Jedburghs get instructions from Briefing Officer in London, England, ca. 1944 (Office of Strategic Services/U.S. National Archives and Records Administration)
Force Integration in Resistance Operations Dutch Jedburghs and U.S. Alamo Scouts
By Kevin D. Stringer
oint special operations forces (SOF) integration with conven- tional forces (CF) is a difficult Colonel Kevin D. Stringer, USA, Ph.D., is assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command Europe. He is an J affiliated Faculty Member at the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania in Vilnius. undertaking in missions ranging from
90 Recall / Force Integration in Resistance Operations JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 humanitarian to combat, yet all future to catalyze the establishment of such contact to build trust and enduring military operations against peer adver- teams, and NATO’s Enhanced Forward personal relationships between SOF saries will require the close coopera- Presence (EFP) formations in Estonia, and CF formations. Finally, the actual tion of SOF and CF for success. This Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland could implementation of SOF-CF integration axiom is especially true for liberation provide the ideal pilot platforms for their has often led to ad hoc organizational operations entailing collaboration launch. After NSHQ pilots this concept, arrangements or mechanisms, both in with national resistance groups in the United States and selected Asian allies training and in wartime. This expedi- occupied territories, where the latter could consider a similar model for the ency promotes poor mission execution will be engaged by U.S. SOF forma- Indo-Pacific theater of operations. The and complicated command and control tions as part of their unconventional World War II historical examples of the relationships. warfare mandate. With the return of Dutch Jedburgh teams in Europe and the In general, the prospect of con- Great Power competition, the threat Alamo Scouts in the Pacific demonstrate ducting combat operations to liberate of Russian or Chinese territorial the value of such SOF liaison elements occupied territory presents a complex aggression and occupation becomes a between conventional forces and resis- landscape for the conventional joint national security anxiety for a number tance groups, while framing a possible force commander, who must integrate of states, which generates the require- modern approach. surviving national resistance groups into ment to consider SOF-CF integration a concept of operations that aims for a in liberation operations where friendly Integration Challenges common operational and strategic end- resistance groups are present. The SOF-CF integration has been an state. At the same time, the commander Baltics, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, enduring problem since the advent of needs to mitigate risks associated Taiwan, Burma, and Tibet are all modern-era special operations forces with these armed groups conducting examples that demonstrate this pros- in World War II. In canvassing the rel- independent actions that might be coun- pect of Russian or Chinese aggression evant literature on the topic, a number terproductive to operations or harmful and occupation. of practitioners and academics have to the civilian population. The latter Proper SOF-CF integration and identified the issues and obstacles asso- point ranges from resistance groups synchronization depends on effective co- ciated with achieving optimal SOF-CF taking punitive actions against actual or ordination and liaison for greatest effect.1 integration.2 The challenge is to extract perceived collaborators to committing Effective liaison between liberating con- the relevant historical examples of this war crimes against civilians and property. ventional forces and friendly resistance phenomenon while culling the rest. The solution is the preconflict establish- elements in an ambiguous battlespace With integration doctrinally defined ment of small, multinational SOF teams is necessary to avoid fratricide and to as “the arrangement of [conventional to liaise and coordinate with an allied na- unify all regular and unconventional and special operations] forces and their tional military and its planned resistance elements toward a common objective. actions to create a force that operates components to support CF actions. Multinational SOF elements are the by engaging as a whole,” this article In the NATO setting, this peacetime logical choice to provide this bridging identifies four obstacles for SOF-CF planning and coordination would pri- function given their inherent expertise collaboration.3 First, doctrine and marily occur with host-nation SOF and with irregular forces—militias, local secu- policy do not comprehensively define territorial forces, elements that have lead- rity forces, and resistance members—as how SOF-CF integration should ing roles in wartime resistance operations. well as their ability to blend into local occur.4 This deficit causes organiza- This situation goes beyond the generic populations. Unfortunately, an estab- tional friction when this collaboration Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, lished joint organizational unit of action is mandated by operations. Second, recommendation that “special operations does not currently exist for this mission. when concepts such as SOF-CF syn- commanders provide liaison to compo- This article proposes the establish- chronization are defined, they tend to nent commands to integrate, coordinate, ment of multinational Jedburgh-like SOF rigidly focus on combat missions and and deconflict SOF and conventional teams to link CF units to national resis- do not account for operational fluidity force operations” because resistance op- tance organizations during operations. In between unconventional, conventional, erations imply that “language differences, World War II, the Jedburghs were multi- or humanitarian scenarios.5 This latter cultural diversity, historical animosities, national, three-person teams designed to situation characterizes liberation opera- and uneven allied and partner capabilities conduct sabotage and guerrilla warfare tions on occupied territory. Third, will further complicate these activities.”7 in Axis-occupied territory as well as liaise there is a lack of mutual understanding These future multinational SOF liaison between resistance groups and the Allied between SOF and CF, creating a sense teams would train and exercise with war effort. In today’s North Atlantic of SOF “otherness vis-à-vis the conven- relevant national forces in peacetime to Treaty Organization (NATO) context, tional forces from which the personnel prepare for occupation situations in com- NATO Special Operations Headquarters were originally drawn.”6 This percep- bat or conflicts below the threshold of (NSHQ) would be the organization tion necessitates habitual and frequent armed conflict.
JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 Stringer 91 Military Assistance and Liaison resistance. Despite the mixed historical provides three specific lessons on using with Resistance Elements record on SOF-CF collaboration, the fol- SOF to coordinate the activities of In the NATO SOF context, this resis- lowing historical vignettes illustrate how partisan forces in support of future con- tance liaison assignment falls under the to successfully accomplish this mission ventional campaigns.17 umbrella of the military assistance task, with dedicated SOF liaison teams. Foremost, against a highly sophis- which is a broad category of activities ticated and repressive occupier such as that support and enable critical friendly The Dutch Jedburgh Nazi Germany, Russia, or China, team assets—in this case, resistance organiza- Liaison Mission members must have superb language ex- tions in occupied territory.8 The military As noted, the Jedburghs were three- pertise and cultural acumen to blend into assistance mission is well understood by man, multinational special operations the local population. As Hooiveld noted both NATO SOF and CF; therefore, teams from the Office of Strategic for the Dutch Liaison Mission, “Any such a liaison element would not be Services that parachuted into occupied non-Dutch member of the [Jedburgh] doctrinally unfamiliar. Resistance, as Europe to establish a link between party was a liability to the resistance defined by the Swedish Defence Univer- local resistance forces and the Allied movement unless his presence there had sity’s Resistance Operating Concept, is command.12 This concept provided the some absolute justification.”18 Second, blueprint for the modern SOF mission SOF liaison teams must educate conven- a nation’s organized, whole-of-society of enabling resistance forces in support tional force commanders on resistance effort, encompassing the full range of ac- of conventional and unconventional force capabilities and the requirements tivities from nonviolent to violent, led by a warfare missions.13 While used through- to attain the necessary integration. Team legally established government, potentially out Europe, several teams, with Dutch Clarence was able to achieve this objec- exiled, displaced, or shadow, to reestablish personnel, were allocated as the Dutch tive, but the success also had much to do independence and autonomy within its Liaison Mission to advise corps and with Major General James M. Gavin, 82nd sovereign territory that has been wholly or division commanders on the utilization Airborne Division commander, having partially occupied by a foreign power.9 of the Dutch resistance in combat oper- confidence in the team.19 Finally, the CF ations in the Netherlands.14 Holland’s commander must have an understand- The significance of this definition is geography complicated resistance opera- ing of SOF activities and missions as well twofold. First, resistance in the NATO tions given its lack of sanctuary—moun- as a willingness to trust the SOF liaison environment is not about insurgency, but tains, forests, wilderness—and the pres- element to operate in his or her interest rather the armed and unarmed efforts of ence of skilled German internal security with resistance forces. Unfortunately, in a legitimate NATO member government forces. For Operation Market Garden, Market Garden, the British airborne corps to restore its sovereignty in the face of Special Forces Headquarters attached leadership had neither, and its assigned adversarial aggression and occupation. Jedburgh teams to the British airborne team was ignored, resulting in no leverag- Second, this approach to resistance re- corps and each participating airborne ing of resistance assets and resources. quires peacetime planning, establishment, division. This decision resulted in the and organization of national resistance teams deploying jointly for the first time Alamo Scouts in the components as part of a comprehensive with conventional forces, which led to Philippines: Liaison with defense concept. Even with peacetime two teams playing significant liaison Guerrillas on Leyte and Luzon planning, resistance organizations be- roles in integrating resistance forces into Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, come messy and complex once faced ongoing conventional operations.15 commander of the U.S. Sixth Army, with an occupying enemy. According In his book Dutch Courage, re- established the Alamo Scouts as a special to U.S. Army doctrine, “The primary searcher Jelle Hooiveld examines how reconnaissance force in the Southwest components of the resistance model are Jedburgh teams Edward and Clarence Pacific during World War II.20 This the underground, the guerrilla or armed were extremely successful in making small 140-person unit contributed to force, the auxiliary support to the un- resistance services available to their Allied combat operations by providing tacti- derground and guerrilla or armed force, forces in their operating sectors, with cal intelligence and conducting special and the public component.”10 While all Team Edward organizing and manag- operations within enemy-held areas.21 In these resistance actors are important, ing a diverse group of rival resistance this latter role, the Alamo Scouts pro- there is no neat division between these groups to augment Allied units, while vided essential liaison with the disparate components, and a CF commander needs Team Clarence engaged with and armed Filipino resistance organizations on the to engage with all of them to harness assorted local groups to unify efforts islands of Leyte and Luzon to support their capabilities for common objectives.11 on orders from the U.S. 82nd Airborne the Sixth Army’s conventional force This situation increases the commander’s Division commander.16 Reviewing these combat operations in its efforts to liber- need for a connecting liaison element that Market Garden Jedburgh teams in the ate the Philippines. can advise him or her and facilitate com- context of modern-day SOF support On Leyte, the U.S. Sixth Army munication and collaboration with the to conventional liberation operations directed the Scouts to contact and
92 Recall / Force Integration in Resistance Operations JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 U.S. Soldiers assigned to 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, conduct door breach demolition qualification training in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group–Poland, in Bemowo Piskie, Poland, May 14, 2020 (U.S. Army/Timothy Hamlin) synchronize guerrilla elements to sup- even China. Both of these revisionist For implementation, NATO’s port campaign objectives. In a shift from powers employ a mixture of national Enhanced Forward Presence formations their original reconnaissance mission, the power instruments to achieve significant could serve as the pilot platforms to Alamo Scouts “consolidated five guerrilla strategic advantages over other nations, establish the multinational Jedburgh-like groups, established operational sectors for while avoiding the international thresh- teams, since these are conventional mul- them, and created intelligence reporting olds for armed conflict.26 In Europe, a tinational battlegroups already operating networks.”22 During the Luzon campaign, number of states are directly threatened in countries facing Russian aggression. the work of the Alamo Scouts broadened by Russian gray zone action, which Besides exercising the liaison and coordi- to include the organization and direction could include the occupation of ter- nation with national militaries and their of guerrilla activities, in which Scout teams ritory. The Donbass and Crimea in planned resistance initiatives in peace- engaged with guerrilla units and organized Ukraine, Transnistria in Moldova, and time, these small SOF teams would also their actions in support of the regular Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia contribute to greater SOF-CF interoper- forces.23 Alamo Scout liaison activities are examples of this threat. ability within the EFP construct. enabled guerrilla elements to support both To prepare for this scenario and In July 2016, in response to the the 43rd Division and XI Corps in expand- enhance an already existing NATO deter- Russian occupation of Crimea and the ing combat operations and to set the rent posture, NATO Special Operations Donbass, NATO decided to establish an conditions for future operations.24 Headquarters could work with its SOF EFP in the eastern part of the Alliance, The Alamo Scouts example provides member nations to create multinational with four multinational battlegroups in an excellent proof of concept for the Jedburgh-like SOF liaison teams that Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. advantages that accrue from having an can provide the critical link between These battlegroups, led by the frame- established, rather than ad hoc, special CF and national resistance elements in work nations of the United Kingdom, operations liaison team linking resistance times of crisis. NSHQ is ideally suited Canada, Germany, and the United States, elements—in this case, rather sizable for this brokerage role. Created in 2009, respectively, are multinational and com- guerrilla forces—to division-, corps-, and NSHQ provides strategic SOF advice to bat-ready, demonstrating the strength army-level conventional formations in the the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of the transatlantic bond. Their presence execution of a liberation campaign. As and the NATO chain of command. At makes clear that an attack on one Ally Stephen Ryan notes, “The Alamo Scouts the same time, NSHQ offers a collabora- will be considered an attack on the whole were able to harness the combat power tive, interdependent platform to enhance Alliance. The battlegroups form part of of the guerrilla forces. . . . When the con- and expand the Alliance SOF network, the biggest reinforcement of NATO’s ventional force landing began, the Scouts while developing the SOF capability and collective defense in a generation.28 These directly integrated guerrilla activities to interoperability of Allies and partners.27 battlegroups, together with local national support the ground force main effort.”25 This Jedburgh-like approach would be a defense forces, provide both strategic The Scouts were also well embedded in method for multinational special opera- deterrence and initial defense for their the U.S. Sixth Army’s structure and had tions and conventional forces to combine host countries.29 Adding a small multina- a habitual and trusting relationship with in a habitual way to further increase tional SOF Jedburgh-like element would the conventional commander. Such a NATO capacity to conduct SOF-CF enhance the EFP forces and extend their case could be easily projected onto any operations in an unconventional warfare capabilities into the unconventional war- scenario in which an allied country is environment. fare space. This idea finds support from confronted with partial occupation from Structurally, an ideal team would several European researchers who argue a peer adversary, and NATO or coalition consist of three to four personnel with that the “EFP deployments in the Baltic conventional forces need to integrate resis- obligatory host-nation participation to region could serve as an experiment for tance elements—guerrillas, underground, guarantee language and cultural exper- wider defence cooperation among clus- or auxiliaries—into the overall concept of tise. The remaining team members would ters of NATO countries.”30 The creation operations. A SOF unit of action, already be expected to possess requisite language of multinational resistance liaison mis- emplaced within a conventional construct and cultural knowledge. The team sions would be a step in this direction. and by virtue of its expertise and capabili- would have a joint composition since ties, would be the connecting mechanism maritime operations and airpower play While SOF-CF integration could to achieve greatest effect. significant roles in resistance and libera- be daunting in all types of operations, tion operations. For the air component, campaigning to liberate occupied terri- Creating a Multinational SOF infiltration and joint terminal attack tory adds the complication of managing Jedburgh Testbed controller knowledge is needed. Similarly, a resistance interface with disparate stay- The historical examples of Dutch Jed- maritime expertise in littoral activities and behind groups and guerrillas. With the burgh teams and Alamo Scouts offer infiltration techniques would be invalu- existence of both Russian and Chinese potential for adaptation in the current able. Team members could be a mix of aggression toward neighboring countries security environment with Russia and SOF operators and enablers. in their geographical space, prudent
94 Recall / Force Integration in Resistance Operations JFQ 102, 3rd Quarter 2021 preparation would recommend evaluat- Jr., SOF/Conventional Force Light Footprint In- chael E. Krivdo (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army terdependence in Asia and Beyond (Carlisle, PA: University Press, 2019), 111–130. ing and experimenting with the concept U.S. Army War College, 2013); Mike Findlay, 22 Ibid. of establishing small multinational SOF Robert Green, and Eric Braganca, “SOF on the 23 Eustace E. Nabbie, “The Alamo Scouts,” liaison teams to manage the resistance Contemporary Battlefield,”Military Review CIA Historical Review Program, September interface for conventional forces. The two 83, no. 3 (2003), 8–14; Mark Jones and Wes 22, 1993, available at
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