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VU Research Portal Inter-democratic Security Institutions and the Security Dilemma: EU and NATO relations with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union Diesen, G. 2014 document version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication in VU Research Portal citation for published version (APA) Diesen, G. (2014). Inter-democratic Security Institutions and the Security Dilemma: EU and NATO relations with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 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Sep. 2021 VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT Inter-democratic Security Institutions and the Security Dilemma: EU and NATO relations with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, op gezag van de rector magnificus prof.dr. F.A. van der Duyn Schouten, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie van de Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen op woensdag 3 september 2014 om 11.45 uur in de aula van de universiteit, De Boelelaan 1105 door Glenn Eric Andre Diesen geboren te Oslo, Noorwegen promotor: prof.dr. W.M. Wagner ii Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... vii Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. ix Abbreviations ....................................................................................................................... xi Preface ................................................................................................................................ xv 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 2. Contribution to the literature ....................................................................................... 19 3. Theoretical comparison ................................................................................................. 29 3.1. Neoclassical realist theory ............................................................................. 30 3.2. Liberal institutional theory ............................................................................ 43 4. Research Design ............................................................................................................. 47 4.1. Method ......................................................................................................... 48 4.2. Case selection and case portraits ................................................................... 51 4.3. Conceptualising and operationalising variables affecting the security dilemma ............................................................................................................................ 59 4.3.1. Conceptualising and operationalising instruments of power .................... 60 4.3.2. Conceptualising and operationalising security dilemma sensibility ......... 66 4.3.3. Conceptualising and operationalising institutional inclusion ................... 68 4.3.4. Conceptualising and operationalising threat perceptions ......................... 72 4.4. Expected outcomes for competing theories .................................................... 73 5. Case study I: CSDP and Russia .................................................................................... 79 5.1. Instruments of power..................................................................................... 81 5.1.1. Military capabilities: a disconnect between tasks and capacity ................ 82 5.1.2. Strategy/policies ..................................................................................... 87 5.1.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................ 106 5.2. Security Dilemma Sensibility ....................................................................... 109 5.2.1 Russian security concerns regarding the CSDP ....................................... 110 iii 5.2.2. Russian policies responding to fears of the CSDP .................................. 122 5.2.3. EU recognition of Russian security concerns ......................................... 128 5.2.4. EU recognition of Russian policy motivations ....................................... 137 5.2.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................ 141 5.3. Institutional inclusion ................................................................................... 143 5.3.1. Planning ................................................................................................ 144 5.3.2. Decision-making.................................................................................... 158 5.3.3. Implementation ...................................................................................... 168 5.3.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................ 170 5.4. Threat perceptions ........................................................................................ 172 5.4.1. Conclusion ............................................................................................ 181 5.5. Conclusion: Coercing ‘European integration’ ............................................... 183 6. Case Study II: Missile Defence and Russia ................................................................. 185 6.1. Instruments of Power ................................................................................... 187 6.1.1. Military Capabilities .............................................................................. 188 6.1.2. Strategies and policies ........................................................................... 199 6.1.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................ 201 6.2. Security dilemma sensibility ........................................................................ 203 6.2.1. Russian Security Concerns regarding Missile Defence ........................... 204 6.2.2. Russian policies responding to fears of missile defence.......................... 212 6.2.3. NATO recognition of Russian security concerns .................................... 218 6.2.4. NATO recognition of Russian policy motivations .................................. 226 6.2.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................ 228 6.3. Institutional Inclusion................................................................................... 230 6.3.1. Planning ................................................................................................ 231 6.3.2. Decision-making.................................................................................... 242 6.3.3. Implementation ...................................................................................... 252 iv 6.3.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................ 253 6.4. Threat perceptions ........................................................................................ 255 6.4.1. Conclusion ............................................................................................ 261 6.5. Conclusion: Containing Russia by reducing nuclear parity ........................... 263 7. Conclusion: Ideology, institutions and hegemony ...................................................... 265 References ......................................................................................................................... 275 Primary Sources .............................................................................................. 275 Secondary sources: Journal articles and books ................................................. 288 Secondary sources: Media ............................................................................... 313 Nederlandse samenvatting ................................................................................................. 319 v vi Abstract Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the EU and NATO have become the dominant security institutions in Europe. They have expanded their membership and the geographic scope of missions ostensibly undertaken to enhance security. Membership of these institutions is now predicated on liberal-democratic credentials. The puzzle is whether the “inter-democratic” quality of these security institutions contributes to improve or deteriorate security relations with Russia. To examine this proposition, the expectations of two alternative theoretical schools or approaches
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