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Retoren en demokratie. Funkties en disfunkties van de retorika in klassiek Athene. Scholten, Jentje
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Publication date: 1990
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Citation for published version (APA): Scholten, J. (1990). Retoren en demokratie. Funkties en disfunkties van de retorika in klassiek Athene. s.n.
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Download date: 12-11-2019 ORATORSAND DEMOCRACY Functionsand Dvsfunctionsof Rhetoric in ClassicalAthens
SUMMARY
From the last part oí the Íifth century onwards, orators trained in rhetoric became increasinglyimportant in the Athenian democracy,as politicians,logo- graphers and lawyers. BecauseoÍ their expertisein rhetoric as well as admi- nistration and law they are usually describedas the first 'professionals'in the Athenianpolitical system. As such, their function in the political and judicial organs in Athens is in a sense comparable to that of their modern counterparts/and not necessarily objectionable.However, our sourcesfrom the Íifth and íourth century expressa mainly negative judgment oí orators and rhetoric, and the unanimity of the various authors on this point is striking.This unanimity and above all the Íact that even the Attic Orators themselvesvoice this negative judgment - from which one may inÍer that their audiencein the ekkleslaand Ihe heliaiashared this opinion - indicates that rhetoric was generallyregarded as detrimental to the working of the Atheniandemocracy. How can this massivecriticism oí orators and rhetoric be explained?lt is not probable that orators simply happenedto be a collectivelydepraved group and that their bad reputation can be explainedby their collectiveimmorality, as the sourcessuggest. In this study I suggestthat the orators merely operated with a different type of values than at the time were dominant in Athens, as was also the case with the Sophists,who, becauseof their adherenceto new values,became involved in a clash with a large part of the Atheniancitizenry. fn De /a division du travail socia/ (Paris 1893) the sociologistEmile Durkheim has made a distinction between two types of morality, which he called 'mecha- nical solidarity'and 'organic solidarity'.According to Durkheim the morality in a society which is characterizedby a low degree oÍ division of labour is one oÍ the 'mechanicalsolidarity', which can be called a collectivisticmorality, whereas in a societywith a greater differentiationoí labour there will develop a morality of the type 'organic solidarity', which is characterizedby secularismand in- dividualism. The secularismand individualismwhich are central features oí the Sophistic movement were for a great part responsiblefor the clash between the Sophists and the ordinaryAthenian citizens. Did the moral valuesof the averageAthenian citizen then bear íeatures of Durkheim's mechanicalsolidarity? This is one of the main hypothesesthat are tested in this book. Further hypothesesto explain the dysíunctionsoí rhetoric in classicalAthens were inspiredto me by S.C. Humphreys'discussion oí Basil Bernstein'stheory in connection with the development of Creek philosophy in the sixth and íifth 170 SUMMARY century (Humphreys,1978, 265 fÍ). Bernsteinpresents a more comprehensiveanalysis than Durkheim,whose dis- tinction between two types of morality forms a major starting point in Bern- stein'stheory (e.g.Bernstein, 1977,239). The lattercovers differences in menta- lity as well as different uses of language. His concepts restricted code and elaboratedcode expressthe different uses of language of the lower and the middleclasses in modernsociety respectively, which are connectedwith difÍerent typesoÍ morality,analogous to Durkheim'smechanical and organicsolidarity, and differencesin perception,knowledge and the prevailingtypes of roles.Bernstein givesa penetratinganalysis of how people who are used to a restrictedcode can becomebewildered when confrontedwith the behaviourand normswhich charac- terizean elaboratedcode.
The principalhypothesis which is testedin this study is that the mistrustoí and hostility towards orators and rhetoric on the part oí the ordinary Athenian citizenshave their origin in this sort of bewilderment,because the latter were conírontedwith a new type of role,an individualisticmentality which went hand in hand with the professionalrole, and a kind of knowledgewhich they did not understand. To this end I first investigatewhether it might legitimatelybe assumedthat the lower classesin the Atheniandemocracy adhered to the values of a restric- ted code. In the second chapter an analysisis made of the most frequently occurringmoral notions in the jurisdictionof the Athenian dikastêria.In the third chapterthe centralquestion is whetherthis kind of thinkingalso extended to the opinions of the averageAthenian about democracy,as far as one can concludeÍrom the speechesof the Attic Orators. As regardsthe moral notions in the jurisdictionoí the heliaiaa remarkable feature emerges.lt appearsfrom the Íorensic speeches,that Íor a verdict oí a jury not only the legal point of issue or offence was taken into account, but also the character and the past of the parties. A good character, which was shown by one's merits with regard to the polis and one's loyalty to family and friends, usually served as an argument for the bestowal oÍ kharis, e/eos or sungnómê,whereas a bad character,the lack of such merits and loyalty, might evoke orgé,misos or phthonos on the part of the judges. In modern scholarshipthese arguments are often left out of account,in spite oÍ their evidenteffects. This is done most markedlyby the Cerman legal his- torian HansJulius Wolff and his studentsMeyer-Laurin and Meinecke.According to these scholarsthe decisionsof the drkasfériawere basedstrictly on the letter of the law and the Athenianheliasts were characterizedby very legalisticthin- king. In their jurisdictionthere was not even room íor the principleof equity, as Meyer-Laurinconcludes in his study relatingto this subject.In his opinion, the argumentslexamine in chapterll are merelyrhetorical tricks. SUMMARY SUMMARY 17'l
ln my view, however,the mechanismsoí kharis, eleos,orgê, rnisosand phtho- 'kheim, whosedis- nos in the jurisdictionof the Atheniancourts were nof introducedby the rheto- ing point in Bern- ricians,although they becameindeed the subjectof the rhetoricaltechnique of Íerencesin menta- arousingemotions. I believethat these notionsto the Atheniandicasts represen- strictedcode and ted real values, and an important part oÍ their morality, a kind oí morality he lower and the which Schadewaldtcharacterized as "eine Ethikder Triebe"(Schadewaldt, 1955, rctedwith different 137 f.). In my opinionthe effectsof thesearguments show that the decisionsof anicsolidarity, and the people'scourt in Athens were not strictly based on the letter of the law. On of roles.Bernstein the contrary, when the notion of justice, dikaion, occurs in the speeches,it is 'estricted code can especiallyin connection with exhortationsto bestow kharis, eleos,sungnómê, rrmswhich charac- orgê, misos and phthonos. lt is argued that this idea oí dikaion is not a strict judicialprinciple, but the generalnotion oí justiceas it was used in dailylife. The applicationoí this idea oí dikaion in the jurisdictionoí the people's court he mistrustoÍ and meansthat litigantswere judged,not only on the legal issue,but also on their ordinaryAthenian functioningin their socialroles: as a son, brother,íriend and as citizen.lt can se the latter were be shown that the principles oÍ kharis, e/eos and sungnómê function in the 'which wenthand courts, exactly as in social life, on the basis of reciprocity,as a quid pro quo vhichthey did not for servicesrendered, and that the jurors are addressedas partners in a per- sonalrelationship. ' be assumedthat Kharis,eleos, sungnómê and their counterparts are values that bear marked valuesof a restric- Íeaturesoí a restrictedcode. One can call these values 'particularistic'as Bern- e most Írequently stein considerscharacteristic oÍ a restrictedcode: they relate to concrete per- dikasÍéria.In the sons in their concrete relationships,and function in a quasi-personal,face-to-
ral role oí in accordancewith publicstandards, and good managementof one'sproperty (in aboutthe order to be able to give as much as possibleto the state), together with good judgment. public conduct, are important Íeatures of the sóphrón, metrios and kosrnios 'atorstook citizen. standards This is clearly thinking based on a restrictedcode. These norms leave little rde, which room íor the individualto lead a private life accordingto self-determinedprin- ciples. l by moral The norms which are expressedby the Attic Orators for citizensand leaders tizens,and are thus in sharp contrast with the words oí Thucydides'Pericles in the funeral ,lue-pattern oration, where freedom in public and in private liíe are proclaimed as central . An inven- values in the democraticideal. Modern scholarshave oíten concluded Írom this ld andnew and other passagesoÍ the same tenor that in the Athenian democracy roughly hos,aristos the same values applied as in modern western democracies,especially stressing ros,dikaios, the notion of individualliberty. On the basisof the values and behavioralnorms which appear in the orations uesarouno I considerit unlikelythat the democraticthinking of the Athenianswho took fact.Howe- the decisionsin the ekk/esiaand heliaiain any way resembledwith such modern titive'arefé, democratic ideas. On the contrary: accordingto their values the individual had as of minor to submit himself and his personalinterests to those oí the state, and a private rreÍéin the life in accordancewith the sharedvalues oí the community representeda special lrationsthe interest for the state. That this last idea was common in Athenian democratic aios thinking can also be inferred from the provisions in the dokirnasia test for to political Athenianstaking office and the specialdokimasia rhêtorón.
,altyto the In the fourth chapter the investigationfocusses upon the professionalrole of the groups,are rhetor and the central question whether this role involved also a proÍessional fiilodêmos, attitude with the marks of an elaboratedcode, which conÍlictedwith the way oÍ :d by these thinking and the valuesof audiencesin the assemblyand law courts. and philo- The rhetoricalhandbook oÍ AnaximenesoÍ Lampsakos,which can be regarded denotethe as more or less representativeoÍ the handbooksthat in the íourth century were ucedin the used by most orators and logographers,seles as the main sourceíor reconstruc- ' 'new style ting the attitude and mentality oÍ the orators who worked according to the ' the lower principlesoí rhetoricaltheory. ;edthrough The investigationis directed to two major aspectsof an elaboratedcode: the individualisticmentality and the abstract knowledge,which, accordingto Bern- luesof the stein, providesan enormousadvantage over peoplewho use only concreteknow- ledge, characteristicof a resfricÍedcode. Abstract knowledge is 'context-inde- l oÍ distinc- pendent', as Bernsteinputs it, which meansthat it can be generalizedand used nd philodê- in different situations,whereas concrete, 'context-dependent'knowledge, to etvveenthe which people are socialized under a restrictedcode, has relevance only íor f the life oí specificsituations. g a sex life Although the very mediocrehandbook of Anaximenesdoes not in every respect 174 SUMMARY presupposean abstract and analyticalapproach by orators, it does present the best-knownabstract rhetoricaltechniques, most oí which can be traced back to the fifth century, such as the techniquesof auxêsisand fapeinósis,makrologia and brakhylogia,argumentation írom probability,and other rhetoricalmodes of demonstration:by sérneia,tekmêria, gnómai, paradeigmata, elenkhoi and enthumê- mafa. Thesetechniques are oí generalapplicability and can be called context- independent. The applicationoí such techniquesimplies a rationalisticattitude which contrastsstrongly with the moralisticattitude oí the Athenianjurors. Above all, this contrast appears from the prescriptionswhich Anaximenesgives for the heuresis,in which the traditional values oÍ dikaion, nomimon and ka/on are treated as abstract categoriesfor argumentation, under which the concrete materialcan be arranged.Thus thesevalues, which were basicin the organsof the Athenian democracy,are to the orator merely instrumentsíor persuadinghs audience.
The right oí the individualto íollow his own interests,even if these should conílict with those of the community and the state, was a hot item in the Sophisticdiscussions in the fiíth centuryand it seemsthat a rationalindividua- listicattitude then íound broaderadherence in intellectualcircles . The question ariseswhether rhetoricaltraning and theory also were affected by this individualism.Although traces oÍ the sophisticrelativism are found in the handbooksof both Aristotleand Anaximenesin the treatmentof the nornos,even the more sophisticAnaximenes reílects essentially the same,collectivistic values as are expressedin the speechesof the Attic Orators. But what does this tell us about the mentality of the orators themselves? Again one needs to investigatehow a rhetoricalhandbook expectedorators and logographersto work. It is arguedhere that the main principleoÍ presentationoí the materialin the handbooks,the method of antitheticalarguments, which can be traced back to Protagoras,presupposes an individualisticmentality with the orators.This method can be connectedwith Protagoras'homo mensurathesis, and thus implies that differentpoints of view are equallydeÍensible. This principlemeans for example that someonewho has committed an offencecan be defendedin the sameway as an innocentperscin. One can see how this principleof rhetoricaltraining con- flicted with the rules which prevailedfor a sunêgorosand hence why the Athe- nian public could judge this method as immoral.This is well illustratedby a statement oÍ Lykourgos:one who takes up the defense of a guilty person is probablycapable of participatingin the wrongfulact(c. Leocr.138). But one can also see how this principlemade the role oÍ the orator in the court comparable to that of a modern barrister.The method oí antitheticalarguments leaves room for individualchoices by the orators.The orators themselvesare to choose írom lMARY SUMMARY 175
nt the the alternativesthat are availableand, like a modern lawyer, to make a rational ack to assessmentoÍ what is technicallydefensible. rologta rdesof The fifth chapterexplains how some oÍ the most'context-independent'rhetorical thumê- techniquescould be usedto misleadjuries, because the characteroí theseargu- ontext- ments was not understood. Firstare treatedthe main rhetoricalmodes oí demonstrationwhich were applied which in the law courts.As appearsÍrom the handbookof Anaximenesand from the cve all, forensicspeeches, these proofs are oÍten only hypotheticaland so'prove' hardly for the any,thing.How could such proofs be applied successÍully?Bernstein notes that lon are logical and causal reasoningin the case of a restrictedcode tends to be under- oncrete developed. lt is likely that the frequent use and successof such proofs were gansof possible only because of the restricted code thinking of the members of the Ldinghs juries. Next it is shown how the rhetoricaltechnique of arousingemotions became a major factor by which the moral basis of the jurisdiction of the heliaia was should undermined.While kharls,e/eos and their counterpartsfor the heliastsrepresen- r in the ted important values relatingto concrete persons/rhetorical theory treated these rdividua- as context-independentemotions, which could be arousedto suit any person. Finallythe questionis treatedwhether the complaintsabout the oratorsthat affected they, just like the fifth-centurydemagogues, only spoke pros hêdonên and pros rd in the kharin and merely tried to areskein,therapeuein and ko/akeueinthe people, have os,even a relationshipwith techniquesthat were taught in rhetoricaleducation. Remarks c values by the rhetoriciansAnaximenes, lsokrates, Alkidamas, Polos and further referen- ces made by Plato indeed point in that direction. mselves? torsand al in the backto ;method rliesthat example e wayas ringcon- he Athe- :ed by a lersonis onecan nparable /esroom osefrom