Issue 1352 8 February 2019 // USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1352 //
Feature Report
“Four Problems on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea’s Expanding Nuclear Capabilities Drive a Complex Set of Problems”. Published by RAND; Jan. 11, 2019 https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL271.html North Korean provocations and threats have created an unstable environment on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's ongoing development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles increases the possibility of their use against regional states, furthering instability across the region and beyond. The United States, its allies, and other theater powers, including China and Russia, must attend to four interconnected threats. Failure to prepare will increase the chance of mistakes and miscalculation and constrain options to reduce the likelihood or gravity of future conflicts. Problem 1: North Korea is on a trajectory of nuclear development that has transformed it into a fundamentally different kind of strategic challenge — a state with a significant nuclear arsenal, an increasing range and number of delivery systems, and a nuclear doctrine of early or even preemptive use. Problem 2: North Korea has medium- and long-range artillery that can hold South Korean population centers hostage to a massive conventional and chemical barrage. Problem 3: If North Korea employs chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or conventional artillery against Seoul, up to 25 million South Koreans, 1 million Chinese, and 500,000 other foreign citizens — including 150,000 Americans — might be in immediate danger. This could trigger mass panic and prompt a massive civilian evacuation of Seoul and other population centers. Problem 4: A regime collapse could occur with little warning and have disastrous implications. Possible consequences include a civil war; a massive humanitarian crisis; and the potential for the theft, proliferation, and use of North Korea's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
Issue No. 1320 22 June 2018
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TABLE OF CONTENTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS • Pentagon Official: No Plans to Develop New Missile System amid end of Russian Arms Treaty (The Hill) Undersecretary of Defense for Policy John Rood said that because the U.S. has been in full compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty since it was signed in 1987, “we don’t have an intermediate range system or something like that that we would, that we’re talking about deploying at this time.” • ICBM Test Conducted from Vandenberg Air Force Base; Anti-weapons Group Raises Concerns (Lompoc Record) The intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, was blasted from a silo on the northern portion of the base at 11:01 p.m. • Russia Bids Farewell to INF Treaty with Fresh Nuclear Development Plans (Defense News) The U.S. and Russia have been sparring over mutual alleged violations of the INF Treaty since at least 2014, when the Obama administration began issuing vague protests of Russian noncompliance.
US COUNTER-WMD • Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense Focuses on DOD Role in Protecting U.S. against Bio Attacks (Homeland Preparedness News) “Our troops must be able to ‘survive and fight’ in any environment, including one contaminated with chemical or biological weapons agents,” said Derek ‘Dirk’ Maurer …
US ARMS CONTROL • Trump Announces Second North Korea Summit in State of the Union (Defense One) Broadly, the speech reflected policy ideas and positions that Trump articulated as a candidate — such as a desire to get out of military engagements in the Middle East — or that his administration has already enacted. • Russia: US Nuclear Pact Withdrawal Does Not Mean ‘Development of a Cold War’ (The Hill) President Trump said in his own statement that the U.S. would “move forward with developing our own military response options” to the violations and work to “deny Russia any military advantage from its unlawful conduct.” • French Air Force Rehearses a Long-Range Nuclear Strike (Defense News) The French Air Force has successfully practiced a nuclear strike mission, sending aircraft on an 11-hour mission to sneak a nuclear-capable cruise missile through simulated enemy air defenses and nail it into the sands of a test range south of Bordeaux.
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COMMENTARY • North Korea and America’s Second Summit: Here’s What Graham Allison Thinks Will Happen (National Interest) If the upcoming summit ends with a verifiable commitment from North Korea to eliminate all ICBMs, and not to produce additional missiles, in exchange for a political declaration ending the Korean War, that would be a significant achievement. • Welcome to the New Nuclear Arms Race (The Hill) But in "Arms Race Two: The Sequel," now we have the U.S. and Russian presidents conspiring in the opposite direction — to kill nuclear arms control. • The Best Defense Ever? Myths about the Trump Administration’s Missile Defense Review (War on the Rocks) The 2019 Missile Defense Review is only the latest in a long series of attempts to “solve” dilemmas of defense with dreams of new technologies.
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The Hill (Washington, D.C.) Pentagon Official: No Plans to Develop New Missile System amid End of Russian Arms Treaty By Ellen Mitchell Feb. 6, 2019 The head of Pentagon policy on Wednesday said the military is not yet planning to create or deploy an intermediate-range missile system in the light of the U.S. announcing it will no longer comply with a Soviet-era arms control pact with Russia. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy John Rood said that because the U.S. has been in full compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty since it was signed in 1987, “we don’t have an intermediate range system or something like that that we would, that we’re talking about deploying at this time.” “We’re going to look at our options in this regard,” Rood added. The Trump administration last week announced long-anticipated plans to stop complying with the INF Treaty, accusing Russia of violating the agreement for years. Moscow has for years denied breaching the agreement, though officials from successive administrations have raised the issue in failed diplomatic talks. The treaty, signed by then-President Reagan and Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev, bans nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, including those that can carry a nuclear warhead, with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The declaration kick-starts a six-month withdrawal period, during which Russia has a final chance to comply with the treaty by destroying the missiles that violate it and associated equipment. But Moscow has indicated it will also abandon INF, with plans to develop two new land-based missile launch systems by 2021 in order to counter U.S. developments in its missile capabilities. In his State of the Union speech on Tuesday night, President Trump countered that the United States “is developing a state of the art missile defense system,” and “will never apologize for advancing America’s interests.” “Perhaps we can negotiate a different agreement, adding China and others, or perhaps we can’t. In which case we will outspend and out innovate all others, by far,” Trump added. Rood, one of the leaders in creating the Trump administration’s newly released Missile Defense Review, said U.S. officials will discuss their defense options with allies at a NATO defense ministers meeting later this month in Brussels. “We’re going to have to see how we adapt our defense posture in response to that new reality,” Rood said. He added that Washington doesn’t “have any plans right now and aren’t contemplating a deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe or anything of that nature. That’s not what we’re thinking about right now.” https://thehill.com/policy/defense/428845-pentagon-official-no-plans-to-develop-new-missile- system-amid-end-of-russian
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Lompoc Record (Lompoc, Calif.) ICBM Test Conducted from Vandenberg Air Force Base; Anti-weapons Group Raises Concerns By Willis Jacobson Feb. 6, 2019 An unarmed Minuteman III missile was fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base late Tuesday night as part of a test of the U.S. nuclear weapons system. The intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, was blasted from a silo on the northern portion of the base at 11:01 p.m. The missile’s launch and journey created an extended deep rumble that resonated throughout the Lompoc Valley and beyond. Representatives with Air Force Global Strike Command did not reveal whether the test was deemed successful. The ICBM test launches, according to the Air Force, are held regularly and are not related to any specific real-world events. Representatives of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, however, raised concerns about the test being held just days after President Donald Trump’s administration announced Feb. 1 that the U.S. would be withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, or INF, Treaty with Russia. That treaty has been a cornerstone of arms control since the Cold War, and the U.S. planned exit has raised fears among some of a new arms race. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, which has a stated mission to “educate, advocate and inspire action for a just and peaceful world, free of nuclear weapons,” is among those sharing those worries. “It’s time for Americans to wake up,” David Krieger, president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, said ahead of Tuesday’s missile test. “These tests don’t make us safer; they make the world more dangerous. Rather than continuing to test nuclear weapons, we should be leading negotiations to rid the world of these weapons of indiscriminate mass annihilation.” Rick Wayman, the deputy director of the foundation, particularly took issue with the timing after the INF treaty announcement. “Just four days ago, the Trump administration suspended the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, one of the most important arms control treaties ever achieved between the United States and Russia,” he said. “The very same week, both of these countries now appear set to test launch intercontinental ballistic missiles. While ICBMs would not have violated the INF Treaty, it is alarming that this extraordinary tension is coming to a head with major nuclear-capable missile tests just hours or days apart.” According to the Air Force, the operational tests of Minuteman III missiles provide valuable data to planners and holistically test the system, procedures and airmen. https://lompocrecord.com/news/local/icbm-test-conducted-from-vandenberg-air-force-base-anti- weapons/article_645a77a9-b848-57a9-bd05-a9543b755fdd.html Return to top
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Defense News (Washington, D.C.) Russia Bids Farewell to INF Treaty with Fresh Nuclear Development Plans By Matthew Bodner Feb. 6, 2019 MOSCOW — It didn’t take long following the United States' announcement that the country would suspend its participation in a major Cold War arms treaty for Russia to move in kind. Now, freed of its obligations under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Moscow is wasting no time in developing new, once-prohibited weapons systems. In a meeting of Russian military leaders in Moscow on Tuesday, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu passed down the word from the Kremlin: Develop, by 2020, “a ground-based version of the sea- based Kalibr system with a long-range cruise missile,” Shoigu said, “and in the same period, we will create a ground-based missile system with a long-range hypersonic rocket.” Kalibr, a Russian cruise missile analogous to the American Tomahawk missile, has seen effective use in Syria and is being deployed across a wide variety of Russian naval platforms. As for the hypersonic system, there has been confusion as to which weapons project he was referring — Shoigu described the system in two different ways. During a meeting with Putin on Saturday, the Russian-language transcript quotes Shoigu as describing the system as ballistic. The term ballistic disappeared from the English-language transcript, and again did not appear in Shoigu’s description of the system on Tuesday. “While the second description doesn’t contradict the first, we’ve only heard the word ‘ballistic’ once,” said Andrey Baklitskiy, an expert on nuclear issues with the Moscow-based PIR Center. “Was Shoigu’s statement a slip of the tongue? If he was right and it will be a ballistic missile, it could be Rubezh resurrected from the dead with or without a hypersonic glide vehicle.” Rubezh was a Russian development project for an intercontinental ballistic missile. Russian news agency Tass reported in March that the development effort was bumped to 2027 in favor of the Avangard boost-glide hypersonic project unveiled by President Vladimir Putin on March 1, 2018. However, the Kommerstant newspaper has suggested the weapon may be a modified Tsirkon anti- ship cruise missile. “If it is a cruise missile after all, then Tsirkon is an interesting option,” Baklitsky said. “It is indeed hypersonic, but we don’t know that much about it, and all of that is not official information. But [according to public information, its] distance is said to be around 500 kilometers, and if that is true you would need to significantly upgrade the range.” In addition to new ground-launched cruise missiles and some form of hypersonic system, Shoigu said the military has been directed to increase the strike range of existing ground-launched systems currently under development thanks to funds allocated for procurement through 2021. Using existing sea- and ground-based systems as the basis for new missiles to fill strike ranges once banned by the INF Treaty (500-5,500 kilometers), according to Shoigu, will allow for a significantly expedited development timeline. And some in Washington may say Russia, which stands accused of already developing weapons at INF ranges, already has a head start. The U.S. and Russia have been sparring over mutual alleged violations of the INF Treaty since at least 2014, when the Obama administration began issuing vague protests of Russian noncompliance. The Trump administration upped the ante last year with formal protests that a new Russian missile, dubbed the 9M729, had been tested at ranges prohibited under the treaty.
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Few in the West doubt that Russia stands in violation, but the Trump administration prompted alarm across Europe when national security adviser John Bolton was dispatched to Moscow in October 2018 to signal America’s imminent withdrawal from the treaty. Russian officials scoffed at an ultimatum to return to compliance or face unilateral U.S. withdrawal. Moscow has been on overdrive in attempting to make the case that the U.S. is, in fact, the main offender — pointing to a variety of U.S. actions as evidence that Washington’s suspension of the treaty was premeditated and precedes a major American buildup of INF-banned weapons. In a meeting with Putin on Saturday, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov laid out Moscow’s case. “The United States has been violating the treaty since 1999, when it started testing combat unmanned aerial vehicles that have the same characteristics as land-based cruise missiles banned by the treaty,” Lavrov said. He then lashed out at U.S. missile defense deployments in eastern Europe, specifically the Mark 41 launch system. “These launchers are fully suitable, as they are for Tomahawk intermediate-range attack missiles,” he said. The U.S. has denied the allegation. Lavrov noted that the United States' most recent Nuclear Posture Review called for the development of low-yield nuclear weapons, and that intermediate-range missiles would likely be used to deliver them. “It was also announced only recently that this provision of the U.S. nuclear doctrine is beginning to materialize with missiles of this kind entering production," he said. American officials, for their part, have maintained for years that there are no U.S. systems which violate the INF Treaty. Speaking Feb. 6 at the Washington-based Hudson Institute, John Rood, the Pentagon’s undersecretary of defense for policy, waved away such Russian statements as propaganda. “We’ve had these concerns about Russia violating the INF Treaty for some time. I saw the comments from the Russians that this might cause them to pursue intermediate-range missiles,” Rood said. “My first reaction was, well, of course [they mean] in addition to those you have deployed in significant numbers in violation of the treaty. It’s not that big of a change in behavior they are hinting at, unfortunately.” He added that the threat of new Russian systems does not require major changes to the recently released Missile Defense Review, as the document took into account Russian weapons that the U.S. has alleged violates the treaty. On Saturday, the day Russia suspended its participation in the INF Treaty, the Russian Defence Ministry took to social media to allege that the U.S. began preparations to manufacture missiles banned by the agreement two years before it formally suspended its participation. A satellite photo of recent expansions of Raytheon’s production facilities in Tucson, Arizona, were offered as evidence. “This plant is the largest diversified enterprise of the US space industry,” the social media post said. “Over the past two years the space of the plant has increased by 44% — from 55,000 to 79,000 sq [meters], while the number of employees is about to rise by almost 2,000 people, according to official statements." Shoigu, the defense minister, struck a similar chord three days later when he painted the Kremlin’s directive to begin work on new missiles as a direct response to U.S. efforts to field intermediate- range missiles. And dire predictions of World War III with an aggressive United States have dominated talk shows and headlines in Russia.
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The Trump administration’s approach to the dispute has left the U.S. taking most of the heat for the treaty’s demise, and it is certainly a treaty Moscow wanted to scrap. But this is unlikely the way Moscow wanted things to play out, and the Kremlin now finds itself frustrated that Washington may be backing away from arms control entirely. “Moscow sees itself diminished by the U.S. refusal to discuss Russia’s concerns about U.S. compliance with INF, as well as the New START treaty,” according to Vladimir Frolov, a Russian foreign affairs analyst. “Moscow needs to have those concerns at least acknowledged as a sign that Washington deals with Moscow on equal footing.” Rather than treat Russia as an equal partner on nuclear issues, where it has always enjoyed a special status vis-a-vis the U.S., Moscow finds itself subject to American ultimatums — a relationship Moscow is constantly looking to break. “Moscow wants to break that pattern where the U.S. is the accuser and Russia is the guilty party,” Frolov said. “Moscow’s message is: ‘Admit that we are both to blame, then we can deal with your concerns, and you deal with ours.' “So we are stuck here.” Aaron Mehta in Washington contributed to this report. https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nuclear-arsenal/2019/02/06/russia-bids-farewell-to-inf- treaty-with-fresh-nuclear-development-plans/ Return to top
US COUNTER-WMD
Homeland Preparedness News (Washington, D.C.) Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense Focuses on DOD Role in Protecting U.S. against Bio Attacks By Kim Riley Feb. 6, 2019 There’s ample reason to concentrate on the role the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) plays in helping the nation defend against biological attacks, one of the most critical being the protection of America’s military troops, said experts Tuesday during a Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense event in Washington, D.C. “Our troops must be able to ‘survive and fight’ in any environment, including one contaminated with chemical or biological weapons agents,” said Derek ‘Dirk’ Maurer, deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction at DOD, during one of the panel’s discussions on Feb. 5. The Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense held its Fighting the Next War: Defense Against Biological Weapons meeting to gain a better understanding about DOD’s responsibilities and requirements for biodefense, as well as the department’s role in implementing the 2018 National Biodefense Strategy. Former Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Ridge, co-chairman of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, said that when the panel in 2015 released its own A National Blueprint for Biodefense, which
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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1352 // helped inform the recent national strategy, the members focused on other federal agencies, not so much on DOD. “We didn’t ignore it; we recognize the important role played by the military,” Ridge said on Tuesday, noting that the panel was more concerned at that time in improving the civilian side of the biodefense enterprise. “We thought the military was better prepared, at that time, than their civilian counterparts,” said Ridge, “and while we didn’t think they were doing everything they could possibly do, we thought they were doing more and doing it more efficiently than just about anybody else.” So Blue Ribbon Panel members included DOD in some of its blueprint’s recommendations “when it was clear to us that some of these departments needed to take action together in the biodefense field,” he said, noting that it’s “always a challenge” to get independent, disparate agencies to communicate and collaborate, “whether it’s on biodefense or anything else.” Ridge said the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense “always intended to revisit and fully examine the military’s efforts to defend against bio attacks and naturally occurring diseases that could bring this nation down.” “We want to ensure today’s warfighters have the tools they need to identify an attack before it occurs, to fulfill their proliferation and nonproliferation missions, to accurately detect biological agents used against them, to protect themselves against such attacks and fight their way through biologically contaminated areas, while at the same time maintaining their operational strength,” he said. “It would be illogical, unrealistic and improper to expect that biological weapons would never be used against our military or our nation.” Thus, the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense delved into DOD’s biodefense priorities, including countering biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its force protection requirements. U.S. Rep. James Langevin (D-RI), chairman of the U.S. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities, discussed both current and emerging bio threats, technologies and programs that subcommittee members must consider when authorizing DOD activities, as well as oversight and legislation to address biodefense, among other related topics. Rep. Langevin testified that biodefense will be a continued focus for the subcommittee this congressional term. “As chairman, I will continue to evaluate and elevate the conversation around this issue,” the congressman said during a morning discussion with panel members. Langevin noted that many of the nation’s adversaries seek to acquire, develop, proliferate, and use biological and chemical WMD against the United States, both overseas and at home. Syria and ISIS, for example, think their use of chemical WMD against civilians will help them achieve their tactical and strategic objectives, he said, while the emerging capabilities of advanced technology can provide them with a way to develop biological weapons “at a scope and scale not yet encountered.” So clearly the motive exists for the use of chemical weapons, the lawmaker told Blue Ribbon Study Panel members. DOD has taken “some initial steps toward viable risk mitigation and innovative solutions,” Langevin said, and in 2014 released its strategy for chemical WMD and in 2017 a special operations command was designated as a coordinating authority for chemical WMD. Since that time, he said, the command has been leveraging best practices from its traditional mission and integrating chemical WMD into all operations across DOD.
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Langevin said the Trump administration’s release of the National Biodefense Strategy last September also represents a coordinated effort between DOD, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Agriculture Department and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) among others. “Each have roles, areas of specialties and capabilities and responsibilities in addressing biodefense, preparedness and response,” said Langevin said, adding that the document also recognizes the critical role of the intelligence community in identifying potential bio threats. “The plan requires a whole-of-government approach to drive investment and buy-in across the spectrum of biodefense activities,” he said, “and includes long-term investments in science and technology, which can provide better capabilities to our warfighters and law enforcement professionals.” His subcommittee regularly evaluates WMD and has stepped up its DOD oversight, Langevin told panel members, pointing out that lawmakers have a lot of work to do around CBRN threats. For example, the U.S. Comptroller General is currently conducting an evaluation of military preparedness for germ attacks following a request from the House Armed Services Committee. Although unsure of when the committee will receive the comptroller’s report, Langevin said he thinks it will be within the year. “We want to be sure our troops are going to be adequately prepared and protected so that’s something we will be following up on.” Bioweapons used to inflict widespread casualties and loss of life are something federal lawmakers must take seriously, the congressman said. “We must continue to push this dialogue forward, not just in the defense community but also in Congress,” he said. “We have to stay on top of this threat … and we also must provide resources to keep our nation out of harm’s way.” DOD’s Maurer provided Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense members with the DOD perspective on challenges to defending against biological weapons. Maurer explained that the DOD’s national defense strategy, which is aligned with the National Biodefense Strategy, outlines three lines of effort for the department: to rebuild readiness while building a more lethal force; to strengthen alliances and attract new partners; and to improve performance in affordability by reforming DOD business practices. He discussed each and how they related to the national biodefense effort. While building a lethal force, for example, Maurer said part of DOD’s job is ensuring U.S. troops can operate in all environments, including those contaminated by bio or chemical agents. “DOD also needs to stand ready to provide support to civil authorities such as HHS or DHS should they require unique military capabilities or additional capacity to respond to infectious disease, naturally occurring or otherwise. Such events can also affect the readiness of our force,” he said. “Correspondingly,” added Maurer, “the first focus must be the health of our force to ensure that we can continue to defend the nation.” Maurer said DOD is working to understand and anticipate both the promise and potential peril of cutting-edge technologies, including synthetic biology. “The solution to this threat is the same as the threat: these same cutting-edge technologies,” he said. Within his office, Maurer also oversees the cooperative threat reduction policy team, which includes the biological threat reduction program. The efforts are around stopping biothreats that can rapidly grow to impact American military forces and to strengthen biological solutions in
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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1352 // partner countries. “The ultimate goal is to establish local hubs of expertise in biosecurity and surveillance that work independent of DOD support,” he said. “We’re making good progress,” Maurer said. “More progress is needed and we look to colleagues both inside and outside the government to help us make that progress.” Overall, he said, there’s a sustained effort across DOD regarding the chemical WMD mission. “We do not have every challenge figured out yet,” he added, but they’re working to “ensure transparency, raise concerns and collaborate on solutions.” Christian Hassell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense at DOD, elaborated on some of Maurer’s comments, as well as goals for his office. “For the record, let me state clearly and without exception, the DOD does not have an offensive chemical and biological weapons program,” said Hassell. “We have a chemical and biological defense program, which also includes radiological, but we haven’t formally changed the name yet.” This defense program plays an important role in ensuring the lethality of America’s military forces, Hassell said, and provides the equipment and the systems that American warfighters need to carry out their missions during a chemical or bio attack. Such systems include detection and diagnostics systems, protective suits, gloves and masks, vaccines and therapeutic drugs, and decontamination systems, as well as the associated information systems that tie these all together, he added. The program also is focused on specific agents, such as those that can be genetically modified, and synthetic biology, among other areas. Passionate about interagency collaboration and the collective spirit around it, Maurer said the National Biodefense Strategy also will help DOD go further on collaborations. “Mission divergence isn’t an excuse for not sharing information,” he said. During an afternoon panel, the civilian perspectives on defense policy were offered to Blue Ribbon Panel members, including from Dan Gerstein, senior policy researcher at RAND Corporation. Gerstein was the undersecretary (acting) and deputy undersecretary in the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security from 2011 to 2014. Regarding DOD response capabilities, he said: “We are not prepared for a significant biological event. DOD is simply not prepared for a major biological issue.” And while the National Biodefense Strategy contains goals and objectives for federal agencies, it doesn’t address resources or processing issues, among others, he said. “In other words, it’s light on ways and means,” said Gerstein. The strategy also is HHS-focused, which he pointed out could create “a significant shortfall” in its implementation, an opinion that other DOD experts also alluded to during the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense event. https://homelandprepnews.com/countermeasures/32417-blue-ribbon-study-panel-on- biodefense-focuses-on-dod-role-in-protecting-u-s-against-bio-attacks/ Return to top
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US ARMS CONTROL
Defense One (Washington, D.C.) Trump Announces Second North Korea Summit in State of the Union By Katie Bo Williams Feb. 5, 2019 President Trump will meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un for a second time: a two-day summit in Vietnam at month’s end. The announcement was perhaps the most significant national-security development in his 82-minute State of the Union speech. Trump touted his relationship with Kim. “If I had not been elected President of the United States, we would right now, in my opinion, be in a major war with North Korea with potentially millions of people killed,” he said. There is no evidence for this assertion, which the president has made before, and which drew an astonished expression from House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, sitting behind his left shoulder. The men met in Singapore last year in the first bilateral meeting between leaders of their countries. Trump stuck to the teleprompter in a speech that both urged national unity amid an acrimonious political climate and piqued Democrats with a robust defense of his border wall proposal and other controversial national-security initiatives. Broadly, the speech reflected policy ideas and positions that Trump articulated as a candidate — such as a desire to get out of military engagements in the Middle East — or that his administration has already enacted. He spoke at length about his administration’s touchstone national-security efforts, including leaving the Iran nuclear deal and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty. He condemned Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, whose government the Trump administration recently declared illegitimate, and vowed that “America will never be a socialist country.” He boasted that NATO allies’ defense spending has gone up during his administration, ad-libbing, “And they said it couldn’t be done.” As expected, Trump defended his efforts to remove U.S. forces from the Middle East. “Great nations do not fight endless wars,” he said, saying that the United States has spent more than $7 trillion in the Middle East, fighting “for almost 19 years.” The $7 trillion figure appears to be exaggerated, according to a fact check by the New York Times, and a Brown University study that calculated the total cost of the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Pakistan was $3.6 trillion through 2016. Also, the American military mission in Afghanistan began in October 2001, less than 18 years ago, not 19. Trump touted “progress” in ongoing peace talks “with a number of Afghan groups, including the Taliban.” “We do not know whether we will achieve an agreement — but we do know that after two decades of war, the hour has come to at least try for peace,” he said. The president did not provide an extended defense of his controversial December decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria, an edict delivered via tweet that prompted the resignations of then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and top counter-ISIS diplomat Brett McGurk. He did contradicted his own December assertion that ISIS was “defeated,” saying in the speech that as the United States is “[working] with our allies to destroy the remnants of ISIS, it is time to give our brave warriors in Syria a warm welcome home.”
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The second summit with Kim will be closely watched for any signs that the rogue regime is serious about giving up its nuclear weapons. After the first summit with Kim, in June, Trump triumphantly declared, “There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea.” Last week, Dan Coats, director of the Office of National Intelligence, told lawmakers that “North Korean leaders view nuclear arms as critical to regime survival” and that the intelligence community “continues to assess that it is unlikely to give up all of its WMD stockpiles, delivery systems, and production capabilities.” Trump has tempered his boasts about North Korea in recent months, but on Tuesday repeated assertions that the country’s cessation of missile testing is evidence of a reduced threat. Pyongyang has said that their ICBMs are now reliable enough to need no further tests. The speech, which was delayed several weeks by the 35-day government shutdown, clocked in as the second-longest State of the Union in history, and the longest since President Bill Clinton’s speech in 2000. Katie Bo Williams is the senior national security correspondent for Defense One, where she writes about defense, counterterror, NATO, nukes, and more. https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2019/02/trump-announces-second-north-korea-summit- state-union/154672/?oref=d-topstory l Return to top
The Hill (Washington, D.C.) Russia: US Nuclear Pact Withdrawal Does Not Mean ‘Development of a Cold War’ By Michael Burke Feb. 4, 2019 Russia on Monday said the United States's withdrawal from a Cold War-era arms control pact would not lead to another Cold War, according to a Russian state news agency. “I don’t think we’re talking about the development of a Cold War. A new era has begun," RIA news agency quotes Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov as saying, according to Reuters reports. The Trump administration announced last week that it would withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, saying that Russia had violated the agreement. “Russia has refused to take any steps to return to real and verifiable compliance over these 60 days,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Friday. “The United States will therefore suspend its obligations under the INF Treaty effective Feb. 2." President Trump said in his own statement that the U.S. would “move forward with developing our own military response options” to the violations and work to “deny Russia any military advantage from its unlawful conduct.” The U.S. since 2014 had accused Russia of violating the treaty, which was signed in 1987 and banned weapons including certain ballistic and cruise missiles. The international community has widely believed that Russia has violated the agreement, but has expressed concern about the impact of the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded on Saturday by announcing that Russia would also withdraw from the pact.
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“Our American partners have announced they were suspending their participation in the treaty, and we will do the same," he said. "They have announced they will conduct research and development, and we will act accordingly." https://thehill.com/policy/international/428306-russia-says-us-nuclear-pact-withdrawal-does- not-mean-development-of-a Return to top
Defense News (Washington, D.C.) French Air Force Rehearses a Long-Range Nuclear Strike By Sebastian Sprenger Feb. 5, 2019 COLOGNE, Germany — The French Air Force has successfully practiced a nuclear strike mission, sending aircraft on an 11-hour mission to sneak a nuclear-capable cruise missile through simulated enemy air defenses and nail it into the sands of a test range south of Bordeaux. The Feb. 4 mission, billed by the Armed Forces Ministry as “operation-representative,” featured a Rafale fighter jet releasing an ASMP-A missile, made by MBDA. Officials designed the drill to include “all phases characteristic of a nuclear-dissuasion mission,” including successive refueling by C-135 and A-330 tankers before aiming the missile — without a nuclear warhead — at a missile test area near the town of Biscarrosse. “This success reinforces the technical and operational credibility of the deterrence that the airborne component has continuously maintained through the Air Force since 1964,” reads an Armed Forces Ministry statement from Feb. 5. Besides its aerial deterrence leg, the French military has submarines capable of firing nuclear- tipped missiles. Monday’s test came days after Russia and the United States said they would abandon a key arms- control agreement that has kept Europe free of the threat of intermediate-range nuclear weapons for decades. In an apparent effort to counter the appearance of a retaliatory move aimed at Russia, the French ministry statement stresses that the test mission had been long planned. “There is no reason to believe that the timing of the test due to anything other operational or technical reasons,” agreed Bruno Tertrais, deputy director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique think tank in Paris. He said similar tests occur roughly once per year. “The alternative would have been to cancel the test for fear that it was understood as response to INFT suspensions — that would have been fairly ridiculous,” Tertrais told Defense News, using shorthand for the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/02/05/french-air-force-rehearses-a-long- range-nuclear-strike/ Return to top
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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1352 //
COMMENTARY
National Interest (Washington, D.C.) North Korea and America’s Second Summit: Here’s What Graham Allison Thinks Will Happen By Graham Allison Feb. 6, 2019 Assessing prospects for the Trump-Kim summit, we should ask: (1) What matters most for American national interests? (2) Compared to what? Where would we be absent the policies and actions of the Trump Administration? In thinking about national interests, the essential question is: what matters more than something else that matters? In this case, the U.S. hierarchy of interests is: (1) no nuclear explosions on American soil; (2 & 3) no North Korean capability to attack the United States with nuclear weapons and no second Korean War (that could drag the U.S. and China into war); (4) no sale of North Korean nuclear weapons to terrorists or states; (5) no North Korean missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons against American troops and allies; (6) no North Korean production of additional nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material or missiles. All of which matter more than no North Korean nuclear weapons. When the Trump Administration began, North Korea stood on the threshold of a reliable capability to deliver nuclear warheads against the American homeland. Its November 2017 ICBM test demonstrated that it could deliver a payload of nuclear weapon size to the American west coast, but was still short of a reliable reentry vehicle to achieving this objective. But since then, North Korea has stopped all ICBM and nuclear tests (and thus not acquired a reliable capability to strike the United States) and has pledged to denuclearize. In his 2019 New Year’s speech, for the first time, Kim Jong-un promised that North Korea “would neither make and test nuclear weapons any longer, nor use and proliferate them.” If the upcoming summit ends with a verifiable commitment from North Korea to eliminate all ICBMs, and not to produce additional missiles, in exchange for a political declaration ending the Korean War, that would be a significant achievement. If in the months ahead, North Korea can be persuaded to take further steps that serve American interests in exchange for South Korea and the U.S. relaxing sanctions, restoring diplomatic relations, investments, and even normalizing relations with a verifiably denuclearized North Korea, this would count as a historic achievement. Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats was right when he testified last Tuesday that North Korea is unlikely to zero out its nuclear arsenal because it’s critical to regime survival. But so was Secretary Pompeo in his claim that the United States is safer today than we were when Trump took office. Graham Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University. The author of 12 books, he has also served as Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration and Special Advisor to the Secretary of Defense under President Ronald Reagan. You can follow him on Twitter at @GrahamTAllison. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/north-korea-and-america%E2%80%99s-second-summit- here%E2%80%99s-what-graham-allison-thinks-will-happen Return to top
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The Hill (Washington, D.C.) Welcome to the New Nuclear Arms Race By Tom Z. Collina Feb. 4, 2019 If you missed out on the first nuclear arms race, you’re in luck. It’s back. On Friday, the Trump administration announced the U.S. would withdraw from the Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark deal signed in 1987 by President Reagan. This treaty marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. INF and follow-on agreements led to the demise of thousands of nuclear weapons in Russia that used to be aimed at us. The very next day, Russian President Vladimir Putin said his country would follow suit: “Our answer will be symmetrical,” Putin said. “Our American partners declared that they will suspend their participation in the treaty, so we will suspend ours as well. They said they would start research and development, and we will do the same.” Of course. This is how an arms race starts. We have seen this movie before, and it does not end well. In "Arms Race One," the United States built an insanely large nuclear arsenal that peaked at more than 30,000 warheads in the 1960s. Russia, then the Soviet Union, had 40,000. Today, thanks to arms control agreements that are now on the chopping block, both sides are down to about 4,000 each; still way too many but heading in the right direction. Climate research shows that just 100 weapons detonated on cities could end civilization as we know it. How much did all of this cost? About $6 trillion. How did we survive it? By sheer good luck. In the words of former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, who had a front row seat to the buildup, “There is only one way to win an arms race: refuse to run.” Global sanity got a leg up when the stars aligned and two enlightened leaders agreed to change course. In 1985, President Reagan and Soviet Premier Gorbachev declared that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” The INF Treaty followed two years later. The Cold War began to thaw and finally melted away with the Soviet Union in 1992. But in "Arms Race Two: The Sequel," now we have the U.S. and Russian presidents conspiring in the opposite direction — to kill nuclear arms control. It is no secret that Russia has been chafing at the INF Treaty’s limits for years, seeking a way out. Regrettably, Moscow deployed prohibited land- based cruise missiles near its western border. Rather than seek to keep Russia inside INF and thereby constrained, President Trump has handed Putin a free pass to get out of the deal. Soon, Russia will be able to leave the treaty, blame the United States and build as many intermediate-range missiles as it wants. This is not progress. This is no solution. This makes things worse. Think of it like highway speed limits. The limit is 65, and Russia is speeding at 75. If we throw away the speed limit, Russia can now go 125 with no constraints. How is this better?
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The Trump administration could seek to save INF by sitting down with Moscow and putting all the concerns on the table. Russia has its own problems with INF, such as the deployment of U.S. missile interceptors in Poland and Romania. There is a precedent for this. Back in the 1980s, the Reagan administration accused Russia of violating the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Did President Reagan leave the treaty in a huff? No, he worked with Moscow to come back into compliance. That is what President Trump should do today. “The Trump administration is risking an arms race and undermining international security and stability,” Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) said. “The administration should exhaust every diplomatic effort and work closely with NATO allies over the next six months to avoid thrusting the United States into a dangerous arms competition.” But having a one-sided conversation with Moscow will not work. “I’m asking both ministries to no longer initiate any negotiations on this issue,” Putin said Saturday. “Let’s wait until our partners are ready to hold an equal, meaningful dialogue on this extremely important topic.” By refusing to deal with Moscow’s concerns, the Trump administration is effectively killing INF. Trump’s National Security Advisor John Bolton has wanted INF dead for years. Bolton wrote in 2011, quoting Charles de Gaulle, “Treaties, you see, are like girls and roses: They last while they last.” Bolton led the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and from the Agreed Framework with North Korea in 2002 and led Trump out of the Iran nuclear deal just last year. These moves have proven to be major strategic blunders. But the biggest blunder may be yet to come. The New START Treaty, signed by President Obama in 2010, is the last major agreement limiting nuclear arms, and it expires in two years. It can be renewed for five years, but only if Washington and Russia agree. This agreement has served the United States well, and there are no indications of Russian violations. It deserves to be renewed. But given the fate of INF, the future of New START is up for grabs. If New START is killed, it would be the first time there have been no speed limits on U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals since 1972. We would be back in the Wild West. We are speeding, with nuclear weapons, along a dangerous mountain road, and we are driving blind. Tom Z. Collina is director of policy for Ploughshares Fund, a public grantmaking foundation that supports initiatives to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons and to prevent conflicts that could lead to their use. https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/428327-welcome-to-the-new-nuclear-arms-race Return to top
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War on the Rocks (Washington, D.C.) The Best Defense Ever? Myths about the Trump Administration’s Missile Defense Review By Joan Johnson-Freese and David T. Burbach Feb. 6, 2019 Unveiling the 2019 Missile Defense Review, President Donald Trump declared in typical hyperbolic fashion that the United States will build a defense system to protect the American public against missiles “anywhere, anytime, anyplace.” The text of the review was only slightly less ambitious, calling for six lines of expanded effort including new space-based and/or directed-energy weapons and extending U.S. missile defense goals beyond protection against limited regional threats toward a global protection system. The president’s lofty vision for U.S. dominance in space was consistent with his calls to create a separate “Space Force” military service and the hope he floated that NASA could land an astronaut on Mars as soon as next year. Indeed, the only thing missing from the document’s over-the-top unveiling was an announcement that the United States would accomplish this goal with the Warp Drive, powered by unobtainium. In practice, the administration’s missile defense accomplishments are likely to remain rather more earthbound. The 2019 Missile Defense Review is only the latest in a long series of attempts to “solve” dilemmas of defense with dreams of new technologies. There is no reason to believe these dreams will materialize this time either — though unwelcome reactions of adversaries will be real enough. Regardless of viability, the vision of an umbrella rendering the United States invulnerable to nuclear weapons has become embedded in U.S. strategic thinking and, in fact, political culture. As a statement of belief, the Missile Defense Review reflects that reality. As a policy proposal, though, after Pentagon and congressional action the most likely outcome will be moderate increases for existing “kinetic kill” systems, but no great leap toward the radical and risky new programs that Trump promised Background The United States pursued defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the 1950s and 1960s, only to drop these defenses when it signed the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It had become clear to both the United States and the Soviets that defensive systems could always be outmatched by deploying more offensive missiles at much lower cost than expanding defenses. Ballistic missile defense would just accelerate the arms race for little real benefit. President Ronald Reagan resurrected missile defense in the early 1980s with his “Strategic Defense Initiative,” which would rely on exotic (i.e., nonexistent) technology to overcome the fundamental advantage of strategic offense. Reagan’s vision of orbiting X-ray lasers — inspired by Edward Teller — remained science fiction, and the Soviet Union’s demise ought to have reduced the need for nuclear defense. Nevertheless, missile defense became an even more fervent belief for conservatives after the Cold War. As a military-technical question, some missile defense investments seem worthwhile. There is merit to “theater defense” of limited areas against shorter-range missiles in hot spots like the Persian Gulf. But national invulnerability remained alluring, and Republicans prominently featured ballistic missile defense in their 1994 “Contract with America.” In 1998 evangelical stalwart Gary Bauer, president of the Family Research Council, declared missile defense part of a pro-life, pro- family agenda — not merely a foreign policy issue but a “moral imperative.” How Boldly Shall We Go? High-level tensions in 2017 and 2018 between the United States and North Korea, which could have escalated into a nuclear exchange, certainly raised awareness of America’s vulnerability to nuclear attack, despite the over $200 billion already spent on missile defense research, development and
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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1352 // deployment between 1985 and 2018. A truly perfect defense from nuclear attack would be worth a great deal to American taxpayers. But since no amount of money can produce such a holy grail — and since the quest itself may bring harmful side effects — then if the United States must pursue ballistic missile defense the question becomes whether to continue to sink money into programs with questionable track records, or move on to more esoteric programs with even higher technical risk and subsequently bigger price tags. Of the Missile Defense Review’s recommendations, the best case can be made for systems relying on relatively proven technology and with relatively less ambitious goals. That means Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot for the Army; ship- and shore-based Aegis/Standard Missile programs for the Navy; and for the Air Force, yet another mission for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: as a platform for boost-phase intercept. THAAD and Aegis at least have performed better in tests than other ballistic missile defense systems, and their theater defense role is less technically demanding than shooting down longer-range, faster ICBMs. Using the Joint Strike Fighter as an anti-ICBM platform is still a dubious proposition, however. Modified versions of existing air-to-air missiles are hopeless for the task: They would have to intercept an outgoing ICBM below approximately 100,000 feet of altitude. ICBMs accelerate rapidly, so catching them at such low altitude requires the F-35 (or an unmanned aerial vehicle) to be virtually on top of the adversary launch site, deep in hostile territory, at the moment of liftoff. In principle an entirely new, large exo-atmospheric interceptor missile could be developed and built for the F-35. Doing so might allow intercepts within 200 to 300 miles of a launch site. Such an ambitious capability — if it ever became a reality — could be useful against geographically small North Korea but would be pointless against most adversaries given their available interior space. The Missile Defense Review also proposes a major expansion of the interceptors based in California and Alaska designed to shoot down intercontinental-range missiles, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense. This system has, at best, a mixed test record. The Missile Defense Agency, an agency free from many of the Pentagon’s usual oversight, testing, and accountability rules, states a success rate of 10 intercepts out of 18 attempts since 1999. The Union of Concerned Scientists puts the intercept success rate under 50 percent. Keep in mind that those tests have been highly scripted toward success rather than conducted under operational conditions. There is also interest in expanding Aegis’s ballistic missile defense capability to include ICBMs. That ability has yet to be engineered, let alone tested, but Aegis at least seems better managed by the Navy than the Missile Defense Agency’s ground-based system. Ground-based “kinetic kill” systems like Aegis or the midcourse defense do have the advantage of actually existing; they aren’t PowerPoint fantasy technology. The interceptors are expensive and delicate, however, and beyond mediocre performance in simple intercept tests they are likely to be highly vulnerable to countermeasures as simple as metalized balloons and chaff in their pathway or more sophisticated like maneuvering warheads. Where No Missile Defense Has Gone Before? Trump, the Missile Defense Review, the National Security Strategy, and last year’s National Space Strategy have all declared that space is a “new warfighting domain.” While the Missile Defense Review formally calls for “study” of space-based missile defenses, Pentagon leaders are enthused by the prospect and Trump himself said at the document’s unveiling that space-based defenses will play a “very, very big part.” The shift in U.S. space policy came in response to Chinese advancements in space, which include human and robotic space exploration as well as the military use of space. Although the United States has expanded its expertise in those areas for decades, because of the dual-use nature of space technology it has taken a “do as we say, not as we do” approach to those same areas regarding China — viewing it as threatening when the Chinese develop the same space
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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1352 // capabilities, even for non-military uses, that the United States relies on every day. But space is also an inherently expensive place to operate, an environment with different physical principles than other domains — warfighting or otherwise. As such, developing new technology for space requires considerable economic and technical risk. Moscow learned that when it sought to keep up with U.S. “Star Wars” efforts in the 1980s, which contributed — along with its military involvement in Afghanistan, cheap oil, and its own failed economic system — to the demise of the Soviet Union by draining its coffers. The United States partially vindicated the Soviets’ fear that missile defense technology could be used for offensive purposes, including for anti-satellite weapons, in 2008 with Operation Burnt Frost, in which a U.S. anti-missile interceptor was used to destroy an orbiting satellite. Many countries today remain fearful of being vulnerable to American space weapons, which further encourages these countries to pursue, out of self-interest, their own versions of offensive space capabilities. Since its anti-satellite weapon test in 2007, China has learned it is more politically acceptable to test nearly symbiotic “missile defense” capabilities instead. Similarly, Russia and India have missile defense programs with anti-satellite potential. Offense in space is cheaper and easier than defense. Space-based kinetic interceptors could target ICBMs during their boost phase, but that requires the interceptor to be near the launch site. A battle satellite in low-Earth orbit will, because it is orbiting, spend only a small fraction of the time within range of adversary launch sites. Continuous coverage therefore requires a constellation of dozens or more likely hundreds of expensive satellites. Satellites carrying directed-energy weapons like lasers could have more range, but still would require line-of-sight shots — and more importantly, that technology does not currently exist. Orbiting anti-missile platforms would themselves be highly vulnerable to anti-satellite weapons. Advocates may propose that orbiting ballistic missile defense platforms carry defensive countermeasures of their own, but it is hard to imagine how such countermeasures could not be overcome with improved anti-satellite weapons. Development of defensive space technology has been described as a “self-licking ice cream cone” as it is never really reaches the intended goal; it only perpetuates the need for a next step, and more funding. Whichever technologies are pursued, the price tag could be high indeed. Many of the review’s critics focused on the sticker shock: Joe Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund, for example, suggests the price tag for the steps outlined in the document could top $1 trillion. Such a high figure is not implausible. The National Academy of Sciences calculated in 2012 that a “bare-bones” constellation of space-based interceptors alone could cost half a trillion dollars. Even as modest an improvement as buying 20 additional interceptors for the Alaskan ground-based midcourse defense will cost $2 billion, not counting the never-ending expense of retrofitting “fixes” to all the deployed interceptors after test failures. Grandiose ideas come with grandiose costs. Landmines: The Downsides of a Technologically Questionable System Even if missile defense were moderately successful and affordable, arms control advocates have convincingly warned for decades about the potential for counterproductive, even dangerous, unintended consequences of pursuing a nuclear shield. Robust missile defenses are likely to increase an adversary’s incentive to strike first in a crisis, to trigger arms races to overwhelm any defensive system, or to encourage the deployment of entirely new kinds of weapons. Because offense is cheaper and easier than defense, technically capable countries such as China and Russia have kept pace with U.S. efforts to thwart those countries’ strategic capabilities and will continue to prioritize doing so. Physics is the same in Moscow and Beijing as it is in Washington. Expanding U.S. missile defense efforts could push them to expand their strategic nuclear forces, creating a game of catch-up the United States cannot afford and will not win. Last year, for instance, as if on cue, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed Russia would get around U.S. missile defenses with
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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1352 // nuclear-powered cruise missiles, or with robotic submarines carrying hundred-megaton warheads to detonate in America’s harbors. In pursuing nuclear invulnerability we risk chasing a chimera, only to step on landmines. Missile Defense Review supporters might argue that the Chinese and Russians initiated this cycle with new offensive systems of their own; the United States is merely reacting. In fact, China has not greatly expanded its modest arsenal of intercontinental missiles (theater systems to strike deployed U.S. forces are another matter). Russia is deploying new strategic nuclear systems, but consistent with arms control treaties, has actually been reducing its total number of deliverable strategic weapons by dismantling even greater numbers of old launchers. Experts who study Russian decision-making believe fear of U.S. counterforce and ballistic missile defense efforts is a significant motivator for Moscow. In either case, America’s ability to deter attacks through nuclear retaliation remains unchallenged and is likely to remain so. Exacerbating fears in foreign capitals will be the Missile Defense Review’s novel inclusion of offense as part of American missile defense. Unlike previous missile defense policy statements, the latest document places preemptive attacks on adversary missile forces within the category of “missile defense.” The Missile Defense Review avoids the words “preemption” or “counterforce,” instead using the phrase “attack options for missile defense.” What the review does suggest, though, is disarming first strikes: “U.S. attack operations supporting missile defense will degrade, disrupt, or destroy an adversary’s missiles before they are launched. Such operations are part of a comprehensive missile defense strategy.” It notes that “DoD is placing added emphasis on the capabilities needed for such attack operations.” Counterforce has always been part of U.S. doctrine, but official statements have, in the past, downplayed any connection between missile defense and offensive strikes precisely because that is what adversaries like Russia or China have suspected American missile defense is all about. The most charitable read would be that Missile Defense Review authors were directing those comments at North Korea, not trying to raise Russian or Chinese fears. Even so, giving Kim Jong Un additional incentive for a “hair trigger” is not wise, and of course the document is read globally. Explicitly linking anti-missile systems and disarming first strikes in a public document suggests either a major misstep in strategic messaging or a dramatically more aggressive U.S. counterforce posture. Rhetoric vs. Implementation: What’s Next for Missile Defense? An old aphorism about space suggests “no bucks, no Buck Rogers.” There is a long distance between something being proposed in a high-level policy document and it becoming a Defense Department program of record with congressionally appropriated funding. Given the multiple, interconnected risks associated with funding new technologies as well as service bureaucratic interests and skepticism in Congress, the most likely bet is that funding priority will go to “more of the same” programs. The services will be most inclined to support lower-risk programs relevant to theater war plans and that make use of flagship platforms like Aegis or the Joint Strike Fighter; generals and admirals will not be eager to trade away their future “crown jewel” programs for hypothetical space lasers. With mounting deficits, large increases in Defense Department funding for new missile defense programs will be a tough sell, especially given Democratic control of the House of Representatives. Major procurement programs usually have champions on both sides of the aisle, but since the Reagan era, missile defense has had few friends among Democrats. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith (D-Wash.) was strongly negative on the Missile Defense Review, as was Senator Jack Reed (D-R.I.), ranking member on the Senate Armed Services Committee. In today’s political climate it is difficult to see how any expensive new initiative subject to decades of partisan disagreement can survive.
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As with the call for a “separate and equal” Space Force, what emerges from the Missile Defense Review is likely to be well short of Trump’s bold claims. But a “failure to launch” for the document’s most ambitious ideas is probably a good outcome, as these concepts would be more likely to generate budgetary black holes and dangerous reactions from adversaries than to deliver a spaceborne shield that frees Americans from the frightening reality of the nuclear age. David T. Burbach is an Associate Professor at the Naval War College who writes on security and technology issues. Joan Johnson-Freese holds the Charles F. Bolden, Jr. Chair of Science, Space & Technology at the Naval War College. The views expressed are the authors’ alone and not those of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of Defense. https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-best-defense-ever-busting-myths-about-the-trump- administrations-missile-defense-review/ Return to top
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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1352 //
ABOUT THE USAF CSDS The USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University — while extending its reach far beyond — and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff’s Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON) and Air War College commandant established the initial personnel and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation. In 2008, the Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." This led to the addition of three teaching positions to the CPC in 2011 to enhance nuclear PME efforts. At the same time, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide professional continuing education (PCE) through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the CPC in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research on not just countering WMD but also nuclear operations issues. In April 2016, the nuclear PCE courses were transferred from the Air War College to the U.S. Air Force Institute for Technology. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. In May 2018, the name changed again to the Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies (CSDS) in recognition of senior Air Force interest in focusing on this vital national security topic. The Center’s military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation — counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management. The Latin inscription "Armis Bella Venenis Geri" stands for "weapons of war involving poisons."
DISCLAIMER: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.
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