2009 National Security and Nonproliferation Briefing Book
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National Council of Resistance of Iran U.S
Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 01/3/2021 3:05 PM National Council of Resistance of Iran U.S. Representative Office 1747 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 1125, Washington, DC 20006 Tel: 202-747-7847; Fax 202-330-5346; [email protected]; twitter: ©ncrius Experts: To Counter Threat from Iran’s Regime, Side with the Iranian People Rising for Freedom, Keep Maximum Pressure WASHINGTON, DC, June 5, 2020 -- On Wednesday, June 3, 2020, the U.S. Representative Office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI-US), held a stellar panel of experts, to discuss “The Growing Threat from Iran’s Regime.” Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, John Rood; former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Ambassador Robert Joseph; former Director of the National Counterproliferation Center and Special Adviser to the Director of National Intelligence, Ambassador Joseph DeTrani; and distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, and former deputy director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Dr. Olli Heinonen were the panelists. Deputy Director of the NCRI-US, Alireza Jafarzadeh, moderated the online panel. Panelists focused on subjects with regard to the Iranian regime and the threat it poses to the international community. Some of the subjects were: the expiring United Nations arms embargo on the Iranian regime, the snapback of UN sanctions, the Iranian regime’s regional aggression, whether direct or through supporting proxy militias, its terrorism and assassination of dissidents abroad, the regime’s missile and nuclear programs and its domestic oppression and crackdown on the Iranian people. In his opening remarks, Alireza Jafarzadeh, explained the key role the nationwide network of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) has played inside Iran to expose the horrific extent of COVID-19 deaths, covered up by the regime and its criminal incompetence and depraved indifference during the pandemic. -
Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment Trial Of
1 116TH CONGRESS " ! S. DOC. 2d Session SENATE 116–12 PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF PRESIDENT DONALD JOHN TRUMP PART III PART III OF IV VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:12 Jan 20, 2020 Jkt 039382 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6012 Sfmt 6012 E:\HR\OC\SD012P3.XXX SD012P3 tkelley on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with SENATE DOC E:\Seals\Congress.#13 1 116TH CONGRESS " ! S. DOC. 2d Session SENATE 116–12 PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF PRESIDENT DONALD JOHN TRUMP PART III PART III OF IV U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 39–382 WASHINGTON : 2020 VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:12 Jan 20, 2020 Jkt 039382 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 4012 Sfmt 4012 E:\HR\OC\SD012P3.XXX SD012P3 tkelley on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with SENATE DOC E:\Seals\Congress.#13 VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:12 Jan 20, 2020 Jkt 039382 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 4012 Sfmt 4012 E:\HR\OC\SD012P3.XXX SD012P3 tkelley on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with SENATE DOC C O N T E N T S Page PART III 1. Replication of the United States House of Representatives to the Answer of President Donald J. Trump to the Articles of Impeachment ............................................................................................... 129 2. Trial Memorandum of President Donald J. Trump .................................. 139 (III) VerDate Sep 11 2014 21:28 Jan 20, 2020 Jkt 039382 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 0486 E:\HR\OC\SD012P3.XXX SD012P3 tkelley on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with SENATE DOC VerDate Sep 11 2014 17:12 Jan 20, 2020 Jkt 039382 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 0486 E:\HR\OC\SD012P3.XXX SD012P3 tkelley on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with SENATE DOC IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Sitting as a Court of Impeachment In re IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. -
Congressional Record United States Th of America PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES of the 116 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
E PL UR UM IB N U U S Congressional Record United States th of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 116 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION Vol. 165 WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, JUNE 27, 2019 No. 109 Senate The Senate met at 9:30 a.m. and was Iowa and across the country and to rec- mater. He played for the University of called to order by the President pro ognize the cost to taxpayers because of Northern Iowa Panthers from 1985 to tempore (Mr. GRASSLEY). the care it takes in the last years of 1989. Nick went on to coach numerous f their lives. This disease robs Ameri- teams, including for Grand View Uni- cans of their memories and impacts versity in Des Moines. Nick knows how PRAYER their ability to speak, pay attention, to reignite hometown pride. He led the The Chaplain, Dr. Barry C. Black, of- and exercise judgment. first and only boys’ Class 3–A cham- fered the following prayer: The best way for Congress to help pionship for Kuemper Catholic High Let us pray. with Alzheimer’s disease is to ensure School in Carroll, IA. He is a class act. Eternal Lord, the center of our joy, adequate research funding to find Congratulations to Nick. we come to You, drawn by Your uncon- treatments. As Congress considers ap- I yield the floor. ditional love. Lord, give us reverential propriations for next year, we should I suggest the absence of a quorum. awe as You open our eyes to see Your continue to fund research and work to- The PRESIDING OFFICER. -
CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1352
Issue 1352 8 February 2019 // USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1352 // Feature Report “Four Problems on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea’s Expanding Nuclear Capabilities Drive a Complex Set of Problems”. Published by RAND; Jan. 11, 2019 https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL271.html North Korean provocations and threats have created an unstable environment on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's ongoing development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles increases the possibility of their use against regional states, furthering instability across the region and beyond. The United States, its allies, and other theater powers, including China and Russia, must attend to four interconnected threats. Failure to prepare will increase the chance of mistakes and miscalculation and constrain options to reduce the likelihood or gravity of future conflicts. Problem 1: North Korea is on a trajectory of nuclear development that has transformed it into a fundamentally different kind of strategic challenge — a state with a significant nuclear arsenal, an increasing range and number of delivery systems, and a nuclear doctrine of early or even preemptive use. Problem 2: North Korea has medium- and long-range artillery that can hold South Korean population centers hostage to a massive conventional and chemical barrage. Problem 3: If North Korea employs chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or conventional artillery against Seoul, up to 25 million South Koreans, 1 million Chinese, and 500,000 other foreign citizens — including 150,000 Americans — might be in immediate danger. This could trigger mass panic and prompt a massive civilian evacuation of Seoul and other population centers. Problem 4: A regime collapse could occur with little warning and have disastrous implications. -
VU Research Portal
VU Research Portal Inter-democratic Security Institutions and the Security Dilemma: EU and NATO relations with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union Diesen, G. 2014 document version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication in VU Research Portal citation for published version (APA) Diesen, G. (2014). Inter-democratic Security Institutions and the Security Dilemma: EU and NATO relations with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. E-mail address: [email protected] Download date: 30. Sep. 2021 VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT Inter-democratic Security Institutions and the Security Dilemma: EU and NATO relations with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, op gezag van de rector magnificus prof.dr. F.A. -
Stolaralexander.Pdf (879Kb)
HALTING REACTOR TRANSFERS: CAN TRADE EXPECTATIONS EXPLAIN THE WILLINGNESS OF NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS TO EXPORT REACTORS? A Masters Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Security Studies By Alexander W. Stolar, B.A. Washington, DC April 15, 2010 Copyright 2009 by Alexander W. Stolar All Rights Reserved ii HALTING REACTOR TRANSFERS: CAN TRADE EXPECTATIONS EXPLAIN THE WILLINGNESS OF NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS TO EXPORT REACTORS? Alexander W. Stolar, B.A. Thesis Advisor: Justine Rosenthal, Ph.D. ABSTRACT Since 1974, there have been 42 contested nuclear reactor exports in which a supplier state (“the supplier”) has considered exporting a reactor to a recipient nation (“the recipient,”) and a third country (“the objector”) has objected to the proposed transfer. The thesis’s core research question is: Does a supplier’s expectation of future trade with an objector impact the supplier’s decision on whether to proceed with a reactor transfer to a recipient despite the objector’s protest? Significance testing determined that there is no relationship between a supplier’s expectation of future trade with an objector and a supplier’s decision on whether to proceed with a reactor transfer to a recipient after an objector has protested the proposed transfer. However, the thesis’s evidence suggests that the adoption of Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) guidelines for nuclear commerce in 1978 and 1992 contributed to the development of a robust norm against exports of nuclear reactors that do not accord with NSG regulations. iii The research and writing of this thesis is dedicated to my family. -
Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution
Occasional Paper 9 Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution Susan J. Koch Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction National Defense University DR. JOHN F. REICHART Director DR. W. SETH CARUS Deputy Director, Distinguished Research Fellow Since its inception in 1994, the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Center) has been at the forefront of research on the implications of weapons of mass destruction for U.S. security. Originally focusing on threats to the military, the WMD Center now also applies its expertise and body of research to the challenges of homeland security. The center’s mandate includes research, education, and outreach. Research focuses on understanding the security challenges posed by WMD and on fashioning effective responses thereto. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has designated the center as the focal point for WMD education in the joint professional military education system. Education programs, including its courses on countering WMD and consequence management, enhance awareness in the next generation of military and civilian leaders of the WMD threat as it relates to defense and homeland security policy, programs, technology, and operations. As a part of its broad outreach efforts, the WMD Center hosts annual symposia on key issues bringing together leaders and experts from the government and private sectors. Visit the center online at www.ndu.edu/WMDCenter/. Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution Susan J. Koch Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper, No. 9 National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government.