>* «.>•.'.3 fJ " - 3 Code Number
a, :•.: u o o : • 2 M »* IB - 1933
"A Critioal dialysis of the Aisno-Marne Offensive."
Submitted by
A?JS
The Command and General Stnff Sohool Fort Loavonworth, Kansas Port Leavem/orth, Kansas IE May,
1EEKORANDUM TOR: The Director Second Year Class, Tho Cownand and General Staff School, Port Lcavenworth, Kansas.
SUBJECT: A Critical Analysis of the
I. PAPERS ACCOMPANYING: 1. A Bibliography for this study. 2. Maps: Situation Map. Railroad and Hi^roay Map. Approximate ordor of Battle July 18, 1918. II. THE STUDY PRESENTED. — A critical analysis of the Aisne-Marne Offensive.
INTRODUCTION The Aisme-Mame Offensive nay "be classified as one of the most impor tant operations of the vrhole war. It turned the tide of war; restored the initiative to the Allied arms; (l) brought about the transition of the German Armies from tho elation of victory to the despondenoy of defeat, for on «T'ily 18th that all important quality "Morale" had been reborn in the Allies and "there sourdpd forth the trvmpet that never called retreat". (2) This offensive is also important, to us as Americans, for the reason th*t it was the first major offensive battle of the \rar in whioh tho Ameri can Army "participated. Wo find eifht American divisions playing an impor tant part in this battle and an American officer (Major General Hunter Li&rett) commanding the Fir at American Corps* In addition we find two American divisions, the 1st and 2nd, with the famous lat Moroccan Division delivering the "Coupe de belier" or battering ram blow. (3)
III. HISTORICAL PACTS RELATING K) THE SUBJECT. ~ Confident of viotory, the Germans had orossed the Marne for the second time, and as in 1914 created an excellent opportunity for an Allied counter offensive, ftiey conducted major operations on the southeastern and eastern front of the great Marne salient and at the same time left the forces on the west front of tho salient so weak that an attack in force there was almost sure to prove disastrous. (4) Von Ludendorff believed the Allies to be fully occupied at the south eastern point of the salient. (5) At the time of the German drive for Aoiena it is said that von Ludendorff "pooh-poohed" Poch«o strategio re serve. (6) If this is true we shall see the mistake he made in not giving this subject a more oaroful analysis three months later when three hwdred thousand American soldiers were available for use at the front and more than 1,200,000 American troops had arrived in Franoe. (7) (1) Pro, 264-5; MSB, 61r, Bui, 222 (S) Boo, 309; Pag, 45 (3) Ayr, 108; Pal, 298; Van, 117 U) Vim, 99; MSB, 622-3; Hart, 419; Tan, 1; Hin, 370,376,377,370; LT, 95 (5) Man, 171; now, 330 (6) MoP, 394 (7) WC, 69; How, 332 When the Goman Charapaflno—Llarne attack had Jyjen stopped and the Allied counter-offensive launched on July 18, 1918, the boundary of the llarno saliont ran as follows: from Fontenoy (west of Soissons); a littl e east of south to Bolloau; thence to the Marao River south of Chateau- Thierry; thence alon* the north tank of the IJarne beyond Glond; thence south of the Ifarne River to St. Agnan and Comblizy; thence east of north to Oeuilly, Toiircy and YrltW» to west of Rhoims near Thillois. (B) The base of the salient, from west of Soissons to v/est of Rheims, was about sixty kilometers and the depth of the salient v/as about forty kilometers. (9) The Uat-ne salient was vulnerable; its weak points strategically were the sectors on each side of it near Its base (west of Soissons and west of Bheims); because an attack in force there by threatening the communications of the occupying troops, would, if successful, force their retreat. (10) The German lines of communications in the Mame salient consisted of the Soiss »ns—Fismes—Rheims Railway running across the base of the salient and parallel to the Voslo River; the Rheims—Fisraes—Paris Railway which parallels the Ourcq Rivor from Fere-en-Tardenois and crosses the Soiesons- Chateau-i'hierry highway about half way between Soissons and Chateau-Thierry; and the Soissons—Chateau-Thierry highway parallel to the western side of the salient and cot far from the front lines. (11) Howland states that the Germans had started to construct a branch railroad from north of Rheims to west of Rheims but this road was still incomplete when the counteroffen sive was launched July 18. (12) Owing to the inadequacy and location of the German line of cortnunica tions the salient was net stable. (1?) The Germans, realizing their lines of communications were inadequate endeavored to correct the supply situation by the c°.r>turo of Compio^ne on June 9. failing in th'a they tried to t*;ke Rheims in their Chrmaign—Marne offensive. Had they captured Rheims as pl?mned, the supply situation would have been helped materially. However, this attack only rrnde the supply situation worse as it increased the area and the number of troops to bo supplied without adding to the supply faoilies. (14) Owing to tho failure of the attack on Rhoins and the continuous bombardment of the bridges over the llarno the supply of the German troops south of the Marne River became increasingly difficult. (15) July 1, 1918, there were two hundred seven German divisions on the wes tern front. July 15, eighty-one cf these divisions (sixty-five fresh) wer*" in reserve, and on July 18, sixty-five were in reserve (thirty-four fresh), (16) There were more than forty divisions in the Marae salient, (17) Eleven of these divisions considerably depleted in artillery and personnel held p. front of thirty mills from Chateau-Thierry to the Aisne Fiver, (18) Six reserve divisions were held in the salient as supporting troops. (19) The remainder were ooramitted to battle in the southeastern and eastern parts of the salient. (20) Although the Germans had thus far failed to defeat the French in thoir Champagne—Marne offensive the morale of the soldiers was good. The Germans believed that there was no possibility of a counter offensive. In fact some of the soldiers were sent to the fields to harvest the wheat whioh the French had planted. (21) (8) How, 329; P&g, 65; Pet, Operations Map (9) How, i>29; Pag, 55; Pet, Operations Kap (10) How, 329; Hin, 381; Sim, 154-157 (11) How, 329; Uio, 14; Sar, 94; MSB, 637-8; Hin, 370 (12) How, 329 (13) MSB, 637-8; How, 329; Hin, 383 (Hj How, 329-30; Mau, 93 to 96 (15) MSB, 641; Br5 Enc, 933; How, 330 (16) V/C, 70; Hart, 422 (17) WC, 73; MSB, 638; How, 330 J18) V/C, 73; KSB, 622; Pet, Situation L'ap J19) M & H, 66; Pet, Situation Map 20) WC, 73; How, 332-3 (21) MSB, 622; How, 330; Hin, 380; Hal, 285 -2 By the 16th of July the Germans estimated that the sacrifice in men and material vihioh would result from a continuation of the attaok "by tho Seventh Army south of the Marne would not correspond to the probable f^in. However, thoy believed that on tho oast front of tho Seventh Army there was some hope for the progress of tho attack as an advance here would com pel the French to evacuate the Reims basin. (22) Tho Army Croup German Crown Prince issued orders at 12:20 PM July 17, to tho First and Seventh Armies for an attaok to be exeouted withbut fail on July 21 to drive the Frenoh out of the Reims arc — preparations wero ordered to be hastened, especially the shifting of the artillery and the bringing up of artillery ammunition. (23) The Seventh Array immediately issued the necessary orders for the rein foroement of Corps Borne which was to maka the main effort of the Seventh Army in this attack. (24) Thus we see the German high command frantically endeavoring to improve the supply situation by tho capture of Reims and widening the oast flunk of the salient, but giving little or no consideration to a possible Allied counteroffensive against their present inadequate supply line bordering the west flank of the salient. Owing tc the exoellent railroad net around the Marne salient the Frenoh had littlo difficulty in concentrating and supplying troops engaged in defending and later reducing it. The railway froa Epernay to Reims paral leled the southeastern face at a distance of about five miles from the front; on the west face at nearly equidistant intervals of about eight miles, four railway lines approached the front as follows: the lines front Compiegne to Soissons; from Paris to Chateau-Thierry, and two branch linen leading to Fere-en-Tardenois and Soissons. A seotion of the Paris—Chalons railroad east of Chateau Thierry wan in possession of the German divisions south of tho Marne until July 20th, and the nearest railroad in rear of this point was the Paris—Yitry line, about 30 miles south, (25) Tho front from Relua to the Marne offered very little concealment for a concentration of troops for an offensive. The front from Epernay to east of Chateau-Thierry was wooded and offered concealment for a seoret oono«n tration, but lacked railroads for a rapid concentration. The west front from Chateau-Thierry to west of Sol aeons, however, not only offered good concealment for the secret concentration of a large force, but had four railroads distributed alone* the entire front to facilitate such a concen tration. In addition it was evident that an advanoe of a few miles at this point would cut the coranunicationa of the Germans and compel them to retire. (26) Before July 16th tho Allies had node no advances of any importance since 1917. The Genaar* drives durln? 1918 had sapped their reserves. (27) The Fifth British Army had lost its artillery, all its advance supply depots, and had been thrown back in confusion to a line but a few miles east of Widens. As a oonsequenoe the morale of the Allies was low. However, in Juno and the early part of July the Allies1 morale begftn to improve with the evidence that American troops ware superior to the Germans in combat. (28) The performance of the 1st, and, 3rd and 42d divisions in oombat had made an
(22) MSB, 671; IUD, 158 (23) MSB, 57* (24) MSB, 579, 695 (25) Map; How, 331 (Zf>) Sar, 95; HOW, 331? Hap (27) Pap, 46j V«u», 116 (28) Woo, 9} Req, 175
-3 exoollent impression upon them, By tho middle of July there were 300,000 American soldiers, in tho line or in support, on the Aisne-Marnovfront whioh gave Pooh hi a strategic reserve. (29)
The Comftne wore now fully committed, having oonoentrated their ef fort in tho southeastern oornor of tho Aiflno-Marne salient — ;}ust where Pooh desired them to conmit thotnselvoo. When the Crown Prince had hurled his forces into th<* battle beyond reoall, and had reduced his forces on the western face of the salient to a minimum, Pooh grasped his long awaited opportunity to launch the oounteroffenBive he had "been seorotly planning Mid preparing since tho opening of July. (30)
THE TERRAIN Tho Marne Plateau has rightfully been called, "The natural defense of Paris". An invading army oannot hope for success until this plateau with its river tronohos, ravines, wooded areas and ridges overlooking the sur rounding country for miles, has been reduced.
prinoipal rivers in the Aisne-Harne salient from north to south are the Aisno, Vesle, Ourcq and the Msrne. These rivers f.\ow generally east and west in parallel lines and are cut several hundred feet below the surface of tho plateau, with woodod and narshy areas on either side, thus forming serious barriers to the advance of armies moving north or south. In the northwestern corner of the salient, the Crise River runs for a short distance southwest of Soissons and joins the Aigne River near that oity. The Ardre River rises in the Champagne district and outs a deep valley out to ?ismee, where i t has confluence with the Veule River, The Savieres River flowing southwest meets the Ourcq River on the western faoe of the salient. (31)
Numerous quarries, subterranean oxoavations, vhere limestone or ohplk in large quantities have been removed," leaving large galleries and cherabera, are found in this area. There vast galleries and ohambers housed many thousand Gorman troops safe from tho heaviest shell fire. (32)
The terrain in general i s wooded and hilly with deep ravines and valleys,. The open spaces are cultivated, tho crop bein# mostly wheat. The farm houses and villages are built of stone. The farm houses in most oases are surrounded by high stone walls. (33)
The nature of the country, terrain and the construction of the farm houses and villages i s ideal for the organisation of oenters of resistant, strong points PJTA machine gun nests for tho defense. (34)
DISPOSITIONS
The (krnan order of battio July 18th was: The First Army (von Iwudra) from east of Reims to Thilloio (inclusive); the Seventh Army (von Boehn) to Yauxcastille (inolupiva) Braino (exclusive), consisting of Corps ..inokler from Yauxcastiile to ttoroy; Corps Schoeler tc» Hantevasnes; Corps K*then to Chateau-Thierry{ Corps Wichura to ComMaay; Corps Conta to EuUly; Corpa Schmettow to Kantemil and Corps Borne to ThUlois; the Ninth Army (von Ebon) from VftuxcaBtille-Draino (inolusivo) to west of J'ontenoy with Corps Stabbs
(29) How, 332; UC, $9,*1 (50) McPS, 391; KAU, 97, 102: Hoq, 177 (51() ) Joh, { p ()(32) Joh, 40; ,/illo, W; Px (33) Px; Llap (54) Px; USB, fi4R; Willo, IOC and Corpo Matter In tho salient west and southwest of Sol aeons. Hote: For detailed order of battle please turn to nap shovinr approximate Allied and Gorman order of battle July 16, 1918, •(??) The Allied and American order of battle July 10th was: The mt h Array (General BetMlot), from l'runay (exclusive) to tho Itorne near Oouilly, with cotxiand post at Llontmort. 'Vhv Amy was composed of six oorps disposed from north to south as follows: I Colonial Corps with the 2d Colonial division in the first line; tho II Italian Corpr with the 3d Italian and the 14th and 120th ironoh Divisions in tho first lino and tho 8th Italian Division, which had participated in the defensive battle in reserve*: the V Corps with tho 7th Division and the 10th Colonial Division in the first line and tho 9th and 40th Divisions in the seoowrline, the 40th MviBion and the 10th Colonial Division had both participated in the defensive battles the I Cavalry Corps, with the 77th and 151st Divisions and the 3d Cavalry Division in the front lino and the let and 5th Cavalry Divisions in the second line; the XTV Corps with tho 51st Division, which had participated in tho defensive, in reaenre in tho vicinity of Aviae; and the Xv.II British Corp9 Dlst airi fi?d 3rJ+ish Divipions in resorve in tho area Vertur—Aviae.
The Ninth Artny (General de Hi try) to Chateau-xhierry, with comnand popt at Esternay. itie array was oompoped of two corpn disposed fron ripht to left as follows: tho III Corps with the 4th, 10th and 73d Divisions in the first line, the 20th and l?5th Divisions in the seoond line and the 8th and 168th Divisions in reserve, tho 8th and l£l>th Divisions had both participated in tho defensive battle; and th/» iCXXVIII Corps with tho 3d Anerican Division in tho l'irat line and PBth -Vioric&n Division in reserve• ilhe Sixth Army (General Deroutte), to the. 0urfi4, with oocman^ post at ljay-en Unltien. 'it1* Ar-ny was conposod of three CM'ps dispu9ed from noith to south as follows: The II Corps with the 2d, P2d and 47th Divisions and the 7th Brif^ade of the 4th .cnerican Division, in the first line and tho 63d Division in the second lino; the VII Corps with the 164th Division and the 8th Uripnde of *h«» 4th *norican Division in tho ^irst lino: *?><*. the I American Corps with the Pfcth Anor'.^nTt 'DH'5«»*'>^ nr^ tbt* lf.7th ?»*pnch Divlpion in the first lino. Iho 'IVnth Arr^' (General -lanrin), with cotrnand poit at Bonnouil-on- Valoip. %e Amy wan conyos^d of ftfur corps )n the line and ono cavalry corps disposed from north to south an follows: Tho T Corns ^ th 11th, 153d, pn* "!«?*. Divisions in the front line and the 72d Division in the sec ond line; the XX Corpp vfith the 1st and 2d American Divisions r-nd Uoroocan Division in the first lino one1 the RPth and 69th Divisions in tho eeoond linej/the XXX Corps with the 33th *r.d *f»th Divisions in tho firflt. line and the 1st and 19th Divisions in the second line; the XI Corps with tho 41st and l2Rth Divisions in the first line and She 5th Division in tho socond line; pnd the II Cavalry Corps vith the 2d, 4th and 5th Divisions in tho seoond line. The 15th and 34th Britiph Divisions vere in reserve in tho vicinity of Pont-Sainte-Maxence and Senlis respectively. The American III Corps (General Builard), consisting of the lat and ?A American Divisions oons+Jtuted four-fifths of the XX Corps. (36) The French Arnlos in this nrca wore grouped as follows: The Reserve. Amy Group with comivmd ?ost at Lamorlayo consJptinp of the Tenth vid Sixth Arnioa. Tho Central Army Grovxi with oonnflnd popt at Scsanne consisting of tho Fifth and Ninth Armioa. (?6.^) (35) Kow733?; laid, 307; Win, 131; MSB, 504 to 623; Sinn, The plan of the Aisne-Mnrno owntoroffensivc had been proposed ao early as May ?7th, v/hen the Germans had drivon a wedpe in the line as far eouth as Chatoau-'iMorry. The details of the plan had boon worked out. The difficulty of execution was in securing divisions of the "chock class". Then too, the Germans wore concentrating for a final drJvo. Cenoral Porshing was oonvinoed t)u>t a drive on tho western face of the sal lent would bo dis astrous to the enemy and ropoatedly urged thio plan upon Gonoral Poch. (57) l Fooh was highly in favor of tho offensive. He was too ohrowd, however, to allow the attack to bo launched until tho psychological time. He waitsA pationtly for tho opening to be created before delivering his knockout "b]o'Y. (78) On Juno in General Mangln receivod instruotiona to determine under what conditions the Gorman line of comnrwication south of Soiseons could be disturbed: firstly by aerial bombardment, secondly by a rapid advance from southwest of Soissons, which would enable him to interdict the bridges of Soissons vrith his heavy batteries. By tho 20th of Jruie ho submitted his plan and asked GHQ to consider how the success of thia operation could be turned to advantage. He also suggested that he undertake a series of minor operations prior to the main attack in order to improve tho positions from whioh he would launch his main attack. (39) On June 29th General Mangin reoeived General Petain's approval for this plan. General Mangin had already started the minor operations and by July 3d ho reported that: "tho minor operations undertaken by the Tenth Army during the second fortnight of June have been carried out very easily and without attaching to them mora impor tance than they deserve tho proof can b3 seen that the onerny experiences the same difficulty as we do in defending himself against troops making use of nethods of actual attack.** He also stated that: "there 1P ample reason for thinking that an attack carried out on the plateau to the southwest of Soissons, under conditions whioh were outlined in the scheme of June 16, would present not only tho best chance of puccess, but could also bring about such a development thet would result in the irroediate exploitation of the factor of sv.rprise and would le^d to the elimination of the Chateau ilhierry pocket", (40) On July Dth a further operation southwest of Soissons by the Tenth Army improved the position to tho south of th« forost of Villers-Cottprets. (41) On July 9th General Mangin* P plans were approved by General Petain. Pron July 9 to 13 he continued the minor operations to improve his positi6n for the attack until the Saviere Valley, which presented a serious obstacle in that area, was taken. (42) K telegram dispatchod July 13 fixod the launching of the atvaok for July 16, and the beginning of the concentration for July 14, (43) Pron the seventy divisions available to meet the expected German offen sive General Foch set aside twenty-seven divisions to be used in the counter offensive to be launched July 18th. Thus we see General Fooh economising force prior to a major defensive battle in order to provide mass for a counteroffensive. (43A) The ob,ieotivo of this counteroffensive was to reduce the Chateau-Thierry nfiient by executing two lateral thrusts toward the plateau located north of Fore-on-Tardenois. This was to be accomplished by a penetration of the enerry front t»outh of tho Aisne by the Tenth Array in the r^neral dircotion of Oulohy-le-Chateau — by the Sixth Army in the general direotion of the platoau south of Breny--Armontieren, and by the Fifth Army (37) Bri Eno, 1002; lag, 45; Pal, 264,2*5; llal, 23?,2?? (38) Mau, 86; I3uo, 712; Sim, 166; Van, 116 (39) MAn, 168: Bri Enn, 617; LSB, 430 (40) Man, 169; Bri Enn, 617," *»:SB, Wl (41) Man, 170; Bri Enn, 617; USB, 431 42) tfan, 170; Bri Enn, 617; L'SB, 4P1 43) Bri Enn, 617; lton, 171; KiW, 43f, 436 U3A) How, 334, ?3f; * -6 in the general direction of Arcis-le-Ponsart. 'Ae broach made on each flank of the salient was to be exploited with the maximum speed, so thnt a Junotion of the Rosorve Anny Group and the Central Army Group would bo effected In the vicinity of Foro-en-Tardenois. (43$) Owing to the German offensive which had started in front of Go^raud'n y and on the southeastern front of the Chateau-Thierry salient, General Petain at 9:00 AM, July 15, interrupted the concentration whioh was already under considerable headway. General Pooh, however, annulled this order &nd the preparations wore resumed. (44) General Foch was assurod that the opening for the lnockout blow had been oreated, when, on tho morning of July 15th, he learned that Gouraud had successfully resisted the German attack oast of Reims, and that the enemy hod had vory little success near Chateau-Thierry. (45) The enemy1 s intentions had been clearly revealed and Foch could now., commit himself to a definite plan of action without apprehension. (46) : Raving estimated that tactical and strategical surprise was essential to the success of this operation Genoral Foch's orders to tho Army Commanders required that the highest degree of secrecy be maintained. He informed Uarsh-xl Haig of his PIPJI and requested the use of four British divisions. (47) The date for the attack was definitely set for July 18th. All movements of personnel, supplies and material were taade at night. Every effort was made to prevent the enemy from observing any change, (48) Word was passed around that the troops were groin? to rest areas in the vicinity of Meaux, Finally, after narching by night, bivouacing in forests by day and occupying abandoned positions in the rear areas, the troops were rushed to the front line on the ni*ht of July 17th-rl8th. (^9) Seorecy in this concentration was carried so far by the French that even the division commanders were not only kept ir. ignorance as to the plans for the operation and the destination of their troopn but th*> control of their troops was completely removed from the authorities responsible for their supply and efficiency in the oominf* attnok. (50) One his tori en vividly describes the march of the XX Corps as follows: "Thunder storms nre a rare thin*? in France. Truly God must have been with the Allies in this enterprise, for the roads that night presented an unmis takable target. Under the canopy of darkness on this occasion along the three rondo leading to tho front marched the three divisions, two of the American ForceB and one of tho French, 67,000 men strong, 5,000 animals, 3,000 vehicles, all ordered to a particular point to be reached simultaneous ly, and each with a separate purpose. Thoso who live to recall that memor able march will recall it with wonder and dismay, oven now. The road was un faniliar to them, and while tho storm made th« passage safer, yet it made it wore difficult. Artillery pieces and caissons of necessity held the center of the way, while tho infantry trudged through the muddy ditches. To make natters worse several battalions of big Frenoh tanks came wallowing down tho Mghwyv compelling everything to ?ivc wt^ to thro", "The onfnfrtnn, under the blftcHiosa of tho '.T?MD rm* nlonp- the rain drenched roads was beyond (nl) (45*) AntfM, "4?, ?*?; pQt, 11? MSB , 435 (44) »'•»*, 171, Bri Enn, 617 (46) sin, 165; Vnn, Ufi? Hil, *: -7 Pho ovonln.T intellicnnco report of the Army Group, German Orovm Prince, for July 17, for tho Ninth Army states, "Groat hostile aviation activity in the mornirr* Moar reconnaissance in front of Army seotor showed little traf fic on railroads and roads. Thero are a fow cars at the railroad depot in VillerB-Cottorota." (52) By 4t?5 AM, JuJ« \Rth, General Poch had succeeded in secretly concen trating on the western face of the salient a force neatly superior to the enemy. Tho Tonth French Army (Gonoral Manpin) had eighteen divisions, ten of which wore in the front line; fo\ir hundred and seventy batteries of artillery, forty air squadrons and throe hundred and seventy-five tanks. One of lifcht tanks beinpr held in Army reserve, The Sixth French Army (General Degoutte) had three oorps with a total of seven divisions on the line, two hundred and thirty batteries of artillery, twenty-oieht air squadrons and one hundred and seventy tanks. The Ninth Amy (do Mi try) had two corps with a total of six divisions on the lino, one hundred twenty-aovon "batteries of artillery and seven air squadrons. The Fifth Army (Bethelot) had throe corps with a total of ten divisions on the line from Thillois south to the Ninth Arny boundary, three hundred and seventy-five batteries of artillery, sixty-nine air squadrons and one hundred forty-seven tanks. (53) The Tenth Army was to strike tho aledre hammer blow, Ita role was to capture the heists south of Soissons, rupture the enemy13 line of comrauni- CAtiona botween tho Aisno Mid the Ourcq and push ahead in the direction of Pere-en-T?.rd OPKFtATIONS At 4:?5 on the norning of July lfith, on a front of nearly thirty milos, froo Fontenov to Bolleau the Frenoh and Anerinans attacked, The Germans were taken oonpletely by surprise. The Allied forces advanoed from three to six (52) MSB, 588 (53) Pet, 12,16,17,31,5?,^} Kow, (M) Cha, 17J>{ Pae, 47} AnSi M?., tW?>) Fift, W, Buo, 311j ton, \00.1Ol Lig, ?5,36; Pet, 11,1M3,14,^,26,27,29,7O -8 miles, breaking tho Gonn«ui lines at the first stroke, the Tenth and Sixth Armies reaching tho line, Fontenoy, Chaudun, Viorzy, Noroy nnd Bolleaa. by tho night of July 18th, (55) Tho attack o* vho Tonth Array was launched without artillery prepara tion in order to preserve secrecy to tho very last moment fjfid to t>ain tacti cal surprise. Tho XX Corps (1st end Z\ Amoricin an* 1st Moroccan Divisions) advancod with magnificent daeh putting a wedge in tho onemy's line to such an extont as to threaten his main line of communication from Soioeone to Chateau-Thierry. (66) The tanks materially aided tho advance of the in fantry, especially in tho vicinity of Magon lfeuoe Farn, Beaurepaire Farm and Vierzy. (57) In view of the advanco already made on the front of the XX Corps and the large number of prisoners captured, General tfangin dnoidod at 8:00 AM, July 18, to put his cavalry in the action to exploit the success. The time for cavalry action had not arrived howevor, as the penetration was not com plete, and as a remilt the cavalry charge was cut to pieces by raachino fire. (P8) At this time, Genoral ilangin also placed at tho disposal of tho XX and XXX Corps the regiment o** light tanks held in Army reserve * (58^) Tho Sixth Amy advanced aftor a short artillery preparation. Its ri«ht wing, the I American Corps, pivoted on Yaux and advanced its line to Toroy, Givry and Bolleau. The contor and left advanced conforming with the right wing of the Tenth Army and captured Hauterenes at 5:00 AM, Courchamps at 11:00 AM, and later reached Chevilion. (59) IF order to ocoupy the enemy and threaton his left, the Fifth Army attacked tho Roinp base of the salient in the face of stubborn resistance, (80) A3 the American I Corps of the Sixth Army was the pivot of tho offen sive, the Kinth Army took no part in the aotion on the 18th other than hold the eneny by fire. (61) News of the Allied offensive reached von Ludandorff at tho headquarters of the Crovm Prince Ruppreoht, where he was inspecting the preparations for the proposed Flanders offensive. B^alieinf the nost critical point was the area southwest of Soissons, he immediately ordered reserves by rail to this front. (62) Ov'in^ to tho interdiction fire of the Allied artillery on the railways, those forces vrere compelled to detrain in the Ailftte Valley. This seriously delayed their arrival at a critical stage of the battle. ( The defeat suffered by tho Cermons fron the Aisne to tho Itarne and the threat to their connunications was too serious for them to continue further their operations against Roins and the l>rne. (6?^) At 12:00 noon, J"ly 18, Goneral Headquarters sent the following tele phone message to the Anrv Group German Crovm Prineo: "The Seventh Army will mako preparations to withdraw fifhting troops in line south of the I^rno and submit a plan therefor to me, which will (55) T1.O), 156; LtcP, 338; How, 337; I!SB, 775,776; Sim, 168 56) Req, 179; MSB, 615; 616; Hln, 301; How, 336,343; Px hf) ?r. 58) Tho, 15A.1P5; Bui, 219,220; I>et, &6 59?) Pet, 46; Tnn, 6 59) Chf>, 178,??9; Ml?, ?*? €0) Pr.l, 371; Sitt, 170 (61) Kow, 344; Fi*, ??.?. (62) Lud, 311; Sim, 170; HJn, 378 (63) Lud, 311; Hln, 701,?^? (63f) pot, 37; A -9 opp y and clearly show tho hour and day whon thtu eun bo finished. General Ho«rtqunrtr«r ^n^rves tho rifht to Jamie finnl orders In thin matter. By ordpr: Ludondorff" (64) At fltSP FM, J"ly 18, Lvdondorff nrproyed tho order of the Army Grour. German Orovm Prinm for the withdrawal of tho Seventh Am\y troops south of tho Ifamo to the north bank. (65) Thia first days fighting had netted th»» Allied forcer* a dopth of two Mid one h/ilf to fivo miles a?onp- tho nntiro front, Seventeon thousand prisoners and two hundred and fifty pi Tho Hoadevartore of the Army Group German Crovm Prino* *n July 18 ordor«d that resistance bo organised alon^ the eonoral line: Soissons— Bellw—Moy^t—Kartcnnee—lo Plossior-*Kultii—Cirand Voni\—LatJlly— EV>avJX—hills north of Chfitrr.u Thierry, Ihree additional d.'vlaJ.nns v/ere aselrn^d to each Army foi* the organisation of this lino. At tho same time the army group enphisized the fact tho.t tho troopi now in battle must hold cut on rrmsont ISn^B and that tho above mentioned line was tne line of ex treme rceistanoo, v.'hich would bo held under all contingencies. The spr.e order directed that a sacond position in rear be established en thr rcnerel lino: north bank cf the Ausne to Buoy—Le Lon?>—hilin weat of Acy—Drolay—Beufii^vy—Kanteuil—ifo ;rp Dwr.e—Coincy—Ehioe—Chiirtevos and that both o? tho above line? le st-onfly sunp]ied with fiaoMne runs, (67) At 6:^0 PM, Jrtly IP, Corps Yfp.tter was tactically pl-iced under orders of the Seventh Amy and at midni^t i°-19 July Corps Borne passed to tho corrroand of th<* First () Or*, tfc? 3 9th the Germans countorattacked fiercely, esprrcially on thn Tenth \rroy front in the vicinity of Soisaons, but without dislodging tho French anc» Americans from their positions, During tho 19th the XX Corps re pelled all counterattack*, seired Ploisv, p^d advanoed its lines to a point west of the Soissons—Chatoau-lMerry road near Villem^rtoire and H)?ny, (69) I^io Sixth .\rny advanced itn center and left on Ju.ly 19th to conform iith the process of tho Tonth Array, (70) The Ninth and Fifth Armies i.ttnoked with micoess at several points, but the rains v/oro of mveh 1 On tho 19th the British XX7I Corpe relieved the Italian II Corps, (7?.) With tho lose of tho main highway froa Soiasons to Chateau-lfcierry threatened and Mth the Allied ?unfl dominatino1 the railway Junotion near O'Jlchy Lo Chateau, the cneny had practically lost tho one artery of supply, *hioh enabled him to maintain h!rr troops rmaitiir^r nouth of tho Mamr, Tho only routoe of supply now Available wero the parish roads threading the wooded Mils of TardenoiV. (73) (64) 1£S3, 69B (55) MSB, 599 Ihe. 4^; Lr<7B, 607 Doo. 457 (66) Vmt 75; MSB, 616; Pet, 37 (67) MSB, 602, 615 1 ((69)) 55m!! l^fcha! ^; KftHt 9": Pal, W?J WB. () Pa^, 55: 1Kb, 1531 Pet, I1? Buo, P13; W, 98\ Brl Eno, 9?A S6 -10 With tho wet side o<* the salient brokon in and tho east oido under strong nrosnure, there was nothing for I/Jdendorff to do but extricate hie analofi the beet he could. Orders woro thorofore issued for tho withdrawal of the flyman troops south of the Marno, (74) Von Himl^nburc statos, "hard thou/>h it was for me, I ordered the withdrawal of our troops to the north bank of tho Mnrne", (75) Tho Gernan plan of rotirement ran to hold tho French north of tho Ouroq in tho west and north of the Ardre This was no simple taak for as tho War Diary of the Seventh Army on Jidy 19 states: "Vo The Allied -nlan of action wan to breah thr«Mifih tho Geman flanks and to push nlonp th« entire lino as rapidly as possible. Tho Reserve Anny Group to make its main effort toward tho east betweon the upper Crioe and tho roid from Lon^port to Pere-en-Tardonoio, covering this attack with an action carried out south of the Ourcq, in the direction of Fere-en-Tardenois; tho objootive biirt^ to «iln a foothold on tho Arcy— Sainte-Sestitue plateau in order to be able subsequently to en^-afre the 3r*aochos reckon. The Central Army Groxtp to continue it s attacks in the general dirftction of Fiunes, its l^ft and the ricftt of the Reserve Arngr Oroup to act in accordance with the progress of the principal attanks aid pvriruo vdth vi/ror the enemy delaying forces north of th*» Uarne. (77f) The retirement of tho G^mnn forces nouth of the Karne be£^n on tho night of July 18-19. On the 20 July tho N!r»th Array attacked alon On the nif^t of the 19th and 20th the 2d ;jneric^n DWisSon of tho XX Vr«nch Corpp was relieved by tha F>«th Coloni4l Division, and passed to tho (79) AP tho Tenth kmj near Soieeons was refnrded the chief da»?*r, the Cirmans concentrated ill their available reserves on this front. As a con- the Tenth .Vrtny nide very littl e prepross on tue. 20th» (80) The ?ifth Anx', however, nwde conniderable procreDB advancing up the Ardre and ondan^rin^ the highroad which .loined ?ienes on the Vesle with Chatellon on the Karne. (81) J'lly 21st th«? XX Corps Tenth Amy captured BerRy-le-«eo a.V the heights northwest of Bin«incy vhich dominated Soiflaws. Beray-lft-aec had been the ob jective of the 153d'French Divlnion on the right of the I French Corps, but ovine to the irabllJty ef the 1574 French Division to keon up with the let Anerle&n Divipicn and th" remainder of the XX Corps, this important objective was tLBQlyicd to tho 1st An VW', LPB, H5n, Fio, 2J?3j ll^B, 6?*; tlnl, 27? I/SB, 78) m>t 1B«« 3uc, MSj Cha, 1BO; JISB, «CO 79) How, »•" "- BO) &'o Pftfr! BO;'lIov/f *M?; VfiUo, 97 -11 On tho nlpht of tho 20th and ?lst the Ccrmans along the Sixth Arrry front withdrow leaving detachments of machine pinners to cover their ro troat. Or the morninr of the 21 at tho I American Corns attacked and not with little opposition until lato in tho afternoon when strong maohine run fjre chockM thoJr advance n«ai« Spiels, (03) ihat nlpht the Sixth A ray front extended from tho Ourcq in tho vicinity of Oulchy~ie-Chatoau to Bpied*1 and Joulc-onne. On the name day the Ninth Arr«y (^e Ltitry) forced a crosoin* of tho liarne, took Chateau-Worry and established sevoral bridgeheads farther enst, whiJe the Fifth Arrny continued Its pressure toward Planes up the Ardre. C4 ) OVe XXXVIII Corps of th* ill nth Arr^r passed to tho Sixth Arry July p.Oth. (05) On the ?JJd advances of fron one to two miles wero npdo at various points alonr the llnr from nor*h of the friroq to the village cf Bovilly at the northern end of th« i:orta*no de Helms. () ^ e Gemane had vast quantities of Buuplles in the vicinity of Porp-on T&Henoi"? an''. Pinnes which wore absolutely vital to thera. In addition they had nassod larf<* lujantitieg of material north of the Karne in anticipation of a breakthrou/^ and further advance on July 16th, In oHor to save these supplies «nd traterial it wap nvessarv ti 8tr.nd and fi£t>^. ^ accomplish their aafe withdrawal Dtidendorff wtt all M3 available *e On JMIV p?(< there waB a rnvVen st*. ffenin- of ref'otanco in the r»outh of the silient. Ton Sir^h Arrr\" h*id ao^io twjn^ C^r^an ^*v)«i1onp on its front, fw? «f **Meh vere •"r^m the fresh reserves of th" Cro~n ?r!noe of Bavaria. Ii thft face ?? 7?ie !?»t \rserl<*«n Division w On tvr °4th thn ? On July ?r>th the l**r»th Arr?y arrived *itMn six niles of Fere-en-!IHrVmols, «M the Girth Arr^' was within three rt?lo* of this vital point «n the G«rm%n defence, (°°) It n^on ?F» J'tly the III Corps n<* thp Hinth Arm passed to the Fifth Arr^ and the Kead'piarter* Hinth Ar?rr/ passed to the GHC Res«rre, (93) Oulchy-le-Chatea-.'., th*» c"tpo«t of Pern—*r»-'iV»rdenois, had fallen on the , ind *i^ Fero-en-1lar(l«noi8 were to fall, the troops, supplies and not es yet ^ylly withdrawn fron the southern pftrt of tho salient, would bg trapped, Acc^Hinrly the en«ny put their nain strength into the, defense of "^o, ?»?: Pal, *9f>; Mr, 7° Per, ?A7; XcP, ^?9; Ho't, 337• 3ri 2nc, 9M ) Pet, UO (W) Per, "**• 3.!cP. ??<»: How, 3'.^; i^e, ^H{ Par, 55 (e ) How, W\ Hln, 7»7{ Si^, 171; Hal, ? ) Cha, 179; Hf<, 74?; BUT), ? (90) !»!c, "K^, TT, l r0 (*l) Pil, 70?; P"», M: Tho, 17 ?) VcP, 740; 2«of 7.1 f 3) thifl area, (04) Ludomlorff h«d a^ranpod for tho ^adual withdrawal of ton Boehn»B Army to the VUlc-on-Tr>rdonoi8—y^re-on-Turrlenois lino on tho 26th i»M f^" tho rotlromnnt of this nmy north of the Voelo In the <»arly part of Au/Tuot, At tho ooro ti**<> Yu countermanded tho projected, Flandp*** offensive. (Q5) On th« ^fith tho lf>th Scott! s' Divinlor cf tho Tenth Arrny captured oi«t oO tb* "lain Soifl&one--ChHteau~?hiorry road. ( ) Into thnt nlyht von Boehn bo-\n his rotiremint to tho VCFIO the Ourci and '.». xdre. It now beenne necessary for tho SJxth Amy to carry Fere~en-T«rdonol8 before the menp could establish his forces on a new front betvroon tho u.tmor Ourcq and tho upper YOPI*, a wooded, hilly country which offered, rood opportunities for defense. Bc.t even though tho % enetly did establish thi» line, th» Tonth Arrr^f no * rested an-I refitted, lay waiting to Ptr5ke its flanV. (97) On the °7th the Sixth artf 9ifth Ai-nifls pressed hnrd. Desperate fight ing enpn^d; the French and Americans capturlnr the M ^h ^rrouM south and of For*-«jn-T'1.rd On thr ?Pth the Sixth Arnj' entered Fere-en-Tardenois anl b;* th^ ?9th th». salient had bfron reduced to tho lire: 311gny—Villors—A«*non—Sovffl— Sozory—west of Soinsono, «md tho Allies «JW had an unbroken viow of the Ourcq. Vu-ll^ "W^- the Ccrmk ines for raat^y miles to tho northeast. (99) On July 30th the Third African Division was relieved "by the WA Ameri cvn Divl^io^, vrtich becari enna^ed in hard fi^ht^n? in front of Cler^p. (100) To enable v n Boehn to organise a defonnivo position on the vrator hed the Ou"oi an^. the Venlo, the Gemnns la^uichod a s«»rie*« of count*r on tho ?9th, 30th am? ^lst, (101) There attacks represented ;he last stand of the en«my on the north side of the Oureq valley an<\ every foot of ground rainod by the French and AraerJoans waa bitterly disputed, 0 the hiph point on the Ovtlchy—risnes road, four miles north- weft of Fere-en-TardenoJs, which overlooked five or elx piles of downs to the Yesle and beyond to Fisnes, n On Aurast 1st the XXXVITI French Corps of tho Sixth Army consisted wholly of Araerican divisions. Thifl Corps, now connanded by Ceneral Bullard (III Corps), advanced toward the Vosle with the 32d Division In line, the 28th in support, and the ?d In reserve, (104) ot A the whole Allied tine advanced meeting littl e resistance and Tenth Amy entered Soisaons. (105) (94) »ic, j , (95) I'ir», ^19; KJr, ZBZ; 1.5B, 445 (%) !'au, 98j Hftl, 277 (?7) J»c, 7*1*; LT\ EreI 9?A (99) frtc, Z\h; I!!D, 159 (99) Buc, 315; Hew, S?7; H»l, 267; IIT), 1^9; Brl SiH, «18 (100) V&z, 5?; Cha, 181: Pal, ?>U (101) A & 0, 325; I!T), Jr>9 (10J>) VJKM, «8: IJT)", 1^9; Duo, ?1$ M _. ,_, (103) TIT), 159; 3-ic, ?^t Hal, 2?9j An En, ?^J lift", 98; Sin, 171 (104) Ch*, I8t; »ii, 227 (105) » ift> 317{ 'Jin, 171; Lif, 46, 47 -I? Auruft ?d the 4th Division relieved the 42d American Division. On this day "both French and American troops continued their advance meeting with little resistance until they reached the southern bank* of the Aisno and Yosle Rivovs on August 4th, (106) Durlnr tho course of the next few days the German "bridgeheads were re duood* On Au^ist 5th the Allied troop* foroed the passage of tbn Vesle in »vmy places oast and west of Brr.isne, and crossed the Aisne just east of Soissons. That same day troops of tho 32d Division entered Fismo3. (107) On the nifht of the 5th patrols which had anioceedod in crossing the Yesle wore withdrawn to permit artillery preparation for a general attaok. At 4:?0 AM, on tho 6th, tho 8th Brigade of the 4th American DivipJon attacked an* ~r\ined the Soiasons—Bheima road. The 7th Brigade of this division, which vfP3 on the loft, however, failed to cross the river. (109) The enemy launched several fierce counterattacks and this advance position was held TfJth rreat difficulty. (109) !!iUdendorff had reaohod a lino on which he could stand and tho Alsne- Dirne Offensive offidially ended on Aupust 6th, (110) General Foch received his baton as Marshal of France on August 6th, Frenter Clenenoeau, when awarding this honor, said, "5n order to consecrate for the future the authority of the great soldi or who is called to Jead the arnion of the Entente to final victory". (Ill) ANALYSIS A1ID CRITICISE The A5.sne-I.>rne Offensive may be clsissifi^d as one of H\Q moft important battles of tho war. As fi result of this offensive the Chateau-£M erry pallent ^vns reducod and tho threat on Paris eliminated. I t turned the tide of vrar. (lir>) T4: restored tho initiative to tho Allios. (113) I t stopped fb<* r>ro.^ected Gorrian offensive in Plandors duo to be launched in tho early r>art of Au'-iot by tho Jroup of Amies comnandod by the BavArian Crown Irince. (114) The Gormnns lost thousands in killed, woundod and prisoners in addition to vast quantities o^ supplies, (115) Tho Allied and American loases in killed and wounded wore heavy but not out of proportion with the results accomplishod, (116) The effect of thir victory on Paris, France and the entire Allied world WAS immediately apparent in A rc^wenation of morale; on the other }v>vx 5t lowered the norale of the German Army and produced scenes of un o despair in Berlin. (H7) Hew ^3d thin situation come about? Did Ludendorff consider tho follow fncta beforo ho w-de his doci,«?ion TO laimch his Champa^ne-Mame Offensive? (•») That the s».li?nt Jr. itr^lf was vulnerable and the lack of corircuniea ?? rade i t moro so. (118) (106) Lnr, 10390; Cha, 1<=Oj Buo, 317 d n ?) 113, iro: Buc, ?17 (109) Cha, lfl?>; I iff. ** (110) Buc, 317; Lar, 30398 (111) Hnv, 3?4; Sim 1??; Hal, ?90 (11?) MSB, 613; S (5) The minor operations conducted by the French during the later part of June and tho first part of July, west and southwest of Soissons whioh improved their position for a possible offensive* After considering those questions did Ludendorff ask himself the follow ing questions? (1) Wat will happen should the enery attack from the west side of the salient while I am oorducting an offensive battle to the east and southeast? (2) Can I afford to economiae force on my right flank (west front of salient) which is the only guard I h«s.ve to preserve my line of communications? (3) Arc oloven divisions disposed over a thirty mile front sufficient for this task? Ludendorff may have considered these questions but the events whioh followed go to prove that he failed to properly seoure his right flank (west face of salient) against a possible counteroffensive; (123) that he under estimated the valuo of American military aid and tho evidence of Allied re serves; (124) that ho failed to inforce the usual seoreoy for the Champ&gne- Kftrne Offensive; (125) and flushed with the sucoess ot past viotorlon he placed his faith in the invincibility of the German Amy, and allowed himself to bo surprised. (126) V/hen the /.Hied counteroffensive was launohed, realising the most oritical point was the area southwest of Soipsons, Ludendorff innedlately took prompt and vigorous action to stop this threat by the use of such reserves as ho had at hand and by calling for more reserves from other fronts, (127) He prompt ly seoured the two flanks of the pooket at Soissons and Reims and held these fimly while he withdrew the forty German divisions and suoh supplies as oould tie taken from the pooket. (128) The withdrawal was oonduoted aooording to plan and without rout, Handicapped by poor roads, through a brokon country, the Germans withdrew in an orderly manner fiphtlng stubborn delaying actions. (129) The French befan to prepare for viotory in the hour of defeat at the Chenin des Dames when Fooh Instinctively reoogniaed that the Reims and Solasona shoulders must bo held. (130) (119) Sar, 95; How, 330 (120) Sar, 95,96; How, 331 (121) Pag, 44,45; How, 331,332; Sar, 66 122) Man, -169; MSB, 622 123) Lar, 10397; MoP, 391,398; Man, 169 124) M&H, 65; Sim, 156,167; Hal, 25%J>60 126) MoP, 391; MSB, 621, 674 126 U h H, 65; Sim, 156; Hal, 255,260 127 Lud, 311; Sim, 170; Hln, 37e (128 Pag, 57; Flo. J»23; Buo, 315; Hal, ?58; Sar, 97,98 (129 San© ae (128) (ISO Sin, 173; Sap, 76 -15 As long as those shoulders >wld the Germans were without nde (131) Sar, 79,80; HOW, 329,330 (132) MSB, 621; Pag ,45 133) Pag, 45; ifan, 170; Bri fclo, 1002 134 135 1W.168.1M.1M, 13$ Pag, 64; Buo, 312; MoP, 338{ Wau, 89; Sar, 99 137 MSB, 623; Sar, 93,96 138 Man, 171,172; Sar, 106J Px (139 Hah, 171,172; Px; Pag, 47 " * (140 How, 342,343; Req, 179 }JJ{ (HI Howl 339; Kan, 171, Px (14«> «* • 177» (142) Man, 170; Sar, 11B; How, 331 (U5) MSB, 622; How, 330; Hln, 380; -16Hal , 235 IV. CONCLUSIONS OP THE AUTHOR. In forming tne plan of a campaign one of the first considerations should deal with the adequacy and seourity of existing supply facilities. With the supply facilities available to the Germans on July 16, the tteme salient was entirely unsuitable as e. base from whioh xo laonoh a major of fensive. Only one main line of comaunioaUon was available and this line was no 0I080 to the flu^it of the salient that it was extremely vulnerable, notwithstanding this faot, Ludendorff economised foroe to supply mass for his Champagne-ISarne Offensive by leaving only eleven depletod divisiono, disposed on a front of thrity miles, to defend the west front of the salient and his line of corxiunications* The line of communications of an army should be preserved with oaro, "Y/hile distant spectators," says Hanley in his book "The Operations of Ufar", "imagine a general to be intent only on striking or parrying a blow, he probably directs a hundred glances, a hundred anxious thoughts, to th« coiwiunioatiAn'! in his r*«Rr, *or cno that he bestows on his adversary1* front." Ludendorff failed to properly protoot his right flank and line of eom •onioations from Soissons to Chateau-Thierry and in so doing violated the prinoiple of security, "In forming the 'plan of a oanpai«i," says Napoleon in his second maxim of war, "it Is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it," Again he says in his Aighth maxim of war, "A general-ln-ohief should ask himself frequently in the day, 'What should I do if the unemy'e army appeared now in ny front, or on ny rifht, or my left?* If he has any difficulty in answering these -17 Napoleon in his ninteenth maxim says, "the transition from the defen live to the offensive is one of the most delicate operations in war"; The transition from the defensive to the offensive was possibly more dlffioult in 1918 than it was in Napoleon»s time. Due to improved means of recon naissance from the air it wan extremely difficult to concentrate large todies of troopa and material without the movement being discovered. However, re sorting to night raarohes and the use of forests for oonoealment during the flay and finally by moving the troops to the attack position at the last pos sible momont, Fooh was successful in seoretly concentrating a superior mass at a vital point southwest oi1 Soissons. This concentration required the strict eoonootf of foroe on other parts of the front and the proper distribu tion of force to continue a successful defensive battle at still another oritioal point. In carrying out this defensive-offensive battle, Poch took advantage of Ludendorff'o mistakes and by seoreoy, rapidity and preparation aohieved a strategical surprise and through the use of tanks and omitting the usual artillery preparation, achieved a complete taotical surprise. Pooh complied with the principle of the offensive when he launched his counter-offensive as soon as the situation and the means available were suitable to provide reasonable chanceB for success. He oomplied with the principle of mass when he concentrated a superior force at the most critical point in the German line of communications and when the German mass was en gaged elsewhere launched an attaok to disrupt these communications and foroe a German withdrawal. He oomplied with the principle of movement when he con centrated the mass for the attaok southwest of Soissons where i t oould attaok with advantage. By reducing the foroes on other parts of the front consist ent with safety, Fooh obtained the men and means for the main effort and by 80 doing complied with the prinoiple of economy of foroe. When the element of surprise is sought in an operation, it is a good plan not to inform all ranks as to the details and plans of the high command, but when the Frenoh High Command during the concentration southwest of Soissons removed from division commanders the control of their troops i t violated the prinoiple of simplicity. How and when reserves are used is a most tioklish deoision for any com nander. When General Mangin used his cavalry to exploit the success on July 18, no breakthrough had ocourred and there was nothing to exploit with cav alry. Its use was therefore premature. The same applies to the regiment of light tanks held in army reserve. General Mangin divided them between the XX and XXX Corps on July 18. Their use waB premature and their effec tiveness dissipated. Considering the initial advance made by the XX Corps and the decisive direction of this advance a much better use of this power ful reserve would have been to use it entirely on the front of tho XX Corps 'I on July 19th in a oonoerted and well coordinated drive to take the heights ' south of Soissons and the Soissons—Chateau-Thierry Highway, The participation of the Amerioan troops in this offensive not only aided the Allies considerably but served as a praotioal training school in offensive warfare for the troops participating and the oommandors and staffs of eight divisions and two corps. V. RECOMMENDATIONS. — Hone required. VI. COHCTJKffiNCES. — Hono required. B £ B L I £ 0fiA P Jg Y KEY: (A & 0, Si>5) - No. 1 Text (below), page 325. 1, Allen and Other a: "The Great War." Philadelphia, George Barrie* 8 Sons, Copyright 1919, 2, "Americana Encyclopedia." New York, The aicyolopedia Corporation, 1921. (Vol. 28) 5, Amerine, William Henry: "Alabama's Own in France." New York, Eaton and Gettinger, oopyright 19U'. 4. Ayrea, Leonard P.t "The Y/ar with Geroanyj A Statistical Summary." 2d Edition, Washington, Government Printing Offioe, 1919. 5. Bond, P.3. , & Sherrlll, C.O.s "America in the Y/orld V/ar." Monasha, Y/is oonain, George Banta Publishing Company, Copyright 1921. 6. "Brief Hlatoriea of Divisions, U.S. Army, 1917-18," 7. "Britannica, The Encyclopedia." Hew Vohimes - Vol. XXX. Cambridge Issue 8. "Britannioa Enoyolopedia", 12th Edition. The New Volumes. London, The Enoyolopedia Britannioa Company, 1922. (Vol. 32) 9. Browne, G.W. ,& Pillabury, K.W.j "American Army in the Y/orld War. A Divisional Reoord." Manchester, N.H., Overseas Company, 1921. 10. Buohan, John: "A History of the Great Var.M Boston, Hough ton Uiffl in Company, (Vol. 4) 11. Bullard, Robert Lee: "Personalities and Reminisoenoes of the .far." NPW York, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1926. 12* Chambrun, Jacques Aldebsrt de Pineton de {I- Gomte de tfarenohea)t "The American Army in the European ConfHot." New York, The Macmillan Company, 1919. 13, Flebeger, C.J.i "The World War, a Short Account of the Prlnoipal Land Operations on the Belgian, Frenoh, Russian, Italian, Greek and Turkish Fronts." West Point, N.Y., The United States Uilitary Academy Printing Offlcs, 1921. U. Frothingham, T.C. i "A Guide to the ttilitary History of the Yforld Var," Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1921. ID, Ccnoral Service Schools: "The Gorman Offensive of July 15, 1918." (M*rne Souroe Book) General Service School PreBB, 1923. 16. General Staff (Frenoh)t "Why Gerrwny Capitulated on November 11, 1918." A Brief Study based on Dooumonts in the possession of the French General Staff. 17. General Staff, U.S. Army, A.E.F.; Historical Sub-Section: "A Survey of German Tsotios." Washington, D.C., Offioe of the Adjutant General, Deeember 1918. 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