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Plataformas De Compartición De Incidentes De Ciberseguridad

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Plataformas De Compartición De Incidentes De Ciberseguridad PROJECTE FINAL DE CARRERA Plataformas de Compartición de Incidentes de Ciberseguridad (Cybersecurity Incident Sharing Platforms) Estudis: Enginyeria de Telecomunicació Autor: Jenifer Jiménez Gallardo Director: Manel Medina Any: 2016 2 Table of Contents 1. Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ 9 2. Summary .......................................................................................................................... 10 2.1 Resum del Projecte ................................................................................................... 10 2.2 Resumen del Proyecto .............................................................................................. 11 2.3 Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 12 3. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 13 3.1 Background ................................................................................................................ 13 3.2 Objectives .................................................................................................................. 13 3.3 Thesis Structure ......................................................................................................... 13 4. Methodology Used........................................................................................................... 14 4.1 Cyber Threat Sources Research................................................................................. 14 4.2 Cyber Threat Sources Selection ................................................................................ 14 4.3 Quality Assessment Methodology for Data Sources ................................................ 14 4.3.1 Coverage ............................................................................................................ 14 4.3.2 Data Frequency .................................................................................................. 15 4.3.3 Accuracy of Results ............................................................................................ 16 4.4 Data Quality assessment formula ............................................................................. 17 5. Inventory and Description of Identified Sources ............................................................. 18 5.1 Abuse.ch .................................................................................................................... 18 5.2 AlienVault Open Threat Exchange ............................................................................ 20 5.3 ATLAS ........................................................................................................................... 2 5.4 Anti Phishing Working Group ...................................................................................... 4 5.5 Autoshun ..................................................................................................................... 6 5.6 Blocklist ....................................................................................................................... 8 5.7 BotScout .................................................................................................................... 10 5.8 BruteForceBlocker ..................................................................................................... 11 5.9 CI Army ...................................................................................................................... 13 5.10 Cisco IronPort SenderBase .................................................................................... 14 3 5.11 Clean MX ................................................................................................................ 16 5.12 Composite Blocking List ......................................................................................... 17 5.13 CyberCrime Tracker ............................................................................................... 20 5.14 DNS-BH Malware Domain Blocklist ....................................................................... 21 5.15 Dr Web ................................................................................................................... 23 5.16 Dragon Research Group ........................................................................................ 25 5.17 Dshield ................................................................................................................... 27 5.18 Emerging Threats ................................................................................................... 29 5.19 hpHosts .................................................................................................................. 31 5.20 ImproWare AG ....................................................................................................... 33 5.21 Kaspersky ............................................................................................................... 35 5.22 Malc0de ................................................................................................................. 37 5.23 Malware Domain List ............................................................................................. 38 5.24 NoThink! ................................................................................................................ 40 5.25 PhisTank ................................................................................................................. 42 5.26 Project Honey Pot .................................................................................................. 43 5.27 Shadowserver ........................................................................................................ 45 5.28 Spamhaus .............................................................................................................. 48 5.29 Team Cymru ........................................................................................................... 50 5.30 Zone H .................................................................................................................... 52 6. Information Sources Analysis........................................................................................... 55 6.1 Summary of the evaluations ..................................................................................... 55 6.2 Data Uniqueness ....................................................................................................... 57 6.2.1 Phishing .............................................................................................................. 57 6.2.2 Malware ............................................................................................................. 58 6.2.3 Spam .................................................................................................................. 59 6.3 Timeliness .................................................................................................................. 60 6.3.1 Phishing .............................................................................................................. 60 6.3.2 Malware ............................................................................................................. 61 6.3.3 Spam .................................................................................................................. 61 4 7. Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 62 8. Annex I: Abbreviations ..................................................................................................... 63 9. Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 1 5 List of Figures Figure 1: Abuse.ch geographical distribution .......................................................................... 19 Figure 2: AlienVault geographical distribution ........................................................................ 21 Figure 3: ATLAS geographical distribution ................................................................................. 2 Figure 4: ATLAS Intelligence Feed .............................................................................................. 3 Figure 5: APWG geographical distribution................................................................................. 5 Figure 6: Autoshun geographical distribution ........................................................................... 7 Figure 7: Blocklist geographical distribution ............................................................................. 8 Figure 8: BotScout geographical distribution .......................................................................... 10 Figure 9: BruteForceBlocker geographical distribution ........................................................... 12 Figure 10: CI Army geographical distribution .......................................................................... 13 Figure 11: Cisco IronPort SenderBase geographical distribution ............................................ 15 Figure 12: Clean MX geographical distribution ....................................................................... 16 Figure 13: Composite Blocking List geographical distribution................................................
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