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Russian Special Forces Just Practiced Invading an Island Near Russian Special Forces Just Practiced Invading anan Island Near Finland DefenseDefens 1 By Patrick Tucker Technology Editor ((PatrickPatrick Tucker Is Technology EditorEditor ForFor DefenseDefense One.One. He’sHe's AlsoAlso TheThe Author Of The Naked Future: What Happens In AA World That Anticipates YourYour EveryEvery Move?Move? (Current, 2014). Read Bio July 11, 2018 It’sIt's the latest inin a series ofof militarymilitary exercises that regional observers call provocative and intimidating. A group of Russian special operations forces parachuted onto the island ofof GoglandGogland inin a RussianRussian-controlled-controlled portion ofof thethe Gulf of Finland. They hidhid theirtheir parachutes,parachutes, journeyed deepdeep into the interior, and destroyed a series ofof mockmock communications stations, radars and ASMkSM batteries batteries.. They thenthen preppedprepped aa landinglanding sitesite for a helhelicoptericopter escape — despite the factfact thatthat thethe islandisland already has a helipad. The troops jumped fromfrom a MiMi-8AMTSH-8AMTSH helicopter helicopter atat an altitude of 2,500 meters, and used satellite navigationnavigation equipmentequipment to guide them toto theirtheir landinglanding site,site, notes a JulyJuly 10 press release onon the drill from the RussianRussian MinistryMinistry ofof Defense. The soldierssoldiers thatthat took part in the exercisexercisee had “not"not less than a hundredhundred jumps with parachutes of variousvarious types,”types," it said. Aki Heikkinen, who curates Russianmilitarywatch.com, pointed out that Gogland, seized byby Russia inin 1944, is justjust 24 miles from the Finnish citycity of Kotka. Just to clear things up for people notnot familiarfamiliar withwith thethe area: GoglandGogland waswas taken by Soviet Union in 1944, it’sit's part of Russia. Only likelike 40km fromfrom citycity ofof Kotka, Finland. Check the map: pic.twitter.com/pic.twitter.com/41XCMfekAw “Make"Make no mistake, makingmaking thisthis very publicpublic isis a suresure message,” he said on Twitter. In May, Russia staged a submarinesubmarine missilemissile exerciseexercise off the Finnish coast. It’sIt's one more chapter inin thethe chronicle of worsening relations between Russia and various Baltic states, whichwhich have gone downhill since Russia’sRussia's 2014 annexation ofof CrimeaCrimea andand its attacks on Ukraine.Ukraine. In 2016, Russian PresidentPresident VladimirVladimir Putin threatened that ifif Finland jojoinedined NATO,NATO, itit mightmight havehave to “fight"fight with Russia until the last FinnishFinnish soldier.”soldier." Last December,December, thethe Finnish Defense Ministry accused the Russians ofof violatingviolating itsits airspace with a Russian transport plane. The Finnish 2017 Defense reportreport notes, “Military"Military activity and military tensions have increased inin thethe BalticBaltic Sea region.region. The early- warning periodperiod forfor militarymilitary crises has become shortershorter and the threshold for usingusing force has lowered.”lowered." InIn October,October, the Finnish government opened a EuropeanEuropean CenterCenter ofof Excellence for Countering HybridHybrid Threats, withwith EuropeanEuropean andand U.S.U.S. partners. .
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