ONR’s statutory determination of the off-site emergency planning and public information areas for Barrow in accordance with the requirements of the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR) regulations 9 and 16 Project Assessment Report ONR-COP-PAR-14-006 Revision 0 10 12 2014 © Office for Nuclear Regulation, 2014 If you wish to reuse this information visit www.onr.org.uk/copyright.htm for details. Published 12/14 For published documents, the electronic copy on the ONR website remains the most current publicly available version and copying or printing renders this document uncontrolled. Office for Nuclear Regulation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ONR’s statutory determination of the off-site emergency planning and public information areas for Barrow in accordance with the requirements of the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR) regulations 9 and 16 This Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) Project Assessment Report (PAR) describes and explains the basis for ONR’s re-determination of the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR) off-site emergency planning area and the area within which prior information is to be distributed around the Barrow GB nuclear site and nuclear warship site. The determination of a REPPIR off-site emergency planning area defines the area around a site within which, in the opinion of ONR, any member of the public is likely to be affected by a reasonably foreseeable radiation emergency (as defined in REPPIR), and constitutes an important component of the UK’s overall emergency response framework. In relation to this area, the local authority is required to prepare an adequate off-site emergency plan with the purpose of minimising, so far as is reasonably practicable, radiation exposures to those likely to be affected by such an emergency. This plan will detail the potential need to implement appropriate countermeasures within all or part of this area. REPPIR requires operators to undertake hazard identifications and risk evaluations (HIRE) in relation to work with ionising radiations (including where there are material changes to such work) as specified in REPPIR. These HIREs must identify all hazards on the sites with the potential to cause a radiation accident, and evaluate the nature and magnitude of the risks to employees and other persons (e.g. those who live or work nearby) arising from those hazards. REPPIR also requires operators to assess their HIRE and to send a Report of Assessment (RoA) to ONR either prior to commencement of the work with ionising radiation, following any relevant material change in this work, or at least within three years from the last assessment. REPPIR also makes provision for ONR to request additional information. In practice, it is usual for the HIRE information itself to be requested to inform ONR’s determinations. ONR has historically used the term detailed emergency planning zone (DEPZ) to refer to the area it defined under REPPIR regulation 9 as requiring an off-site emergency plan. (The term is still used this way in some ONR guidance.) As the term is not used within REPPIR itself (although referred to in the related guidance), and to ensure legal clarity and avoid misunderstanding amongst stakeholders, this report refers to the ‘REPPIR off-site emergency planning area’ and the ‘REPPIR prior information area’ under regulations 9 and 16 respectively rather than to ‘detailed emergency planning zone’ or ‘DEPZ’. The off-site local authority emergency planning area around the Barrow sites, as provided for in REPPIR regulations 9(1) and 16(1), was first determined in 2002 - a short while after REPPIR came into force in 2001. The current area is represented by overlapping circular areas of radius 2 km around the two sites and is based on the radiological hazards assessed for a routine operational submarine berth. This re-determination has been undertaken in response to REPPIR submissions to ONR by BAE Systems Marine Limited in relation to the GB nuclear site (Wet Dock Quay) and by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) for the nuclear warship site (Ramsden Dock Basin). In these submissions, the dutyholders highlight the differences in the hazards associated with activities at the Barrow sites compared to a routine submarine operational berth. This leads to a reduction in the size of the technical area associated with the reference accident, specifically for the Barrow sites, compared to routine submarine operational berths. This re-determination has been undertaken in accordance with ONR’s regulatory processes, guidance associated with REPPIR itself, and the relevant ONR Technical Assessment Guide (TAG). In conducting the re-determination of the REPPIR off-site emergency planning area Office for Nuclear Regulation for Barrow, ONR has applied its’ recently published determination principles and associated guidance for the determination of such areas. These principles recognise the learning that has emerged from global events such as occurred at Fukushima and the need to review the scope of off-site emergency planning. They also reflect ONR’s insistence on and commitment to high standards of nuclear safety and security at nuclear installations, and its continual efforts to seek improvements to standards and to the consistency and transparency of its decision-making. ONR’s determination process requires that: (i) Technical assessments be undertaken, by ONR, of BAE Systems Marine Ltd and the MOD’s Hazard Identification and Risk Evaluations (HIREs) and Reports of Assessment (RoAs) for the respective sites. These have been completed and are reported separately. These technical assessments conclude that areas of radius of 690 m around the reference accident locations at the Wet Dock Quay and Ramsden Dock Basin should be used as the foundation for defining the extent of the need for local authority off-site emergency planning under regulation 9 of REPPIR. (ii) In accordance with the relevant ONR Technical Assessment Guide, ONR also gives appropriate consideration to practical and strategic factors relating to the planning and potential implementation of an off-site emergency plan, and other pragmatic factors appropriate to secure confidence as regards protection of the public. This aspect of the process includes dialogue with the relevant local authority (as the dutyholder within REPPIR to prepare the off-site plan), and considers, amongst other factors, local demographic and geographical considerations. ONR’s determination is therefore informed by a range of practical and common-sense factors which have the effect of defining a more practical area (from an emergency planning perspective) than that in (i) above. ONR’s principles emphasise the importance of ensuring that an appropriate balance is achieved between the assessment of technical submissions provided by the operator, and other practical and strategic considerations judged necessary in the interests of public safety. As a consequence, the ultimate determination of the REPPIR off-site emergency planning area represents ONR’s best regulatory judgement, and is not formed solely on the basis of technical considerations or criteria. The outcome of ONR’s review of the technical submissions made by operators, taking into account the relevant practical and strategic considerations relating specifically to Barrow, is that both the REPPIR off-site emergency planning area and the REPPIR prior information area for the Barrow sites will be re-defined to be the enhanced single area shown within the red line on the map contained in appendix C to this report. This area is geographically approximately twice the size but has a smaller population than the area previously defined. The change to the planning area (to include the whole of Walney Island) does not mean that ONR has identified a greater risk for those living near the site. On the contrary, ONR is satisfied that the overall risk from the two sites has been conservatively estimated. The changes therefore reflect an improved assessment of the risks specific to activities at the Barrow site; factors which ONR judges to be relevant in securing confidence as regards protection of the public during a reasonably foreseeable radiation emergency; the learning that has emerged from global events such as occurred at Fukushima; and the need to review the scope of off-site emergency planning. Office for Nuclear Regulation The key recommendations are: • That ONR write to Cumbria County Council, BAE Systems Ltd (WDQ) and the MOD (RDB) to advise that the REPPIR off-site emergency planning area has been determined as the area within the red line on the map at appendix C. • That ONR write to Cumbria County Council confirming the need to update, as required, its off-site emergency plan to adequately cover the area defined in recommendation 1. • That ONR write to BAESM (WDQ) and MOD (RDB) confirming the requirement to ensure the appropriate provision of prior information to the public within the area referred to in recommendation 1. This information should also be copied to Cumbria County Council. • ONR should notify the Defence Safety Nuclear Regulator (DNSR) of the revised REPPIR off-site emergency planning areas. Office for Nuclear Regulation LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USE D ABP Association of British Ports BAESM BAE Systems Marine CCA Civil Contingencies Act (2004) CCC Cumbria County Council DEPZ Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (Ref: REPPIR regulation 9(1)) DNSR Defence Safety Nuclear Regulator