sign in sign up
<<
Home , Zaporizhzhia, Zaporizhzhia (region)

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Identity and Violence in WP Societal Developments since the Maidan Protests

Steffen Halling and Susan Stewart S

Since the Maidan protests erupted at the end of 2013 Ukrainian society has witnessed a deep transformation, in which polarising as well as consolidating tendencies can be identified. The “Revolution of Dignity” and ’s violation of the country’s territorial integrity have strengthened Ukrainian identity in a way that has enhanced social cohe- sion. But these developments and the accompanying violence have at the same time heightened pre-existing conflicts. Only a lasting stabilisation can prevent these social fractures from widening yet further. To that end Ukrainian and external actors will need to engage in processes of conflict management and social reconciliation.

While Ukraine has in many respects become proportion of the Ukrainian population – a different society since the Maidan, its even in the east, where support for Yanu- political actors pay little heed to the impli- kovych had plummeted in the course of his cations of these changes. As well as setting presidency. However, most of the Maidan the stage for future difficulties in the post- participants came either from itself or war phase, the transformation is already from the western and central regions, and affecting how the growing number of in- largely ignored the significantly greater in- ternally displaced persons (IDPs) is treated difference or even resistance to their move- and deepening the rift between the ment in the east and south. This contributed and the rest of Ukraine. to the ability of the so-called separatists in the Donbas to rely – at least at the begin- ning – on a certain degree of support among Consolidation through the Maidan the population there. And the movement in The Maidan movement established a con- Kyiv tended to class protesters in the east, sensus concerning shared goals (such as who saw themselves – in terms of their dis- effective action against corruption) and satisfaction and the methods they used – in an idea of solidarity among citizens that the Maidan tradition, more as adversaries extended across large parts of Ukrainian than as allies. society. Its determined opposition to the The consolidating moment of the Mai- regime of President dan brought forth a civil society movement was decisive, striking a chord with a large that today strives not merely to replace

Steffen Halling is a Doctoral Fellow in SWP’s Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division SWP Comments 19 Dr. Susan Stewart is Deputy Head of SWP’s Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division March 2015

1 (some of) the elites, but to achieve lasting European Union even during the Maidan change in the political and economic protests. system. The movement comprises many Attitudes towards the European Union different organisations and loose group- have grown even more complex in the ings, most of which only emerged in the interim. Support for joining the European course of the Maidan. One representative Union has grown since the Maidan, if only example is the “Reanimation Package of because Moscow’s actions in and Reforms”, an alliance of individuals and the Donbas have made the alternative – NGOs working to stimulate the reform pro- cooperation with Russia in the Eurasian cess and monitor the implementation of Economic Union framework – a great deal adopted measures. In this regard the will less attractive, if not inconceivable. At the of civil society and political actors to co- same time there has also been increasing operate with one another is crucial. While disappointment with the European Union, individual parliamentarians and govern- whose response to Russia’s aggression has ment officials maintain good relations been perceived as weak and inadequate. with representatives of civil society, many This applies in particular to the military politicians and civil servants are extremely aspect: Many feel that if the sceptical about involving such actors in the West acknowledges that the conflict is political process. The newly emerged groups about more than just Ukraine and affects also find it difficult to coordinate sensibly the security of Europe as a whole, it should and effectively with their allies in the re- also be willing to participate militarily, gions, because the new actors in the capital if not directly then at least by supplying still have to learn how to cooperate closely, defensive weaponry. There is also deep- while the civil society structures in the rooted suspicion that the European Union regions are significantly weaker. Despite and especially Germany might be willing these difficulties, there is steadily growing to make a deal with Russia at Ukraine’s cooperation between Kyiv and the regions expense. and between individual regions. At the A second polarising element of the Mai- same time, a number of the more promi- dan concerns the politics of history. The nent activists are now members of the Kyiv protests included many participants Ukrainian parliament, where they seek who view the era of Soviet rule as purely to influence politics from within. negative. This interpretation of history, which is especially prevalent in , came to be symbolised by the Societal Divisions large-format portrait of the nationalist As well as consolidating Ukrainian society, partisan that was promi- the Maidan also brought to light a number nently displayed throughout the active of differences. Many still refer to it as the phase of the Maidan protests. Bandera “”, because it began as a protest (1909–1959) is celebrated as an independ- against President Yanukovych’s refusal to ence fighter and national hero in western sign an Association Agreement with the Ukraine, but despised as a traitor and Nazi European Union. Many Maidan participants collaborator in the south and east. Some believed that opposition to Yanukovych and Ukrainians became persuaded that the support for the EU convergence process were Maidan was a gathering of “Bandera fol- inseparable, because it would have been lowers”, an image avidly propagated by impossible to implement the values repre- official Russian media. These diverging sented by the European Union under a perceptions have a polarising effect and regime like his. But not all opponents of hinder reconciliation between parts of the the former regime followed that logic, and eastern population and the rest of society. some expressed great scepticism about the Differences over the Soviet past are also

SWP Comments 19 March 2015

2 found within , however, as Svoboda Party – and demonstrators frus- evidenced for example by the controversy trated that the impact of the Maidan had over the destruction of the Lenin statue in not yet reached their region, especially at in September 2014. the level of the cadres. The violent elements of the Kyiv movement seem to have habitu- ated some of its supporters to the idea of A Growing Culture of Violence violence as a legitimate means of political Although the protests began peacefully, protest. Moreover, Ukrainians find them- violence was increasingly used on both selves confronted with violence and its ef- sides of the barricades after Berkut special fects on a daily basis in their own country, forces attacked demonstrators at the end whether directly in the fighting in eastern of November 2013. The participation of Ukraine, through encounters with IDPs and Maidan supporters in violent clashes has returning soldiers, or via media reports. raised a series of questions with which The present developments reveal that society has yet to deal, relating inter alia to Ukrainian society (including the elite) has the myth of a peaceful Ukrainian nation failed during the twenty-four years since and the legitimacy of violence as a means independence to learn to deal productively of addressing conflict. with conflicts or to resolve them through The presence of a volunteer security sustainable compromises. Looking ahead, force on the Maidan, many of them from there is therefore a danger that parts of military backgrounds, contributed to society will follow the many examples from keeping the protest well-organised and 2014 where violence was used in response solving the practical problems that arise to conflicts. This risk is greatest if funda- where large numbers of demonstrators mental economic and social reforms are occupy a crowded public space. While few not realised, or if their implementation of the Maidan supporters questioned the leads to a significant deterioration in living use of violence by their own side, at least in standards. Especially if the elites escape response to attacks by government forces, suffering or are even seen to profit from the events on the Maidan ultimately paved reforms, the risk of violent protest is great. the way for a culture of violence that for At the same time, few actors in Ukraine example facilitated the emergence of vol- are in a position to counteract the culture unteer battalions originally located outside of violence. While awareness of the prob- the regular command structures of the inte- lem is growing, for example in church rior and defence ministries. One indication circles, the few initiatives for action to date of growing brutalisation is the practice of have come almost exclusively from a civil “trash bin justice”, a kind of informal lus- society that is already overstretched with tration where protestors dump unpopular other tasks (supporting the army, caring for politicians and officials in rubbish bins. IDPs and promoting reforms). Especially Such phenomena encourage the acceptance with regard to IDPs, organised groups with- of violence within society and make it more in society have already taken over some of difficult to return to a peaceful normality. the functions of the state. State representa- By inflaming suspicions that parts of Ukrain- tives are not generally capable of assessing ian society are fundamentally hostile to the consequences of the violence for society the population of the Donbas, they can also and initiating suitable responses, such as hinder reconciliation processes. providing free psychological counselling. The partly violent protests that broke out There is also a dearth of actors offering at the end of 2014 in the regional capitals the resources required to help others come and were apparent- to terms with the violence they have em- ly driven by a symbiosis of attention-seeking ployed or experienced. political forces – the Radical Party and the

SWP Comments 19 March 2015

3 Identity and Patriotism teristics, whereas ethnic and national cat- Elements of consolidation have also egories have been secondary in the past. emerged due to the repeated and ongoing Support for Ukrainian independence was violation of the country’s territorial integ- correspondingly much less deeply rooted in rity. One clear indication of this is the this region. Although rejection of Ukraini- observed strengthening of a Ukrainian an statehood has fallen here too, above all identity whose principal point of reference during 2014, the proportion of those who is national sovereignty. Surveys show that are neither for nor against Ukrainian inde- the Ukrainian population’s emotional con- pendence has significantly increased. Even nection to the nation increased sharply in before 2014 the population of the Donbas the course of 2014; one can certainly speak had an ambivalent relationship with the of an acceleration of the Ukrainian nation- Ukrainian nation-state. The last credible building process. While pro-Ukrainian atti- surveys from summer 2014 show approxi- tudes are more prevalent in the western, mately one third of the population respec- central and northern parts of the country tively supporting, rejecting or remaining than in the east and south, it should be neutral/undecided on Ukrainian statehood. noted that a majority of Ukrainians in all At the same time, the Donbas is the only these areas identify with the Ukrainian region where a relative majority (45 per- state and support its independence. In fact, cent) favour the Russian-led Customs Union. the strongest growth in pro-Ukrainian atti- It is in itself nothing new to find diverg- tudes is found in the eastern parts of the ing attitudes on fundamental questions of country, where more than two thirds of the Ukrainian statehood in the Donbas, espe- population now favour - cially given the increasing political instru- hood. mentalisation of supposed regional and This underlines how regional differences ethnic/cultural differences during the past have as a whole declined in importance ten years. But the population had not hith- in the course of the crisis, and that despite erto experienced violent clashes between regional specifics Ukrainian society is today “pro-Russian” and “pro-Ukrainian” demon- more united than before. Whether a par- strators of the kind witnessed in March 2014 ticular group prefers to speak Ukrainian or in . Even if Russia is primarily re- Russian plays a subordinate role here. This sponsible for the escalation since then, the emerging new national consensus is asso- population of the Donbas in particular has ciated with growing approval for European been exposed to a stark societal polarisation integration, whereas support for joining that both prepared fertile ground for and the Eurasian Economic Union has fallen reinforced external propaganda and dis- steadily in recent months. Before the begin- information. The conflict potential that ning of the Maidan protests in November became visible after the Maidan, which runs 2013, 41 percent supported EU member- mainly along ideological lines, has inevitably ship, while 38 percent were in favour of intensified in the course of the fighting. joining the Russian-led Customs Union. Whilst other regions have been less One year later, in November 2014, the gap affected by societal polarisation of this had widened to 64 versus 17 percent. kind, cities like and Kharkiv also However, the strengthening of national demonstrated that diverging political views identity and patriotism in the country as harbour potential for violence as well as a whole is contradicted by a development conflict. Both were repeatedly hit by terror- observed above all in the areas directly ist attacks in 2014, including a bombing affected by the fighting, the Donetsk and at an anniversary commemoration of the regions. The population of the Maidan revolution in Kharkiv. These regions Donbas has a particularly strong regional thus remain susceptible to political sub- identity founded primarily on social charac- version and instrumentalisation.

SWP Comments 19 March 2015

4 War and Its Consequences faction with a socio-economic situation that The “Anti-Terror-Operation” conducted by had arisen over the course of years. More- the Ukrainian government since May 2014 over, propaganda and other types of Russian meets with a heterogeneous response with- influence fanned massive fears about sup- in the population. In summer 2014 a major- posed right-wing extremists. ity of 54 percent wanted to see the operation However, the continuing fighting, in ended and the conflict resolved through which both sides have been willing to tol- dialogue and compromise, while 34 per- erate a significant number of civilian cas- cent supported continuing it. But attitudes ualties, has inevitably consolidated the hardened over the course of the autumn mistrust that already existed in the Donbas after attempts to bring about a cease-fire towards Kyiv and the existence of supposed- failed while the Moscow-supported separat- ly radical pro-Ukrainian attitudes. While ists made territorial gains. In October 53 most of the Ukrainian population under- percent still were calling for a cease-fire to stood the military operations to be directed be negotiated with the leaders of the self- against the resistance of Russian “terrorists”, appointed “people’s republics”, but in No- the inhabitants of the directly affected vember the figure fell to 43 percent, while regions may come to precisely the opposite the proportion calling for the peace talks to conclusion. The perceptions of the popula- be abandoned grew from 22 to 36 percent. tion in the area controlled by the separat- Where there have been public criticism ists are shaped above all by months of and isolated protests, these have not been exposure to exclusively (pro-)Russian propa- directed against the military operations as ganda. Personal experience of violence, such. Instead the political leadership has propagandistic instrumentalisation of been accused of failure, for example in civilian victims and the publicly flaunted protecting and equipping conscripts and use of torture against prisoners of war have volunteers. As far as attitudes towards the caused grave harm to relations between military operation are concerned, surveys different sections of Ukrainian society. also reveal regional differences: the closer Certain measures introduced by Kyiv, to the warzone, the greater the rejection such as stopping payment of pensions of military means and the stronger the sup- and other benefits and the introduction port for dialogue. However, the population of a travel permit regime to prevent more regards the self-appointed “people’s repub- separatist forces infiltrating into the non- lics” of Donetsk and Luhansk as a product occupied areas, must also be questioned in of Russian aggression rather than as genuine this context. While it was initially possible representatives of those living there. It is to pass the checkpoints without major above all this perception that feeds Ukrain- difficulties, principally to collect cash and ian society’s fundamental approval for the have pensions paid, in recent weeks it has actions of its government. become much more difficult for residents In fact, even in the affected regions the of separatist-controlled areas to leave. This armed separatists have to date received also cements the existing front line as a de little in the way of active support from the facto frontier. At the same time, increasing population. Participation in so-called refer- war-weariness is leading to growing calls endums on independence from Ukraine within Ukraine to let the Donbas go. held in parts of the Donbas in May 2014 Enormous movements of IDPs create a should be understood above all as a protest further strain on social cohesion, with against what was felt to be inadequate heed numbers from the war-afflicted eastern for the interests of the regions in the Maidan regions increasing steadily as the fighting movement. But no concrete demands were continues. Alongside about twenty thou- formulated. Instead, parts of the Donbas sand from Crimea, well over one million population articulated a general dissatis- IDPs from the Donbas were registered by

SWP Comments 19 March 2015

5 the middle of March 2015. Most of them behaviour society will also help to deter- now reside in the directly adjoining areas mine whether Ukraine engages in success- under Ukrainian control, in the regions ful reforms. bordering the Donbas (Kharkiv, Dniprope- Yet the role of Ukrainian society is often trovsk, Zaporizhzhia), in the Odessa region neglected, by external actors as well as or in the capital Kyiv. Especially during by the country’s elites. In fact, a stronger the cold part of the year, providing proper awareness of societal attitudes could be housing for these people represents an helpful in generating realistic demands and almost insurmountable challenge. Given expectations with which to approach Kyiv. that many do not register at all, the Office Such deeper insights would also assist Ger- of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees many and the European Union to locate believes that the true numbers are con- allies within Ukrainian (civil) society who siderably larger. could help to advance the reform process. The IDPs have to date mainly been seek- This would make it easier to identify the ing temporary protection from the dangers risks and opportunities that will influence of war, and it can be assumed that most developments in Ukraine in the coming will wish to return home. This is particular- months. A more profound understanding ly likely to be the case for pensioners, who of societal trends and potential lines of con- represent the overwhelming majority of flict could also be useful for OSCE observers IDPs in the areas around the war zone. on the ground in Ukraine in their inter- But fighting and ongoing instability in the actions with local actors, as well as on the region are likely to make a quick return level of strategic planning. impossible in most cases. In view of the Recognition of the potential of Ukrain- deteriorating economic situation in the ian civil society and the wish do more to country there is therefore a risk of resource- promote it are certainly present in the Ger- related conflicts, for example over housing man context. The best proof of this is the and public services. Those from the Donbas special funding approved by the Bundestag may also suffer stigmatisation on the basis for German organisations to carry out of suspicion of lack of patriotism or (at least projects at (civil) society level with partners passive) support of separatism. Above all, from Ukraine or other countries of the East- political conflicts could occur in the regions ern Partnership (EaP). These funds, adminis- that accept particularly large numbers of tered by the German Foreign Ministry, have IDPs. The question of how to deal with active been increased from €5 million in 2014 to or passive support of military separatism €14 million in 2015.The special funds are on a legal and especially on a societal level suitable for financing projects in the fields is also likely to arise. This is a question that of conflict transformation and societal affects the social cohesion of the country reconciliation. But the funding is too short- as a whole and must therefore be clarified term in nature to generate credible sustain- above and beyond the regions directly ability. It would therefore make sense to affected by the fighting. consider how these monies could be linked to other longer-term funding sources, since projects working towards reconciliation Society as a Crucial Actor must be medium- to long-term if they are It was activists from Ukrainian society who to have any prospect of success. sparked the Maidan movement in Novem- On the EU level there has been a signifi- ber 2013, and organised parts of society cant amount of rhetorical as well as sub- today make a decisive contribution to sup- stantive support for Ukrainian civil society plying the Ukrainian army with the equip- in past years. The Eastern Partnership’s ment it needs and caring for steadily grow- Civil Society Forum has provided opportu- ing numbers of IDPs. Through its future nities for Ukraine and other EaP countries

SWP Comments 19 March 2015

6 to provide input from civil society actors dealing with conflict, and perhaps more into Brussels policy processes, as well as to accepted as well. network with their counterparts from other The handling of these problems in the states in the region and some EU member coming months and years will help deter- states as well. However, while the EU has mine the strength or weakness of the increasingly acknowledged the need to Ukrainian state. It will be important to sen- assist civil society development in Ukraine sitise political actors in the country to these and has acted accordingly, the potential of questions. Here their contacts in Germany forming a tandem between the EU and civil and the European Union have a contribu- society actors in Ukraine to induce the tion to make. It is equally important to en- Ukrainian political and economic elite to courage and concretely support the small carry out genuine reforms has not yet been but growing number of (civil) society actors realised. A much more systematic network working on processes of conflict transfor- of contacts would be necessary to ensure mation and reconciliation. The actual form that Brussels institutions and Ukrainian of assistance will differ from case to case, © Stiftung Wissenschaft und NGOs are effectively pooling their efforts and will need to be continuously re-nego- Politik, 2015 to push for reform. tiated between those involved to reflect All rights reserved This can also apply in part to the field the rapidly changing situation. This makes These Comments reflect of societal reconciliation, in which greater tackling these questions a significant but solely the author’s views. awareness in Brussels of efforts by Ukrain- worthwhile challenge, and one where the SWP ian organisations can enable the EU to alert interaction between political and societal Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik members of the Ukrainian elite to the prob- actors will be decisive. German Institute for lems generated by societal tensions and the International and Security Affairs potential solutions offered by its own (civil) society. Furthermore, a heightened under- Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 standing of societal trends and concerns 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 in Brussels can help EU officials tailor their Fax +49 30 880 07-100 approach to Ukraine in a more realistic www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] and appropriate manner. This fits in well with the emerging consensus around ISSN 1861-1761 stronger differentiation according to coun- Translation by Meredith Dale try within the Eastern Partnership, as re- (English version of flected for example in the Joint Consulta- SWP-Aktuell 23/2015) tion Paper “Towards a new European Neigh- bourhood Policy” issued by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on 4 March 2015. As in the fields of politics and economy, Ukraine has missed many opportunities to promote social cohesion in the past two decades. The Maidan and the events in Crimea and the Donbas have now initiated and accelerated diverse processes of change in society. While these have contributed to consolidating a Ukrainian identity, they have also deepened existing fault lines between the Donbas and other parts of the country. Moreover, violence has also become at least more commonplace as a means for

SWP Comments 19 March 2015

7