Utmost Gallantry THE U.S. AND ROYAL NAVIES AT SEA IN THE WAR OF 1812 Kevin D. McCranie Naval Institute Press Annapolis, Maryland Naval Institute Press 291 Wood Road CONTENTS Annapolis, MD 21402 © 20ll by Kevin D. McCranie All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form List of Illustrations vii or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing Preface xi from the publisher. Acknowledgments xv Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Chapter 1. "Every Appearance of Hastening the Crisis": The Royal Navy, McCranie, Kevin D. the United States Navy, and the Background to War Utmost gallantry: the U.S. and Royal Navies at sea in the War of 1812 / Kevin D. McCranie. Chapter 2. "~Little Bit of a Dust' With an English Frigate": The Opening 26 p.cm. Naval Campaign, June to September 1812 Includes bibliographical references and index. Chapter 3. "It Is a Thing I Could Not Have Expected": The Second Round, 54 ISBN 978-1-59114-504-2 (hbk. : alk. paper) - ISBN 978-1-61251-063-7 (ebook) l. September 1812-March 1813 United States-History-War of 1812-Naval operations. 2. United States. Navy­ Chapter 4. "If We Could Take One or Two of These D-d Frigates": 86 History-War of 1~12. 3. Great Britain. Royal Navy-History-War of 1812. I. Title. Reassessment of Britain's Naval Objectives, 1812-13 II. Title: U.s. and Royal Navies at sea in the War of 1812. Chapter 5. "Cast Away ... or Taken": American Naval Failure and 97 E360.M34 2011 Reassessment, June 1812-Early 1813 973· 5' 2-··dc23 Chapter 6. "Creating a Powerful Diversion": Secretary Jones and the 116 2011026325 Naval Campaign of 1813 @)This paper meets the requirements of ANSIINISO Z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper). Chapter J. '~ Glorious Retrieval of Our Naval Reputation": 140 The Turning Point, 1 June 1813 Printed in the United States of America. Chapter 8. "More Than Ordinary Risk": United States Frigates, Winter 1813-14 157 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 9 8 7 6 543 2 1 Chapter 9. "Pursuing My Own Course": The Essex in the Pacific, 1813-14 176 First printing Chapter lO. "Some Hard Knocks": Reassessment-The United States, 190 September 1813-March 1814 Chapter 11. "Into Abler Hands": Britain Turns to New Leadership, 1814 208 Chapter 12. "Repulsed in Every Attempt": The Culmination of the 221 Jones' Small Cruiser Strategy, mid-1814 v CHAPTER I "Every Appearance of Hastening the Crisis" 'The Royal Navy, the United States Navy, and the Background to War ess than a hundred yards separated the two ships, but darkness obscured their identities. The commander of one, Arthur Bingham, hailed across L the water, demanding the name of the other ship. He heard a voice that echoed the same question. Bingham then repeated his demand but received an identical response. On the other ship, Commodore John Rodgers stood on principle: "Having asked the first question, & of course conSidering myself entitled by the common rules of politeness to the first answer, after a pause ... I reiterated my first enquiry of 'What Ship is that'?" Both officers refused to answer as a matter of pride; the dilemma was intensified because one party did not realize the other had spoken first. At this point one side fired, and in the confused moments that followed, a del­ uge of iron spewed from both ships. Some minutes later, Rodgers again hailed, "What Ship is that?" A voice responded, "His Britannic Majesty;' but the wind swallowed the ship's name. For Rodgers, this answer was enough to discontinue the engagement. As day broke some fifty miles outside the entrance to Chesapeake Bay on 17 May 18n, the two warships remained in sight. Rodgers sent over a boat with an offi­ cer. Bingham identified himself as commander of the British sloop Little Belt, and Rodgers' officer stated that he belonged to the U.S. frigate President. When Bingham asked why the President had fired, the American officer claimed the British had fired first. Bingham railed that this "was positively not the case:' To make matters worse, 2 Chaptet· I. "Every Appearance ofHastening the Crisis" The Royal Navy, the United States Navy, and the Background to war 3 the much larger President had completely shattered the Little Belt, killing or wound­ complained, "Look at our ships, how they are manned at the breaking out of a war, ing thirty-two of her crew. Rodgers asserted that such bloodshed "would cause me and compare them with the generality of ships now commissioned, and the differ­ the most acute pain during the remainder of my life, had I not the consolation to ence will be most striking: it cannot be otherwise, on account of the vast number know that there was no alternative left me, between such a sacrifice & one which of ships at this time in commission, which are now manned by a very small pro­ would have been still greater; namely to have remained a passive spectator of insult portion of able seamen, and the remainder filled up with good, bad, and indiffer­ to the Flag of my Country, whilst it was confided to my protection:'l ent, viz. ordinary seamen, landsmen, foreigners, the sweepings of Newgate, from the "The affair of the President and Little Belt, so contested on the point of fact, but hulks, and almost all the prisons in the country:'4 which I believe was unpremeditated at least by the governments on both sides, has Naval officers also complained about the manning of their warships. In every appearance of hastening the crisis:' concluded the u.s. ambassador to Russia. 2 December 1811 one captain described his crew as "not at all what I would wish them The bloody affair was indicative of larger problems involving issues of honor and to be, or what they ought to be:' The next month, another explained that "such a misunderstandings leading up to the War of 1812. miserable Crew, I have never before, had the misfortune to command:' A third cap­ The heart of the issue was much broader and signaled that the established rules tain wrote in June 1814, "We have not a bad Ships company, thd a very weak one, as of maritime commerce had deteriorated in an international environment domi­ the last supplies of men, ... were lads much too slight for working Guns of the cali­ nated by a series of wars between Britain and France, and at times with Spain or bre, this ship is armed with:'5 with other European states. In these conflicts spanning the eighteenth century, Inadequate in quality and quantity, manning the British navy has been Britain's survival rested on financial strength, global commerce, and naval power. described as "its most intractable problem:'6 Skilled seamen took years to train, Victory generally resulted from something more, be it victories on the European and without them the wooden warships of the Royal Navy were frankly useless. continent by British and allied armies or the conquest of colonies. Britain entered Attrition suffered in two decades of warfare against Revolutionary and Napoleonic the longest, most expensive, and most unlimited of these European wars in 1793· France-and at times Spain, Denmark, and a number of other countries-meant Over the next two decades, Britain fought successive French revolutionary regimes that finding seamen for Britain's warships became ever more difficult, especially followed by Napoleon and his European allies with only a short pause resulting since the Royal Navy competed for manpower against more-attractive employment from the Peace of Amiens. Throughout the conflict, British commercial and naval opportunities in merchant ships. Volunteers for the naval service did not prove suf­ power grew relentlessly. Britain swept French merchant vessels from the sea and ficient, and the navy's leadership resorted to forcible recruitment or impressment. attempted to impose its will on neutrals, including the United States. Concurrently, Used in every war of the eighteenth century, it was extraordinarily unpopular in France obtained stunning land victories over continental challengers. However, the Britain, but the strategic imperative of keeping the Royal Navy operational provided asymmetry between French land power and British sea power meant that neither naval leaders with a justification for the questionable practice of impressment? could strike a decisive blow. Manpower deficiencies and the inability to replace human attrition contributed to a decline in the Royal Navy's strength by the time of the War of 1812. The number of ships in operational commands fell from 596 in July 1809 to 515 in July 1812, even though the navy's commitments had not declined proportionately. The 515 ships of By 1812 Britain possessed half the world's warship tonnage, an unprecedented figure July 1812 resulted in a savings of 12,070 men over what was necessary for the 596 for any state between 1500 and 1850, and its navy arguably stood at the height of its ships of 1809.8 These manpower figures were based on· authorized complements, power, having emerged victorious in all its fleet battles since 1793. In smaller actions but ships were not always manned to this leveP To keep more warships at sea, their the British navy looked nearly as impressive. In 1811 no British warship larger than authorized complements were reduced to less than optimal numbers, leading one an 18-gun sloop had struck her colors because of combat.3 Moreover, the missions contemporary to write, "The materiel and personnel were more than ever out of the Royal Navy uridertook were more expansive than any contemporary navy and their due proportions:'l0 included policing the oceans, controlling maritime trade, blockading French war­ The British navy conSistently had more ships than could be manned, but one ships, and supporting land forces.