To What Extent Was the Role of John F. Kennedy Significant for the Outcome of the Berlin Crisis in the Year 1961?

To what extent was the role of John F. Kennedy significant for the outcome of the Berlin Crisis in the year 1961?

Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy in Vienna in 1961.

History Internal Assessment HL

Personal code: gbk997

Word count: 2,200

24.3.2017 Contents

1. Identification and evaluation of sources ...... 1

2. Investigation ...... 3

3. Reflection ...... 8

4. Bibliography ...... 9

5. Appendix ...... 10

History Internal Assessment

1. Identification and evaluation of sources

This investigation will examine the role of the leader of the United States, John F. Kennedy, in the Berlin crisis. The research question investigated is the following: To what extent was the role of John F. Kennedy significant for the outcome of the Berlin Crisis in the year 1961? The year 1961 was chosen as it was the first year of Kennedy’s presidency and the year most crucial for the Berlin crisis. The construction of the Berlin Wall will be regarded as the main outcome of the crisis.1

“Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, 1953–1964” by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was published in 2007. The contents of the memoirs have been narrated by Khrushchev himself but edited by his son Sergei Khrushchev. The main purpose of the memoirs is to bring insight into the perspective of Khrushchev and tell the story of his rule from his own viewpoint. Therefore the memoirs as a primary source are especially valuable as they show the first-hand experience of Khrushchev in a very clear way.

In the context of this research the memoirs are valuable as they show the perspective of the other leader. Even though this investigation focuses on the role of Kennedy it’s important to examine the other superpower leader as well and especially the ways he saw his opponent Kennedy as a leader.

However as the memoirs have been narrated by Khrushchev himself they are very subjective and only show one perspective. The book tends to portray Soviet Union and the decisions made by Khrushchev in a positive light. It could be possible that Khrushchev has knowingly left some things unsaid that could be interpreted negatively for his administration. On the other hand the value of showing Khrushchev’s point of view is to some extent a limitation as the memoirs do not show the perspective and decision-making that took place on the other side in the Kennedy administration.

“Berlin 1961 – Kennedy, Khrushchev and the most dangerous place on Earth” (2011) has been written by Frederick Kempe. Kempe is an awarded journalist and editor mostly known

1 Office of the Historian (2016) Milestones: 1953–1960; The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1961. Available at: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/berlin-crises [Last accessed 12.3.2016]

History Internal Assessment for his work in the Wall Street Journal. He is the president and CEO of the Atlantic Council.2 The purpose of his book is to be a historical research book about the events of Berlin in the year 1961. It concentrates on the differing sides of the crisis as it discusses the points of views of all leaders connected to the crisis.

As the book is very narrowly focused on the topic of this research it’s very valuable as it gives a wide and rather objective picture of the Berlin crisis in 1961. The book has been published in 2011 and therefore it’s able to take into account all the available source material which maybe hasn’t been available in the earlier years. Due to this the scope of the research is much larger and the writer is able to make judgements based on variety of sources. However this narrow focus can to some extent be regarded as a limiting factor as the book is so closely focused on the events of one year that the bigger picture of the Cold War context might not be visible.

2 Atlantic Council (2016) Frederick Kempe: Full Bio. Available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/about/experts/list/frederick-kempe#fullbio [Last accessed 1.3.2016]

History Internal Assessment

2. Investigation

Throughout the Cold War divided Germany remained as one of the main issues of the period. As both USA and Soviet Union saw their control over Germany as vital and were committed to keep it divided, the struggle over the area continued for more than four decades.3 Especially the city of Berlin which itself was divided into four zones (see appendix for maps) was something that affected the superpower relations ever since World War Ⅱ.4

John F. Kennedy became the president of USA in January 1961.5 Kennedy wanted to bring change and one of his key ideas was the “New Frontier” which for foreign policy meant military build-up mixed with the ideas of peaceful cooperation. Kennedy stepping up as the president introduced significant contrast to his predecessor president Eisenhower.6 The year 1961 was significant for the Berlin crisis as well. Ever since the speech delivered by Nikita Khrushchev in November of 1958 the situation over Berlin had been tense. Khrushchev demanded the end of the four-power occupation of Berlin and tried to pressure the western powers out by threatening to grant East Germany full access to the city.7 In 1961 Khrushchev renewed this threat and therefore made the western influence in West Berlin vulnerable which was something unacceptable for the USA and Kennedy.8

It can be argued that Kennedy stepping up as president brought change and therefore significantly affected the Berlin crisis.9 His rule in 1961 was flawed by inconsistency in foreign policy and by mistakes that portrayed him as a weak leader for the Soviets.10 He was an unexperienced leader determined to avoid conflict and therefore Khrushchev was able to pressure him and construct the Berlin Wall without a military conflict.11

3 Melvyn P. Leffler & Odd Arne Westad (2010) The Cambridge History of the Cold War – Volume 2, Crises and Détente. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. p. 119. 4 Office of the Historian 5 Jeffrey D. Sachs (2013) To Move the World – JFK’s Quest for Peace. New York; Random House. p. 3. 6 Richard D. Williamson (2012) First Steps Toward Détente: American Diplomacy in the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1963. Lanham, Maryland; Lexington Books. p. 74. 7 William Taubman (2003) Khrushchev – The Man and his Era. New York; W.W Norton & Company. p. 396-397. 8 Leffler & Westad p. 119. 9 Williamson p. 74. 10 Frederick Kempe (2011) Berlin 1961 – Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth. New York; G.P Putnam’s Sons. p. 177. 11 Taubman p. 495-496.

History Internal Assessment

During his presidential run Kennedy took tough positions especially on disarmament and Germany promising to build-up US military strength.12 Despite this he was still seen as the favourable candidate by the Soviets as Khrushchev disliked the anti-communism of the Republican candidate Nixon.13 At the time of Kennedy’s election the hopes for possible improvements in the superpower relations increased and especially Khrushchev believed that he could engage in negotiations with the new president. Khrushchev saw that Kennedy understood the need for improved relations better than Eisenhower.14

For Khrushchev it was important to resolve the Berlin crisis during 1961 as he felt to some extent pressured by the leader of East Germany Ulbricht who was anxious about the growing refugee problem outwards of East Berlin.15 Another motive for Khrushchev was his need to consolidate communist influence in Europe. He saw that he had been losing in Europe ever since the creation of NATO and implementation of the Marshall Plan. Soviet victories in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the space race would in Khrushchev’s mind be furthermore consolidated by securing the Soviet influence in Berlin and Europe. Thus proving communism superior in all areas of the Cold War.16

From the beginning of his presidency Kennedy’s foreign policy was to some extent incoherent. The Soviet Foreign Ministry for example described Kennedy as a pragmatic man who advocated improved superpower relations but at the same time wanted military build-up and protect US influence in Berlin.17 Furthermore Kennedy was afraid of looking like he was being too soft on communism as his margin thin victory in the elections increased the backlash from the Republicans.18 Especially during his first year in office his foreign policy was significantly affected by this inner struggle of wanting arms control and change for better relations but also needing to portray himself as a harsh anti-communist leader continuing the containment policy of his predecessors.19

12 Aleksandr Fursenko & Timothy Naftali (2007) Khrushchev’s Cold War. New York; W.W Norton & Company. p. 338-339. 13 Nikita Khrushchev (2007) Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, 1953–1964. Edited by Sergei Khrushchev. Pennsylvania; The Pennsylvania State University Press. p. 295. 14 Ibid. p. 296-297. 15 Kempe p. 84. 16 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (1965) A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. New York; Houghton Mifflin. p. 345-346. 17 Taubman p. 484-485. 18 Sachs p. 10. 19 Ibid. p. 8.

History Internal Assessment

Even though Kennedy wanted change towards better relations he found it difficult to escape the Cold War policies of Truman and Eisenhower.20 Ideology played important role in the Cold War as well as in Kennedy’s foreign policy. Continuing the path of his predecessors his main foreign policy motive was to try to contain the spread of communism and prevent neutral countries from becoming communist. That affected his motivation in Berlin as well.21

Furthermore factors affecting Kennedy’s motives in Berlin were the other areas important in the Cold War. Kennedy saw that he could not secure a victory in Berlin if he didn’t win in the areas closest to him in Latin America.22 The fear about communism spreading in his “back- yard” led to an obsession to destroy the Cuban revolutionary and therefore the Bay of Pigs fiasco.23 Kennedys’ failure at the Bay of Pigs had huge impact as it portrayed him as an inexperienced and weak leader.24 However for Khrushchev it was a stroke of luck as his opponent showed weakness and incompetence in a situation of international importance.25

Both Kennedy and Khrushchev had shown interest in meeting with each other since the beginning of Kennedy’s presidency.26 In May it was agreed that the leaders would meet in June in Vienna.27 For Khrushchev Vienna was the perfect opportunity to discuss Berlin but Kennedy on the other hand lacked new resolutions to offer and therefore aimed at avoiding the subject of Berlin.28 The US course of action was therefore only to show to Khrushchev that USA would not compromise on Berlin and was determined to stand up against the Soviets if needed.29 Kennedy’s policy regarding Berlin was continuity to the one of Eisenhower’s but Kennedy offered more flexibility and accepted Khrushchev’s proposal for peaceful coexistence.30

During the summit Khrushchev repeated his earlier ultimatum about blocking the western access to West Berlin if the problem was not resolved. However Kennedy stood his ground and explained that West Europe was so important for the US national security that they could not risk their influence in Berlin. Furthermore as both leaders were equally stubborn in their

20 Leffler & Westad p. 132. 21 Ibid. p. 122. 22 Ibid. p. 120. 23 Ibid. p. 121. 24 Kempe p. 176. 25 Ibid. p. 177. 26 Khrushchev p. 297. 27 Kempe p. 197. 28 Ibid. p.195-196. 29 Schlesinger p. 380. 30 Khrushchev p. 300.

History Internal Assessment positions the summit saw no resolution to the crisis of Berlin.31 The inability to compromise and find agreements was something blocking the resolutions in Vienna but in the larger scale it was the reason for all Cold War tensions in general.32

Kennedy described the Vienna Summit as the “roughest thing of his life”. Khrushchev had met his young opponent with brutality and won Kennedy in the mental power game of the leaders. Khrushchev had destroyed the new president and again made him seem weak.33 However Khrushchev in his memoirs describes Kennedy as a man of valuable qualities that grew is stature during Vienna.34 Despite this he did still see Kennedy as a president who wanted to avoid confrontation and could therefore be pushed around.35

After the summit Khrushchev issued another six month ultimatum to resolve the problem of Berlin.36 As a countermove Kennedy increased military expenditure and sent more troops to West Berlin mainly to protect the city and to prepare for possible war.37 38 Finally Khrushchev saw no other solution than to build a wall proposed already before by Ulbricht and the Berlin Wall was constructed on 13th of August in 1961. Therefore Khrushchev would be able to control the flow of people on the border and secure his position. However he was unsure on how the Americans would react.39 There was a border stand-off at the Checkpoint Charlie between Soviet and US tanks which was close to developing into a military conflict but was neutralised overnight. That furthermore showed that in the end neither superpower was ready for military conflict over Berlin.40

To conclude it can be said that Kennedy’s role was significant. He brought change as the new president and as a whole his foreign policy was mixed regarding the question of Berlin. Even though he was determined to resolve the problem via negotiations he still later on resorted to military threat by building up the armed forces and by that showed inability to solve the crisis.41 The construction of the Berlin Wall can also be seen as a direct consequence of the

31 Taubman p. 499. 32 Khrushchev p. 305. 33 Taubman p. 495. 34 Khrushchev p. 305 35 Taubman p. 495. 36 Ibid. p. 500. 37 Ibid. p. 501. 38 Khrushchev p. 308. 39 Taubman p. 505-506. 40 Khrushchev p. 312. 41 Thomas G. Paterson (1989) Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963. New York; Oxford University Press. p. 6.

History Internal Assessment failure to negotiate resolutions in Vienna.42 Kennedy’s role in Vienna was significant as it proved to Khrushchev that he could pressure Kennedy into an outcome favourable for him.43

42 Khrushchev p. 313. 43 Taubman p. 495.

History Internal Assessment

3. Reflection

This investigation allowed me to examine interesting and important Cold War topic. It was fascinating to study something which had happened fairly recently in the modern history. However clear limitation for a Cold War topic is the wide scope of information available. To some extent it was overwhelming to try to gather all the information regarding this topic and make sense of it. Historians studying similar topics face difficulties in selecting what to include and what not. As Cold War was a complex period where everything was connected somehow it’s difficult to try to include everything necessary without leaving out anything important.

In this investigation various methods of historical research were used. During the research process both primary and secondary sources were used to create a wider scope. Especially primary sources by people in the Kennedy administration and the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev brought valuable first-hand experience and showed the fascinating nature of studying sources from people who have experienced the events themselves. The examination of memoirs was something really interesting as it showed the way world leaders think and act.

Simultaneously it proved the limitations in studying primary sources that tend to be very subjective and limited in their views. Therefore limitation facing historians doing similar research is the subjectivity of sources. Whereas on the other hand it’s extraordinarily valuable to examine the memoirs of a Cold War leader it’s at the same time very limited by their own perspective and doesn’t succeed in the objectivity crucial for investigation such as this. That creates struggle when evaluating which sources are trustworthy and which not.

To some extent it was difficult to find differing perspectives which are important for a balanced historical investigation. As much of the source material had similar views it was hard to find counterarguments which would benefit the analysis. As a whole this investigation gave valuable and fascinating insight into the way of historian thinking. It proved the difficulties in trying to study huge amounts of source material and forming concrete arguments based on that.

History Internal Assessment

4. Bibliography

Atlantic Council (2016) Frederick Kempe: Full Bio. Available at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/about/experts/list/frederick-kempe#fullbio [Last accessed 1.3.2016]

Fursenko, Aleksandr & Naftali, Timothy (2007) Khrushchev’s Cold War. New York; W.W Norton & Company.

Kempe, Frederick (2011) Berlin 1961 – Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth. New York; G.P Putnam’s Sons.

Khrushchev, Nikita (2007) Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, 1953–1964. Edited by Sergei Khrushchev. Pennsylvania; The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Leffler, Melvyn P. & Westad, Odd Arne (2010) The Cambridge History of the Cold War – Volume 2, Crises and Détente. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.

Office of the Historian (2016) Milestones: 1953–1960; The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1961. Available at: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/berlin-crises [Last accessed 12.3.2016]

Paterson, Thomas G. (1989) Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961- 1963. New York; Oxford University Press.

Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2013) To Move the World – JFK’s Quest for Peace. New York; Random House.

Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. (1965) A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. New York; Houghton Mifflin.

Taubman, William (2003) Khrushchev – The Man and his Era. New York; W.W Norton & Company.

Williamson, Richard D. (2012) First Steps Toward Détente: American Diplomacy in the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1963. Lanham, Maryland; Lexington Books.

History Internal Assessment

5. Appendix

Figure 5.1. Map showing the division of Germany into four zones after 1945

Figure 5.2. Map of Berlin, showing the course of the Berlin Wall