Force Integration in Resistance Operations Dutch Jedburghs and U.S
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Jedburghs get instructions from Briefing Officer in London, England, ca. 1944 (Office of Strategic Services/U.S. National Archives and Records Administration) Force Integration in Resistance Operations Dutch Jedburghs and U.S. Alamo Scouts By Kevin D. Stringer oint special operations forces (SOF) integration with conven- tional forces (CF) is a difficult Colonel Kevin D. Stringer, USA, Ph.D., is assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command Europe. He is an J affiliated Faculty Member at the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania in Vilnius. undertaking in missions ranging from 90 Recall / Force Integration in Resistance Operations JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 humanitarian to combat, yet all future to catalyze the establishment of such contact to build trust and enduring military operations against peer adver- teams, and NATO’s Enhanced Forward personal relationships between SOF saries will require the close coopera- Presence (EFP) formations in Estonia, and CF formations. Finally, the actual tion of SOF and CF for success. This Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland could implementation of SOF-CF integration axiom is especially true for liberation provide the ideal pilot platforms for their has often led to ad hoc organizational operations entailing collaboration launch. After NSHQ pilots this concept, arrangements or mechanisms, both in with national resistance groups in the United States and selected Asian allies training and in wartime. This expedi- occupied territories, where the latter could consider a similar model for the ency promotes poor mission execution will be engaged by U.S. SOF forma- Indo-Pacific theater of operations. The and complicated command and control tions as part of their unconventional World War II historical examples of the relationships. warfare mandate. With the return of Dutch Jedburgh teams in Europe and the In general, the prospect of con- Great Power competition, the threat Alamo Scouts in the Pacific demonstrate ducting combat operations to liberate of Russian or Chinese territorial the value of such SOF liaison elements occupied territory presents a complex aggression and occupation becomes a between conventional forces and resis- landscape for the conventional joint national security anxiety for a number tance groups, while framing a possible force commander, who must integrate of states, which generates the require- modern approach. surviving national resistance groups into ment to consider SOF-CF integration a concept of operations that aims for a in liberation operations where friendly Integration Challenges common operational and strategic end- resistance groups are present. The SOF-CF integration has been an state. At the same time, the commander Baltics, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, enduring problem since the advent of needs to mitigate risks associated Taiwan, Burma, and Tibet are all modern-era special operations forces with these armed groups conducting examples that demonstrate this pros- in World War II. In canvassing the rel- independent actions that might be coun- pect of Russian or Chinese aggression evant literature on the topic, a number terproductive to operations or harmful and occupation. of practitioners and academics have to the civilian population. The latter Proper SOF-CF integration and identified the issues and obstacles asso- point ranges from resistance groups synchronization depends on effective co- ciated with achieving optimal SOF-CF taking punitive actions against actual or ordination and liaison for greatest effect.1 integration.2 The challenge is to extract perceived collaborators to committing Effective liaison between liberating con- the relevant historical examples of this war crimes against civilians and property. ventional forces and friendly resistance phenomenon while culling the rest. The solution is the preconflict establish- elements in an ambiguous battlespace With integration doctrinally defined ment of small, multinational SOF teams is necessary to avoid fratricide and to as “the arrangement of [conventional to liaise and coordinate with an allied na- unify all regular and unconventional and special operations] forces and their tional military and its planned resistance elements toward a common objective. actions to create a force that operates components to support CF actions. Multinational SOF elements are the by engaging as a whole,” this article In the NATO setting, this peacetime logical choice to provide this bridging identifies four obstacles for SOF-CF planning and coordination would pri- function given their inherent expertise collaboration.3 First, doctrine and marily occur with host-nation SOF and with irregular forces—militias, local secu- policy do not comprehensively define territorial forces, elements that have lead- rity forces, and resistance members—as how SOF-CF integration should ing roles in wartime resistance operations. well as their ability to blend into local occur.4 This deficit causes organiza- This situation goes beyond the generic populations. Unfortunately, an estab- tional friction when this collaboration Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, lished joint organizational unit of action is mandated by operations. Second, recommendation that “special operations does not currently exist for this mission. when concepts such as SOF-CF syn- commanders provide liaison to compo- This article proposes the establish- chronization are defined, they tend to nent commands to integrate, coordinate, ment of multinational Jedburgh-like SOF rigidly focus on combat missions and and deconflict SOF and conventional teams to link CF units to national resis- do not account for operational fluidity force operations” because resistance op- tance organizations during operations. In between unconventional, conventional, erations imply that “language differences, World War II, the Jedburghs were multi- or humanitarian scenarios.5 This latter cultural diversity, historical animosities, national, three-person teams designed to situation characterizes liberation opera- and uneven allied and partner capabilities conduct sabotage and guerrilla warfare tions on occupied territory. Third, will further complicate these activities.”7 in Axis-occupied territory as well as liaise there is a lack of mutual understanding These future multinational SOF liaison between resistance groups and the Allied between SOF and CF, creating a sense teams would train and exercise with war effort. In today’s North Atlantic of SOF “otherness vis-à-vis the conven- relevant national forces in peacetime to Treaty Organization (NATO) context, tional forces from which the personnel prepare for occupation situations in com- NATO Special Operations Headquarters were originally drawn.”6 This percep- bat or conflicts below the threshold of (NSHQ) would be the organization tion necessitates habitual and frequent armed conflict. JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Stringer 91 Military Assistance and Liaison resistance. Despite the mixed historical provides three specific lessons on using with Resistance Elements record on SOF-CF collaboration, the fol- SOF to coordinate the activities of In the NATO SOF context, this resis- lowing historical vignettes illustrate how partisan forces in support of future con- tance liaison assignment falls under the to successfully accomplish this mission ventional campaigns.17 umbrella of the military assistance task, with dedicated SOF liaison teams. Foremost, against a highly sophis- which is a broad category of activities ticated and repressive occupier such as that support and enable critical friendly The Dutch Jedburgh Nazi Germany, Russia, or China, team assets—in this case, resistance organiza- Liaison Mission members must have superb language ex- tions in occupied territory.8 The military As noted, the Jedburghs were three- pertise and cultural acumen to blend into assistance mission is well understood by man, multinational special operations the local population. As Hooiveld noted both NATO SOF and CF; therefore, teams from the Office of Strategic for the Dutch Liaison Mission, “Any such a liaison element would not be Services that parachuted into occupied non-Dutch member of the [Jedburgh] doctrinally unfamiliar. Resistance, as Europe to establish a link between party was a liability to the resistance defined by the Swedish Defence Univer- local resistance forces and the Allied movement unless his presence there had sity’s Resistance Operating Concept, is command.12 This concept provided the some absolute justification.”18 Second, blueprint for the modern SOF mission SOF liaison teams must educate conven- a nation’s organized, whole-of-society of enabling resistance forces in support tional force commanders on resistance effort, encompassing the full range of ac- of conventional and unconventional force capabilities and the requirements tivities from nonviolent to violent, led by a warfare missions.13 While used through- to attain the necessary integration. Team legally established government, potentially out Europe, several teams, with Dutch Clarence was able to achieve this objec- exiled, displaced, or shadow, to reestablish personnel, were allocated as the Dutch tive, but the success also had much to do independence and autonomy within its Liaison Mission to advise corps and with Major General James M. Gavin, 82nd sovereign territory that has been wholly or division commanders on the utilization Airborne Division commander, having partially occupied by a foreign power.9 of the Dutch resistance in combat oper- confidence in the team.19