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White Paper the National Transition of Catalonia

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White Paper the National Transition of Catalonia WHITE PAPER WHITE PAPER THE SYNTHESIS NATIONAL TRANSITION THE OF CATALONIA NATIONAL TRANSITION OF CATALONIA WHITE PAPER ON THE NATIONAL TRANSITION OF CATALONIA. TRANSITION OF CATALONIA. ON THE NATIONAL WHITE PAPER SYNTHESIS www.catalangovernment.eu White paper on The National Transition of Catalonia Synthesis Barcelona, 2014 www.catalangovernment.eu This edition: © 2014, Generalitat de Catalunya. Department of the Presidency First edition: September 2014. Cover design: Estudi Tere Guix Photography: Pedro Madueño and Rubén Moreno Editorial production: Autonomous Institution of the Diari Oficial and Publications Legal deposit: B 22481-2014 Summary Deciding to win the future 6 Artur Mas i Gavarró, president of the Government of Catalonia The National Transition of Catalonia 9 Synthesis 15 1 The constituent process 17 1.1 Legitimisation of the process of self-determination 19 1.1.1 Self-determination in application of a democratic principle 19 1.1.2 Self-determination as the inalienable right of a national community 19 1.1.3 Self-determination as the last resort to remedy an unjust situation 20 1.1.4 Application in Catalonia 21 1.2 How to get there. The consultation on the political future 24 1.2.1 Arguments to legitimise the holding of the consultation 24 1.2.2 Legal strategies to call a legal consultation in accordance with internal law 25 1.2.3 The consultation within the framework of European Union law and international law 26 1.2.4 The implementation of the results of the legal consultation 27 1.2.5 Alternative routes if the legal consultation cannot be held 29 1.3 Second stage in the creation of the new Catalan State: From the consultation or plebiscite elections to the unilateral proclamation or declaration of independence 31 1.3.1 Scenario of collaboration 31 1.3.2 Scenario of non-collaboration 33 1.4 Third stage in the creation of the new Catalan State: From the unilateral proclamation or declaration of independence to the approval of the Constitution 36 1.4.1 Constitutional law on the constituent process 36 1.4.2 The constituent procedure 37 1.4.3 The interim systems 38 1.5 The Succession of Governance and Administrations 41 1.5.1 Legislative programme of the new State 42 1.5.2 Succession of regulations and the institutions that enforce them 43 1.5.3 Autonomous regional law and State law 43 1.5.4 Treaty and Supranational Law 44 1.5.5 The Succession of Administrations. Principle and techniques 44 1.5.6 People providing services to the Administration 46 1.5.7 Regime of the implemented administrative acts, the proceedings in progress and related information. 47 1.5.8 The succession of contracts 49 3 1.6 The distribution of assets and liabilities with the Spanish State 53 1.6.1 The legal framework 53 1.6.2 Public debt and obligations of the State 55 1.6.3 Assets and rights of the State 57 1.6.4 Historical, artistic and cultural heritage 57 1.6.5 Natural resources 58 1.6.6 Private property and debts 58 1.7 Quantitative variation in the budgets of the Generalitat, after the new Catalan State is achieved 59 1.7.1 Additional expenditure 59 1.7.2 Additional revenues 60 1.7.3 Fiscal surplus of the Generalitat 60 1.7.4 Considerations for the first few months 61 2 The organisation of Catalonia as a new State 63 2.1 Economics and Finance 65 2.1.1 Fiscal and financial viability 65 2.1.2 Monetary policy. The euro 65 2.1.3 Bank of Catalonia, the country’s own central bank 66 2.1.4 The Catalan Investments and Markets Authority 68 2.1.5 The Tax Administration 69 2.1.6 Customs service 72 2.2 Administrative authorities and structures of the new State 74 2.2.1 Competition and regulation authorities 74 2.2.2 Other administrative structures required by the EU 75 a) Rail transport, electricity and gas energy services and telecommunications 75 b) Financial system and economic and social policies 76 c) Justice, rights, freedoms and security 77 d) Education, culture, science and environment 78 e) Consumer protection 79 f) Foreign and security policy 79 2.3 Catalan Social Security 81 2.3.1 The Catalan concept of Social Security 81 2.3.2 Functional and organic aspects 82 2.3.3 Contributory pensions and sustainability of retirement pensions 82 2.4 The judiciary and the administration of justice 84 2.4.1 Organisation and jurisdiction of courts 84 2.4.2 Regulation of court procedures and language system 85 2.4.3 Pending processes and judicial executions 85 2.4.4 Provisional judiciary system of government 86 2.5 Law enforcement and defence 88 2.5.1 Defining elements of the new law enforcement system 88 2.5.2 Options and actions in the field of internal law enforcement 89 2.5.3 Taking on the civil protection and emergency management tasks guaranteed until now by the central government 90 2.5.4 International coordination with police forces 90 2.5.5 Options and actions in the field of international law enforcement 90 2.5.6 Operating model, bodies, contingents and organisation 91 2.5.7 Cybersecurity 92 4 2.6 Infrastructure: energy and water supply and information technology and communication 94 2.6.1 Power supply 94 2.6.2 Water supply 96 2.6.3 Communication and information technology 98 3 The relationship between Catalonia and Spain, the European Union and the international community 103 3.1 Cooperation between Catalonia and Spain 105 3.1.1 Cooperation models. Iberian Council or Catalan-Spanish Council 106 3.1.2 Regional cooperation: the Mediterranean Arc 108 3.2 Trade relations between Catalonia and Spain 109 3.3 Cooperation between Catalan-language territories 111 3.3.1 Criteria and proposals 112 3.3.2 Proposal to create a Catalan Language Agreement 113 3.3.3 Consolidation of the Ramon Llull Institute 114 3.4 Paths to Catalonia’s integration in the European Union 115 3.4.1 Legal conditions and requirements 116 3.4.2 Membership scenarios. Procedures to be followed 116 3.4.3 EU flexibility and pragmatism 119 3.4.4 Probabilities of application of the various scenarios 120 3.5 Alternatives to non-permanence of Catalonia in the EU or to a prolonged accession process 122 3.5.1 Bilateral agreement between Catalonia and the EU 122 3.5.2 Membership of the EFTA, the EEA and the Schengen Area 122 3.5.3 Free trade agreements and customs unions 123 3.6 Integration with the international community 124 3.6.1 Recognition of the new State 124 3.6.2 Incorporation of international law and treaties within the State’s domestic law 125 3.6.3 Membership of international intergovernmental organisations 125 a) Council of Europe 126 b) United Nations and its System 126 c) NATO and other international security agencies (OSCE, EU security structures, transatlantic relations and relations with the United States, etc.) 130 d) Other international institutions 132 5 Deciding to win the future Catalonia is experiencing a decisive process direction. Fundamentally, it is the will that has as a country and a society. Like never before, been sustained and clearly expressed by we Catalans are holding in our hands the broad majorities of Catalans and their civil so- chance to decide on our own future. ciety, as demonstrated by the thousands and thousands of organisations which have joined Catalonia has always felt like a nation. For a the National Pact on the Right to Decide. But long time, it has striven to make this national the pact and a vast parliamentary majority are feeling compatible with belonging to a State also what provide coverage for the govern- that recognises its unique features. The im- ment of Catalonia’s action to allow Catalans to possibility of continuing along this pathway exercise their right to decide at the polls. has led the Catalan people to take to the streets and at the polls to express their desire The objective of this collective commitment to decide on their collective future and to do is to work together based on respect for the so peacefully, democratically and legally. legal framework in effect, and to rigorously define the future scenarios and the sense of “The Advisory Council on the Na- responsibility in taking decisions that will de- tional Transition has identified the fine the future of our country. crucial aspects in order for Catalonia to become a State of its own with full The excitement and hope of our country’s guarantees” chance to construct a new State that allowed everyone to unfold our vast potential, if that is For more than 100 years, political Catalanism what we choose, should not make us forget has intensely and constructively contributed that this process requires a rigorous, hon- to the political and economic progress of the est exercise of ascertaining the difficulties Spanish State, by participating and support- which we are facing, identifying the risks and ing all the major state decisions and submit- analysing the possible consequences of our ting proposals for an amicable fit within Spain decisions. which recognises its identity and facilitates its development as the economic engine of “We want to decide on our future, southern Europe. but we have to do so seriously and rigorously, aware of the pathway The 2010 Constitutional Court ruling against upon which we are embarking” the Statute of Autonomy approved by the peo- ple of Catalonia signalled the end of this stage And this is the job that the Advisory Council and the start of a new process defined by the on the National Transition has been perform- steadfast desire of the citizens of Catalonia to ing over the course of 15 months.
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