After Slobodan Milošević Was Ousted from Power in Serbia in October
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Südosteuropa 56 (2008), H. 3, S. 353-375 SERBIEN BOJAN ALEKSOV The New Role of the Orthodox Church in Serbia Abstract. After Slobodan Milošević was ousted from power, one of the first steps of the new democratic government of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was to introduce religious education in state schools. Although only one and eventually the least successful part of Đinđić’s politi- cal strategy, allying with the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) became a steady component of political rule in Serbia. While not a novelty in the Balkans or Eastern Europe, in Serbia the alliance with the Church is a significant and symbolic departure from Milošević’s rule. The confessional allegiance and faith became chief legitimizing devices, supplementing or replacing the nationalism and social populism of Milošević’s era, and filling up an ideological void. In addition to the introduction of religious education in schools, the effects of the alliance of the political elites with the SOC in the last few years have been, among other things, a new law on religious communities which secures a special status to the so-called traditional churches; privileging traditional churches in the procedure for returning nationalized property; an officially sanctioned influence of the SOC on the media; increased public spending on the churches, especially the SOC; worsening relations with Romania, Macedonia and Montenegro by following the SOC’s or individual bishops’ policies; dismissing legal proceedings against SOC clergy; as well as growing discrimination against small religious communities. Bojan Aleksov is Lecturer in Modern Southeast European History at the School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University College London. After Slobodan Milošević was ousted from power in Serbia in October 2000, one of the first measures of the new democratic government of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was to introduce religious education in state schools.1 A declared atheist, Đinđić also became the head of the consortium for the construction of St. Sava church in Belgrade, often hailed as the biggest Orthodox Church in the world. After two years in office, he made his last public appearance at a fund raising event for St. Sava church among the Serbs in Germany. A couple of days later, Đinđić was killed in broad daylight in front of a government building by members of the secret police. Despite his efforts, Đinđić remained unpopular among the clergy and generally among those close to the Serbian Orthodox 1 The author wishes to thank Klaus Buchenau, Slobodan Marković and Sabine Rutar, who read previous drafts of this article and offered valuable comments and suggestions. For any remaining errors the responsibility remains with the author. 354 Bojan Aleksov Church (SOC). This was evident even during his funeral when the Metropolitan of Montenegro, Amfilohije, who was officiating in place of the ailing Patriarch Pavle, compared in his eulogy Đinđić’s murder to all the murders in Kosovo and Iraq (sic), to the consternation of all those present. Although only one and eventually the least successful of Đinđić’s political strategies, allying with the Church has remained a steady component of and rule in political behaviour in Serbia ever since. Whether a true sign of piety or rather a pragmatic display of confessional allegiance, close contacts with the Church developed into key elements of authority building. This comes as no surprise considering the fact that for many years now the SOC has featured as the most trusted institution on all the public opinion polls. There are two phenomena to distinguish here. With the growth of public recognition of religion in Serbia from the end of the 1980s onwards both idea- tional and practical religiosity undeniably rose, albeit with a considerable gap between the two.2 Indicative of this change is the fact that before churches often stood empty, whereas now throngs of believers cram both the old and the new sacral constructions mushrooming all over the country. Instead of a handful of elderly women hidden in the churches’ corners, now men and women in attendance are neatly separated, standing on the right and the left side respec- tively. Even head covering for women in churches has, after half a century, been reintroduced. Not all of this can be discarded as a fashion, a consequence of or a benefit from the Church’s alignment with Serb nationalism in recent years, as is often simplistically claimed. In order to point out that there is more to it, it suffices to consider the rising number of young men and women who take monastic vows of celibacy and dedicate their lives to God and the Church in numerous old or newly founded monasteries. The revitalization of religion has been a dominant trend in the entire post- communist world, yet it occurred in different ways in all countries, and hence this wholesomeness as such cannot explain the socio-religious changes and the role of the different churches involved in the process.3 The alleged desecularisa- 2 For a detailed analysis cfr. Mirko Blagojević, Religijska situacija u SR Jugoslaviji: Revita- lizacija religijskog ponašanja i verovanja, Teme 27 (2003), no. 4, 525-552, available at <http://www. scindeks.nbs.bg.ac.yu/clanak.php?issn=0353-7919&je=sr&id=0353-79190304525B&pdf=da>. All cited websites were last retrieved on 2 December 2008. 3 Research on the expectations and hopes with regard to the social and cultural role of the church shows significant differences among the post-communist countries and aptly illustrates the point, even if it unfortunately does not include Serbia. The polls, asking for religiosity and orientation towards the church, brought forth the most skeptical attitudes towards the church in Eastern Germany (27.6 %), Bulgaria (33.9 %), the Czech Republic (36.4 %), and Estonia (38.5 %). In the middle part of the scale range Hungary (42.3 %), Belarus (44.5 %), Slovenia (46.8 %), Latvia (52.8 %), Russia (55.1 %), Slovakia (59.7 %), and Croatia (60 %). Po- land (62.7 %), Ukraine (63.1 %), Lithuania (74.4 %), and Romania (74.7 %) feature the highest percentage of respondents who think that the church significantly contributes to solving The New Role of the Orthodox Church in Serbia 355 tion of the Serbian (and Yugoslav) society and the subsequent reclaiming of the public space by the SOC are post-Soviet trends that have been closely studied. Developments since 2000 have received less attention.4 In Serbia, the alliance between the elites and the SOC marks a significant hangec compared to the years of Milošević’s rule. In addition, the Church’s relations with the state, political ambitions, conflicts within the Church itself as well as with other segments of society have reached unforeseen dimensions. This article looks at some of these quantitative and qualitative changes noticeable since the overthrow of Milošević. As I will illustrate, it is the state’s representatives who, in a remarkable twist, since the end of 2000 have been seeking to establish strong links with the Church in order to consolidate and legitimate their political positions. This is quite re- verse from the situation in the late eighties and early nineties, when it was the Church that sought to establish such links and when Milošević only reluctantly accepted such offers, often only to his own benefit. However, Milošević never attended liturgies or showed a high regard for the hurch.C Neither did he restore church property lost under the communist rule nor did he allow for religious education in public schools and religious influence in the public media.5 Whereas during Milošević’s rule religious resources and symbolism were mobilized only to serve clearly political purposes and to legitimize the dominant nationalist orientation, after 2000 systemic institutional arrangements were introduced with the aim of establishing a new cultural and symbolic centrality of the Serbian Orthodox Church and some other so-called traditional religious organizations. In order to achieve this, massive changes in both the legislation and policies of representative governmental agencies at all levels have been undertaken. Most prominently, government members elected after 2000 as well as all those gaining moral, family, spiritual, and social problems. The polls in the various countries also confirm that no cleavage along confessional lines exists in the societies involved in the research. Cfr. Miklós Tomka, Tendances de la religiosité et de l’orientation vers les Églises en Europe de l’Est, Social Compass 49 (2002), no. 2, 537-552. 4 The role of the SOC between 1945 and the 1990s is well covered in Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States. Oxford 2002; Klaus Buchenau, Orthodoxie und Katholizismus in Jugoslawien 1945-1991. Ein serbisch-kroatischer Vergleich. Wiesbaden 2004 (Balkanologische Veröffentlichungen, 40); Radmila Radić, Država i verske zajednice 1945.-1970., 2 vols. Beograd 2002; and Eadem, The Church and the Serbian Question, in: Nebojša Popov (ed.), The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis. Budapest 2000, 247-273 (german version: Thomas Bremer / Nebojša Popov / Heinz-Günther Stobbe (eds.), Serbiens Weg in den Krieg. Kollektive Erinnerung, nationale Formierung und ideologische Aufrüstung. Berlin 1998). References to the time period from 2000 to the present can be found in Angela Ilić, Church and State Relations in Present-Day Serbia, parts I-IV, Religion in Eastern Europe 24 and 25 (2004 / 2005), nos. 6, 26-37, and 1-3, 8-33, 40-57, 48-56; Nonka Bogomilova, The Religious Situation in Contemporary Bulgaria and in Serbia and Montenegro: Differences and Similarities, Religion in Eastern Europe 25 (2005), no. 4, 1-20. 5 In fact, he even vetoed a bill on the restitution of Church property enacted by members of Parliament of his own party, the Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistička partija Srbije, SPS).