Environmental Degradation in Heilongjiang: Policy Reform and Agrarian Dynamics in China’s New Hybrid Economy

Joshua S. S. Muldavin

Department of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles

This paper analyzes environmental degradation in rural China as structurally embedded in China’s rapid economic growth in the post-Mao era. The theoretical discussion focuses on changes in the organization of production, resource use, and regional development. A critical assessment of the Chinese hybrid economy challenges standard views of the reforms. The overall environmental problems of state socialist agriculture in China have been aggravated following the agrarian reforms of the current regime. Rather than mitigating negative trends, marketization and privatization have brought new, qualitatively different, environmental problems. Resource decline and its attendant social problems are not limited to aspects of transitional economy but are a fundamental part of the new hybrid system. I offer an alternative explanation for interpreting increases in rural productivity as an appropriation and use of collective assets, suggesting that the mining of communal capital is hidden behind the economic growth of the rural economy. Case studies in Heilongjiang Province based on long-term field data provide a profile of three aspects: intensification of land use, agroindustrial pollution, and declining social/communal capital. Further, the political legitimacy of the state is gradually eroded by mutually exclusive fiscal constraints on expenditure and political commitments to peasant producers. Recent repression of political dissent by peasants in hinterland regions forces indirect forms of resistance to state policy. Opportunities for sustainable development are nonetheless present within China, providing that policy makers attempt to address the structural conditions of the rural sector. Key Words: China, Heilongjiang, environment, agriculture, peasants, rural reforms, political ecology, market socialism.

he struggle to control resources is central China. In agriculture, these qualitative differ- to the relationship between local societies ences will become increasingly apparent as more Tand larger entities. In this articulation, the critical assessments are made of China’s rapid extraction of economic surplus from rural areas growth over the last seventeen years. by the state and private capital is contingent upon Economic observers tend to herald the reforms entering, dismantling, and transforming local in- of 1978 as the proper pathway for China to follow, stitutions directly involved in natural resource given the failures of the communal period and the use. Based on fieldwork over a fourteen-year pe- pronounced success of market reforms through- riod, this paper uses village-based case studies to out the world (Byrd 1990; Friedman 1990; Dorn show how privatization and deregulation in and Wang 1990; Lin 1993; McMillan and China have brought major change to capital, Naughton 1992; Nolan 1993; Nolan and Sender labor, and natural resource relationships. Agrar- 1992; Wang 1994; Chen et al. 1995). The World ian reforms of the current regime have aggravated Bank trumpets China as its number one success rather than mitigated specific environmental story for postsocialist transition, in contrast to the problems associated with state socialist agricul- difficulties experienced by Russia. More tempered ture in China. Marketization and privatization views welcome the reforms as a move in the right have added new environmental problems to direction, but see difficulties (political, economic, those of the collective period, representing a ma- or cultural) in the transition to a market economy jor obstacle to both medium and long-term efforts (Deng et al. 1992; Croll 1988, 1994; Feuchtwang to introduce sustainable development policies in et al. 1988; Fan 1995; Rozelle 1996; Wang 1996;

Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 87(4), 1997, pp. 579–613 ©1997 by Association of American Geographers Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF,UK. 580 Muldavin

Bowring 1997). Social and environmental con- sophisticated market-based institutions or inde- cerns are emphasized by a third group who see pendent sources of finance, rural producers came fundamental problems with certain aspects of the to regard these assets as a source of capital. The reforms that undermine their supposed success in rapid mining of communal assets (tangible and solving weaknesses of the communal period intangible) forces us to reevaluate the impacts of (Meisner 1996; Bowles and Dong 1994; Delman short-term coping strategies under shifting re- 1989; Hinton 1990; Chossudovsky 1986; gimes of accumulation—from plan to market, Muldavin 1986, 1992; Chai and Leung 1987; collective to individual, long-term to short-term. Davin 1988; Smith 1993; He 1991; Odegard Furthermore, we are obligated to look at political 1992). The contradictions of decollectivization consequences among rural producers of ecologi- coupled with market reforms and increased pri- cal decline—such as claims by peasants on the vatization suggest that there might be a political state for losses incurred as a consequence of ecological “crisis” in the making (Muldavin “natural” disasters (Blaikie et al. 1994). 1992). This crisis stems from environmental Resistance to the new order has emerged problems resulting from the very success of the among workers and peasants. Whether the un- reforms as well as the political character of the derlying social tensions will become openly ac- portentous deepening of social polarization, as tive politics, or surface through everyday the gulf widens between the haves and have-nots resistance, depends to a large degree on the in China (Knight and Song 1993; Bramall and development of a social (civil) space for dissent Jones 1993). Toargue this viewpoint, I rely on an and discourse (Solinger 1993). At this time, atypical but nevertheless useful case, the rela- there is limited potential for organized social tively undeveloped region of rural Heilongjiang movements on a broad scale in China, demon- Province. Unlike the boom regions, the grass and strating a transfer of authoritarian politics to cropland areas of this border province are simul- the emerging hybrid system.1 taneously exposed to economic growth dynamics This paper is a product of and contribution to and to the limitations of a hinterland region the emerging subdiscipline of political ecology. It (Lyons 1991). As a hinterland, the region pro- situates the Chinese reforms in an analysis crafted duces primary commodities which are exported on the theoretical concerns and insights of politi- to boom regions—precluding a shift to more so- cal ecology, exploring the social impacts and eco- phisticated and sustainable forms of resource use logical consequences of reform, and subsequent and management. Thus, this hinterland case state attempts to maintain legitimacy in the face study of the Chinese economy will demonstrate of growing resistance.2 The implications of social- how the overlooked but nonetheless problematic ist-transition economies’ insertion into global use of natural resources in one area prefigures a production networks can be better understood political-ecological crisis in the making for the through a specific political ecology of China’s own rest of the country. articulation. Using this analysis, emergent envi- The interaction between changes in produc- ronmental and social problems in China appear tion and state policy in China’s reform period can not only as consequences of reform policy, but as 3 best be seen in agriculture, where the rapid tran- linked to global economic restructuring. At the sition from collective to household forms of pro- local level, changes in the organization of produc- duction organization affects land-use practices. tion, and in marketing and consumption patterns These practices in turn are embedded in social result in an intensification of natural resource use 4 perceptions of risk, security, and stability. Non- and environmental degradation. state actors and institutions transform the pro- duction process despite the state’s attempts to control them (Watson 1992). A political ecology The Fate of Communal Capital in in this context places a special emphasis on or- the New Hybrid System ganizational forms and capital sources. One of the major problems overlooked in the China is all things to all people: it is “capital’s more celebratory writings on Chinese economic salvation”—a vast new market, a place to invest reform has been the fate of assets built up during East Asia’s surplus capital, a huge labor pool of the communal period. These social, economic, disciplined workers, a vast resource base, a pow- and environmental forms of capital typified local- erful industrial system, and a diversified agricul- level economic development under Mao. Lacking tural and industrial economy. China is also a Environmental Degradation in Heilongjiang 581

Third Worldeconomy, with an enormous peasant of these areas for meeting the real needs of the population facing the tremendous gap between majority of their own populations. Perhaps China economic possibility and everyday actuality. Still, is undertaking a project that will “underdevelop” as its regions of prosperity rapidly merge into the its hinterland regions (Lippit 1978) through the First World (in much the same way as other East accelerated use of local resources. Asian economies), China is increasingly identi- As a latecomer into global capitalism, China fied as a newly industrialized country (NIC), but faced the West with little capital organization. also a powerful and potentially destabilizing mili- The material wealth of central planning could not tary force—a regional superpower and a political be easily mobilized or transferred to its market enigma. equivalents. Therefore China propelled itself into A new political economic system has emerged the international arena of capital through the in China, derived from a synthesis of command energetic use of communal capital. This included socialism and advanced capitalism but seeming to the social and organizational achievements of the combine the worst of both systems. Politically, the communal period which have provided China strong one-party state has retained its complete with the literate, healthy, and skilled individuals intolerance of dissent, gambling that the party- so attractive today to foreign investors. Once state system can remain responsive to crises, freed from their socialist moorings, these social while retaining its political legitimacy. Socially, assets have been readily translated into China’s an eruption of new poverty has accompanied economic growth. Communal capital contains the creation of concentrated personal wealth. both tangible and intangible investments. So- And despite claims of pragmatism, the new cially oriented tangible investments in infrastruc- economy is speculative in terms of capitalist ture consist of housing, clinics, schools, and investment, natural resources, and even so- administrative buildings, and by extension, liter- cial/political institutions.5 acy, improved health care, and greater access to The exact nature of this hybrid system is diffi- community resources. Biophysical infrastructure cult to pinpoint. It is simultaneously a cross be- is directly related to production—dams, levees, tween a NIC, a Soviet-style industrialization canals, roads, reforestation projects, terracing, model, an export-led growth model, an import- and improvements in soil fertility, grassland, and substitution model, and a sweat shop/subcontrac- cropland quality. In some regions, these projects tor to the world’s manufacturing corporations.6 were the most significant economic changes on Even the term “hybrid,” is a restricted vision the land. Collectives purchased machinery and when applied to the Chinese system. We may operated small industrial facilities processing ag- actually be witnessing the evolution of an en- ricultural products, producing construction ma- tirely new phenomenon, one historically spe- terials, and allocating special labor contributions cific and difficult to repeat, fitting like a missing to specific productive efforts. piece into the global jigsaw puzzle of the new In the new Chinese hybrid, privatization and international order. reform have permitted a relocation of risk and There is no one “market socialism” in China. uncertainty to the weakest class of producers, There are areas of pure capitalism (frontier style, forcing peasant decision making towards ever- speculative to a large degree) as well as spheres of shorter time frames.7 Whether Chinese peasants Stalinesque socialist growth economies (highly are profit maximizers or risk averse, or both (Scott controlled, rigid and bureaucratic). The spatial 1985; Shanin 1987; Ellis 1988), this privatization dimensions of socioeconomic heterogeneity are of the social and personalization of the communal translated as uneven development or geographic have profound effects on nature, as demonstrated differentiation in the intensity with which the by intensified transformation and degradation. new “model” appears (Lyons 1991). We are now Positive estimations of the sustainability of mar- able to identify multiple Chinas—multiple devel- ket socialism (Nee and Stark 1989) can now be opment models and paths occurring simultane- challenged by a critical political ecology of its ously (Muldavin 1992). Behind this phenomenon practice. is a structural trend that resembles the distorted The Maoist development model of revolution- development characteristic of large Third World ary China can be distinguished from Soviet-Len- countries. The wealthier regions (particularly in inist central planning by its emphasis on the eastern portion of the country) use the hin- self-reliance. Commune-based development lo- terlands in ways that structurally limit potential calized the joint development of agriculture and 582 Muldavin rural industry by building up infrastructure, al- period. But the widespread perception was that lowing for reinvestment of surplus at the com- this social and physical infrastructure, or commu- mune level—harnessing long-term productivity nal capital, was built up under a system of socialist gains to the communal project (Robinson 1971). production in which environmental problems The model reflected a peasant-centered revolu- were also expected to be solved collectively. In- tionary ideology through its emphasis on collec- deed, Maoist planning assumed the permanence tive labor organization and an egalitarian of collective and state enterprise and the success distribution of surpluses. Traditional peasant val- of the inward development model as a whole. The ues were reshaped to associate individual incen- internalization of all costs, including environ- tives with the social and political ideals of the mental, was implicit on the Maoist commune, collective good. Though current observers point given the immobility of peasants and the long- to failures in the Maoist project of social engineer- term character of the development projects. In ing (Rawski and Li 1992; Selden 1995), its politi- other words, there was no theory in Maoist China cal success with Chinese peasants is undeniable. that placed the self-reliant commune in a com- Much of the legitimacy of the Maoist period was petitive, global market economy dominated by gained from the overthrow of the preceding “feu- capitalist industrialized states. By the mid-1970s, dal” history of oppressive landlordism. The state’s the 1950s commune found itself in such a world. political commitment to social justice in the Whatever notable and successful experiments in countryside is central to its historical role since collectivization were achieved in China between 1949, allowing China to focus on inward devel- 1949 and 1978 would not see serious mention in opment through a Maoist version of socialism as subsequent years. The state in post-Mao China material conditions improved. was transformed. Policymakers concerned with China’s collectivized agriculture differed sig- China’s global position gained sway over those nificantly from that practiced in the former committed to the Maoist model. China was on its USSR. It was composed of a spectrum of organ- way to becoming a superpower. izational forms, from state farms to communes, and ranged from large-scale mechanized capital- intensive operations on flat open plains to small- Environmental Effects of the scale nonmechanized labor-intensive units on Reforms: 1978–1995 narrow terraces in the mountainous interior. Communes and state farms were part of a na- The communes of the Maoist period proved a tional system of planning, which was necessarily mixed success, with one-third failing, one-third a top-down, bottom-up, negotiated deal (Gurley holding their own, and one-third running quite 1976). It relied on imperfect coordination and efficiently by 1978 (Muldavin 1986; Hinton communication. The commune was hierarchi- 1990; Chussodovsky 1986). The legitimacy of cally divided into brigades organized around tra- veteran leaders, who were purged during the Cul- ditional villages. Within the commune, the tural Revolution but who regained power after greatest responsibilities, cohesiveness, and shar- Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, still lay with the ing of risk rested with teams of ten to twenty peasantry, since rural Chinese are both the real households. During its most dynamic stages, col- and symbolic bedrock of the Communist Party. lective labor was applied at all three levels (com- Failure of certain command structures opened mune, brigade, team) to rapidly develop social the way for reforms. The genius of the reformers and physical infrastructure. In the relatively suc- lay in exploiting the problems of collective agri- cessful communes, this application enhanced culture to unite the Chinese peasantry’s histori- productivity and quality of life (Riskin 1987). cally-rooted desire for land with its strong Clearly, there were many failures (Rawski 1995), patriarchal family structures. Dissatisfaction with but investment was usually made with an expec- command production in the socialist period, com- tation of long-term collective benefits. So it is bined with disillusionment (particularly of the essential to see that the build-up of assets referred urban elite, but also of some peasants) as a result to earlier as communal capital was important not of the Cultural Revolution, led to a general will- only because of the way it was produced, but also ingness to abandon the political emphasis of Chi- of how it was perceived. nese rural development policy. State legitimation Many environmental disasters followed some based on a collectivist definition of social progress of the worst planning debacles of the commune shifted under the rehabilitated leadership (led by Environmental Degradation in Heilongjiang 583

Deng Xiaoping) to legitimation based on a retreat forms (Figure 1). These observations reveal basic from the state’s active role in the rural economy. factors that have led to new environmental prob- Thus, in the post-Mao “pragmatic” period, at- lems for China, produced in part by rural reforms tention shifted to decollectivization, the disman- but with broad implications for long-term sustain- tling of the commune system in rural areas, and ability of production. The most significant shift a move towards a market-oriented economy. Col- produced by the reforms was the opening of a lective production was seen by many as stagnant predominantly planned economy to the decisive- and economically restrictive; a return to house- ness of market forces. Although planned resource hold- and individually-based systems was thought allocation still exists, particularly in heavy indus- the best hope for countering these weaknesses. tries, it functions now within an increasingly com- Peasants on poorer communes more readily em- petitive framework, individually as well as braced the reforms, while successful communes institutionally. That competitive framework, in could best take advantage of efficient adminis- turn, makes planning problematic, since there has trative structures and ample agricultural and been a simultaneous shift from collective produc- industrial assets to pursue new opportunities. tion to the household and individual. An impor- Such differences conditioned the outcome of tant transfer of control over local resources has the reforms. taken place, corresponding to a shift in control at Looking at the predominant mode of economic the highest levels of government.8 coordination and its basic unit, and relating these Over a period of six years, beginning in 1978, to decision-making strategies and goals, we can the state was able to dismantle much of the make general observations that distinguish the collective control of land through the introduc- pre-1978 period from the post-1984 time of re- tion of subcontracting and by parceling out per-

Figure 1. Shifts in China’s rural political economy from pre-reform period to post-reform. 584 Muldavin capita shares of equivalent pieces of land to every factors of production such as fertilizer application family—the Household Responsibility System.9 rather than social reorganization (Stone 1988). Significant increases in prices for grain, as well as Problems associated with these technical fac- fertilizer availability and use, brought a rapid rise tors therefore loom large in the subsequent in grain production, legitimizing Deng’s calls for period of stagnation. For example, the expected the complete decollectivization of agriculture and benefits of freer input flows following the lifting the transformation of other areas of the society. of the state monopoly on agricultural inputs in By 1984, 99 percent of all communes had decol- the mid-1980s (World Bank 1990), were under- lectivized agriculture and implemented the re- mined by the potential for huge profits in the forms. But behind decollectivization and black market. In part due to the long chain of increases in productivity was the wholesale deple- middlepersons, prices were so high that the al- tion of communal assets. ready minimal profitability of grain production In rural areas, where collective industries ex- simply vanished. isted at a number of levels—team, brigade, com- As peasants across China shifted cultivated mune, and county—results of decollectivization land from grain to cash crops, they created a produced both local advances and setbacks, cre- contradictory relationship with the state. Though ating a varied landscape of industrial change. At still required to provide a set quota of grain to the the team and brigade (village) level, most collec- state, they were simultaneously being encouraged tive industrial works and sideline industries were to respond to market opportunities. Peasants in contracted out to individuals, families, or small Jilin Province responded by putting filler materi- groups of families. At the commune level, a com- als in their quota grain deliveries (“A Big Case of bination of individuals and hired managers was Grain Filler . . .” 1995). Still, grain production’s used. At the county level, most industries re- lower profitability relative to cash crops left peas- mained in the hands of the local state. Thus, the ant farmers striving to increase grain yields on most unequal distribution occurred at the village smaller and smaller parcels of land in order to free level, where industrial assets were often limited more land for cash crops. They attempted this by (tofu factories, flour mills, machine shops, etc.). using costly chemical fertilizers and pesticides, This led to rapid social stratification in many rural purchased with profits derived from their expand- areas, as a few lucky peasant households gained ing acreage of oilseeds, tobacco, cotton, and other control of collective assets and were transformed high-input cash crops. Most farmers hope that into a new class of small industrial and commer- this shift in practices will enable them to meet cial entrepreneurs (Odegaard 1992).10 By com- their quotas and make money. The adoption of a parison, in most places, land distribution was host of unsustainable practices raises their de- carried out in a roughly egalitarian manner.Those pendency on costly agricultural chemicals, as households fortunate enough to acquire indus- farm households jump onto the increased-pro- trial assets were able to invest profits in such duction treadmill. Falling grain production area goods as better houses. Figures 2 and 3 show how in China (ZTNJ 1996) thus reflects an increas- two peasant households, each with identical land ingly vulnerable and risky agricultural system, holdings, faired after redistribution of collective predicated on the decreasing resilience of soil. industries. Note that both houses serve as back- This policy assumes that China’s fields can absorb drops to the traditional outdoor grain bins. The endless increases in chemical fertilizers and in- household in Figure 2 received a small grain mill, puts with no negative results. while that in Figure 3 is still wholly dependent on Historically, intensive Chinese agriculture de- its harvests. veloped with characteristics that were integral to In agriculture, risk was transferred to house- sustainable farming (King 1911), but that also holds within an unregulated atmosphere. Be- degraded specific environments. Ch’i Min Yao tween 1984 and 1989, total grain production Shu: An Agricultural Encyclopedia of the 6th Cen- fluctuated below the 1984 peak, while unit yields tury carries detailed instructions for proper main- stagnated (see Figure 4). Causes of the stagnation tenance and improvement of cultivated in grain production include decreasing profitabil- land—crop succession and green manure prac- ity, a subsequent shift to cash crops, and unsus- tices to improve soil fertility, field infrastructure tainable production practices. Much of to prevent erosion and improve yields, and vari- production gains obtained during the boom pe- ous methods for insect protection—as well as riod (1978–1984) can be attributed to technical methods for crop storage and food processing. niomna erdto nHiogin 585 Heilongjiang in Degradation Environmental

Figure 2. Rich peasant home gained from transfer of grain mill after decollectivization. 8 Muldavin 586

Figure 3. Poor peasant household received no decollectivized assests. Environmental Degradation in Heilongjiang 587

Figure 4. Grain production, yields, and fertilizer use for China and Heilongjiang showing the 1984–1989 stagnation period. Source: CSY 1992: 222, 312, 323–334; 1993: 332, 348, 349; 1996: 368, 371; HLJSY 1992: 347, 351, 354; HLJSY 1993: 319; 1995, 1996; Liu 1992: 47–50; CRSY 1992: 272; 1995. 588 Muldavin

Two thousand years ago, agricultural practices Zhaozhou County and other areas, and as a involved livestock, fish, crops, and humans in a Fulbright Scholar (1988–1990) in Bayan complex and highly-evolved system of produc- County conducting doctoral research on three tion (Shih 1962). King (1911) described many of villages. The case studies in this paper are these systems still in effect during his travels in drawn from field work and observation in these early twentieth-century China. Yet despite this two counties (Figure 5).14 Zhaozhou County’s vast knowledge, environmental degradation also flat expanse is split in half, with crop cultivation occurred, largely as a result of the extraction of dominating the eastern portion and herding of wealth by the state and local landlords. War and livestock the west. Further east in Bayan rebellion also took their toll, devastating large County, field crops predominate on the richer areas, as occurred in the early Qing dynasty (Pur- alluvial soils, supplemented by a significant for- due 1987). Land reclamation and repopulation estry sector in the rolling hills and low mountains. followed, demonstrating that degradation could Heilongjiang Province, although described here be slowed or reversed through monumental exer- as a hinterland, fulfills a historically important tion of human labor (Cressey 1934). The post- role as a resource-rich industrial pole of the revolutionary period is just a snapshot in this long northeast economy. Heilongjiang was developed evolution of land use in China, but it is one in into “the great northern granary” in less than a which the history of sustainability is being rapidly century by all three political systems—imperial, forgotten. Today, most agricultural land under republic, and people’s republic. The project has cultivation is in a degraded state (“NEPA Issues always been hampered by particularly long harsh China Environmental Survey . . .” 1994). In place winters that limit the region to single-season of monumental tasks that were a hallmark of crop production, preventing the intensification Maoist communalism,11 massive inputs of chemi- of production through multiple cropping preva- cal nutrients and individual labor make crop pro- lent in other parts of China. Yet for China, duction viable.12 Heilongjiang serves as an important indicator Without a concerted national effort to develop of wider changes, as the reforms re-create a alternative practices such as agroecology and in- speculative and unregulated frontier of natural tegrated pest management, or to rescue indige- resource exploitation. nous knowledge, it appears that the sustainability Plans to diversify and expand Heilongjiang’s of agriculture in China will end up dependent economy are based on the vast resources avail- upon expensive nonrenewable resources that in able. With a total area of 454,000 square kilome- themselves have destructive long-term effects.13 ters, this border province’s 35 million people are Combined with decreasing social welfare and in- economically dependent upon significant grain creasingly volatile local markets, agricultural pro- and agricultural commodities traded to Russia duction and rural industry have shifted towards and the rest of China (HLJSY 1992). In addition, practices that provide short-term returns but re- Heilongjiang is a major industrial center and sult in rapid, often degrading, exploitation of source of raw materials such as oil and lumber. natural resources and labor. Granted, there One-twelfth of the total cropland and one-sixth were numerous examples of environmentally of the total commercial grain production of China unsound decisions prior to the reform period are concentrated in this northern province (Zhao (Smil 1984, 1993; Ross 1988; Howard 1993), 1981). Moreover, much of the western marshy but the reforms introduced new negative ele- grassland region, fed by the floodwaters of the ments that exacerbated environmental prob- Songhua River,15 has served as the historical lems and decreased sustainability in the new grasslands of the minority Mongol herders, who hybrid system of China (Edmonds 1994; graze cattle, sheep, and horses, and hunt indige- Muldavin 1992). nous species such as deer and antelope. These indigenous practices have been altered by recent Han settler-agriculturalists who increasingly push The Case of Heilongjiang grain and cash-crop cultivation into these areas Province: 1978–1995 as well as introduce more intensive grazing sys- tems (see Figure 6). Since 1982 I have worked for periods of time Given the inevitability that the reforms would in Heilongjiang Province, as a consultant to the have a different impact both within and among Ministry of Agriculture on rural development in villages, townships, counties, and provinces, my Environmental Degradation in Heilongjiang 589

Figure 5. Heilongjiang Province, China, locating Bayan, Zhaozhou and provincial capital, Harbin. concern during my stays in Zhaozhou and Bayan agrarian change are considered: (1) land-use in- Counties was to determine how the reforms tensification, (2) agroindustrial pollution, and (3) would shape and structure agrarian change when declining communal capital. implemented in relatively poor hinterland areas of China. Taken together, the empirical village- based observations in Zhaozhou and Bayan Intensification of Land Use Counties allow a more nuanced understanding of specific causes of environmental problems in con- The range of choices theoretically available to temporary rural China. Three dimensions of peasant heads of households are moderated by 590 Muldavin

Figure 6. Land use in Northeastern China plain research area showing wetland regions, Songhua River basin, and Nen tributary. two factors: the perception of risk and the pres- Lands were staked out in a competitive rush, sure to increase yields. These limitations should using squatter rights, limited fencing materials, temper notions that the outcomes of farmers’ and expanded numbers of animals to lay claim to decisions are somehow optimal, or that choices previously collective grassland reserves. This is are purely economic. In fact, farmers often decide one example of environmental degradation, at- to do things that go against their own better tributable to the impacts of state policy reform on judgment. I witnessed individual claims being agrarian dynamics, that I witnessed in Zhaozhou made on formerly collective resources in both County while working with the Ministry of Agri- agricultural and grassland regions, and how this culture on livestock development projects. The was related to an evolving social stratification. most serious environmental degradation resulted Grasslands were appropriated by villagers accord- from this combination of deregulation and the ing to their socioeconomic status and access. releasing of large numbers of households into a Environmental Degradation in Heilongjiang 591 previous common property system following lack of new investment in what is now a crum- decollectivization. A similar process in Bayan bling irrigation infrastructure resulting in a de- County was exemplified by the rapid degradation cline of available water, agricultural production of forest reserves.16 has become less stable as it has intensified, forcing some farmers to extend crop production to pre- Croplands. The necessity to intensify produc- viously uncultivated lands. tion under a situation of increasing risk imposed a seriesofinterrelatedchoices onpeasanthouseholds. Grasslands. The western edge of the north- Peasants resisted adding organic nutrients to their east China plain, from northern Hebei through fields because they had to use crop residues to meet western Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, is a immediate household needs—pulling up whole transitional zone between the Mongol steppe stalks and roots to provide winter fuel and feed for grasslands and the agricultural lands of sedentary household and livestock. Amplifying the problem peasants (see Figure 6). Agricultural production were shorter fallow periods and declining green has been extended beyond lands appropriate for manure (plant material incorporated into soil while cultivation. Although short-term cropping is fea- still green [Brady 1984]) and compost returned to sible in small areas of the grasslands, their large- fields because only minimal manure, household, scale transformation into cropland has reduced and crop wastes were available. All green-manure and degraded remaining pastoral areas, precipi- cropping ended one year after the implementation tating widespread desertification. of reforms in Zhaozhou County as these crops were It is impossible to travel through Zhaozhou replaced with cash crops, resulting in a 50 percent County without being struck by the immensity of decline in green-manure area. Likewise, manure environmental decline due to sodic alkaliniza- delivery to fields for composting and spreading tion. Upon entering the county, one sees large declined rapidly in Bayan county. When waste white plains of salt-encrusted soil where recent was available, it was used on intensive garden thunderstorms leave puddles of water. As the plots. Thus the village was required to impose a water evaporates, it draws more of the killing salts quota of compost to be returned to the fields. to the surface from the shallow groundwater ta- Peasants found many creative ways to meet this ble, where they mix with the rainwater and flow demand, for example, by adding large quantities into other areas, stunting the growth of grass and of dirt or other filler material to the piles. This crops (Figure 7).18 These conditions, combined gave the appearance of composted mounds being with polluted effluent from the Daqing oil field applied to fields, but a quick check found them just to the north, can make one imagine these lacking the expected and needed organic matter blasted lands as empty of life. In fact, this damage (Muldavin 1992). is the spreading result of intensified grazing and Intensification of land use in Zhaozhou and cropping in an extremely vulnerable, yet highly Bayan counties in the early 1980s also led to a productive ecosystem. What is also surprising is rapid decline in overall soil fertility. As peasants how abruptly these landscapes change. Tallwaves abandoned sustainable agronomic practices, they of grass stretch for miles (Figure 8), interrupted increased their use of chemical fertilizers, post- as one nears another village surrounded by sodic poning for a number of years the visible signs of alkali flats and fields of stunted crops. Zhaozhou declining organic matter. Salinization, ground County’s villages together contain a total of water pollution, and micronutrient deficiencies 300,000 people, who, between 1978 and 1984, were direct consequences (Muldavin 1983, 1986, doubled their livestock numbers despite the on- 1992). As a result, yields stagnated and then going decline in available grassland. Foraging in declined. Crop rotation was simply abandoned a smaller area, cattle, sheep, and goats are ever throughout Heilongjiang in favor of monocul- more rapidly destroying the remaining productive ture, with the choice of crop (especially corn) lands, as depicted in Figure 9 (Muldavin 1986).19 depending on short-term profitability.17 Peasant Social stratification is a further result of these farmers complain about the “soil burning” of long- processes. The ability to fence off range land was term fertilizer use. Because of a loss of structure constrained by access to fencing wire—an expen- and decline in overall quality, the soils became sive and scarce commodity. Enclosures of grass- harder and less friable, with available nutrients land by wealthier peasants forced larger numbers actually diminishing despite large additions of of livestock into a diminishing area (Muldavin chemical fertilizer (see Figure 4). Further, with a field notes 1984, 1988, 1989). As large areas go 592 Muldavin

pH 11+

surface

A salt crust develops A

-- sodic-alkali formation

particles and on the

Sodium particles are

deposited between clay

ponding occurs

As ground hardens,

stimulating

hits ground

capillary action

Sunlight directly

water and sodium

Capillary action pulls up

TIME

Water table (2 meters below surface) Water

height

Clay

Cutting and

particles

over grazing

lowers grass Diagram of process of sodic alkalinization in grasslands over time: crust and hardening develop gradually as pH values rise from 7 up to 11.

pH 7 Figure 7. niomna erdto nHiogin 593 Heilongjiang in Degradation Environmental

Figure 8. Healthy summer grassland in Zhaozhou County. 594 Muldavin out of production through rapid degradation, as construction boom of the last fifteen years and is can be seen in the final stages of denuded grass- compounded by the building of larger homes.21 lands in Figure 10, grazing pressure is increased The construction boom increased the demand for on the remaining lands. wood, cement, iron products, and other housing This intensified use of grazing lands resulted materials as well as for land itself (“Peasants Ille- from decollectivization and the subsequent lack gally Use. . .” 1995). Rampant cutting of roadside of control over livestock numbers and grazing windbreaks, nurtured collectively over thirty area rights. Peasant herders rapidly increased years, became unstoppable. It is now possible to their herd sizes after the reforms as a means of drive for miles past stumps of trees felled in the improving security and laying claim to previously last few years. In Fendou Village, Bayan County, communal grasslands. With the expansion of ag- the elder villager assigned the difficult task of ricultural land and the degradation of pastures protecting village trees, described how every near villages, herders moved their flocks farther night a few more trees disappear in a process he away, setting up temporary houses to guard their called “nibbling” (“Henan Province Solved Two animals and stake claims to land. But the effective Cases” 1995). Despite fines and increased polic- deregulation of grasslands meant that the rapid ing, the practice only accelerates (Muldavin field decline in land quality was difficult to monitor,let notes 1989). In Zhaozhou County during alone reverse. In some areas, no contracts (via the 1983–1984, I witnessed the abandonment of Household Responsibility System) have been tree-planting programs, as well as the subsequent made between herders and the village govern- rapid harvest when forest plots were contracted ment. If such contracts existed, they might pro- for management to individual households. Trees vide at least passive land-use regulation and were reduced to logs piled in front of the former reduced risk to herders. In the absence of collec- commune’s headquarters (Figure 11). Combined tive regulation or household contracts within a with intensified grazing pressures, cutting forest functioning institutional regulatory system, who- for wood products and fuel serves to increase soil ever can seize control uses the land. Conse- erosion by breaking through the protective soil quently, strong incentives for increasing herd size cover (Muldavin 1986, 1992; Hinton 1985, were directly induced by decollectivization (Hin- 1990). In merely four years, between 1985 and ton [1990] documents the same process in nearby 1989, there was a 48-percent decline in the area Inner Mongolia). covered by windbreaks nationwide (ZNTN Accelerating internal desertification in 1992).22 Heilongjiang Province is tied closely to the rapid Rapid destruction of tree-based erosion con- increase in the use of marginal lands coming with trol systems was even more evident in Bayan the decline of collective control (Muldavin County during 1988–1989 (Muldavin field notes 1986)—a direct result of the fact that much of 1989). In Fuxiang Village during the 1980s, the the most marginal land is part of the collective uncontrolled harvesting of forest stands on the holdings. As land use in general is intensified, hills overlooking the village led to serious soil production increases are achieved through envi- erosion. The forest “reserves” now consist of bar- ronmentally destructive practices, often resulting ren and rocky yellow subsoils. The mass wasting in desertification of vulnerable regions. Officially and soil slumping on the denuded hillsides have designated desert area in China increased from covered the valley and alluvial cropping areas 1.3 to 1.5 million square kilometers between the with low-quality silt. The slopes, still classified as late 1970s and 1990 (Liang 1988).20 protected forests, are barren and eroded (Figure 12). Thus, not only have forest resources disap- peared, but agricultural lands have been rendered Soils and Forests. Lands lost to animal and useless—a dual destruction of the village’s two crop production are often used as sources of primary assets. The village leader acknowledged adobe. The sodic-alkali nature of these soils the problem but felt helpless to stop the process acts as a water repellent, and thus the topsoil given the unregulated climate that typifies cur- makes bricks with good durability. Soil for rent resource use (Muldavin 1992). Furthermore, bricks is only taken from the top meter, often in county leaders are unable to organize sufficient areas that still have a short grass cover. In labor and funds to replant denuded hillsides or Zhaozhou County, thousands of hectares have windbreaks. been pockmarked in this fashion. This practice has increased rapidly due to the rural and urban niomna erdto nHiogin 595 Heilongjiang in Degradation Environmental

Figure 9. Sheep on overgrazed grassland create patches of salt crust. 9 Muldavin 596

Figure 10. Sodic alkalinization after severe overgrazing with erosion and hardening of surface. niomna erdto nHiogin 597 Heilongjiang in Degradation Environmental

Figure 11. Destruction of trees: former commune facility used to warehouse raw logs. 598 Muldavin

Agroindustrial Pollution runoff from TVEs and agriculture increased dra- matically. Brickworks in many villages burn large Industrial pollution occurs on such a large quantities of low-quality coal. By the end of the scale in both rural and urban areas, and is so day, a low, fog-like inversion spreads across the completely uncontrolled, that China faces immi- villages and combines with widespread use of nent and serious environmental disasters (Ed- small fires for cooking, to make rural air quality monds 1994). With more than 80 percent of very poor. According to local health workers, the industrial waste water reentering waterways un- high level of particulate matter in the air leads to treated, it is no wonder that almost 50 percent of rising rates of associated illness and disease inland water is too polluted to drink or to support (Muldavin HSVS, BCSI 1989). Not only air qual- aquatic life (Liang 1988; He 1991). Unregulated ity is affected by the widespread use of high-sulfur township and village enterprises (TVEs) pose coal in TVEs, however. Despite producing a third serious health threats at the village level through of China’s industrial output, TVEs receive only groundwater contamination and other forms of 20 percent of state-supplied energy inputs for pollution. Although many are collectively owned, industry (FBIS 1992). The gap in supply is filled few localities are willing to impose on their own though production from largely unregulated enterprises regulatory controls that would de- small-scale collective and individually run coal crease their competitiveness (Yang and Wei mines—60,000 of which are scattered through- 1996). TVEs expanded rapidly in the new hybrid out the countryside. First expanded under the economy, many subcontracting to national and commune, their current growth is responsible for international firms. Their rapid growth is due to widespread destruction of adjacent forests and a combination of flexibility and low-cost produc- fields. Mine tailings are a further health hazard, tion, which they achieve through their ability to polluting land and water alike.24 hire cheap labor,use older,highly-polluting meth- ods and machinery, and ignore all environmental and occupational health and safety regulations Environmental Decline and the Mining of (Odegard 1992; “The Situation of National Communal Capital Wastewater Discharge” 1994). Often built on the limited arable land (declining by one percent By 1984, the collective ceased to exist as the each year nationally), and being spatially far- allocator of capital and labor. In the aftermath, flung, they are virtually impossible to monitor or capital and labor investment declined in large- regulate, making them potentially more hazard- scale infrastructure while being redirected into ous than spatially concentrated urban industries. short-term projects. Observers from widely differ- In the three Bayan County villages I observed, ing schools of thought (Lin 1993; Hinton 1990) industrial and agricultural pollution were largely recognize that state investment in agriculture and unacknowledged contributors to public health infrastructure has fallen significantly since the problems. These problems are further com- reforms were implemented, with resulting nega- pounded by the declining quality of health care tive impacts on production (Odegard 1992). Ex- over the last fifteen years, as collective services penditure on agriculture as a whole, as a disappear through lack of funding and organiza- percentage of total (national) state expenditure, tion (Davis 1989; Henderson 1993).23 For exam- has been in continual decline since the late 1970s. ple, the potato-starch noodle mills in Hesheng From more than 13 percent of the state budget at Village simply empty their effluents into dirt-lined the time of Deng’s assent, state expenditure had ditches alongside the roads. A purple-colored fallen to less then nine percent by 1981 and has chemical used to process potatoes into starch averaged below 5 percent in the 1990s (ZTNJ made it easy to identify the contamination of local 1991, 1992, 1993; Qiu 1996). By 1988, one-third groundwater when families began drawing violet of state investment in agriculture was financed by water from their household wells. In another foreign sources, principally the World Bank village in Bayan, all the fish raised by two house- (Muldavin 1992).25 This rapid decline in state holds were killed by chemically contaminated capital investment in agriculture, combined with water from a number of small village industries. the redirection of collective labor and capital, Fishers along the Songhua river, at the southern prefigured the agricultural stagnation between border of both Zhaozhou and Bayan counties, 1985 and 1989. Together with declining house- reported rapid declines in fish yields as chemical hold investment, these changes remain as major niomna erdto nHiogin 599 Heilongjiang in Degradation Environmental

Figure 12. Fuxiang Village, Bayan County: denuded hillsides of previously forested areas. 600 Muldavin barriers to the improvement of land and labor over the utilization of resources led to severe productivity in agriculture (Lardy 1984; Stone overdraft of alternative water resources in many 1985; Walker 1984; Muldavin 1986). Repeated areas (Hinton 1990; He 1991; Edmonds 1994). calls have been made in the last few years to divert A rapid acceleration in local-level “natural” state revenues to agriculture. In 1989, the Vice disasters in the last few years is attributable largely Minister of Agriculture (Wang) said that large to the delayed effects of this decrease in capital capital construction projects in agriculture were investment. As irrigation systems fall into disre- being successfully implemented with a new land pair, villages are left with no buffer against the conversion tax being the major source of funds. unpredictable rains. Village informants describe Yet problems in collection of this and other agri- in detail the contradiction between their at- cultural taxes hinder proposed increases in in- tempts to meet subsistence needs and the de- vestment. Another difficulty is the translation of mands of local state authorities for higher taxes. top directives and transfer of monies down Widespread anger towards local representatives through the institutional maze into productive of the state, an increasing trend throughout much investment, without most getting “lost” along the of rural China (Muldavin BCSII 1994, field notes way. Total projected investment needs of rural 1987–1988; also field notes from Henan Province China until the end of this century exceed 1.5 1990–1994) is a portentous sign of rapidly eroding trillion RMB (180 billion USD), with the state political legitimation. Ignoring these environ- expected to contribute less than one-fifth, and mental and economic problems may invite civil the rest expected to come from peasant savings, unrest. Yet rather than rebel, peasants often rely the savings of TVEs, and the weakened collec- on the state’s forbearance in attributing actual tives (Delfs 1984; Du 1985; Riskin 1987; Qiu and fictional shortfalls to “natural disaster.” 1996). With institutional structures at a local An attempt to build a levee in Hesheng Village level severely weakened by reforms, it is difficult is a good example of accelerated “natural disas- to imagine the funding and smooth implementa- ter.” Using contracted labor-duty days, work has tion of rural development projects. Ultimately the been organized annually to construct a levee to state will have to recognize institutional failures protect the village from floods (see Figure 15). Yet and renew support for local initiatives. These will the village has been unable to complete construc- inevitably present cases where the rehabilitation tion. Failure to collectively organize and invest of collective assets and common property play a the requisite capital and labor necessitates start- determining role in future solutions. Their eco- ing the project over from scratch annually, as the nomic viability will first have to be appreciated. product of each year’s labor is washed away. The Throughout China, villagers have been unable villagers are so demoralized by the Sisyphean to organize the necessary labor and capital invest- nature of this task that it is no longer possible to ment for agricultural infrastructure. Reservoirs, rally their efforts around the project. The result dikes, irrigation canals, tube wells, erosion con- is the progressive impoverishment of Hesheng trol, tree planting—all critical to sustaining and Village. For a number of years, the village has been increasing production—receive little investment unable to deliver its quota of grain to the town- for maintenance, let alone improvement or ex- ship because the entire harvest was destroyed, pansion, and are in a state of serious disrepair and the village became completely dependent on (Peasant Daily 1989; Muldavin 1992, 1994; Hin- state relief. Families have outmigrated, further ton 1990; Odegard 1992). The photographs of complicating attempts to complete the levee. lined irrigation systems in Figures 13 and 14 con- These migrants join the millions of peasants wan- trast infrastructure before and after full imple- dering across China in search of work (Muldavin mentation of the reforms (1983 and 1995). Figure HSVS 1989; also Hesheng Village Meeting, Nov. 14 shows that for lack of labor and capital, a 10, 1989). In late 1994, it was impossible to reach valuable resource has been abandoned. Although the village for a follow-up research visit because collectively owned equipment and facilities were it was under water (Muldavin BCSII 1994). often distributed along with land (Peoples’ Daily Disasters such as this can be ignored while 1982), water control infrastructure remained un- economic growth in agriculture remains high, but der collective management. Yet collectives expe- that growth itself is being obtained by a redirec- rienced a massive decline in investment capital tion of investment. Capital previously used for while simultaneously being stripped of authority large-scale infrastructure and collective projects and assets (ZNTN 1992). Such loss of control has been diverted to purchase chemical fertilizers, Environmental Degradation in Heilongjiang 601

Figure 13. Water flowing in well-maintained ditch before reform. 602 Muldavin

Figure 14. Silted-up and overgrown ditch in disrepair after reform. Environmental Degradation in Heilongjiang 603

County road

Figure 15. Hesheng Village cultivated lands and levee project along Songhua River floodplain showing high flood-prone area. plastic sheeting, small pumps for water control, greater numbers, not all of which can be attrib- and other agrochemicals (ZNTN 1992; Muldavin uted to climatic variation. For example, there was field notes 1990) as well as to household con- a 25-percent increase in the area covered and sumption (Zhang 1993; “Life vs. Death. . .” affected by natural disasters between 1985 and 1989).26 Similarly, investment in TVEs comes at 1991 [ZNTN 1992].27 The best example of hu- the expense of other investments in infrastruc- man-induced environmental problems is the in- ture needed for long-term production gains. creased flooding that has followed in the wake of Given the fact that many unregulated TVEs con- the practices described above. Raised silt loads tribute to increased local air, water, and soil pol- and deposits in lower reaches of the major rivers lution, the much-touted change in locus of threaten dike systems weakened by lack of repairs control over capital investment and planning, and investment. Reservoirs are rapidly silting up, from the center to local authorities, has not undermining water conservation efforts, decreas- brought the expected advantages or met the ob- ing both flood control and the electricity-gener- jectives promised by decentralization. Indeed, the ating potential of the large-scale hydroelectric capacity for local people to organize or plan more projects on China’s major rivers. In my sustainable production has been directly ham- Heilongjiang work, I observed a correspondence pered by the “gold rush” on communal capital. between increased flooding and peasant requests The failure to recognize the value of collective for forbearance from state-imposed production assets has already cost the economy in losses contracts. In fact, these requests are but one of attributable to the increased frequency of natural many tactics used by peasants to reduce the pres- disasters. Such disasters seem to be occurring in sures to which they are now exposed. Thus they 604 Muldavin are part of an attempt to test the legitimacy of the treatment, they were punished through the can- state, often before committing conscious acts of cellation of the state contract for their fields. resistance. They were left with only a small quantity of ration, or subsistence, land (Muldavin field notes 1990, 1993; also in Henan Province). With such Political and Ecological Aspects of high costs attached to political protest, peasants develop indirect forms of resistance. State Legitimacy and Peasant The testing of state legitimacy is a critical Resistance weapon in the peasantry’s relationship with the state. It is considered a moral right to request The phenomenon of passive rural resistance is assistance after a flood, and the state has little well examined by observers of peasant societies choice but to come to the aid of stricken commu- (Scott 1976; Shanin 1987). Chinese peasants nities. As a result, declarations of natural disasters insulate themselves from volatile change through as a means to obtain assistance have become an such “weapons” as lying to state authorities about essential ploy by villagers who have mastered the actual natural conditions or otherwise limiting art of “poor-mouthing” to strengthen their claims the state’s ability to demand surpluses. These (Swift 1989; Sen 1994) (Muldavin HSVS, FDVS, passive forms of resistance (cf. Scott 1985; Peet FXVS 1989). For example, between 1981 and and Watts1996) have been engendered by exces- 1989, natural disaster claims were made for seven sive taxation, declining subsidies, inflation, and of nine years on behalf of villages in Songhuajiang corruption, all of which have been brought to the Township in Bayan County (Muldavin 1992). surface by the social and environmental context These claims were made to justify lower annual of rapid decollectivization. The misinterpretation quota requirements, increased disaster relief, de- of passive resistance as strictly economic, or its velopment aid, cheaper and more abundant in- recasting as a temporary response to market dis- puts, and free credit (see Figure 16). In Hesheng location, is not, however, conducive to a rethink- Village, repayment for credit from the township ing of state policies. Certainly, elements within cooperative declined in years of natural disasters, the state are quite cognizant of these problems, when loans were either pushed forward or written and there is a rigorous debate over the extent, off. This adds to local officials’ and peasants’ pace, and consequences of reform (Sun 1995). temptations to have their area declared eligible More activist, militant, and even violent forms for disaster relief. Such costs accrue to the pro- of resistance have emerged in ethnic and class- vincial and central governments, which must re- based conflicts in both hinterland minority re- plenish credit sources each year. gions and the heartland of Chinese agriculture, Peasants thus leverage assets from the state flaring into local, but nonetheless important, in- based on historical agreements between the Com- cidents of rebellion. By 1987, rising real costs of munist Party and the peasantry. In a sense, the agricultural and agroindustrial inputs caused un- “party of the peasants” has to provide a morally rest and demonstrations. Since 1990, some peas- correct patronage system of asset distribution to ants have gone beyond small-scale acts of its supporters. If it were to lose its rural support resistance such as cheating on grain quotas (“A base, it would be further weakened in relation to Big Case of Grain Filler. . .” 1995), risking more pressing urban demands. Thus, the environment direct acts that demonstrate the economic vise has become part of the political terrain in which on peasant households. A recent peasant revolt Chinese peasants negotiate their relations to the in Renshou in Sichuan Province highlights the state. In this derivative system, it is difficult for difficulties of a state trying to impose levies on the state to take stock of the problems that accu- peasants when rural household incomes are stag- mulate around its reform policies. Yetit is prema- nating or declining (Muldavin 1992). When ture to say that policy reform in China has created peasants refused to pay taxes in rural a crisis from which the state and its institutions Heilongjiang, local police (whose wages are de- cannot escape. Nevertheless, China may be the pendent on tax income) went with local cadres first modern state to face an intractable legitima- to peasant homes to demand payment.28 If the tion crisis based on environmental decline. peasants did not pay, the police took household There remain various paths that could engen- goods of equivalent value. In cases where peas- der a more equitable, albeit slower, pace of eco- ants accused the local leaders and police of unfair nomic change for regions like Heilongjiang, as Environmental Degradation in Heilongjiang 605

Figure 16. Natural disaster claims and actual weather conditions, 1981–1989, for Bayan County, Heilongjiang Province. Source: author; Zhao 1994:176. well as for the booming south. Nonetheless, the quences of tumultuous change on the state itself. traditional alliance between the Communist With decentralization, the state loses sources of Party and the peasantry is threatened by the new revenue and reduces its commitment to social hybrid regime and appears to be unraveling in well being, becoming in the process a target for many areas of the countryside. A decline in state discontent. subsidies aggravates problems caused by the re- If Chinese central planning and government forms but also relocates the political conse- are giving way to an authoritarian but “market- 606 Muldavin preserving” federalist system (see Montinola, G., employ long-term decision-making strategies in et al. 1995), then Western observers will wait a production alongside short-term market ones. long time to see the institutional changes they This arrangement can spread the increased risk have anticipated for China. There is little evi- of market mechanisms over larger groups (Bard- dence that the Chinese variant of modern indus- han and Roemer 1993). Such an institutionalized trial capitalism redresses environmental competition within a collective market economy problems. These problems call into question the could reduce the mining of communal capital. long-term viability of China’s derivative eco- In Heilongjiang Province, recollectivization nomic system—closing the door to sustainable by poor peasant households into small groups development and opening the door to unrest. might not only help to spread risk but also in- crease efficiency and power,and insulate the now- individualized households from an unstable Conclusion economy. This kind of collective market econ- omy may soon predominate, according to the A national policy that relies on a raid of natural deputy director of agriculture for the province, systems structures economic growth on ecologi- and is being closely watched in Beijing as a strat- cal decline. Since China’s introduction of reforms egy to overcome some of the contradictions of the in 1978, resource degradation takes many forms: more general hybrid system (Sun 1990). What is increased use of marginal lands, more intensive critical in any assessment is to learn in what ways cropping patterns, increased and uncontrolled small-scale reunification is truly a voluntary bot- use of destructive chemical inputs, a decline in tom-up adaptation to problems of decollectiviza- agricultural infrastructure investments, rapid ex- tion or, in contrast, a top-down means of surplus ploitation of existing assets through industrializa- extraction by the state.29 tion and accompanying pollution, land An alternate path is to have individual deci- conversion, and the rampant destruction of eco- sion making within a planned economy with cer- systems through industrial mining and the search tain state guarantees left in place (that is, an for construction materials. While the Maoist as- individual planned economy). This path could sault on nature could be seen as inherent to the provide adequate social welfare and stability of ideologies of “socialist developmentalism,” post- markets for individuals to make long-term deci- 1978 China is promoting a use of resources that sions regarding production. In fact, intervention has come to resemble a “run on the bank.” of this sort (though short-term and reactive) has In Heilongjiang, people are learning that in a been the method most often used to deal with decollectivized world, problems are now the “ex- crises arising from the reforms (Zhang et al. ternalities” of economic boom achieved through the faster utilization of natural resources, typical 1989). Both alternatives already exist in certain of agriculture in frontier regions throughout the of China’s regions and localities. Thus, a wide world. This is not typical, however, of a peasant range of options are already in place to deal with commune where all problems were expected to the problems facing rural China—all of them be solved locally. There is no brigade or team or better than a complete turn to a market economy campaign that will eliminate pests, clean the composed of millions of small producers. The result- water, dig canals, or repair the roads. ing picture of agrarian and ecological change, It is a commonly held view that reform of emerging from an array of often contradictory collectively based, planned economies requires forces—from state policy to local resistance—has decollectivization to occur simultaneously with evolved toward a mosaic of mixed market and the promotion of market mechanisms. In fact, the socialist forms, some with government sanction, two need not be tied together. A shift from col- some without. These forms range from the individ- lective to household economy is not a necessary ual to the collective, and in recent years in corollary to the transition from command to mar- Heilongjiang Province at least, have defied the ket economies (Nove 1983; Bardhan and Roemer national trend by increasingly relying on govern- 1993). Within the local and regional heterogene- ment intervention in the local economy for long- ity of China’s political economy, reforms take term market planning and stability. This situation diverse paths. Alternate pathways are emerging, provides a space for dialogue between different for example, a shift to markets within a predomi- state institutions and independent social move- nantly collective economy allowing peasants to ments—the development of civil society. Environmental Degradation in Heilongjiang 607

The abrupt dismantling of collectives and their difficult problems of sustainability are to be re- replacement by individual/ household production solved. The state’s ability to maintain legitimacy units, in concert with the shift from plan to mar- through its paraphernalia of subsidies and debt is ket, is causing a complex of significant problems, structurally limited by fiscal crisis (Muldavin many of which have severe environmental con- 1996). Furthermore, the inequitable growth of sequences. Within the new economic context the past fifteen years has been achieved through provided by the hybrid system, there are deepen- mining of communal capital. Thus, China’s emer- ing contradictions: lowering the productivity of gent derivative hybrid of socialism and capital- the resource base and bringing a decline in the ism—authoritarian, corrupt, speculative, long-term development potential in many areas exploitative of labor and nature—is based on of rural China. The structural problems of the fundamental contradictions that will not simply hybrid system are manifested in numerous ways, go away with the completion of a “transition” to including stagnant output of grain, soil-degrading a market economy. intensification of land use, environmentally toxic agroindustrial development, declining capital in- vestment by communities, increased vulnerabil- Acknowledgment ity of poor peasant households resulting from greater risk, declining subsidies brought about by I would like to acknowledge the Fulbright-Hays a state revenue crisis, and declining purchasing Doctoral Dissertation Research Fellowship and the power due to inflation. These problems are im- IEE/ITT Fulbright Fellowship for their generous portant components of the subsequent delegit- support during a period of research which forms a imization of the state. substantial basis for this paper. I would like to thank China’s restructuring, coming from its experi- George Leddy and Richard Peet for extremely useful ments with socialism and its articulation with the close readings and critical comments on drafts along global economy, significantly increases its de- the way. I would also like to thank the following pendency on international markets as outlets for people for their helpful suggestions: John Agnew, its products and as sources of capital, technology, Piers Blaikie, Claudia Carr, Alex Clapp, Carmen and imported commodities.30 This paper shows Diana Deere, Donald Gauthier, Lucy Jarosz, Victor how costs and risks of the new hybrid are trans- Lippit, Brian Page, Ivan Szelenyi, TeodorShanin, ferred to nature. Combined with unstable and Craig Thorburn, and Michael Watts. Last, I want changing tenure relations, short-term practices to thank four anonymous referees for their helpful are emphasized over long-term sustainability. critiques. Responsibility for the ideas presented is Thus, the “problems of market triumphalism” are completely my own. mirrored by quite similar problems of socialist- market triumphalism in China. Rapid social stratification, in line with global trends, has oc- Notes curred as control of productive assets, particularly nonagricultural ones, has been concentrated in 1. Recent ethnic-based turmoil in the hinterland the hands of a new wealthy elite (Odgaard 1992). regions of the West, along with pronouncements A significant number of China’s peasants, and to from the Chinese leadership, make abundantly clear that the regime will not make the “mistakes” a lesser degree urban residents, are experiencing of the former USSR by freeing politics along with 31 declining living standards (Muldavin 1992). In economy. 1993, 4.3 million people saw their incomes sky- 2. Political ecology emphasizes the importance of rocket to 32 times the rural average, but the political economy in the understanding of envi- incomes of 400 million people declined (Schell ronmental degradation—a historically informed 1995). The failure of the commandist state—or attempt to understand the role of the state, the of the magic of trickle-down—to redistribute the social relations within which land users are en- wealth of the rapidly developing coastal and twined, and resulting environmental changes. southern regions to the poorer, agriculturally de- Much work has been done on the transformative effects of the penetration of capital into different pendent hinterlands and peoples, amplifies the aspects of the production process, the commodi- sense of multiple Chinas. fication of production and reproduction, and sub- Takinginto account the immense heterogeneity sequent changes in land use towards more of China, locally-based collective action and long- degrading practices (Blaikie 1985; Blaikie and term production strategies must be promoted if the Brookfield 1987; Neumann 1992). With excep- 608 Muldavin

tion of emphasis given to interactions between reforms, for it was no longer possible to use them peasant/indigenous and capitalist forms of pro- efficiently on the myriad individual plots duction organization, however, the environ- (Muldavin 1983, 1986, 1992). mental effects of changes in the organization of 10. Parallel to this was the restructuring of collective production are under-theorized. industries. As in Russia, this can be interpreted as 3. In China, it is the rural industrial complexes that a transfer of collective assets to the elite, or as the now provide the greatest dynamism in the econ- transformation of political power into inheritable omy, while simultaneously affecting nature in un- wealth (Cooper 1993). Typically, in urban areas precedented ways. As flexibility becomes the this process was dominated by the new “prince- watchword of global capitalism (Sayer and Walker lings”—the children of China’s aging leadership 1992; Scott and Storper 1986), global restructur- (Malhotra and Studwell 1995). The resulting ing processes are paralleled by shifts in Chinese class stratification is a national, as well as a highly state policies since 1978 towards privatization, localized and intrafamilial, phenomenon. subcontracting, and deregulation. The new eco- 11. The People’s Republic of China set out in 1949 to nomic space created in China brings local labor reclaim and repopulate lands lost to production and resources into direct global linkage with a during Japanese occupation, World War II, and constellation of factors choreographed by cycles the subsequent civil war. The thirty years follow- of investment, technical and organizational inno- ing liberation are replete with heroic accounts of vation, and complex networks of contracts be- turning back the desert, converting wastelands tween firms (Page 1993). Further,this exploitation into productive croplands, reforesting denuded of uneven development and flexible regimes of hillsides, controlling rivers, and bringing water to accumulation (in particular, subcontracting net- arid lands. Indeed, an entire discursive formation works) increases the ongoing concentration of was built on the notion of the state-socialist trans- control in the struggle over assets. formation of nature in China. It must be stressed 4. Thus, theorists of the new industrial geography that the large-scale organization of labor by col- analyzing processes of First World industrial capi- lectives, focused on building needed biophysical talism engage similar issues to those raised by infrastructure, was very much responsible for the political ecologists analyzing agriculture in Third long-term gains in production that were achieved. World rural contexts. 12. In the late 1970s, fertilizer availability increased 5. Wang (1996) and others argue that institution as factories built in the communal period came on building is the next crucial step in China’s line. As noted above, this increased fertilizer transition. availability, combined with a 50-percent increase 6. Now able to enter new regions, open thanks to in prices paid to peasants for grain and the mining market socialism (Bardhan and Roemer 1993), of communal capital, brought most of the in- these modern enterprises benefit from decidedly creases in production. And yet, it was decollec- unmodern conditions in both the exploitation of tivization that was identified by the state as the labor and nature. primary factor. The broad acceptance of this 7. Deregulation and decentralization of economic flawed position served to legitimize a deepening activity and administration, and the increasing of reforms and the subsequent shift to urban areas, control at local and household levels, led to pro- since the rural question had been “solved.” duction decision making that responded to mar- 13. This vulnerability is acknowledged in China, but ket signals in one sector while demands in others the loss of biodiversity with the shift to hybrid remained unanswered. cultivars, and the ecological implications of this 8. Infrastructure that was built up on the commune genetic loss, remain underresearched. is not what China’s policy makers want today. The 14. These sites represented a full range of agrarian contemporary focus is no longer on local roads, change over fifteen years. Using household inter- canals, and treelines within a commune produc- views and participant observations, I developed a tive unit, but rather on nation-building invest- rich database of individual and family responses ments of networks of satellites, telephones, to the implementation of the reforms. I combined highways, etc. this with intensive surveys of natural resources 9. Communes also gave up much of their regulatory (through, for example, soil analyses), socioeco- power, while distancing themselves from the risks nomic indicators, and production figures, as well associated with production. Peasants are required as with first-hand documentation of environ- to provide the state with an annual quota of grain mental degradation in order to assess the charac- at below market prices in exchange for long-term ter, scale, and pace of agrarian transformation use of small parcels of land. A devolution in within these communities. After one year of ex- farming practices accompanied this shift in scale, periencing collective productionon the commune from large unified plots to a mosaic of small hold- and state farm, during my stay in Zhaozhou ings reminiscent of prerevolutionary China. Large County in the early 1980s, I witnessed the phe- tractors and harvesters were abandoned after the nomenal speed of decollectivization first-hand. In Environmental Degradation in Heilongjiang 609

Bayan County, through cooperation with village tween clay particles, thus further restricting leaders and government officials, I was free to downward percolation of water and speeding up select representative households drawn from all the process of alkalinization. The result is an registered members of the community. My criteria expansion of barren areas with extremely high-pH included a constellation of cross-secting variables soils covered with a salty crust. Erosion increases, in the three dissimilar villages: these variables exposing even less fertile subhorizons, further documented family size and structure, relative complicating rehabilitation. social position in the community (from the 19. The most common example of marginal land in- wealthiest and most prominent households to the vasion in Zhaozhou County since 1978 was the poorest and most marginalized), as well as access continued transformation of tall-grass prairie into to land, credit, side-line, and small industrial as- field crop and intensively grazed pasture areas. sets. The resulting sample of households (checked The movement into these and other marginal against village aggregate data) provided a unique lands and the shift in land use from forests, profile with which to analyze changing decision- marshes, and grasslands to more intensive agricul- making patterns in production and resource use. ture increased output through an overall exten- Follow-up visits through 1995 help provide a more sion of areas under cultivation. Whether the complete timeline of changes under the reforms. choice was to rapidly increase grazing or to plow These sources are cited as Muldavin field notes under the grasslands, the end result is the with year, and the three village and two county same—rapid expansion in the area of barren sodic surveys in Bayan County as FDVS (Fendou), alkali land (Muldavin 1986). It takes large FXVS (Fuxiang), HSVS (Hesheng), and BCSI amounts of water and expensive tile drainage and II (Bayan County Survey I and II). systems to flush out the salt accumulations, and 15. Freshwater fisheries along Heilongjiang’s exten- this process is financially unfeasible for the large sive river systems produce large quantities of fish areas of extensive grain production in for provincial export, as well as high-value caviar Heilongjiang Province. for the world market. 20. These changes in production practices are indica- 16. It is increasingly recognized (Geography Institute tive of a shift from long to short-term goals in rural 1990) that similar environmental problems are decision making. Peasants are very constrained prevalent throughout Heilongjiang province, in- because, despite reforms, important institutions cluding erosion and soil degradation, air and are altogether absent. Other missing elements water pollution, forest decline and grassland de- that might serve as indicators include land mar- sertification. kets. Land values, therefore, cannot serve as a 17. The impact on soil fertility was partly countered signal of uneconomic use of resources. Similarly, through increasing chemical fertilizer use, from the intensification and transformation of arable 175 thousand metric tons in 1978 to more than land through rapid and unregulated rural indus- one million metric tons by 1995 (HLJSY 1993, trialization, expanded home building, and popu- 1995; CSY, 1996). This growth was even more lation increase, cannot be tempered by increases rapid than a parallel national increase from 10 in the value of agricultural land. In this respect, million metric tons in 1978 to more than 35 reforms are premature, particularly with regard to million metric tons by 1995. The increased use of the encouragement of rapid decollectivization. chemical fertilizers degraded overall soil fertility 21. Increased standing water in this minefield of holes and water quality (Liang 1988; Muldavin field supplies a perfect breeding ground for mosquitoes notes 1989). and other disease vectors, creating a grave health 18. With a decline in soil cover due to intensified problem. In this area, the mosquito carries Japa- grazing, a process of sodicalkalinization begins, nese encephalitis, a very serious disease. raising the pH in the upper horizons of the soil 22. In fact, it has been discovered that reforestation from 7 or 8 to 10 or 11. At the higher pH levels, areas throughout China have generally poor qual- what is left of the grasses dies off, leaving only ity stands (Delman 1989:59). clumps of high-pH tolerant weeds with low nutri- 23. One of the less noted results of decollectivization tional value (Muldavin 1986). The physical proc- is a breakdown of large-scale pest control pro- ess of degradation is as follows. There is decreased grams. Subsequently, there is increased exposure grass cover on land with only slight elevation to harmful pesticides, particularly for children and variations. Following significant precipitation the elderly. In Zhaozhou County, the collective’s (particularly in the summer rainy season), water former method of running sheep through a ce- ponds on the soil surface. Exposed to sunlight, ment-lined pesticide dip to control scabies is no much of the water evaporates before percolating longer practiced. Responsibility for control of such down into the soil, drawing salts to the surface diseases falls on the household, usually untrained through capillary action and forming crusts of female children, with little or no protective meas- white particles. The soil porosity is reduced fur- ures taken against exposure to toxic chemicals. ther by the lodging of sodium (salt) particles be- 610 Muldavin

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Correspondence: Department of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90025, email [email protected].