the Inquiry, the families and other core participants by identifying what seem to us to be the central issues for the Inquiry to address in relation to Arena security, by outlining the core evidence that SMG witnesses will give in respect of those issues, and by suggesting areas of focus and approach that the Inquiry may wish to adopt. We have avoided descending too far into detail – we are sure that the Inquiry will be more assisted by detail at the stage of closing submissions.

11. We have also endeavoured to comply with the Chairman’s direction to include in this opening statement a narrative of SMG’s performance by reference to the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference, as well as with ILT’s overlapping request that we include our response to the criticisms of SMG that have been made by the Inquiry’s experts. More detail both on the narrative and on the response to criticism can of course be found in the statements that we have served from SMG’s command and control witnesses.

12. All that said, we must immediately add one very important caveat. Our ability to provide an opening statement that is comprehensive has been severely compromised by the fact that some documents, including the security experts’ addendum report and certain witness statements, have only recently been made available to us and other significant documents, including the experts’ final report and other important witness statements, have not yet been disclosed. We say this as a matter of fact, not by way of criticism, but we are sure the Inquiry will appreciate that this has caused us difficulties, not least in taking instructions from our client. For that reason, this document is necessarily incomplete. We will endeavor to fill in the gaps in due course, either by way of an amended written opening statement, or in our oral opening.

C. Generic points on the Inquiry’s approach to the evidence

13. We wish to raise at the outset three (connected) points that relate to the way in which the Inquiry should approach the evidence that it will hear and consider. Although these observations arise from our consideration of the Chapter 7 evidence on Arena security, we respectfully submit that they are of general application.

3 The need to focus on causative issues 14. The first of these submissions is that the Inquiry should focus on evidence of matters that are of some causative relevance to the Attack. Put another way, the Inquiry should not spend its time investigating matters that have no real bearing on the deaths of the 22 victims of the bomb on 22 May 2017. Such an approach, we say, is justified on grounds both of pragmatism and of principle.

15. As to pragmatism, the Inquiry has received an enormous volume of documentary and other evidence and intends to call a large number of witnesses to give oral evidence. It will simply not be possible to cover all the issues that arise on the face of the material with all the witnesses, and it is apparent from the relatively short time periods that have been allocated for witnesses’ oral evidence on the Hearing Plan that the Inquiry anticipates limited and focused questioning of witnesses.

16. The Inquiry’s Terms of Reference provide the principled basis (indeed, a requirement) for such a focus. According to the Terms of Reference, the Inquiry’s core purpose is: “To investigate how, and in what circumstances, 22 innocent people came to lose their lives in the attack at the Manchester Arena on 22 May 2017 and to make any such recommendations as may seem appropriate.”5

17. The Inquiry is not, therefore, a wide-ranging investigation into the policies and practices either of the Arena or of any of the government agencies, emergency services and other institutions whose conduct is under examination. Rather, it is a focused investigation into what happened on the night, what were the causative and contributing factors to the deaths, and what lessons can be learned. The recent judgment of the Divisional Court in the judicial review proceedings emphasised that the Inquiry has no power to investigate matters that fall outwith its Terms of Reference.6

18. The Divisional Court also explained (in accepting submissions made to it by CTI) that the Terms of Reference are to be understood in the context of the Inquiry having been established to take over the role and purpose of the previous inquests.7 This leads to a similar point on the importance of causation as a limiting factor. Had these proceedings continued as inquests, then, even given the engagement of Article 2, the scope of the proceedings could not properly have extended beyond the circumstances in which the 22 victims died. We submit that exactly the same approach should be adopted here.

5 Note also sub-paragraphs 4(vi) and 5(v) of the Terms of Reference, which, similarly, emphasise that the Inquiry’s investigation into the security arrangements at the Arena and the emergency response must be limited to matters that were at least potentially causative of the deaths. 6 R (EA&BT) v The Chairman of the Manchester Arena Inquiry [2020] EWHC 2053 (Admin), paragraphs 45-46 7 R (EA&BT) v The Chairman of the Manchester Arena Inquiry [2020] EWHC 2053 (Admin), paragraph 49

4 19. To give a practical example, the Inquiry has obtained detailed evidence relating to the procedures in place at the Arena on the night of 22 May 2017 for searching those attending the concert as they entered the Arena. At the Inquiry’s request, witness evidence and relevant documentary material has been provided, and the issue has been addressed by the Inquiry’s security experts.

20. However, now that that material has been collated and a considered view can be taken against the context of all the other evidence obtained by the Inquiry, it is entirely clear that the ingress searching procedures have no causative relevance whatsoever to the deaths of Salman Abedi’s 22 innocent victims.

a. The ingress searching procedures were in operation from when the doors to the Arena opened (approximately 18.00), as the members of the audience arrived and queued for admittance to the Arena, and some staff remained in place throughout the event in order to admit any latecomers. Salman Abedi only entered the City Room once for a few seconds during the busy ingress period, and did not attempt to enter the Arena.

b. On the two occasions when Abedi was in the City Room later in the evening, he again made no attempt to enter the Arena itself. Had he done so, whatever the nuances of the searching arrangements that were in operation, there can be no doubt that he would have not been permitted to enter the Arena. He did not fit the audience profile and he had a large rucksack with him.

21. A similar point can be made about staffing levels at the Arena. There are various references in the documents to reduction of staffing levels at positions within the Arena itself, and the experts' initial report suggests that more staff should have been present at ingress.8 None of this is of any causative relevance to the circumstances in which Abedi’s 22 innocent victims died. They died in a blast that took place in the City Room at the end of the show. Staffing levels inside the Arena itself, or in the City Room earlier in the evening, are nothing to the point. The staffing levels that are, clearly, of relevance, are the numbers of security staff in and around the City Room at the time of and in the period immediately preceding the Attack. And the evidence shows that, whatever else may have caused or contributed to the Attack, a shortage of staff was not one of those causes. Abedi was seen by not one but two of Showsec’s security staff. They were aware of concerns about Abedi expressed by a member of the public. They had plenty of time to react and to take the proper action, which was to report Abedi to the control room. There is no question of them being over- stretched. Why neither of the two men reported concerns about Abedi to the control room will of course be a matter for the Inquiry to investigate and to reach conclusions upon. But, we submit, staffing levels – certainly in places other than the City Room and at times other than egress - simply do not enter the analysis.

8 Security Experts’ Initial Report, paragraphs 34, 672 [INQ032612]

5 Standard[s] to be applied 22. The second point is a shorter one. A core part of the Inquiry’s function will be to reach conclusions about the efficacy of the way in which certain organisations, including SMG, prepared for and/or responded to the Attack. Unlike a court conducting, say, a civil or criminal trial, the Inquiry can approach this task without having to apply a single, pre-ordained standard. We note in this regard that the experts instructed by the Inquiry have been asked to assess the performance of organisations by reference to the broad standard of “adequacy and effectiveness”. The security experts have referred to this standard in many places in their report, but have also utilised other measures. In some instances for example they refer to conduct that “could have been better” and in others they identify a “missed opportunity”.

23. We make two submissions in this regard. First, so long as there is consistency and transparency, there is no harm in the Inquiry testing performance against a number of different standards. Indeed, this may enable the Inquiry to make more nuanced and informative findings than would be possible under a narrower approach. Second, at least in the field of Arena security, we submit that the Inquiry ought to consider as part of its analysis the additional standard of contemporaneous industry practice. This consideration was not addressed at all in the security experts’ initial report, but we note that it does feature in their addendum report, by reference to the letter that is in evidence from Lucy Noble, Chair of the National Arenas Association (NAA).9 We note in particular the observation of the security experts at paragraph 320 of their addendum report – “We have not seen evidence that the security operation that was in place at Manchester arena was dramatically out of step with the operations being used at most other comparable venues.”

Avoiding hindsight 24. Finally, it is of course a truism that an Inquiry of this nature should be aware of the risks of hindsight. That is particularly important in the Arena security context, we submit, precisely because the Attack was such a devastating and significant event, which has had a profound impact not only on the Arena itself, but also on security best-practice across the entertainment industry. Note, for example, the observation of DAC Lucy D’Orsi that “The terrorist attacks in London and Manchester in 2017 marked a watershed moment for UK society, the emergency and intelligence services and in particular Counter Terrorism Policing”,10 and the references in the security experts’ report to the greater understanding of risks associated with ‘grey spaces’ and egress from venues following the Attack.11 And in the particular context of the Arena, note the evidence of James Allen and Mike Cowley that the closure of the City Room on a permanent basis only became a practical possibility as a result of the Attack itself.12

9 Letter from Lucy Noble to John Sharkey [INQ034755] 10 Lucy D’Orsi first witness statement paragraph 5 [INQ025466] 11 Security Experts' Addendum Report paragraphs 115-120 and 255 [INQ035292] 12 James Allen third witness statement, paragraphs 19 and 26 [INQ034754]; and Mike Cowley second witness statement, paragraphs 8 and 17-18 [INQ034759]

6 25. To make the obvious factual point, the security arrangements at the Arena have changed since the Attack, and many of the changes (e.g. the use of Walk Through Metal Detectors (‘WTMDs’) at every event and the creation of a sterile area in the City Room, in effect extending the perimeter) mirror certain so- called failings identified by the security experts in the arrangements at the time of the Attack. But it plainly does not follow simply from the fact that these developments have taken place since the Attack that their absence at the time of the Attack represented any form of failing. The mere fact that any given system is capable of improvement does not mean that it fails unless it is improved.13

26. And, critically, hindsight must be avoided. As Megarry J once observed, “In this world there are few things that could not have been better done if done with hindsight. The advantages of hindsight include the benefit of having a sufficient indication of which of the many factors present are important and which are unimportant. But hindsight is no touchstone of negligence”.14 The task of this Inquiry is to consider the complicated evidence regarding the status of and the security arrangements within the City Room at the time of the Attack, and to reach conclusions about the appropriateness of those arrangements based not on hindsight, not on the basis of what has happened since, but on the basis of the contemporary standards and prevailing circumstances as at May 2017.

27. Of course, the position is different when the Inquiry comes to consider recommendations. That is a forward-looking exercise, and so the Inquiry will, of necessity, take as its starting point the evidence that it has regarding current arrangements.

D. [NOT PUBLISHED]

28. [NOT PUBLISHED]

29. [NOT PUBLISHED]

30. [NOT PUBLISHED]

31. [NOT PUBLISHED]

32. [NOT PUBLISHED]

33. [NOT PUBLISHED]

34. [NOT PUBLISHED]

13 As Haddon-Cave LJ and Swift J recently observed in the entirely different context of policies relating to facial recognition technology, “The possibility (or even the likelihood) of … improvement is not evidence of present deficiency.” R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2020] 1 WLR 672, at paragraph 96. 14 Duchess of Argyll v Beuselinck [1972] 2 Lloyd's Rep 172, p185

7 E. Narrative of SMG’s performance - approach

35. In his Ruling of 30 January 2020, the Chairman stated that he would be assisted by a narrative of the performance of SMG (and that of other institutional CPs) with respect to the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference. As we have previously indicated, SMG is happy to provide such a narrative.

36. In their Note of 11 March 2020, ILT identified which of the Terms of Reference the narrative should cover. Most of the Terms of Reference highlighted by ILT fall into two categories, that is (a) security planning prior to the Attack and arrangements in place at the time of the Attack; and (b) the events of the night of the Attack, and in particular SMG’s response to it. The bulk of our narrative will be provided in two parts, covering those two broad categories. The few further Terms of Reference that we have been asked to address do not fall readily into either category, and we will cover them in a short third section.

37. We note the request for a narrative that is efficient and not over-lengthy. We will therefore avoid rehearsing contextual and background matters, details of which can of course be found in the statements of our command and control witnesses referred to above.

38. In their Note on Expert Reports dated 13 May 2020 (updated 15 May 2020), ILT asked that institutional CPs should set out in their opening statements the extent to which criticisms made by experts are accepted or not accepted. We will attempt to address what seem to us to be the most significant criticisms of SMG’s conduct in the course of our narrative of SMG’s performance.

F. Narrative of SMG’s performance - security arrangements at the Arena

39. In this section we address Part 4 of the Terms of Reference – “The security arrangements within and outside the Arena”, as well as Parts 5(i) and 5(ii), which cover planning and preparation for a terrorist incident, and associated policies, systems and practices.

Responsibility for security at the Arena and in the City Room 40. SMG was responsible for security in the Arena.

41. It also had a responsibility, with others, for security in the City Room.

42. One of the security experts’ conclusions that has caused SMG most concern is the assertion in their first report that SMG staff were guilty of a “fundamental misunderstanding” in that they “did not appear to realise they were responsible” for security at the Arena.15 Although the experts have expanded on this point (at our request) in their addendum report,16 there is still a lack of clarity as to the basis of this purported factual finding (which, despite the

15 Security Experts’ Initial Report, paragraphs 7, 193 [INQ032612] 16 Security Experts’ Addendum Report paragraphs 136-155 [INQ035292]

8 experts’ protestations, is clearly what it is) and also as to the identities of those to whom it is directed.

43. In any event, the experts’ view on this matter is, we suggest, simply wrong. SMG’s managers knew very well what their responsibilities were, as the Inquiry will hear when they give oral evidence. In advance of that, we draw particular attention to the opening paragraphs of Miriam Stone’s second witness statement17 and to the email that she quotes at paragraph 7 of that statement. That email was sent by Miriam Stone to Christopher Smith of BTP and Ken Upham, the Arena’s GMP CTSA, in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January 2015. In the email, she updates the police officers on enhanced security at the Arena following the attack and requests their assistance – “we do want to make sure we are up to date with everything we are supposed to know and doing everything we can. If there is anything you can tell us, we would greatly appreciate it.” That is only one email, of course, and the Inquiry will hear evidence about the longstanding relationship between staff at the Arena and Ken Upham in particular. But the email does clearly show, we say, not only that Miriam Stone knew that SMG was responsible for security at the Arena, but also that she was conscientious in discharging that responsibility.

44. The Arena was and is a private entertainment venue. As the operator of that venue, SMG owes all the usual duties to take care for the safety of everyone – staff, contractors, performers and visitors – who enters the Arena.

45. The Inquiry will naturally focus on security arrangements in the City Room, where Salman Abedi exploded his bomb. It is therefore important that the special nature of that space is understood from the outset.

46. The City Room is not part of the Arena. Whilst it is understandable that visitors to the Arena sometimes refer to the City Room as the ‘foyer’, that term is in fact misleading. SMG’s lease of the Arena does not (and did not at the time of the Attack) include the City Room. The boundary of the area leased by SMG is the Arena doors that separate the Arena concourse from the City Room.

47. SMG did of course use the City Room at the time of the Attack. It was used, for example, for selling merchandise – although on every occasion that it wished to use the City Room for the sale of merchandise SMG had to obtain a licence from the landlord. But SMG did not control the City Room, and it was also used by many others, for a variety of different purposes. Most importantly, perhaps, it afforded public access between Victoria Station, Trinity Way and other parts of the Victoria Exchange complex – the Inquiry will hear evidence that maintaining this public right of way through the City Room had been a key consideration in the redevelopment of the station in 2013. The City Room was also used for accessing the call centre, the NCP car park, and the go karting track also located in the Victoria Exchange complex. Until December 2016 there had been a McDonalds restaurant in the City Room. In summary, the City Room was at the heart of the Victoria Exchange complex. It was used by different organisations (one of which was SMG) for different purposes. The

17 Miriam Stone second witness statement [INQ034752]

9 ability of the public to pass through the City Room at all times was regarded as critical. These matters are set out in more detail in the SMG witness statements, in particular those of Mike Cowley.18 They are of obvious importance because they form the factual context for consideration of security arrangements in the City Room at the time of the Attack.

48. Returning to the question of responsibility for security, we do accept that SMG had a responsibility for security in the City Room at the time of the Attack. It had a responsibility for the safety of those leaving the concert. More generally, SMG was contracted to provide facilities management and security services across the Victoria Exchange complex, including the City Room. We want to be clear – we accept that SMG had those duties on the night of the Attack and that those duties included looking out for suspicious individuals who might pose a threat. At the time of the Attack, those duties were being performed by the SMG and Showsec staff who were on duty in the control rooms at the Arena as well as the Showsec stewards and supervisors stationed in and around the City Room itself.

49. We add only one further point. Because the City Room (in contrast to the Arena itself) was a public space that was not controlled by SMG, we do not accept that SMG had sole responsibility for security there. The police also had such responsibilities. As the Inquiry will hear, BTP officers had been specifically tasked with patrolling the City Room on the night of the Attack.

SMG and Showsec 50. Showsec is a market leader in the UK security industry, and has provided security services at the Arena since it opened in 1995.19 Showsec has an intimate knowledge of the workings of the Arena. Showsec operates at hundreds of other venues and events across the country, including Manchester City FC and the Manchester Christmas markets as well as numerous high profile festivals and events such as Creamfields and the Download festival (organized by a member of the same group, Live Nation). Showsec’s wide experience of security issues is highly valued by SMG.20

51. SMG and Showsec staff at the Arena work very closely together, both in preparation for and in putting on events. Showsec staff are an integral part of the operation of events at the Arena. They attend the weekly building meetings held to discuss upcoming events, they attend the multi-agency planning meetings held at the Arena, they sit on the Arena Health and Safety Committee and they also play a key role both in devising and in undertaking table top training exercises. At every event the SMG Duty Manager attends the Showsec Supervisors’ briefing, and the Showsec Head of Security is stationed with the Duty Manager in the Sierra Control Room.

18 Mike Cowley second witness statement, paragraphs 5 & 9 [INQ034759] 19 James Allen first witness statement, paragraphs 68-71 [INQ025577] 20 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraph 29 (generally, paragraphs 23-29) [INQ034752]

10 52. Showsec’s work at the Arena goes well beyond security and crowd management at events. They have an office at the Arena, and take a leading role in joint SMG / Showsec staff training. They also advise on strategic issues, including, we say counter-terrorism measures. Both James Allen and Miriam Stone will give evidence to the effect that, in the period prior to the Attack, they regarded Showsec as specialists in counter-terrorism security and sought and received their advice on such matters.21

53. As the Inquiry will be aware, this latter point is contentious. We invite the Inquiry to take a broad approach in addressing this issue. This is not a civil court hearing a claim in contract, but an inquiry that has been tasked with getting to the bottom of what actually happened. And we say that, regardless of the fact that the contractual documents refer to security services generally, without specific reference to counter terrorism subservices, Showsec’s daily interactions with SMG at the Arena demonstrate, we suggest unsurprisingly, that counter terrorism duties were subsumed in its overall security services. Thus for example Showsec created specific counter-terrorism documents in relation to the Arena22and senior Showsec staff such as Tom Bailey held themselves out as possessing a level of counter-terrorism security expertise and gave advice on that basis.

54. To be clear, SMG’s primary source of advice and guidance on counter-terrorism matters prior to the Attack were its contacts at GMP and BTP, in particular the CTSA Ken Upham, who had a specialised role in providing such advice to public venues.

SMG and the CTSAs 55. It is important that the Inquiry understands from the outset the high-level of expertise held by Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (“CTSAs”), and the respect with which they are regarded. In giving oral evidence to the London Bridge inquests, DAC Lucy D’Orsi described CTSAs as the “highest qualified counter terrorism security advisors in the country”, adding that “they are a fantastic group of people across the country who do a really challenging role, which is often a role of negotiation in relation to protective security, and they are hugely qualified”. 23 Although the use of the Protective Security Improvement Assessment tool (“PSIA”) is one element of their work, it is apparent from the evidence before the Inquiry that the “bespoke security advice”24 that CTSAs provide to venues such as the Arena is (and was) intended to be more broadly based than merely completing the PSIA spreadsheets. It is perhaps unsurprising in the circumstances that, both prior to and since the Attack, entertainment venues have relied heavily on CTSA advice. The letter from Lucy Noble, Chair of the NAA, that we have referred to above states “To

21 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraphs 23-29 [INQ034752]; James Allen third witness statement, paragraphs 31-32 [INQ034754] 22 Counter Terrorism Awareness 2017: Manchester Arena [INQ001480]

23 London Bridge Inquests: Evidence of Lucy D’Orsi, page 24 line 17 and page 48 line 7 [INQ035310] 24 Lucy D’Orsi first witness statement, paragraph 36 [INQ025466]

11 the best of my knowledge, most venues did not have an in house security expert to assess counter terrorism and security measures. They used in house to liaise with their local CTSA for specialised counter terrorism advice before May 2017. The focus using internal and CTSA expertise has continued since May 2017.”

56. The relationship between SMG and the CTSAs from GMP, and in particular the advice it received from them regarding the security measures at the Arena, will be of central importance to the Inquiry’s consideration of Arena security.

57. In a sentence, SMG says that it relied upon the specialist advice from the CTSAs, that the consistent advice SMG had received from the CTSAs prior to the Attack was that the counter-terrorism security measures it had in place were appropriate, and in particular that the CTSAs had never even suggested that anything like the “entirely different” security regime now raised by the security experts was needed.

58. Pausing there, it would seem in light of the recently served evidence from the various parties involved, and also the addendum report from the experts, that parts of that statement are contentious and other parts are not.

a. It is common ground that the CTSAs perform an advisory function.

b. On reading the experts’ initial report, we were concerned at their apparent suggestion that SMG was not entitled to rely upon advice received from the CTSAs. They have now clarified their position and confirmed that SMG were entitled to rely on such advice.25

c. There may be some dispute about the proper ambit of CTSA advice at the time in question. The recent statement from DAC Lucy D’Orsi, for example, indicates that a CTSA would have been expected, where appropriate, to offer advice on matters such as extending a perimeter and risks on egress. 26 It is not clear whether or not GMP accept that proposition.

d. There is clearly a dispute on what is perhaps the most important issue. That is the purely factual issue of what advice Ken Upham actually gave. Miriam Stone was not to know the niceties of CTSA internal guidance or practice. All she knew was what Ken Upham, as an undoubted counter-terrorism expert, was telling her. It is clear that the two disagree on what was said. A summary of Miriam Stone’s account is set out below. The Inquiry will hear oral evidence from both.

59. SMG staff at the Arena had a long standing and good working relationship with the CTSAs from GMP. The CTSA at the time of the Attack was Ken Upham. His predecessor was John Archibald, who prepared reports on the Arena in 2011 [INQ023030] and 2012 [INQ023042] that are available to the Inquiry. Ken

25 Security Experts’ Addendum Report paragraphs 163 [INQ035292] 26 Lucy D’Orsi fourth witness statement [INQ035098]

12 Upham took over in 2014 and implemented the Protective Security Improvement Activity (“PSIA”) programme.27

60. Between 2014 and 2017 Ken Upham became well acquainted with the Arena and those who worked there. His main point of contact was Miriam Stone, who describes their relationship in detail in her written evidence.28 It is apparent from Miriam Stone’s evidence that the six-monthly PSIA meetings were lengthy and in depth. The PSIA scores were high, although Mr Upham did recommend certain changes to the counter-terrorism security arrangements, which were adopted. She also states that Mr Upham would come to the Arena on other occasions, beyond those formal meetings. Sometimes he would pop in because he was passing, on other occasions he would come at her request. In particular, Miriam Stone records that Ken Upham came to the Arena at her request following both the Charlie Hebdo shooting in early 2015 and the Stade de France and Bataclan attacks at the end of that year, so that he could discuss whether any changes were required to the Arena’s security measures in light of those events. 29 On both occasions, he stated that he was happy with the arrangements that were in place. Because the Inquiry will naturally focus on the City Room, we also draw attention to Miriam Stone’s recollection of discussing the security arrangements there with Ken Upham. Her evidence, we say, is striking: Ken Upham understood how the City Room was used at events, but never raised any concerns about the security arrangements there.30

61. Miriam Stone is also very clear about the reliance that SMG placed upon Ken Upham. They did rely on him – indeed she describes Mr Upham as “our most important source of guidance and advice” in counter-terrorism matters. She also says that she is sure that Mr Upham knew that SMG did not have any internal expert counter-terrorism advice at that time, and so he must have known that they were relying on him. She adds, and this is a point that we invite the Inquiry to consider, that she thought this was the whole purpose of him providing the advice – she says it had never crossed her mind that they shouldn’t rely on it.31

SMG and BTP 62. The Arena’s location on top of Victoria station meant that SMG staff had a uniquely close relationship with BTP. Miriam Stone observes that “[a]s a venue, including security in Whiskey control, we were probably in contact with BTP in one form or another on an almost daily basis.” 32 BTP officers undertook routine patrols at the time of events, attended the Arena’s multi-

27 Kenneth Upham first witness statement, paragraph 13 [INQ029098] 28 Miriam Stone first witness statement [INQ025576]; and Miriam Stone second witness statement [INQ034752] 29 Miriam Stone first witness statement, paras 71 and 75 [INQ025576] 30 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraphs 10-12 [INQ034752] 31 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraph 6 [INQ034752] 32 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraph 196 [INQ034752]

13 agency planning meetings33 and were often called to attend incidents at the Arena.34 One of the consequences of that close relationship was that BTP officers had a good practical understanding of how the Arena worked.

63. Although formal counter-terrorism advice was provided by Ken Upham, Miriam Stone states that SMG did discuss counter-terrorism matters with contacts at BTP. Of particular note, Miriam Stone had discussions with BTP officers Christopher Smith and Eddie Wylie after the Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan attacks respectively about the Arena’s counter-terrorism security arrangements, on both occasions jointly with Ken Upham.35 In a document circulated within SMG by Miriam Stone shortly after the Bataclan attack (see paragraph 77 of her first witness statement), she recorded the advice that Eddie Wylie had given in the following terms “Our Police Superintendent (Pennine Sub Divisional Commander of British Transport Police), with whom we have a very healthy relationship, is happy that what we do here is as good as it can be. He is confident that we are doing as much as we can to achieve the best and safest situation for our guests, staff, artists, etc. and is not asking us to do anything further.”36

64. We are aware that the Inquiry has asked both Mr Smith and Mr Wylie to provide witness statements.

65. The security experts have suggested (a) that CTSA advice should have been provided to the Arena jointly by CTSAs from GMP and BTP; and (b) that SMG share responsibility with the police for this so-called failing.37

66. The first question is outside SMG’s knowledge, although, as we suggested in our observations on the security experts’ initial report (see text reproduced above paragraph 169 of the security experts’ addendum report), it appears to us that the email exchanges at [INQ001867] and indeed the conclusions of the police experts provide a compelling rationale for GMP to be the sole source of specialist counter-terrorism advice to the Arena. We note further that the experts have not identified any NaCTSO guidance supporting their criticism.38

67. The second point seems to us, with respect, to amount to entirely unfair criticism. SMG had a longstanding relationship with CTSAs from GMP and had no reason to question that arrangement. If the experts are correct to say that a decision should have been taken to add input from BTP, then that was a decision for others. See further in this regard paragraph 22 of Miriam Stone’s

33 Miriam Stone first witness statement, paragraph 45 [INQ025576] 34 Miriam Stone first witness statement, paragraphs 95-99 and 101-105 [INQ025576] 35 Miriam Stone first witness statement, paragraphs 71 and 75 [INQ025576; and Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraphs 7 and 20 [INQ034752] 36 Learning outcomes of the Manchester Arena table top exercise dated 17/12/2014, page 1 paragraph 5 [INQ001444] 37 Security Experts’ Initial Report, paragraphs 15, 17, 22 and 297 [INQ032612]; and also Security Experts' Addendum Report paragraphs 169-177 [INQ035292] 38 Security Experts' Addendum Report, paragraph 77 [INQ035292].

14 second statement.39 There would have been no reason to believe that CTSA advice from GMP was insufficient.

Counter-Terrorism training 68. When the Inquiry comes to consider counter-terrorism training at the Arena, it will be important to distinguish between, on the one hand, the counter-terrorism training provided by Showsec to its staff – for example, the CT online training module and the CT Awareness document [INQ012031], and on the other hand the programme of counter-terrorism training organised by SMG, some of which was provided in-house and some of which involved external sessions, much of which involved both Showsec and SMG staff.

69. The former is a matter for Showsec evidence. SMG took no part in this training, although it was of course aware that the Showsec staff at the Arena were receiving this training, and took comfort from that fact.

70. The SMG counter-terrorism training is described in some detail in Miriam Stone’s witness statements. 40 This training received top marks from Ken Upham in the course of his PSIA assessments, and, we suggest, deservedly so. There was a range of formal and informal training – some of it using NaCTSO resources, such as the Project Griffin and Project Argus training, and some of it devised in house, such as the annual table top training exercises that were put together by Miriam Stone from SMG and Tom Bailey from Showsec.

71. The security experts have made only limited criticism of the SMG counter- terrorism training (the criticism at paragraph 18 of the executive summary is put no higher than that the training was “not as good as it could have been”).41 In general terms, it is difficult to argue with that conclusion. Any system of training is capable of improvement – one can always say that more people can attend more sessions, that refresher training can be more frequent, and so on.

72. What we do say is that there was a perfectly reasonable system of training in place. Miriam Stone has given a detailed response to the points raised by the experts at paragraphs 30 to 42 of her second witness statement42, and we invite the Inquiry to review what she has said with care. In those paragraphs she explains how, contrary to the view expressed by the experts at paragraph 18 of their initial report, learning gained at external sessions was disseminated widely to staff at the Arena, in particular by means of the table top exercises.

73. The points we have made above regarding causation bear repeating here. The Inquiry is not engaged on a general review of SMG’s practices, but rather an investigation into the causes of the 22 deaths on 22 May 2017. In addressing

39 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraph 22 [INQ034752] 40 Miriam Stone first witness statement, paragraphs 69-90 [INQ025576]; Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraphs 30-42 [INQ034752] 41 Security Experts’ Initial Report, paragraph 18 [INQ032612] 42 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraphs 30-42 [INQ034752]

15 whether any suggested shortcomings in SMG training had any part to play in those deaths, it should be noted:

a. that the experts have stated that they are “content that there was a general culture [at the Arena] of looking for suspicious behaviour and reporting it when identified.” – a culture, we would add, that was in part the consequence of the training described by Miriam Stone;43 and

b. that the experts agree that both Mohammad Agha and Kyle Lawler had sufficient training as at 22 May 2017 to report a suspicious individual to a radio holder and/or supervisor so that the Sierra Control Room could have been informed.44

74. A further criticism that the experts have made in connection with training relates to the fact that representatives of external agencies, in particular the police, prior to the Attack, were not invited to attend the table top training exercises at the Arena .45 The decision not to invite external agencies was taken deliberately in light of the fact that the training scenarios focused on the time period immediately after an incident occurred and before external agencies could be expected to arrive.46 However, whilst we do not accept that this matter has a causative connection to what happened on 22 May 2017, we do accept that involving emergency services in these exercises was considered best practice, and that is indeed now the practice at the Arena.

Counter-Terrorism risk assessing 75. The security experts have been critical of the counter-terrorism risk assessment pages of SMG’s Emergency and Contingency Plans document [INQ001359].47 There is another pre-Attack SMG terrorism risk assessment document that the experts have not addressed – the SMG ‘Security Risk Analysis’ [INQ001442] – which is currently subject to the Type 2 Restriction Order. We accept that there were shortcomings with these documents. We also accept that they were not being reviewed with the appropriate frequency at the time of the Attack. In fact, neither of these documents was being used as part of the day to day process of terrorism risk assessment at the Arena in the period running up to the Attack.

76. That is not, however, the end of the story. Whatever the shortcomings with the documents, at the time of the Attack SMG did have a system (albeit one that was not paper-based) for assessing terrorism-related risks to the Arena and for putting in place appropriate mitigations. Because SMG did not (then) have internal counter-terrorism expertise, that system necessarily involved expert

43 Security Experts' Addendum Report paragraphs 95 [INQ035292] 44 Security Experts' Addendum Report paragraphs 268-9 [INQ035292] 45 Security Experts’ Initial Report, paragraphs 276-278 [INQ032612]; and Security Experts' Addendum Report paragraphs 198 and 205 [INQ035292] 46 See Miriam Stone’s discussion of this issue in the final paragraphs of document titled Learning outcomes of the Manchester Arena table top exercise dated 17/12/2014 [INQ001444] 47 Security Experts' Addendum Report, paragraphs 169-179 [INQ035292]

16 advice and guidance received by others. We invite the Inquiry to approach this issue as a matter of substance, not form.

77. At the time of the Attack there was a ‘baseline’ set of security measures at the Arena that had been developed through practice and experience, and which in practice was under continuous review. The ‘baseline’ measures were those that were at that time considered generally appropriate to mitigate terrorism risks at events in the absence of any reason to adopt enhanced measures, for example intelligence of a specific threat. It was those ‘baseline’ measures that were in place on the night of the Attack.

78. The ‘baseline’ was informed (and reviewed) by means of regular discussions with and input from the CTSAs John Archibald and Ken Upham, by SMG’s very regular interactions with BTP, by discussions with and advice from Showsec, and also by SMG’s own internal learning from NaCTSO guidance, training and desktop exercises. By means of these processes, the continuing security risks (including terrorism risks) were the subject of regular assessment and, over time, the ‘baseline’ security procedures at the Arena were adapted accordingly. For higher risk events or where there was specific intelligence from the police (or Showsec or the NAA or otherwise) that baseline would be enhanced.

79. In their addendum report the security experts emphasise the fact that “risk assessments should be regularly reviewed as the security risks dynamically change over time”.48 The evidence shows that the practical system in place at the Arena prior to the Attack for assessing risks of terrorism was indeed dynamic and reactive. Miriam Stone’s statements refer to the frequent and in depth PSIA meetings with Ken Upham, and to the fact that changes were made to the physical security arrangements at the Arena at his suggestion. She also refers to the reaction to the Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan attacks – existing security arrangements were reviewed by SMG and Showsec and also, at the request of Miriam Stone, through liaising with Ken Upham and BTP officers (see the reference to the January 2015 email to Christopher Smith and Ken Upham at paragraph [41] above).

80. Prior to the Attack, reliance on the expertise of others was a necessary feature of SMG’s counter-terrorism risk assessing process, for the simple reason that it did not then have (as it does now) internal expertise in that area. That was not in itself a shortcoming. The Inquiry will hear evidence that it was not at that time common practice in the industry for entertainment venues such as the Arena to employ specialist security advisers. See in this regard paragraph 312 of the security experts’ addendum report, referring to the letter from Lucy Noble, the Chair of the NAA – “Most venues did not have an in-house security expert to assess counter terrorism and security measures. Venues would liaise with their local CTSA for specialised counter terrorism advice.”49

48 Security Experts' Addendum Report, paragraph 338 [INQ035292] 49 Security Experts' Addendum Report paragraph 312 [INQ035292]. See also in this regard Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraph 68 [INQ034752].

17 81. We repeat – the lack of a security specialist on the staff did not mean that SMG lacked security, and counter-terrorism, advice. SMG had ready access to specialist counter-terrorism advice from Ken Upham, BTP officers and Showsec, with whom it had close and frequent contact. SMG relied on that advice. It was, we say, quite entitled to do so.

82. Risk assessment is not an end in itself, but a means to an end.50 Here, the purpose of SMG’s counter-terrorism risk assessing process was to ensure that an appropriate set of counter-terrorism mitigations was in place at the Arena, both in terms of physical measures and also associated procedures. The question for the Inquiry is whether the mitigations in place on the night of the Attack were in fact appropriate. It is to that issue that we now turn.

The experts’ view that the baseline physical security measures at the Arena should have involved an “entirely different regime” 83. The view expressed by the security experts is that the ‘baseline’ security arrangements at the Arena were not appropriate. At paragraph 673 of their initial report, the experts state: “To deliver a reasonably high level of assurance that mass casualty weapons were not posing a threat to the crowd an entirely different regime for the screening of people and their belongings would have needed to be in place. This would have involved extending the perimeter away from the Arena itself and the screening of people and their belongings involving the use of Walk Through Metal Detectors (WTMDs) backed up with Hand Held Metal Detectors (HHMD) to resolve alarms for every concertgoer.”

84. The additional security measures that the experts identify – an extended perimeter and WTMDs – are, of course, the principal extra measures that were put in place after the Attack. However, for the reasons we have already articulated, it does not follow from the fact that these measures were adopted after the Attack that they should, or even perhaps could, have been adopted prior to it. The Attack itself had a profound effect on security practice across the industry, and in particular of course at the Arena. The Inquiry must avoid the perils of hindsight bias.

85. But the Inquiry must of course still confront the question – were the security arrangements at the Arena on the night of the Attack appropriate? And, given the view expressed by the experts, in answering that question the Inquiry will have to consider (avoiding hindsight) whether an extended perimeter and WTMDs could and/or should have been in place.

86. These are complex questions, about which the Inquiry will inevitably hear a great deal of evidence in the coming weeks and months. At this stage we make

50 Field J made a similar point, albeit in the context of a civil trial, at paragraph 39 of his judgment in Uren v Corporate Leisure [2010] EWHC 46 (QB): “My findings as to the risk assessments prepared for and on behalf of the first and second defendants do not mean that Mr Uren succeeds on the issue of liability. The question for decision is not whether adequate risk assessments had been undertaken, but whether the defendants took reasonable measures to ensure that the game was safe.”

18 three high-level points that we invite the Inquiry to have in mind when considering these matters.

87. First, the location of the Arena and the status and function of the City Room would have made it (at best) extremely challenging for SMG to institute that regime (with the necessary consent of other stakeholders) on a permanent basis prior to the Attack. The witness statements of Mike Cowley and James Allen explain the high value that other stakeholders in the Victoria Exchange complex placed on maintaining public access through the City Room, rights that are also set out in their respective leases.51 Indeed, the use of the City Room as a public thoroughfare was the basis of the station redevelopment in 2013. None of this means, of course, that it would have been impossible to put these measures in place prior to the Attack. But they are part of the factual context and must be considered. And what we do say is that the competing demands on the use of the City Room meant that security considerations at this Arena were – and are – in a wholly different category to those at standalone venues such as the O2.

88. Second, the Inquiry will hear evidence that the use of WTMDs and the imposition of an extended perimeter was not standard industry practice in May 2017. The experts have not attempted any form of comparative analysis on this issue, but it is a factor that, we say, must be taken into account.

89. The letter from Lucy Noble, Chair of the NAA,52 that is referred to above contains the following relevant passages:

“Walk through metal detectors (WTMD’s) To the best of my knowledge, it was not common practice for Arenas to deploy WTMD’s for every event prior to May 2017, with the O2 London and only having them in place for all events however, they could be deployed at other venues based on events assessed as high risk due to the nature of the event, eg, boxing, or because of a specific threat as notified by CTSA. The use of WTMD’s has increased at some Arenas in the UK since May 2017 with venues such as Manchester Arena, Leeds, , Resorts World and Utilita Arena Birmingham now using them as standard equipment for all the customers visiting these facilities.

Extended Perimeters To my knowledge, it was not common practice for venues to have extended perimeters for searching visitors before May 2017 and this process has not significantly changed since [M]ay 2017”

51 James Allen first witness statement, paragraphs 19-21 and 23 [INQ025577]; and Mike Cowley second witness statement, paragraphs 7-9 [INQ034759]; and James Allen third witness statement, paragraphs 17 and 18 [INQ034754] 52 Letter from Lucy Noble to John Sharkey [INQ034755]

19 90. See also in this regard Mike Cowley’s observation that “security arrangements at the Arena were broadly comparable to those at other venues”53 and further observations on this issue in the third statement of James Allen.54

91. Third, none of the experts to whom SMG looked for specialist counter-terrorism advice in the period before the Attack suggested that there was anything wrong with the ‘baseline’ security arrangements in the City Room, far less that the “entirely different regime” outlined by the experts should be implemented. The Inquiry will hear that Ken Upham, the CTSA and expert adviser on counter- terrorism risks in crowded spaces, did not tell SMG that the City Room must be closed to the public and WTMDs routinely used for searching all customers (notwithstanding that, as DAC Lucy D’Orsi has now made clear in further evidence that she has provided on behalf of NaCTSO, such matters were within the ambit of the “bespoke security advice” that he was providing). Nor did Showsec. Nor did BTP.

92. We encourage the Inquiry to approach this issue in a commonsense manner. There is, quite simply, a stark mismatch, between, on the one hand, the radical changes to the security arrangements that the experts say should have been made, and, on the other hand, the fact that neither Ken Upham nor any of the other security professionals with intimate knowledge of the workings of the Arena, ever advised such changes.

93. We also add a further question that the Inquiry will need to consider in addressing the experts’ proposed “entirely different regime”. Would it have made a difference?

94. WTMDs would have been used for those entering the Arena, but since Abedi never tried to enter the Arena, WTMDs would have made no difference on the night. An extended perimeter would have made a difference in one sense – it would have meant that the City Room was a sterile area during and at the end of the concert. It would have meant that Abedi was unable to get into the City Room. It would also have prevented all the parents and friends waiting to meet concertgoers from entering the City Room. They would have had to wait somewhere else. And that gives rise to an uncomfortable truth that, we say, this Inquiry cannot ignore. Preventing a crowd from gathering in the City Room simply means that it will gather elsewhere – on the station concourse, say, or on the pavement at the bottom of the Hunts Bank steps. Extending the perimeter of the Arena does not mean that there will be no crowd at the edge of that perimeter for a suicide bomber to target, it simply relocates that target. We note in this regard the observations of the security experts at paragraph 114 of their Addendum Report – “Consideration should also be given to what impact extending security perimeters would have on security. For example, security checkpoints or searches away from a venue could result in external queues in vulnerable areas.”

53 Mike Cowley second witness statement, paragraph 26 [INQ034759] 54 James Allen third witness statement, paragraphs 37- 47 [INQ034754]

20 Exchanges between Miriam Stone and Rik Weightman regarding extra security measures at the Ariana Grande concert 95. At paragraph 29 of their initial report the experts assert that the email exchanges between Rik Weightman and Miriam Stone in advance of the Ariana Grande concert55 “shows that SMG was discouraging some extra security measures. From the evidence that we have this seems to have been in order to reduce additional cost to the tour and may also have been because some of the options offered wouldn’t work.”

96. As we have already submitted, it is not the experts’ function to make factual findings of this nature, and even if it was it would not be appropriate to do so before Rik Weightman and Miriam Stone have had an opportunity to explain their email conversation in the course of oral evidence. Miriam Stone vigorously rejects the experts’ interpretation of these emails.56 She says that she was simply trying to explain to Rik Weightman the practicalities and costs associated with the proposed additional security measures. The Chairman will hear oral evidence from those involved and no doubt will draw his own conclusions. For the time being, we say no more than that the slant the experts have, for whatever reason, seen fit to place on this exchange is wholly unjustified.

Bag searches 97. We have already made the general point that the experts’ criticisms of the bag searching procedures on the night of 22 May 2017 are not grounded in any potentially causative issue. Whilst this may not have been apparent at an earlier stage of the Inquiry’s work, it is now entirely clear that Abedi never put himself in a position where he might have been subject to SMG / Showsec bag searching procedures – in other words, he never attempted to enter the Arena. And had he done so he would certainly not have been permitted to enter the Arena with his bomb.

98. Miriam Stone’s second statement addresses the experts’ suggestion that the way in which bags were searched may have breached SIA rules.57 Prior to the Attack she had reviewed SIA guidance and had been reassured by Showsec that the way in which they conducted bag checks was within the rules. She understood the way in which these checks were conducted by Showsec at the Arena reflected standard practice across the security industry. Moreover, Showsec was a market leading security company and was authorised to carry out SIA training. She expected them to understand SIA rules and to abide by them – indeed, part of their specified contractual responsibility was “[e]nsuring relevant legislation is adhered to on the event day”.

Looking out for and reporting suspicious behaviour 99. We readily accept that this is a core issue, which the Inquiry will wish to probe in some depth. If we are right to say (as above) that crowds will always gather

55 Emails between Rik Weightman, Promoter’s Rep, Live Nation and Miriam Stone [INQ001623] 56 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraph 90 [INQ034752] 57 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraphs 70-74 [INQ034752]; See also James Allen third witness statement at paragraphs 34-35 [INQ034754].

21 on the perimeter of an entertainment venue and in doing so present a target to a suicide bomber, that underlines, we accept, the need for vigilant surveillance.

100. This issue has been covered in detail in the SMG command and control witness statements.58 In view of the importance of this issue and the volume of evidence about it that the Inquiry is likely to hear, we confine ourselves for the purposes of this opening statement to highlighting the following eight propositions, which we hope will assist the Inquiry in approaching this issue.

101. The importance of being watchful for suspicious behaviour was well understood by SMG and was one of the core messages that was promoted in formal and informal training. See in particular:

a. Immediately after the Stade de France / Bataclan attacks in November 2015, James Allen emailed all SMG Manchester staff reminding them of the Arena’s security housekeeping rules and encouraging all staff to ‘Question, Challenge, Report’ any suspicious activity.59

b. Informal training for SMG Manchester staff arranged by Miriam Stone during which NaCTSO ‘Stay Safe’ video was shown and discussed. More than 40 people, over half the complement, attended. Miriam Stone states that she spoke to staff during the presentation and specifically remembers “emphasising that staff should not be afraid to report any suspicious behaviour”.60

c. Project Griffin training delivered to over 50 SMG and Showsec staff in September 2016, which included training in identifying and responding to suspicious behaviour.61

d. Reporting of suspicious behaviour was also a feature of the annual table top training exercises devised and run jointly by SMG and Showsec.62

e. More generally, and going to the general ethos at the Arena, note paragraph 50 of Miriam Stone’s second witness statement: “For my own part, I personally encouraged staff to report anything suspicious or concerning. Staff were given anti- terrorism hotline cards which had telephone numbers for reporting suspicious behaviour printed on them and we put posters up on our health and safety noticeboards with the same hotline information. During our training sessions I even told

58 In particular, Miriam Stone first witness statement [INQ025576]; and Miriam Stone second witness statement [INQ034752] 59 Miriam Stone first witness statement, paragraph 73 [INQ025576]; Email from James Allen [INQ025118] 60 Miriam Stone first witness statement, paragraphs 73-74 [INQ025576]; and Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraph 33 [INQ034752] 61 James Allen first witness statement, paragraphs 125-128 [INQ025577]; and Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraph 32 [INQ034752] 62 Miriam Stone second witness statement paragraphs 35-36, 52 [INQ034752]

22 staff that if they were nervous about calling the police, they should call Whiskey Control and explain their concern. I explained that Whiskey Control can focus cameras onto the relevant individual(s) and will phone the police for them if necessary. I made it clear that if they were in any doubt that they should always report a concern and that nobody would shout if we ended up reporting things to the police all the time!”

102. We note in this regard paragraph 33 of the security experts’ addendum report, where they state: “We have not seen evidence that staff lacked confidence to report incidents immediately for fear of criticism from management. In our opinion, SMG and Showsec security staff had sufficient training, confidence, empowerment and support to report suspicious activity.”

A similar point is made at paragraph 95 of the security experts’ addendum report, where they state that, having reviewed further evidence including Miriam Stone’s second statement “We are content that there was a culture of looking for suspicious behaviour and reporting it when identified.”

103. SMG was aware that this was also a message that Showsec emphasised to its staff. SMG knew that all Showsec staff working at the Arena – both SIA licensed staff and stewards - were required to undertake the Showsec “Counter Terrorism at Events” training course.63 Moreover, Showsec staff attended some of the SMG training sessions referred to above and were exposed to the general ethos at the Arena that was encouraging of reporting suspicious activity. It was routine for the SMG Duty Manager to attend the Showsec supervisor briefings at every event, at which there was always a clear message to ‘LOOK OUT FOR SUSPICIOUS CHARACTERS’.64

104. The system in place at the Arena for looking out for suspicious behaviour included (a) using the resources of the personnel in the Whiskey Control Room during events to monitor real time CCTV footage; and (b) pre-egress checks conducted by Showsec supervisors. Both have been subject to criticism by the security experts.

a. As to the monitoring of CCTV footage by the Whiskey Control Room, see paragraphs 75 to 79 of Miriam Stone’s second witness statement. Although the experts are correct to say65 that there was no dedicated member of staff to monitor the CCTV, the staffing levels were such that in practice there was always at least one person watching the screens.66 Prior to the Attack, Whiskey Control Room staff received internal SMG

63 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraph 28 [INQ034752] ; Showsec Service Delivery Management document for Manchester Arena, page 12 [INQ012054] 64 As there was on the night of 22 May 2017 – see Miriam Stone second witness statement paragraph 53 [INQ034752]; and Showsec Briefing Sheet for Ariana Grande concert [INQ012111]. 65 Security Experts’ Initial Report, paragraphs 466-7 [INQ032612] 66 As the experts accept in the Security Experts' Addendum Report paragraph 54 [INQ035292]

23 training on the operation of the CCTV system and the identification of suspicious activity; 67 those staff were due to undertake SIA CCTV training earlier this year but this has been delayed as a result of COVID- 19.68

b. The experts’ initial report contained repeated criticism of the lack of what they describe as ‘counter terrorism sweeps’, in particular prior to egress.69 At paragraph 51 of their addendum report they explain this term as meaning a check that an area is free from threats to the crowd, and that such a check “should look out for, among other things, suspicious items, individuals and activity”.70 In fact, and as explained at paragraph 54 of Miriam Stone’s second witness statement, checks for suspicious activity were very much part of the standard pre-egress checks conducted as a matter of routine by experienced Showsec supervisors. As far as SMG was concerned, the pre-ingress and egress checks conducted by Showsec amounted to what the experts label ‘counter-terrorism sweeps’. We note in this regard Showsec’s assertion that the final pre-egress check conducted by Jordan Beak on the night of the Attack took 7-8 minutes, as opposed to the 1 minute suggested by the experts, and we further note that the evidence of Jordan Beak himself is that the check took 5-10 minutes.71

105. There were plentiful means by which suspicious behaviour could be reported to the Sierra Control Room. This is an important point in terms of the events of the night. The experts state, wrongly, that “there were no other forms of communication with the Event Control Room other than the radio channels from Lawler’s reported location” – i.e. the City Room.72 The true position, as explained in Miriam Stone’s second witness statement,73 is that staff in the City room had a variety of means with which to communicate with the Sierra Control Room, beyond the obvious means of their own radios. There were telephones in the box office in the City Room and in a nearby management suite that were, according to Ms Stone, often used to contact the control room. SMG merchandise management staff were present in the City Room who (unlike Showsec staff) would have had their mobile phones with them, which could have been used in an emergency. Most striking of all, perhaps, is Ms Stone’s evidence that it would only have taken about one minute to walk from the City room to the Sierra Control Room, and that it was quite common for members of staff simply to come and knock on the door during a show.

67 Mike Cowley first witness statement, paragraph 33 [INQ025586] 68 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraph 79 [INQ034752] 69 See, for example, Security Experts’ Initial Report, paragraph 43 [INQ032612]“We have seen no evidence the pre-egress checks formally included a counter-terrorism sweep.” 70 Security Experts' Addendum Report, paragraph 51 [INQ035292] 71 Security Experts' Addendum Report paragraph 293 [INQ035292]; and Jordan Beak witness statements [INQ011960] and [INQ006521] 72 Security Experts’ Initial Report, paragraph 751 [INQ032612] 73 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraphs 91-93 [INQ034752]

24 106. There was a concrete record at the Arena of suspicious behaviour being spotted and reported, including only a few days before the Attack. A series of examples has been provided of occasions when suspicious behaviour was noted by Showsec staff and reported to the control room. See paragraphs 97-106 of Miriam Stone’s first statement and, in particular, paragraph 47 of her second statement, when she describes two such incidents that took place on the same night only four days before the Attack.

107. SMG was aware that BTP officers routinely patrolled the City Room on event nights. Given all the guidance and training that SMG had received from NaCTSO and others as to the importance of looking out for suspicious behaviour, SMG assumed that the BTP officers on patrol would be performing a counter-terrorism function. Indeed, it was reasonable to assume that the BTP officers would have had more specialised training, would have received a more detailed briefing and would have had access to better intelligence than the SMG and Showsec staff on duty that night. The Inquiry will have to consider the evidence that in fact the BTP officers on duty that night did not have any form of counter-terrorism briefing, and did not follow instructions about the timing and manner of their patrols (matters that the security experts have not seen fit to criticise).

108. In light of the matters set out above, at the time of the Attack SMG considered (and was entitled to consider) that there was an effective system in place for looking out for suspicious behaviour.

109. There is no evidence to support the experts’ suggestion that staff may not have had the confidence to report suspicious behaviour immediately, for fear of criticism from management. At paragraph 19 of their initial report the experts advance this as a possible explanation for the fact that Abedi was not apprehended. They refer to no evidence in support of that hypothesis and there is none. In responding to it, Miriam Stone stated that “To my knowledge, none of the managers at the Arena has ever responded negatively to staff making reports. The culture was – and is – that if you see something, you call it in.”74 It is also notable that the experts advance their three hypotheses at paragraph 19 of the report as if they are the only possible explanations for what happened that night. Determining the truth of what happened will of course be a matter for the Chairman once he has heard evidence from all involved, but we respectfully suggest that there is at least one further hypothesis, which is that the failure by Lawler and Agha to report concerns about Abedi to the Sierra Control Room was the result of simple human error on the part of well-trained and well- motivated members of Showsec staff. We note that the security experts have recognised this point at paragraph 35 of their addendum report.

G. Narrative of SMG’s performance – the events of the night of 22 May 2017

74 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraph 45 [INQ034752]

25 110. In this section we address Parts 3(i), 3(iii), 5(iii), 5(iv) and 5(v) of the Terms of Reference – the events immediately prior to the detonation and the events following it, including SMG’s operational response.

The events immediately prior to the detonation 111. Miriam Stone was the SMG Duty Manager for the Ariana Grande concert on the night of 22 May 2017. Her post during the show was in the Sierra Control Room, looking out over the stage and the crowd inside the Arena. With her in the Sierra Control Room was Tom Rigby, the Showsec Head of Security, as well as Michelle Ramsbottom, the Radio Controller and Jade Duxbury, the medic radio controller.75

112. One of the many roles of the team in the Sierra Control Room during a show was to receive reports of suspicious activity in or near the Arena and to direct a response. As noted above, they were well-practised in that. Miriam Stone and Tom Rigby had also been on duty together four nights before when the two separate incidents to which we have already referred took place. Had they received a report about Abedi – whether on the radio, or by phone or by someone walking the short distance from the City Room to the Sierra Control Room and knocking on the door - they would have reacted. Miriam Stone will give evidence about what she would have done.76 Her evidence will be that the first they knew that anything was amiss was when the bomb went off.

113. The events that followed moved at great speed. The Inquiry will hear evidence from those involved. That evidence, we say, will show that SMG staff acted with professionalism, skill and, in many cases, bravery in responding to the terrible events that were unfolding. Whilst the Inquiry will understandably focus, in considering SMG’s internal training, on counter-terrorism training, it must not be forgotten that SMG’s routine training also covered a host of other subjects. One of those subjects was emergency evacuation – including, as Miriam Stone observed in her first statement “losing an exit”.77 It was this training, we suggest, that kicked in on the night.

114. The security experts have suggested that the Sierra Control Room was understaffed because the single radio controller who was on duty was insufficient to deal with the radio traffic on all the different channels in use.78 SMG does not accept either that the control room was understaffed on this basis on the night of 22 May 2017, or that there was a more general problem in this regard. Detailed evidence on this subject is given in Miriam Stone’s second witness statement.79 In brief, a single radio operator was quite sufficient to undertake the role at a show such as the Ariane Grande concert. In any event, extra assistance was always available and could be summoned at short notice, and two radio operators were assigned to shows where the radio traffic was

75 Miriam Stone first witness statement, paragraph 133 [INQ025576] 76 Miriam Stone first witness statement, paragraphs 143 to 147 [INQ025576] 77 Miriam Stone first witness statement, paragraph 146 [INQ025576] 78 Security Experts’ Initial Report, paragraphs 39 and 149 [INQ032612] 79 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraphs 84 to 87 [INQ034752]

26 expected to be busier. We note that in their addendum report the security experts have now withdrawn this criticism in the light of Miriam Stone’s further evidence.80

999 call 115. There is a suggestion in the security experts’ report that the making of the 999 call may have been delayed because of what the experts describe as understaffing in the Sierra Control Room.81 This is not accepted. It is clear from the evidence before the Inquiry that the 999 call was made promptly from the Whiskey Control Room, by Paul Johnson, who describes making the call as his first priority.82 He states that it took him several minutes to get through, but that appears to have been because the emergency lines were effectively being deluged with calls about the explosion. We note that this criticism has also been withdrawn in the security experts’ addendum report.83

Evacuation 116. Miriam Stone dealt with the emergency evacuation of the Arena from her post in the Sierra Control Room. She describes the steps that she took, and in particular her immediate decision to divert people away from the City Room, in her first witness statement.84

117. Miriam Stone refers in the same statement to the fact that mass crushing incidents such as Hillsborough are common points of reference in the entertainment industry. In that connection, we submit that it is greatly to the credit of the SMG and Showsec staff on duty that night that the understandable alarm following the explosion did not result in a mass crushing incident, and that 14,000 people were evacuated from the Arena without serious injury. We note that the security experts share this view.85

118. The security experts’ report contains a series of criticisms about the way in which Tour personnel were dealt with in the immediate aftermath of the explosion.86 They criticise the priority that was given to getting the tour bus out of the venue because they had seen no evidence that this was a considered response, and suggest that this action would have taken staff away from other roles. They also suggest that the promoter’s representative was wrongly informed about the explosion before Showsec staff. SMG does not accept that any of these criticisms are well founded, for reasons set out in Miriam Stone’s second witness statement. 87 Some of the explanations touch on sensitive matters and so we say no more about this matter here.

80 Security Experts' Addendum Report, paragraph 70 [INQ035292] 81 Security Experts’ Initial Report, paragraphs 50 and 778 [INQ032612] 82 Paul Johnson first witness statement, paragraph 85 [INQ025575] 83 Security Experts' Addendum Report, paragraph 187 [INQ035292] 84 Miriam Stone first witness statement paragraphs 149-150 [INQ025576] 85 Security Experts’ Initial Report, paragraph 51 [INQ032612] 86 Security Experts’ Initial Report, paragraph 49 [INQ032612] 87 Miriam Stone second witness statement, paragraphs 94 to 97 [INQ034752]

27 Immediate medical assistance to victims 119. Miriam Stone contacted Ian Parry, the leader of the contracted medics from Emergency Training, and told him that there were individuals in the City room who needed medical attention. Mr Parry, understandably, told her that he wanted an assurance that the City Room was safe before he took his medics into the scene of an explosion. Ms Stone told him that, as far as she could tell from the CCTV pictures, it was safe. Again, it is greatly to the credit of Mr Parry and his team that they then went straight into the City Room. They must have accepted that they were doing so at considerable personal risk.88

120. Miriam Stone also put out a radio request for first aid trained members of SMG staff to go to the City Room if they felt able to do so. Several did, including John Clarkson and Paul Worsley, whose actions will feature in the evidence heard by the Inquiry. Their actions also, we submit, are to be praised.

Liaison with emergency services 121. James Allen was not on duty at the Ariana Grande concert. He was contacted by Miriam Stone very shortly after the explosion and came straight to the Arena, arriving in the Whiskey Control Room (the Sierra Control Room having been by that stage evacuated) at approximately 11.00 pm. At that point, he took charge of operations from Miriam Stone.89

122. James Allen describes his liaison with the emergency services, in particular Fred Warburton and Mark Dexter of GMP, at paragraphs 142-155 of his first statement.

H. Narrative of SMG’s performance – other matters

123. In this section we deal briefly with two more of the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference.

124. We have been invited to address Part 2(iv) of the Terms of Reference, which asks what if anything SMG knew about the build up to the Attack, including attack planning and reconnaissance, bomb preparation and assembly and the movement of Salman Abedi and other relevant associates in the lead up to the Attack.

125. Our short answer is that SMG knew nothing of any of these matters.

126. We have also been asked to address Part 7(iii) of the Terms of Reference – survivability, including whether any inadequacies in the emergency response contributed to individual deaths and/or whether any of the deaths could have been prevented.

88 Miriam Stone first witness statement, paragraph 152 [INQ025576]; and Ian Parry witness statement [INQ006866] 89 James Allen first witness statement, paragraphs 135-140 [INQ025577]

28 127. Although it is possible that SMG employees may be able to assist with evidential issues arising in relation to some of the particular deceased, we do not think, in terms of a narrative of SMG’s corporate performance, that there is anything we can usefully add here to the submissions that we have already made in relation to the other Terms of Reference.

I. Post – Attack changes at the Arena

128. As stated at the outset of this document, SMG has made significant changes to the way in which the Arena is operated since the Attack. Those changes reflect the developments in security best practice across the entertainment industry that are a direct consequence of the Attack, as well as SMG’s determination to try and prevent any repetition of the terrible events of 22 May 2017.

129. The changes are set out in James Allen’s second witness statement.90 These matters will clearly be of relevance to any recommendations that the Inquiry may wish to make, and we note that the Inquiry intends to hear evidence in that regard towards the end of the oral evidence sessions.

130. The main changes that have been made, which we summarise very briefly here, fall into two categories.

131. First, with the consent of the landlord and other tenants of the complex, changes have been made to the physical security arrangements at the Arena. In essence, the changes have involved increasing the security perimeter away from the entrances to the Arena and introducing a standardised series of security checks and searches in areas within the security perimeter (these areas being referred to as “controlled spaces”). The regime for checking and searching is more intensive than that in place at the time of the Attack, and includes the use of WTMDs at all events. The controls on the new perimeter mean that no one without a ticket (or a valid access card holder) can access the controlled spaces at certain times on an Event Day. The City Room is one of these controlled spaces and is no longer open to the public prior to, during and following an event.

132. Second, since the Attack SMG has appointed a security director who has responsibility for all SMG’s venues in Europe. He was formerly a senior police officer with Greater Manchester Police and was Deputy head of Stadium Safety and Security at Manchester United Football Club before joining SMG. He provides in-house security expertise, in particular in the field of counter- terrorism. Whilst SMG still conducts PSIA assessments with GMP, the security director is developing internal processes that are designed to ensure that the prevailing counter terrorism threat is regularly reviewed, that measures are developed to protect visitors to SMG’s venues, including the assessment of new technology and tactics, and that SMG’s security operations are independently audited to make sure that standards are maintained.

90 James Allen second witness statement [INQ032858]

29 J. Conclusion

133. We finish by repeating our expression of sympathy, on behalf of SMG, to the families of Salman Abedi’s 22 innocent victims and to all those who survived the Attack. And we also repeat that SMG is committed to assisting the Inquiry in establishing the circumstances of those deaths, and the lessons to be learned from them.

ANDREW O’CONNOR QC

Temple Garden Chambers, London. EC4Y 9DA

28 August 2020

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