>* «.>•.'.3 fJ " - 3 Code Number a, :•.: u o o : • 2 M »* IB - 1933 <i. i.j CJ r3 nnr ] rj.y £/» !. i <• :: o• *~ ;u i i f U O fH > > •) •*• J -; t-::J .r :o w n r.> iv .J I..-; • p •tli O pi H o o 6 je IlfDlVIIXJAL RESEARCH SWOT iJfflrJK• 4 U. H5^ iJfflJKM HH {-• L? tj «L ;- b '• • J Q t- -i "A Critioal dialysis of the Aisno-Marne Offensive." Submitted by A?JS The Command and General Stnff Sohool Fort Loavonworth, Kansas Port Leavem/orth, Kansas IE May, 1EEKORANDUM TOR: The Director Second Year Class, Tho Cownand and General Staff School, Port Lcavenworth, Kansas. SUBJECT: A Critical Analysis of the I. PAPERS ACCOMPANYING: 1. A Bibliography for this study. 2. Maps: Situation Map. Railroad and Hi^roay Map. Approximate ordor of Battle July 18, 1918. II. THE STUDY PRESENTED. — A critical analysis of the Aisne-Marne Offensive. INTRODUCTION The Aisme-Mame Offensive nay "be classified as one of the most impor­ tant operations of the vrhole war. It turned the tide of war; restored the initiative to the Allied arms; (l) brought about the transition of the German Armies from tho elation of victory to the despondenoy of defeat, for on «T'ily 18th that all important quality "Morale" had been reborn in the Allies and "there sourdpd forth the trvmpet that never called retreat". (2) This offensive is also important, to us as Americans, for the reason th*t it was the first major offensive battle of the \rar in whioh tho Ameri­ can Army "participated. Wo find eifht American divisions playing an impor­ tant part in this battle and an American officer (Major General Hunter Li&rett) commanding the Fir at American Corps* In addition we find two American divisions, the 1st and 2nd, with the famous lat Moroccan Division delivering the "Coupe de belier" or battering ram blow. (3) III. HISTORICAL PACTS RELATING K) THE SUBJECT. ~ Confident of viotory, the Germans had orossed the Marne for the second time, and as in 1914 created an excellent opportunity for an Allied counter­ offensive, ftiey conducted major operations on the southeastern and eastern front of the great Marne salient and at the same time left the forces on the west front of tho salient so weak that an attack in force there was almost sure to prove disastrous. (4) Von Ludendorff believed the Allies to be fully occupied at the south­ eastern point of the salient. (5) At the time of the German drive for Aoiena it is said that von Ludendorff "pooh-poohed" Poch«o strategio re­ serve. (6) If this is true we shall see the mistake he made in not giving this subject a more oaroful analysis three months later when three hwdred thousand American soldiers were available for use at the front and more than 1,200,000 American troops had arrived in Franoe. (7) (1) Pro, 264-5; MSB, 61r, Bui, 222 (S) Boo, 309; Pag, 45 (3) Ayr, 108; Pal, 298; Van, 117 U) Vim, 99; MSB, 622-3; Hart, 419; Tan, 1; Hin, 370,376,377,370; LT, 95 (5) Man, 171; now, 330 (6) MoP, 394 (7) WC, 69; How, 332 When the Goman Charapaflno—Llarne attack had Jyjen stopped and the Allied counter-offensive launched on July 18, 1918, the boundary of the llarno saliont ran as follows: from Fontenoy (west of Soissons); a littl e east of south to Bolloau; thence to the Marao River south of Chateau- Thierry; thence alon* the north tank of the IJarne beyond Glond; thence south of the Ifarne River to St. Agnan and Comblizy; thence east of north to Oeuilly, Toiircy and YrltW» to west of Rhoims near Thillois. (B) The base of the salient, from west of Soissons to v/est of Rheims, was about sixty kilometers and the depth of the salient v/as about forty kilometers. (9) The Uat-ne salient was vulnerable; its weak points strategically were the sectors on each side of it near Its base (west of Soissons and west of Bheims); because an attack in force there by threatening the communications of the occupying troops, would, if successful, force their retreat. (10) The German lines of communications in the Mame salient consisted of the Soiss »ns—Fismes—Rheims Railway running across the base of the salient and parallel to the Voslo River; the Rheims—Fisraes—Paris Railway which parallels the Ourcq Rivor from Fere-en-Tardenois and crosses the Soiesons-­ Chateau-i'hierry highway about half way between Soissons and Chateau-Thierry; and the Soissons—Chateau-Thierry highway parallel to the western side of the salient and cot far from the front lines. (11) Howland states that the Germans had started to construct a branch railroad from north of Rheims to west of Rheims but this road was still incomplete when the counteroffen­ sive was launched July 18. (12) Owing to the inadequacy and location of the German line of cortnunica­ tions the salient was net stable. (1?) The Germans, realizing their lines of communications were inadequate endeavored to correct the supply situation by the c°.r>turo of Compio^ne on June 9. failing in th'a they tried to t*;ke Rheims in their Chrmaign—Marne offensive. Had they captured Rheims as pl?mned, the supply situation would have been helped materially. However, this attack only rrnde the supply situation worse as it increased the area and the number of troops to bo supplied without adding to the supply faoilies. (14) Owing to tho failure of the attack on Rhoins and the continuous bombardment of the bridges over the llarno the supply of the German troops south of the Marne River became increasingly difficult. (15) July 1, 1918, there were two hundred seven German divisions on the wes­ tern front. July 15, eighty-one cf these divisions (sixty-five fresh) wer*" in reserve, and on July 18, sixty-five were in reserve (thirty-four fresh), (16) There were more than forty divisions in the Marae salient, (17) Eleven of these divisions considerably depleted in artillery and personnel held p. front of thirty mills from Chateau-Thierry to the Aisne Fiver, (18) Six reserve divisions were held in the salient as supporting troops. (19) The remainder were ooramitted to battle in the southeastern and eastern parts of the salient. (20) Although the Germans had thus far failed to defeat the French in thoir Champagne—Marne offensive the morale of the soldiers was good. The Germans believed that there was no possibility of a counter­ offensive. In fact some of the soldiers were sent to the fields to harvest the wheat whioh the French had planted. (21) (8) How, 329; P&g, 65; Pet, Operations Map (9) How, i>29; Pag, 55; Pet, Operations Kap (10) How, 329; Hin, 381; Sim, 154-157 (11) How, 329; Uio, 14; Sar, 94; MSB, 637-8; Hin, 370 (12) How, 329 (13) MSB, 637-8; How, 329; Hin, 383 (Hj How, 329-30; Mau, 93 to 96 (15) MSB, 641; Br5 Enc, 933; How, 330 (16) V/C, 70; Hart, 422 (17) WC, 73; MSB, 638; How, 330 J18) V/C, 73; KSB, 622; Pet, Situation L'ap J19) M & H, 66; Pet, Situation Map 20) WC, 73; How, 332-3 (21) MSB, 622; How, 330; Hin, 380; Hal, 285 -2­ By the 16th of July the Germans estimated that the sacrifice in men and material vihioh would result from a continuation of the attaok "by tho Seventh Army south of the Marne would not correspond to the probable f^in. However, thoy believed that on tho oast front of tho Seventh Army there was some hope for the progress of tho attack as an advance here would com­ pel the French to evacuate the Reims basin. (22) Tho Army Croup German Crown Prince issued orders at 12:20 PM July 17, to tho First and Seventh Armies for an attaok to be exeouted withbut fail on July 21 to drive the Frenoh out of the Reims arc — preparations wero ordered to be hastened, especially the shifting of the artillery and the bringing up of artillery ammunition. (23) The Seventh Array immediately issued the necessary orders for the rein­ foroement of Corps Borne which was to maka the main effort of the Seventh Army in this attack. (24) Thus we see the German high command frantically endeavoring to improve the supply situation by tho capture of Reims and widening the oast flunk of the salient, but giving little or no consideration to a possible Allied counteroffensive against their present inadequate supply line bordering the west flank of the salient. Owing tc the exoellent railroad net around the Marne salient the Frenoh had littlo difficulty in concentrating and supplying troops engaged in defending and later reducing it. The railway froa Epernay to Reims paral­ leled the southeastern face at a distance of about five miles from the front; on the west face at nearly equidistant intervals of about eight miles, four railway lines approached the front as follows: the lines front Compiegne to Soissons; from Paris to Chateau-Thierry, and two branch linen leading to Fere-en-Tardenois and Soissons. A seotion of the Paris—Chalons railroad east of Chateau Thierry wan in possession of the German divisions south of tho Marne until July 20th, and the nearest railroad in rear of this point was the Paris—Yitry line, about 30 miles south, (25) Tho front from Relua to the Marne offered very little concealment for a concentration of troops for an offensive. The front from Epernay to east of Chateau-Thierry was wooded and offered concealment for a seoret oono«n­ tration, but lacked railroads for a rapid concentration.